Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
GLORIA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
CINGULAR WIRELESS; ARTHUR
FINCH; SHIRLEY BYRD; MARTINEZ
JOHNSON,
Defendants.
No. 09-1025
No. 09-1568
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Senior Judge Alarcn joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Iole Ariadne Staples, METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, New York, New York, for
Appellant. Andrew O. Whiteman, HARTZELL & WHITEMAN, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Stephen A. Dunn, EMANUEL & DUNN, PLLC,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
OPINION
KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
In this consolidated appeal, we consider whether the district
court erred in holding that an administrator of an employee
welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 10011461, abused its discretion when the administrator terminated
the plaintiffs long-term disability benefits. We also consider
whether the district court abused its discretion by awarding
attorneys fees to the plaintiff. For the reasons stated below,
we affirm.
I.
Plaintiff-Appellee Gloria Williams was employed by
Cingular Wireless as a customer services clerk from Septem-
The medical treatise Grays Anatomy defines "trigger finger" as a condition that
affects the fibrous flexor sheaths of the fingers or thumb within
the palm. The affected sheath thickens and entraps the contained
tendons, which become constricted at the site of entrapment . . . .
The finger now snaps as the tendon nodule passes through the
constriction on flexing the finger. The corresponding extensor
muscle is insufficiently powerful to extend the affected finger.
The patient does this passively, accompanied by a painful snap.
Treatment frequently requires surgical division of the A1 pulley
of the flexor sheath to relieve the stricture.
Grays Anatomy: The Anatomical Basis of Clinical Practice 879 (Susan
Standring ed., 40th ed. 2008).
Smith, one of Williams treating physicians, reflecting Williams April 1, 2005 visit with Dr. Smith. Dr. Smiths report
related Williams statements that she was having "good and
bad days," and that her pain averaged a three on a ten-point
scale. Dr. Smiths report did not specifically address Williams hand and wrist pain, nor did the report conclude that
Williams was able to return to work.
After MetLifes termination of her long-term disability
benefits in August 2005, Williams exercised her appeal rights
under the plan in September 2005 and submitted additional
medical evaluations in support of her appeal. MetLife referred
Williams file to Dr. John D. Thomas II, an independent Certified Disability Evaluator and board-certified physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist, and to Dr. Lee Becker, an
independent physician consultant and certified psychiatry specialist.
Dr. Thomas reviewed the information in Williams file at
the time of the initial denial of benefits, as well as updated
information submitted after that denial. Dr. Thomas analysis
focused on Williams medical issues with her neck and back.
With regard to Williams medical issues with her hands and
wrists, Dr. Thomas concluded that:
Certainly . . . there is ample medical record support
for inability to use the hands, over time, during the
90s and again in the early 2000s, these issues appear
to retreat with a 05/28/03 C-spine MRI. . . . It is not
clear to me how these findings correlate with Ms.
Williams complaints on exam. It does not appear
that any of her providers really lined the clinical picture up well.
Dr. Thomas issued a report on September 22, 2005, agreeing
with MetLifes determination that the medical information in
Williams file did not show that Williams was unable to work
after August 9, 2005. Similarly, Dr. Becker concluded on
Dr. Smith concluded previously in March 2005 that Williams was not
able to return to her work as a customer services representative, due in part
to Williams medical issues with her hands. This information was included
with MetLifes previous reviews of Williams medical file.
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tors decision was given less deference than if the administrator had no conflict of this nature. In applying that prior
standard, we noted that such a conflict would modify the
abuse-of-discretion standard according to a "sliding scale,"
requiring greater objective reasonableness and more substantial evidence in support of a decision depending on the degree
of the administrators financial incentive to benefit itself by
reaching a certain outcome. See id.; see also, e.g., Guthrie,
509 F.3d at 649-52 (applying "sliding scale" modified abuseof-discretion analysis); Blackshear v. Reliance Standard Life
Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); Stup v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 390 F.3d 301, 307-11 (4th Cir.
2004) (same).
This line of cases, however, predated Glenn, in which the
Supreme Court established the framework of review for
ERISA cases in which a plan administrator has a structural
conflict of interest. Addressing the different standards of
review employed by some of the circuit courts, the Supreme
Court clarified that the presence of a plan administrators conflict of interest did not alter the abuse-of-discretion standard
of review. Instead, the Court explained, the presence of such
a conflict is "but one factor among many that a reviewing
judge must take into account." 554 U.S. at ___; 128 S. Ct. at
2351. In particular, the Supreme Court counseled that the conflict of interest should not itself lead to "special burden-ofproof rules, or other special procedural or evidentiary rules."
Id.
Although the district court in the present case was aware of
the Supreme Courts holding in Glenn, the district court did
not have the benefit of our opinion in Champion, decided two
weeks after the district court entered its order. In Champion,
we first substantively addressed the impact of Glenn on our
prior "modified abuse-of-discretion" standard. We observed
that the decision in Glenn required a change in our prior standard for reviewing discretionary decisions made by ERISA
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We also note that neither party asks us to remand this case to the district court for application of the correct legal standard.
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olina Care Plan, Inc. v. McKenzie, 467 F.3d 383, 390 (4th
Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Champion, 550
F.3d 353; Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 1993).
We observe that the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Hardt after we heard oral argument on the present appeal. We
conclude that the holding in Hardt requires us to change our
analytical approach to the review of an attorneys fees award
in an ERISA case.
Before the decision in Hardt, the rule in this Circuit was
that only a "prevailing party" was eligible for an award of
attorneys fees in an action under ERISA. See Martin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th
Cir. 1997). In Hardt, the Supreme Court expressly rejected
our "prevailing party" requirement. ___ U.S. at ___, slip. op.
at 9. The Supreme Court held that a party is eligible for an
attorneys fees award in an ERISA case if the party has
achieved "some degree of success on the merits." ___ U.S. at
___, slip. op. at 1, 12. Thus, under the Supreme Courts decision in Hardt, the category of litigants eligible for an attorneys fees award in an ERISA action is broader than under
our prior standard.
The first step of our analysis, therefore, requires us to consider whether Williams achieved "some degree of success on
the merits" in the district court, thereby making her eligible
for an award of attorneys fees. We have no difficulty in concluding that Williams did show "some degree of success on
the merits." In fact, the degree of her success was very high,
as shown by the district courts grant of Williams motion for
summary judgment and the district courts holding that Williams was entitled to long-term disability benefits. Therefore,
we conclude that Williams was eligible for an award of attorneys fees under the Hardt standard.
B.
Because Williams was eligible for an award of attorneys
fees under the decision in Hardt, we proceed to the second
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step of our analysis, in which we determine whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in holding that
Williams should be awarded attorneys fees. We note at the
outset that even a successful party such as Williams does not
enjoy a presumption in favor of an attorneys fees award. See
Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1029
(4th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
We identified five factors in Quesinberry that a district
court should consider in informing its exercise of discretion
when ruling on a motion for attorneys fees in an ERISA case.
Id. at 1029. As we stated in Quesinberry, these factors
include:
(1) degree of opposing parties culpability or bad
faith;
(2) ability of opposing parties to satisfy an award of
attorneys fees;
(3) whether an award of attorneys fees against the
opposing parties would deter other persons acting
under similar circumstances;
(4) whether the parties requesting attorneys fees
sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of
an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and
(5) the relative merits of the parties positions.
987 F.2d at 1029. We cautioned that this five-factor approach
is not a "rigid test," but instead provides "general guidelines."
Id.
We observe that the Supreme Courts decision in Hardt
does not preclude our continued use of the five-factor
approach that we established in Quesinberry. The Supreme
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MetLife does not argue on appeal that the district court erred in calculating the amount of attorneys fees awarded to Williams.
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C.
We reach the same conclusion regarding the district courts
decision to award costs to Williams.7 Under Rule 54(d)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, costs "should be
allowed to the prevailing party" unless a federal statute provides otherwise. Thus, we have stated that Rule 54 gives rise
to a presumption in favor of an award of costs to the prevailing party. Teague v. Baker, 35 F.3d 978, 996 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, Williams was the "prevailing party." Further, ERISA
expressly permits a district court to award costs in the courts
discretion, but the statute does not alter the general rule in
favor of awarding costs to prevailing parties such as Williams.
See 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1). Thus, Williams is entitled to a
presumption in favor of costs.
With this presumption in mind, we review a district courts
award of costs for abuse of discretion. Oak Hall Cap & Gown
Co. v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 899 F.2d 291, 296
(4th Cir. 1990). In light of our conclusion regarding the district courts award of reasonable attorneys fees to Williams,
we easily conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to Williams.
IV.
Although the district court applied a legal standard that this
Court later abrogated in Champion, we agree with the district
courts ultimate conclusion that MetLife abused its discretion
by terminating Williams long-term disability benefits. We
also uphold the district courts order awarding Williams attorneys fees and costs. The judgment of the district court is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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