A. PRE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERhales of Miletus (c. 620 B.C.E.c. 546 B.C.E.

)
The ancient Greek philosopher Thales was born in Miletus in
Greek Ionia. Aristotle, the major source for Thales's
philosophy and science, identified Thales as the first person to
investigate the basic principles, the question of the
originating substances of matter and, therefore, as the
founder of the school of natural philosophy. Thales was
interested in almost everything, investigating almost all areas
of knowledge, philosophy, history, science, mathematics,
engineering, geography, and politics. He proposed theories to
explain many of the events of nature, the primary substance,
the support of the earth, and the cause of change. Thales was
much involved in the problems of astronomy and provided a
number of explanations of cosmological events which
traditionally involved supernatural entities. His questioning
approach to the understanding of heavenly phenomena was
the beginning of Greek astronomy. Thales' hypotheses were
new and bold, and in freeing phenomena from godly
intervention, he paved the way towards scientific endeavor.
He founded the Milesian school of natural philosophy, developed the scientific method, and
initiated the first western enlightenment. A number of anecdotes is closely connected to Thales'
investigations of the cosmos. When considered in association with his hypotheses they take on
added meaning and are most enlightening. Thales was highly esteemed in ancient times, and a
letter cited by Diogenes Laertius, and purporting to be from Anaximenes to Pythagoras, advised
that all our discourse should begin with a reference to Thales (D.L. II.4).

1. The Writings of Thales

Doubts have always existed about whether Thales wrote anything, but a number of ancient reports
credit him with writings. Simplicius (Diels, Dox. p. 475) specifically attributed to Thales authorship
of the so-called Nautical Star-guide. Diogenes Laertius raised doubts about authenticity, but wrote
that 'according to others [Thales] wrote nothing but two treatises, one On the Solstice and one On
the Equinox' (D.L. I.23). Lobon of Argus asserted that the writings of Thales amounted to two
hundred lines (D.L. I.34), and Plutarch associated Thales with opinions and accounts expressed in
verse (Plutarch, De Pyth. or. 18. 402 E). Hesychius, recorded that '[Thales] wrote on celestial
matters in epic verse, on the equinox, and much else' (DK, 11A2). Callimachus credited Thales
with the sage advice that navigators should navigate by Ursa Minor (D.L. I.23), advice which may
have been in writing.
Diogenes mentions a poet, Choerilus, who declared that '[Thales] was the first to maintain the
immortality of the soul' (D.L. I.24), and in De Anima, Aristotle's words 'from what is recorded
about [Thales]', indicate that Aristotle was working from a written source. Diogenes recorded that
'[Thales] seems by some accounts to have been the first to study astronomy, the first to predict
eclipses of the sun and to fix the solstices; so Eudemus in his History of Astronomy. It was this
which gained for him the admiration of Xenophanes and Herodotus and the notice of Heraclitus
and Democritus' (D.L. I.23). Eudemus who wrote a History of Astronomy, and also on geometry
and theology, must be considered as a possible source for the hypotheses of Thales. The
information provided by Diogenes is the sort of material which he would have included in his
History of Astronomy, and it is possible that the titles On the Solstice, and On the Equinox were

available to Eudemus. Xenophanes, Herodotus, Heraclitus and Democritus were familiar with the
work of Thales, and may have had a work by Thales available to them.
Proclus recorded that Thales was followed by a great wealth of geometers, most of whom remain
as honoured names. They commence with Mamercus, who was a pupil of Thales, and include
Hippias of Elis, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Eudoxus of Cnidus, Philippus of Mende, Euclid, and
Eudemus, a friend of Aristotle, who wrote histories of arithmetic, of astronomy, and of geometry,
and many lesser known names. It is possible that writings of Thales were available to some of
these men.
Any records which Thales may have kept would have been an advantage in his own work. This is
especially true of mathematics, of the dates and times determined when fixing the solstices, the
positions of stars, and in financial transactions. It is difficult to believe that Thales would not have
written down the information he had gathered in his travels, particularly the geometry he
investigated in Egypt and his measuring of the height of the pyramid, his hypotheses about nature,
and the cause of change.
Proclus acknowledged Thales as the discoverer of a number of specific theorems (A Commentary
on the First Book of Euclid's Elements 65. 8-9; 250. 16-17). This suggests that Eudemus, Proclus's
source had before him the written records of Thales's discoveries. How did Thales 'prove' his
theorems if not in written words and sketches? The works On the Solstice, On the Equinox, which
were attributed to Thales (D.L. I.23), and the 'Nautical Star-guide, to which Simplicius referred,
may have been sources for the History of Astronomy of Eudemus (D.L. I.23).

2. Possible Sources for Aristotle

There is no direct evidence that any written material of Thales was available to Plato and Aristotle,
but there is a surprisingly long list of early writers who could have known Thales, or had access to
his works, and these must be considered as possible sources for Plato, Aristotle, and the
philosophers and commentators who followed them. Aristotle's wording, 'Thales says', is assertive
wording which suggests a reliable source, perhaps writings of Thales himself. Anaximander and
Anaximenes were associates of Thales, and would have been familiar with his ideas. Both
produced written work. Anaximander wrote in a poetical style (Theophr. ap. Simpl. Phys. fr. 2),
and the writing of Anaximenes was simple and unaffected (D.L. II.3). Other philosophers who were
credited with written works, who worked on topics similar to those of Thales, and who may have
provided material for later writers, are Heraclitus of Ephesus, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae,
Alcmaeon, Hippo of Samos, and Hippias of Elis.

3. Thales says Water is the Primary Principle

Aristotle defined wisdom as knowledge of certain principles and causes (Metaph. 982 a2-3). He
commenced his investigation of the wisdom of the philosophers who preceded him, with Thales,
the first philosopher, and described Thales as the founder of natural philosophy (Metaph. 983 b2122). He recorded: 'Thales says that it is water'. 'it' is the nature, the arch, the originating
principle. For Thales, this nature was a single material substance, water. Despite the more
advanced terminology which Aristotle and Plato had created, Aristotle recorded the doctrines of
Thales in terms which were available to Thales in the sixth century B.C.E., Aristotle made a
definite statement, and presented it with confidence. It was only when Aristotle attempted to
provide the reasons for the opinions that Thales held, and for the theories that he proposed, that
he sometimes displayed caution.

4. Thales and Mythology

2

Those who believe that Thales inherited his views from Greek or Near-Eastern sources are wrong.
Thales was esteemed in his times as an original thinker, and one who broke with tradition and not
as one who conveyed existing mythologies. Aristotle unequivocally recorded Thales's hypothesis
on the nature of matter, and proffered a number of conjectures based on observation in favour of
Thales's declaration (Metaph. 983 b20-28). His report provided the testimony that Thales
supplanted myth in his explanations of the behaviour of natural phenomena. Thales did not derive
his thesis from either Greek or non-Greek mythological traditions.
Thales would have been familiar with Homer's acknowledgements of divine progenitors but he
never attributed organization or control of the cosmos to the gods. Aristotle recognized the
similarity between Thales's doctrine about water and the ancient legend which associates water
with Oceanus and Tethys, but he reported that Thales declared water to be the nature of all
things. Aristotle pointed to a similarity to traditional beliefs, not a dependency upon them.
Aristotle did not call Thales a theologian in the sense in which he designated 'the old poets'
(Metaph. 1091 b4) and others, such as Pherecydes, as 'mixed theologians' who did not use
'mythical language throughout' (Metaph. 1091 b9). To Aristotle, the theories of Thales were so
obviously different from all that had gone before that they stood out from earlier explanations.
Thales's views were not ancient and primitive. They were new and exciting, and the genesis of
scientific conjecture about natural phenomena. It was the view for which Aristotle acknowledged
Thales as the founder of natural philosophy.

5. Thales's Primary Principle

The problem of the nature of matter, and its transformation into the myriad things of which the
universe is made, engaged the natural philosophers, commencing with Thales. For his hypothesis
to be credible, it was essential that he could explain how all things could come into being from
water, and return ultimately to the originating material. It is inherent in Thales's hypotheses that
water had the potentiality to change to the myriad things of which the universe is made, the
botanical, physiological, meteorological and geological states. In Timaeus, 49B-C, Plato had
Timaeus relate a cyclic process. The passage commences with 'that which we now call "water" ',
and describes a theory which was possibly that of Thales. Thales would have recognized
evaporation, and have been familiar with traditional views, such as the nutritive capacity of mist
and ancient theories about spontaneous generation, phenomena which he may have 'observed',
just as Aristotle believed he, himself had (Hist. An. 569 b1; Gen. An. 762 a9-763 a34), and about
which Diodorus Siculus (I.7.3-5; 1.10.6), Epicurus (ap. Censorinus, D.N. IV.9), Lucretius (De
Rerum Natura , V.783-808) and Ovid (Met. I.416-437) wrote.
When Aristotle reported Thales's pronouncement that the primary principle is water, he made a
precise statement: 'Thales says that it [the nature of things] is water' (Metaph. 983 b20), but he
became tentative when he proposed reasons which might have justified Thales's decision:
'[Thales's] supposition may have arisen from observation . . . ' (Metaph. 983 b22). It was Aristotle's
opinion that Thales may have observed, 'that the nurture of all creatures is moist, and that warmth
itself is generated from moisture and lives by it; and that from which all things come to be is their
first principle' (Metaph. 983 b23-25). Then, in the lines 983 b26-27, Aristotle's tone changed
towards greater confidence. He declared: 'Besides this, another reason for the supposition would
be that the semina of all things have a moist nature . . . ' (Metaph. 983 b26-27). In continuing the
criticism of Thales, Aristotle wrote: 'That from which all things come to be is their first principle'
(Metaph. 983 b25).
Simple metallurgy had been practised long before Thales presented his hypotheses, so Thales
knew that heat could return metals to a liquid state. Water exhibits sensible changes more

obviously than any of the other so-called elements, and can readily be observed in the three states
of liquid, vapour and ice. The understanding that water could generate into earth is basic to
Thales's watery thesis. At Miletus it could readily be observed that water had the capacity to
thicken into earth. Miletus stood on the Gulf of Lade through which the Maeander river emptied
its waters. Within living memory, older Milesians had witnessed the island of Lade increasing in
size within the Gulf, and the river banks encroaching into the river to such an extent that at
Priene, across the gulf from Miletus the warehouses had to be rebuilt closer to the water's edge.
The ruins of the once prosperous city-port of Miletus are now ten kilometres distant from the coast
and the Island of Lade now forms part of a rich agricultural plain. There would have been
opportunity to observe other areas where earth generated from water, for example, the deltas of
the Halys, the Ister, about which Hesiod wrote (Theogony, 341), now called the Danube, the TigrisEuphrates, and almost certainly the Nile. This coming-into-being of land would have provided
substantiation of Thales's doctrine. To Thales water held the potentialities for the nourishment and
generation of the entire cosmos. Atius attributed to Thales the concept that 'even the very fire of
the sun and the stars, and indeed the cosmos itself is nourished by evaporation of the waters'
(Atius, Placita, I.3).
It is not known how Thales explained his watery thesis, but Aristotle believed that the reasons he
proposed were probably the persuasive factors in Thales's considerations. Thales gave no role to
the Olympian gods. Belief in generation of earth from water was not proven to be wrong until A.D.
1769 following experiments of Antoine Lavoisier, and spontaneous generation was not disproved
until the nineteenth century as a result of the work of Louis Pasteur.

6. New Ideas about the Earth

Thales proposed answers to a number of questions about the earth: the question of its support; its
shape; its size; and the cause of earthquakes; the dates of the solstices; the size of the sun and
moon.

a. The Earth Floats on Water

In De Caelo Aristotle wrote: 'This [opinion that the earth rests on water] is the most ancient
explanation which has come down to us, and is attributed to Thales of Miletus (Cael. 294 a28-30).
He explained his theory by adding the analogy that the earth is at rest because it is of the nature
of wood and similar substances which have the capacity to float on water, although not on air
(Cael. 294 a30-b1). In Metaphysics (983 b21) Aristotle stated, quite unequivocally: 'Thales . . .
declared that the earth rests on water'. This concept does appear to be at odds with natural
expectations, and Aristotle expressed his difficulty with Thales's theory (Cael. 294 a33-294 b6).
Perhaps Thales anticipated problems with acceptance because he explained that it floated because
of a particular quality, a quality of buoyancy similar to that of wood. At the busy city-port of
Miletus, Thales had unlimited opportunities to observe the arrival and departure of ships with
their heavier-than-water cargoes, and recognized an analogy to floating logs. Thales may have
envisaged some quality, common to ships and earth, a quality of 'floatiness', or buoyancy. It seems
that Thales's hypothesis was substantiated by sound observation and reasoned considerations.
Indeed, Seneca reported that Thales had land supported by water and carried along like a boat
(Sen. QNat.III.14). Aristotle's lines in Metaphysics indicate his understanding that Thales believed
that, because water was the permanent entity, the earth floats on water.
Thales may have reasoned that as a modification of water, earth must be the lighter substance,
and floating islands do exist. Herodotus (The Histories, II.156) was impressed when he saw
Chemmis, a floating island, about thirty-eight kilometres north-east of Naucratis, the Egyptian

trading concession which Thales probably visited. Seneca described floating islands in Lydia:
'There are many light, pumice-like stones of which islands are composed, namely those which float
in Lydia' (Sen. QNat., III.25. 7-10). Pliny described several floating islands, the most relevant
being the Reed Islands, in Lydia (HN, II.XCVII), and Pliny (the Younger) (Ep. VIII.XX) described a
circular floating island, its buoyancy, and the way it moved. Thales could have visited the near-by
Reed Islands. He might have considered such readily visible examples to be models of his theory,
and he could well have claimed that the observation that certain islands had the capacity to float
substantiated his hypothesis that water has the capacity to support earth.
Again it is understood that Thales did not mention any of the gods who were traditionally
associated with the simple bodies; we do not hear of Oceanus or Gaia: we read of water and earth.
The idea that Thales would have resurrected the gods is quite contrary to the bold, new, nonmythical theories which Thales proposed.

b. Thales's Spherical Earth

Modern commentators assume that Thales regarded the earth as flat, thin, and circular, but there
is no ancient testimony to support that opinion. On the contrary, Aristotle may have attributed
knowledge of the sphericity of the earth to Thales, an opinion which was later reported by Atius
(At. III. 9-10) and followed by Ps.-Plutarch (Epit. III.10). Aristotle wrote that some think it
spherical, others flat and shaped like a drum (Arist. Cael. 293 b33-294 a1), and then attributed
belief in a flat earth to Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritus (Arist. Cael. 294 b14-15). If
following chronological order, Aristotle's words, 'some think it spherical', referred to the theory of
Thales. Aristotle then followed with the theory of Thales's immediate Milesian successor,
Anaximander, and then reported the flat earth view of Anaximenes, the third of the Milesian
natural philosophers.
There are several good reasons to accept that Thales envisaged the earth as spherical. Aristotle
used these arguments to support his own view (Arist. Cael. 297 b25-298 a8). First is the fact that
during a solar eclipse, the shadow caused by the interposition of the earth between the sun and
the moon is always convex; therefore the earth must be spherical. In other words, if the earth
were a flat disk, the shadow cast during an eclipse would be elliptical. Second, Thales, who is
acknowledged as an observer of the heavens, would have observed that stars which are visible in a
certain locality may not be visible further to the north or south, a phenomena which could be
explained within the understanding of a spherical earth. Third, from mere observation the earth
has the appearance of being curved. From observation, it appears that the earth is covered by a
dome. When observed from an elevated site, the sky seems to surround the earth, like a dome, to
meet the apparently curved horizon. If observed over the seasons, the dome would appear to
revolve, with many of the heavenly bodies changing their position in varying degrees, but
returning annually to a similar place in the heavens. Through his work in astronomy Thales would
almost certainly have become familiar with the night sky and the motion of the heavenly bodies.
There is evidence that he gave advice to navigate by Ursa Minor, and was so involved in
observation of the stars that he fell into a well. As a result of observations made over a long period
of time, Thales could have realized that the motions of the fixed stars could not be explained
within the idea of the observable hemispherical dome. During the determination of the size of the
rising sun, and again while watching its risings and settings during his work on fixing the
solstices, Thales may have realized that much natural phenomena could be explained only within
the understanding of the earth as a sphere.
From the shore, a ship can be seen to be descending, gradually, below the horizon, with the hull
disappearing from view first, to be followed by masts and sails. If one had a companion observing

from a higher point, the companion would see the ship for a long period before it disappeared
from view.
Atius recorded the different opinions of the shape of the earth that were held by Thales,
Anaximander and Anaximenes (III.9-10; III.10; and III.10). Cicero attributed to Thales the earliest
construction of a solid celestial globe (Rep. I.XIII.22). Thales's immediate successors proposed
theories about the shape of the earth which were quite different from each other, but that is no
reason to reject the view that Thales hypothesized a spherical earth. It is not the only occasion on
which Anaximander and Anaximenes failed to follow the theories of Thales. That they did not do so
is the main argument in favour of accepting that the scientific method commenced in the Milesian
School. There is testimony that Thales knew the earth to be spherical, but no evidence to suggest
that he proposed any other shape.

c. Earthquake Theory
Thales's theory about the cause of earthquakes is consistent with his hypothesis that earth floats
upon water. It seems that he applied his floating on water simile to the natural phenomena of
earthquakes. Atius recorded that Thales and Democritus found in water the cause of earthquakes
(At. III.15), and Seneca attributed to Thales a theory that on the occasions when the earth is said
to quake it is fluctuating because of the roughness of oceans (QNat. III.14; 6.6). Although the
theory is wrong, Thales's hypothesis is rational because it provides an explanation which does not
invoke hidden entities. It is an advance upon the traditional Homeric view that they resulted from
an angry supernatural god, Poseidon, shaking the earth through his rapid striding.

7. All Things are Full of God

The question of whether Thales endowed the gods with a role in his theories is fundamental to his
hypotheses. The relevant text from Aristotle reads: 'Thales, too, to judge from what is recorded of
his views, seems to suppose that the soul is in a sense the cause of movement, since he says that a
stone [magnet, or lodestone] has a soul because it causes movement to iron' (De An. 405 a20-22);
'Some think that the soul pervades the whole universe, whence perhaps came Thales's view that
everything is full of gods' (De An. 411 a7-8). In reference to the clause in the first passage 'to
judge from what is recorded of his views', Snell convincingly argued that Aristotle had before him
the actual sentence recording Thales's views about the lodestone (Snell, 1944, 170). In the second
passage the 'some' to whom Aristotle refers are Leucippus, Democritus, Diogenes of Apollonia,
Heraclitus, and Alcmaeon, philosophers who were later than Thales. They adopted and adapted
the earlier view of Thales that soul was the cause of motion, permeating and enlivening the entire
cosmos. The order in which Aristotle discussed Thales's hypothesis obscures the issue.
The source for Aristotle's report that Thales held all things to be full of gods is unknown, but some
presume that it was Plato. Thales is not mentioned in the relevant lines in Plato, but there is a
popular misconception that they refer to the belief of Thales. This is wrong. Thales had rejected
the old gods. In a passage in Apology(26 C) Socrates identified the heavenly bodies as gods, and
pointed out that that was the general understanding. In Cratylus(399 D-E) Plato had Socrates
explain a relationship between soul as a life-giving force, the capacity to breathe, and the reviving
force. In Timaeus 34B) Plato had Timaeus relate a theory which described soul as pervading the
whole universe. Then, in Laws Plato has the Athenian Stranger say: 'Everyone . . . who has not
reached the utmost verge of folly is bound to regard the soul as a god. Concerning all the stars
and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we
give than this very same, - namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by
one or more souls . . . we shall declare these souls to be gods . . .? Is there any man that agrees

with this view who will stand hearing it denied that 'all things are full of gods'? The response is:
'No man is so wrong-headed as that' (Laws, 899 A-B). Plato had the Athenian Stranger extend his
ideas into a theological theory. He used a sleight of hand method to express his own ideas about
divine spiritual beings. With the exception of gods in the scheme of things, these passages reflect
the beliefs which formed the Thalean hypothesis, but Plato did not have the Athenian Stranger
attribute the crucial clause 'all things are full of gods' to Thales. Thales is not mentioned.
Aristotle's text not the earliest extant testimony. Diogenes preserved a report from Hippias:
'Aristotle and Hippias affirm that, arguing from the magnet and from amber, [Thales] attributed a
soul or life even to inanimate objects' (D.L. I.24). This early report does not mention godly entities.
The later commentators, Cicero (Nat. D. I.X.25), and Stobaeus (Ecl. I.1.11) included gods in
Thales's theory. However, their views post-date Stoicism and are distorted by theistic doctrines.
Plato converted the idea of soul into a theory that 'all things are full of gods', and this may have
been Aristotle's source, but the idea of gods is contrary to Thales's materialism. When Thales
defined reality, he chose an element, not a god. The motive force was not a supernatural being. It
was a force within the universe itself. Thales never invoked a power that was not present in nature
itself, because he believed that he had recognized a force which underpinned the events of nature.

8. Thales's Astronomy
a. The Eclipse of Thales
Thales is acclaimed for having predicted an eclipse of the sun which occurred on 28 May 585
B.C.E. The earliest extant account of the eclipse is from Herodotus: 'On one occasion [the Medes
and the Lydians] had an unexpected battle in the dark, an event which occurred after five years of
indecisive warfare: the two armies had already engaged and the fight was in progress, when day
was suddenly turned into night. This change from daylight to darkness had been foretold to the
Ionians by Thales of Miletus, who fixed the date for it within the limits of the year in which it did,
in fact, take place' (Hdt. I.74). The vital points are: Thales foretold a solar eclipse; it did occur
within the period he specified. How Thales foretold the eclipse is not known but there is strong
opinion that he was able to perform this remarkable feat through knowledge of a cycle known as
the Saros, with some attributing his success to use of the Exeligmos cycle. It is not known how
Thales was able to predict the Eclipse, if indeed he did, but he could not have predicted the
Eclipse by using the Saros or the Exeligmos cycles.
In addition to Herodotus, the successful prediction of the eclipse was accepted by Eudemus in his
History of Astronomy and acknowledged by a number of other writers of ancient times (Cicero,
Pliny, Dercyllides, Clement, Eusebius). This is how Diogenes Laertius recorded the event: '[Thales]
seems by some accounts to have been the first to study astronomy, the first to predict eclipses of
the sun, and to fix the solstices; so Eudemus in his History of Astronomy. It was this which gained
for him the admiration of Xenophanes and Herodotus and the notice of Heraclitus and Democritus'
(D.L. I.23). Diogenes asserted that Herodotus knew of Thales's work, and in naming Xenophanes,
Heraclitus, and Democritus, he nominated three of the great pre-Socratics, eminent philosophers
who were familiar with the work of Thales.
Modern astronomy confirms that the eclipse did occur, and was total. According to Herodotus's
report, the umbra of the eclipse of Thales must have passed over the battle field. The "unnaturalness" of a solar eclipse is eerie and chilling. All becomes hushed and there is a strong
uncanny sensation of impending disaster, of being within the control of some awful power. In
ancient times, the awesome phenomenon must have aroused great fear, anxiety and wonder. The

combatants saw the eclipse as disapproval of their warfare, and as a warning. They ceased
fighting and a peace agreement was reached between the two kings.
It is not known why Thales turned away from the traditional beliefs which attributed all natural
events and man's fortunes and misfortunes to the great family of Olympian gods, but Miletus was
the most prosperous of the Ionian cities, and it cannot be doubted that the flourishing merchants
believed that their prosperity resulted from their own initiative and endeavours. Thales's great
philosophical pronouncement that water is the basic principle shows that Thales gave no
acknowledgement to the gods as instigators and controllers of phenomena. Thales's hypotheses
indicate that he envisaged phenomena as natural events with natural causes and possible of
explanation. From his new perspective of observation and reasoning, Thales studied the heavens
and sought explanations of heavenly phenomena.
It is widely accepted that Thales acquired information from Near-Eastern sources and gained
access to the extensive records which dated from the time of Nabonassar (747 B.C.E.) and which
were later used by Ptolemy (Alm. III.7. H 254). Some commentators have suggested that Thales
predicted the solar eclipse of 585 B.C.E. through knowledge of the Saros period, a cycle of 223
lunar months (18 years, 10-11 days plus 0.321124 of a day) after which eclipses both of the sun
and moon repeat themselves with very little change, or through knowledge of the Exeligmos cycle
which is exactly three times the length of the Saros (Ptolemy, Alm. IV.2. H270). The ancients could
not have predicted solar eclipses on the basis of those periodic cycles because eclipses of the sun
do not repeat themselves with very little change. The extra 0.321124 of a day means that each
recurring solar eclipse will be visible to the west, just under one-third of the circumference of the
earth, being a period of time of almost 7.7 hours. This regression to the west could not have been
known to the ancient astrologers, a fact which seems not to have been taken into account by the
philosophers who attribute Thales's success to application of one of those two cycles.
The following important fact should be noted. Some commentators and philosophers believe that
Thales may have witnessed the solar eclipse of 18th May 603 B.C.E. or have had heard of it. They
accepted that he had predicted the solar eclipse of 28 May 585 B.C.E. and reasoned from the
astronomical fact of the Saros cycles and the fact that the two solar eclipses had been separated
by the period of 18 years, 10 days, and 7.7 hours, and concluded that Thales had been able to
predict a solar eclipse based upon the knowledge of that cycle. Two facts discount rebut those
claims. First, recent research shows that the solar eclipse of 18th May 603 B.C.E. would not have
been visible in Egypt, nor in the Babylonian observation cities where the astronomers watched the
heavens for expected and unusual heavenly events. The eclipse of 603 passed over the Persian
Gulf, too far to the south for observation (Stephenson, personal communication, March 1999; and
Stephenson, "Long-term Fluctuations", 165-202). Even if the eclipse of 603 had been visible to the
Near-Eastern astronomers, it is not possible to recognize a pattern from witnessing one event, or
indeed, from witnessing two events. One may suggest a pattern after witnessing three events that
are separated by equal periods of time, but the eclipse which preceded that of 603, and which
occurred on 6th May 621, was not visible in Near-Eastern regions. Consequently, it could not have
been recorded by the astrologer/priests who watched for unusual heavenly phenomena, and could
not have been seen as forming a pattern.
It is quite wrong to say that eclipses repeat themselves with very little change, because each solar
eclipse in a particular Saros occurs about 7.7 hours later than in the previous eclipse in the same
Saros, and that is about 1/3 of the circumference of the earth's circumference. Adding to the
difficulty of recognizing a particular cycle is the fact that about forty-two periodic cycles are in
progress continuously, and overlapping at any time. Every series in a periodic cycle lasts about

1,300 years and comprises 73 eclipses. Eclipses which occur in one periodic cycle are unrelated to
eclipses in other periodic cycles.
The ancient letters prove that the Babylonians and Assyrians knew that lunar eclipses can occur
only at full moon, and solar eclipses only at new moon, and also that eclipses occur at intervals of
five or six months. However, while lunar eclipses are visible over about half the globe, solar
eclipses are visible from only small areas of the earth's surface. Recent opinion is that, as early as
650 B.C.E. the Assyrian astronomers seem to have recognized the six months-five months period
by which they could isolate eclipse possibilities (Steele, "Eclipse Prediction", 429).
In other recent research Britton has analysed a text known as Text S, which provides considerable
detail and fine analysis of lunar phenomena dating from Nabonassar in 747 B.C.E. The text points
to knowledge of the six-month five month periods. Britton believes that the Saros cycle was known
before 525 B.C.E. (Britton, "Scientific Astronomy", 62) but, although the text identifies a particular
Saros cycle, and graphically depicts the number of eclipse possibilities, the ancient commentary of
Text S does not attest to an actual observation (Britton, "An Early Function", 32).
There is no evidence that the Saros could have been used for the prediction of solar eclipses in the
sixth century B.C.E., but it remains possible that forthcoming research, and the transliteration of
more of the vast stock of ancient tablets will prove that the Babylonians and Assyrians had a
greater knowledge of eclipse phenomena than is now known.
The Babylonian and Assyrian astronomers knew of the Saros period in relation to lunar eclipses,
and had some success in predicting lunar eclipses but, in the sixth century B.C.E. when Thales
lived and worked, neither the Saros nor the Exeligmos cycles could be used to predict solar
eclipses.
It is testified that Thales knew that the sun is eclipsed when the moon passes in front of it, the day
of eclipse - called the thirtieth by some, new moon by others (The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, 3710).
Atius (II.28) recorded: [Thales] says that eclipses of the sun take place when the moon passes
across it in a direct line, since the moon is earthy in character; and it seems to the eye to be laid
on the disc of the sun'.
There is a possibility that, through analysis of ancient eclipse records, Thales identified another
cycle, the lunar eclipse-solar eclipse cycle of 23 1/2 months, the fact that a solar eclipse is a
possibility 23 1/2 months after a lunar eclipse. However, lunar eclipses are not always followed by
solar eclipses. Although the possibility is about 57% it is important to note that the total solar
eclipse of 28th May, 585, occurred 23 1/2months after the total lunar eclipse of 4th July, 587. The
wording of the report of the eclipse by Herodotus: 'Thales . . . fixed the date for the eclipse within
the limits of the year' is precise, and suggests that Thales's prediction was based upon a definite
eclipse theory.

b. Setting the Solstices

A report from Theon of Smyrna ap. Dercyllides states that: 'Eudemus relates in the Astronomy that
Thales was the first to discover the eclipse of the sun and that its period with respect to the
solstices is not always constant' (DK, 11 A 17). Diogenes Laertius (I.24) recorded that [Thales] was
the first to determine the sun's course from solstice to solstice, and also acknowledged the
Astronomy of Eudemus as his source.
Solstices are natural phenomena which occur on June 21 or 22, and December 21 or 22, but the
determination of the precise date on which they occur is difficult. This is because the sun seems to

'stand still' for several days because there is no discernible difference in its position in the sky. It is
the reason why the precise determination of the solstices was so difficult. It was a problem which
engaged the early astronomers, and more than seven centuries later, Ptolemy acknowledged the
difficulty (Alm. III.1. H203).
It is not known how Thales proceeded with his determination, but the testimony of Flavius
Philostratus is that: '[Thales] observed the heavenly bodies . . . from [Mount] Mycale which was
close by his home' (Philostratus, Life of Apollonius , II.V). This suggests that Thales observed the
rising and setting of the sun for many days at mid-summer and mid-winter (and, necessarily, over
many years). Mount Mycale, being the highest point in the locality of Miletus, would provide the
perfect vantage point from which to make observations. Another method which Thales could have
employed was to measure the length of the noon-day sun around mid-summer and mid-winter.
Again this would require observations to be made, and records kept over many days near the
solstice period, and over many years.

c. Thales's Discovery of the Seasons

From Diogenes Laertius we have the report: '[Thales] is said to have discovered the seasons of the
year and divided it into 365 days' (D.L. I.27). Because Thales had determined the solstices, he
would have known of the number of days between say, summer solstices, and therefore have
known the length of a solar year. It is consistent with his determination of the solstices that he
should be credited with discovering that 365 days comprise a year. It is also a fact that had long
been known to the Egyptians who set their year by the more reliable indicator of the annual rising
of the star Sirius in July. Thales may have first gained the knowledge of the length of the year from
the Egyptians, and perhaps have attempted to clarify the matter by using a different procedure.
Thales certainly did not 'discover' the seasons, but he may have identified the relationship
between the solstices, the changing position during the year of the sun in the sky, and associated
this with seasonal climatic changes.

d. Thales's Determination of the Diameters of the Sun and the Moon

Apuleius wrote that 'Thales in his declining years devised a marvellous calculation about the sun,
showing how often the sun measures by its own size the circle which it describes'.
(Apul. Florida,18). Following soon after Apuleius, Cleomedes explained that the calculation could
be made by running a water-clock, from which the result was obtained: the diameter of the sun is
found to be one seven-hundred-and-fiftieth of its own orbit (Cleomedes, De Motu circulari
corporum caelestium, II.75). The third report is from Diogenes: 'According to some [Thales was]
the first to declare the size of the sun to be one seven hundred and twentieth part of the solar
circle, and the size of the moon to be the same fraction of the lunar circle' (D.L. I.24). Little
credence can be given to the water-clock method for reaching this determination, because there is
an inbuilt likelihood of repeated errors over the 24 hour period. Even Ptolemy, who flourished in
the second century A.D., rejected all measurements which were made by means of water-clocks,
because of the impossibility of attaining accuracy by such means (Alm. V.14. H416).
In his work in geometry, Thales was engaged in circles and angles, and their characteristics, and
he could have arrived at his solution to the problem by applying the geometrical knowledge he had
acquired. There is no evidence to support a suggestion that Thales was familiar with
measurements by degrees but he could have learnt, from the Babylonians, that a circle is divided
into 3600. The figure of 720, which was given by Diogenes for Thales, is double 360, and this is
related to the Babylonian sexagesimal system. To establish the dates of the solstices, Thales
probably made repeated observations of the risings and settings of the sun. From such

10

experiments he could have observed that the angle which was subtended by the elevation of the
rising sun is 1/20 and with 3600 in a circle, the ratio of 1:720 is determined.
Of the report from Diogenes Laertius (D.L. I.24) that Thales also determined the orbit of the moon
in relation to the size of its diameter, Thales would repeat the method to calculate the orbit of the
moon.

e. Ursa Minor
Callimachus (D.L. I.22) reported that Thales 'discovered' Ursa Minor. This means only that he
recognized the advantages of navigating by Ursa Minor, rather than by Ursa Major, as was the
preferred method of the Greeks. Ursa Minor, a constellation of six stars, has a smaller orbit than
does the Great Bear, which means that, as it circles the North Pole, Ursa Minor changes its
position in the sky to a lesser degree than does the Great Bear. Thales offered this sage advice to
the mariners of Miletus, to whom it should have been of special value because Miletus had
developed a maritime trade of economic importance.
f. Falling into a Well
In Theaetetus (174 A) Plato had Socrates relate a story that Thales was so intent upon watching
the stars that he failed to watch where he was walking, and fell into a well. The story is also
related by Hippolytus (Diels, Dox. 555), and by Diogenes Laertius (D.L. II.4-5). Irony and jest
abound in Plato's writing and he loved to make fun of the pre-Socratics, but he is not likely to have
invented the episode, especially as he had Socrates relate the event. Aristotle wrote that viewing
the heavens through a tube 'enables one to see further' (Gen. An. 780 b19-21), and Pliny
(HN, II.XI) wrote that: 'The sun's radiance makes the fixed stars invisible in daytime, although they
are shining as much as in the night, which becomes manifest at a solar eclipse and also when the
star is reflected in a very deep well'. Thales was renowned and admired for his astronomical
studies, and he was credited with the 'discovery' of Ursa Minor (D.L. I.23). If Thales had heard
that stars could be viewed to greater advantage from wells, either during day or night, he would
surely have made an opportunity to test the theory, and to take advantage of a method that could
assist him in his observations. The possibility that the story was based on fact should not be
overlooked. Plato had information which associated Thales with stars, a well, and an accident.
Whether Thales fell into a well, or tripped when he was getting in or out of a well, the story grew
up around a mishap.

9. Mathematics
The practical skill of land measurement was invented in Egypt because of the necessity frequently
to remeasure plots of land after destructive inundations. The phenomena is well described by
Herodotus (II.93-109). Egypt was believed to be the source of much wisdom and reports tell us
that many Greeks, including Thales, Pythagoras, Solon, Herodotus, Plato, Democritus, and Euclid,
visited that ancient land to see the wonders for themselves.
The Egyptians had little to offer in the way of abstract thought. The surveyors were able to
measure and to calculate and they had outstanding practical skills. In Egypt Thales would have
observed the land surveyors, those who used a knotted cord to make their measurements, and
were known as rope-stretchers. Egyptian mathematics had already reached its heights when The
Rhind Mathematical Papyrus was written in about 1800 B.C.E. More than a thousand years later,
Thales would have watched the surveyors as they went about their work in the same manner,
measuring the land with the aid of a knotted rope which they stretched to measure lengths and to
form angles.

11

The development of geometry is preserved in a work of Proclus, A Commentary on the First Book
of Euclid's Elements (64.12-65.13). Proclus provided a remarkable amount of intriguing
information, the vital points of which are the following: Geometry originated in Egypt where it
developed out of necessity; it was adopted by Thales who had visited Egypt, and was introduced
into Greece by him
The Commentary of Proclus indicates that he had access to the work of Euclid and also to The
History of Geometry which was written by Eudemus of Rhodes, a pupil of Aristotle, but which is no
longer extant. His wording makes it clear that he was familiar with the views of those writers who
had earlier written about the origin of geometry. He affirmed the earlier views that the rudiments
of geometry developed in Egypt because of the need to re-define the boundaries, just as Herodotus
stated.

a. The Theorems Attributed to Thales

Five Euclidean theorems have been explicitly attributed to Thales, and the testimony is that Thales
successfully applied two theorems to the solution of practical problems.
Thales did not formulate proofs in the formal sense. What Thales did was to put forward certain
propositions which, it seems, he could have 'proven' by induction: he observed the similar results
of his calculations: he showed by repeated experiment that his propositions and theorems were
correct, and if none of his calculations resulted in contrary outcomes, he probably felt justified in
accepting his results as proof. Thalean 'proof' was often really inductive demonstration. The
process Thales used was the method of exhaustion. This seems to be the evidence from Proclus
who declared that Thales 'attacked some problems in a general way and others more empirically'.
DEFINITION I.17: A diameter of the circle is a straight line drawn through the centre and
terminated in both directions by the circumference of the circle; and such a straight line also
bisects the circle (Proclus, 124). >
PROPOSITION I.5: In isosceles triangles the angles at the base are equal; and if the equal straight
lines are produced further, the angles under the base will be equal (Proclus, 244). It seems that
Thales discovered only the first part of this theorem for Proclus reported: We are indebted to old
Thales for the discovery of this and many other theorems. For he, it is said, was the first to notice
and assert that in every isosceles the angles at the base are equal, though in somewhat archaic
fashion he called the equal angles similar (Proclus, 250.18-251.2).
PROPOSITION I.15: 'If two straight lines cut one another, they make the vertical angles equal to
one another' (Proclus, 298.12-13). This theorem is positively attributed to Thales. Proof of the
theorem dates from the Elements of Euclid (Proclus, 299.2-5).
PROPOSITION I.26: 'If two triangles have the two angles equal to two angles respectively, and one
side equal to one side, namely, either the side adjoining the equal angles, or that subtending one
of the equal angles, they will also have the remaining sides equal to the remaining sides and the
remaining angle equal to the remaining angle' (Proclus, 347.13-16). 'Eudemus in his history of
geometry attributes the theorem itself to Thales, saying that the method by which he is reported
to have determined the distance of ships at sea shows that he must have used it' (Proclus, 352.1215). Thales applied this theorem to determine the height of a pyramid. The great pyramid was
already over two thousand years old when Thales visited Gizeh, but its height was not known.
Diogenes recorded that 'Hieronymus informs us that [Thales] measured the height of the pyramids
by the shadow they cast, taking the observation at the hour when our shadow is of the same
length as ourselves' (D.L. I.27). Pliny (HN, XXXVI.XVII.82) and Plutarch (Conv. sept. sap. 147) also

12

recorded versions of the event. Thales was alerted by the similarity of the two triangles, the
'quality of proportionality'. He introduced the concept of ratio, and recognized its application as a
general principle. Thales's accomplishment of measuring the height of the pyramid is a beautiful
piece of mathematics. It is considered that the general principle in Euclid I.26 was applied to the
ship at sea problem, would have general application to other distant objects or land features
which posed difficulties in the calculation of their distances.
PROPOSITION III.31: 'The angle in a semicircle is a right angle'. Diogenes Laertius (I.27)
recorded: 'Pamphila states that, having learnt geometry from the Egyptians, [Thales] was the first
to inscribe a right-angled triangle in a circle, whereupon he sacrificed an ox'. Aristotle was
intrigued by the fact that the angle in a semi-circle is always right. In two works, he asked the
question: 'Why is the angle in a semicircle always a right angle?' (An. Post. 94 a2733; Metaph.1051 a28). Aristotle described the conditions which are necessary if the conclusion is
to hold, but did not add anything that assists with this problem.
It is testified that it was from Egypt that Thales acquired the rudiments of geometry. However, the
evidence is that the Egyptian skills were in orientation, measurement, and calculation. Thales's
unique ability was with the characteristics of lines, angles and circles. He recognized, noticed and
apprehended certain principles which he probably 'proved' through repeated demonstration.

10. Crossing the Halys

Herodotus recorded 'the general belief of the Greeks' that Thales assisted Croesus in transporting
his troops across the Halys river (Hdt. I.75) on his advance into Capadoccia to engage the great
Persian conqueror, Cyrus who threatened from the east. Herodotus provided a detailed description
of the reported crossing which many of the Greeks supposed had been accomplished through
Thales's engineering skills and ingenuity (Hdt. I.75). Herodotus had been told that Thales advised
Croesus to divide the river into two parts. The story is that Thales directed the digging so that the
river was diverted into two smaller streams, each of which could then be forded. The story from
Herodotus describes a formation similar to an oxbow lake. The work could have been undertaken
by the men of Croesus's army, and directed by Thales. With both channels then being fordable,
Croesus could lead his army across the Halys. This description complies with 'the general belief of
the Greeks' which Herodotus related.
However, Herodotus did not accept that story, because he believed that bridges crossed the river
at that time (I.74). Herodotus's misgivings were well founded. There is considerable support for
the argument that Croesus and his army crossed the Halys by the bridge which already existed
and travelled by the Royal Road which provided the main access to the East. Herodotus explained
that at the Halys there were gates which had to be passed before one crossed the river, which
formed the border, with the post being strongly guarded (Hdt. V.52).
The town of Cesnir Kopru, or Tcheshnir Keupreu, is a feasible site for a crossing. Before the
industrialization of the area, a mediaeval bridge was observed, underneath which, when the river
was low, could be seen not only the remains of its Roman predecessor but the roughly hewn blocks
of a much earlier bridge (Garstang, 1959, 2). Any clues that may have helped to provide an answer
to the question of whether there were bridges in the time of Croesus are now submerged by the
hydroelectric plants which have been built in the area. Herodotus recorded the details that he had
obtained, but used his own different understanding of the situation to discount the report.

11. The Possible Travels of Thales

13

Establishing whether or not Thales travelled and what countries he visited is important because
we may be able to establish what information he could have acquired from other sources.
In Epinomis987 E) Plato made the point that the Greeks took from foreigners what was of value
and developed their notions into better ideas.
Eudemus, who was one of Aristotle's students, believed that Thales had travelled to Egypt
(Eudemus ap. Proclus, 65.7). A number of ancient sources support that opinion, including
Pamphila who held that he spent time with the Egyptian priests (D.L. I.24), Hieronymus from
whose report we learn that Thales measured the height of the pyramids by the shadow they cast
(D.L. I.27), and Plutarch (De Is. et Os. 131). Thales gave an explanation for the inundation (D.L.
I.37). He may have devised this explanation after witnessing the phenomena, which Herodotus
later described (Hdt. II.97).
By 620 B.C.E., and perhaps earlier, Miletus held a trading concession at Naucratis (Hdt. II.178,
Strab. 17.1.18) on the Canopic mouth of the Nile, and it is possible that Thales visited Egypt on a
trading mission. Travel to Egypt would not have been difficult. Homer had Ulysses sailing from
Crete to the Nile in five days, and Ernle Bradford recently made a similar journey, proving the trip
to be feasible (Bradford, Ulysses Found, 26, and passim). The wealth of Miletus was the result of
its success as a trading centre, and there would have been no difficulty in arranging passage on
one of the many vessels which traded through of Miletus.
Josephus (Contra Apionem I.2) wrote that Thales was a disciple of the Egyptians and the
Chaldeans which suggests that he visited the Near-East. It is thought that Thales visited the
Babylonians and Chaldeans and had access to the astrological records which enabled him to
predict the solar eclipse of 585 B.C.E.
Miletus had founded many colonies around the Mediterranean and especially along the coasts of
the Black Sea. Pliny (HN, V.31.112) gives the number as ninety. The Milesians traded their goods
for raw materials, especially iron and timber, and tunny fish. Strabo made mention of 'a sheepindustry', and the yield of 'soft wool' (Strabo, 12.3.13), and Aristophanes mentioned the fine and
luxurious Milesian wool (Lysistrata, 729; Frogs, 543). The Milesian traders had access to the
hinterland. The land around the mouth of the Halys was fertile, 'productive of everything . . . and
planted with olive trees' (Strabo, 12.3.12-13). Thales was associated with a commercial venture in
the production of olive oil in Miletus and Chios, but his interests may have extended beyond those
two places. Olive oil was a basic item in the Mediterranean diet, and was probably a trading
commodity of some importance to Milesian commerce.
It is likely that Thales was one of the 'great teachers' who, according to Herodotus, visited
Croesus in the Lydian capital, Sardis (Hdt. I.30). From Sardis, he could have joined a caravan to
make the three-month journey along the well used Royal Road (Hdt. V.53), to visit the
observatories in Babylonia, and seek the astronomical knowledge which they had accumulated
over centuries of observation of heavenly phenomena. In about 547 B.C.E. late in his life, Thales
travelled into Cappadocia with Croesus, and, according to some belief, devised a scheme by which
the army of Croesus was able to cross the River Halys. Milesian merchantmen continually plied
the Black Sea, and gaining a passage could have been easily arranged. From any number of ports
Thales could have sought information, and from Sinope he may have ventured on the long journey
to Babylonia, perhaps travelling along the valley of the Tigris, as Xenophon did in 401-399 B.C.E.
In a letter purported to be from Thales to Pherecydes, Thales stated that he and Solon had both
visited Crete, and Egypt to confer with the priests and astronomers, and all over Hellas and Asia
(D.L. I.43-44). All that should be gleaned from such reports, is that travel was not exceptional,
with many reports affirming the visits of mainly notable people to foreign lands. Alcaeus visited

14

Egypt' (Strabo, 1.2.30), and his brother, Antimenidas, served in Judaea in the army of the
Babylonian monarch, King Nebuchadrezzar. Sappho went into exile in Sicily, her brother,Charaxus,
spent some time in Egypt, and a number of friends of Sappho visited Sardis where they lived in
Lydian society. There must have been any number of people who visited foreign lands, about
whom we know nothing.
Very little about the travels of Thales may be stated with certainty, but it seems probable that he
would have sought information from any sources of knowledge and wisdom, particularly the
centres of learning in the Near-East. It is accepted that there was ample opportunity for travel.

12. Milesian School

Thales was the founder of a new school of philosophy (Arist. Metaph. 983 b20). His two fellow
Milesians who also engaged in the new questioning approach to the understanding of the
universe, were Anaximander, his disciple (D.L. I.13), and Anaximenes, who was the disciple of
Anaximander (D.L. II.2). Anaximander was about ten years younger than Thales, but survived him
by only a year, dying in about 545. Anaximenes was born in 585 and died in about 528. Their lives
all overlapped. Through their association they comprised the Milesian School: They all worked on
similar problems, the nature of matter and the nature of change, but they each proposed a
different material as the primary principle, which indicates that there was no necessity to follow
the master's teachings or attribute their discoveries to him. Each proposed a different support for
the earth. Thales was held in high regard for his wisdom, being acclaimed as the most eminent of
the Wise Men of Ancient Greece, but he was not regarded as a god, as Pythagoras was.
Anaximander and Anaximenes were free to pursue their own ideas and to express them in writing.
This surely suggests that they engaged in critical discussion of the theories of each other. The
Greeks are a sociable people, and their willingness to converse brought rewards in knowledge
gained, as Plato remarked (Epinomis, 987E). Critical discussion implies more than familiarity with
other views, and more than mere disagreement with other theories. It is the adoption, or in this
case, the development, of a new style of discussion. It is a procedure which encourages
questioning, debate, explanation, justification and criticism. There was a unique relationship
between the three Milesians and it is highly probable that the critical method developed in the
Milesian School under the leadership of Thales.

13. The Seven Sages of Ancient Greece

The earliest reference to the Seven Sages of Ancient Greece is in Plato's Protagoras in which he
listed seven names: 'A man's ability to utter such remarks [notable, short and compressed] is to be
ascribed to his perfect education. Such men were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of
Priene, Solon of our city [Athens], Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and, last of the traditional
seven, Chilon of Sparta. . . . and you can recognize that character in their wisdom by the short
memorable sayings that fell from each of them' (Protagoras, 342 E-343 A).
Diogenes recorded that 'Thales was the first to receive the name of Sage in the archonship of
Damasias at Athens, when the term was applied to all the Seven Sages, as Demetrius of Phalerum
[born. ca. 350 B.C] mentions in his List of Archons (D.L. I.22). Demetrius cannot have been the
source for Plato, who died when Demetrius was only three years old. Perhaps there was a source
common to both Plato and Demetrius, but it is unknown.
Damasias was archon in 582/1. It may be significant that at this time the Pythian Games were reorganized. More events were added and, for the first time, they were to be held at intervals of four
years, in the third year of the Olympiad, instead of the previous eight-yearly intervals. Whether
there is an association between the re-organization of the Pythian Games and the inauguration of

15

the Seven Sages in not known but, as Pausanias indicates, the Seven were selected from all
around Greece: 'These [the sages] were: from Ionia, Thales of Miletus and Bias of Priene; of the
Aeolians in Lesbos, Pittacus of Mitylene; of the Dorians in Asia, Cleobulus of Lindus; Solon of
Athens and Chilon of Sparta; the seventh sage, according to the list of Plato, the son of Ariston is
not Periander, the son of Cypselus, but Myson of Chenae, a village on Mount Oeta' (Paus. 14.1).
The purpose of Damasias may have been aimed at establishing unity between the city-states.
It is difficult to believe that the Seven all assembled at Delphi, although the dates just allow it.
Plato wrote that their notable maxims were featured at Delphi: 'They [the Sages], assembled
together and dedicated these [short memorable sayings] as the first-fruits of their lore to Apollo in
his Delphic temple, inscribing there those maxims which are on every tongue - "Know thyself' and
"Nothing overmuch" ' (Pl. Prt. 343 A-B).
Plato regarded wise maxims as the most essential of the criteria for a sage, and associated them
with wisdom and with good education, but he has Socrates say: 'Think again of all the ingenious
devices in arts or other achievements, such as you might expect in one of practical ability; you
might remember Thales of Miletus and Anacharsis the Scythian' (Respublica , 600 A). Practical
ability was clearly important.
Several other lists were compiled: Hippobotus (D.L. I.42); Pittacus (D.L. I.42); and Diogenes (D.L.
I.13. They omitted some names and adding others. In his work On the Sages, Hermippus reckons
seventeen, which included most of the names listed by other compilers.
Many commentators state that Thales was named as Sage because of the practical advice he gave
to Miletus in particular, and to Ionia in general. The earlier advice was to his fellow Milesians. In
560, the thirty-five year old Croesus (Hdt. I.25) succeeded his father Alyattes and continued the
efforts begun by his father to subdue the Milesians, but without success. Diogenes tells us that
'when Croesus sent to Miletus offering terms of alliance, [Thales] frustrated the plan' (D.L. I.25).
The second occasion was at an even later date, when the power of Cyrus loomed as a threat from
the east. Thales's advice to the Ionian states was to unite in a political alliance, so that their
unified strength could be a defence against the might of Cyrus. This can hardly have been prior to
550 B.C.E. which is thirty years later than the promulgation of the Seven Sages. Thales was not
named as a Sage because of any political advice which is extant.
One of the few dates in Thales's life which can be known with certainty is the date of the Eclipse
of 585 B.C.E. It brought to a halt the battle being fought between Alyattes and the Mede, Cyaxares
and, in addition, brought peace to the region after 'five years of indecisive warfare' (Hdt. I.74).
The Greeks believed that Thales had predicted the Eclipse, and perhaps even regarded him as
being influential in causing the phenomenon to occur. This was reason enough to declare Thales to
be a man of great wisdom and to designate him as the first of the Seven Sages of Ancient Greece.

14. Corner in Oil

Thales's reputation for wisdom is further enhanced in a story which was related by Aristotle.
(Politics, 1259 a 6-23). Somehow, through observation of the heavenly bodies, Thales concluded
that there would be a bumper crop of olives. He raised the money to put a deposit on the olive
presses of Miletus and Chios, so that when the harvest was ready, he was able to let them out at a
rate which brought him considerable profit. In this way, Thales answered those who reproached
him for his poverty. As Aristotle points out, the scheme has universal application, being nothing
more than a monopoly. There need not have been a bumper harvest for the scheme to have been
successful. It is quite likely that Thales was involved in commercial ventures, possibly the export

16

of olive oil, and Plutarch reported that Thales was said to have engaged in trade (Plut. Vit.
Sol. II.4).

15. The Heritage of Thales

Thales is the first person about whom we know to propose explanations of natural phenomena
which were materialistic rather than mythological or theological. His theories were new, bold,
exciting, comprehensible, and possible of explanation. He did not speak in riddles as did
Heraclitus, and had no need to invent an undefined non-substance, as Anaximander did. Because
he gave no role to mythical beings, Thales's theories could be refuted. Arguments could be put
forward in attempts to discredit them. Thales's hypotheses were rational and scientific. Aristotle
acknowledged Thales as the first philosopher, and criticized his hypotheses in a scientific manner.
The most outstanding aspects of Thales's heritage are: The search for knowledge for its own sake;
the development of the scientific method; the adoption of practical methods and their development
into general principles; his curiosity and conjectural approach to the questions of natural
phenomena - In the sixth century B.C.E., Thales asked the question, 'What is the basic material of
the cosmos?' The answer is yet to be discovered.

16. References and Further Reading

Ernle Bradford. Ulysses Found. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964.
Britton, John P. "An Early Function for Eclipse Magnitudes in Babylonian Astronomy." Centaurus, 32 (1989): 32.
Britton, John P. "Scientific Astronomy in Pre-Seleucid Babylon." Chapter in H.D. Galter, Die Rolle der Astronomy in den
Kulteren Mesopotamiens. Graz: 1993.
Garstang, John and O.R. Gurney. The Geography of the Hittite Empire. Occasional Publications of The British Institute of
Archaeology in Ankara, no. 5. London: The British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, 1959.
Proclus. A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Glenn R
Morrow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
Ptolemy. Ptolemy'snAlmagest. Translated and Annotated by G.J. Toomer. London: Duckworth, 1984.
Snell, Bruno. "Die Nachrichten ber die Lehren des Thales und die Anfnge der griechischen Philosophie - und
Literaturgeschichte." [The News about the Teachings of Thales and the Beginnings of the Greek History of Philosophy and
Literature], Philologus 96 (1944): 170-182.
Steele, John M."Eclipse Prediction in Mesopotamia." Archive for History of Exact Science 54 (5) (2000):421-454.
Stephenson, F. Richard, and L.V. Morrison. "Long-term fluctuations in the Earth's rotation: 700 BC to AD
1990." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London351 (1995): 165-202.

Author Information
Patricia O'Grady
Email: Patricia.OGrady@flinders.edu.au
The Flinders University of South Australia
Australia

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Pythagoras (c. 570c. 495 B.C.E)

The pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Pythagoras must have
been one of the world's greatest persons, but he wrote
nothing, and it is hard to say how much of the doctrine we
know as Pythagorean is due to the founder of the society and
how much is later development. It is also hard to say how
much of what we are told about the life of Pythagoras is
trustworthy; for a mass of legend gathered around his name
at an early date. Sometimes he is represented as a man of
science, and sometimes as a preacher of mystic doctrines,
and we might be tempted to regard one or other of those
characters as alone historical. The truth is that there is no
need to reject either of the traditional views. The union of
mathematical genius and mysticism is common enough.
Originally from Samos, Pythagoras founded at Kroton (in
southern Italy) a society which was at once a religious
community and a scientific school. Such a body was bound to
excite jealousy and mistrust, and we hear of many struggles.
Pythagoras himself had to flee from Kroton to Metapontion, where he died.
It is stated that he was a disciple of Anaximander, his astronomy was the natural development of
Anaximander's. Also, the way in which the Pythagorean geometry developed also bears witness to
its descent from that of Miletos. The great problem at this date was the duplication of the square,
a problem which gave rise to the theorem of the square on the hypotenuse, commonly known still
as the Pythagorean proposition (Euclid, I. 47). If we were right in assuming that Thales worked
with the old 3:4:5 triangle, the connection is obvious.
Pythagoras argued that there are three kinds of men, just as there are three classes of strangers
who come to the Olympic Games. The lowest consists of those who come to buy and sell, and next
above them are those who come to compete. Best of all are those who simply come to look on.
Men may be classified accordingly as lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, and lovers of gain. That
seems to imply the doctrine of the tripartite soul, which is also attributed to the early
Pythagoreans on good authority, though it is common now to ascribe it to Plato. There are,
however, clear references to it before his time, and it agrees much better with the general outlook
of the Pythagoreans. The comparison of human life to a gathering like the Games was often
repeated in later days. Pythagoras also taught the doctrine of Rebirth or transmigration, which we
may have learned from the contemporary Orphics. Xenophanes made fun of him for pretending to
recognize the voice of a departed friend in the howls of a beaten dog. Empedocles seems to be
referring to him when he speaks of a man who could remember what happened ten or twenty
generations before. It was on this that the doctrine of Recollection, which plays so great a part in
Plato, was based. The things we perceive with the senses, Plato argues, remind us of things we
knew when the soul was out of the body and could perceive reality directly.
There is more difficulty about the cosmology of Pythagoras. Hardly any school ever professed such
reverence for its founder's authority as the Pythagoreans. 'The Master said so' was their
watchword. On the other hand, few schools have shown so much capacity for progress and for
adapting themselves to new conditions. Pythagoras started from the cosmical system of
Anaximenes. Aristotle tells us that the Pythagoreans represented the world as inhaling 'air' form
the boundless mass outside it, and this 'air' is identified with 'the unlimited'. When, however, we
come to the process by which things are developed out of the 'unlimited', we observe a great

18

change. We hear nothing more of 'separating out' or even of rarefaction and condensation. Instead
of that we have the theory that what gives form to the Unlimited is the Limit. That is the great
contribution of Pythagoras to philosophy, and we must try to understand it. Now the function of
the Limit is usually illustrated from the arts of music and medicine, and we have seen how
important these two arts were for Pythagoreans, so it is natural to infer that the key to its meaning
is to be found in them.
It may be taken as certain that Pythagoras himself discovered the numerical ratios which
determine the concordant intervals of the musical scale. Similar to musical intervals, in medicine
there are opposites, such as the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, and it is the business of the
physician to produce a proper 'blend' of these in the human body. In a well-known passage of
Plato's Phaedo (86 b) we are told by Simmias that the Pythagoreans held the body to be strung
like an instrument to a certain pitch, hot and cold, wet and dry taking the place of high and low in
music. Musical tuning and health are alike means arising from the application of Limit to the
Unlimited. It was natural for Pythagoras to look for something of the same kind in the world at
large. Briefly stated, the doctrine of Pythagoras was that all things are numbers. In certain
fundamental cases, the early Pythagoreans represented numbers and explained their properties
by means of dots arranged in certain 'figures' or patterns.
Author Information
The author of this article is anonymous. The IEP is actively seeking an author who will write a
replacement article.

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Xenophanes (c. 570c. 478 B.C.E.)

Xenophanes of Colophon was a traveling poet and sage with
philosophical leanings who lived in ancient Greece during the
sixth and the beginning of the fifth centuries B.C.E. There are
a significant number of surviving fragments for such an early
figure, and the poetic verses available to us indicate a broad
range of issues. These include comments on religion,
knowledge, the natural world, the proper comportment at a
banquet, as well as other social teachings and commentary.
Despite his varying interests, he is most commonly
remembered for his critiques of popular religion, particularly
false conceptions of the divine that are a byproduct of the
human propensity to anthropomorphize deities. According to
Xenophanes, humans have been severely mislead by this
tendency, as well as the scriptures of the day, and he seemed
intent on leading his audience toward a perspective on
religion that is based more on rationality and less on
traditionally held beliefs. His theological contributions were
not merely negative, however, for he also presented
comments that support the notion of divine goodness, and many have speculated that he may have
been the first monotheist, or even pantheist, in the Western intellectual tradition. The possibility
that Xenophanes endorsed the perspective of divine unity led Plato and Aristotle to designate him
as the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, and some have classified him (though probably
erroneously) as having been Parmenides teacher.
Many of Xenophanes poetic lines are concerned with the physical world and the fragments show
some very inventive attempts to demythologize various heavenly phenomena. An example of this is
his claim that a rainbow is nothing but a cloud. He also postulated that earth and water are the
fundamental stuffs of nature and, based in part on his observations of fossils, he held the view
that our world has gone through alternating periods of extreme wetness and dryness.
Another area in which Xenophanes made some seminal comments is epistemology. In addition to
endorsing a critical rationality toward religious claims, he encouraged a general humility and
skepticism toward all knowledge claims and he attempted to discourage dogmatic arrogance.
1. Life, Works and Significance
Xenophanes was from a small town of Colophon in Ionia and most recent scholars place the date
of his birth sometime around 570-560 B.C.E. He appeared to live into his nineties, thereby placing
his death sometime after 478 B.C.E. This is indicated by the following lines from one of
Xenophanes remaining fragments, which shows him to still be writing poetry at ninety-two years
of age:
Already there are seven and sixty years tossing about my counsel throughout the land of Greece,
and from my birth up till then there were twenty and five to add to these, if I know how to speak
truly concerning these things. (frag. 8)
He seems to have left his home at an early age and spent much of his life wandering around
Greece, often reciting his poetry at the appropriate functions and gatherings.

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There are 45 remaining fragments of Xenophanes poetry and testimonia about Xenophanes that
have been collected from a wide range of sources. The fragments are in the form of poetic verse,
primarily in hexameters and elegiac meter. A few ancient authors contend that Xenophanes also
wrote a treatise entitled, On Nature, but such sources do not appear to be credible.
Nonetheless, the existing fragments comprise a rather significant collection of work for an early
Greek philosopher. In fact, Xenophanes is the first Pre-Socratic philosopher for whom we have a
significant amount of preserved text. While this amount of material has been helpful in
determining the various themes and concerns of Xenophanes, there are still wide ranging opinions
on the fundamental tenets of his philosophy. Perhaps the greatest impediment to a consistent
understanding of Xenophanes philosophy, states J.H. Lesher, is the frequent disparity between
the opinions he expressed in his poems and those attributed to him in the testimonia. (7)
There is some debate as to whether Xenophanes ought to be included in the philosophical canon
and it is the case that in some surveys of ancient Greek or Pre-Socratic philosophy, Xenophanes is
left out altogether. Many scholars have classified him as basically a poet or a theologian, or even
an irrational mystic. There are several issues working against Xenophanes in this regard. He
apparently did not attract a large number of followers or disciples to his philosophy. He was not
treated particularly favorably by Plato or Aristotle. Plus, given the poetical and polemical nature of
the various fragments, it is also true that Xenophanes did not leave us with anything resembling a
rational justification or argument for some of his claims, which is the sort of thing one would
expect from a philosopher, no matter how early. Nonetheless, to disregard Xenophanes as a
serious philosophical figure would be shortsighted. He did leave us with some rather seminal and
interesting contributions to the history of thought. While it is true that Xenophanes may not fit
into any precise mold or pattern of justification which would classify him as a philosopher of note,
the man and his fragments are deserving of serious philosophical consideration.
2. Social Commentary and Criticism
Much like Socrates, the gadfly of Athens, whom he preceded by over one hundred years, one
picture of Xenophanes that emerges in several of the fragments is that of social critic. Much of
Xenophanes verse was likely intended for performance at social gatherings and functions as he
tossed about, bearing [him]self from city to city (frag 45). In fragment 1 we find a detailed
account of a feast that ends with a call to proper behavior.
And having poured a libation and prayed to be able to do what is rightfor these are obvious
it is not wrong to drink as much as allows any but an aged man to reach his home without a
servants aid.
Praise the man who when he has taken drink brings noble deeds to light, As memory and a
striving for virtue bring to him.
This suggests that while he was welcome among circles of people who had access to the finer
things in life he also felt it his duty to encourage them to comport themselves with piety and
moderation. Elsewhere, we find Xenophanes implying a connection between the downfall of his
hometown with her citizens ostentatious displays of wealth (frag 3). In another of the lengthy
surviving fragments, we find a critique of cultural priorities that like minds have echoed
throughout history. Here Xenophanes bemoans the rewards and reverence afforded champion
athletes while the expertise of the learned and the poets goes unheeded and unappreciated.
For our expertise is better than the strength of men and horses. But this practice makes no sense
nor is it right to prefer strength to this good expertise. For neither if there were a good boxer
among the people
nor if there were a pentathlete or wrestler nor again if there were someone swift afoot

21

which is most honoured of all mens deeds of strength would for this reason a city be better
governed.
Small joy would a city have from this If someone were to be victorious in competing for a prize
on Pisas banks For these do not enrich a citys treasure room. (frag. 2)
3. Religious Views
a. Critique of Greek Religion
Xenophanes is the first Greek figure that we know of to provide a set of theological assertions and
he is perhaps best remembered for his critique of Greek popular religion, specifically the tendency
to anthropomorphize deities. In rather bold fashion, Xenophanes takes to task the scripture of his
day for rendering the gods in such a negative and erroneous light.
Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all sorts of things which are matters of reproach
and censure among men: theft, adultery and mutual deceit. (frag. 11)
This line of criticism against the primary teachers of Greece clearly resonated with Socrates and
Plato where Xenophanes influence can especially be seen in the Euthyphro and book two of
theRepublic. In another set of passages, which are probably the most commonly cited of
Xenophanes fragments, we find a series of argumentatively styled passages against the human
propensity to create gods in our own image:
But mortals suppose that gods are born, wear their own clothes and have a voice and body. (frag.
14)
Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black; Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and
red-haired. (frag. 16) But if horses or oxen or lions had hands or could draw with their hands and
accomplish such works as men, horses would draw the figures of the gods as similar to horses,
and the oxen as similar to oxen,
and they would make the bodies of the sort which each of them had. (frag. 15)
While Xenophanes is obviously targeting our predisposition to anthropomorphize here, he is also
being critical of the tendency of religiously-minded people to privilege their own belief systems
over others for no sound reasons. This would have been particularly true of the Greeks of
Xenophanes time who considered their religious views superior to those of barbarians. As Richard
McKirihan notes, when held up to the critical light of reason, Greek, barbarian, and hypothetical
bovine views of the gods are put on an even footing and cancel each other out, leaving no grounds
to prefer one over the others. This brings them all equally into question. (74) This does not imply
that Xenophanes considered all religious views to be equivalent, but rather it seems to indicate
that he is concerned with leading his Greek audience toward a perspective on religion that is
based more on rationality and less on traditionally held beliefs. So then, what would a more
rational perspective on religion entail? Here Xenophanes offers up a number of theological
insights, both negative and positive.
b. Divine Goodness
As we have seen in fragment 11, Xenophanes upheld the notion that immorality cannot be
associated with a deity. But while Xenophanes is clearly against the portrayals of the Olympian
gods performing illicit deeds, it is less clear as to why he would maintain such a thesis. There are
two possible readings of this. One could first say that, given Xenophanes critique of
anthropomorphizing that is discussed above, he believes that it would make no sense to ascribe to
the gods any sort of human behaviors or characteristics, be they illicit or praiseworthy. On this

22

reading, Xenophanes should be seen as a type of mystic. Another interpretation, which is more
likely, is that Xenophanes upheld the notion of divine perfection and goodness. It is true that
Xenophanes never explicitly states such a position. However, as Lesher points out, such a thesis is
attributed to him by Simplicius, and the belief in the inherent goodness of the gods or god was a
widely shared conviction among many Greek philosophers. (84) Furthermore, such an
interpretation would square with Xenophanes assertion that it is good always to hold the gods in
high regard. (frag. 1)
c. The Nature of the Divine
While it seems clear that Xenophanes advocated the moral goodness of the divine, some of his
other theological assertions are more difficult to discern. There have been a rather wide range of
arguments by scholars that commit Xenophanes to any number of theological positions. Some
scholars have maintained that he was the first Greek philosopher to advocate monotheism while
others have argued that Xenophanes was clearly supporting Olympian polytheism. Some have
attributed pantheism to Xenophanes while others have maintained that he is essentially an atheist
or materialist. Given such a wide discrepancy, it will perhaps be helpful to first list the
fundamental fragments and then move on to the possible specifics of Xenophanes theology.
One god is greatest among gods and men, Not at all like mortals in body or in thought. (frag. 23)
whole he sees, whole he thinks, and whole he hears. (frag. 24) but completely without toil he
shakes all things by the thought of his mind. (frag. 25) always he abides in the same place, not
moving at all, nor is it seemly for him to travel to different places at different times. (frag. 26)
i. Was Xenophanes a Monotheist?
At first glance, the opening line of fragment 23 could be read as a pronouncement of monotheism
and a rejection of Greek polytheism. If so, Xenophanes would have been the first Greek thinker to
espouse such a revolutionary theological perspective. While the phrasing one god
greatest among gods [emphasis mine] would seem to contradict monotheism on the face of it,
scholars from both sides of the debate recognize that this is not an endorsement of polytheism by
Xenophanes. Rather it should be seen as a polar expression, which is a poetic device used to
emphasize a point and does not imply the existence of things at either pole. Nor should the fact
that Xenophanes utilizes the term gods throughout the available fragments be seen as an
endorsement of polytheism in and of itself. It is highly likely that Xenophanes is simply utilizing
the common vernacular to speak of the divine. So the question remains, was Xenophanes a
monotheist?
A great number of traditional and modern sources have attributed monotheism to Xenophanes and
fragments 23-26 would seem to indicate the potential merit of such an assumption. Some have
gone as far as to say that not only was he the first monotheist, but he was also the first to advocate
a radical form of monotheism which insists that the one god is pure spirit and is completely
distinct from the world. In recent years, the staunchest advocate of the monotheistic
interpretation has been Jonathan Barnes who extends Xenophanes rationalistic critique of religion
to its natural end: Xenophanes, I conclude, was a monotheist, as the long tradition has it; and he
was an a priori monotheist; like later Christian theologians, he argued on purely logical grounds
that there could not be a plurality of gods. (92) Given such an interpretation, Barnes maintains
that the enigmatic opening line of fragment 23 should be paraphrased to read, There is one god,
since (by definition) a god is greater than anything else, whether god or man. (92) Other scholars
have ascribed a softer form of monotheism to Xenophanes, maintaining that while he does not
seem to completely abandon polytheism explicitly, he does so implicitly.

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While the designation of Xenophanes as a monotheist is warranted in many respects, such an

interpretation ultimately presumes too much. Given the fact that monotheism would have been a
radical departure from traditional Greek beliefs, we would assume that Xenophanes would have
taken more pains to differentiate and clarify his viewpoint. For one thing, it is highly suspicious
that, while he takes Homer and Hesiod to task for their portrayal of the nature of the gods, he
never bothers to comment on the number of their gods. Furthermore, a true monotheist would not
likely be so cavalier about his use of the plural gods in a polythesitic society. It is likely that later
commentators and scholars have been somewhat biased in their attempts to find in Xenophanes
the early articulations of a now commonly held religious perspective. Guthrie puts the matter in
perspective: it must be understood that the question of monotheism or polytheism, which is of
vital religious importance to the Christian, Jew or Muslim, never had the same prominence in the
Greek mind. (375) As such, the best summary of the complexity of the monotheistic question is
presented to us by Lesher: The fragments warrant attributing to Xenophanes the novel idea of a
single god of unusual power, consciousness, and cosmic influence, but not the stronger view that
beyond this one god there could be nothing else worthy of the name. (99)
ii. Was Xenophanes an Immaterialist?
In the second line of fragment 23, Xenophanes declares that god is unlike mortals in body and
thought. Although some of the ancient testimonia have interpreted this to mean that god lacks a
body, this should not be read as an attempt by Xenophanes to put forth the claim that the divine is
incorporeal, for it would be some time before the concept of an existing thing that is completely
immaterial would develop. As McKirahan, notes, the fifth-century atomists were the first
presocratics clearly to conceive of an immaterial, noncorporeal existing thing, and this idea came
only with difficulty. (63) Rather than reading these lines as an expression of the incorporeal
nature of the divine, these passages should be interpreted as a continuation of Xenophanes efforts
to correct the mistaken conceptions of divine nature that have been passed on from Homer and
Hesiod. In fragment 25, for example, Xenophanes introduces a god who effortlessly, shakes all
things by the thought of his mind. Readers or hearers of this passage would immediately
recognize Xenophanes dramatic corollary to a famous portrayal of Zeus in the Illiad who simply
shakes his head to display his will and power. By contrast, a truly supreme god exerts will and
power without any toil whatsoever, according to Xenophanes.
iii. Was Xenophanes a Pantheist?
If Xenophanes cannot be read as an immaterialist then we may rightly question what sort of body
unlike mortals can be attributed to the divine? Numerous writers, both ancient and modern,
attribute to Xenophanes the viewpoint that god is spherical and identical with the universe. In
Ciceros Prior Academics, for example we find the following passage: (Xenophanes said that) all
things are one, that this is unchanging, and is god, that this never came into being and is eternal,
and has a spherical shape. (2.18) In another source, Theodoretus Treatment of Greek Afflictions,
we find this statement: Accordingly Xenophanes, the son of Orthomenes from Colophon, leader of
the Eleatic School, said that the whole is one, spherical, and limited, not generated but eternally
and totally motionless. (4.5) More recently, Guthrie concludes after a careful analysis of recent
texts that, for Xenophanes the cosmos was a spherical body, living, conscious, and divine, the
cause of its own internal movements and change. He was in the Ionian tradition. (382)
One should not contradict such formidable scholarship lightly, but the fact of the matter is that
there is no basis for the spherical/pantheistic interpretation in the fragments that are available to
us. In fact, it is difficult to square the claims of pantheism with fragment 25, in which god shakes
all things by the thought of his mind; it is perhaps even trickier to square the notion of a

24

spherical god with another one of Xenophanes fragments in which he declares, The upper limit
of the earth is seen here at our feet, pushing up against the air, but that below goes on without
limits (frag. 28). Lesher, who has provided us with the most balanced and careful analysis of this
question in recent years, makes a convincing case that the development of the
spherical/pantheistic interpretation was spawned in part by a confused assimilation of
Xenophanes philosophy with that of Parmenides, misled by superficial similarities between
Xenophanes god and Parmenides one Being, and relying on an overly optimistic reading of some
cryptic comments by Plato (Sophist 242c-d) and Aristotle (Metaphysics 986b10ff) (100-101). In
other words, the doxographical tradition seems to be guilty of viewing Xenophanes conception of
the divine through a series of lenses that, when stacked upon each other, distort the original
picture.
4. Natural and Scientific Views
The physical theories of Xenophanes have been ignored in much of the ancient literature, due in
large part to the influence of Aristotle. According to The Philosopher, Xenophanes is to be
classified as a theological theorist rather than a student of nature. As the fragments indicate,
however, Xenophanes was indeed quite interested in theorizing about the natural world, and while
his ideas are rather rudimentary by current standards, they do show a level of sophistication and
coherence not always appreciated by his successors. As Lesher indicates: We must then
recognize the distinct possibility that Aristotle failed to mention Xenophanes physical views not
because there were none to mention but because Aristotle regarded Xenophanes as insufficiently
interested and engaged in physical theorizing to warrant discussion. (127) Another reason for the
disregard is that Xenophanes did not provide the kind of teleologically based insights into the
natural phenomena that successors such as Plato and Aristotle would have desired. In any case,
the physical theories of Xenophanes deserve more serious attention than they have been afforded
historically.
a. Earth and Water as Fundamental
Xenophanes speculations on the physical world need to be understood within the context of his
predecessors, the Milesian philosophers (Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander). As the first
metaphysicians, the Milesians attempted to determine the first principle or arche of reality. To
briefly summarize for our purposes here, each of the Milesians postulated one primary principle
(arche) as the source of everything else. For Thales, the arche was water. For Anaximenes, air was
fundamental and all the other apparent stuffs of reality could be accounted for by a principle of
condensation and rarefaction. For Anaximander, none of the traditional elements would suffice,
and he identified the source of all things as a boundless or indefinite stuff termed apeiron.
Xenophanes sought to expand and improve upon the work of his predecessors, and instead of
limiting his speculations to one stuff, or substance, his theory is based upon the interplay of two
substances, earth and water. All things that come into being and grow are earth and water. (frag.
29) According to the historical sources, Xenophanes seems to have held that the opposition of wet
and dry in the world is the preeminent explanatory basis for the phenomena of the natural world.
In Hippolytus Refutation of All Heresies (1.14), for example, we are told that Xenophanes held
that the history of the natural world has been a continually alternating process of extreme dryness
and wetness. At the point of extreme wetness, the earth sinks completely into mud and all humans
perish. Once the world begins to dry out there is a period of regeneration in which life on earth
begins again. Xenophanes developed this theory based upon a wide variety of empirical evidence,
particularly his examination of fossils. Again, a key source for this is Hippolytus, who discussed
how Xenophanes gathered the proof for this thesis from the existence of various fossilized

25

imprints of sea creatures as well as sea shells that are found far inland. It should be noted that
what is significant about his viewpoint is not so much the conclusion at which he arrives, but
rather the process he utilizes to support it. Prior thinkers had speculated on the possibility that
the earth had been reduced to mud, but Xenophanes seems to have been the first to provide
empirical evidence coupled with deduction to support and develop his theory. Thus, not only was
Xenophanes probably the first to draw attention to the real significance of fossils (Kirk 177), we
also find in him the beginnings of a scientific methodology.
b. Demythologizing Heavenly Phenomena
Although we do not have much by way of direct statements from Xenophanes, there is a good deal
of ancient testimonia that references his astronomical and meteorological views, particularly his
emphasis on the clouds and their explanatory role for various phenomena. According to a variety
of sources, Xenophanes seems to have held the view that the sun comes into beingperhaps
newly each dayeither by a collection of ignited clouds (according to some) or by pieces of fiery
earth. Students of early Greek philosophy will recognize the similarity to Heraclitus in this theory.
It is commonly accepted that Xenophanes was an influential figure in the development of
Heraclitus ideas. As such it is somewhat difficult to determine whether Xenophanes position here
is authentic, or whether the ancient sources are reading Xenophanes through Heraclitus.
Nevertheless, the historical speculation seems somewhat justified, particularly given the fact that
Xenophanes proposed the view that the clouds were responsible for various heavenly phenomena.
A key passage in this regard is fragment 32, where Xenophanes explains a rainbow: And she
whom they call Iris, this too is by nature a cloud, purple, red and greenish-yellow to behold.
Other instances where Xenophanes provides a natural explanation for what had been considered
supernatural manifestations are in reference to stars as well as the phenomenon known as St.
Elmos Fire (or Dioscuri) which is produced by glimmering clouds.
Further evidence of Xenophanes demythologizing tendencies occurs in the following passage:
The sea is the source of water and of wind, for without the great sea there would be no wind
nor streams of rivers nor rainwater from on high; but the great sea is the begetter of clouds,
winds,
and rivers. (frag. 30)
It would have been natural for someone who had lived his life around bodies of water to make
several observations about streams, winds and mists. What is lacking from Xenophanes and the
traditional accounts is any clear explanation for why he held these beliefs. Why, for instance, did
he think that the sea produced clouds and wind? Thus, as a purely scientific account, Xenophanes
theory is lacking. Nevertheless, the true significance of this fragment becomes evident when it is
read against the backdrop of Homeric poetry. As such, the true significance lies not in what the
lines attempt to explain, but rather in what they attempt to explain away. Without explicitly
announcing their banishment, As Lesher indicates, Xenophanes has dispatched an array of
traditional sea, river, cloud, wind, and rain deities (hence Zeus himself) to the explanatory
sidelines. (137) While Xenophanes is repeating ideas that had earlier been developed by
Anaximander and Anaximenes, it is significant that he is carrying forward the criticism of
traditional Homeric notions, particularly lines in the Iliad, which characterize Oceanus as the
source of all waterrivers, sea, springs and wellsand they declare that the sea is the source not
only of rivers but also of rain wind and clouds. (Guthrie 391). Ironically, Xenophanes value free
speculations on the natural world, while a goal of scientific inquiry today, guaranteed that his
physical theorizing would be disregarded by Plato and Aristotle.
5. Critique of Knowledge

26

According to many scholars, none of what Xenophanes has said up to this point would qualify him
as a philosopher in the strict sense. It is Xenophanes contribution to epistemology, however, that
ultimately seems to have earned him a place in the philosophical canon from a traditional
standpoint. We have already seen how Xenophanes applies a critical rationality to the divine
claims of his contemporaries, but he also advanced a skeptical outlook toward human knowledge
in general.
and of course the clear and certain truth no man has seen
nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I say about all things.
For even if, in the best case, one happened to speak just of what has been brought to pass,
still he himself would not know. But opinion is allotted to all. (frag. 34)
If these statements are to be readper many of the later skepticsas a blanket claim that would
render all positions meaningless, then it is difficult to see how anything Xenophanes has said up to
this point should be taken with any seriousness or sincerity. How could Xenophanes put forth this
kind of skepticism and be assured that the poets were wrong to portray the gods the way that they
have, for instance? As such, a more charitable interpretation of these lines would seem to be in
order.
A better reading of Xenophanes skeptical statements is to see them not as an attack on the
possibility of knowledge per se, but rather as a charge against arrogance and dogmatism,
particularly with regard to matters that we cannot directly experience. The human realm of
knowledge is limited by what can be observed. If, for example, god had not made yellow honey
[we] would think that figs were much sweeter. (frag. 38) Therefore, broad based speculations on
the workings of the divine and the cosmos are ultimately matters of opinion. Although some
opinions would seem to square better with how things ought to be understood through rational
thinking and our experiences of the world (keeping with Xenophanes earlier statements against
the poets), any thoughts on such matters should be tempered by humility. Accordingly, F.R.
Pickering notes, Xenophanes is a natural epistemologist, who claims that statements concerning
the non-evident realm of the divine as well as the far-reaching generalizations of natural sciences
cannot be known with certainty but must remain the objects of opinion. (233) Unfortunately,
Xenophanes does not develop his critical empiricism, nor does he explain or examine how our
various opinions might receive further justification. Still, just as the poet philosopher has provided
us with some meaningful warnings toward our tendency to anthropomorphize our deities, the poet
philosopher is also warning us against our natural human proclivity to confuse dogmatism with
piety.
6. References and Further Reading
Barnes, Jonathan. The Presocratic Philosophers: Volume 1. London, Henley and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.
Classen, C. Joachim. Xenophanes and the Tradition of Epic Poetry. Ionian Philosophy. Ed. K.J. Boudouris. Athens:
International Association for Greek Philosophy: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1989: 91-103.
Cleve, Felix M. The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy. Vol 1. 2nd ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
Frnkel, Hermann. Xenophanes Empiricism and His Critique of Knowledge. The Presocratics: A Collection of Critical
Essays. Ed. Alexander P.D. Mourelatos. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press Doubleday, 1974: 118-31.
Guthrie, W.K.C. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.
Kirk, G.S., J.E. Raven and M. Schofield. The Presocratic Philosophers. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1983.

27

Lesher, J.H. Xeonphanes of Colophon: Fragments: A Text and Translation with Commentary. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1992.
Lesher provides an excellent translation, commentary and analysis of Xenophanes. This is most thorough and balanced
treatment of Xenophanes available in English.
Lesher, J.H. Xenophanes Skepticism. Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Vol. 2. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1983: 20-40
McKirahan, Richard D. Philosophy before Socrates. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994.
Pickering, F.R. Xenophanes. The Classical Review. Vol. 43, No. 2. 1993: 232-233.
Stokes, Michael C. One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Vlastos, Gregory. Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought. The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 7. 1952: 97123.

Author Information
Michael Patzia
patziam@central.edu
Central College
U. S. A.

28

Heraclitus (fl. c. 500 B.C.E.)

A Greek philosopher of the late 6th century BCE, Heraclitus
criticizes his predecessors and contemporaries for their
failure to see the unity in experience. He claims to announce
an everlasting Word (Logos) according to which all things are
one, in some sense. Opposites are necessary for life, but they
are unified in a system of balanced exchanges. The world
itself consists of a law-like interchange of elements,
symbolized by fire. Thus the world is not to be identified with
any particular substance, but rather with an ongoing process
governed by a law of change. The underlying law of nature
also manifests itself as a moral law for human beings.
Heraclitus is the first Western philosopher to go beyond
physical theory in search of metaphysical foundations and moral applications.
1. Life and Times
Heraclitus lived in Ephesus, an important city on the Ionian coast of Asia Minor, not far from
Miletus, the birthplace of philosophy. We know nothing about his life other than what can be
gleaned from his own statements, for all ancient biographies of him consist of nothing more than
inferences or imaginary constructions based on his sayings. Although Plato thought he wrote
afterParmenides, it is more likely he wrote before Parmenides. For he criticizes by name important
thinkers and writers with whom he disagrees, and he does not mention Parmenides. On the other
hand, Parmenides in his poem arguably echoes the words of Heraclitus. Heraclitus criticizes the
mythographers Homer and Hesiod, as well as the philosophers Pythagoras and Xenophanes and
the historian Hecataeus. All of these figures flourished in the 6th century BCE or earlier,
suggesting a date for Heraclitus in the late 6th century. Although he does not speak in detail of his
political views in the extant fragments, Heraclitus seems to reflect an aristocratic disdain for the
masses and favor the rule of a few wise men, for instance when he recommends that his fellowcitizens hang themselves because they have banished their most prominent leader (DK22B121 in
the Diels-Kranz collection of Presocratic sources).
2. Theory of Knowledge
Heraclitus sees the great majority of human beings as lacking understanding:
Of this Word's being forever do men prove to be uncomprehending, both before they hear and
once they have heard it. For although all things happen according to this Word they are like the
unexperienced experiencing words and deeds such as I explain when I distinguish each thing
according to its nature and declare how it is. Other men are unaware of what they do when they
are awake just as they are forgetful of what they do when they are asleep. (DK22B1)
Most people sleep-walk through life, not understanding what is going on about them. Yet
experience of words and deeds can enlighten those who are receptive to their meaning. (The
opening sentence is ambiguous: does the 'forever' go with the preceding or the following words?
Heraclitus prefigures the semantic complexity of his message.)
On the one hand, Heraclitus commends sense experience: "The things of which there is sight,
hearing, experience, I prefer" (DK22B55). On the other hand, "Poor witnesses for men are their
eyes and ears if they have barbarian souls" (DK22B107). A barbarian is one who does not speak
the Greek language. Thus while sense experience seems necessary for understanding, if we do not

29

know the right language, we cannot interpret the information the senses provide. Heraclitus does
not give a detailed and systematic account of the respective roles of experience and reason in
knowledge. But we can learn something from his manner of expression.
Describing the practice of religious prophets, Heraclitus says, "The Lord whose oracle is at Delphi
neither reveals nor conceals, but gives a sign" (DK22B93). Similarly, Heraclitus does not reveal or
conceal, but produces complex expressions that have encoded in them multiple messages for
those who can interpret them. He uses puns, paradoxes, antitheses, parallels, and various
rhetorical and literary devices to construct expressions that have meanings beyond the obvious.
This practice, together with his emphasis on the Word (Logos) as an ordering principle of the
world, suggests that he sees his own expressions as imitations of the world with its structural and
semantic complexity. To read Heraclitus the reader must solve verbal puzzles, and to learn to solve
these puzzles is to learn to read the signs of the world. Heraclitus stresses the inductive rather
than the deductive method of grasping the world, a world that is rationally structured, if we can
but discern its shape.
For those who can discern it, the Word has an overriding message to impart: "Listening not to me
but to the Word it is wise to agree that all things are one" (DK22B50). It is perhaps Heraclitus's
chief project to explain in what sense all things are one.
3. The Doctrine of Flux and the Unity of Opposites
According to both Plato and Aristotle, Heraclitus held extreme views that led to logical
incoherence. For he held that (1) everything is constantly changing and (2) opposite things are
identical, so that (3) everything is and is not at the same time. In other words, Universal Flux and
the Identity of Opposites entail a denial of the Law of Non-Contradiction. Plato indicates the
source of the flux doctrine: "Heraclitus, I believe, says that all things go and nothing stays, and
comparing existents to the flow of a river, he says you could not step twice into the same
river"(Cratylus 402a = DK22A6).
What Heraclitus actually says is the following:
On those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters flow. (DK22B12)
There is an antithesis between 'same' and 'other.' The sentence says that different waters flow in
rivers staying the same. In other words, though the waters are always changing, the rivers stay
the same. Indeed, it must be precisely because the waters are always changing that there are
rivers at all, rather than lakes or ponds. The message is that rivers can stay the same over time
even though, or indeed because, the waters change. The point, then, is not that everything is
changing, but that the fact that some things change makes possible the continued existence
of other things. Perhaps more generally, the change in elements or constituents supports the
constancy of higher-level structures.As for the alleged doctrine of the Identity of Opposites,
Heraclitus does believe in some kind of unity of opposites. For instance, "God is day night, winter
summer, war peace, satiety hunger . . ." (DK22B67). But if we look closer, we see that the unity in
question is not identity:
As the same thing in us is living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old. For these things
having changed around are those, and conversely those having changed around are these.
(DK22B88)
The second sentence in B88 gives the explanation for the first. If F is the same as G because F
turns into G, then the two are not identical. And Heraclitus insists on the common-sense truth of

30

change: "Cold things warm up, the hot cools off, wet becomes dry, dry becomes wet" (DK22B126).
This sort of mutual change presupposes the non-identity of the terms. What Heraclitus wishes to
maintain is not the identity of opposites but the fact that they replace each other in a series of
transformations: they are interchangeable or transformationally equivalent.
Thus, Heraclitus does not hold Universal Flux, but recognizes a lawlike flux of elements; and he
does not hold the Identity of Opposites, but the Transformational Equivalence of Opposites. The
views that he does hold do not, jointly or separately, entail a denial of the Law of NonContradiction. Heraclitus does, to be sure, make paradoxical statements, but his views are no
more self-contradictory than are the paradoxical claims of Socrates. They are, presumably, meant
to wake us up from our dogmatic slumbers.
4. Criticism of Ionian Philosophy
Heraclitus' theory can be understood as a response to the philosophy of his Ionian predecessors.
The philosophers of the city of Miletus (near Ephesus), Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes,
believed some original material turns into all other things. The world as we know it is the orderly
articulation of different stuffs produced out of the original stuff. For the Milesians, to explain the
world and its phenomena was just to show how everything came from the original stuff, such as
Thales' water or Anaximenes' air.
Heraclitus seems to follow this pattern of explanation when he refers to the world as "everliving
fire" (DK22B30, quoted in full in next section) and makes statements such as "Thunderbolt steers
all things," alluding to the directive power of fire (DK22B64). But fire is a strange stuff to make the
origin of all things, for it is the most inconstant and changeable. It is, indeed, a symbol of change
and process. Heraclitus observes,
All things are an exchange for fire, and fire for all things, as goods for gold and gold for goods.
(DK22B90)
We can measure all things against fire as a standard; there is an equivalence between all things
and gold, but all things are not identical to gold. Similarly, fire provides a standard of value for
other stuffs, but it is not identical to them. Fire plays an important role in Heraclitus' system, but
it is not the unique source of all things, because all stuffs are equivalent.
Ultimately, fire may be more important as a symbol than as a stuff. Fire is constantly changing-but
so is every other stuff. One thing is transformed into another in a cycle of changes. What is
constant is not some stuff, but the overall process of change itself. There is a constant law of
transformations, which is, perhaps, to be identified with the Logos. Heraclitus may be saying that
the Milesians correctly saw that one stuff turns into another in a series, but they incorrectly
inferred from this that some one stuff is the source of everything else. But if A is the source of B
and B of C, and C turns back into B and then A, then B is likewise the source of A and C, and C is
the source of A and B. There is no particular reason to promote one stuff at the expense of the
others. What is important about the stuffs is that they change into others. The one constant in the
whole process is the law of change by which there is an order and sequence to the changes. If this
is what Heraclitus has in mind, he goes beyond the physical theory of his early predecessors to
arrive at something like a process philosophy with a sophisticated understanding of metaphysics.
5. Physical Theory
Heraclitus' criticisms and metaphysical speculations are grounded in a physical theory. He
expresses the principles of his cosmology in a single sentence:

31

This world-order, the same of all, no god nor man did create, but it ever was and is and will be:
everliving fire, kindling in measures and being quenched in measures. (DK22B30)
This passage contains the earliest extant philosophical use of the word kosmos, "world-order,"
denoting the organized world in which we live, with earth, sea, atmosphere, and heavens. While
ancient sources understand Heraclitus as saying the world comes to be and then perishes in a
fiery holocaust, only to be born again (DK22A10), the present passage seems to contradict this
reading: the world itself does not have a beginning or end. Parts of it are being consumed by fire
at any given time, but the whole remains. Almost all other early cosmologists before and after
Heraclitus explained the existence of the ordered world by recounting its origin out of elemental
stuffs. Some also predicted the extinction of the world. But Heraclitus, the philosopher of flux,
believes that as the stuffs turn into one another, the world itself remains stable. How can that be?
Heraclitus explains the order and proportion in which the stuffs change:
The turnings of fire: first sea, and of sea, half is earth, half firewind (prstr: some sort of fiery
meteorological phenomenon). (DK22B31a)
Sea is liquefied and measured into the same proportion as it had before it became earth.
(DK22B31b)
Fire is transformed into water ("sea") of which half turns back into fire ("firewind") and half into
earth. Thus there is a sequence of stuffs: fire, water, earth, which are interconnected. When earth
turns back into sea, it occupies the same volume as it had before it turned into earth. Thus we can
recognize a primitive law of conservation-not precisely conservation of matter, at least the identity
of the matter is not conserved, nor of mass, but at least an equivalence of matter is maintained.
Although the fragments do not give detailed information about Heraclitus' physics, it seems likely
that the amount of water that evaporates each day is balanced by the amount of stuff that
precipitates as water, and so on, so that a balance of stuffs is maintained even though portions of
stuff are constantly changing their identity.
For Heraclitus, flux and opposition are necessary for life. Aristotle reports,
Heraclitus criticizes the poet who said, 'would that strife might perish from among gods and men'
[Homer Iliad 18.107]' for there would not be harmony without high and low notes, nor living
things without female and male, which are opposites. (DK22A22)
Heraclitus views strife or conflict as maintaining the world:
We must recognize that war is common and strife is justice, and all things happen according to
strife and necessity. (DK22B80)
War is the father of all and king of all, who manifested some as gods and some as men, who made
some slaves and some freemen. (DK22B53)
In a tacit criticism of Anaximander, Heraclitus rejects the view that cosmic justice is designed to
punish one opposite for its transgressions against another. If it were not for the constant conflict
of opposites, there would be no alternations of day and night, hot and cold, summer and winter,
even life and death. Indeed, if some things did not die, others would not be born. Conflict does not
interfere with life, but rather is a precondition of life.
As we have seen, for Heraclitus fire changes into water and then into earth; earth changes into
water and then into fire. At the level of either cosmic bodies (in which sea turns into fiery storms
on the one hand and earth on the other) or domestic activities (in which, for instance, water boils

32

out of a pot), there is constant flux among opposites. To maintain the balance of the world, we
must posit an equal and opposite reaction to every change. Heraclitus observes,
The road up and down is one and the same. (DK22B60)
Here again we find a unity of opposites, but no contradiction. One road is used to pursue two
different routes. Daily traffic carries some travelers out of the city, while it brings some back in.
The image applies equally to physical theory: as earth changes to fire, fire changes to earth. And it
may apply to psychology and other domains as well.
6. Moral and Political Theory
There has been some debate as to whether Heraclitus is chiefly a philosopher of nature (a view
championed by G. S. Kirk) or a philosopher concerned with the human condition (C. H. Kahn). The
opening words of Heraclitus' book (DK22B1, quoted above) seem to indicate that he will expound
the nature of things in a way that will have profound implications for human life. In other words,
he seems to see the theory of nature and the human condition as intimately connected. In fact,
recently discovered papyri have shown that Heraclitus is concerned with technical questions of
astronomy, not only with general theory. There is no reason, then, to think of him as solely a
humanist or moral philosopher. On the other hand, it would be wrong to think of him as a
straightforward natural philosopher in the manner of other Ionian philosophers, for he is deeply
concerned with the moral implications of physical theory.
Heraclitus views the soul as fiery in nature:
To souls it is death to become water, to water death to become earth, but from earth water is born,
and from water soul. (DK22B36)
Soul is generated out of other substances just as fire is. But it has a limitless dimension:
If you went in search of it, you would not find the boundaries of the soul, though you traveled
every road-so deep is its measure [logos]. (DK22B45)
Drunkenness damages the soul by causing it to be moist, while a virtuous life keeps the soul dry
and intelligent. Souls seem to be able to survive death and to fare according to their character.
The laws of a city-state are an important principle of order:
The people [of a city] should fight for their laws as they would for their city wall. (DK22B44)
Speaking with sense we must rely on a common sense of all things, as a city relies on its wall, and
much more reliably. For all human laws are nourished by the one divine law. For it prevails as far
as it will and suffices for all and overflows. (DK22B114)
The laws provide a defense for a city and its way of life. But the laws are not merely of local
interest: they derive their force from a divine law. Here we see the notion of a law of nature that
informs human society as well as nature. There is a human cosmos that like the natural cosmos
reflects an underlying order. The laws by which human societies are governed are not mere
conventions, but are grounded in the ultimate nature of things. One cannot break a human law
with impunity. The notion of a law-like order in nature has antecedents in the theory of
Anaximander, and the notion of an inherent moral law influences the Stoics in the 3rd century
BCE.

33

Heraclitus recognizes a divine unity behind the cosmos, one that is difficult to identify and
perhaps impossible to separate from the processes of the cosmos:
The wise, being one thing only, would and would not take the name of Zeus [or: Life]. (DK22B32)
God is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger, and it alters just as when it is mixed
with incense is named according to the aroma of each. (DK22B67)
Evidently the world either is god, or is a manifestation of the activity of god, which is somehow to
be identified with the underlying order of things. God can be thought of as fire, but fire, as we
have seen, is constantly changing, symbolic of transformation and process. Divinity is present in
the world, but not as a conventional anthropomorphic being such as the Greeks worshiped.
7. Accomplishments and Influence
Heraclitus goes beyond the natural philosophy of the other Ionian philosophers to make profound
criticisms and develop far-reaching implications of those criticisms. He suggests the first
metaphysical foundation for philosophical speculation, anticipating process philosophy. And he
makes human values a central concern of philosophy for the first time. His aphoristic manner of
expression and his manner of propounding general truths through concrete examples remained
unique.
Heraclitus's paradoxical exposition may have spurred Parmenides' rejection of Ionian
philosophy.Empedocles and some medical writers echoed Heraclitean themes of alteration and
ongoing process, while Democritus imitated his ethical observations. Influenced by the teachings
of the Heraclitean Cratylus, Plato saw the sensible world as exemplifying a Heraclitean flux. Plato
and Aristotle both criticized Heraclitus for a radical theory that led to a denial of the Law of NonContradiction. The Stoics adopted Heraclitus's physical principles as the basis for their theories.
8. References and Further Reading
Barnes, Jonathan. The Presocratic Philosophers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, vol. 1, ch. 4.
Uses modern arguments to defend the traditional view, going back to Plato and Aristotle, that Heraclitus' commitment to
the flux doctrine and the identity of opposites results in an incoherent theory.
Graham, Daniel W. "Heraclitus' Criticism of Ionian Philosophy." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 15 (1997): 1-50.
Defends Heraclitus against the traditional view held by Barnes and others, and argues that his theory can be understood as
a coherent criticism of earlier Ionian philosophy.
Hussey, Edward. "Epistemology and Meaning in Heraclitus." Language and Logos. Ed. M. Schofield and M. C. Nussbaum.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982. 33-59.
Studies Heraclitus' theory of knowledge.
Kahn, Charles H. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979.
An important reassessment of Heraclitus that recognizes the literary complexity of his language as a key to interpreting his
message. Focuses on Heraclitus as a philosopher of the human condition.
Kirk, G. S. Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1954.
Focuses on Heraclitus as a natural philosopher.
Marcovich, Miroslav. Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary. Merida, Venezuela: U. of the Andes, 1967.
A very thorough edition of Heraclitus, which effectively sorts out fragments from reports and reactions.

34

Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Things." Exegesis and Argument. Ed.
E. N. Lee et al. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973. 16-48.
Examines Heraclitus' response to the pre-philosophical understanding of things.
Nussbaum, Martha C. "Psych in Heraclitus." Phronesis 17 (1972): 1-16, 153-70.
Good treatment of Heraclitus' conception of soul.
Robinson, T. M. Heraclitus: Fragments. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1987.
Good brief edition with commentary.
Vlastos, Gregory. "On Heraclitus." American Journal of Philology 76 (1955): 337-68. Reprinted in G. Vlastos,Studies in
Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, Princeton: Princeton U. Pr., 1995.
Vigorous defense of the traditional interpretation of Heraclitus against Kirk and others.

Author Information
Daniel W. Graham
Email: daniel_graham@byu.edu
Brigham Young University
U. S. A.

35

B. THE ELEATICS PHILOSOPHERS:

Change and Diversity Where Just Illusion
Parmenides of Elea (Late 6th cn.Mid 5th cn. B.C.E.)
Parmenides of Elea was a Presocratic Greek philosopher. As
the first philosopher to inquire into the nature of existence
itself, he is incontrovertibly credited as the Father of
Metaphysics. As the first to employ deductive, a
prioriarguments to justify his claims, he competes with
Aristotle for the title Father of Logic. He is also commonly
thought of as the founder of the Eleatic School of thought
a philosophical label ascribed to Presocratics who
purportedly argued that reality is in some sense a unified
and unchanging singular entity. This has often been
understood to mean there is just one thing in all of existence.
In light of this questionable interpretation, Parmenides has
traditionally been viewed as a pivotal figure in the history of
philosophy: one who challenged the physical systems of his
predecessors and set forth for his successors the
metaphysical criteria any successful system must meet.
Other thinkers, also commonly thought of as Eleatics,
include: Zeno of Elea, Melissus of Samos, and (more
controversially) Xenophanes of Colophon.
Parmenides only written work is a poem entitled, supposedly, but likely erroneously, On
Nature.Only a limited number of fragments (more precisely, quotations by later authors) of his
poem are still in existence, which have traditionally been assigned to three main sections
Proem, Reality(Altheia), and Opinion (Doxa). The Proem (prelude) features a young man on a
cosmic (perhaps spiritual) journey in search of enlightenment, expressed in traditional Greek
religious motifs and geography. This is followed by the central, most philosophically-oriented
section (Reality). Here, Parmenides positively endorses certain epistemic guidelines for inquiry,
which he then uses to argue for his famous metaphysical claimsthat what is (whatever is
referred to by the word this) cannot be in motion, change, come-to-be, perish, lack uniformity,
and so forth. The final section (Opinion) concludes the poem with a theogonical and cosmogonical
account of the world, which paradoxically employs the very phenomena (motion, change, and so
forth) that Realityseems to have denied. Furthermore, despite making apparently true claims (for
example, the moon gets its light from the sun), the account offered in Opinion is supposed to be
representative of the mistaken opinions of mortals, and thus is to be rejected on some level.
All three sections of the poem seem particularly contrived to yield a cohesive and unified thesis.
However, discerning exactly what that thesis is supposed to be has proven a vexing, perennial
problem since ancient times. Even Plato expressed reservations as to whether Parmenides noble
depth could be understood at alland Plato possessed Parmenides entire poem, a blessing
denied to modern scholars. Although there are many important philological and philosophical
questions surrounding Parmenides poem, the central question for Parmenidean studies is
addressing how the positively-endorsed, radical conclusions of Reality can be adequately
reconciled with the seemingly contradictory cosmological account Parmenides rejects
in Opinion. The primary focus of this article is to provide the reader with sufficient background to
appreciate this interpretative problem and the difficulties with its proposed solutions.

36

1. Life
As with other ancient figures, little can be said about Parmenides life with much confidence. It is
certain that his hometown was Elea (Latin: Velia)a Greek settlement along the Tyrrhenian coast
of the Appenine Peninsula, just south of the Bay of Salerno, now located in the modern
municipality (comune) of Ascea, Italy. Herodotus reports that members of the Phocaean tribe
established this settlement ca. 540-535 B.C.E., and thus Parmenides was of Ionian stock (1.167.3).
Parmenides father, a wealthy aristocrat named Pyres, was probably one of the original colonizers
(Coxon Test. 40-41a, 96, 106).
When exactly Parmenides was born is far more controversial. There are two competing methods
for dating Parmenides birth, to either 540 (Diogenes Laertius) or 515 (Plato) B.C.E. Neither
account is clearly convincing in-itself, and scholars are divided on their reliability and veracity.
The source for Parmenides earlier birthdate (c. 540 B.C.E.) is based upon a relatively late (3 rd cn.
C.E.) doxographical account by Diogenes, who relied on Apollodorus (2 nd cn. B.C.E.) writings. This
account claims Parmenides flourisheda euphemism conventionally understood to correspond
with having reached forty years of age, and/or the height of ones intellectual careerduring the
sixty-ninth Olympiad (between 504-500 B.C.E.). The reliability of this account is esteemed for its
historical focus (as opposed to any philosophical agenda) of these authors. However, the lateness
of the account can be considered a weakness, and the flourishing system of dating is quite
artificial, vague, and imprecise.
The later birthdate (515 B.C.E). is based upon the opening of Platos Parmenides (127a5-c5). The
narrative setting describes a young Socrates (about 20) conversing with Parmenides, who is
explicitly described as being about 65. Since Socrates was born c. 470 B.C.E., subtracting the
remaining 45 years yields a birthdate for Parmenides c. 515 B.C.E. Some have taken Platos
precise mention of Parmenides age as indicative of veracity. However, Plato is also known for
including other entirely fictitious, clearly anachronistic yet precise details in his dialogues. In fact,
the very conversation reported in the dialogue would have been impossible, as it depends upon
views Plato developed late in his life, which are certainly not Socratic at all. Plato is not
necessarily a reliable historical source.
Choosing between these accounts can have significant historical implications regarding
Parmenides possible relationship to other thinkers, particularly Heraclitus. For instance, if one
accepts Platos later date, this would seem to require denying that Parmenides
influencedHeraclitus (540-480 B.C.E., also based upon Diogenes reports) as Plato suggests
(Sophist 242d-e). On the other hand, if one accepts the earlier dating by Diogenes, it makes it very
unlikely Heraclitus work could have influenced Parmenides, as there would not have been
sufficient time for his writings to become known and travel across the Greek world from Ephesus,
Ionia.
Whenever Parmenides was born, he must have remained a lifelong citizen and permanent resident
of Eleaeven if he traveled late in life, as Platos accounts in Parmenides and Theatetus suggest.
This is first indicated by the evident notoriety he gained for contributions to his community.
Several sources attest that he established a set of laws for Elea, which remained in effect and
sworn to for centuries after his death (Coxon Test. 16, 116). A 1st cn. C.E. pedestal discovered in
Elea is dedicated to him, with an inscription crediting him not only as a natural philosopher, but
as a member (priest) of a local healing cult/school (Coxon 41; Test. 106). Thus, he likely
contributed to the healing arts as a patron and/or practitioner. Finally, if Parmenides really was a
personal teacher of Zeno of Elea (490-430 B.C.E)., Parmenides must have been present in Elea

37

well into the mid-fourth century B.C.E. Ultimately, however, when and where Parmenides died is
entirely unattested.
2. Parmenides Poem
Ancient tradition holds that Parmenides produced only one written work, which was supposedly
entitled On Nature (Coxon Test. 136). This title is suspect, as it had become common even by
Sextus time to attribute this generic title to all Presocratic works (Coxon 269-70; Test. 126). No
copy of the original work has survived, in any part. Instead, scholars have collected purported
quotations (or testimonia) from a number of ancient authors and attempted to reconstruct the
poem by arranging these fragments according to internal and external (testimonia) evidence. The
result is a rather fragmentary text, constituted by approximately 154 dactylic-hexameter lines
(some are only partial lines, or even only one word). This reconstructed arrangement has then
been traditionally divided into three distinct parts: an introductory section known as the Proem; a
central section of epistemological guidelines and metaphysical arguments (Aletheia, Reality); and
a concluding cosmology, (Doxa, or Opinion).
The linear order of the three main extant sections is certain, and the assignment of particular
fragments (and internal lines) to each section is generally well-supported. However, it must be
admitted that confidence in the connectedness, completeness, and internal ordering of the
fragments in each section decreases significantly as one proceeds through the poem
linearly:Proem-Reality-Opinion. Furthermore, many philological difficulties persist throughout the
reconstruction. There are conflicting transmissions regarding which Greek word to read, variant
punctuation possibilities, concerns surrounding adequate translation, ambiguities in the poetical
form, and so forth. Given all of this, any serious engagement with Parmenides work should begin
by acknowledging the incomplete status of the text and recognizing that interpretative certainty is
generally not to be found.
a. The Proem
The Proem (C/DK 1.1-32) is by far the most complete section available of Parmenides poem. This
is due entirely to Sextus Empiricus, who quoted Lines 1-30 of the Proem (C1) as a whole and
explicitly reported that they began the poem (Coxon Test. 136). Not only are the bulk of these
lines (1.1-28) not quoted by any other ancient source, but their content is not even mentioned in
passing. In short, modern scholars would have no idea the Proem ever existed were it not for
Sextus. Simplicius quotes lines C/DK 1.31-32 immediately after quoting lines very similar to
Sextus 1.28-30, and thus these are traditionally taken to end the Proem.
Nevertheless, there is some controversy regarding the proper ending of the Proem. While Lines
1.28-30 are reported by several additional sources (Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Clement, and
Proclus), Simplicius alone quotes lines 1.31-32. In contrast, Sextus continued his block quotation
of the Proem after line 1.30 with the lines currently assigned to C/DK 7.2-7, as if these
immediately followed. Diels-Kranz separated Sextus quotation into distinct fragments (1 and 7)
and added Simplicius lines to the end of C/DK 1. The vast majority of interpreters have followed
both these moves. However, there may be good reasons to challenge this reconstruction (compare
Bicknell 1968; Kurfess 2012, 2014).
The Proem opens mid-action, with a first-person account of an unnamed youth (generally taken to
be Parmenides himself) traveling along a divine path to meet a didactic (also unnamed) goddess.
The youth describes himself riding in a chariot with fire-blazing wheels turning on pipe-whistling
axles, which seems to be traversing the heavens. The chariot is drawn by mares, steered by the
Daughters of the Sun (the Heliades), who began their journey at the House of Night. The party

38

eventually arrives at two tightly-locked, bronze-fitted gatesthe Gates of Night and Day. In order
to pass through these aethereal gates, the Heliades must persuade Justice to unlock the doors
with soft words. After successfully passing through this portal and driving into the yawning maw
beyond, the youth is finally welcomed by the unnamed goddess, and the youths first-person
account ends.
Many have thought the chariot journey involved an ascent into the heavens/light as a metaphor for
achieving enlightenment/knowledge and for escaping from darkness/ignorance. However, it would
seem that any chariot journey directed by sun goddesses is best understood as following the
ecliptic path of the sun and Day (also, that of the moon and Night). This is further confirmed given
the two geographical locations explicitly named (the House of Night and the Gates of Night and
Day), both of which are traditionally located in the underworld by Homer and Hesiod. Thus, the
chariot journey is ultimately circular, ending where it began (compare C2/DK5). From the House
of Nightfar below the center of the Earththe Heliades would follow an ascending arc to the
eastern edge of the Earth, where the sun/moon rise. The journey would then continue following
the ecliptic pathway upwards across the heavens to apogee, and then descend towards sunset in
the West. At some point along this route over the Earth they would collect their mortal charge.
Following this circular path, the troupe would eventually arrive back in the underworld at the
Gates of Night and Day. Not only are these gates traditionally located immediately in front of the
House of Night, but the mention of the chasm that lies beyond them is an apt poetical description
of the completely dark House of Night. On this reading, rather than a metaphorical ascent towards
enlightenment, the youths journey is actually a didactic katabasis (a descent into the underworld).
It also suggests a possible identification of the anonymous spokes-goddessNight (compare
Palmer 2009).
The rest of the poem consists of a narration from the perspective of the unnamed goddess, who
begins by offering a programmatic outline of what she will teach and what the youth must learn
(1.28b-30):
And it is necessary for you to learn all things,
Both the still heart of persuasive reality
And the opinions of mortals, in which there is no genuine reliability.
That the youth is supposed to learn some truth about reality (aletheia) is uncontroversial and
universally understood to be satisfied by the second major section of the poem, Reality (C 2-8.50).
It is also uncontroversial that the opinions of mortals will be taught in Opinion (C 8.51-C 20) and
that this account will be inferior to the account of Aletheia in some waycertainly epistemically
and perhaps also ontologically. The standard reconstruction of the Proem then concludes with the
two most difficult and controversial lines in Parmenides poem (C 1.31-32):

[ ].
The suspicion that these lines might help shed light on the crucial relationship
between Reality andOpinion is well-warranted. However, there are numerous possible readings
(both in the Greek transmission and in the English translation) and selecting a translation for
these lines requires extensive philological considerations, as well as an interpretative lens in
which to understand the overall poemthe lines themselves are simply too ambiguous to make
any determination. Thus, it is quite difficult to offer a translation or summary here that does not

39

strongly favor one interpretation of Parmenides over another. The following is an imperfect
attempt at doing so, while remaining as interpretatively uncommitted as possible.
But nevertheless, you shall also learn these things, how the accepted/seeming things
should/would have had (to be) to be acceptably, passing through [just being] all things,
altogether/in every way.
Commentators have tended to understand these lines in several general ways. First, Parmenides
might be offering an explanation for why it is important to learn about mortal opinions if they are
so untrustworthy/unreliable, as line 1.30 argues. Another common view is that Parmenides might
be telling the youth he will learn counterfactually how the opinions of mortals (or the objects of
such opinions) would or could have been correct (even though they were not and are not now).
Alternatively, Parmenides might be pointing to some distinct, third thing for the youth to learn,
beyond just Reality and Opinion. This third thing could be, but is not limited to, the relationship
between the two sections, which does not seem to have been explicitly outlined in the poem (at
least, not in the extant fragments). In any case, these lines are probably best dealt with once one
already has settled upon an interpretative stance for the overall poem given the rest of the
evidence. If nothing else, whether a selected interpretation can be coherently and convincingly
conjoined with these lines can provide a sort of final test for that view.
b. Reality
Immediately following the Proem (C/DK 1), the poem moves into its central philosophical
section:Reality (C. 2-C 8.49). In this section, Parmenides positively endorsed epistemic and
metaphysical claims are outlined. Though lengthy quotations strongly suggest a certain internal
structure, there is certainly some room for debate with respect to proper placement, in particular
amongst the shorter fragments that do not share any common content/themes with the others. In
any case, due to the overall relative completeness of the section and its clearly novel philosophical
contentas opposed to the more mythical and cosmological content found in the other sections
these lines have received far more attention from philosophically-minded readers, in both ancient
and modern times.
In Reality, the unnamed youth is first informed that there are only two logically possible routes of
inquiry one might embark upon in order to understand reality (C 3/DK 2). Parmenides goddess
endorses the first route, which recognizes that what-is is, and that it must be (it is not to not be),
on the grounds that it is completely trustworthy and persuasive. On the other hand, the goddess
warns the youth away from the route which posits what-is-not and necessarily cannot be, as it is
a path that can neither be known nor spoken of. The reasoning seems to be that along this latter
route, there is no concept to conceive of, no subject there to refer to, and no properties that can
be predicated of nothingness.
Arguably, a third possible route of inquiry may be identified in C 5/DK 6. Here, the goddess
seems to warn the youth from following the path which holds being and not-being (or becoming
and not-becoming) to be both the same and not the same. This is the path that mortals are said to
wander without judgment, on a backwards-turning journey. Not only is confusing what is
and what is not different from positing necessary being and non-being (C 3/DK 2), and thus a
distinct route, but this description also seems to correspond far better to the cosmogony of
opposites found in Opinion than to the route of what is not and necessarily cannot be.
The order not to follow the path that posits only what is is further complicated by the
fragmentary report that there is some sort of close relationship between thinking (or knowing) and
being (what exists, or can exist, or necessarily exists): for thinking and being are the same

40

thing, or for the same thing is for thinking as is for being (C 4/DK 3). Scholars are divided as
to what the exact meaning of this relationship is supposed to be, leading to numerous mutually
exclusive interpretative models. Does Parmenides really mean to make an identity claim between
the twothat thinking really is numerically one and the same as being, and vice-versa? Or, is it
that there is some shared property(-ies) between the two? Is Parmenides making the rather
problematic claim that whatever can be thought, exists (compare Gorgias On Nature, or What-isNot)? Or, more charitably, only that whatever does exist can in principle be thought of without
contradiction, and thus is understandable by reasonunlike nothingness? Perhaps both? Most
commonly, Parmenides has been understood here as anticipating Russellian concerns with
language and how meaning and reference must be coextensive with, and even preceded by,
ontology (Owen 1960).
In any case, from these epistemic considerations, the goddess deductive arguments in C/DK 8 are
supposed to follow with certainty from deductive, a priori reasoning. By studiously avoiding
thinking in any way which entails thinking about what-is-not, via reductio, the subject
of Realityis concluded to be: truly eternalungenerated and imperishable (8.5-21), a continuous
whole (8.21-25), unmoved and unique (8.21-33), perfect and uniform (8.42-49). For instance, since
coming-to-be involves positing not-being in the past, and mutatis mutandis for perishing, and
since not-being cannot be conceived of, what is cannot have either property. In a similar vein,
spatial motion includes not-being at a current location in the past, and thus motion is also
denied. This line of reasoning can be readily advanced to deny any sort of change at all.
In the end, what is certain about Reality (whatever the subject, scope, or number of this reality
is supposed to be) is that there is purportedly at least one thing (or perhaps one kind of thing) that
must possess all the aforementioned perfect properties, and that these properties are supposed
to follow from some problem with thinking about what is not. It has been commonly inferred
from this that Parmenides advocated that there is actually just one thing in the entire world (that
is, strict monism), and that this entity necessarily possesses the aforementioned properties.
c. Opinion

Opinion has traditionally been estimated to be far longer than the previous two sections combined.
Diels even estimated that 9/10 of Reality, but only 1/10 of Opinion, are extant, which would have
the poem spanning some 800-1000 lines. This degree of precision is highly speculative, to say the
least. The reason Opinion has been estimated to be so much larger is due to the fragmentary
nature of the section (only 44 verses, largely disjointed or incomplete, are attested) and the
apparently wide array of different topics treatedwhich would seem to require a great deal of
exposition to properly flesh-out.
The belief that Opinion would have required a lengthy explication in order to adequately address
its myriad of disparate topics may be overstated. As Kurfess has recently argued, there is nothing
in the testimonia indicating any significant additional content belonging to the Opinion beyond
that which is explicitly mentioned in the extant fragments (2012). Thus, though Opinion would still
be far longer than the quite limited sampling that has been transmitted, it need not have been
anywhere near as extensive as has been traditionally supposed, or all that much longer
thanReality. Regardless of its original length, the incompleteness of this section allows for
substantially less confidence regarding its arrangement and even less clarity concerning the
overall meaning of the section. As a result, the assignment of certain fragments to this section has
faced more opposition (compare Cordero 2010 for a recent example). Nevertheless, the internal

41

evidence andtestimonia provide good reasons to accept the traditional assignment of fragments to
this section, as well as their general arrangement.

Following the arguments of Aletheia, the goddess explicitly ends her trustworthy account and
thought about reality and commands the youth from there on, hearing the deceptive
arrangement of her words, to learn mortal opinions (C 8.50-52).
The range of content in this section includes: metaphysical critiques of how mortals err in
naming things, particularly in terms of a Light/Night duality (C 8.51-61, 9, 20); programmatic
passages promising a detailed account of the origin of celestial bodies (C 10, 11); a theogonical
account of a goddess who rules the cosmos and creates other deities, beginning with Love (C 12,
13); cosmogonical and astronomical descriptions of the moon and its relationship to the sun (C 14,
15), along with an apparent description of the foundations of the earth (C 16); some consideration
of the relationship between the mind and body (C 17); and even accounts related to animal/human
procreation (C 18-19).
The error of mortals is grounded in their naming (that is, providing definite descriptions and
predications) the subject of Reality in ways contrary to the conclusions previously established
about that very subject. As a result, mortals have grounded their views on an oppositional duality
of two formsLight/Fire and Nightwhen in fact it is not right to do so (8.53-54). Admittedly, the
Greek is ambiguous about what exactly it is not right for mortals to do. It is common amongst
scholars to read these passages as claiming it is either wrong for mortals to name both Light and
Night, or that naming just one of these opposites is wrong and the other acceptable. This reading
tends to suggest that Parmenides is either denying the existence of the duality completely, or
accepting that only one of them properly exists. Naming only one opposite (for example, Light)
seems to require thinking of it in terms of its opposite (for example, Light is not-dark), which
is contrary to the path of only thinking of what is, and never what is not (compare Mourelatos
1979). The same holds if only Night is named. Thus, it would not seem appropriate to name only
one of these forms. This problem is only doubled if both forms are named. Thus, it would seem
that mortals should not name either form, and thus both Light and Night are denied as proper
objects of thought. The Greek can also be read as indicating that it is the confusion of thinking
both what is and what is not that results in this naming error, and that thinking both of these
judgments (what is and what is not) simultaneously is the true error, not naming in-itself.
Mortal naming is treated as problematic overall in other passages as well. This universal
denigration is first introduced at C 8.34-41 on the traditional reconstruction (For a proposal to
relocate these lines to Opinion, see Palmers 2009 discussion of Eberts Proposal). Here, the
goddess dismisses anything mortals erroneously think to be real, but which violate the perfect
predicates of Reality, as names. C 11 expounds upon this naming error, arguing that Light and
Night have been named and the relevant powers of each have been granted to their objects, which
have also been named accordingly. C 20 appears to be a concluding passage for both Opinion and
the poem overall, stating that only according to (presumably mistaken) belief, things came-to-be in
the past, currently exist, and will ultimately perish and that men have given a name to each of
these things (and/or states of existence). If this is truly a concluding passage, the apparently
disparate content of Opinion is unified as a treatment of mortal errors in naming, which the
section uncontroversially began with. From these grounds, the other fragments traditionally
assigned toOpinion can be linked (directly or indirectly) to this section, based upon parallels in
content/imagery and/or through contextual clues in the ancient testimonia.

42

Both C 9/DK 10 and C 10/DK 11 variably promise that the youth will learn about the
generation/origins of the aether, along with many of its components (sun, moon, stars, and so
forth). C/DK 12 and C/DK 13 then deliver on this cosmogonical promise by developing a theogony:
C 12: For the narrowest rings became filled with unmixed fire,
The outer ones with night, along which spews forth a portion of flame.
And in the middle of these is a goddess, who governs all things.
For in every way she engenders hateful birth and intercourse
Sending female to mix with male, and again in turn,
male to mix with the more feminine.
C 13: [and she] contrived Love first, of all the gods.
C 14 and C 15 then describe the cosmology that results from the theogonical arrangement,
expounding the properties of the moon as, respectively, an alien, night-shining light, wandering
around the Earth, which is always looking towards the rays of the sun. Similarly, C 16 is a
single word (), meaning rooted in water, and the testmonia explicitly claims this is
grounded in the Earth.
In many ways, the theogonical cosmology presented so far is quite reminiscent of Hesiods
ownTheogony, and certain Milesian cosmologies at times. However, C 17-19 are more novel,
focusing on the relationship between the mind and body (C 17/DK 16), as well as sexual
reproduction in animalswhich side of the uterus different sexes are implanted on (C 18/DK 17)
and the necessary conditions for a viable, healthy fetus (C 19/DK 18). These passages can be tied
to the previous fragments in that they are an extension of the theogonical/cosmogonical account,
which has moved on to offer an account of earthly mattersthe origin of animals and their mental
activitywhich would still be under the direction of the goddess who governs all things (C 12).
This is clearly the case with respect to C 18-19, as the governing goddess is explicitly said to
direct male-female intercourse in C 12.
d. Positive Aletheia. Negative Opinion?
Given the overall reconstruction of the poem as it stands, there appears to be a counter-intuitive
account of reality offered in the central section (Reality)one which describes some entity (or
class of such) with specific predicational perfections: eternalungenerated, imperishable, a
continuous whole, unmoving, unique, perfect, and uniform. This is then followed by a more
intuitive cosmogony, suffused with traditional mythopoetical elements (Opinion)a world full of
generation, perishing, motion, and so forth., which seems incommensurable with the account
inReality. It is uncontroversial that Reality is positively endorsed, and it is equally clear
that Opinionis negatively presented in relation to Aletheia. However, there is significant
uncertainty regarding the ultimate status of Opinion, with questions remaining such as whether it
is supposed to have any value at all and, if so, what sort of value.
While most passages in the poem are consistent with a completely worthless Opinion, they do not
necessitate that valuation; even the most obvious denigrations of Opinion itself (or mortals and
their views) are not entirely clear regarding the exact type or extent of its failings. Even more
troubling, there are two passages which might suggest some degree of positive value for Opinion
however, the lines are notoriously difficult to understand. Depending upon how the passages

43

outlined below are read/interpreted largely determines what degree/kind (if any) of positive value
should be ascribed to Opinion. Thus, it is helpful to examine more closely the passages where the
relationship between the sections is most directly treated.
Consider the goddess programmatic outline for the rest of the poem at the end of the Proem:==
C 1: And it is necessary for you to learn all things, (28b)
Both the still-heart of persuasive reality,
And the opinions of mortals, in which there is no trustworthy persuasion. (30)
From the very beginning of her speech, the goddess presents the opinions of mortals (that
is,Opinion) negatively in relation to Reality. However, it does not necessarily follow from these
lines that Opinion is entirely false or valueless. At most, all that seems entailed here is a
comparative lack of epistemic certainty in relation to Reality. However, the transition
from Reality to Opinion(C/DK 8.50-52), when the goddess ends her trustworthy account and
thought about reality, and in contrast, charges the youth to learn about the opinions of mortals,
hearing the deceptive arrangement of my words, implies falsity (C/DK 8.50-52). This deceptive
arrangement could be understood to apply only to the goddess presentation of the account.
However, as Aletheia is described as a trustworthy account, and there seems to be no doubt that
it is the content (as well as the presentation) that is trustworthy, the parallel should hold
for Opinion as well. Accepting that it is the content of Opinion that is deceptive, one of the most
difficult interpretative questions regarding Opinion remains. Is the extent of the deception
supposed to apply to: a) every proposition within Opinion (for example, Parmenides wants to say it
is actually false that the moon reflects sunlight), or b) only some significant aspects of its content
(for example, basing an account on opposites like Light/Night)? Either way, C/DK 1.30 and 8.50-2
make it clear that Opinion and the opinions of mortals are lacking in both veracity and epistemic
certaintyat least to some extent.
Mortal beliefs are also unequivocally derided in between these bookends to Reality, though in
slightly different terms. At C 5, the goddess warns the youth from the path of inquiry upon which
mortals with no understanding stray two-headedby whom this has been accepted as both
being and not being the same (Coxons translation). C 5 not only claims mortal views are in error,
it identifies the source of their errorconfusing being and non-being. C/DK 7 then further
identifies the reason mortals tend to fall into this confusionby relying upon their senses, rather
than rational accounts. But do keep your thought from this way of enquiry. And let not habit do
violence to you on the empirical way of exercising an unseeing eye and a noisy ear and tongue, but
decide by discourse the controversial test enjoined by me (Coxons translation).
Finally, the goddess criticism of the naming error of mortalswhich seems to be the primary
criticism offered in Opinionfurthers the case against Opinions apparently complete lack of
veracity. At the first mention of the naming error on the traditional arraignment, the goddess
says, To these things all will be a name, which mortals establish, having been persuaded they
are real: to come to be and to perish, to be and not to be, and to change location and exchange
bright color throughout (C/DK 8.38b-41; Coxons translation). The persuasion of mortals to
believe in the reality of the objects and phenomena they name clearly implies here that the
counterfactual is supposed to be true, and that any such phenomena which do not correspond with
the properties advocated in Reality are not real. Immediately following the goddess transition to
her deceptive account, C/DK 8.53-56 makes it clear that the activity of naming and
distinguishing things in opposition, contrary to the unity of Reality, is the initial mistake of
mortals: For they established two forms to describe (name) their two judgments (of which one

44

should not bethe one by which mortals are and have been misled), and they distinguished two
opposites in substance, and established predicates separating each from one another.
Given the passages outlined so far in this section, there appears to be quite a substantial case for
taking Opinion to be entirely false and lacking any value whatsoever. Nevertheless, this may not
be the entire story. It is important to stress that while these passages seem to strongly suggest
(and one may argue that they even entail) Opinion is false, the goddess never actually says it is
false (). Furthermore, there is at least some textual evidence that might be understood to
suggestOpinion should not be treated as negatively as the passages considered so far would
suggest.
As noted in the summary of the Proem above, there are two particularly difficult lines (C 1.31-32)
which may be understood as suggesting some positive value for Opinion, despite its lacking in
comparison to Reality. However, even if the Greek is read along these lines, it remains to be
determined whether this value is based upon some substantial value in the account itself (there is
some sense or perspective in which it is true), or merely some pragmatic and/or instructive value
(for example, it is worthwhile to know what is wrong and why, so as to avoid not falling into such
errors).
In any case, even if there is some positive reason for learning Opinion provided in these lines, this
could hardly contradict the epistemic inferiority (no trustworthy persuasion) just asserted at
C/DK 1.30, just as it is quite difficult to deny the falsity implied from lines C/DK 8.50-52. At most,
these lines could only soften the negative treatment of mortal views. Nonetheless, the possibility
should be admitted that upon certain variant readings of C/DK 1.31-32, the status of Opinion and
its value could be more complex and ambivalent than other passages suggest.
Only one further extant passage remains which might offer some reason to think Opinionmaintains
some positive value, and this is the passage most commonly appealed to for this purpose. At C/DK
8.60-61, the goddess seems to offer an explicit rationale for providing the youth with her
deceptive account: I declare to you this entirely likely () arrangement so that you shall
never be surpassed by any judgment of mortals. The key word here is the apparently positive
participle , which does not obviously reconcile with the otherwise negative treatment
of Opinion. The participle can have the general sense of likely, in the sense of probable,
as well as fitting/seemly in the sense of appropriate. Either translation could suggest at least
the possibility of veracity and/or value in Opinion. That is, the account in Opinioncould likely be
true, though it is epistemically uncertain whether it is or not. Or, the account could be fitting,
given the type of account it isone which seeks to explain the world as it appears to the senses,
which is still worth knowing, even if it is not consistent with the way the world truly is. On either
of these readings, Opinion could be deceptive, yet still be worthwhile in-itself. On these readings
view, though Opinion is inferior to Aletheia in some regards, it can be positively endorsed in its
own right, as Parmenides own version of mortal-style accounts. If it is then understood that
Parmenides cosmology is superior to all other possible mortal accounts of this kind, the
goddess promise to the youth that learning this account will insure he is never surpassed by any
other mortal judgments can be explained (C/DK 8.60b-1).
On the other hand, it is just as easy to understand Opinion being likely in the sense that it is
indicative of the sort of account a deranged mortal relying upon their senses might be prone
(likely) to offer, which is hardly an endorsement. Since mortals are incorrect in their accounts,
the particular account offered in Opinion is representative of such accounts, and is presented
didacticallyas an example of the sorts of accounts that should not be accepted. If the youth can
learn to recognize what is fundamentally mistaken in this representative account (Opinion), any

45

alternative or derivative account offered by mortals which includes the same fundamental errors
can be recognized and resisted. This seems to be far more consistent given the treatment
ofOpinion overall, and C/DK 8.60b-1 arguably better fits with this interpretation. Furthermore, it is
quite difficult to defend a fundamental premise required for the alternative, more positive view
outlined abovethat the cosmology offered in Parmenides Opinion is intended to be superior to
all other mortal views. Not only is this in tension with the clear negative treatment
of Opinionthroughout the text, it is implausible on more general grounds, as any account
grounded upon fundamentally incorrect assumptions cannot be superior in any substantial
sense. While some have attempted to claim that Opinion satisfies this on account of its dualistic
nature, which is second-best to Realitys monistic claims, this approach fails to account for
how Opinion could possibly be superior to any other dualistic account.
Given all of this, it is undeniable that Opinion is lacking in comparison to Aletheia, and certainly
treated negatively in comparison. It should also be taken as well-founded that the Opinion is
epistemically inferior. Whether Opinion is also inferior in terms of veracity seems most likely
though again, it is not certain whether this means Opinion is entirely lacking in value, and the
extent of its deceptiveness (all content, or its fundamental premises and assumptions) is still an
open question. Navigating the Scylla and Charybdis of: a) taking the negative, yet often
ambiguous and/or ambivalent, treatment of Opinion in the text seriously, while b) avoiding
apparently absurd interpretative outcomes, is what makes understanding its relationship
to Reality, and thus developing an acceptable interpretation of the poem overall, so very difficult.
3. Interpretative Treatments
This section provides a brief overview of: (a) some of the most common and/or influential
interpretative approaches to the Proem itself, as well as (b) the relationship
between Reality andOpinion, and/or the poem overall. The purpose is to provide the reader with a
head-start on how scholars have tended to think about these aspects of the poem, and some of the
difficulties and objections these views have faced. The treatment is not meant to be at all
exhaustive, nor advocate any particular view in favor of another.
a. Reception of the Proem
The only ancient response to the content of the Proem is from the Pyrrhonian Skeptic Sextus
Empiricus (2nd cn. C.E). In an attempt to demonstrate how Parmenides rejected opinions based
upon sensory evidence in favor of infallible reason, Sextus set forth a detailed allegorical account
in which most details described in the Proem are supposed to possess a particular metaphorical
meaning relating to this epistemological preference. Sextus describes the chariot ride as a journey
towards knowledge of all things, with Parmenides irrational desires and appetites represented as
mares, and the path of the goddess upon which he travels as representative of the guidance
provided by philosophical reasoning. Sextus also identifies the charioteer-maidens with
Parmenides sense organs. However, he then strangely associates the wheels of the chariot with
Parmenides ears/hearing, and even more strangely, the Daughters of the Sun with his eyes/sight
as if Sextus failed to recognize the numerical identity between the charioteer-maidens and the
Daughters of the Sun. Similarly, he identifies Justice as intelligence and then erroneously
seems to think that Justice is the very same goddess which Parmenides is subsequently greeted by
and learns from, when the journey clearly leaves Justice behind to meet with a new goddess. In his
attempt to make nearly every aspect of the story fit a particular metaphorical model, Sextus
clearly overreaches all evidence and falls into obvious mistakes. Even more evidently problematic,
the division of the soul into these distinct parts and accompanying metaphorical identifications is

46

clearly anachronistic, borrowing directly from the chariot journey described in Platos Phaedrus.
For these reasons, no modern scholar takes Sextus particular account seriously.
Modern allegorical treatments of the Proem have generally persisted in understanding the cosmic
journey as an allegory of enlightenment (for a recent representative example, see Thanssas
2007). This treatment is possible no matter what one takes the geometry/geography of the chariot
ride to bewhether an ascension into the light as a metaphor for knowledge as opposed to
ignorance/darkness, or a circular journey resulting in a chthonic katabasis along Orphic lines.
Though the particular details will vary from one allegorical account to the next, they tend to face
objections similar to that of Sextus treatment. The metaphorical associations are often strained at
best, if not far beyond any reasonable speculation, particularly when one attempts to find
metaphorical representations in every minor detail. More theoretically problematic, determining
some aspects to be allegorical while other details are not would seem to require some nonarbitrary methodology, which is not readily forthcoming. Due to ambiguity in, and variant possible
readings of the text, there is room for many variants of allegorical interpretationsall equally
plausible, as it seems none will be convincing on the evidence of the Proem alone. Recognition
of this has led some to claim that while the Proem is certainly allegorical, we are so far distant
from the cultural context as to have no hope of reliably accessing its metaphorical meanings (for
example, Curd 1998). Finally, the allegorical accounts available tend to offer little if any
substantive guidance or interpretative weight for reading the poem overall. For these reasons,
allegorical treatment has become less common (for extensive criticism of Sextus account and
allegorical treatments of theProem in general, see Taran 1965; Palmer 2009).
With the decline of allegorical treatments, an interest in parsing the Proem in terms of possible
shared historical, cultural, and mythical themes has ascended. For instance, a fair amount has
been written on the parallels between the chariots path and Babylonian Sun-mythology, as well as
how the Proem supposedly contains Orphic and/or Shamanistic themes. However, while Greek sun
mythology may well have ancient Babylonian roots, the cultural origins do not seem at all relevant
to Parmenides own cultural understanding at his time, nor that of any likely listener or reader of
his work. Shamanistic influences are more suspect as influences and can be easily dismissed as a
literary device designed to get the readers attention (Lombardo 2010). Purported Orphic parallels
turn on Orphisms revelatory journeys to the underworld, as well as initiations led by Night, and
such influences are far more likely to have been relevantly parallel. Unfortunately, little is known
about this mystery tradition overall, particularly at Parmenides time. Thus, it is overly speculative
to hang very much on this purported influence with any confidence. Also, the theme of knowledge
gained via chthonic journey, while consistent with Orphism, would not seem to be unique to that
tradition, and the kind of revelations Parmenides youth undergoes are very different. The youth
does not learn about any topics Orphism itself focuses on: moral truths, the nature of the soul
itself, or what the afterlife was like. Furthermore, Parmenides unnamed youth learns a rational
account based upon argumentation that can (and should be) tested and applied (compare C/DK
7.5-6), which is very different from the more revelatory nature of Orphism.
Overall, the Proem has far more commonly been minimized, dismissed as irrelevant, and/or
entirely ignored by ancients and moderns alike, probably because they saw no immediately
obvious philosophical content or guidance for understanding the rest of the poem within it. A
select few advocate that the reader is merely supposed to recognize that Parmenides is here
indicating that his insights were the product of an actual spiritual experience he underwent.
However, there is no real evidence for this, and some against. The verbal moods (optative and
imperfect) suggest ongoing, indefinite actiona journey that is repeated over and over, or at least
repeatablewhich cuts against a description of a one-off event that would be characteristic of a
spiritual awakening. Even more problematic, the rationalistic account/argumentation of the

47

goddesswhich she demands the listener/reader to judge by reason (logos)would thus be

superfluous, if not undermined (C/DK 7.5-6). The same objection holds for attempts to dismiss
the Proem as a mere nod to tradition, whereby epic poets traditionally invoke divine agents
(usually, the Muses) as a source of inspiration and/or revelatory authority. It has also been
common to reduce the Proem to a mere literary device, introducing nothing of relevance except
the unnamed Goddess as the poems primary speaker.
While the Proem may be enigmatic, any summary dismissal which suggests that the Proem is
entirely irrelevant to understanding Parmenides philosophical views is likely too hasty. There are
very close similarities between the imagery and thematic elements in the Proem and those found
throughout the rest of the poem, especially Opinion. For instance, the Proem clearly contrasts
light/fire/day imagery with darkness/night, just as the two fundamental opposing principles
underlying the cosmogony/cosmology in Opinion are also Fire/Light and Night. Both the Proemand
the theogonical cosmology in Opinion introduce an anonymous goddess. In fact, in contrast
toReality, both sections have extensive mythological content, which scholars have regularly
overlooked. The obvious pervasive female presence in the Proem (and the rest of the poem),
particularly in relation to divinity, can also hardly be a coincidence, though its importance remains
unclear. Once considered at greater length, the parallels between the Proem and Opinion seem far
too numerous and carefully contrived to be coincidental and unimportant. This suggests a
stronger relationship between the Proem and Opinion than has commonly been recognized and
the need for a much more holistic interpretative approach to the poem overall, in contrast to the
more compartmentalized analyses that have been so pervasive. Further scholarly consideration
along these lines would likely prove quite fruitful.
b. The A-D Paradox: Select Interpretative Strategies and their Difficulties
The central issue for understanding the poems overall meaning seems to require reconciling the
paradoxical accounts offered in Reality and Opinion. That is, how to reconcile: a) the positively
endorsed metaphysical arguments of Reality, which describe some unified, unchanging,
motionless, and eternal reality, with b) the ambiguously negative (or perhaps, ambivalent)
treatment of the ensuing cosmology in Opinion, which incorporates the very
principles Realitydenies. Based upon the Greek terms for these respective sections
(Aletheia and Doxa), I will refer to this as the A-D Paradox.
In this section, some of the more common and/or influential approaches by modern scholars to
address this paradox are considered, along with general objections to each strategy. This approach
provides a more universal appreciation of the A-D Paradox than taking on any selection of authors
as foils, allowing the reader a broad appreciation for why various interpretative approaches to the
poem have yet to yield a convincing resolution to this problem.
i. Strict Monism and Worthless Opinion
The most persistent approach to understanding the poem is to accept that for some reason
perhaps merely following where logic led him, no matter how counterintuitive the results
Parmenides has concluded that all of reality is really quite different than it appears to our senses.
On this view, when Parmenides talks about what is, he is referring to what exists, in a universal
sense (that is, all of reality), and making a cosmological conclusion on metaphysical groundsthat
all that exists is truly a single, unchanging, unified whole. This conclusion is arrived at through a
priori logical deduction rather than empirical or scientific evidence, and is thus certain, following
necessarily from avoiding the nonsensical positing of what is not. Any description of the world
that is inconsistent with this account defies reason, and is thus false. That mortals erroneously
believe otherwise is a result of relying on their fallible senses instead of reason. Thus, the account

48

in Opinion lacks any intrinsic value and its inclusion in the poem must be explained in some
practical way. It can be explained dialectically, as an exercise in explicating opposing views (Owen
1960). It can also be explained didactically, as an example of the sort of views that are mistaken
and should be rejected (Taran 1965). This strict monism has been the most common way of
understanding Parmenides thesis, from early times into the mid-twentieth century.
This reading is certainly understandable. The text repeatedly sets forth its claims in seemingly
universal and/or exhaustive contexts (for example, It is necessary for you to learn all things
C/DK 1.28b, And only one story of the way remains, that it-is, C/DK 8.1a-2). The arguments of
C/DK 8 all describe a singular subject, in a way that naturally suggests there is only one thing that
can possibly exist. There is even one passage which is commonly translated and interpreted in
such a way that all other existence is explicitly denied (for nothing else either is or will be except
what is C/DK 8.36b); however, the broader context surrounding this line undercuts this
interpretation, on either selection of the variant Greek transmission. The broad range of topics
inOpinion seems to be intended as an exhaustive (though mistaken) account of the world, which
the abstract and singular subject of Reality stands in corrective contrast to. Perhaps the most
significant driving force for understanding Parmenides subject in this way is Platos ascription to
him of the thesis that all is one and Aristotles subsequent similar treatment.
While this view is pervasive and perhaps even defensible, many have found it hard to accept given
its radical and absurd entailments. Not only is the external world experienced by mortal senses
denied reality, the very beings who are supposed to be misled by their senses are also denied
existence, including Parmenides himself! Thus, this view results in the mad, self-denying
position that Descartes would famously show later was the one thing we could never deny as
thinkersour own existence. If there is to be any didactic purpose to the poem overallthat is,
the youth is to learn how to not fall into the errors of other mortalsthe existence of mortals must
be a given; since this view entails they do not exist, the poems apparent purpose is entirely
undercut. Surely this blatant contradiction could not have escaped Parmenides notice.
It is also difficult to reconcile the apparent length and detailed specificity characteristic of the
account offered in Opinion (as well as the Proem), if it is supposed to be entirely lacking in
veracity. Providing such a detailed exposition of mortal views in a traditional cosmology just to
dismiss it entirely, rather than continue to argue against mortal views by deductively
demonstrating their principles to be incorrect, would be counterintuitive. If the purpose is
didactic, the latter approach would certainly be sufficient and far more succinct. The view that
Parmenides went to such lengths to provide a dialectical opposition to his central thesis seems
weak: a convenient ad hoc motivation which denies any substantial purpose for Opinion, implying
a lack of unity to the overall poem.
Though the strict monist view remains pervasive in introductory texts, contemporary scholars
have tended to abandon it on account of these worrisome entailments. Yet, there seems to be no
way to avoid these entailments if Parmenides subject is understood as: i) making a universal
existential claim, and if ii) the account offered in Opinion is treated as inherently worthless. Thus,
alternative accounts tend to challenge one or both of these assumptions.
ii. Two-World (or Aspectual) Views
If the problems of strict monism are to be avoided while maintaining the apparent universal,
existential subject (that is, all of reality), it makes sense to seek some redemptive value
forOpinion so that Parmenides neither: a) denies the existence of the world as mortals know it, nor
b) provides an extensively detailed account of that world just to dismiss it as entirely worthless.
The primary strategy for redeeming the Opinions value has been to emphasize the epistemic

49

inferiority of the Opinion, while denying its complete lack of veracity. Such approaches also tend
to simultaneously downplay any ontological/existential claims made in the poem.
Emphasizing the epistemic distinctions, it can be pointed out that the conclusions offered
inReality are reached through a priori, deductive reasoninga methodology which can provide
certainty of the conclusion, given the premises. The Greeks tended to associate such knowledge
with divinity, and thus the conclusions in Reality can also be understood as divine (note that it is
narratively achieved via divine assistance, the poems spokes-goddess). On the other hand, there
is no true trust or reliability to mortal accounts (C 1.30), either in the traditional divine v. mortal
distinction or in Parmenides poem. Parmenides attributes this failing to the fact that mortals rely
entirely upon fallible, a posteriori sense experience. However, while mortal accounts may be
fallible, as well as epistemically inferior to divine (or deductive) knowledge, such accounts may
still be true. By passing along the goddess logos via his poem, Parmenides has shown how mortals
can overcome the traditional division between divine (certain) and mortal (fallible) knowledge. If it
is just that Opinion is uncertain, and not completely false, then it can have intrinsic value. The
account in Opinion could thus be likely in the sense that it is the best account that can be
offered, even though the mortal approach does not yield certainty like divine methodology does. It
is for these reasons that Parmenides provides his own, purportedly superior, cosmology.
Emphasizing the epistemological differences between these sections is not altogether wrong, as
the explicit epistemic contrasts between these accounts in the poem are undeniable. However,
holding the sole failing of Opinion to be its lack of epistemic certainty can hardly be the entire
story. The conclusions offered in Reality remain irreconcilable with the account in Opinion, and
the entailment that mortals still do not really exist to learn from Parmenides poem if the divine
account is true, persists. Furthermore, other aspects of the poem are not adequately addressed at
all. How is Opinion a deceptive account, other than it might be if we are misled by fallible senses
(but it might also be true!), and we just cannot be certain? How do mortals err by
accepting beingand not-being to both be actual, and by naming opposites? Even if it is granted
that reliance on senses can result in these errors, it seems that any lack of error on these points
would once again lead back to strict monism (if what is remains existential and universal) and its
world-denying problems.
Attempts to resolve these issues have tended to rely upon positing an ontological hierarchy to
complement the epistemic hierarchy. The account revealed by the divine methodology of logical
deduction in Reality reveals what the world, or at least Being, must fundamentally be like.
However, the world as it appears also exists in some ontologically inferior manner. Though any
account of it cannot be truly correct, since mortals actually live in this lower ontological level,
learning the best account of reality at that level remains important. In short, such views trade
upon a distinction between: a) an unexperienced though genuine reality, which corresponds with
divine epistemic certainty (Reality), in contrast to b) a lower-level of reality, accounts of which
are epistemically uncertain, as well as deceptive in that they tend to obscure deeper ontological
truths (especially if they are taken to describe all that there is).
A number of objections can be raised to this interpretative approach. However, they tend to boil
down to anachronistic worries about the Platonization of Parmenides, by Plato and his
successors, even down to the Neoplatonist Simplicius. The ontological gradations posited on this
view (in addition to anachronistic translations of Parmenides Greek along such lines) would
suggest that Parmenides very closely anticipated the ontological and epistemological distinctions
normally taken to be first developed in Platos Theory of Forms. While Parmenides certainly made
some very basic yet pioneering advances in epistemic distinctionsadvances which very likely in
turn influenced Platothe far more refined distinctions and conceptions required for this

50

interpretation of Parmenides are almost certainly the result of interpreters reading Platonic
distinctions back into Parmenides (as Plato himself seems to have done), rather than the
distinctions genuinely being present in Parmenides own thought. The pervasiveness of such twoworld interpretative accounts likely says far more about Platos extensive influence, as well as the
importance of finding some way out of the world-denying entailments, than it does about
Parmenides own novelty.
It is also quite difficult to offer a convincing explanation for what possible grounds Parmenides
could have for ascribing superiority to his own account of the apparent world offered in Opinion,
in comparison to any other mortal offering of his time. The content certainly doesnt appear to be
superior. The echoes to other accounts, such as Anaximanders and Hesiods, are rather obvious
and not at all novel. While his cosmological claims may contain some novel truths (moon gets its
light from the sun, etc.), these claims are still cast in a deceptive frameworkthe naming error
of mortals. The defense that Parmenides own account is superior on the grounds that Opinion is
the simplest account possible, relying upon a dualism of conflicting opposites, fails to explain how
it would be superior to any similar dualistic account. Furthermore, the methodology does not
appear to be superior in any wayParmenides abandons his pioneering deduction in Reality,
resorting to a traditional mythopoetic approach in Opinion.
iii. Essentialist (or Meta-Principle) Views
A promising suggestion by some recent commentators is that, rather than drawing ontological
conclusions about the entirety of existence, Parmenides was instead focused on more abstract
metaphysical considerations. Such approaches impute a primarily predicative (rather than
existential) usage of the Greek word to be by Parmenides, particularly with respect to the
deductive argumentation found in Reality. Such approaches result in C/DK 8.1-50 revealing the
nature, or essence, of what any fundamental or genuine entity must be like.
Mourelatos was the first to advocate that Parmenides employed the Greek verb to be in a
particular predicative sensethe is of speculative predication. Mourelatos takes Parmenides to
be attempting an exhaustive account of the necessary and essential properties
for any fundamental ontological entity. That is, to say X is Y in this way is to predicate of X all
the properties that necessarily belong to X, given the sort of thing X is (Mourelatos 1970, 56-67).
Nehamas (1981) and Curd (1998) have both developed more recent proposals along similar lines.
A common upshot of Essentialist views is that, while it remains true that every fundamental entity
that exists must be eternal, motionless, a unified whole, etc., this is consistent with existence of a
plurality of such fundamental beings. Parmenides view would thus not be quite so radical as seen
under the ontological, strict monist approaches. Furthermore, this view can have welcome
implications for the narrative of how Parmenides was received by his immediate successors (that
is, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and the early Atomists). Rather than directly rejecting Parmenides
strict monism in developing their pluralistic systems, they would be able to freely accept his
conclusions regarding the nature of fundamental entities and move on to develop pluralistic
systems that respected this nature while simultaneously explaining our perception of the world.
Such a change in narrative is an improvement if, as Curd argues, one thinks the lack of any
explicit argumentation against Parmenides strict monism by his successors is problematic, as it
would entail later thinkers were guilty of begging the question against Parmenides.
Whatever the merits of this more limited and abstract thesis of Reality, such interpretations
continue to face very similar, if not the same, problematic entailments and worries related to the
value of the Opinion. First, there is substantial objection particular to such accounts. If
Parmenides were truly providing an account of what any genuine being should be like, and this in

51

turn outlines the requirements any acceptable cosmology must meet, it would be expected that
Parmenides own cosmology (Opinion) would make use of these very principles. At the very least,
one should expect some hint at how such an essentialist account of being could be consistent with
mortal accounts. However, there is not even a hint of such in Opinion. Furthermore, though the
arguments inReality are now consistent with a plurality of fundamental perfect beings, there
seems to be no way such entirely motionless and changeless entities could be consistent with, or
productive of, the contrary phenomena found in the world of mortal experience. Thus, it remains
difficult to see howOpinion could be true in any way, and the existence of mortals and Parmenides
is still under threat, along with the implications that follow. The purpose of the poem is frustrated
if mortals and Parmenides cannot exist. If Opinion is still entirely worthless, then the objections
concerning its length and specificity also remain. Any attempts to introduce a two-world
distinction still face charges of anachronism, and attempts to explain Opinion away as Parmenides
own best account of the world (even though it is false) continue to be lacking in justification.
iv. Modal Views
While the presence of modal language in Parmenides works has long been recognized, this fact
has largely escaped scholarly attention other than to evaluate whether any fallacies have been
committed (compare Lewis 2009; Owen 1960, 94 fn. 2). Only recently has its presence been taken
seriously enough to warrant a full-fledged interpretative account that addresses the relationship
between Reality and Opinion (Palmer 2009). This approach is quite similar in some ways to the
Essentialist approach. The account in Reality is still intended to provide a thorough analysis of the
essential properties of some kind of being. However, the kind of being is more narrowly
prescribed. Rather than an account of what any fundamental entity must be like, Parmenides is
taken to explicate in Reality what any necessary being must necessarily be like, qua necessary
being.
The inspiration for this approach is found in C 3/DK 2, where Parmenides introduces the initial
two paths of inquiry. The first is the way that is, and that is not to not be. Something that is not
to not be is equivalent to must be. Therefore, the first path concerns that which necessarily
exists, or necessary being. The second path is clearly the contrarythat it is not and must not
be, or necessary non-being. Though Parmenides does not use this exact formulation later in the
poem, on the reasonable hypothesis that this construction is awkward (even in prose, let alone
poetry), it is posited that what is and what is not are to be taken as shorthand for referring to
these modes of being.
Adopting this understanding provides new and compelling perspectives on a number of issues
inReality. At the end of C 3/DK 2, the path that follows what is not is dismissed as one that can
neither be apprehended nor spoken of. Rather than importing the likely anachronistic parallels to
modern philosophy of language, particularly Russellian concerns with negative existential
statements, the difficulty can be taken to be the impossibility of conceiving of necessarily nonexistent things (for example, square-circles), which is a far more likely problem to have been
recognized given the historical context. It is also readily understood why knowledge along these
lines is entirely trustworthy, as any necessary entity must have certain essential properties given
the sort of thing it is and its mode of existence.
This view also offers a very different perspective on the third way of inquiry introduced in C 5/DK
6. This is the mixed path of mortals, who knowing nothing and depending entirely upon their
senses, erroneously think to be and not to be are the same and not the same. If Parmenides
central thesis is to explicate the essential characteristics of necessary being (and reject necessary
non-being as that which cannot be conceived at all), it is fitting for him to recognize that there are

52

other beings as well: contingent beings. Mortals who have not used reason to conceive of what
necessary being must be like are stuck only contemplating and believing in contingent beings,
which can and often do change their aspects and existential statusor, are at least perceived to in
certain contextsleading to a wandering understanding that lacks the unchanging knowledge
inherent in understanding necessary being qua necessary being.
Perhaps most compelling, the properties deduced in C/DK 8 as necessarily characteristic of what
is make far more sense on the modal approach. Clearly, the provisions against coming-to-be and
perishing are far more intuitive on this model than they are on models which simply disallow
what is not to be part of its conception. More telling, while it is still certainly possible to justify
some of these properties on the grounds that thinking what is not is not allowed in the
conception, others are far more problematic. For instance, what is is argued to be limited in
spatial extent and uniform throughout (C/DK 8.42-29). Thinking of something as motionless and
limited in spatial extent, and uniform throughout itself, seems to require thinking of it as not
being in other places than it actually is and of its own properties not existing beyondthat is,
thinking not being in both instances. On the other hand, if Parmenides thesis is to explicate
what a necessary being must be like on account of its modality alone, it is perfectly acceptable to
think of a (spatially extended, material) necessary being as a discrete entity, which must possess
its modal nature uniformly throughout. In short, were we even now to construct a list of properties
essential for any necessary (spatially extended) being, such a list would closely match Parmenides
own.
Though the modal view seems compelling in many ways with respect to Reality, the same might be
said of other views considered above. The real question is whether it can resolve the A-D
Paradox, while providing a compelling and meaningful answer for the inclusion of Opinion.
SinceReality explicates the nature of necessary being, and this is a very different sort of thing
from the contingent beings described in Opinion, the tension between these accounts has already
been largely eliminated. Thus, the modal view generally succeeds in resolving the A-D Paradox,
as it restricts Reality to such a narrow scope that Opinion can no longer be about the same
entities. However, there can still be better and worse explanations for what Parmenides intention
is withOpinion, and this still involves resolving whether its status is ultimately positive or negative,
and in what sense. While Palmer has offered a very insightful and important contribution to
Parmenidean studies, it is not beyond reproach or objection.
Palmers own view on Opinion is quite positive. Palmer takes the error of mortals to be thinking
that contingent beings are all there is in the world, by relying solely upon their senses. It is not
that the objects in Opinion do not exist, it is that they do not share the same unwavering epistemic
account as necessary being does, as the contingent objects and phenomena found in Opinion are
in a certain way, and then they are notas they change, move, come to be, perish, and so forth.
Thus, mortal knowledge remains wandering, while the (divine) knowledge of necessary being
that Parmenides imparts is certain and unchanging. Nevertheless, the contingent world does exist,
so there is value in knowing what one can about it. Thus, Palmer avers that Opinion is Parmenides
own best attempt to explain the world of contingent being, which does not admit knowledge via
the deductive methodology used in Reality. In this way, Palmer has succeeded in developing an
interpretation that requires only an epistemic hierarchy between Reality and Opinion, without the
additional ontological hierarchy of Two-World views and the anachronistic worries that accompany
them.
While the modal view does allow the existence of contingent beings and thus an account of them
would be valuable in-itself, it does not necessarily follow that this is what Parmenides was
attempting in Opinion. Such a positive treatment still seems to be in tension with the overarching

53

negative treatment of Opinion throughout the poem. Furthermore, Palmers attempts to portray
passages about Opinion in a more positive light are far less compelling than his modal treatment
ofReality.
One of the more problematic attempts to cast Opinion in a more positive light is Palmers
corrective emendation of the missing verb at the end of line C 5.3/DK 6.3, changing the goddess
words from warning the youth away from the wandering path of mortals () to a
programmatic promise () to being an explication of that path later on (Palmer 2009, 65-67).
The problem with this emendation is that it is a common rule in Greek for the active verb to
mean rulethe verb normally only carries the meaning of begin in its middle form ().
This objection is not decisive, however, as Palmers overall view does not require this emendation.
What is fundamentally damning is Palmers view that Opinion is Parmenides best account of
contingent being. First, Palmer faces the challenges noted above of explaining why Parmenides
would be entitled to think his own mythopoetic account in Opinion would be superior to any other
mortal account. Palmer is likely entitled to the view that the cosmology is in some sense
Parmenides own, in the sense that it is his own construction and not borrowed from someone
else, on the grounds that it contains novel cosmological truths (moon gets light from sun). The
account could even be superior in that it contains novel cosmological truths that past accounts
failed to include. However, this would require that Parmenides really think there could be no
further discoveries that would then surpass his own knowledge. More importantly, there are no
grounds to support that his theogonical content is supposedly superior to Hesiods.
Second, and most importantly, Palmers positive account of Opinion fails to explain how mortals
could possibly be mistaken about the subject of Reality, as the text clearly requires.
to it all things have been given as names

8.38b

all that mortals have established in their conviction that they are genuine,
both coming to be and perishing, both being and not
and altering place and exchanging brilliant colour.

8.41

What is is the subject of 8.38b-41, which is uncontroversially the entity described in Aletheia,
and thus necessary being on Palmers view. It is to that entity mortals have given as names all
the attributions listed: coming to be, perishing, and so forth. That mortals in their conviction
believe these names to pick out something genuine with respect to the subject
of Aletheia clearly implies that mortals are in error to do sothat these phenomena do not
correctly specify the nature ofAletheias subject. This is the central claim about mortal errors by
the goddess, and it is undeniable that, in order for mortals to incorrectly specify the nature
of Aletheias subject, mortals must have some conception of and familiarity with that relevant
object (or type of entity). Palmer recognizes this himself, asking How can mortals describe or
misconceive What Is [necessary being] when they in fact have no grasp of it? (167). The answer
is, of course, that they cannot. The naming error of mortals requires an account of how mortals
get the nature of Realitys subject wrong.
According to Palmer, Parmenides task is to explicate the essential nature of necessary
being, quanecessary being. Since mortals have only ever relied upon their sense perceptions
rather than deductive logic, they have never conceived of the essential nature of any necessary
entity. Thus, their failure is to have believed that all of reality consisted entirely of contingent
beings. However, if mortals have never conceived of necessary being, then they certainly could not

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ever have been wrong about it, and incorrectly predicated motion, change, coming-to-be,
perishing, and so forth of it. Palmer even realizes this tension and attempts to explain it away as
follows:
Apparently because mortals are represented by the goddess as searching, along their own way of
inquiry, for trustworthy thought and understanding, but they mistakenly suppose that this can
have as its object something that comes to be and perishes, is and is not (what is), and so on.
Again, the goddess represents mortals fixing their attention on entities that fall short of the mode
of being she has indicated is required of a proper object of thought. (172)
However, this is no solution. Erroneously thinking that contingent beings can provide trustworthy
thought and understanding may indeed be an error of mortals. Yet, this is certainly not the same
error as mortals thinking that which is explicated in Aletheia can be properly described in ways
contrary to its nature (that is, coming to be, perishing, and so forth), which is precisely the error
the goddess insists they commit. Palmers view of Opinion simply cannot satisfy this textual
requirement.
However, Palmers modal view of Reality can be readily modified to be consistent with a more
negative treatment of Opinion. In fact, a more negative treatment of Opinion seems necessary in
order to avoid this fatal flaw. A ready solution is available, which Palmer himself considered at
some length, but ultimately rejectedidentifying what is not only as necessary being, but divine
being. This allows for mortals to have a familiar subject (divine being) which they have up until
now misunderstood through the mythopoetic tradition, failing to recognize that such would have
to be a necessary being, and as such could not be born, die, move, change, or even be
anthropomorphic.
In explicating the essential nature of the divine qua necessary being in Reality, Parmenides can be
understood as continuing the Xenophanean agenda of criticizing traditional, mythopoetic views of
the divine, though he uses metaphysical and deductive argumentation, rather than the ethical
appeals of his predecessor. This should not be surprising, given Parmenides historical context.
Incorporating naturalistic elements or principles that are supposed to be divine, in contrast to
anthropomorphic conceptions from the mythopoetical tradition, was otherwise pervasive amongst
the Presocratics. The Milesians tended to treat their fundamental and eternal arche as divine
entities. Pythagoras, perhaps more of a religious mystic in the first place, certainly included his
own views on divinity. Identification of divine entities certainly does not end after Parmenides
either, as the systems of the Pluralists and Atomists continue to associate their fundamental
parmenidean entities with divinity. Most importantly, of course, Xenophanes conception of his
supreme (and perhaps only) deity very closely parallels Parmenides description of what is, and
recognizing what is as a necessary being would only seem to advance this metaphysical
treatment of divinity even further. This should not be at all surprising given the extensive evidence
for Xenophanes role as a strong influence, or even personal teacher, of Parmenides (compare
4.a.iii below). Thus, even if Parmenides never (at least, not in the extant fragments) refers to
what is as a god/divine thing, that he was thinking along those lines and paralleling the
properties others had ascribed to their conception of deity is hard to deny, and readily makes the
modal view at least tenable, and perhaps compelling.
4. Parmenides Place in the Historical Narrative
a. Influential Predecessors?
Hardly less certain than the rest of his general biography is Parmenides intellectual background
with questions arising regarding whether he was a pupil of, or at least heavily influenced by, some

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particular thinker(s). If so, the question remains whether he sought to further refine or challenge
such viewsor perhaps both. This section broadly analyzes the evidence for ascribing particular
intellectual influences and teachers to Parmenides.
i. Anaximander/Milesians
Theophrastus alone asserted that Parmenides was a pupil of Anaximander (Coxon Test. 41, 41a).
However, this is historically impossibleeven with the earliest birthdate, Anaximander was long
dead before Parmenides ever engaged in philosophical contemplation. Thus, Parmenides could
never have been personally instructed by Anaximander. At most, one could argue that
Anaximanders views influenced and/or provided a particular target for Parmenides to reject, as
some modern scholars have suggested.
It is quite likely Parmenides would have been familiar with Anaximanders works. At least, there is
no good reason to doubt this. Also, there are certainly parallel conceptions and opposing contrasts
that can be drawn between these two thinkers. Both can be read as understanding the cosmos to
be operating in terms of some necessity, in accordance with justice (compare Miller 2006).
Anaximanders dualistic opposites consist of hot and cold interacting with each other in
generative fashion. Similarly, Parmenides dualistic cosmology names Light/Fire and Night
as the primordial opposites that are found in all other things, and Aristotle and Theophrastus both
explicitly associate these Parmenidean opposites with hot and cold (Coxon Test. 21, 25, 26, 35,
45). Both Parmenides and Anaximander describe cosmological light as rings, or circles, of fire.
They both think that there are deathless and eternal things (Parmenides what is, and
Anaximanders divine arche, the apeiron). Both can be understood as drawing upon a rudimentary
principle of sufficient reason, concluding that if there is no sufficient reason for something to
move in one direction or manner versus another, then it must necessarily be at rest (Parmenides
what is, and Anaximanders description of Earth). Perhaps most importantly, Anaximander
suggests opposites arise from an indefinite or boundless (aperion) eternal substance.
Parmenides metaphysical deductions can be understood as a direct denial of this, either because
nothing could ever arise from something so indefinite in qualities as the apeiron (as such a thing
would essentially be nothing--that is, Parmenides denies creatio ex nihilo), and/or that
Anaximanders apeiron is not a proper unity (one distinct thing) if opposites with entirely different
and distinct properties (hot and cold) can arise from it (Curd 1998, 77-79; Palmer 2009, 12).
However, closer inspection of these supposed parallels tends to undermine the thesis that
Anaximander is particularly influential upon, or a specific target for, Parmenides. First, many of
the particulars of Anaximanders views are noticeably absent, or distinct from, the supposed
parallels in Parmenides. While Anaximanders necessity is probably best understood as physical
laws, Parmenides conception appears to rely on logical consistency. Whereas Anaximander
envisions justice as a regulatory, ontological compensation arising from the competition for
existential pervasiveness amongst opposites, this conception of natural balance via justice is
entirely absent in Parmenides works. The Aristotelian identification of Parmenides Light/Night
dualism with Anaximanders Hot/Cold opposition is also highly suspect. No extant fragments of
Parmenides make this connection. Furthermore, the Peripatetics mistakenly refer to Parmenides
two primary principles in Opinion as fire and earth instead of fire (or light) and night.
Anaximanders description of the cosmic fire rings as tubes with vent-holes is lacking in
Parmenides rings of fire. In short, none of these supposed parallels clearly identifies
Anaximander as an influence/target, and they can all be understood as rather common
conceptions of cosmology and physics in philosophically-oriented Greek minds during Parmenides
time (Cordero 2004, 20; Curd 1998, 116-126). The same can be said for the apparently shared
views on the existence of divine/eternal beings, appeals to some principal of sufficient reason, as

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well as the denial of creatio ex nihilo, and the impossibility of distinct pluralities arising from a
properly indistinct unity.
If Parmenides is not directly targeting Anaximander in particular, it is possible that he could be
understood as responding to Milesian physics and cosmology in general, but probably not. On the
one hand, Parmenides seems to be engaged in a very different sort of endeavor. Whereas the
Milesians sought to explain cosmology and physics by identifying the arche (origin or first
principle) from which all things originated (and possibly, remained constituted by), the only
section of Parmenides poem that could provide an alternative or competing cosmological account
(Opinion) is supposed to be fundamentally and deeply flawed, and offered for rejection on some
grounds. The grounds upon which this cosmology is flawed is the point of Parmenides overall
project, which seems far broader than denying Milesian views in particular. Though Parmenides
may very well be challenging fundamental assumptions made by the Milesiansthat things exist;
that our senses provide knowledge of existing things; that there must be a primordial,
foundational element(s)these assumptions are hardly unique to them (Cordero 2004, 20). Thus,
while the Milesians should most likely be listed amongst the mortals whose opinions about the
world Parmenides thinks are fundamentally mistaken, and while Milesian views may even be
paradigmatic examples of such mistaken views, Parmenides criticism would seem to include the
common man on the street as well. Parmenides thesis is broader, his focus more metaphysical
and logically-driven, than can be explained by ascribing the more historically-based motivation of
challenging the Milesians (compare Owen 1960; Palmer 2009, 8-29). He is challenging everyones
understanding.
ii. Aminias/Pythagoreanism
Ancient sources provide very limited support for imputing a significant Pythagorean influence
upon Parmenides. Sotion alone attests that Parmenides, though admittedly a student of
Xenophanes, did not follow him (presumably, in his way of thinking)but was instead urged to
take up the Pythagorean life of stillness by Aminias (Coxon Test. 96). Though Sotion goes on to
describe how Parmenides built a hero shrine to poor Aminias upon his death, nothing else is
known of Aminias himself. It is also reported by Nicomachus of Gerasa that both Parmenides and
Zeno attended the Pythagorean school (Coxon Test. 121). However, even if this were true, it does
not necessarily follow that either adopted or sought to challenge Pythagorean views in their later
thought. Finally, Iamblichus mentions Parmenides amongst a list of known Pythagoreans, though
no defense of, nor basis for, this attribution is provided (Coxon Test. 154).
Similarly, only a relatively small minority of contemporary scholars has been committed to
defending a general Pythagorean influence upon Parmenides, and even fewer are willing to grant
credence to the claim that Aminias was his teacher. The vast majority of contemporary
Parmenidean scholars reject the Pythagorean influence entirely, or at least hold it to not be
directly or substantially significant on informing Parmenides own mature views. When
contemporary commentators have attempted to demonstrate the presence of Pythagorean
elements within Parmenides text itself, the attempts have been quite strained, at best
particularly given the general lack of good information about early Pythagoreanism itself. Most
telling against this purported influence is the fact that even amongst modern scholars who agree
that Parmenides does demonstrate Pythagorean influences, the details and purported parallels
differ entirely from one commentator to the next. As a result, even those who agree that there is a
Pythagorean influence cannot agree at all on what exactly that influence consists of, or what
counts as evidence for it.

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It would seem that the real reason for the persistence of this association is far more dependent
upon geographical considerations than is often let on. In fact, this is probably the best argument
for thinking any Pythagorean influence upon Parmenides is likely in the first place, as the primary
Pythagorean school was founded in Croton, just over 200 miles SSE from Elea. While geographical
considerations make it virtually certain that Parmenides was aware of the Pythagorean school, and
even had interactions with Pythagoreans, there is simply no compelling evidence for any
significant influence by this tradition in his mature work.
iii. Xenophanes
That Parmenides was either a direct disciple of Xenophanes, or at least heavily influenced by him
in developing his own views, is pervasive amongst ancient sources. Plato is the first, claiming that
there is an Eleatic tribe, which commonly held that all things are one, and that this view was
first advanced by Xenophanesand even thinkers before him! While this offhand remark by Plato
may not be intended to be taken seriously in pushing Eleaticism back beyond Xenophanes, the
idea that there is some real sense in which the philosophical views of these two are closely related
is suggestive. Both Aristotle and his student Theophrastus explicitly claim that Parmenides was a
direct personal student of Xenophanes. This is further attested by several later doxographers:
Aetius (2nd-1st cn. B.C.E.) and Pseudo-Plutarch (1st cn.? B.C.E.). Numerous other ancient sources
from variant traditions and spanning nearly a millennium could be listed here, all of which attest
to a strong intellectual relationship between these two thinkers, on several different interpretative
bases. While some are skeptical of this relationship (for example, Cordero 2004), most modern
scholars are willing to grant some degree of influence between these thinkers, and the overall
evidence is perhaps suggestive of a far deeper relationship than is normally admitted.
It is often superficially recognized that both Xenophanes and Parmenides wrote in verse rather
than prose. It is also common to point to stark differences on this point. First, it is commonly
claimed that Xenophanes was a philosophically-oriented poet, in contrast to Parmenidesa
genuine philosopher who simply used poetry as a vehicle for communicating his thoughts. This
seems to be based primarily upon the fact that Xenophanes also wrote silloi (satirical poetry),
which do not always have obvious or exclusively philosophical themes. Also, even when both do
make use of the epic dactylic-hexameter meter, there is a difference in vocabulary and syntax;
Parmenides extensively and deliberately imitates language, phrasing, and imagery from Homer
and Hesiod, while Xenophanes does not.
On the other hand, it is unfair to dismiss Xenophanes philosophical focus based upon his elegiac
poems, which often do contain philosophical elementsthat is, criticism of traditional religious
views, the value of philosophy for the state, and how to live correctly. Furthermore, aside from
these silloi, the majority of the extant fragments appear to be part of one major extended work by
Xenophanes, all of which are in the epic style. More importantly, the content and general structure
of this work bear substantial similarities to Parmenides own poem. Xenophanes begins by
explicitly challenging the teachings of Homer and Hesiod in particular and of mortals in general
regarding their understanding of the gods. Parmenides Proem clearly opens with a journey
grounded in Homeric/Hesiodic mythology, and one of the main things for the youth is to learn why
the opinions of mortals (including, or perhaps even especially, Homer and Hesiod) are misguided.
Xenophanes draws a distinction between divine and mortal knowledge which mortals cannot
overcome; Parmenides poem also seems to acknowledge this distinction, though he may very well
be suggesting this divide can be overcome through logical inquiry, in contrast to Xenophanes.
Xenophanes claims that the misunderstanding of the gods is the result of mortals relying upon
their own subjective perceptions and imputing similar qualities to divine nature. Similarly,

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Parmenides spokes-goddess ascribes the source of mortal error to reliance on sense-perception,

in contrast to logical inquiry, and may also have a divine subject in mind.
Having identified his intellectual targets, Xenophanes seems to move from criticism of others to
providing a positively-endorsed, corrective account of divine nature. There is one (supreme or
only?) god, which is not anthropomorphic in form or thought. Though this being does have some
sort of sensory perception (hearing and seeing) and thinking abilities, it is different from how
mortals experience these statesif in no other way than that this supreme god sees, hears, and
knows all things. This being is unchanging and motionless, though it affects things with its mind.
It cannot be denied that the description of Xenophanes (supreme/only) god bears many of the
same qualities as Parmenides what isthe only question is whether Parmenides was directly
influenced in this matter by Xenophanes views.
There are also extant fragments from Xenophanes which seem to provide an extended cosmology
and physics. It is possible these constituted the end of Xenophanes major epic work. If so, there
would again be at least a superficial similarity in structure between his poem and Parmenides
own. More substantially, there may be parallel passages that could suggest the cosmology/physics
on offer in each is not to be trusted. Consider Xenophanes injunction to believe things he has
described as resembling the truth (Xenophanes B35). It is unlikely that he would be
undercutting his positively-endorsed account of his one god in such a way, thus this likely refers
to his physics/cosmology. When Parmenides spokes-goddess tells us why she is providing her
deceptive account of mortal opinions (which in-itself implies it should not be taken as correct or
real), she uses the exact same Greek adjective () to describe this mortal account as one
which is entirely fitting for the youth to learn (C/DK 8.60). The context here seems to be that by
learning the particular account offered in Opinion, which shares the mistakes any mortal account
might possess, and/or which makes the failure of mortal accounts most evident, the deceptive
account on offer is worth learning so as to best know how to avoid the mistakes other mortals
make.
Finally, if geographical proximity is grounds for imputing a likely intellectual influence, then the
case for a Xenophanean influence on Parmenides is just as strong, if not superior to, the
Pythagorean association considered above. Though Xenophanes was originally a native of
Colophon, an Ionian city which lies on the opposite side of the ancient Greek world from Elea,
evidence suggests he spent significant time in or at least near Elea. Xenophanes describes himself
as having spent sixty-seven years traveling and sharing his teachings after leaving Colophon at the
age of twenty-five. Xenophanes writings clearly demonstrate familiarity with Pythagoras himself,
and thus implies familiarity with his school in southern Italy. Diogenes explicitly reports that
Xenophanes lived at two locations in Sicily (near Elea) and that Xenophanes even wrote a poem on
the founding of Elea, as well as his native Colophon. What would make these two cities worthy of
odes, and no others? Likely, both were important to Xenophanes in the same respecthe identified
with both as home. Finally, Aristotle explicitly reports that the citizens of Elea sought
Xenophanes guidance about religious matters on at least one occasion (Rhetoric II.23 1400b6).
On these grounds, in addition to the ancient reports that Parmenides was Xenophanes student
and the parallels found in their major works, it is very likely Xenophanes lived near or in Elea
during his philosophical maturity, likely at just the right time to influence Parmenides in his own
philosophical development.
iv. Heraclitus
No ancient source attests that Heraclitus influenced Parmenides. In fact, the only ancient source
to suggest any relationship between the thinkers is Plato, who would have Parmenides influencing

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Heraclitus instead. Platos claim is almost universally rejected today, especially since Heraclitus
does not hesitate to criticize other thinkers, and he never mentions Parmenides. However, it was
quite common throughout much of the twentieth-century for modern scholars to argue that
Parmenides was directly challenging Heraclitus views, and introductory textbooks continue to
regularly draw interpretative parallels between them. The interpretative comparison generally
relies upon the highly questionable ascription of a motionless, strict-monism to Parmenides, in
contrast with understanding Heraclitus as the philosopher of flux, who advocated a pluralistic
universe constantly undergoing motion and change. I leave consideration of the interpretative
adequacy of these views aside here. While ahistorical interpretative comparisons can certainly be
worthwhile exercises in-themselves, the question here is whether there are actually any good
historical grounds to think Parmenides was directly challenging Heraclitus. The thesis that
Heraclitus influenced Parmenides faces serious chronological challenges. All evidence suggests
Heraclitus wrote his major work near the end of his sixty-year lifetime. Evidence also suggests
Parmenides could not have written much after Heraclitus own death. This leaves little time in
between, if any, for Parmenides to become aware of or be inspired to challenge Heracliteanism.
That Heraclitus wrote late in his lifetime is evident from his explicit criticism of other thinkers. In
one passage, Heraclitus criticizes the Ephesians for exiling his friend Hermodorus, which would
have occurred at the very end of the sixth century (B121). In another passage, he denigrates
Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataetus as failing to understand anything, despite their
studiousness (B40). This list of names is in chronological order, and Heraclitus use of the past
tense may be taken as indicating they are all dead by the time of his writing. If so, as Hecataetus
lifetime is estimated as c. 550-485 B.C.E., Heraclitus would have to have completed his work in
the last few years of his life. Admittedly, Heraclitus use of the past tense here is not decisive, as it
certainly does not require all those named be dead. It only requires that the named persons have,
on Heraclitus view, demonstrated their lack of understanding in the past (likely through written
works). Nevertheless, this passage still supports a late composition date. Though Pythagoras
established his school in Croton early in Heraclitus life (c. 530 B.C.E.), it would seem to require a
significant amount of time for the arcane teachings of Pythagoreanism to have made their way to
Ephesus. In addition, since Pythagoras himself did not write anything, any written works in the
Pythagorean tradition that were disseminated must have been written by his followersagain,
probably after Pythagoras own death (post-500 B.C.E.). Finally, even if Hecataetus was still alive
at the time Heraclitus wrote, Hecataetus almost certainly wrote his own works late in his lifetime,
after his travels (that is, post-500 B.C.E.).
Given this evidence, it is reasonable to estimate the earliest composition of Heraclitus book to c.
490 B.C.E., plus or minus five years. If Platos claims that Parmenides was the personal teacher of
a young Zeno (490-430 B.C.E.), and that Zeno wrote his own book in defense of his masters while
very young, then Parmenides must have written prior to 470 B.C.E. This estimate is reasonable
even if the details of Platos Parmenides are not reliable and if one accepts Diogenes account, as
Parmenides would be seventy by this point. This leaves a rather short windowless than twenty
yearsfor Heraclitus views to spread across the Greek world to Elea and inspire Parmenides.
Though not impossible, this is unlikely.
Furthermore, when further biographical details are considered, the window arguably completely
vanishes. Diogenes reports that upon completion of his book, Heraclitus deposited it (apparently
the only copy) in the Temple of Artemis (the Artemisium). Access to the work in the temples
storeroom would almost certainly have been limited and available only to particularly privileged
persons. Tradition further holds that Heraclitus himself did not have any students, but that a
following eventually arose amongst those who studied his book and named themselves
Heracliteans. Under these circumstances, in conjunction with Heraclitus deliberate obscurity, the

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time required to study, discuss, teach, and disseminate Heraclitus views into the rest of the Greek
world would be substantialnot years, but decades. This inference seems supported by the lack of
any records of Heracliteans in the early fifth century. In fact, the very earliest evidence of a
Heraclitean outside of Ephesus is of Cratylusa thinker to whom Plato dedicated an eponymous
dialogue and who Aristotle reports as the first teacher whose views Plato adopted
(Metaphysics i.6, 987a29-35). If Cratylus was the first to spread Heracliteanism beyond Ionia, and
if he indeed taught Plato before Socrates did (pre-410 B.C.E.), Heracliteanism would only have
first arrived in Athens (let alone Elea) sometime after 450 B.C.Efar too late to influence
Parmenides work (pre-470), and almost certainly after his death.
All this may still be objected to, and the unlikely possibility apparently confirmed, on the grounds
of supposedly clear textual evidence. Parmenides is commonly thought to have made a clear
allusion to Heraclitus, describing mortals with no understanding as simultaneously accepting that
things both are and are not, are the same and not the same (C5/DK6). This can be understood as
referring directly to Heraclitus paradoxical aphorisms, which describe things like rivers and roads
as being both simultaneously the same, but yet not (B39; B60). Proponents may even go on to
point out that Parmenides describes those who hold such mistaken beliefs as being on a
backward-turning () journey, which is the same adjective Heraclitus uses to describe
the unity of opposites that mortals fail to appreciate. While this may initially seem compelling,
closer examination of these textual claims reveals their inadequacy. Furthermore, a broader
examination of the texts reveals that the apparent attractiveness largely depends upon selective
cherry-picking.
First, it is not even clear if Heraclitus wrote some sources report (backwardstretching) instead, and there is no scholarly consensus on which is correct. Even if both did
write , imputing an intellectual influence from this is rather weak. It could simply be a
coincidental usage of a relatively common term or idiom. In any case, the apparent similar
philosophical usagein relation to mortal cognitive failuresonly stands on the surface. It is not
that mortals themselves are, in their cognitive failures, backwards-turning, in either case.
Instead, Parmenides is using it metaphorically to describe a way of inquiring that leads to
contradiction. He is using this image to describe a way in which mortals should not think about
things. On the other hand, while Heraclitus use is also metaphorical, he is advocating for his view
of how opposites should be thought of. Here, nature itself is backwards-turning, and the failure
by mortals is the failure to recognize this fortunate confluence of opposites, which can result in
the complementary unity and harmony found in, for example, the bent sapling and taut string that
form a bow. Parmenides is not here denying the more limited claims by Heraclitusthat opposites
can work together to produce some new harmony. Rather, he seems to be claiming that even
thinking of opposites requires thinking in terms of a more fundamental distinctionwhat is and
what is notand this inevitably leads to contradiction. While Parmenides claims would certainly
refute Heraclitus, his view is aimed at an error that is found in all prior philosophical systems, and
even the most common mortal beliefs. Thus, to think of this passage, and thereby Parmenides
overall poem, as intentionally designed to directly challenge Heraclitus in particular is to risk
missing Parmenides larger project for what it is.
Perhaps more telling, the apparent direct challenges and differences between these thinkers are
belied by the similarities. Heraclitus describes the divine Logos as eternal and unchanging, much
as Parmenides describes what is. Properly understanding the Logos is supposed to lead to the
conclusion that all is one, and Parmenides has often been thought to be advocating similar
monistic conclusions regarding what is. Similarly, both can be read as advocating there is no
distinction between night and daythat they are both one, and that both are also divine. Both are

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critical of common mortal views, and both seem to acknowledge a distinction between mortal and
divine knowledge.
In the end, these similarities should no more be taken as indicative of direct influence than the
apparent critical differencesthe chronology makes both problematic. How then might the
apparent interaction/influence between these thinkers be explained, when they were almost
certainly writing in isolation and ignorance of each other on opposite sides of the Greek world?
The better explanation here is to seek a common influence which would explain the similarities in
doctrine and critical themes and which would have been widely spread by the end of the sixth
century. The most obvious common influence in this context is Xenophanes.
b. Parmenides Influence on Select Successors
As this article has set out to demonstrate, understanding the meaning Parmenides intended in his
poem is quite difficult, if not impossible. Given that any historical narrative of Parmenides legacy
is directly determined by how the poem is supposed to be understood, there are almost as many
plausible accounts of the former as the latter. Such considerations are further complicated by the
tendency of ancient philosophical authors to use prior views to serve their own interests and
purposes, with relatively little regard for historical accuracy. Even if ancient authors did
conscientiously attempt to portray earlier thinkers faithfully, there is no guarantee they properly
understood the original authors intended meaningand this is particularly the case given
Parmenides enigmatic style. Thus, the question how did Parmenides own views influence later
thinkers may in many cases be a mistake, as the more relevant question could be how did each
of Parmenides successors understand Parmenides and /or choose to make use of his work in their
own. Given these considerations, it is especially difficult to speak about Parmenides influence
upon his successors in any detail without first adopting a particular interpretative outlook.
However, there are some general observations that can be advanced which are, at least, highly
suggestive. Some of these are briefly sketched out below.
i. Eleatics: Zeno and Melissus of Samos
Though it is highly questionable as to whether Parmenides himself argued for strict monism, the
views found in the writings of his immediate followers can be taken as advocating such. It is
important to realize that this does not show Parmenides was in agreement on this pointit could
be that this is the way they developed his thoughts and logical method further. Whatever
Parmenides himself held, however, it is clear that his writings did lead some to adopt this view.
Tradition holds that Zeno of Elea was a student of Parmenides from a young age. He is famous for
writing a short book of paradoxes, which are designed to demonstrate the absurdity of positing
a plurality of beings, as well as the associated conceptions of change and motion. Zeno certainly
adopts and improves upon Parmenides deductive, reductio ad absurdum argumentative style in
his prose. However, whether the denial of pluralism was Zenos own addition to his teachers
views, or if he is truly and faithfully defending Parmenides own account, as Plato represents him
to be (Parmenides 128c-d), is not clear.
It is universally understood and uncontroversial that there was at least one Greek thinker who did
adopt and defend the radical metaphysical hypothesis of strict monism: Melissus of Samos.
Melissus clearly (largely because he wrote in prose) adopts Parmenides own language and
argumentative styles, especially from C/DK 8, and expanded upon them. Most qualities of
Parmenides what is remain the same in Melissus accountit is eternal, motionless, a uniform
and complete entity, and so forth. However, Melissus conversely describes his sole being as
unlimited in extension, rather than limited. He further adds that what is cannot undergo

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psychological changes (such as pain, distress, or health) and explicitly denies the existence of
void. He also expressly denies the existence of things mortals believe in, but yet fails to realize the
entailment that mortalsincluding himselfthus also would not exist.
ii. The Pluralists and the Atomists
The Pluralists include Anaxagoras and Empedocles. Each posited very different cosmological
accounts, based upon very different fundamental entities and processes. Anaxagoras posits an
extensive number of fundamental and eternal seeds, every kind of which is found in even the
smallest portion of matter, and which give rise to objects of perception according to whichever
kind of seed dominates the mixture at a particular spatio-temporal location, in accordance with
the will of Nous.
Empedocles (who may have been a student of Parmenides) makes the four fundamental Greek
elements (earth, air, fire, water), as well as two basic forces (Love and Strife), his fundamental
entities. The elements, in conjunction with his basic forces, are continuously mixed together to
become one and subsequently separated entirely in the eternal cyclical nature of the cosmos.
Despite the radical surface differences, the Pluralists share some basic ideas. Both hold that the
world as it appears to mortals is an outcome of the mixture and separation of fundamental entities
entities which satisfy the description of what is set forth by Parmenides in Reality, except for
the motion they undergo. This is almost certainly no accident, and generally indicative of
Parmenides influence on Greek thought overall. However, it is again not clear whether the
Pluralists are best understood as agreeing with, or rejecting, Parmenides own views. Even if
passages ascribed to these thinkers are seen to be rejecting Eleaticism, the rejection may need to
be taken as directed against Melissus, not Parmenides himself.
The situation is very similar with respect to the early AtomistsLeucippus and Democritus. The
atomists posit two fundamental entities, one that corresponds to what is (atoms), and one that
corresponds to what is not (void). The void is simply the absence of what is, and is necessary
for motion. The atomists do provide arguments for the existence of void, which can seem to be a
direct challenge to Parmenides claim that what is not necessarily cannot be. However, the
rejection is likely more indirect, as only Melissus explicitly argued against the existence of void
(though since Leucippus and Melissus were contemporaries, Melissus could be responding to
Leucippus instead, though it is unlikely). The atoms are infinite in number and kind, indivisible,
uncuttable, whole, eternal, and unchanging with respect to themselves. Like the pluralists, the
macro-objects found in human perceptions are formed out of combining these fundamental microobjects in particular arrangements. Overall, the fundamental entities of atomism again closely
correspond in many ways to Parmenides description of what is, with the primary exception
being motion. Also, though it is clear that the Atomists are aware of Eleaticism, whether they are
best described as agreeing with and/or rejecting Parmenides own views is unclear, given the clear
target Melissus has provided in explicitly adopting strict monism and denying the existence of
void.
iii. Plato
If there is any Presocratic whom Plato consistently treats with deep reverence, it is Parmenides,
who he describes as possessing a noble depth, and being venerable and awesome. The deep
influence of Eleatic thought upon Plato is clear in his regular use of a main character known as the
Eleatic Stranger in several late dialogues, as well as his eponymous dialogue, Parmenides, in
which the coherence of the Theory of Forms is examined. Within Platos Theory of Forms, and in
his accompanying epistemological and ontological hierarchies, Parmenides influence can be most

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readily seen. Similar to what is in Parmenides, each Form is an eternal, unchanging, complete,
perfect, unique, and uniform whole. They can only be understood via reason, and understanding
them is the highest epistemic level attainable, wherein one possesses certain knowledge. The
Forms are also the most fundamental ontological level, which are always true and real in all
contexts. In contrast, understanding the account in Opinion as the mistake that mortals make due
to their sensesthinking that being and not-being are both the same and differentand
erroneously thinking they have thus grasped the way the world truly is in these ways, provides a
parallel to Platos description of the world of appearances. For Plato, this corresponds to a
typical epistemological level at which human beings, relying upon their senses, can only have
opinions and not knowledge. It is also a typical ontological level, at which objects and phenomena
perceived simultaneoulsy are and are not, as they are imperfect imitations of the more
fundamental reality found in the Forms. Beyond the Theory of Forms, there are also interesting
epistemic and allegorical comparisons and contrasts to be drawn between Parmenides poem
(particularly the Proem) and Platos Allegory of the Cave."
5. References and Further Reading
This article uses the revised edition (2009) of Coxons seminal monograph as the standard reference for the study of
Parmenides in English. For ease of reference, references to fragments of Parmenides poem list, first, Coxons numbering
(C) and then, Diels-Kranzs (DK). Thus, the same fragment is indicated by (C 2/DK 5). References to all
ancient testimonia regarding Parmenides are based on Coxons arrangement and numbering and are listed with
Test. preceding the relevant number (for example, Coxon Test. 1). References to ancient sources concerning Presocratics
other than Parmenides are based on DKs arrangement.
a. Primary Sources
Austin, Scott. Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic. New Haven: Yale, 1986.
A work focused solely on explaining the logical aspects of Reality.
Cordero, Nstor-Luis. By Being, It Is. Las Vegas: Parmenides, 2004.
Cordero provides a new perspective on Parmenides reasoning and method by focusing on Parmenides use of the verb to
be and its enigmatic subject, in addition to the number and meaning of the paths of inquiry considered in the poem,
Coxon, A. H. The Fragments of Parmenides: Revised and Expanded Edition. Ed. and Trans. Richard McKirahan. Las Vegas:
Parmenides, 2009.
The sixth-edition of Diels-Kranzs (DK) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1952) has long been the standard text for
referencing Presocratic fragments in a numbered arrangement, along with related testimonia. However, it is somewhat
dated, has long been out of print, the German commentary is relatively brief, it does not contain all the available or
pertinent testiomonia, and no translations of the testimonia are offered. This arrangement of Parmenides by Coxon is far
more accessible to most readers of this article (in English, and easily available in-print), and it provides a more
comprehensive list of testimonia, with English translations. The recent revisions by McKirahan have also kept it up to date
with recent advances in scholarship. For these reasons, Coxons is now, or should be, the current standard text for
Parmenidean studies. All references in this article to fragments of Parmenides poem and relevant
ancient testimonia follow Coxons arrangement.
Diels, Hermann, and Walther Kranz. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratikor. 6th ed. Berlin: Weidmann, 1952.
Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E., Schofield, M. The Presocratic Philosophers. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge, 2011.
A valuable introductory work on the Presocratics which provides all fragments of Parmenides poem in Greek with their
English translation, in the midst of a running interpretative commentary. Select testimonia related to Parmenides are also
provided in both Greek and English.
Palmer, John A. Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford, 2009.

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In perhaps the most comprehensive contemporary monograph on Parmenides poem, Palmers most novel contribution
consists of fully developing a modal perspective for understanding Reality and Opinion, as well as the relationship between
both sections.
Sider, David, and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. The Fragments of Parmenides. Bryn Mawr Commentaries. Bryn Mawr: Bryn
Mawr College, 1986.
An essential resource for students who want to study Parmenides in the original Greek.
Tarn, Leonardo. Parmenides. New Jersey: Princeton, 1965.
One of the seminal works in the field advocating Parmenides strict monism.
b. Secondary Sources
Baird, Forrest E., and Walter Kaufmann, eds. Ancient Philosophy. 4th ed. Philosophy Classics. Vol. 1. New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 2003.
An introductory text with an incomplete translation of the poem, which paints Parmenides as a strict monist and contrasts
his position as radically opposite to Heraclitus philosophy of flux.
Bicknell, P. J. A New Arrangement of Some Parmenidean Verses, Symbolae Osloenses 42.1 (1968): 44-50.
Challenges the arrangement of Diels-Kranz. Bicknell suggests a new arrangement of some Parmenidean fragments,
primarily based upon Sextus report that the lines which began the poem (C/DK 1) were followed by lines currently
assigned to fragments C/DK 7 and 8.
Bowra, C. M. The Proem of Parmenides. Classical Philology 32.2 (1937): 97-112.
One of the earliest and most influential treatments of Parmenides Proem, particularly focusing on its similarities to Pindar.
Cherubin, Rose. "Light, Night, and the Opinions of Mortals: Parmenides B8.51-61 and B9." Ancient Philosophy25.1 (2005):
1-23.
An insightful discussion of the dualistic principles found in Opinion.
Cohen, Marc and Patricial Curd and C.D.C. Reeve, eds. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle. 4th
ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2011.
An excellent, if limited, introductory text with a full translation of Parmenides poem. In the brief introduction to
Parmenides, the likelihood of a Xenophanean influence is stressed, the difficulty in reconciling Reality and Opinion is
raised, and Parmenides ultimate position is left open.
Cordero, Nstor-Luis. The Opinion of Parmenides Dismantled. Ancient Philosophy 30.2 (2010): 231-246.
Cordero advances several theses in this paper. First, he avers that the standard arrangement of the fragments is based
solely upon perceived content, which ultimately depends upon imputing anachronistic, Platonic distinctions to Parmenides.
Having challenged this status quo, he goes on to advocate a new arrangement for the poem, moving some passages which
make true cosmological claims out of Opinion, and into Reality.
Cordero, Nstor-Luis. Ed. Parmenides, Venerable and Awesome. Proc. of International Symposium, Buenos Aires, 10/2911/2/2007. Las Vegas: Parmenides, 2011.
A collection of scholarly essays, many of which engage with each other, presented at the first international conference for
Parmenidean studies.
Curd, Patricia. The Legacy of Parmenides. New Jersey: Princeton, 1998.
Curd argues that Parmenides intended to argue for predicational monismthat whatever exists as a genuine entity must
be one specific, basic kind of thing. Curds primary argument is that none of Parmenides immediate successors offers any
argument for the possibility of metaphysical pluralism. Thus, if Parmenides had held the strict-monist view, later thinkers
would be begging the question against him, and Curd thinks this fallacious move unlikely. Since predicational monism
allows for a plurality of entities, there would be no reason for his successors to argue for the possibility of pluralism, and
thus their failure to do so is no longer fallacious.

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DeLong, Jeremy. Rearranging Parmenides: B 1.31-32 and a Case for an Entirely Negative Opinion (Opinion).Southwest
Philosophy Review 31.1 (2015): 177-186.
In addition to considering the meaning of C 1.31-32 and how Opinion should be taken negatively, this article directly takes
on and challenges Corderos proposed rearrangement of the fragments.
Diels, Herman. Parmenides Lehrgedicht: Griechisch und Deutsch. Berlin: George Reimar, 1897.
Granger, Herbert. "Parmenides of Elea: Rationalist or Dogmatist?" Ancient Philosophy 30.1 (2010): 15-38.
An article that helpfully sets interpretative approaches to Parmenides in the context of commentators background
assumptions regarding Parmenides rationalism.
Hermann, Arnold. To Think Like a God: Pythagoras and ParmenidesThe Origins of Philosophy. Las Vegas: Parmenides,
2004.
While ultimately denying any significant historical influence by Pythagoreans upon Parmenides, Hermann traces how the
ancient conceptual distinction between divine and mortal knowledge led to the development of these diametrically opposed
views. Whereas this distinction essentially led the Pythagoreans to develop a religious cult, it inspired Parmenides
(stepping up to Xenophanes challenges) to became the first true philosopher, relying upon logic and reasoning to arrive at
metaphysical conclusions, and thus achieving a sort of divine knowledge as a mortal.
Kingsley, Peter. Reality. Inverness: Golden Sufi Center, 2003.
Kingsley advocates rejecting that Parmenides attempted to communicate any epistemic or metaphysical truths in his poem
at least, not in any rationalistic sense. Rather, Parmenides is a mystic who has found divine truth through ritual and
spiritual experiences. His poem recounts these experiences in the Proem, and what follows is designed to open the
readers mind to similar experiences, via losing oneself in elenchus, and facing death metaphorically, if not literally.
Kurfess, Christopher John. Restoring Parmenides Poem: Essays Toward a New Arrangement of the Fragments Based
upon a Reassessment of the Original Sources. Diss. U. of Pittsburgh, 2012.
Kurfess, Christopher. Veritys Intrepid Heart: The Variants in Parmenides, DK B. 1.29 (and 8.4). Apeiron 47.1 (2014): 8193.
Lewis, Frank A. Parmenides Modal Fallacy, Phronesis 54 (2009): 1-8.
Lombardo, Stanley. Parmenides and Empedocles. Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2010.
For those interested in a translation that attempts to capture Parmenides poetical style.
Miller, Mitchell. Ambiguity and Transport: Reflections on the Proem to Parmenides Poem. Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 30 (2006): 1-47.
McKirahan, Richard D. Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentaries. Indianapolis: Hackett,
1994.
An exceptionally solid and detailed introduction to the Presocratics overall. Suitable for both beginning and more advanced
readers. Provides an overview of the interpretative problems for Parmenides and various perspectives, in addition to
McKirahans own perspective on them, (which differs markedly from Coxons, whose work he recently edited and revised).
Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. Parmenides on Mortal Belief. Journal of the History of Philosophy 15.3 (1979): 253-65.
Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. The Route of Parmenides: Revised and Expanded Edition. Las Vegas: Parmenides, 2008.
Perhaps the most influential modern work on Parmenides in the twentieth century, the contributions and insights offered
by Mourelatos in this monograph are invaluable and extensive. He is perhaps best known for demonstrating the extensive
and inventive ways in which Parmenides invokes and plays off of Homeric/Hesiodic meter and language, as well as being
the first to posit an Essentialist interpretation of Reality.
Nehamas, Alexander. On Parmenides Three Ways of Inquiry. Deucalion 33/34 (1981): 97-111.
Owen, G. E. L. Eleatic Questions. The Classics Quarterly 10.1 (1960): 84-102.

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In addition to focusing on the problematic lines 1.31-32, Owen provides one of the most influential interpretations of
Parmenides. He claims that Parmenides was led to adopt a strict monism on logical and Russellian grounds, and explains
how Opinion can be viewed negatively without contradiction as a mere dialectical exercise.
Reeve, C.D.C, and Patrick Lee Miller, eds. Introductory Readings in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy. Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2006.
An example of an introductory text with a full translation of the poem, which straightforwardly casts Parmenides as
advocating strict monism.
Stumpf, Samuel Enoch. Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of Philosophy. 7th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003.
An introductory text with no translation of Parmenides poem. Provides several pages of interpretative summary, casting
Parmenides as a strict monist, and in opposition to Heraclitus.
Thanassas, Panagiotis. Parmenides, Cosmos, and Being: A Philosophical Interpretation. Milwaukee: Marquette, 2007.
Thanassas emphasizes the epistemological reliability as grounding the distinction between Reality and Opinion, concluding
that Parmenides viewed true knowledge (and the philosophical methodology that leads to) as divine. He also offers a novel
view concerning the content of Opinion, which he believes needs to be further divided up into several distinct sections with
variant polemical ends.

Author Information
Jeremy C. DeLong
Email: jeremydelong@sbcglobal.net
University of Kansas
U. S. A.

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