Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2d 257
This appeal presents the question whether an extension of Social Security Act
coverage to self-employed physicians "with respect to taxable years ending on
or after December 31, 1965" operates to effect coverage of a self-employed
physician who died during 1965. The district court held that it did not. We
reverse and remand for entry of judgment for the plaintiff.
In order to be eligible for Social Security benefits, one must have received
"covered" income during a certain number of quarter-yearly periods. 42 U.S.
C.A. 414(a). Dr. Anderson, plaintiff's deceased husband, needed 14 quarters
of coverage at the time of his death to entitle his survivors to benefits. He had
accumulated 13 of these at private and military employment in 1947-50.
Before 1965, the practice of medicine was expressly excluded from the
definition of "trade or business" in connection with self-employment income. In
1965, the Act was amended to eliminate this exclusion "with respect to taxable
years ending on or after December 31, 1965."1 Dr. Anderson was employed as
a private physican during 1965, and earned in excess of $28,000. Pursuant to
the amended Act, he paid self-employment tax on his earnings for the first
three quarters of the year.2 On November 9, 1965, Dr. Anderson died, and his
wife applied for survivor's benefits for herself and their minor children,
claiming that her husband's 1965 earnings had been covered. The hearing
examiner denied the application, holding that Dr. Anderson had not been
covered during 1965, since his taxable year ended on the day of his death rather
than on or after December 31 as required by the amendment. The Secretary
refused to review the case, the district court affirmed the Secretary's decision,
and Dr. Anderson's widow appealed.
4
The statutes do not need to be read so narrowly and we believe that the intent of
Congress was that they should not.
The deceased, when he was alive, was reporting his income on a calendar basis.
For 1965, until the date of his death, his taxable year was the calendar year
ending on December 31, 1965. True, because he died on November 9, his
estate was required to file a return for less than the full calendar year ( 443(a)
(2)), and for this purpose the period January 1, 1965, to November 9, 1965, is
also defined as his taxable year ( 441(b) (3)). But although the definitions of
"taxable year" are in the disjunctive, nothing contained therein prevents
"taxable year" from having more than one meaning.4 At the beginning of 1965
the deceased's taxable year was the calendar year, anticipated to end December
31, 1965 ( 441 (b) (1)), and 441 is sufficiently ambiguous to allow that to
continue to be the case after his death for purposes of the Social Security
provision. Sections 441(b) (1) and (3) seem to provide a choice of definitions,
one effecting coverage and the other excluding coverage. The intention of
Congress becomes crucial in these circumstances.5
7
Even aside from the legislative history of the amendment, the interpretation of
441 as effecting coverage is more consistent with a fair and symmetrical
administration of the Social Security system. If the Secretary's interpretation
were adopted, Dr. Anderson and others in his position would have been
required to pay up to three quarters of social security tax beyond the statutory
test for coverage contained in 42 U.S.C.A. 414(a) before becoming entitled to
full benefits. Moreover, during 1965 they would have been in the anomalous
position of being "fully insured individuals" within the meaning of the Act for
some purposes but not others: for disability payments, for example, but not
survivor's benefits. Indeed, logically it would seem that even disability benefits
accruing to a person in Dr. Anderson's position during 1965 would have to be
withheld until January, against the possibility that he might die before the
calendar year ended. It is impossible to believe that Congress intended these
unfairnesses and anomalies without saying so explicitly.
9
Notes:
*
P.L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 381, amending 211(c) (5) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 411
(c) (5)
The Secretary, in denying benefits to the widow and minor children on the
ground that the Act was not applicable to the deceased, advised the widow to
seek a refund of the tax from the taxing authorities. Rev.Rul. 68.458, C.B.
1968-2, p. 388 supports this advice. The revenue ruling, however, rests upon 26
U.S.C.A. 7701(a) (23), which is not pertinent to the present problem. See n.
4,infra.
10
11
I would readily join the majority if I thought the statutes were reasonably
susceptible to the interpretation given them, but I do not think they are.
12
13
The question in this case is a simple one whether Dr. Anderson's last taxable
year ended on December 31, 1965, as it would have had he lived, or on
November 9, 1965, the date of his death.
14
15
The term "taxable year" is defined in the Social Security Act by reference to the
definitions in the Internal Revenue Code. A taxpayer's taxable year for
purposes of imposition of taxes on income, is also his taxable year for social
security purposes.3 The statutory definition predates the 1965 amendment and
is applicable to it.
16
"Taxable year" is a highly technical term of art. It has neither meaning nor
existence outside of the Internal Revenue and Social Security Acts. When
Congress defines such a term in the statute to which it applies, and in
subsequent amendments to that statute uses the term again without any
qualification, it cannot be supposed that it means something different in the
amendment than in the original. Thus, under the express and unqualified
command of 42 U.S.C.A. 411(e), if Dr. Anderson's taxable year for the
purpose of assessing tax on his income in 1965 was some period other than the
calendar year ending on December 31, it was the same period for the purpose
of determining whether his income in that year was derived from a "trade or
business."4
17
Taxes] of Title 26. If the two sections were different in any material respect, a
question would arise as to which would have controlling effect, but I can
discern no difference between the two, apart from inconsequential differences
in phraseology, and see no need to consider 7701(a) (23) separately.7
18
Because Dr. Anderson died before the end of 1965, a return was required to be
filed for the short period beginning at the first of the year and ending on the
date of his death.8 It is apparently conceded that this short period was his
taxable year for the purpose of determining his tax liability.9 However, it is
suggested that 441(b) does not limit the taxable year of one individual in one
year to a single meaning, and that Dr. Anderson's taxable year might have been
both the short period and the calendar year 1965. The statute seems to me much
more precise and inflexible.
19
20
Finally, it is suggested that to hold that Dr. Anderson's taxable year ended with
his death would produce an unfair result, and that such a purpose should not be
attributed to Congress. We would all agree, of course, that our private notions
of fairness cannot prevail in the face of a contrary congressional command,
especially in an area in which Congress has striven for so many years for
technical precision. It has attained it here, for it is more than mere inference
from the statutory language which supports the conclusion that for social
security purposes a person's taxable year must end on the date of his death. In
the Social Security Act Congress has expressly referred to this situation and has
provided rules for determining self-employment income from a partnership of a
deceased partner "for his taxable year which ends as a result of his death * * *"
42 U.S.C.A. 411(f). A similar provision is contained in the Self-Employment
Tax Act. 26 U.S.C.A. 1402(f). This explicit congressional recognition of the
termination of a taxable year, for social security purposes, by the taxpayer's
death, should remove any doubt that the natural reading of the amendment is
also the correct and intended one.
21
22
23
I think Congress has answered the question for us and that we must apply the
congressional answer. In the amendments to the Social Security Act, the
Congress demonstrated its knowledge of the effect of technical language
referable to taxable years. In 1965 it knew the form of words to employ to reach
the results the court would reach. It knew how to avoid it, too. Its choice here
compellingly appears deliberate.
24
I would affirm.
25
Notes:
1
Code, almost without exception, is the method of defining such terms in the
Social Security Act
2
P.L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 381, amending 211 (c) (5) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
411(c) (5)
"Taxable year. The term `taxable year' shall have the same meaning as when
used in chapter 1 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of 1939; and the taxable
year of any individual shall be a calendar year unless he has a different taxable
year for the purposes of chapter 1 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of 1939 in
which case his taxable year for the purposes of this subchapter shall be the
same as his taxable year under chapter 1 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of
1939." 42 U.S.C.A. 411(e).
The references to chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 are to be read
as referring to Subtitle A [Income Taxes] of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
which replaced chapter 1 of the 1939 Code. 26 U.S.C.A. 7852(b).
It can hardly be disputed that the definition of a taxable year is applicable when
the beginning or ending date of a taxable year is used to determine the effective
date of an amendment. Express recognition is given to this application by 26
U.S.C.A. 441(f) (2), which provides that in any case where the effective date
of a Code provision is fixed in terms of a taxable year beginning or ending on,
or including, a particular date, a special accounting period of 52-53 weeks will
be deemed to have begun and ended on the dates on which the nearest
corresponding fiscal or calendar year began and ended. The effect of this
section is to alter the interpretation of "taxable year" for such accounting
periods. Thus, a 52-53 week accounting period which ended on Saturday,
December 25, 1965 would not be a "taxable year ending on or after December
31, 1965" but for 441(f) (2), under which it is treated, for the purpose of
determining the amendment's effective date, as ending on December 31 rather
than December 25
"(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or
manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof
*****
(23) Taxable year. The term `taxable year' means the calendar year, or the
fiscal year ending during such calendar year, upon the basis of which the
taxable income is computed under Subtitle A. `Taxable year' means, in the case
of a return made for a fractional part of a year under the provisions of Subtitle
A or under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, the period
"(b)Taxable year. For purposes of this subtitle, the term `taxable year' means
The fact that both 441(b) and 7701 (a) (23) are expressly applicable to the
same substantive provisions is a strong indication of identity of meaning. It
should be noted also that 7701(a) (23) is the direct descendant of 48 of
chapter 1, 1939 Code. It was carried over without change except for the
substitution of "Subtitle A" for "this chapter" and substitution of "Secretary or
his delegate" for "Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary." These two
alterations reflect the renumbering of Code sections and the reorganization of
the Internal Revenue Service respectively. That the present 7701(a) (23) is
not physically contained within Subtitle A is not relevant to its applicability
"(a)Returns for short period. A return for a period of less than 12 months
(referred to in this section as `short period') shall be made under any of the
following circumstances:
*****
(2) Taxpayer not in existence for entire taxable year. When the taxpayer is
in existence during only part of what would otherwise be his taxable year." 26
U.S.C.A. 443.
Apparently Dr. Anderson's return included a computation of tax on his selfemployment income for 1965, under chapter 2 of subtitle A, 1954 Code. The
Secretary's decision advised Mrs. Anderson to apply for a refund of any such
tax paid, relying on a revenue ruling previously made in connection with an
identical occurrence. Rev.Rul. 68-458. It is argued that the ruling is not
pertinent to this case, because the ruling concerned a deceased physician's
liability for tax rather than his eligibility for benefits, but the two things are
measured by the same standard. The implication that Dr. Anderson could be
eligible to receive social security benefits without being liable for any social
security tax is hardly compatible with sound administration of the Act. The
provisions for benefits for self-employed persons and those for selfemployment taxation to provide a fund out of which those benefits can be paid
are obviously complementary. If the revenue ruling correctly reflects the law
on tax liability, as I believe it does, it must be highly persuasive, if not
controlling, as to eligibility for benefits. That it relies on 7701(a) (23) rather
than on 441(b) for the definition of "taxable year" in the context of subtitle A
is quite irrelevant, for reasons already stated. See note 7,supra.
10