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extinction of the civil action, whether or not the civil action was
hand, Ludolfo argues that where there was no separate civil acti
Elizalde receive P2Million pesos from him on condition that he will subcontract the
project to Ludolfo, which Elizalde never did. Because of this, Elizalde filed libel
cases against Ludolf, which were eventually filed with the RTC. However, Elizalde
did not institute a separate civil action, nor reserved the right to file a separate civil
action against Ludolfo arising from the alleged libellous remarks against him. In his
defense, Ludoldo alleged that exposing the anomalous transactions was a public duty
for him; he further alleged that Elizalde is a public figure due to his participation in
government projects and prominence in business circles; that the imputations were
matters of public interest, thus privileged. In the absence of actual malice, and
applying the rules on privileged communication, the prosecution thus far failed to
show there was malice in his declarations. The RTC, however, convicted him, and
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinctio
ordered him to pay P5M in damages for each count; and for legal expenses as well as
cost of litigation. Ludolfo appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC ruling and
acquitted him on the criminal case, declaring that the interviews were impressed with
public interest thus covered by the rule on privileged communication. As a public
Muoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies only
if the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to file it
separately was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muoz acquittal of the
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judg
crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because Muoz utterance
if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise d
(Emphasis ours)
We reject Muoz claim. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC
applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged,
of the civil action that was instituted with the criminal action, th
regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action.
Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the offended
party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its
civil liability may arise did not exist. The Rules precisely requi
title When separate civil action is suspended. Despite this wording, the last
paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. This is based
that the offended party may avail of the proper remedies to enfo
on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that [e]very person criminally liable for
liability ex delicto.
a felony is also civilly liable. Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one
criminal and one civil.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA, the Court ruled that an appeal is the
judgment:
liability ex delicto may be enforced: (1) through a civil action that is deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal action; (2) through a civil action that is filed
separately, either before the criminal action or after, upon reservation of the right to
file it separately in the criminal action. The offended party may also choose to waive
the civil action. This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not affect
its nature, as may be apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2,
Rule 120 of the ROC, which states:
Section 2. Contents of the judgment. x x x
party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from
civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he
proved that the imputation is true and published with good inten
did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action
motive.
Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed
extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from
the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if
there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three
instances when, notwithstanding the accuseds acquittal, the offended party may still
claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. We thus now proceed
to determine if Cos claim falls under any of these three situations.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comm
crime. The law presumes that every imputation is malicious; this is referred to as
malice in law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that
the imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused
matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muoz
statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the
#4 DALURAYA VS OLIVAR
prosecution has the burden of proving that Muoz acted with malice in fact. The CA
found that the prosecution failed in this respect.
Co assails the CAs ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of
the CAs factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the present
petition, review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with
respect to factual matters, and without violating Muoz right against double jeopardy
given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on a question of fact.
In light of the privileged nature of Muoz statements and the failure of the
prosecution to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muoz.
Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be
pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise
that exists.
while onboard a patrol car, saw two unidentified men rush out o
St., Pasay City. Sensing something amiss, the police officers app
and peeked inside the partially opened door, where they saw Ge
improvised tooter and a pink lighter, and beside him, his live-in
Because of this, they entered the house, and arrested George and
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355 dated January 31, 2007 is
AFFIRMED.
#2 RAFAEL COSCOLLUELAS VS SB
#3 PEOPLE V DESMOND
The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, i
through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid
a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgen
warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for
instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry f
objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for
from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked th
shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even
assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace
open door, how was the door open?Was it totally open, or was it
A It was partially open Your Honor.
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act
Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified
men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a
crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the
jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and
Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the hou
only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
A We pushed the door, Your Honor.
mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the searc
that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized a
having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the
Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before you
can search the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregul
Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before
Accused acquitted.
Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to
investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was
something wrong inside the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.
lawful marriage with one Karla. James Walter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offe
alleging that there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in ca
marriage filed by Karla before the RTC of Antipolo, which if declared void would
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead acco
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy. Thus, the arraignment and pre-trial of
James Walter was reset. In the meantime, the RTC of Antipolo declared the second
marriage between James and Shirley void. Because of this, James Walter filed a
Motion to Dismiss the bigamy case, on the ground that the second marriage had been
declared void. The RTC granted the motion, ruling that the declaration by the RTC of
Antipolo of the voidness of the second marriage between James and Shirley meant
that there was no more bigamy to speak of. On petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, the latter reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and remanded the case to
the RTC for further proceedings. Thus, James elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The main issue for consideration being that if a second marriage is declared void, will
the bigamy case be dismissed?
The Supreme Court:
We rule in the negative.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime o
present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
him.
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even
if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and
In Crime
ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It
further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
232238, the RTC of Manila granted the petition and directed the Registrar of Deeds
of Manila to issue a new TCT. Chula filed an Omnibus motion to recall the order
granting the petition, alleging that she has possession of TCT No. 232238; because of
this the RTC recalled the order. Chua Lee also filed a case for perjury against Paul
Lee because of the alleged perjurious statements made in the Petition as well as his
testimony in court regarding the loss of TCT 232238, which she alleged Paul Lee did
to mortgage the property to Planters Bank, even though there is an intra-corporate
controversy between him and his siblings, including Chua. The Office of the City
Prosecutor then filed an Information for perjury against Paul Lee before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After Atty. Augusto Macam, private prosecutor
under the control of the public prosecutor, presented the first witness, Atty. Roland
Viesca Jr of the Registry of Deeds, Manila, the accused thru counsel, moved in open
lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has
court that Atty. Macam be excluded from participating in the case since perjury is a
public offence, to which Atty. Macam vehemently objected. After allowing the
parties to file their respective written memoranda in support of their positions, the
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arisin
MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion filed by the accused, where he principally raised
his objection on the appearance of the private prosecutor on the ground that perjury is
a crime against public interest; since there being no allegation of damage to private
interest, hence on private prosecutor is needed. According to the MeTC, citing that
the rules do not distinguish between public and private crimes when it comes to
participation of private prosecutors; since the private offended party did not waive her
civil action or reserved her right to institute a separate civil action, then the private
prosecutor may participate, under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appe
prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
His motion for reconsideration denied, Paul Lee elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which also denied it, citing such right to intervene exists even when no civil
liability attaches to a crime. Hence, Paul Lee went right up to the Supreme Court to
Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the
commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly
tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim T
liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the
cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crim
offended party.
City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private respondents testimony
was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private
and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, righ
prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the
case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private
prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the
latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the
criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private
prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of
the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not
provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of
the offense.
imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil actio
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liab
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to instit
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in h
institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the
offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial
establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioners
alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were
proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were
supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without
basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken
of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled
to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does
not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the
offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be
allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the
offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through
the private prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
#8
EN BANC, G.R. No. 135053, March 06, 2002, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
(1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the volunta
Benjamin was charged with Rape by her own daughter, AAA, allegedly committed
on the third week of april, 1997. During his arriagnment, where the charges for 10
Renato Mercado, he pleaded not guilty to the charges. However, during the hearing
on May 14, 1998, Benjamin, this time assisted by Atty. Ruby Rosa Espino, changed
his plea from not guilty to guilty, and an inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of his plea was conducted by the trial court. Even so, the trial court
(3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evide
allow him to do so if he desires.
proceeded to hear evidence from the offended party. Benjamin did not file evidence
in his behalf, thus the trial court convicted him of Rape, thus automatic appeal was
resorted to the court. In his brief, Benjamin assails the failure of the trial court in
assuring the safeguards set forth under Rule 116 of the Rules off Court, particularly
on his plea of guilt.
The Supreme Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case
involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought
for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea.
In People v. Aranzado, the Court, citing Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, set
the following guidelines for receiving a plea of guilt in a case involving a capital
offense:
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and conse
guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
COURT: Why dont you arraign him? Alright, the previous ple
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the acused [of] the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty
under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently
indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice
admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him
to supply missing details of significance.
Appellants re-arraignment on May 14, 1999 miserably fell short of these guidelines,
quote hereunder:
PROS. CASTILLO: By way of dialogue with the defense counsel the accused is
willing to enter a plea of guilty for the ten (10) counts of rape, your Honor.
It is clear from the foregoing that the trial judge did not conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness of appellants plea of guilt and full comprehension thereof. He
read to the accused or even translated into the dialect they speak
compliance with Alicando was more like a monologue, or a warning at best, rather
than a searching inquiry. He did not inquire into appellants personality profile
age, socio-economic status or educational background. His Honor did not even
require an answer to his question on whether appellant realized that the death penalty
would result from the latters plea. No response from appellant was given or
recorded.
accused who had been charged with the rape and murder of a nin
consequences of the latters plea probable conviction and death sentence. Equally
because his counsel had declined to present evidence for his clie
important, the trial judge should have asked why the plea of appellant was
changed. The former obtained none of the information required in Aranzado. Hence,
there is no basis to conclude that the latter voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty
In Bello, the Court remarked that there were cases when the accused would plead
In the instant case, the Court also notes that guilty was not the
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or because of promises from the authorities or
defense. This should have again prompted the trial judge to pro
following the guidelines in Aranzado.
accused that, in a case involving a capital offense, such plea may result in the
imposition of the death penalty. The same is true when the requirements in Aranzado
the memo itself was dated January 2. Noel then instructed her to
are not satisfied. Recently, in People v. Bernas, the Court set aside a death sentence
and remanded the case to the trial court, because the Aranzado guidelines on how to
Case remanded to the trial court for re-arraignment and further proceedings.
EN BANC, G.R. No. 135053, March 06, 2002, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
made on December 29, 1996 after the cut-off time. Another cash
Virgilio for that period revealed that Olivia should have a cash b
her actual cash count revealed she only had $11,778.86 (Olivia u
Olivia was a teller at the Prudential Bank branch of Angeles City, the only one
conducted by Virgilio inventoried the cash accountabilities of the branch. Olivia was
short by $10,000.00; she only had US5,040.52, when she should have $15,040.52.
withdrawal slip.
When asked to explain, she averred that a withdrawal was made on December 29,
1006 after the cut-off time, evidenced by a withdrawal memo which she showed to
account belonged to Adoracion Tayag and her co-signatory, Apolinario Tayag. This
withdrawal memo when shown to the branch cashier, Noel, did not contain the
allegedly approached her. She then gave the cash to the man
required signature of two officers, hence Noel asked the nature of this withdrawal.
was that the handwritten letter she executed should not have bee
executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath
admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that
guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily inclu
Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she
wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial
investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better
appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial
The distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained and under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the clear intent
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allow
Court of Makati City. He was convicted of the crime of Homicide, hence he appealed
his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and minimum flight
risk. The Court of Appeals denied his petiton, hence he filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court. In his brief, petitioner assails the denial of his application
for bail, citing that none of the conditions in Section 5 (3) of Rule 114 are present in
his case,; his theory is that conviction for a crime with an imposable penalty of more
than 6 years, when not one of the conditions imposed in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 are present, entitles him to bail as a matter of right.
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
remedial law:
the appeal.
xxx
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
(emphasis supplied)
xxx
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission
xxx
xxx
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the cir
of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then
bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the det
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. (emphasis
supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if
none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for
bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts
denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by
and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny
or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to
sound discretion approach.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conv
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For
petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to
limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of the
five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any
such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted
where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punish
pending appeal.
perpetua.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body
This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the
identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal
the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-
and only for strong reasons. In fact, it has even been pointed out
which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. Under
the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial
negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such
that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for
prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending
appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail
pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of
any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a
rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant
and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the convicti
circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending
appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original
constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. While this is of course not
to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal
is no different from that in other democratic societies.
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x
(emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial
courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting
the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our
criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays
often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the
post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be
more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,
permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
his part.
- versus -
strong reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
Issue:
Whether or not bail should automatically be granted absent any
Respondents.
xxx
xxx
e.
xxx
(a)
f.
(e)
bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or
other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the
that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An
application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating2[26]
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said