[G.R. Nos. 140576-99.

December 13, 2004]

JOSE
S.
RAMISCAL,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES
and the ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised

Rules of Court, of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated June 9, 1999 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22,
1999, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS) was established in December 1973 and started its actual
operations in 1976. Created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as
amended, the AFP-RSBS was designed to establish a separate fund to
guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system
as provided for in Republic Act No. 340. Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS
was to be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional
appropriations and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; (2)
donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and (3) all
earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.
AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) under
Rep. Act No. 9182, otherwise known as The Special Purpose Vehicle Act of
2002. It is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of
Trustees and Management Group. Its funds are in the nature of public funds.
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the

House of Representatives representing the First District of the Province of
South Cotabato, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman
[5]

for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate transactions involving
the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable payments of
transfer taxes prejudicial to the government had been entertained into
between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to investigate
the petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the
AFP-RSBS, together with twenty-seven (27) other persons for conspiracy in
misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions
of pesos in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.
[6]

[7]

[8]

On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special

Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate Informations
with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other accused. The
filing of the Informations was duly approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133. All were similarly
worded, except for the names of the other accused, the dates of the
commission of the offense, and the property involved. Representative of the
said Informations is that filed in Criminal Case No. 25122, the inculpatory
portion of which reads:
[9]

That sometime on September 24, 1997, and prior, or subsequent thereto, in General
Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high ranking public official being then the President, and
WILFREDO PABALAN, a low ranking public officer being the Project Director, both
of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their official duties, taking advantage
of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to their offices,
conspiring together and confederating with NILO FLAVIANO and ALEX
GUAYBAR, both private individuals, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally execute and/or cause the execution of a falsified Deed of Sale covering
Lot-X-4, a real property located at General Santos City, by making it appear therein
that the purchase price of the said lot is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS at P3,000.00 per square
meter, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed,
that the same was sold for P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION
FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED

(P10,489,500.00) PESOS, and use the said falsified Deed of Sale as basis for payment
of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes relative to the sale of the subject lot in
the amount of onlyP299,700.00 and P89,910.00, respectively, when the capital gains,
and documentary stamp and other taxes should have been P524,475.00
and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-changing and causing undue injury to the
government through evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the total amount of
TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVEN and
50/100 PESOS (P292,207.50), more or less.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[10]

On the other hand, twelve (12) other separate Informations indicted the
accused for Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as
Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145. Save with respect to the names of the
other accused, the dates of the commission of the felonies, and the property
involved in each case, the Informations were, likewise, similarly worded,
representative of which is that in Criminal Case No. 25134. The accusatory
portion reads:
[11]

That on or about September 24, 1997, and sometime prior, or subsequent thereto, in
General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high-ranking public official being then the
President, and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low-ranking public officer being the
Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their duties,
taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to
their offices, conspiring and confederating with each other and with accused NILO
FLAVIANO and JACK GUIWAN, both private individuals, acting with unfaithfulness
and with malicious intent, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
falsify a public document by executing and/or causing to be executed a Deed of Sale
for a 999-sq. m. property particularly identified as Lot-X-5 located at General Santos
City and stating therein a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter or a total
of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND
(P2,997,000.00) PESOS when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew
and, in fact, agreed, the purchase price of said lot is P10,500.00 per square meter or a
total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, thereby perverting the truth.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

[12]

On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the

Informations and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of
jurisdiction. He, likewise, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Suspend Proceedings on February 16, 1999, because of the pendency of his
motion for reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor opposed the said motions.
[13]

[14]

[15]

Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm

of Albano & Associates filed a Notice of Appearance as private prosecutors
in all the aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and Flag
Officers, Inc. (AGFOI) on March 9, 1999. The notice of appearance was
apparently made conformably to the letter-request of Retired Commodore
Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members
thereof.
[16]

[17]

In a Resolution dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier

motions filed by the petitioner for lack of merit. Consequently, a warrant of
arrest against him was issued. He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional
liberty.
[18]

[19]

[20]

On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of
Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, contending that the charges
brought against him were purely public crimes which did not involve damage
or injury to any private party; thus, no civil liability had arisen. He argued that
under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an offended party may
be allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor only in those cases
where there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense charged. He
maintained that if the prosecution were to be allowed to prove damages, the
prosecution would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
[21]

[22]

In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri
and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and contributors of AFPRSBS. It alleged that as such members-contributors, they have been
disadvantaged or deprived of their lawful investments and residual interest at

the AFP-RSBS through the criminal acts of the petitioner and his cohorts. It
posited that its clients, not having waived the civil aspect of the cases
involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court. Moreover, the law firm averred that its appearance was in
collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that their intervention in
any event, was subject to the direction and control of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
[23]

Replying to the comment, the petitioner refuted the allegation of AGFOI

that he had civil interest in the criminal cases involved. He posited that AGFOI
was neither a member nor a beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover,
considering that it was funded partly by the national government and
individual soldiers by way of salary deductions, the AGFOI never contributed a
single centavo to the funds of the AFP-RSBS. He further averred that AGFOI,
as an organization, has a distinct personality of its own, apart from the
individual members who compose it. Hence, it is of no moment if some
members of AGFOI are or have been members and beneficiaries of the AFPRSBS.
[24]

Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for

Reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan, mentioning therein his unresolved
motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that
the proceeding be suspended and his arraignment deferred pending the
resolution of the reinvestigation.
[25]

The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated June 11, 1999.
The fallo of the said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to elevate
its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration
dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of
accused Jose Ramiscal, Jr. and to inform this Court within the said period as to its
findings and recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman.
As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso, this authority from the Court for the
prosecution to evaluate its evidence and take such appropriate action as regards

accused Ramiscals subject motion shall also include the case regarding all the
accused.
SO ORDERED.

[26]

In the meantime, in a Resolution dated June 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan

made short shrift of the petitioners opposition and denied his plea for the
denial of the appearance of the law firm. In justifying its resolution, the
Sandiganbayan declared as follows:
[27]

[28]

Considering that the offended parties are members of the AFP-RSBS, as represented
by the two (2) flag officers, and their right may be affected by the action of the Court
resolving the criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there appears a strong legal
presumption that their appearance should not be disturbed. After all, their appearance
is subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
[29]

The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans

Resolution of June 9, 1999, which was opposed by the prosecution. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the same on October 22, 1999.
[30]

[31]

[32]

The petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, for the nullification of the June 9, 1999 and October 22, 1999
Resolutions of the graft court, and raised the following issues:
I

WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS

FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND ARTICLE
172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE
RISE TO CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE PARTY.
II

WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY ALBANO & ASSOCIATES

ARE PRIVATE INJURED PARTIES ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS THE
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES.
[33]

In support of his petition, the petitioner reiterated the same arguments he

put forth before the Sandiganbayan.

The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that the remedy resorted to by
the petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was improper
since the assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in
nature and not final; hence, the remedy of the petitioner was to file a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He also
argues that the petition is premature because the reinvestigation of the cases
had not yet been completed. On the merits of the petition, he posits that the
AGFOI is a member of the AFP-RSBS, and that its rights may be affected by
the outcome of the cases. He further alleged that the appearance of the
private prosecutor was subject to the direct supervision and control of the
public prosecutor.
The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of reply, that the assailed orders
of the Sandiganbayan are final orders; hence, his recourse under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure was proper.
The Ruling of the Court
The Assailed Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan are
Interlocutory in Nature
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but
is not a final decision of the whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final
order or resolution from an interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals as follows:
[34]

A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more
to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which,
on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment
or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned.

Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move
(which, among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the
execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, final and executory.
[35]

Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of the case, and does not end the
Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or
authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement,
or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or
order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken
from the final judgment rendered in this case.
[36]

The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall

useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by
having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such
orders may be contested in a single appeal.
[37]

Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final judgments,

orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan may be
assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of appeal on questions of law only.
[38]

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan merely resolved to allow the

appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, on
its finding that the AGFOI, represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen.
Navarro who were, likewise, investors/members of the AFP-RSBS, is the
offended party whose rights may be affected by the prosecution of the criminal
and civil aspects of the cases and the outcome thereof. Furthermore, the
private prosecutor is subject to the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan did not dispose of the cases on their merits,
more specifically, the guilt or innocence of the petitioner or the civil liabilities
attendant to the commission of the crimes charged. Assuming that the
Ombudsman would maintain the finding of probable cause against the

petitioner after the reinvestigation of the cases, and, thereafter, the

Sandiganbayan would sustain the finding of probable cause against the
petitioner and issue warrants for his arrest, the graft court would then have to
proceed to trial, receive the evidence of the parties and render judgment on
the basis thereof. The petitioner would then have the following options: (a) to
proceed to trial, and, if convicted, file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to this Court; or (b) to file a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, to nullify the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in issuing the said resolutions and decision.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall treat the
petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Dismissal of appeal
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is
to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of
the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Consequently, in the interest
of justice, the instant petition for review may be treated as a special civil
action on certiorari. As we held in Salinas v. NLRC, a petition which should
have been brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, is not an inflexible rule. The strict application of procedural
technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the
merits.
[39]

[40]

[41]

Although there is no allegation in the petition at bar that the

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction, nonetheless, the petitioner made the following
averments: that the graft court arbitrarily declared the AGFOI to be the
offended party despite the plain language of the Informations and the nature
of the crimes charged; and that the graft court blatantly violated basic
procedural rules, thereby eschewing the speedy and orderly trial in the above
cases. He, likewise, averred that the Sandiganbayan had no authority to allow
the entry of a party, through a private prosecutor, which has no right to the civil
liabilities of the accused arising from the crimes charged, or where the
accused has no civil liabilities at all based on the nature of said crimes. The

petitioner also faulted the Sandiganbayan for rejecting his opposition thereto,
in gross violation of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised
Penal Code. Indeed, such allegations are sufficient to qualify the petition as
one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As we held inPeople v. Court of
Appeals:
[42]

The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to
determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed
with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to
be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
[43]

Besides, unless we resolve the present petition on its merits, other parties,
like the private respondents herein, may, likewise, enter their appearance as
offended parties and participate in criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Appearance of
the Law Firm Albano
& Associates
The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private prosecutor for
AGFOI, purportedly upon the request of Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen.
Navarro, quoted infra:
Atty. Antonio Albano
Practicing Lawyer
Albano-Irao Law Offices
Dear Atty. Albano:
We represent a number of Retired Generals and other Star Rank Officers who
rightfully claim to have been disadvantaged or deprived of our lawful investments and

residual interest at the Retirement Separation Benefit System, AFP because of alleged
plunder of the Systems Funds, Large Scale Estafa and Falsification of Public
Documents.
We are requesting that you appear in our behalf as private prosecutor of our case.
Thank you very much.
(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET)
(Sgd.) BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO (RET)

[44]

As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal services of the respondent

law firm were not engaged by the AGFOI itself; it was Commodore Aparri and
Brig. Gen. Navarro who did so, for and in behalf of the other retired generals
and star rank officers claiming to have residual interests in or to be investors
of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of the lots subject of the Informations against
the petitioner. Moreover, there is no showing in the records that the Board of
Directors of the AGFOI, authorized them to engage the services of the
respondent law firm to represent it as private prosecutor in the above cases.
Neither is there any resolution on record issued by the Board of Directors of
the AGFOI authorizing Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to secure
the services of the respondent law firm to represent it as the private
prosecutor in said cases. If at all, the respondent law firm is the counsel of
Aparri and Navarro only.
The AGFOI and/or Commodore
Aparri and/or Brig. Gen.
Navarro Are Not the Offended
Parties in the Informations filed
Before the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public offenses and, by
their very nature, do not give rise to criminal liabilities in favor of any private

party. He asserts that, as gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases

Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
offended party is the government because based on the deeds of sale
executed in favor of the AFP-RSBS, as vendee, it was deprived of capital
gains and the documentary stamp taxes. He contends that the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145, for falsification of public document
under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not contain any
allegation that the AGFOI or any private party sustained any damage caused
by the said falsifications. The petitioner further argues that absent any civil
liability arising from the crimes charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be
considered the offended party entitled to participate in the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan. According to the petitioner, this view conforms to Section
16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action
for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111,
the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member, beneficiary or
contributor of the AFP-RSBS, and that even if it were so, it would not sustain a
direct and material damage by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the
AGFOI to intervene would open the floodgates to any person similarly situated
to intervene in the proceedings and, thus, frustrate the speedy, efficient and
inexpensive disposition of the cases.
In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor avers that the AGFOI is entitled to
intervene in the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan because it is a member of
the AFP-RSBS, whose rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases.
The AGFOI and the respondent law firm contend that the latter has a right
to intervene, considering that such intervention would enable the members of
AGFOI to assert their rights to information and access to the official records,
documents, and papers, a right granted by no less than paragraph 7, Article IV
of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, the funds of the AFP-RSBS are
impressed with public character because the government provided for its
initial funds, augmented from time to time by the salary contributions of the
incumbent AFP soldiers and officers.

We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended parties
envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and
control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of
the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly
instituted and the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the
right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under
the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of
offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action
personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection
of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to
be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay
the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish
the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or
similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.
[45]

[46]

[47]

[48]

[49]

On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution,
reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil
liabilities of the accused:
[50]

ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles
100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to
intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as
a matter of tolerance.
[51]

The offended party may be the State or any of its instrumentalities,

including local governments or government-owned or controlled corporations,
such as the AFP-RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to
restitution of their properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification. For
instance, in malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, frauds under Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code,
and violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D. No. 705, as
amended, to mention a few, the government is the offended party entitled to
the civil liabilities of the accused. For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, any party, including the government, may be the offended party if such
party sustains undue injury caused by the delictual acts of the accused. In
such cases, the government is to be represented by the public prosecutor for
the recovery of the civil liability of the accused.
[52]

[53]

[54]

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right,
house, liberty or property was actuallyor directly injured by the same
punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is
damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be
one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the
action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if
the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the
accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest
must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest
of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.
[55]

[56]

Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or

beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have a legal
right to intervene in the criminal cases merely and solely to enforce and/or
protect the constitutional right of such members to have access to the records
of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to intervene therein simply
because the funds of the AFP-RSBS are public or government funds. It must
be stressed that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds
or property is merely inchoate and incidental. Such funds belong to the AFPRSBS which has a juridical personality separate and independent of its
members/beneficiaries.
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133
for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the
government, which was allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other
accused of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based on the
actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the
AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of
the crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor is it
entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not the
offended party in the said cases.
We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party
in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of public documents
under paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears
stressing that in the felony of falsification of public document, the existence of
any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the
very least, becomes immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public
character of a document and the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in any
way, have civil liability to a third person.
[57]

However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is

underpriced by a public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal the correct
amount of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale
causing undue injury to the government, the offenders thereby commit two
crimes (a) falsification of public document defined in paragraph 4, Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.

3019, a special penal law. The offender incurs civil liability to the government
as the offended party for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but
not for falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made
liable for the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes and,
thereafter, gave the correct amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the
government, and the petitioner and his co-accused pocketed the difference
between the correct amount of taxes and the amount entrusted for payment,
then the AFP-RSBS may be considered the offended party entitled to
intervene in the above criminal cases, through the Government Corporate
Counsel.
[58]

In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to intervene in said
cases.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Section 4: Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction inall

cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II,Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principalaccused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government,whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission ofthe offense;1) Officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regionaldirector and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher,of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989(R.A. 6758), specificially
including: xxx5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27
andhigher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of1989. b. Other

offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employeesmentioned in

subsection (a) of this section in relation to the office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to and in connection with the ExecutiveOrder Nos. 1,2, 14, and 14-A. In
cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positionscorresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in said R.A.
6758, orPNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent,exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested n the proper Regional Trial
Court,Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court,as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
BatasBlg. 129. Contrary to the claims of the petitioners, R.A. 7975 applies since
what is considered is the time ofthe commission of the crime, during which
Subido was still Commissioner of BID. Similarly,although Parina was holding a
position with a classification lower than salary grade 27, it stillapplies to him
since he is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of Subido, the principal
accused.Jurisdiction is only vested on the other courts if none of the principal
accused where occupyingpositions corresponding to salary grade 27.

People vs. MarianoFacts: The office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing
Mariano of estafa. Mariano was the Liaison Officer of Mayor Nolasco and is authorized to receive and be
receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of the municipality. The property
received were electric cables and cable powers amounting to P4,797.35 which he had a duty to deliver to
the Mayor. However he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit,
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the items. Mariano filed a
motion to quash the Information claiming that the court had no jurisdiction. He claimed that the items
which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor
Nolasco was indicted by the Military Commission under a charge of malversation and found guilty. He
claimed that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco has already been decided by the Military
Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over him. Respondent judge granted the motion to
quash stating that since the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case
involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court, the case for estafa has
already been heard and decided.Issue:Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over estafa and committed by a civilianHeld: there is no concurrent
jurisdictionRatio:The question of jurisdiction of respondent CFI is to be resolved on the basis of the law
or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1948 in Section 44 (f) provides
the CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months or fine of more than 200 pesos. Estafa falls under the original
jurisdiction of CFI.Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. At the time the criminal case was filed on Dec 18, 1974, the law in force
vesting jurisdiction upon said court is the Judiciary Act of 1948. General Order No. 49 dated Oct 4, 1974,
redefines the jurisdiction of military tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa and malversation are not
enumerated therein. Therefore, the Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of
estafa.We do not have here a situation involving two tribunals with concurrent jurisdiction over a
particular crime so as to apply the rule that whoever takes cognizance first acquires jurisdiction exclusive
of the other. The Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the crime of

estafa against Mariano hence there is no concurrent jurisdiction to speak of. Estafa falls within the sole
exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.

REPUBLIC vs. SUNGAJune 20, 1988FACTS:An information for Attempted Homicide

was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of CamarinesSur against accused-private
respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Ahearing was set
but was postponed since Rafael Anadilla was not yet arrested by the authorities.The
court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set
a newtrial date. However, 4 months before the trial date, the court a quo issued the
now assailed orderwhich reads: Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is
no longer interested in the furtherprosecution of this case and there being no
objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla,Rafael Anadilla and Jose
Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.Consequently, the
order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused RafaelAnadilla
dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect. The
bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby
orderedcancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden
is herebyordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon
receipt of this order. SO ORDERED. The order was based on an AFFIDAVIT OF
DESISTANCE which was executed andnotarized by the victim and mentioned
that:a. he was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the caseb. he had
forgiven the accusedc. his material witnesses could not be located, and that without
their testimonies, theguilt of the accused could not be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.The provincial fiscal moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but was also
denied.Hence the petition and issue of the case.ISSUE:Whether or not the court a
quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit ofdesistance executed
by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by
theprosecuting fiscal. RATIO:The court cites a similar case Crespo v. Mogul in its
when it answered that the filing of acomplaint or information in Court initiates
a criminal action. The Court thereby acquiresjurisdiction over the case,
which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after thefiling of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the
trialcourt and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was
duly arrested, theCourt thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose ofdetermining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accusedis terminated upon the filing of the information in the
proper court.The rule is that once a complaint is filed, the disposition of the accused
rests in the sounddiscretion of the court. The fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the

court when the case has beensubmitted to it as his jurisdiction ends in the direction
and control of the prosecution of the case.Only the court can decide what the best
direction is for the case, as it is within its exclusivejurisdiction.In this case, almost
10 years have elapsed since the date of the filing of the information,hence it was
not unusual that the victim could not find his witnesses, the testimonies of whom
areneeded to convict the accused. The fiscal still believed that he could convict the
accused withoutthee testimonies in his MR!Although the Crespo doctrine holds that
it is the courts duty to judge whether acase should be dismissed, any move
of the offended part to dismiss the case, evenwithout objection of the
accused, should first be submitted to the fiscal. It is only after thefiscals hearing
that the court should exercise its duty to continue or dismiss the case.Petition
dismissed.
Dela Cruz vs. MoyaFacts: -Dela Cruz is a Member of the Armed Forces Intelligence and Operations
Section- armed with a MISSION ORDER, DelaCruz proceeds to Maco, Davao del Norte to investigate
reports of illegal cockfighting being conducted- Delacruz and company catches operators of cockfighting,
including deceased Eusebio Cabito in flagrante-Delacruz and co.fails to arrest operators but confiscates
evidence of the crime (eg. Gaffs, fighting cocks, etc)-Delacruz and co. were followed by the cockfight
operators on their way back to the PC headquarters, fighting ensued wherein Delacruz shot CabitoAug 2,
1979 Delacruz is charged with homicide in the CFI of DavaoIssues: W/N CFI has jurisdiction over the
subject matterHeld: NO.Ratio: -Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; One of the essential requisites of a valid
court proceeding is that the court hearing must have jurisdiction over of the subject matter of the case.
Determined by the statute at force at the time the action was commenced-at that time General Order.59
was operative giving military tribunals exclusive jurisdictionover all offenses committed by military
personnel while in the performance of their official duty-Delacruz was executing a Mission
Order=performing official duties-court records contain a copy of Mission Order; certificate from
secretary of DND is unnecessary -CFI was without jurisdiction to try the case
Reyes v. DiazFacts: Some election protest case (it didnt expound)

Doctrine:1) The issue of jurisdiction which confers appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not
such question as is dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere construction of the
pleadings, but that which has reference to the more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter as determined by law.2) Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by
the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers. The question of whether a court
has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of jurisdiction
which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on
the matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial
system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of
the land.3) In order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties. But in some instances it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the

issue meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the
pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter
the latter being conferred by law and the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties.
Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is made
thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the subject-matter is involved. In truth,
jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons
of the parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the complaint, the defendant cannot be
said to have been served with process as to that issue. At any rate, whether or not the court has
jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question that requires nothing except an examinationof the
pleadings, and this function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court
LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYAdherence of Jurisdiction (Exceptions) & Action of the Court
when determined that it has no jurisdiction & Jurisdiction of the SB (Offense deemed committed in
relation to Public Office)Facts:11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an
organized crimesyndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank
Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Petitioner Lacson and petitioners-intervenors Acop and
Zubiawere members of ABRITG.SPO2 de los Reyes exposed to the media that what actually happened
between themembers of the Kuratong Baleleng and the ABRITG was a summary execution (rub-out) and
nota shoot-out. Ombudsman Desierto formed a panel to investigate the incident. Upon investigation,all
the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the incident were absolved from anycriminal
liability because it was a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modifiedthe panels ruling
and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against 26 respondents,including Lacson, Acop
and Zubia. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation and 11informations for murder were
filed against Lacson, as principal, Acop and Zubia as accessoriesbefore the Sandiganbayans Second
DivisioUpon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, the SB allowed them to file amotion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsmanfiled 11 amended
informations before the SB, wherein Lacson was charged only as an accessory.The accused filed separate
motions questioning the jurisdiction of the SB, asserting thatunder the amended informations, the cases
fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant toSection 2 of R.A. 7975. They said that the said law
limited the jurisdiction of the SB to caseswhere one or more of the principal accused are government
officials with Salary Grade 27 orhigher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
They did not qualify underthe said requisites because the highest ranking principal has the rank of only a
Chief Inspectorand none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Thus, the SB admitted the amended
informationand ordered the cases transferred to the QC RTC, which has original and exclusive
jurisdictionunder R.A. 7975.The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting
the casesshould remain with the SB. Petitioner and some of the accused opposed.Pending the motions
for reconsideration, RA 8249 was approved amending thejurisdiction of the SB by deleting
the word principal from the phrase principal accused inSection 2 (a & c) of R.A. 7975. Even
before the issue of jurisdiction came up with the filing of theamended informations, the house bill for that
(1) WON Sections 4 & 7 of R.A. 8249 is unconstitutional.a. WON the statute violates the
petitioners right to due process and equalprotection clause because the provisions seemed to have
been designed for theSandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the case.b. WON the statute
is an ex-post facto law.(2) Whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial
Courtsjurisdiction.

a. WON the offense of multiply murder was committed in relation to the officeof the accused PNP
officers, making the case fall within theSandiganbayans jurisdiction.HELD:(1) SECTIONS 4
AND 7 OF R.A. 8249 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.The issue on due process and equal protection is too
shallow to deseve merit. Therewere no concrete evidence and convincing argument presented. The
classification made bythe law was reasonable and not arbitrary.There is nothing ex post facto in the
statute. Generally, ex post facto laws deal with theretroactive effect of penal laws and the said R.A. is
procedural in nature.(2) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OVERTHE CASES.For a case to be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it
must be shown thatthe offense charged in the information was committed in relation to the
office of theaccused.In People v. Montejo, the court held that an offense is said to have been committed
inrelation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender andperpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimacy mustbe alleged in the
information, which is what determines the jurisdiction of the court. Whatis controlling is the specific
factual allegations in the information that would show theclose intimacy between the discharge of the
accuseds official duties and the commissionof the offense charged. It does not even matter whether the
phrase committed in relationto his office appears in the information or not.In the case at bar, what the
amended information contains is a mere allegation that theoffense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office and that is notsufficient. Such phrase is merely a conclusion of law. Since it
was not proven that thecrime of murder was committed in the discharge of their duties, the
Sandiganbayan doesnot have jurisdiction over the cases.

G.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo, Petitioners,Vs.People of the
Philippines, Respondent.Facts:Petitioners are accused of libel in this case because of an article printed in
a daily publication called Daily Panay. The article was supposedly libelous because it attacked a certain
Dr. Portigo, exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. The article spoke of Dr. Portigo
being an incompetent physician, taking advantage of the poor for his monetary gain. The article was
published July 5, 1994.On March 1, 1995, petitioners pleaded not guilty; thereafter trial ensued. On
December 4, 1997, the RTC of Iloilo finds petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them
to 3 months 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year eight months 21 days of prision correcional
as maximum and a fine of P1,000 each.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on February 20,
1998 but it was denied. Petitioners then filed an appeal to the CA; on November 24, 2004, the CA
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
in a resolution dated April 8, 2005. Petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, raising

for the first time the issue of whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City Branch 23 had jurisdiction
over the case.The Supreme Court said that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised anytime, even
on appeal or motions for reconsiderations, which leaves the case to one final issue.Issue:Whether
or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23 had jurisdiction to try the caseRuling:No, the RTC of
Iloilo. Branch 23 had no jurisdictionRatio:Libel cases can only be instituted in 4 places
according to the rules on venue in Article 360.1. Whether the offended party is a public official is

a public official or private person, the criminal action may be filed in the CFI of the province or
city where the libelous articleis printed and first published.2. If the offended party is a private
individual, the criminal action may also be filed in theCFI of the province where he actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense.3. if the offended party is a public officer
whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in
the CFI of Manila.4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the
action maybe filed in the CFI of the province where he hel d office at the time of the commission
of the offense.In the present case, Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication
of the offense, so the venue is either the place where the article was first published or the place of
his residence.In the information filed, it only alleged that Daily Panay was in general circulation
in the province of Iloilo, nowhere is there proof that the article was indeed first published in the
city of Iloilo. In the case of Dr. Portigos residence, the information only alleged that Dr. Edgar
Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City. According to the SC, this does
nothing to prove that Dr. Portigo is actually residing in Iloilo City, the only thing it stresses was
that Dr. Portigo was a medical practioner in Iloilo City. Finally the Supreme Court stresses the
importance of the fact that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the information, and based on the information, there was no clear fact indicating
that the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23 had jurisdiction over the case, therefore the petition was
granted and the criminal case was dismissed. FOZvPEOPLEFacts:Vicente Foz
(columnist) and Danny Fajardo (editorpublisher) ofPanay News were charged
with libel for writing and publishing anarticle against Dr. Edgar Portigo1.
The RTC found them guilty as charged which was affirmed by the CA
hence this petition
forreview.FozandFajardoraisedforthefirsttimethat theinformation charging
themwithlibeldidnotcontainallegationssufficienttovestjurisdictioninthe
RTCofIloiloCity.Issue:W/NtheRTCofIloilohadjurisdictionovertheoff
enseHeld:NOVenue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Theoffense should have been committed or any one of its
essentialelements took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.Thejurisdiction of thecourt is determined bythe allegations in
thecomplaintorinformation.Therulesonvenueforwrittendefamationare as
follows:1.
Whenoffendedpartyisapublicofficialoraprivateperson=filedinRTCof
provinceorcitywherethelibelousarticleisprintedandfirst published 2.
When offended party is a private individual = filed in RTCof province
where he actually resided at the time ofcommissionofoffense 3. When
offended party is a public officer whose office is
inManila=filedinRTCofManila.
REMEDIALLAWREVIEWDIGESTS(CIVPRO)
TranquilSalvadorIIIAlcisso,Antonio,Arriola,Bernardo,Cajucom,Claudio,Dialino,
Dizon,Escueta,Imperial,Martin,Martinez,Mendoza,Raso,Rosales, Sia, Venzuela
34. When offended party is a public officer holding

officeoutsideManila = filed inRTC of provinceor city

whereheheldofficeatthetimeofcommissionoftheoffenseDr.Portigois
aprivateindividualatthetimeofthepublicationofthelibelous article, the
venue may be the RTC of the province/citywherethelibelousarticlewas
printedandfirstpublishedORwhereheactuallyresidedat the time of the com
missionoftheoffense.The Information [relevant to REM] states only that
x x x both theaccused as columnists and editor publisher, respectively of
PanayNews,a daily publication witha considerable circulation in the
CityofIloiloandthroughouttheregionxxx.suchdidnotestablishthat the
saidpublicationwasprintedandpublishedinIloiloCity.Ascitedin 2
other cases, the SC held that if it would beheld that theinformation
sufficiently vests jurisdiction on the allegation that the publication was in
general circulation in [place where case is filed], there would be no
impediment to the filing of the libel action inother location where the
publication is in general circulation.
SuchwasnottheintentofRA4363.Onresidence theinformation failed
to allege theresidence
ofDr.Portigo.WhiletheinformationallegesthatDr.Portigoisaphysicianand
medical practitioner in Iloilo City, it did not clearly andpositively
indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at thetime of the
commission of the offense. It was possible that he
wasactuallyresidinginanotherplace.Residenceof aperson is his personal, ac
tualorphysicalhabitationorhis actual residence or place of abode provided
he resides thereinwith continuity and consistency; no particular length of
time isrequired.Residencemustbemorethantemporary.Petitioner Ramiscal
then filed a motion for reconsideration of theOmbudsmans finding of
probable cause against him.
TheSandiganbayanorderedtheprosecutiontoevaluateitsevidence and report its
recommendations on the MR filed. Initially, theprosecution recommended the
dropping of petitioner in the casesfiled. However, the prosecutions final
recommendation was thatthe MR filed by Petitioner should be denied. Upon
receipt of thisfinding/recommendation, the Sandiganbayan scheduled
thearraignmentofPetitioner.Afterwards,Petitioner filed his 2ndMR of the
Ombudsmans
findingofprobablecauseagainsthim.Petitionersarraignmentnevertheless followed.
Hefiledamotiontosetasidehisarraignmentpendingresolutionofhis2nd
MR.ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to set aside arraignment
shouldbegrantedduetothependingMR?RULING: No. The motion
should not be granted even though
theresolutionoftheMRwasstillpending.The Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, asamendedby Administrative Order No. 15,
Series of 2001,sanctionthe immediate filing of an information in the
proper court upon
afindingofprobablecause,evenduringthependencyofamotionforreconsider

ation.Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended,provides:Section

7.Motion forReconsideration.a) Only one motion forreconsideration or
reinvestigation of anapproved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same
to be filed within five (5)days from notice thereof with the Office
ofthe Ombudsman, or the proper DeputyOmbudsman as the case may be,
withcorresponding leave of court in cases wherethe information has already
been filed incourt; b) The filing of a motion
forreconsideration/reinvestigationshall notbarthe filing of the
correspondinginformation in Court on the basis of thefinding of probable
cause in the
resolutionsubjectofthemotion.(Emphasissupplied)If the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of theresolutionfinding probable cause
cannot bar the filing of the correspondinginformation, then neither can it
bar the arraignment of
theaccused,whichinthenormalcourseofcriminalprocedurelogicallyfollows the
filingoftheinformation.Moreover,any of grounds for suspension of
arraignment asprovidedforunderSection11,Rule116of
theRulesofCourtisnotpresent in this case (i.e. accused of unsound
mind, prejudicialquestion,etc.)

1.PINOTEvAYCOFACTS:State Prosecutor Pinote filed an administrative

case against
RTCJudgeAycoforgrossignoranceofthelaw,graveabuseofauthority,and
grave misconduct. In a criminal case being handled by Pinote, Judge Ayco
allowed the testimony of 2 witnesses in court,
despitetheabsenceofPinote.Pinote,atthattime,wasundergoingmedical treatme
ntinthePhilippineHeartCenter.In the following hearings,despite orders
of Ayco, Pinote refused tocross examine the witnesses due to his being
absent during theirdirect examinations, contending that the proceedings were
void.Pinotefileda Manifestationstating such,butJudge Ayco ruledthat the
prosecution was waiving its right to crossexamine the
2witnessesinstead.The Court Administrator found in favor of Pinote,
stating that
AycoviolatedRule110,Sec.5oftheRulesofCriminalProcedure.ISSUE:W/
NAycoshouldbeheldadministrativelyliable?
HELD:YES.Aycoshouldbeheldadministrativelyliable.Asa general
rule,all criminal actionsshall beprosecuted underthe
controlanddirectionofthepublicprosecutor.If the schedule of the
public prosecutor does not permit,
however,orincasetherearenopublicprosecutors, aprivate prosecutor maybe
authorizedinwritingbytheChiefoftheProsecutionOfficeortheRegional
State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject tothe approval of
the court.Once so authorized, the privateprosecutor shall continue to

prosecute the case until thetermination of the trial even in the absence
of a public
prosecutor,unlesstheauthorityisrevokedorotherwisewithdrawn. Aycos act
of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses inthe absence of
complainant public prosecutor or a privateprosecutor designated for the
purpose is thus a clear
transgressionoftheRuleswhichcouldnotberectifiedbysubsequentlygiving the
prosecutionachancetocrossexaminethewitnesses.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11241

July 26, 1960

VALENTIN ILO, ET AL., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Perfecto A. Tabora for petitioners.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Asst. Solicitor General A. A. Torres for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Valentin Ilo, et al were charge before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur with the crime of
arson where, after trial, Valentin Ilo and Silvestre Buela were found guilty under Article 321,
paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from 4
months and 1 day to 4 years 2 months and 1 day ofprision correccional to indemnify jointly and
severally the offended party in the sum of P600.00, and to pay their respective share of the costs.
The rest of the accused were acquitted.
Ilo and Buela appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter court, while it found appellants guilty, held
that the crime charged comes under Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code and not
under the same article, paragraph 5, and as a consequence, it modified the penalty imposed upon
them. It accordingly sentenced each of appellants to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not les than 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor nor more than 16 year and 1 day of reclusion temporal affirming
the decision of the trial court in all other respects. Appellants interposed the present petition for
review.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:
Zosimo Taghoy and his family lived in their house located in sitio Ligua, barrio Salvacion,
Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. It appears that prior to December 4, 1950 Valentin
Ilo had quarrelled with one Restituto Bona while they were in the aforesaid house of Zosimo.
As a result thereof Restituto filed a criminal charge against Valentin in connection with which

the latter had warned Zosimo not to testify in favor of his accuser. This notwithstanding,
however, Zosimo testified before Sgt. Rivera when the latter investigated the incident.
The prosecution evidence show that very early in the morning of December 4, 1950, Zosimo
left for Tinambac to buy fish. Between 11 and 12, o'clock that morning as Bruna Absin, a 60year old woman who lived in the house aforesaid together with her granddaughter, Salud
Piania and the latter's three children, the eldest of whom was only three years old she heard
the voices of some people coming towards the place. She went down to see who they were.
The group was composed of eight persons headed by Valentin Ilo. Salud Piania also got up
and looked through the window from where she saw them coming. All of them were wellknown to both Bruna and Salud because they had been their neighbors in the same barrio
for more than ten years.
Upon their arrival Silvestre Buela poured petroleum from a bottle into the awning of the
house, while Valentin Ilo applied a lighted match to the same place after the petroleum had
been poured upon it. Their six companions had by then surrounded the place.
When Bruna asked Valentin why they were burning the house, the latter replied sarcastically;
"What setting fire are you talking about?" Then as the fire begun to spread , Salud Piania
took hold of her youngest child and ran out of the house through the kitchen door while her
grandmother took care of the other two children and hurriedly lead them out of the burning
house through the same door and all of them sought refuge at the house of Salud's motherin-law located at about one kilometer away.
The house of the Taghoys was burned to the ground together with all its contents consisting
of furniture, clothing, house utensils, farm implements, two sacks of corn, and six sacks of
palay, with a total estimated value of more than P1,000.00. The house itself, in the opinion of
the trial court, was worth P600.00.
As stated at the beginning, the evidence shows that Zosimo Taghoy had gone to the
poblacion of Tinambac very early that same morning to buy fish. While he was there walking
with Restituto Bona towards the municipal building, they met Valentin Ilo, Alfredo Caizo and
Pacifico Carullo. Valentin threw a stone at them hitting Restituto with it on the forehead.
Zosimo and Restituto, unwilling to get into further trouble took to their heels, pursued by
Valentin and his two companions, but they succeeded in evading them by seeking refuge in
the house of Maximo Piania, Zosimo's father-in-law.
Due to the incident above described and fearful that Valentin and his companion might do
harm to the member of his family, Zosimo requested the chief of police of Tinambac, to have
a policeman accompany his brother-in-law, Jaime Piania, to his house at sitio Ligua to fetch
his wife and children. This the chief of police did, but when Jaime and municipal policeman
named Gualberto Cantos reached Ligua they found Zosimo's house reduced to ashes. Later
on they went to the house of Zosimo's mother where they found his wife and children.
The trial court found appellant guilty of arson under Article 321, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code because the information does not allege that the house burned was an inhabited one or that

the accused knew it to be inhabited. And in expressing the opinion that the crime come under Article
321, paragraph 5, it surmised that, while the information does not stated in so many words that
building burned was used as a dwelling, it however alleges that it was reduced to ashes together
with all the furniture, utensils, clothing and palay deposited therein, from which it may be inferred that
the house was inhabited when it was set on fire.
The Court of Appeals, however, is of different opinion. It expressed the view that the defendants are
guilty of the offense under paragraph 1 of the same article, which is penalized with reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, or from 12 years and 1 day to reclusion perpetua, because the
information alleges that they "set fire to the house of one Zosimo Taghoy", and the evidence shows
that when they burned the house they saw two occupants therein in the persons of Bruna Absin and
Salud Piania, from which, according to said court, it may be deduced that they knew that the house
was then inhabited and such knowledge is an essential ingredient of this form of arson.
Counsel for appellants, on the other hand, disagrees with both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, for he contends that the information does not contain any allegation that the building
burned is used as a dwelling and is located in an uninhabited place to make it come under Article
321, Paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code, nor does it alleged that the accused set fire to the
house "knowing it to be occupied at the time by one or more persons", even if it does allege that the
house was that of Zosimo Taghoy and it was burned together with the furniture, utensils, clothing
and palay deposited therein. He contends that such avernment, as well as the proof adduced that
the accused saw two occupants of the house at the time of the burning cannot convert the crime
charged into a more serious one, or one under paragraph 1 of the same article.
We find merit in this contention. In one case, where the defendant was accused of arson upon the
allegation that he set fire to the dwelling house of one Rosa Dani which was inhabited by her, it was
held that it was error to find him guilty under Article 321, paragraph 1, because there is no allegation
that he knew that the house was inhabited. This Court said: "Knowledge on the part of the accused
that the building set fire to is occupied, is an essential element of the form of arson defines in Article
549 of the Penal Code, (now Article 321, paragraph 1) and the information must contain allegations
to that effect that the accused had such knowledge at the time of the commission of the crime in
order to sustain a conviction under the article" (People vs. Macalma, 44 Phil., 170). On the other
hand, it is trite to say that the guilty of appellant and their subsequent conviction cannot rest on a
mere presumption, but upon clear proof, while a substantial defect in the information cannot be
cured by evidence, for that would jeopardize their right to be informed of the true nature of the
offense they are charged.
We therefore agree with counsel that the offense of which appellants may be convicted is that
defined and penalized in Article 322, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code which governs cases
of arson not included in Article 321 and imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium period if the damage caused is over P200.00 but does not exceed P1,000.00.
Considering that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, not offset
by any mitigating circumstance, that penalty should be imposed in the maximum period, or from 2
years 11 months and 11 days to 4 years and 2 month. And applying the Indeterminate Sentence

Law, appellants should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.
Wherefore with the above modification, the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects,
without pronouncement as to costs.