Narag vs.

Narag, 291 SCRA 451

25JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who was once his
student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta
Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as
well as the love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The case took
an unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as again the complainant but now
together with their seven children as co-signatories. After several hearings, the facts became clear,
that the respondent indeed abandoned his family as against morals, based on testimonial evidences.
In addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated and the Code of Ethics
for Lawyers culpable for disbarment.
HELD:
YES. Respondent disbarred.
RATIO:
The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent
breached the high and exacting moral standards set for the members of the law profession.

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,

respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before
petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against
respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on
refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries
upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for
review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside
the conjugal home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created
merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is
obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a
fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However,
this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven
away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at
bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support
from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.

Thurman v Torrington (1984)

Thurman v City of Torrington (1984)

Facts:
Tracey Thurman was the victim of her husbands, Charles Thurman, repeated harassments and
physical abuse. Such instances were on October 1982 when Charles Thurman attacked Tracey
Thurman at the home of Judy Bentley and Richard St. Hilaire in the city of Torrington. He took by
force their son Charles J. Thurman, Jr. Mr. St.-Hilaire filed a complaint but the police officers of
refused to take a complainteven of trespassing.
The acts of harassment continued. Even when her husband was finally arrested after attacking
her in full view of a policeman and after a judge issued an order prohibiting him to go to his wife's
home, the police continued to ignore Thurman's pleas for help. Her husband violated the order
and came to her house and threatened her. When she asked the police to arrest her husband for
violating his probation and threatening her life, they ignored her. She obtained a restraining order
against her husband, which he violated, but again the police failed to take any action.
This culminated when Charles Thurman appeared at the BentleySt. Hilaire residence in the
early afternoon and demanded to speak to Tracey Thurman. Tracey, remaining indoors, called
the police department asking that Charles be picked up for violation of his probation. After about
15 minutes, Tracey went outside to try to persuade him not to take or hurt Charles Jr. Charles
suddenly stabbed Tracey repeatedly in the chest, neck, and throat.
At the duration of these events, police officers acted ineptly in handling the wife-battering
situation. At the time when Tracy was stabbed, Officers DeAngelo, Nukirk, and Columbia arrived
on the scene but still permitted Charles Thurman to wander about the crowd and continue to
threaten Tracey. Finally, upon approaching Tracey once again, this time while she was lying on a
stretcher, Charles Thurman was arrested and taken into custody.
It was eventually found out that Charles worked as a counterman and short order cook at Skies
Diner. There he served many members of the Torrington Police Department, including some of

the officers in this case. While at work, Charles Thurman boasted to the officers that he intended
to get his wife and that he intended to kill her.
Tracy then filed a complaint in the Federal Court and sued the city for the lack of equal protection
in the application of social services, and that this violated the 14 th amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, particularly the inept police response to a husband beating up a wife. The City
brought a motion to dismiss her claims. The Cityargues that the equal protection clause [no
state shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws] only prohibits intentional
discrimination that is racially motivated.
Issue: WON the plaintiffs have properly alleged a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Held:
Yes, the application of the equal protection clause is not limited to racial classifications or racially
motivated discrimination. Classifications on the basis of gender will be held invalid under the
equal protection clause unless they are substantially related to strike down classifications which
are not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Tracey Thurman alleges that the city uses an administrative classification that manifests itself in
discriminatory treatment that violates the equal protection clause. Police protection in the City of
Torrington, they argue, is fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim has
no domestic relationship. But the Torrington police have consistently afforded lesser protection,
plaintiffs allege, when the victim is (1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or
boyfriend, or (2) a child abused by a father or stepfather.

PEOPLE vs. LIBERTA

Facts. Defendant Mario Liberta and Denise Liberta married in 1978. Defendant began to
beat Denise shortly after the birth of their son in October of that year. In 1980 Denise
received a temporary order of protection from Family Court. The order required defendant to
move out and remain away from the family home and Denise. It allowed defendant to visit
his son once each weekend. On the weekend of March 21, 1981 defendant did not visit his
son. On Tuesday of the following week he called to request visitation. Denise agreed so long
as he picked up the son and her and took them to the motel he was staying at under the
understanding that a friend of his would be with them at all times. The defendant and his
friend picked the two up and drove to the hotel. Upon arrival the friend left. Shortly thereafter
defendant attacked Denise, threatened to kill her, and forced her to perform fellatio and
engage in sexual intercourse with him. He also forced Denise to tell their son to watc
h. He allowed them to leave after the incident, and Denise reported the incident the next day.
Defendant moved to dismiss the following indictment asserting that he came within a marital
exemption to both rape and sodomy. The People contended that because the couple were
living apart pursuant to the temporary order of protection, they were not married for purposes
of the statute. The trial court dismissed the indictment. The appellate court reversed and
remanded, finding that the couple was not married for purposes of the statute. The
defendant was convicted and appealed, asserting that both statutes are unconstitutional.

Issue. Is defendant correct in his assertion that the marital rape exemption in New Yorks
rape and sodomy statutes renders those statutes violative of the Equal Protection Clause?
Held. Based on Equal Protection analysis, the law must be that any person who engages in
sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with any other person by forcible
compulsion is guilty of either rape or sodomy. The defendants conviction is affirmed.
Under New York law a male is guilty of rape when he engages in sexual intercourse with a
female by forcible compulsion. Female is defined as any female person not married to the
actor. Likewise, deviate sexual conduct in the New York sodomy statute is limited to sexual
conduct between persons not married. Therefore, there is a marital exception for both
forcible rape and forcible sodomy. This marital exemption has certain exemptions, in that a
husband and wife are considered to be not married if at the time of the assault they are living
apart pursuant to a court order or a separation agreement.

Tenchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32
years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises
Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and
was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to
be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta
are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage
in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the
said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta
continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in
Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce
against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial
Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on
August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents
whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding
upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot
give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would
arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in
foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American
husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In
the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign
divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition
neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines.
Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse
entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way
of damages and attorneys' fees.

DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA vs. VILLANUEVA

Facts:
Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, plaintiff-appellant, instituted an action against her husband
Rafael to obtain separate maintenance (monthly allowance), custody of her two younger minor
children Guillermo and Sergio and attorneys fees and other costs.
The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant, upon hearing the cause of the trial (in light of a
doctrine laid down in a former case)a decision that the plaintiff now appeals.
Aurelia sought separate maintenance on the ground of cruelty and infidelity. Proof showed that
the defendant is guilty of repeated acts of infidelity (illicit affairs with 4 different women and
another one before the action was begun) and exhibited brutality against the plaintiff, pushing
the latter to finally leave their home and establish a separate abode with the children.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellant can ask separate maintenance from respondent-appellee after she
left their domicile

Ruling:
Yes. While the Court ruled in Arroyo vs Vasquez de Arroyo that unproved or insufficient
charges of cruelty are not enough to establish a case for separate maintenance, it maintained that
in cases where spouses are found guilty of conjugal infidelity, innocent parties are entitled to
right to relief.
In the case at bar, the Court holds that the law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live
in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes
common habitation with him unbearable. The respondent, being a recurrent, gravely offends the
sanctity of the marriage tie and should thus, not be relieved from his duty to support his wife as
provided by law.
The Court ruled that the plaintiffs right to custody of her children will no longer be disturbed and
that she is entitled to P500 monthly allowance, attorneys fees and other expenses.

CASE: GARCIA VS. SANTIAGO AND SANTIAGO. 53 Phil. 952. GR No. L-28904.
December 29,
1928
PLAINTIFF: Cipriana Garcia
DEFENDANT: Isabelo Santiago and Alejo Santiago
NATURE OF THE CASE:
The case at bar is an APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva
Ecija dismissing the complaint.
FACTS:April 8, 1910- alleged date of marriage between the plaintiff, Cipriana
Garcia and
the defendant, Isabelo Santiago.
conjugal
dwelling due to continued family dissensions.
3. Alejo
-Son
of Isabelo
Santiago
Santiago
(Defendant
(Defendant
No. 2) No. 1)
-allegedly seduced Prisca Aurelio
4. Prisca Aurelio
daughter
of Cipriana Garcia (the Plaintiff
-gave birth to a child that was allegedly Alejo Santiagos child
5. Isabelo
-failed
to see
Santiago
the vindication of the honor of Prisca Aurelio, the plaintiffs
daughter
by requiring his son to marry her.
- refused to get involved with the matter, thus seemingly countenancing the illicit
relations between his son and the plaintiffs daughter

dateplaintiff,
the
ofand
marriage
Cipriana
between
Garcia

-has allegedly conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to

foster
latters whims & caprices and thus, damaging & prejudicing her rights. Some of
these
properties include lands acquired during the plaintiffs and the defendants
marriage
with money belonging to the conjugal partnership.
-publicly maintained illicit relationship with Geronima Yap.
-the separation was necessary to avoid personal violence
7. Isabelo Santiago
-continually
refused to provide for the plaintiffs support
8. Cipriana
-could
not live
Garcia
in their
(theconjugal
plaintiff) dwelling because of the illicit relationship
between
her daughter, Prisca Aurelio and Alejo Santiago, countenanced by the
other
defendant, Isabelo Santiago.
-demanded that she is entitled to P500.00 pendente lite monthly pension
from
conjugal partnership
-claimed that her husband, Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1) has shown
himself
unfit to administer the property of conjugal partnership and the court should
therefore
order its administration to be placed in her hands
ISSUE:1. Whether their separation is unjustified
NO. They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent
fights.Isabelo ordered her to leave the house & threatened to ill-treat her if she
returned. Priscas situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly possible that
Alejo
caused Priscas pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further
quarrels.
2. Whether transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal
NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary
evidence
even show that it was acquired by Isabelo before their marriage.