Greece 1940

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Blunder in the Mountains

The Italian Invasion of Greece 1940
Introduction
The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 was one of Mussolinis major
wartime disasters. A totally inadequate Italian army blundered into the
mountains of north-west Greece, where it was defeated, thrown back into
Albania, only to be rescued by the German invasion of Greece the following
year. The common perception of this campaign is of a massive Italian army
being held o by valiant, outnumbered Greek forces. Valiant they certainly
were, however, as I will demonstrate the opposing forces were actually fairly
evenly balanced.
The campaign oers an interesting alternative to the usual WW2 armoured
encounters. The rugged terrain and limited forces can be reproduced
eectively on the tabletop and even the strategic campaign can be enlivened
with a few historical what-ifs.
The Road to War
War with Greece in 1940 was far from inevitable. Whilst King George and
sections of the Greek political elite had anglophile tendencies, Greece was led
by General Metaxas, a dictator who had far more in common with the Axis
leaders than the western democracies. It was the policy of Mussolini and his
pro-Albanian clique including Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, Jacomoni,
governor-general of Albania and the commanding general, Visconti Prasca
which drove Italy to war with Greece.
Hitlers strategic plans required that the Balkans remain quiet. In the summer
of 1940 German troops had secured the Rumanian oilelds, Bulgaria was
pro-German and the Yugoslavian Prince Regent supported the axis. Even
Turkish neutrality was being undermined. Yet it had been agreed that the

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Balkans would be in Mussolinis sphere of interest and the Italian dictator was
jealous of Hitlers success. The complex diplomatic moves and political
machinations of the Italian leadership are beyond the scope of this article.
However, in the nal analysis it was Mussolini who sanctioned the invasion,
without advising his ally Hitler until after the invasion had begun.
The War Plans
The original Italian plan (known as Contingency G) was a limited territorial
expansion into the Epirus region for which the nine Italian divisions in Albania
were deemed suicient. However, this was expanded in a second phase to the
total occupation of Greece at a meeting only two weeks before the invasion at
which the naval and air force chiefs were not even present. The Chief of the
General Sta, Marshall Badoglio, who had previously indicated muted
objections to the war, argued that 20 divisions would be required. Visconti
Prasca asked for only three extra mountain divisions and some support units.
Even these were to be fed in when the initial objectives had been achieved. His
motives for refusing reinforcements can only be a matter for speculation.
However, the fact that a more senior general might command a larger army,
probably inuenced his thinking.
For such a modest army to be successful required several favourable factors
including; strategic and tactical surprise; a supporting invasion by Bulgarian
forces; diversionary attacks on the poorly defended mainland; massive air
support; and treachery in the Greek armed forces.
Unfortunately for the Italians the Greeks knew the approximate date of the
invasion and King Boris of Bulgaria declined Mussolinis invitation to
participate. This meant the Greek army was well established in the invasion
area with the possibility of shifting reinforcements when Bulgarian neutrality
became clear. No diversionary attacks were planned (even the island attacks
were called o at the last moment) and a winter oensive coupled with
negligible air planning minimised the value of Italian air superiority. Despite
optimistic views expressed by commanders in Albania and substantial
investment in bribes, there was no evidence that Greek forces would collapse
due to internal dissent.
The Greek operational plan was very simple. It consisted of two lines using
the natural defensive features of the rivers and mountain ranges. In Epirus the
army was to follow the principle of elastic defence avoiding major losses. In
Macedonia the rst line was to be used as a platform for an oensive onto the
Koritsa plateau.
Order of Battle
There are conicting sources on the precise OOB for this campaign and both

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sides had sound if dierent reasons to exaggerate the size of Italian forces.
The Greeks to talk up the extent of their victory and Prasca to cover up his
recklessness.
Italian Army (CinC Visconti Prasca)
Julia Alpini Division (Pindus Front) 10800 men & 20 guns
Littoral Group (coast) (Two cavalry regs. and one reg. of Grenadiers) 4823
men & 32 guns
Arezzo Infantry Division (Yugoslav Front) 12000 men & 32 guns
Venezia Infantry Division (Marching from Yugoslav front to XXVI Corps) 10000
men & 40 guns
Tsamouria Corps (General Carlo Rossi) (Epirus Front)
Ferrara Infantry Division 12785 men & 60 guns +3500 Albanians
Siena Infantry Division 9200 men & 50 guns
Centauro Armoured Division 4037 men & 24 guns + 163 light tanks (90
serviceable)
XXVI Corps (General Gabriele Nasci) (Macedonian Front)
Parma Infantry Division 12000 men & 60 guns
Piemonte Infantry Division 9300 men & 32 guns
The Italian Corps were only established four days before the invasion

Italian Autoblinda armoured car and infantry. 15mm gures from the editor's collection.

Greek Army (CinC General Papagos)

Epirus Front 8th Division + Inf. Brig. 15 battalions & 66 guns
Pindus Front 3 reinforced battalions & 6 guns
Macedonian Front 9th Division + 4th Inf. Brig. 22 battalions & 90 guns
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The Greek second line had a further seven battalions in position.

Italian standard divisional organisation in 1940 was 2 (3 btn.) regiments
usually with 2 Blackshirt battalions attached. Greek divisions had 3 (3 btn.)
regiments. Artillery support was similar with 9 batteries. The Italians were
better provided with light mortars and the Greeks had more MGs. Both the
Italian and Greek divisions had limited AA and ATG provision. Supply services
were poor on both sides although this was more vital to the Italians who had
only 107 lorries in Albania out of an estimated requirement of 1,750.
In the air, the Italian Air force in Albania had 55 bombers and 107 ghters
(more than half CR42 & 32s). They could also count on support from Brindisi
in the form of 119 bombers, 20 JU87s and 54 ghters. The tiny Greek air force
had only 27 bombers and 38 ghters serviceable. However, Italian air-ground
co-operation was negligible with the Albania air commander, General Ranza
being based in Tirana, many miles from army HQ. The supporting squadrons in
Italy were not even in telephone contact.
Whilst exact comparisons are diicult even the Greek oicial history admitted
local superiority on the Macedonian front. There was a modest Italian
superiority on the Pindus and Epirus fronts. The main advantage on these
fronts lay with tanks and aircraft, neither of which could be used to great
eect. This meant that far from the two to one advantage Visconte Prasca
thought he had, the opposing forces were fairly evenly balanced with around
150,000 Greeks facing 162,000 Italians. This was even before morale, supply
and organisation are considered.

Italian army Albanian Legion MVSN battalion. 15mm gures from the editor's collection

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The Campaign
The Italian oensive was launched on 28 October in driving rain that deprived
the army of air cover. The Littoral group moved slowly down the coast while
the Tsamouria Corps advanced through the mountains towards Kalpaki. On
their left the Julia Alpini Division split into two regimental battle groups either
side of Mount Smolikas with the objective of seizing the Metsovon pass. In
Macedonia the XXVI Corps (primarily the Parma Division) was thinly spread in
defensive positions.
Rapidly rising rivers and mud tracks resulted in slow progress with Greek
screening forces falling back onto prepared positions. Despite the diiculties
the Aosta Lancers in the Littoral Group gained a bridgehead over the Kalamas
River. The Tsamouria Corps made slow progress on what were little more than
mountain tracks with the Centauros tanks simply sticking in the mud where
they had to be abandoned. The Julia Division in the centre began to create a
wedge in the Greek position despite the conditions and Papagos responded
with inltration attacks that almost surrounded the Italians. Bersaglieri
reinforcements helped extricate the Division only after heavy losses.
On 6 November the Italian command was reorganised into two armies:
9th Army
Piemonte, Arezzo, Parma and Venezia Divisions in Western Macedonia.
Julia and Bari (diverted from cancelled Corfu attack) Divisions on the Pindus.
Tridentia Alpini Division in reserve.
11th Army
Ferrara, Centauro and Siena Divisions
To be reinforced by four divisions in preparation for an oensive after 5
December.
General Soddu subsequently replaced Visconte Prasca.
With the Italian oensive grinding to a halt Papagos shifted the 10 th and 15th
Divisions to the Macedonian front to join the 9th Division (III Corps). The
Italians had dug in on the Devoli River with their backs to the Morava massif.
15th Division in the north made spectacular advances in freezing conditions
around Mount Ivan whilst 9th & 10th Divisions pushed the Italians back o the
mountains exposing the key valley town of Koritsa which was abandoned on
the 21 November.
Italian reinforcements where thrown into the line piecemeal often without
supporting arms and into a chaotic command structure. The loss of Koritisa

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and Erseke exposed the left ank of the 11th Army on the coast which was
forced to retreat deep into Albania whilst being vigorously counterattacked by
fresh Greek divisions. By 10 January the Klisura junction had been captured
and Italian units only managed to stabilise the line south of the port of Vlone.
Even this was due more to the lengthening Greek supply lines than eective
Italian resistance. Marshall Cavallero replaced General Soddu.
The Greek strategy was now to capture Vlone then stabilise the line so that
divisions could be redeployed to the Bulgarian front. It was becoming
increasingly obvious that a German invasion was likely. The assault supported
by RAF squadrons made some progress but ground to a halt in bad weather.
The Italians again reinforced up to a total of 28 divisions(4 Alpine, 1
Armoured and 23 Infantry) totalling 526,000 men. On 9 March their spring
oensive used seven divisions in a limited attack between the Vijose River and
Mount Tommorit. The 14 Greek divisions holding the Albanian front gave some
ground until the attack was called o on 19 March after heavy casualties on
both sides. This remained the position until April when the German invasion of
the Balkans moved through the Pindus capturing Ioannina, sealing the Greek
army in Albania.

What If?
Apart from the campaign in Albania there are a number of interesting
what-ifs including:
A Bulgarian invasion in conjunction with the Italian October oensive or
later. King Boris would probably have agreed if Mussolini had made an earlier
approach with Hitlers backing.

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A Turkish attack on Bulgaria or Greece. Turkish neutrality swung both

ways during this stage of the war. (see Frank Weber The Evasive Neutral
Missouri Press 1979)
The involvement of Yugoslavia on either side.

The earlier arrival of Wilson Force (two Commonwealth divisions and a

tank brigade). The Greeks who were afraid of provoking Hitler refused
this oer.

German air and ground troops in Albania. There was a plan to send a
mountain division in January 1941. Other support might have included
paras and further air support.

Apart from the above it would be interesting to see if the Italian General
Stas 20 division invasion would have been any more successful.
Conclusion
As Mario Cervi in his excellent account of the war put it In the Greek
campaign the Italian troops were, without any doubt whatever, the worst led
troops in the world. They deserved better of their country.
The Battleelds Today
The main battleelds can easily be reached from the Greek region of Epirus.
The editor's trip used small hotels in the mountain villages of Zagoria as a
base. To get a real feel for the mountain war take your walking boots and
climb up the goat paths that were used to supply the front line. Later this was
a centre for resistance against the occupying troops.
Kalpaki was the hinge of the Greek line
and has a monument (left) and a small
museum.
From there you can travel north to the
Albanian border, the site of the later
battles when the Greek's advanced.

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Kalpaki war museum

View from the Greek lines towards the Italian positions on the Kalabas River.

Bibliography
Casson, Stanley Greece against the Axis
Hamiliton 1941
Cervi,
Mario The
Hollow
LegionsDoubleday 1971
Mollo, Andrew The Armed Forces of WW IIOrbis
1981
Nafziger, George Italian Order of Battle World War
IINafziger 1996
Packer, Edwin Italian Fiasco: The Attack on GreecePurnell
History WW2

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Trye, Rex Mussolinis SoldiersAirlife

1995
Willingham, M Perilous Commitments
Spellmount 2006
An earlier version of this article appeared in the SOTCW Journal.
Our Armies of the Balkans section has features on the Greek and Italian
armies with wargame gures from the Editor's collection.
Plus visit Defence of Greece 1941 website which has a large amount of information
on this conict and hosts a discussion group. Jonathan Forsey's brieng on the
Flames of War website is also very good.
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Send mail to balkandave@googlemail.com with questions or comments about this web
site.
Copyright 2005 Balkan Military History
Last modied: 01/23/12

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