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People vs. Quiachon

Facts:
On or about May 12, 2001 the appellant Robert Quiachon have sexual intercourse
with Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8-year old, and a deaf-mute minor, against her
will and consent. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 finds the
appellant guilty of a crime of qualified rape and sentenced on September 9, 2003 to
suffer a maximum penalty of death. However, in view of the enactment of R.A. No.
9346 on lune 24, 2006; prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The penalty to be
meted on the appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Sec. 2 of the said
Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may be given retroactive effect on his sentence?
RULLING:
R.A. No. 9346 is applicable of the case pursuant to the principle in Criminal Law,
"favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa retrigenda" that Penal Laws which are favorable to
the accused are given retroactive effect, under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
and thus provided that he is not a habitual criminal, as defiend in Rule 5 of Article 62
of the same code, although at the time of the publication of such law, a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. In this case the
appellant Roberto Quiachon is found to be not a habitual criminal, thus making R.A.
No. 9346 applicable to him. In the decision of Court of Appeals dated August 25, 2005
was modified and the penalty imposed to Roberto Quiachon which is death penalty
was reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.All told, the trial
court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping his daughter Rowena pursuant to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances of the victims
minority and her relationship to appellant, which were properly alleged in the Information
and their existence duly admitted by the defense on stipulation of facts during pre-trial,
warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on appellant. However, in view of the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with
Section 2 thereof which reads: SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed: (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or (b) the penalty of life
imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code. The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this
case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This
principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the accused because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P=75,000.00 is still proper because the
said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the

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commission of the offense; Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No.
9346, the Supreme Court has resolved, as it hereby resolves, to maintain the award of
P=75,000.00 for rape committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No. 9346.

People vs. Abellera

>Siblings AAA and BBB were raped by their father multiple times
>It first happened when AAA was7 years old, when their father went home drunk.
>Their father warned them not to tell anyone or else he would kill them and their
mother and siblings.
> After years of abuse, BBB reported this to the Baranggay who detained the father
immediately.
> Criminal charges for statutory rape, violation of anti-child abuse act, rape, and
attempted rape were filed against the father.
> Respondent denied the accusations against him. He insisted it was impossible for
him to commit the crimes since his wife was always at home. And that in one
incident alleged, he was in his neighbors house fixing a karaoke appliance. He later
on joined a drinking spree there.
>Furthermore,According to respondent, his daughters filed the cases only because
they were angry at him for not sending them to school.
ISSUE:
HELD:
>After a careful study of this case, the Court ruled for the fathers conviction for
statutory rape, two counts of simple rape and attempted rape. Respondents guilt
was clear beyond the shadow of a doubt.
> Testimonies of victims of tender age are credible, more so if they are
without any motive to falsely testify against their offender.Their revelations that they
were raped, coupled with their willingness to undergo public trial where they could be
compelled to describe the details of the assault on their dignity by their own father,
cannot be easily dismissed as concoctions.
On the applicable penalties, Court affirmed the imposition of reclusion
perpetua for simple rape. For statutory rape however, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed pursuant to RA 9346
which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
We agree with the CA that the proper penalty for attempted rape is the penalty lower
by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony.
In the scale of penalties in Article 71penalty two degrees lower than death
is reclusion temporal. However, with the abolition of the death penalty by
RA 9346, the highest remaining penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the penalty lower by two degrees than reclusion perpetua is
prision mayor, from which the maximum penalty for attempted rape shall
now be taken. As the CA correctly imposed, absent any modifying
circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be

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taken from the medium period of prision mayor or from 8 years and 1 day
to 10 years; while the minimum term is one degree lower than prision
mayor, i.e., prision correccional, from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.
The law became effective on June 24, 2006.

De Joya v. warden
FACTS:
Norma de Joya filed for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for her release from Batangas City
Jail on the claim that herdetention was illegal.Norma de Joya was charged separately with
violations of BP 22 before MTC of Batangas City. She issued a check from Solid BankBatangas
Branch to Flor Catapang de Tenorio amounting to 150,000 pesos despite her knowledge that she
does not have fund under
the said account. After 90 days, FCT presented the check to the drawee bank but was
dishonoured due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. The
same thing happened to Resurrecion Castillo was also issued a check amounting to 225,000
peso, dishonoured by the drawee bankdue to account closed.Despite notice of dishonour and
demands to make proper arrangement or pay her obligation directly to Flor and Resurrecion
shefailed and refused to do so.She was arraigned in both cases, assisted by a legal counsel
pleaded not guilty. While trial was ongoing she jumped for bail.Nevertheless, no evidence was
hereby adduced in her defense for the 2 cases. Come December 14, 1995 the trial
court promulgatedits decision in absentia, the petitioner failed to appear despite due notice. The
court found Norma de Joya guilty of violating BP 22,sentenced to imprisonment of 1 year
indemnify the offender Flor (150k) and Resurrecion of (225K) of damages.The petitioner
remained at large for 5 years, no appeal was filed but was finally arrested while she was applying
for an NBI clearance, was held in Batangas City Jail.
STATES CONTENTION:
The public prosecutor opposed the motion on 3 grounds: the decisions convicting her in violating
BP 22 has long become final and executor hence no longer can it be amended, SC circular
should be applied prospectively and SC Circular didnot amend BP 22, a substantive law but
merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform imposition of fine.
ACCUSEDS CONTENTION:
The petitioner filed for an urgent motion with the MTC of Batangas City to apply retroactively SC
AdminCircular No. 12-2000 pursuant to Article 22 (retroactive effect of penal laws) of RPC and
release from detention.
WON SC Admin Circular NO 12-2000 can be effected retroactively and therefore she be released
from detention

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RULING
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or
conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment
only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22, Congress took into account the principal
objectives of the law, namely, the prohibition on the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public
interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousandfold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property but an offense against public order.[14]
However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal
law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist theory of
criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the
social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of the aspects
of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law. Philippine penal law looks at the
convict as a member of society. Among the important factors to be considered in determining the
penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their
relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the
criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic
usefulness and other social ends.[15] The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties
imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an
opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the
community. The court has to consider not only the primary elements of punishment, namely, the
moral responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to the private complainant, the
intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime was it done by a rich
man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in the extremity of his need? The court must
also take into account the secondary elements of punishment, namely, the reformation of the
offender, the prevention of further offenses by the offender, the repression of offenses in others.
[16]
As Rousseau said, crimes can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties which,
from the benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than to inflame those on whom they
are imposed.[17] There is also merit in the view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the
offense is so much punishment of innocence.[18]
In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as revised,
retroactively, the petition must nevertheless be dismissed. The petitioner did not offer any
evidence during trial. The judgment of the court became final and executory upon her failure to
appeal therefrom. Worse, the petitioner remained at large for five long years. Were it not for her
attempt to secure an NBI clearance, she would have been able to elude the long arm of the law.

People v. Ducosin
Facts: Valeriano Ducosin was convicted of the crime of frustrated murder of Rafael Yanguas,
punishable by one degree lower than the prescribed penalty for murder, which is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death(lowered to prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in medium period). The plea of guilty was appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance, which lowered the penalty to its minimum period. Therefore the range of the
penalty was ten years and one day to twelve years of imprisonment, leaving to the discretion of
the court the precise time to be served within range. The Supreme Court shall revise the penalty
by applying Act 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which will prescribe a minimum
and maximum penalty.
Issue: Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what should be the penalty? In other words,
what should be the maximum and the minimum?
Held: This leads up to the important question: How shall the "maximum" and the "minimum"
penalty be determined?
The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable by the Revised Penal
Code, in accordance with the rules and provisions of said Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, had never been passed. We think it is clear from a reading of
Act No. 4103 that it was not its purpose to make inoperative any of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. Neither the title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the
part of the Legislature to repeal or amend any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The legislative history of the Act further shows that attention was called to the necessity for
taking care "so as not to bring the provisions of this bill in conflict with the provisions of our
penal laws, especially with those treating with penalties." (Committee Report, House of
Representatives, H-3321, Ninth Philippine Legislature, Third Session.)
The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code:
"Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public funds in the amount of

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P10,000. No mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present. Under this law the court
may impose on him a maximum sentence not exceeding ten years and eight months but not
less than nine years, four months and one day (see art. 217, No. 3, Revised Penal Code), and a
minimum which shall not be less than four years, two months and one day (the minimum
imprisonment period of prisin correccional in its maximum to prisin mayor in its
minimum. See article 6'1, Revised Penal Code). The court, therefore, may sentence the
accused to be imprisoned for not less than five years nor more than ten years or for not less
than seven years nor more than ten years and eight months, etc."
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the "maximum" is determined in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. In the example given reference is made to
article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the defendant shall
suffer the penalty of prisin mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty is
placed in the medium degree because of the absence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, that is to say, anywhere between nine years, four months and one day and ten
years and eight months in the discretion of the court. In the case on appeal here the penalty
was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty under the Revised Penal Code because of
the plea of guilty, that is to say, between ten years and one day and twelve years in the
discretion of the court. This discretion is in nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The
trial court, in conformity with the discretion conferred upon it by the Revised Penal Code,
might have assessed the penalty at, let us say, eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act
No. 4103 does not require this court to assess the said penalty at 12 years, which is the
longest time of imprisonment within the minimum degree. We find, therefore, that ten years
and one day of imprisonment conforms to the provisions and rules of the Revised Penal Code
and is therefore fixed and established as the maximum of the sentence which shall be
imposed upon the appellant.
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred to in Act No. 4103.
Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum which shall not be less than the minimum
imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the
offense." We are here upon new ground. It is in determining the "minimum" penalty that Act
No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the
courts have ever had. The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects:
first, the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum
imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors and circumstances that
should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the ascertained
limits.
We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said
Code for the offense" to mean the penalty next lower to that determined by the court in the
case before it as the maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by the Revised Penal
Code, see our discussion above). In the example which the Legisla- ture had before it in the
Committee Report above mentioned, the maximum of the sentence was correctly stated to be
the medium degree of prisin mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty next

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lower is prisin correccional in its maximum degree to prisin mayor in its minimum degree
(article 61, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code), that is to say, anywhere from f our years, two
months and one day to eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply
provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of
the penalty next lower." In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the court to
fix the minimum of the penalty anywhere between four years, two months and one day and
eight years. In the example given by the committee they stated that the court might fix the
minimum penalty at five years or seven years.
In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty to the maximum already
determined as aforesaid, is prisin correccional in its maximum period to prisin mayor in its
medium period, that is to say, from four years, two months and one day to ten years. As
stated, it is in the discretion of the court to fix the time of imprisonment within the said
range without reference to the technical subdivisions of maximum degree, medium degree
and minimum degree, and in this particular the courts are vested as stated with a wider
discretion than they ever had before.
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty, namely, the
considerations which should guide the court in fixing the term or duration of the minimum
period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor- General.
Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal,
first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. This opens up an almost limitless
field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far
as is humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but
fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of
protecting the social order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be considered are:
(1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general health and
physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct,
environment and mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both
intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7)
his demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the
manner and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense
(note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimesthis should be kept in mind
in assessing the minimum penalties for analogous crimes).
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward his
dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and second, his
relationship towards society at large and the State are important factors. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against
the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic

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usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore known in
these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give full effect
to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.
It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment period under Act No. 4103 in the
case before us on this appeal. Unfortunately, as this defendant was convicted before Act No.
4103 became effective, and as we know nothing of his antecedents because his plea of guilty
rendered it unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined to the record before us. He
plead guilty to all of the acts which constitute the crime of murder and only the timely
intervention of medical assistance prevented the death of his victim and the prosecution of
the appellant for murder. He was given the f ull benefit of the plea of guilty in the fixing of
the maximum of the sentence. With such light as we have received from the record in this
case, we have concluded that a reasonable and proper minimum period of imprisonment
should be seven years, which is within the "range of the penalty next lower in degree to the
maximum, that is to say, within the range from four years, two months and one day to ten
years of prisin correccional in its maximum period to prisin mayor in its medium period.
We repeat that Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of
imprisonment in the minimum period of the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.
The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent: that the defendant-appellant is
hereby sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten years and one day of prisin mayor in its
maximum degree, and to a minimum imprisonment period of seven years, and as thus
modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. With costs de oficio.

Jaime Guinhawa vs. People (G.R. No. 162822)

Facts:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles, including
Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. His office and display room for
cars were located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil Azotea as his sales
manager.Spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo purchased a, what would seem as abrand new
Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van that was displayed in the show room of the petitioner. They were not
informed that said van was damaged due to avehicu

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lar accident that occurred when Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan,
suffered a heart attack while traveling from Manila to Naga City On March 17,1995 when said van
was initially purchased by petitioner from Union MotorsCorporation in Paco, Manila.
A day after Spouses Silos purchase of the van, they heard a squeaking
sound which seemed to be coming from underneath the van. Believing that thevan merely
needed grease, they stopped at a Shell gasoline station where it wasexamined. The mechanic
discovered that some parts underneath the van hadbeen welded. When they complained
to Guinhawa, the latter told them that thedefects were mere factory defects. As the defects
persisted, the spouses Silorequested that Guinhawa change the van with two Charade-Daihatsu
vehicles.
Guinhawa initially agreed to the couples proposal, but later changed his mind
and told them that he had to sell the van first. The spouses then brought thevehicle to the Rx Auto
Clinic in Naga City for examination. The mechanicdiscovered that it was the left front stabilizer
that was producing the annoyingsound, and that it had been repaired.Josephine Silo filed a
complaint for the rescission of the sale and the refundof their money before the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI). During theconfrontation between her and Guinhawa, Josephine learned
that Guinhawa hadbought the van from UMC before it was sold to them, and after it was
damaged in the vehicular accident. Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaintfrom
the DTI.On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint for violation of paragraph
1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code againstGuinhawa.
HELD
Indeed, the petitioner and Azotea obdurately insisted in the trial court that the van was
brand new, and that it had never figured in vehicular accident. This representation was
accentuated by the fact that the petitioner gave the Service Manual to the private
complainant, which manual contained the warranty terms and conditions, signifying that the
van was brand new. Believing this good faith, the private complainant decided to purchase
the van for her buy-and-sell and garment business, and even made a downpayment of the
purchase price.
As supported by the evidence on record, the van was defective when the petitioner sold it to
the private complainant. It had ditched onto the shoulder of the highway in Daet, Camarines
Norte on its way from Manila to Naga City. The van was damaged and had to be repaired;
the rod end and bushing had to be replaced, while the left front stabilizer which gave out a
persistent annoying sound was repaired. Some parts underneath the van were even welded
together. Azotea and the petitioner deliberately concealed these facts from the private
complainant when she bought the van, obviously so as not to derail the sale and the profit
from the transaction.
The CA is correct in ruling that fraud or deceit may be committed by omission. It is true that
mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment which the law denounces as
fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party sought to know. 47
Failure to reveal a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be
classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive. 48 Suppression of a
material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false
representation.49 Moreover, a representation is not confined to words or positive assertions;
it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and

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thus allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage. Fraudulent nondisclosure and
fraudulent concealment are of the same genre. Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty
to disclose the truth and that disclosure was not made when opportunity to speak and inform
was presented, and that the party to whom the duty of disclosure, as to a material fact was
due, was induced thereby to act to his injury.
In the present case, the petitioner and Azotea knew that the van had figured in an accident,
was damaged and had to be repaired. Nevertheless, the van was placed in the showroom,
thus making it appear to the public that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was
mandated to reveal the foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the petitioner and
Azotea even obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the vehicle did
not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained that the van was brand
new, knowing that the private complainant was going to use it for her garment business.
Thus, the private complainant bought the van, believing it was brand new.
The MTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer imprisonment of from two months and
one day, as minimum, to four months of arresto mayor, as maximum. The CA

affirmed the penalty imposed by the trial court. This is erroneous. Section 2 of Act
4103, as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, provides

that the law will not apply if the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed
one year:

SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted
of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at
the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (As amended by Act
No. 4225.)
In this case, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner was four months
and one day of arresto mayor. Hence, the MTC was proscribed from imposing an
indeterminate penalty on the petitioner. An indeterminate penalty may be imposed if the
minimum of the penalty is one (1) year or less, and the maximum exceeds one (1) year.

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The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply if the maximum term of imprisonment does
not exceed one yearif the trial court opts to impose penalty of imprisonment less than one
year, it should not impose indeterminate penalty but straight penalty of one year or less
instead; An indeterminate sentence may be imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one year
or less, and the maximum exceeds one year.The MTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer
imprisonment of from two months and one day, as minimum, to four months of arresto mayor,
as maximum. The CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the trial court. This is erroneous.
Section 2 of Act 4103, as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
provides that the law will not apply if the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed
one year: * * * In this case, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed on the petitioner
was four months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence, the MTC was proscribed from
imposing an indeterminate penalty on the petitioner. An indeterminate penalty may be
imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one year or less, and the maximum exceeds one
year. For example, the trial court may impose an indeterminate penalty of six months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum, since the maximum term of imprisonment it imposed exceeds one year. If the trial
court opts to impose a penalty of imprisonment of one year or less, it should not impose an
indeterminate penalty, but a straight penalty of one year or less instead. Thus, the petitioner
may be sentenced to a straight penalty of one year, or a straight penalty of less than one year,
i.e., ten months or eleven months. We believe that considering the attendant circumstances, a
straight penalty of imprisonment of six months is reasonable.

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People v. Manlulu
FACTS
Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His
d r i n k i n g companions, Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the
incident. Patrolman Perez arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz, who
was also drinking with theaccused and the victim. Patrolman Perez seized from
Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casiowristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, without a warrant
and without informing Manlulu of his right to counsel. Samson on the other hand voluntarily
surrendered. Hence, he is claiming for the mitigation of his penalty.
WON Samsons penalty should be mitigated
Held: No. Indeterminate Sentence Law; Reiteration or habituality bars a convict from availing
of the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.As regards accused Dante Samson,
although he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same is
offset by reiteration or habituality he having previously been convicted once of robbery and
thrice of theft within ten (10) years prior to this incident, each time serving sentence
therefor, which further bars him from availing of the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Consequently, he should be sentenced to reclusion temporal medium the range
of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months. Furthermore, being a habitual delinquent as defined in the last paragraph
of Art. 62 of The Revised Penal Code, he should serve an additional penalty within the range
of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum

PEOPLE V. GLINO DECEMBER 4, 2007

FACTS: While aboard a jeepney, the accused Glino blocked Virginias path while his co-accused,
Baloes, who died later in prison, stabbed Virginias husband Domingo several times
whichresulted in domingos death. Glino denies knowing Baloes.
HELD:GUILTYofMurder.
Indeterminate Sentence Law; The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable when the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where the maximum
term of imprisonment is less than one year.The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no
application in both cases. The rule is well- entrenched in this jurisdiction that the law is not
applicable when the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, the law does not apply to those whose maximum term of imprisonment is less than
one year.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, penalizes murder in this wise:
Article 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling within the provision of Article 246, shall

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kill another, shall be guilty of Murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
There being no averment of mitigating nor aggravating circumstancethat attended the killing
of Domingo, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63(2) of
the RPC.
On the other hand, Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes less serious
physical injuries in the following manner:
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries.Any person who shall inflict upon another
physical injuries not described in the preceding articles but which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the
same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor.
Again, absent any appreciable mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty of arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) should be imposed in its medium period (between 2
months and 1 day to 4 months)
The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in both cases. The rule is wellentrenched in this jurisdiction that the law is not applicable when the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, the law does not apply to those
whose maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year.