G.R. No.

190969

January 30, 2013

BARON A. VILLANUEVA and the SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, Petitioners, vs.

EDNA R. CAPARAS, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 tiled by petitioner Baron A. Villanueva (Villanueva) to nullity the
decision2 dated May 28, 2009 and the resolution3 dated January 11, 20 I 0 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 102128 insofar as it reversed the disposition4 of the Secretary of Justice (Secretary) in I.S. No.
05-3813 (docketed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, as Criminal Case No. Q-06143768 ). The Secretary set aside the resolution5 of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (prosecutor) and
directed tile withdrawal of the information for homicide filed against Villanueva.
The Factual Antecedents
As the CA summarized in its decision, an altercation occurred between Renato Caparas, husband of
respondent Edna R. Caparas, and Villanueva in the morning of August 24, 2005, which altercation led to the
death of Renato. On September 7, 2005, Edna filed a criminal complaint for murder against Villanueva.
During the preliminary investigation, Edna submitted her affidavit; the affidavit of her neighbor, Fernando
Gonzales, who witnessed the incident; and the autopsy report of the Philippine National Police-Central Police
District Crime Laboratory.6 Villanueva, for his part, submitted his affidavit; the affidavit of Joan Miguel,
Villanuevas girlfriend and the niece of Edna; the affidavit of Lourdes Miguel, Renatos sister; and the affidavit
of Jovita Caparas, Renato and Lourdes mother, who were all witnesses to the incident. Villanueva submitted
as well as the opinion of Dr. Valentin T. Bernales of the National Bureau of Investigation Medico-Legal Division
(NBI opinion) as to the cause of Renatos head injuries.7
Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for homicide8 against Villanueva on October
3, 2006.9 Villanueva sought reconsideration of the prosecutors resolution, but the prosecutor denied the
motion on March 22, 2007. Before he could be arraigned,10 Villanueva filed a petition for review before the
Department of Justice.
The DOJ Secretarys Resolution
On July 27, 2007, the Secretary set aside the prosecutors resolution and directed the prosecutor to move for
the withdrawal of the information. The Secretary found the evidence against Villanueva insufficient to support a
prima facie case. With the Secretarys denial of Ednas motion for reconsideration on January 4, 2008, Edna
sought recourse with the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.11
The Ruling of the CA
The CA reversed the Secretarys resolution and ordered the reinstatement of the prosecutors resolution and
the corresponding information. It held that the Secretary exceeded the functional requirements of a preliminary
investigation in passing upon the validity of matters essentially evidentiary in nature; grave abuse of discretion
intervened when he passed upon the merits of Villanuevas defenses, a matter best ventilated in the trial

proper. The CA concluded that the facts and the pieces of evidence presented sufficiently supported the finding
of probable cause to indict Villanueva for Homicide.
The CA also denied Villanuevas motion to dismiss, based on the order dated February 16, 2009 of the
RTC12granting the motion for the withdrawal of the information. The CAs denial of Villanuevas motion for
reconsideration gave rise to and prompted the present recourse.
The Petition
Villanueva argues in the petition before us that the CA decided questions of substance in a way not in accord
with law and jurisprudence, and it departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when
the CA:
1. ordered the reinstatement of the information; and
2. reversed and set aside the resolution of the Secretary that was fully in accord with law and the facts
established by the evidence.13
The Case for the Respondents
Edna, in her response,14 argues that, first, the issue raised before the CA is whether the Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing his resolution which was cited as basis for Villanuevas motion to withdraw
the information; thus, after setting aside the Secretarys resolution and finding probable cause, the CA correctly
ordered the reinstatement of the information; and second, the CA correctly ruled that the Secretary gravely
abused his discretion when he reversed the finding of probable cause as he relied on the unconfirmed affidavit
of Jovita and on the NBI opinion, and disregarded the testimony of Edna and her witness and the autopsy
report.
The Courts Ruling
The petition poses to us the issue of whether the CA correctly ruled that the Secretary exceeded the bounds of
his jurisdiction when he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to indict Villanueva for
homicide and, pursuant to this conclusion, ordered the withdrawal of the resolution.
The petitioner posits that: (1) the CA passed upon the findings of the RTC although the latters findings were
not in issue before the CA; (2) the Secretary is specifically granted the power, among others, to reverse the
findings of the prosecutor when, as in this case, they are contrary to the evidence; and (3) the CA completely
disregarded the affidavits of Lourdes and Jovita, and the NBI opinion, among others.
We find the CA decision and resolution in accord with law and jurisprudence in finding that the Secretary acted
with grave abuse of discretion when he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge
Villanueva with homicide. Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information, pertains to facts and
circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof.15 Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty.16Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more
than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.17 The strict validity and merits of a
party's accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and pieces of evidence, are better
ventilated during the trial proper of the case.18 The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive
function,19 lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation20 on the
offended partys complaint.21 The prosecutors ruling is reviewable by the Secretary22 who, as the final

determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutors
determination.23 As a rule, the Secretarys findings are not subject to interference by the courts,24 save only
when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;25 or when he grossly
misapprehends facts;26 or acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.27 In
order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged, homicide in this case, should be
present.28 Jurisprudence laid out the elements of homicide as: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4)
the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide.29 All of these elements are present in this case, as adequately shown by the affidavits of Edna and
her witness, and by the autopsy report.
We agree with the CA that the Secretary, in this case, calibrated the evidentiary weight of the NBI opinion visa-vis the autopsy report, as well as Ednas complaint-affidavit vis--vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing,
already went into the strict merits of Villanuevas defenses. We note that the NBI opinion was procured at
Villanuevas instance and was based on the documents and in response to the questions Villanueva
posed,30 while Jovita was unable to recall the events that transpired relative to Renatos death when asked
during the preliminary investigation. Whether the alternative scenario on the cause of Renatos injuries and
death (as supported by Jovitas affidavit and the NBI opinion and which Villanueva proposed by way of
defense) is more credible and more likely than the narrations of Edna in her complaint-affidavit, in the affidavit
of her witness, and the NBI autopsy report should best be left for the trial court to determine after a full-blown
trial on the merits. When the Secretary made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of
evidence for and against Villanueva, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the
pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.1wphi1 Finally, while the CA may have
discussed the propriety of the RTC's order granting the withdrawal of the information - a matter not directly
raised in the petition before the appellate court - the discussion was done only in response to Villanueva's own
manifestation and motion for the dismissal of the petition by reason of the order of the RTC.31 In this light, the
CA's discussion of the matter is fully justifiable and understandable. We agree with the CA that the order of the
RTC for the withdrawal of information simply relied on the Secretary's resolution granting the withdrawal of the
information.32 Since the Secretary's resolution is void, the consequent order of the RTC, made on the basis of
this void resolution, should likewise be void and of no effect.33
In sum, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it nullified and set aside the resolution rendered by
the Secretary with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the C A also did not err in ordering the reinstatement
of the prosecutor's resolution of probable cause and its accompanying information.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2009 and its resolution dated January 11, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 102128. Costs against petitioner Baron A. Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 106632. October 9, 1997]
DORIS TERESA HO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the
Special
Prosecutor
of
the
Ombudsman)
and
the
SANDIGANBAYAN
(Second
Division), respondents.
[G.R. No. 106678. October 9, 1997]

ROLANDO S. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the
Special
Prosecutor
of
the
Ombudsman)
and
the
SANDIGANBAYAN
(Second
Division), respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor, without personally determining probable cause by independently examining sufficient
evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation?
The Case
This is the main question raised in these two consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court challenging the Sandiganbayans August 25, 1992 Resolution [1]which answered the said query in
the affirmative.
The Facts
Both petitions have the same factual backdrop. On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor and investigator, Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a complaint[2] against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos.
106632 and 106678, respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoo. The
complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 [3] prohibiting a public officer from
entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. After due notice, all
respondents therein filed their respective counter-affidavits with supporting documents. On January 8, 1992,
Graft Investigation Officer Titus P. Labrador (hereafter, GIO Labrador) submitted his resolution [4] with the
following recommendations:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that an information for violation of
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 as amended be filed against respondent Rolando S. Narciso before the
Sandiganbayan.
It is likewise recommending that the case against the other respondents be DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.
However, after a review of the above resolution, Special Prosecution Officer Leonardo P. Tamayo
(hereafter, SPO Tamayo) recommended that both Rolando Narciso and Doris Teresa Ho be charged with
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The resolution of GIO Labrador, as modified by the memorandum [5] of
SPO Tamayo, was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on May 5, 1992. Thus, herein petitioners
were charged accordingly before the Sandiganbayan in an information[6] filed on May 18, 1992. Attached to the
information were the resolution of GIO Labrador and the memorandum of SPO Tamayo. The said information
reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses ROLANDO
NARCISO and DORIS TERESA HO, President of National Marine Corporation, of violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about April 4, 1989, and for sometime prior and/or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO
NARCISO, a public officer, being then the Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a
government-owned or controlled corporation organized and operating under the Philippine laws, and DORIS
TERESA HO, a private individual and then the President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private
corporation organized and operating under our Corporation law, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, with evident bad faith and through manifest
partiality, cause undue injury to the National Steel Corporation (NSC), by entering without legal justification into
a negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate
of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila, despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed upon was
much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines,
Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding held on
June 30, 1988, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation, in the total sum of One
Million One Hundred Sixteen Thousand Fifty Two Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos (P1,116,052.75),
Philippine Currency, to the pecuniary damage and prejudice of the NSC in the aforestated sum. The said
offense was committed by Rolando S. Narciso in the performance of his official functions as Vice-President of
the National Steel Corporation.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Acting on the foregoing information, the Sandiganbayan issued the now questioned warrant of arrest
against Petitioners Ho and Narciso. Petitioner Ho initially questioned the issuance thereof in an Urgent Motion
to Recall Warrant of Arrest/Motion for Reconsideration which was adopted by Petitioner Narciso. They alleged
that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely
relied on the information and the resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting
evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence.
Respondent Sandiganbayan denied said motion in the challenged Resolution. It ratiocinated in this wise:
Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the information in this
case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but
also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of
responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest, or the reconsideration sought
for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly shows that it is sufficient in form and
substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties during the preliminary investigation. To
require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary investigation to be produced before it, including
the evidence submitted by the complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in
futility.
Thus, these petitions.
The Issue
Petitioner Ho raises this sole issue:
May a judge determine probable cause and issue [a] warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution of
the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted
the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as complainants affidavit,
respondents counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted at the preliminary investigation?[7]
In his separate petition, Rolando S. Narciso adopts the foregoing and raises no other distinct issue.

Petitioners Ho and Narciso similarly contend that a judge, in personally determining the existence of
probable cause, must have before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information
filed by the investigating prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest
warrant. Such evidence should not be merely described in a prosecutors resolution. Citing People vs. Inting,
[8]
petitioners insist that the judge must have before him the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic
notes (if any), and all other supporting documents which are material in assisting the judge to make his
determination.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
Section 2 [, Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (Underscoring supplied.)
In explaining the object and import of the aforequoted constitutional mandate, particularly the power and
the authority of judges to issue warrants of arrest, the Court elucidated inSoliven vs. Makasiar[9]:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.[10] [underscoring supplied]
We should stress that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause
personally. The word personally does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous
Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitutions intent to place a greater degree of responsibility
upon trial judges than that imposed under the previous Charters.
While affirming Soliven, People vs. Inting[11] elaborated on what determination of probable cause entails,
differentiating the judges object or goal from that of the prosecutors.
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make
the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to
him. By itself, the Prosecutors certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course
of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives.The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper -- whether
or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial -- is the function of
the Prosecutor.[12]
And clarifying the statement in People vs. Delgado[13] -- that the trial court may rely on the resolution of the
COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest -- this Court
underscored in Lim Sr. vs. Felix[14] that [r]eliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutors certification
presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and
he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the
recommendation. We added, The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but
because of the records which sustain it. Summing up, the Court said:
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the
taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals
bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judges personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of
each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judges examination should
be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge
by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the
Judge must go beyond the Prosecutors certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should
call for [the] complainant and [the] witnesses themselves to answer the courts probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.[15] [underscoring supplied]
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim Sr. were iterated in Allado vs. Diokno[16] where we explained
again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.[17] Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant
of arrest, must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. [18] At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause.
[19]
In Webb vs. De Leon,[20] we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutors initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
In the recent case of Roberts Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,[21] this Courts application of the dictum laid down
in Soliven -- affirmed and fortified in Inting, Lim Sr., Allado and Webb -- should lay to rest the issue raised in the
instant petitions. In Roberts Jr., this Court, through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., set aside the order of the
respondent judge directing inter alia the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused, reasoning that said
judge did not personally determine the existence of probable cause, since he had only the information,

amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence
supporting the prosecutors finding of probable cause.
In like manner, herein Respondent Sandiganbayan had only the information filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the thirteen-page resolution of the investigating officer and the three-page memorandum of the
prosecution officer, when it issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners. The latter two
documents/reports even had dissimilar recommendations -- the first indicting only Petitioner Narciso, the
second including Petitioner Ho. This alone should have prompted the public respondent to verify, in the records
and other documents submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation, whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the Ombudsmans action charging both petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of Anti-Graft
law.But in its initial justification of the issuance of the warrant, the Sandiganbayan simply said:
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
xxx xxx xxx
But in this particular case we believe there is a prima facie case based on our examination of the resolution
because we believe, we think the Ombudsman will not approve a resolution just like that, without evidence to
back it up.[22]
In attempting to further justify its challenged action, the public respondent explained in its assailed
Resolution:
In the instant case, there are attached to the information, two (2) Memorandum/Resolution (sic) emanating
from the Offices of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor (Pp. 4-6, 7-19, respectively, Record) which
clearly and indubitably established, firstly, the conduct of a due and proper preliminary investigation, secondly,
the approval by proper officials clothed with statutory authority; and thirdly, the determination and
ascertainment of probable cause based on the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant (Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines), foremost among which is the Contract of Affreightment entered into between
National Steel Corporation (NSC), and National Marine Corporation (NMC) and the COA-NSC audit report,
together with the counter-affidavits of accused Rolando Narciso and NMC officials, among whom is accusedmovant. Outlined in detail in the aforesaid Resolution of Titus P. Labrador, Graft Investigation Officer II, which
was reviewed by Attys. Romeo I. Tan and Arturo Mojica, Director, Community Coordination Bureau and
Assistant Ombudsman, PACPO, [respectively,] are the facts leading to the questioned transaction between
NSC and NMC, together with an evaluation of the propriety and legality of the bidding process involved therein
and which revealed that there were supposed non-compliance with proper bidding procedures. GIO Labradors
findings and recommendations, extensively set out in his thirteen-page resolution, is complemented by the
three-page Memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer II Leonardo P. Tamayo, both of which meticulously
delved into the merits and demerits of the evidence presented by the complainant and accused-respondents
and which resulted in their respective recommendation which led the Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez to
approve the recommendations of Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de G. Ferrer and Special Prosecutor Aniano
A. Desierto for the filing of the information in the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the information in this
case in the determination of whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but
also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of
responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest, or the reconsideration sought
for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly shows that it is sufficient in form and

substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties during the preliminary investigation. To
require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary investigation to be produced before it, including
the evidence submitted by the complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in
futility.[23]
In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld. Lest we be too
repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held inInting, the determination
of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the
judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether
a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. [24] Thus, even if both should base their
findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct
objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in
finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the
contents of the prosecutors report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of
an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have
supporting evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on
the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining
personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than
the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed
up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding
probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his
personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.[25]
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation
be submitted to and examined by the judge. [26] We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them
to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an
accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if
any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of
the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the
prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report
the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine
probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.
True, in Webb vs. De Leon, we found that the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties evidence
made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there [was] probable cause to issue warrants of arrest
against petitioners. This statement may have been wrongly construed by the public respondent to mean that
the narration or description of portions of the evidence in the prosecutors report may serve as sufficient basis
to make its own independent judgment. What it should bear in mind, however, is that, aside from the 26-page
report of the DOJ panel, the sworn statements of three witnesses and counter-affidavits of the petitioners
in Webb were also submitted to the trial court, and the latter is presumed to have reviewed these documents
as well, prior to its issuance of the warrants of arrest.

In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft
investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information filed before
it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation without supporting
evidence. It had no other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or
the People from which to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists. Clearly and ineluctably,
Respondent Courts findings of the conduct of a due and proper preliminary investigation and the approval by
proper officials clothed with statutory authority are not equivalent to the independent and personalresponsibility
required by the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. At least some of the documentary evidence mentioned
(Contract of Affreightment between National Steel Corporation and National Marine Corporation, the COA-NSC
audit report, and counter-affidavits of Rolando Narciso and NMC officials), upon which the investigating officials
of the Ombudsman reportedly ascertained the existence of probable cause, should have been physically
present before the public respondent for its examination, to enable it to determine on its own whether there is
substantial evidence to support the finding of probable cause. But it stubbornly stood pat on its position that it
had essentially complied with its responsibility. Indisputably, however, the procedure it undertook contravenes
the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion
in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and
recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other
than such bare findings and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Resolution is SET ASIDE. The warrant
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on May 20, 1992 in Case No. 17674 for the arrest of
Petitioners Doris Teresa Ho and Rolando Narciso is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196735

May 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN,
and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research personnel should feel safest.
After all, this is where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this world are peacefully nurtured
and debated. Universities produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of perverse brotherhood for
these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has resulted in a senseless death whose
justice is now the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are prosecuted. It is even more
extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who present themselves courageously before an able and
experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity
rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of their actions. They must do so for
there is an individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family. Excruciating grief
for them will never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of
the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead
pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from
his injuries.
An information1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against several members of
the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano,

Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219. The information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true names,
identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, armed with
baseball bats, lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the
head and clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,2 Cristobal Gaston, Jr.,3 and Leandro Lachica,4 and the frustrated murder of Sigma Rho
fraternity members Mervin Natalicio5 and Amel Fortes.6 Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of the
accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix Tumaneng, 7 and
Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to
1 :00 p.m., they were having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.8 Suddenly, Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina
shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them.10 The men were armed with baseball bats and
lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts.11 Within a few seconds, five (5) of
the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead pipes.12 During the attack, he recognized one of the
attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off.13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions.14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.15 Just before reaching it, he looked back and
saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion
was.16Both of them did not have their masks on.17 He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because
he often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his
friend.18 The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five (45) seconds.19
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when Venturina
shouted.20 He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks, running toward
them.21 He was stunned, and he started running.22 He stumbled over the protruding roots of a tree.23 He got up,
but the attackers came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until he fell down.24 While
he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2) of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L.
Soliva since they were not wearing any masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds, they stopped hitting him.26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men coming
toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.27 This group also beat him up.28 He did not move until another group of
masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.29
When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.30 Several bystanders brought him to the U.P.
Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures. 31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when Venturina shouted and
saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of cloth around their
heads.32He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked
his way and hit him with lead pipes.33 While running and parrying the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert
Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their masks fell off.34 He successfully evaded his
attackers and ran to the Main Library.35 He then decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and
turned back toward Beach House.36There, he saw Venturina lying on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was
beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.38 When they saw
him, they went toward his direction.39 They were about to hit him when somebody shouted that policemen were
coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away.40
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could bring Venturina
to the U.P. Infirmary.41 When they brought the car over, other people, presumably bystanders, were already

loading Venturina into another vehicle.42 They followed that vehicle to the U.P. Infirmary where they saw
Natalicio.43 He stayed at the infirmary until the following morning.44
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he heard someone
shout, "Brods!"45 He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and baseball bats.46 Most of
them had pieces of cloth covering their faces.47 He was about to run when two (2) of the attackers approached
him.48 One struck him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed instrument.49 He was able to
parry most of the blows from the lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left
forearm.50
He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach House
Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano.52 He decided to go back to the
canteen to help his fraternity brothers.53 When he arrived, he did not see any of his fraternity brothers but only
saw the ones who attacked them.54 He ended up going to their hang-out instead to meet with his other
fraternity brothers.55 They then proceeded to the College of Law where the rest of the fraternity was already
discussing the incident.56
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of attackers coming
toward them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina.58 He was also able to see
Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a jeepney to the College
of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers.60 One of his fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told him that he
received information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the Main Library and were
regrouping in SM North.61 Lachica and his group then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and identify
their attackers.62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.63 Lachica saw Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan.64 They had no choice but to get away from the
mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held a meeting.65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge their complaints with
the National Bureau of Investigation.66 Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told the U.P. Police that the victims
would be giving their statements before the National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police
copies of their statements. In the meantime, Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's
Hospital on December 8, 1994. He died on December 10, 1994.67 On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was
conducted on the cadaver of Dennis Venturina.68 Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, found that Venturina had "several contusions located at the back of the upper left arm
and hematoma on the back of both hands,"69 "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the head,70 generalized
hematoma on the skull,"71"several fractures on the head,"72 and "inter-cranial hemorrhage."73 The injuries,
according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard blunt object.74 Dr. Victoria concluded that
Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.75
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their respective
affidavits76 before the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal examinations77 with their
medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated
wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and on the fingers; contused abrasions on both knees;
contusion on the left leg and thigh,"78 all of which could have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These
injuries required medical attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.79
Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right leg which could have been
caused by a blunt instrument."80 These injuries required hospitalization for a period of ten (10) days to thirty
(30) days from date of infliction.81 He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on the left
forearm which could possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard surface and would require one (1) to
nine (9) days of medical attention."82 He found on Leandro Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side,
left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."83 On Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found
"lacerated wounds on the anterior chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands; contusions on
the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."84
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted the demurrer
to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified by the prosecution's
witnesses and that he was not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the prosecution.85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own statement of the facts, as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera,86 a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot patrol with another member of the
U.P. Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the College of Arts and Sciences

(Palma Hall) when he vaguely heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place where the alleged
rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped by bystanders. They helped an injured person board
the service vehicle of the Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name was, and he replied that he was
Mervin Natalicio. When he asked Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply but instead told him that
his attackers were wearing masks. Oscar Salvador87 corroborated his testimony.
Benjamin Lato,88 a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified that the identities of the
attackers were unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however, admitted that he did not see the attack;
he just saw a man sprawled on the ground at the time of the incident.
Frisco Capilo,89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying a cigarette at a vendor located
nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten (10) men, wearing either masks
of red and black bonnets or with shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked nearby. He also saw
three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked men. Two (2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the
victims was lifting the other to help him, but the attackers overtook him. Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He
then saw students helping those who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the injured victims,
which he later found out to be Amel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda Panganiban,90 testified that she and her
friends were in line to order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion happened. She saw around
fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any mask fall off.
Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz Perez,91 corroborated her story that the masked men were
unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez, however, admitted that a member of Scintilla Juris approached
her to make a statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,92 testified on substantially the same matters as Panganiban and
Perez. She also stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being beaten up by about three (3)
to five (5) masked men. She also stated that some of the men were wearing black masks while some were
wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano,93 accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son was in Pampanga
to visit his sick grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son went to Pampanga before lunch
that day and visited the school where she teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,94 he had not been feeling well since December 5, 1994. He said that
he could not have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was absent even from work. He also
testified that he wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly been the person identified by Leandro
Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time since he was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla,95 he and another classmate, Michael Vibas, were working on a school
project on December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the rumble as he had an
injury affecting his balance. The injury was caused by an incident in August 1994 when he was struck in the
head by an unknown assailant. His testimony was corroborated by Jose Victor Santos96 who stated that after
lunch that day, Medalla played darts with him and, afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva,97 on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with his girlfriend and another friend
in Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and went straight to their
fraternity hang-out where he was told that there had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also met several
Sigma Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the hang-out. They were also told by their head, Carlo
Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans and just go home. Anna Cabahug,98 his girlfriend, corroborated his
story.
Warren Zingapan99 also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the incident. He claimed to have gone to
SM North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He also alleged that some Sigma
Rhoans attacked them in SM North that day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision100 with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.101 The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay,
George Morano, and Raymund Narag.102 The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the
court until his apprehension.103 The trial court, m evaluating the voluminous evidence at hand, concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused, some
were sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the amorphous images during the
pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and identify some of the attackers etching an
indelible impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw

the attackers rush towards them wielding deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and
bladed ones, and pounce on their hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one another at the
scene of the crime during the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity
rivals permanently behind bars, not one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses,
who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could
have easily tagged each and every single accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to
make sure that no one else would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and
some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows against them.104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to this court on
automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal,105 the case was remanded to the
Court of Appeals.106 In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several Times107 before it was
eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the writing of the decision.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed108 the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members concurring109 an one (1) dissenting.110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties, the issue may be further
refined, thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information against them
contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting
witnesses to prove that the masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of the
evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
I
An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully
apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the prosecution should not
have included the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since they were
presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law."111 This includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and "to be
informed of the nature and accusation against him."112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in compliance
with the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea,113 this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the
charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to
fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.114
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information.
Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.115 It
was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or
other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be
admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to
remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked
but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.116 What is
important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by
the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the
accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the
act of all."117 This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there
was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been
alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great
weight and credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People v. Daniel Quijada,118 as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through
the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone,
the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity
of an oath, the carriage and mien.119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias,120 this court stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable assumption that it
is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal
much of themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception that makes the rule is where such
findings arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are so lacking in
basis as to suggest that they were reached without the careful study and perceptiveness that should
characterize a judicial decision.121 (Emphasis supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the presumption is always in favor of
innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for the defense
were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial court acquitted six (6)
and convicted five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said that the trial court
acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without a judicious and
exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value, there is also nothing that
precludes this court from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent review of the facts and the
evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently
identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
to be credible. In its decision, the trial court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not
one testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply
bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and every
accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure no one would escape conviction.
Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see
who delivered the blows against them.

Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have seen it
all but they could not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he did not have the
opportunity to see and identify the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a two-inch cut. His forearm was
also hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it. Natalicio, one of the other three who were hospitalized,
was severely beaten by three waves of attackers totalling more than 15 but he could only name 3 of them. He
added, however, that he would be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them again. Of them,
Mangrobang pointed to at least 5 but he stressed that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario,
Daraoay, Denoista, and Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston could have named any of the accused as the
one who repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed him but he frankly said their faces were covered.
Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by several groups but did not name any of the accused as one of
those who attacked him. The persons he identified were those leading the pack with one of them as the
assailant of Venturina, and the two others who he saw standing while he was running away. He added that he
saw some of the accused during the attack but did not know then their names.122 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident,"123 there would be slight
inconsistencies in their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas,124 it was previously observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as
there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In
fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean
that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.125 (Emphasis supplied)
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla;126
Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva;127 and Fortes was able to identify Feliciano,
Medalla, and Zingapan.128 Their positive identification was due to the fact that they either wore no masks or
that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find
ways to identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended. It
has also been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and
body movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory.129
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost their masks. It had been
testified by the victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a piece of cloth or a
handkerchief and that Alvir,130 Zingapan,131 Soliva,132 and Feliciano133 had masks on at first but their masks fell
off and hung around their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during cross-examination who observed that
some of the attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in the Beach House Canteen,
and then running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not?
A Yes, sir.134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of mind to take a look at their
assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, must
be upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony credence while Gaston's testimony
was found to be "hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris members
identified by Mangrobang "should not be. misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony of Mangrobang was an
absolute fabrication."135 The court went on to state that they "were exonerated merely because they were
accorded the benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and chaotic
circumstances were [sic] not corroborated and their alibis, not refuted."136 There was, therefore, no basis to say
that Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that the evidence presented was not strong enough to overcome
the presumption of innocence.

Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy"137 by the trial court only with regard to his
identification of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with Zingapan
moving and Morano staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan and Morano were running
after him. Lachica also testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who was with Zingapan. Because of this
confusion, the trial court found that there was doubt as to who was really beside Zingapan. The uncertainty
resulted into an acquittal for Morano. Despite this, the court still did not" impute doubt in their testimonies that
Zingapan was present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision was brought about only
upon a thorough examination of the evidence presented: It accepted that there were inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the victims but that these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that "[s]uch
inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no person with perfect faculties or
senses."'138
Evidence as part of the res
gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,139 when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the
bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked. This, it is
argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, x x x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is
when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as
part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae,
is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae
refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant
to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae
is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.143
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling
occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido,144 however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference. Therefore,
almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of
witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different impressions and
recollections of the same incident. x x x145
(Emphasis supplied)

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time.
Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks
on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the
incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an
attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than that of
the victims.
The belated identification by
the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon City
Police but instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident
gives doubt as to the credibility of their testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera146 testified that on their way to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the victims
who all told him they could not recognize the attackers because they were all wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr.
Mislang147 testified to the effect that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio answered that he
did not know because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival fraternities. While this court does
not condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are certain practices that
are unique to fraternal organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their attackers but chose not to disclose
it without first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability is bolstered by the actions of Sigma
Rho after the incident, which showed that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in SM North. Because
of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate
against the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the police
officer or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It should not be forgotten that the
victims actually witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were
merely relaying secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident also does not
affect their credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of them were
well enough to go to the National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in order to give their statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior "brads" and their legal
counsel that they executed their sworn statements before the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days
after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead of to the U.P. Police was the
call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of Investigation more equipped to
handle the investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely
following the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is better equipped than the U.P.
Police to handle the investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their station is located in front of
the College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and protect lives and property,
enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and Regulations including
policies and standards; and to perform such other functions relative to the general safety and security of the
students, employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus. x x x.148 (Emphasis supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus security. They are by no means an
actual police force that is equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation. Fraternity-related violence in
U.P. has also increasingly become more frequent, which might possibly have desensitized the U.P. Police in
such a way that would prevent their objectivity in the conduct of their investigations. The victims' reliance on
the National Bureau of Investigation, therefore, is understandable.
III

Alibi cannot prevail over the

positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim.149 In People v.
Benjamin Peteluna,150 this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the defense
of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor
by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at
all and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must
also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving,
and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and
if uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.151
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused-appellants merely
offered alibis and denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld by both the trial court and
the appellate court while giving little credence to the accused-appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no reason to
disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants were correctly
charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball bats attacked
Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against Dennis Venturina
was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The
appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must
concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.154 (Emphasis
supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to the findings of
the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the attack was sudden
and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see them"155 and that "there

was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the
victims."156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a
place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they
could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would
be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute,
which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to
defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The presence of conspiracy
makes all of the accusedappellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of Dennis
Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel
Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the
accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against
Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the
attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting
harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by
slightly injuring them."158 It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have been
done with an intent to kill."159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accusedappellants160and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of
participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as coprincipals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one
is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to
accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the
whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts
other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability
upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the
close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted
by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the
felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the
court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.162 (Emphasis supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the accusedappellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of
damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at
the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was
shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore,
immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the
respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that
intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical injuries. It
would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended
to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston.
Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them
were liable for that intent to kill.1wphi1
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted
murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five other lives whose once
bright futures are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado. There is now more honor for
them to accept their responsibility and serve the consequences of their actions. There is, however, nothing that
they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully compensate for his senseless and painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this case and
many cases like it can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one which valorizes courage,
sacrifice and honor in more life-saving pursuits."Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of
the Philippines. It colors the stories of many who choose to expend their energy in order that our people will
have better lives. Fraternity rumbles are an anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It
fosters a culture that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is
AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva,
Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q9561137.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5,
2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players
and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2,
1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private
complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond
ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value
of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired
without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private

complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1)
men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1)
two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the
proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of
the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying
with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale
thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the
amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of
said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the
other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing
business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner
denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank
receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for
the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty
imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of
Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the
amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision
of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San
Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such
that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of
7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition stating
the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND
APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS,
WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID
NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05
JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS,
IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND
LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counterarguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense and the
acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said
court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in
the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of
the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court
raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt
dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy,
thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private
complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment
to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established
doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed against
him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed
to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially
complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot
be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do
not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and
the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein
the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the
foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of
July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule
requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from
the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the
failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective.
Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the
proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient

compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not
properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b)
of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by
the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the offender,
was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate
petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about
the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on 5 July
1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he
promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it
may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made
upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case,
property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not
be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in
estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law would
have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both
written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not
fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused,
we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as
that introduced in the case at bar.14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the
elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission
basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60)
days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of
jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed
period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is
unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to
the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their
deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records
of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by
the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in
determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the
continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised
Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are
of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus,
several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter.
Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria,
Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The
parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as
counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to
impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value
of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that
would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided
for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon
the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any
remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated
this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the
law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking
into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not
punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act
should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the
subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that
act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation
wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but
to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate
with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the
duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can
exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that
the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court
could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired
Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited
commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered
with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law.
"Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too
severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is
the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given
penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for
clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current inflation
rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy
fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties
will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended
that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is
also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties
in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties
in order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through
the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those
who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00

plundered, the legislature lowered it to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold
amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive
compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property
stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing
stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or
the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty
proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum
penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to
maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after
serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the
minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to
arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period under the

existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The
same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and
the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is
the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would
no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not
changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor
minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision
correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional
minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium to
prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1
day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties are
not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6
months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental
penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions
asP10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the
IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties;
however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same
penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates
requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in
Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be
applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the
proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to
Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled
by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional
penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.

x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has
expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the
duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide
whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense,
and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and
(3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what
respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into
account the latters recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally,
the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine.
Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South
Dakotas recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem
are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense is
high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact
that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed
upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus
entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employers loved ones and properties, a
subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to
deter the commission of such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of
the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than
two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the
amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds
the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and
a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful acts
of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the
amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
(2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement
ofP20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act
No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the
government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15
years)32under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of
malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the
government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited)
where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty
imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost
of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing unlawfully
taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully
taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity
between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the

former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the
premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of
Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if
the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is
the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed is
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the
damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if
the value of the damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less
than the value of the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not
exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00, which
simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine
under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is
categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also
amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same
through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the proposal,
such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused,
to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation
of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article
316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special
cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings).
Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public
treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable officer to
render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the
country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are
punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products
without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the
offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code,
which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest
products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular
crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is
dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this
particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other
related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity
and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in
no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a
study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of

the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal
luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned
law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral
arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the
Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates
to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings
were far different from todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or
supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the
law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and
purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal
branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased
by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient
who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be
contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the
proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some
offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which
is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot
be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does

not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil
indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are
excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of
the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that
which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is that the incremental
penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As
suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no
longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would
occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper
penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly
runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos
Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been questioned
before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the
death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede
the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section
19 (1),42Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of
the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law
from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due
process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on
the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy
wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the
form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine
and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to
the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern
time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary
values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and
variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values
could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socioeconomic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a
wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped,
has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys
to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to
Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to take into
consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the
legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the
Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent
injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three
years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the
Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances"
in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of a
statute. The issue is no different from the Courts adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the
Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article
10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the
proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively
discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to
Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as
elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier
stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law
is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the
amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium
period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period,
as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each
additionalP10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive,
thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of
the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time
included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter
provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor
minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form
one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved
is P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a
period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess
of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then,
adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed
penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months.One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting
laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest
the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March
22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification
the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of
the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN
DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 137385. January 23, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODITO DAGANIO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

[1]

Accused-appellant Rodito Daganio, Sr., was charged with rape by his minor daughter, Virgie Daganio.
The Information[2] against him reads:

That on or about the 6th day of September 1994, at Sapad, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there threatening to kill one
VIRGIE DAGANIO if she will resist and report to her mother accuseds criminal designs, and thereafter lie with
and have carnal knowledge of said VIRGIE DAGANIO, his 11 YEAR OLD daughter, against her will and
consent.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
When arraigned, the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits followed.

The prosecution evidence came chiefly from the victim, Virgie Daganio, the victims mother, Laureta
Daganio, and the examining physician, Dr. William Canoy.
The victim testified that her father (accused-appellant) raped her several times in their house. Her first
defilement was in the month of December, but she could no longer recall what year it was.
The second rape took place in the evening of September 6, 1994. She was then 11 years old. That night,
her mother (Laureta) was in Pikalawag, Lanao del Norte. The victim was playing with her younger siblings
when the accused-appellant told her to go inside the house. She obeyed him. Inside their house, the accusedappellant first placed his finger in her vagina because it was too small. Next, he inserted his penis. Half of the
penis penetrated her.[4] After the sexual assault, he warned her not to tell anyone about the rape or he would
cut her neck.Despite the threat, the victim related her harrowing experience to her mother, Laureta Daganio.[5]
The victim claimed that even before she was raped by the accused-appellant, her parents would quarrel a
lot because the accused-appellant was always drunk. Sometimes her parents would fight because the
accused-appellant touched her. There were also instances when the accused-appellant would hit Laureta with
fist blows during their heated arguments.[6]
Laureta Daganio testified that the victim was eleven years old at the time the accused-appellant raped
her. She further claimed that accused-appellant also raped their other daughter, Rita Daganio, when the latter
was 15 years old. Laureta forgave the accused-appellant then. However, when she learned of the similar plight
of the victim in the hands of the accused-appellant, she reported the incident to the authorities and assisted the
victim in filing the complaint for rape against the accused-appellant.[7]
Dr. William Canoy testified that he conducted a medical examination on the victim on September
15, 1994. There were no fresh wounds in the vagina, although he found edema (slight swelling emission of the
skin) around the victims labia majora and healed lacerations in the hymen at 6, 7, 1 and 8 oclock positions. He
opined that the edema could have been caused by hard or blunt objects or by a mans penis.[8]
The accused-appellant denied the accusations of the victim. He claimed that on September 6, 1994, he
was ill so he stayed in bed the whole day. When asked if he sexually molested the victim on said date, he
replied that he did not know if he did because of his fever. He declared that he loves Laureta and that their
relationship before September 6, 1994 was harmonious. He alleged that he never quarreled with her. He
claimed he did not know why she filed the rape case against him.[9]
After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment, [10] finding the accused-appellant guilty as charged. He
was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death and ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount
of P50,000.00.
Hence, the automatic review of the case.
The accused-appellant contends that:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
VERGIE (sic) DAGANIO.
II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED (APPELLANT) NOTWITHSTANDING

THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
We affirm the assailed judgment.
The accused-appellant claims that the prosecution propounded leading questions on the victim. He
asserts that had the trial court sustained the timely objections of his counsel, the victim would not have been
able to establish the rape. We are not persuaded.
It is true that leading questions are generally not allowed and have little probative value. However, Section
10, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[11] provides:
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. - A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of
tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf mute.
x x x x x x x x x.
In the case at bar, the victim was twelve (12) years old when she testified in court. When most children her
age were already in Grade VI of elementary education, she was only in Grade III. We can also glean from her
testimony that she could not grasp the legal concept of rape. Thus, the trial judge correctly allowed the
prosecutor to ask leading questions to ferret out the truth.
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning
of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, [12] which took
effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of
examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.
The totality of the evidence presented shows beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant raped
the victim on September 6, 1994. During the cross-examination, the victim gave a detailed and candid account
of the rape incident. She testified as follows:[13]
(ATTY. GUBAT):
Q: You said that your father used his fingers, how did your father used (sic) his fingers in raping you?
(VIRGIE):
A: He placed his fingers and his penis into my vagina.
Q: And your fathers fingers and penis were entrusted (sic) to your vagina at the same time is that right?
A: A little.
Q: What do you mean by a little?

A: Its half.
Q: What do you mean by half?
A: Half of the penis.
Q: You said your father used his fingers, how many fingers were used?
A: Only one.
Q: Which of the fingers?
A: In the left hand.
Q: Which of the fingers in the left hand?
A: The middle finger.
Q: Have you seen the penis of your father?
A: Yes, sir.

(emphases ours)
The accused-appellant points out that Dr. William Canoy did not find fresh wounds on the genitalia of the
victim. Allegedly, the absence of said wounds creates a doubt on her claim that she was raped on September
6, 1994. We disagree.
The records clearly show that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. Dr. Canoy
categorically stated that he found swelling in the genitalia of the victim that could have been caused by a male
organ. The medical findings of the physician also showed that she had lacerations in her vagina at 6, 7, 1
and 8 oclock positions.[14] Said lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.[15]
To discredit the victim, the accused-appellant claims it was easy for the victim to shout and ask for help as
her siblings were in the vicinity when the rape took place. She did not. Thus, he submits that her accusations
do not deserve credit. The allegation lacks merit.
A rape victims testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped
her. Indeed, a young girl would not ordinarily file a complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it
were not true.[17] Thus, the victims revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission
to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out details
on an assault to her dignity cannot be dismissed as mere concoction.[18]
[16]

We also take judicial notice, and it can be considered of public knowledge, that the scene of the rape is not
always or necessarily isolated or secluded. Lust is no respecter of time or place.[19] It goes against human
experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of
dishonor, unless that is the truth, for her natural instinct is to protect her honor. More so, where her charges
could mean the death of her own father, as in this case. [20] Undoubtedly, the accused-appellant was correctly
found guilty of raping his daughter.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, reads:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent x x x .
We have always stressed the rule that the minority of the victim and her relationship to the accused must
be duly alleged and proved to justify the imposition of the death penalty. [21] In some cases,[22] we did not mete
out the death penalty for failure of the prosecution to present the minors birth certificate or for non-presentation
of independent evidence that would prove the victims age.
In the case at bar, the information alleged that the victim was then eleven (11) years old. This fact was
established through the testimony of the victims own mother, Laureta Daganio, and admitted by the defense at
the trial that the presentation of the victims Certificate of Live Birth was dispensed with at the instance of the
defense counsel.[23] Being the victims mother, Laureta Daganio has personal knowledge of the age of the
victim. Thus, we fully agree with the trial court that the minority of the victim was duly established. We do not
doubt her because there was no showing that she was motivated by ill feelings to accuse her own husband of
a grievous offense.
In the case of People vs. Dela Cruz,[24] this Court has also relied on the testimony of the victims mother as
to the minority of her daughters and imposed the death penalty on the accused. We held:
In the case at bar, however, the prosecution proved the minority age of the victims beyond reasonable
doubt. Delia, the victims mother, categorically testified in the hearing of October 9, 1996, that her daughters
were both fourteen (14) years of age at the time of the rape incidents complained of. Thus:
xxxxxxxxx
There is no reason to doubt Delia's testimony. As a mother, she has personal knowledge of the ages of her
children. Her testimony was never challenged by the accused who could have presented the victims birth
certificates. Delias testimony stood unrebutted by any other evidence. To be sure, this is not the first time that
the Court is relying on the testimony of the victims mother to establish the minority age of the victim. In People
vs. Balgos, where the rape victim was six (6) years of age, we relied on the testimony of the victims mother to
prove the victims age. Reposing trust on the testimony of the victims mother, we imposed the death penalty on
the accused-appellant.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere.[25] The doctrine leaves us no choice but to apply the full force of the law
and impose the supreme penalty of death on the accused-appellant. As in the case of Dela Cruz, supra, we
have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the victims mother when she told the trial court that her daughter was
only eleven (11) years old when the accused-appellant raped her.
We note that the trial court awarded civil indemnity to the victim in the amount of P50,000.00. The present
rule is to award civil indemnity in the amount of at least P75,000.00.00 as the rape was qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized under R.A. No. 7659.[26]
Further, the victim is entitled to moral damages, in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages, in
the amount of P25,000.00. In rape cases, moral damages may be awarded to the victim in the criminal
proceeding in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof. The fact that the complainant has suffered the scars of mental, physical and psychological trauma
which constitute the basis for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the
victim, since the Court itself even assume and acknowledge such agony on her part as a gauge of her

credibility.[27] Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may be imposed in the case of incestuous rape to deter
other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.[28]
Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law
is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed accordingly.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, (Branch
21), in Criminal Case No. 21-197, sentencing the accused-appellant, RODITO DAGANIO, to death is
AFFIRMED. The civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is modified and increased to P75,000.00. In
addition, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Pursuant to Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153875 August 16, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ROLANDO DAGANI y REYES and OTELLO SANTIANO Y LEONIDA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision dated June 20, 20021 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, Branch 12 (RTC), dated February 18, 1993, in
Criminal Case No. 89-77467, finding the accused-appellants Otello Santiano y Leonida (Santiano) and
Rolando Dagani y Reyes (Dagani) guilty of the crime of Murder.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and use of personal violence upon one
ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX by then and there shooting him with a .38 caliber revolver, thereby inflicting upon
the said ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued where the prosecution adduced evidence to
establish the following:
At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln
Miran (Miran), and two other individuals had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden, appellants, who
were security officers of the PNR and covered by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the canteen
and approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran, causing the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani
then held Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
The defense proceeded to prove their version of the facts:
Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to investigate a commotion at the canteen.
Upon reaching the place, Santiano ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to enter, while the former waited outside.
Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22
caliber revolver and attempted to fire at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside the
canteen, Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22
caliber gun which belonged to Javier. During the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to
fire a warning shot. He heard Javiers gun fire again, so he decided to rush into the canteen. Santiano then
shot Javier from a distance of less than four meters.
Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of official duty as PNR
security officers. They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish treachery and conspiracy.
The RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused Otello Santiano y Leonida and Rolando Dagani y Reyes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Art. 248, RPC, with the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and granting them the benefit of [the] Indeterminate Sentence
Law, both accused are hereby sentenced to each suffer an Indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal x x x.
Both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, the sum of P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses, the sum of
P30,000.00 as and for [sic] attorneys fees and the further sum of P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel.
Both accused shall be credited with the full extent of their preventive imprisonment. Both accused are hereby
committed to the Director, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila for service of Sentence.
SO ORDERED.3
In brief, the RTC held that appellants failed to prove that Javier attempted to squeeze the trigger of the .22
caliber gun when he pointed it at Dagani; that during the course of the struggle for the possession of the .22
caliber gun, the danger to the life of the accused ceased to be imminent; that in grappling for the weapon,
Dagani "controlled" the hands of Javier and pushed them away from his body; that the appellants failed to
produce the two empty shells as physical evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by Javier; that no points of
entry or bullet markings on the walls of the canteen were shown; that, in light of these findings, no unlawful

aggression was present on the part of the victim; that the appellants failed to prove that they were on official
duty at the time of the incidence; that, since it was not established that Javier actually fired his gun, the injury
inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of the due performance of an official duty;
that the appellants were acting in conspiracy; that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing,
considering that Javier had been shot while his hands were being held by Dagani and as his body was out of
balance and about to fall; and that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in
favor of the appellants.
The appellants appealed to the CA and assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING SELF DEFENSE ON THE PART OF THE
ACCUSED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WERE IN LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFICIAL DUTY.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO
ESTABLISH BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF MURDER.4
The CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is MODIFIED. Appellants are hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. The award for attorneys fees and appearance fees for counsel are hereby deleted. In all
the other aspects, the appealed decision is maintained.
Let the entire records of the case be elevated to the Supreme Court for the mandated review.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA affirmed the findings of fact as well as the salient portions of the RTC Decision, but deleted the award
of attorneys fees and the per appearance fees of counsel since, the
CA reasoned, the instant case is criminal in nature which is under the control of the public prosecutor, and,
additionally, the RTC failed to justify this award in the body of its Decision. And last, the CA found that the RTC
erroneously applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law since the penalty for Murder, at the time of the incident,
was reclusion perpetua which is an indivisible penalty to be imposed in its entirety, regardless of the attending
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Appellants are now before this Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the CA.
Through their Manifestation dated February 11, 2003,6 appellants prayed to dispense with the filing of
additional briefs.
As of date, the records show that despite the efforts exerted by the surety and the responsible law officers to
locate the appellants, the latter could not be found and have jumped bail.7
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Appellants argue that the courts a quo misappreciated the facts and erred in finding that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. They insist that the victim, Javier, had been armed with a revolver at the
time he was struggling with appellant Dagani; that the former "could have easily killed the latter;" that, given the
fact that Javier had been drinking, "it is quite probable for Javier to act harshly and aggressively towards
peace officers such as the accused;"8 and that Javier actually fired three shots from his .22 caliber gun.9
We are not convinced.
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally
justified. Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the
Court the elements of self-defense in order to avail of this extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this
burden by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused,
mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. Self-defense requires that there be (1) an
unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. All these conditions must concur.10
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude11 but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.12 To invoke
self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe
wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.13
In the instant case, the assertions that it was "quite probable" that Javier, during the course of the struggle for
the firearm, "could have easily killed" the appellants are uncertain and speculative. There is aggression in
contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.14
To sum up the matter, we quote the findings of the CA:
The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable
to present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found
and no bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident. Javier also tested negative for gunpowder
residue. Moreover, the trial court found appellant Daganis account of the incident to be incredible and selfserving. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without any proof of the existence of its
requisites.15

Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger to
their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the
latter. After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression
that would have necessitated the act of killing.16 When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists,
the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.17 When Javier
had been caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged
by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable extent,18 and
undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and
fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had already ceased.19
The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful aggression
are reasonable and necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply
material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence.20 The circumstances in their entirety which surround the grappling of the firearm by Dagani and
Javier, such as the nature and number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim21 which amounted to two
fatal wounds,22 that Dagani was able to restrain the hands of Javier and push
them away from his body,23 that Dagani was larger than Javier and had finished Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) hand-tohand combat training,24 and Javier, as admitted by the appellants, was inebriated at the time of the
incident,25 do not justify appellant Santianos act of fatally shooting the victim twice.26
All things considered, the appellants plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea
of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent
evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.27 Whether the accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact.
Like alibi, the affirmative defense of self-defense is inherently weak because, as experience has demonstrated,
it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.28 This Court, therefore, finds no reversible error on the part of the
courts a quo in rejecting the claim of self-defense.
Appellants set up the defense that they were in the lawful performance of their official duties. They specifically
aver that they had been ordered by their desk officer to proceed to the canteen in response to a telephone call
stating that there was a group "creating trouble;" that they were in the call of duty and exercising their functions
and responsibilities as members of the PNR Civil Security Office to preserve peace and order and
protect the lives and property in the PNR Compound;29 and that, invoking jurisprudence, as security officers in
the performance of duty, like the police, they must stand their ground and overcome the opponent, and the
force that may be exerted must differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense.30
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before this defense
can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary consequence of
such lawful exercise.31 These requisites are absent in the instant case.
As found by the CA:
The defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on duty at the time they were at the canteen.
The trial court gave weight to the fact that the appellants were unable to submit their daily time records to show

that they were on duty at the time. Appellants assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was
belied by PNR Security Investigator Rolando Marinays testimony that PNR security officers work in two 12hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot be
regarded as a necessary consequence of appellants due performance of an official duty.32
As stated, considering that the imminent or actual danger to the life of the appellants had been neutralized
when Dagani grappled with Javier and restrained his hands; that Javier had been thrown off-balance; that
Dagani had been specially trained for these purposes; and that Javier had been drinking immediately prior to
the scuffle, this Court holds that the fatal injuries that appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim cannot be
deemed to be necessary consequences of the performance of his duty as a PNR security officer.33 While it is
recognized that police officers if indeed the appellants can be likened to them must stand their ground and
overwhelm their opponents, in People v. Ulep,34 this Court counseled:
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under circumstances
indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police
officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find
themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is
needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of
their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the
absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound
discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement
officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must
always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be
protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights.35
But this Court cannot agree with the findings of the courts a quo that the appellants were in conspiracy.
The RTC simply held:
The Information cited conspiracy of the accused. Since it can also be committed thru simultaneous/concerted
action and considering that Javier was shot by Santiano while being held by Dagani, under jurisprudence,
conspiracy is present.36
The tenor of the factual findings of the CA is equally unsatisfactory:
Moreover, the facts show that Javier was shot by appellant Santiano as he was being subdued by appellant
Dagani. The trial court held that the manner of the attack was indicative of a joint purpose and design by the
appellants.37
Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures,
presumptions, or suspicions.38 Other than the plain fact that the victim had been shot by one of the accused
while being held by a co-accused, there is no other evidence that the appellants were animated by the same
purpose or were moved by a previous common accord. It follows that the liability of the accused must be
determined on an individual basis. While no formal agreement is necessary to establish conspiracy because
conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, yet, conspiracy
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.39

This Court has held that even if all the malefactors joined in the killing, such circumstance alone does not
satisfy the requirement of conspiracy because the rule is that
neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. Conspiracy must be shown to exist
as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.40 Thus, even assuming that Javier was
simultaneously attacked, this does not prove conspiracy. No evidence was presented to show that the
appellants planned to kill Javier or that Daganis overt acts facilitated that alleged plan. The prosecution did not
establish that the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the gun from Javier and in the process, held the latters
hands, was for the purpose of enabling Santiano to shoot at Javier. The prosecution had the burden to show
Daganis intentional participation to the furtherance of a common design and purpose41 or that his action was
all part of a scheme to kill Javier. That Dagani did not expect Santiano to shoot the victim is established when
Santiano testified that Dagani "seem[ed] to be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim" as Javier
gradually fell to the ground.42 And since Daganis conviction can only be sustained if the crime had been
carried out through a conspiracy duly proven, in view of the failure of the prosecution to discharge that burden,
this Court is constrained to acquit him. And this Court cannot say that treachery attended the attack. The RTC
declared:
[T]he Court believes that Javier was shot while his body was out-balanced and about to fall to the right side
and while his hands were being held by Dagani. Javier, therefore, was shot at when he has no means to
defend himself, hence, the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.43
which the CA affirmed as follows:
The findings of the court a quo clearly showed that Javier was being held down and could not effectively use
his weapon. As such, the trial court held that Javier could not be considered to be an armed man as he was
being held down and was virtually helpless. It has been held that when an assault is made with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who [was] given no immediate provocation for the attack
and under conditions which made it impossible for him to evade the attack, flee or make [a] defense, the act is
properly qualified as treachery, and the homicide resulting therefrom is classified as murder.44 x x x Treachery
under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment of means,
methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise.
Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means,
methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to
his person.45 This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the
victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was
unarmed, do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous.46 This is of particular significance in a case
of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim
when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless.47 The means employed for the commission of
the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the
accused to insure the consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of
retaliation from the intended victim.48 For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have been
preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim, and without provocation on the part of the
latter.49 Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that the manner of attack must
be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.50 The prosecution failed to
convincingly prove that the assault by the appellants had been deliberately adopted as a mode of attack
intended to insure the killing of Javier and without the latter having the opportunity to defend himself. Other

than the bare fact that Santiano shot Javier while the latter had been struggling with Dagani over the
possession of the .22 caliber gun, no other fact had been adduced to show that the appellants consciously
planned or predetermined the methods to insure the commission of the crime, nor had the risk of the victim to
retaliate been eliminated during the course of the struggle over the weapon, as the latter, though struggling,
had not been completely subdued. As already stated, this Court must emphasize that the mere suddenness of
the attack, or the vulnerable position of the victim at the time of the attack, or yet even the fact that the victim
was unarmed, do not by themselves make the attack treacherous.51 It must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that the means employed gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that such
means had been deliberately or consciously adopted without danger to the life of the accused.52
For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the helpless position of Javier as merely incidental to the
attack, and that the decision to shoot Javier was made in an instant.53
Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved as fully and convincingly as the
crime itself, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of Santiano. Accordingly, for failure of the
prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing to Murder, appellant Santiano may only be convicted of
Homicide.54 The penalty, therefore, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion
temporal. The Office of the Solicitor General is correct in that the courts a quo failed to consider the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position under Article 14 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, since the accused, a PNR security officer covered by the Civil Service, committed the crime with the aid
of a gun he had been authorized to carry as such.55 Considering that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, as duly appreciated by the courts a quo, shall be offset against the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of official position, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, pursuant to Article 64
(4) of the aforesaid Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence of appellant Santiano will consist of a minimum that is
anywhere within the full range of prision mayor, and a maximum which is anywhere within reclusion temporal in
its medium period. This Court hereby fixes it to be from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to the award of damages, prevailing jurisprudence entitles the heirs of the deceased to the amount
ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages.56
The CA erred in deleting the attorneys fees and per appearance fees for lack of factual basis. Although the CA
is correct in noting that the RTC failed to justify these awards in the body of its Decision, this appeal opens the
entire case for review and, accordingly, the records show that the foregoing amounts had been stipulated by
the parties,57 thereby dispensing with the need to prove the same.58
As to moral damages, however, the widow of the victim, Erlinda Javier, is not entitled to the same. She did not
testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her husbands death. No
other heirs of Javier testified in the same manner.59 Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of official position attended the killing, the Court awards exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 in accordance with Articles 2230 and 2234 of the Civil Code and prevailing jurisprudence.60
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15304 dated June 20, 2002
is MODIFIED. Appellant Otello Santiano y Leonida is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate sentence from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Appellant Santiano is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity, P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00

as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel. Appellant Santiano shall be credited with the full
extent of his preventive imprisonment. Appellant Rolando Dagani y Reyes is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 139211. February 12, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GORGONIO VILLARAMA alias Baby, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
On November 2, 1996, the spouses Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak went to the cemetery to light candles
for the dead, leaving behind their three young children, Arthel (8 years old), Bernadeth (6 years old) and
Elizabeth (4 years old), playing inside their house without adult supervision. That perhaps was the biggest
mistake of their lives and one the couple will always regret. On that fateful day, their youngest child fell prey to
the rapacious desires of a beast in the person of the childs own uncle, appellant Gorgonio Villarama.
Approximately between five to six oclock in the afternoon, appellant, 35-year-old Gorgonio Villarama, elder
brother of the victims mother Merlita, arrived at the Tumulaks house and found the three children by
themselves.[1]
Thereupon, appellant ordered the two older children, Arthel and Bernadeth, to pasture the goats, leaving
the youngest, Elizabeth, with him. [2] Once alone, appellant undressed Elizabeth and made her lie down while
he pulled down his pants and briefs to his knees, and thereafter mounted his niece Elizabeth.[3]
This was the scene which greeted the prosecutions eyewitness, Ricardo Tumulak, younger brother of
Elizabeths father Rosendo, when he arrived at his brothers house to return the bolo he borrowed from the
latter.[4] Ricardo peeped through the open window to check why his niece was crying and saw appellant, with
briefs and pants slipped down to the knees, on top of Elizabeth who was naked. [5] When appellant noticed
Ricardos presence, he hurriedly stood up and scurried away through the backdoor.[6] Ricardo immediately
entered the house and dressed up the crying child. Ricardo then called his mother, the victims paternal
grandmother, who was in the house nearby.[7] The grandmother asked Elizabeth what happened but the child
did not answer and just continued crying.[8]
Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak got home at about six oclock in the evening. They were met by Rosendos
parents who told them what happened.[9]
Merlita immediately went to her daughter who had not stopped crying and asked Elizabeth what happened
and why was she crying.[10] It was then that Elizabeth spoke and told her mother that her uncle Baby, herein
appellant, removed her panties, made her lie down and then inserted his penis inside her vagina.[11]
That same evening, the Tumulak family, including Rosendos father, who was a barangay tanod, looked for
appellant. They found him at a party in a neighbors house half a kilometer from theirs. They apprehended
appellant and delivered him, first, to the barangay captain and later on, to the Merida Police. [12] Appellant
allegedly admitted the commission of the crime and said that he only did it out of drunkenness.[13]

On November 4, 1996, Elizabeth was brought to Dr. Jane Grace Solaa, a physician at the Rural Health
Center of Merida, for examination. Dr. Solaa found the girl complaining of pain in her vagina and detected
contusions in her labia minora. The doctor wrote her findings in the following medical report:
Reddish discoloration w/ tenderness (contusion), medial aspect (R) & (L) labia minora.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above described physical injuries are found in the body of he subject, the age of which is
compatible to the alleged date of infliction.
2. Under normal circumstances, without subsequent complication and/or deeper involvement present,
but not clinically apparent at the time of the examination, the above described physical injuries is
expected to improve in 7 to 10 days.[14]
Appellant was charged with rape as then defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA 7659,[15] in the following information:
That on or about the 2nd day of November 1996, at Sitio Capasanan, Barangay Casilda, Municipality of
Merida, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the herein offended party ELIZABETH V. TUMULAK, who is 4 years old, against her will and
without her consent, while inside their residential house of the victim, the accused who is her uncle, held her
hand, remove her short pants and was made to lie down and was made to spread her legs, lay on top of her
and insert his penis over (sic) the victims genital organ to accomplish his lewd design, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: eyewitness Ricardo Tumulak, Dr. Jane Grace Solaa, the
physician who examined the victim, and the victims parents Merlita and Rosendo Tumulak.
The defense presented two witnesses: appellant Gorgonio Villarama and Bernaldo Claros, cousin of
appellant.
Appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that at about five oclock in the afternoon of
November 2, 1996, he was in the house of his aunt, Patricia Claros, butchering a pig. He, however, admitted
that at 6 oclock that same evening, he went to the victims house about a kilometer away from his aunts house,
after a 30-minute walk. Upon reaching the place, he discovered that his sister Merlita and her husband were
not home, but their three children were playing inside the house. Appellant then told the children to tell their
mother that he was going to spend the night in their house because it was already late and he could not find
any means of transportation to go to Ormoc City where he lived.[17]
Thereafter he smoked a cigarette in the balcony and admitted having cradled the victim because the child
allegedly clung to his shoulder. Appellant claims that it was that cradling which eyewitness Ricardo Tumulak
chanced upon when the latter arrived to borrow the bolo of his brother Rosendo. According to appellant, they
were not able to find the bolo so Ricardo left. Not long after, appellant also left, heeding the invitation of a friend
to attend the birthday party of the latters wife.[18] Upon arriving at the friends house, appellant helped in grating

coconut and joined the celebrations. It was then that he was arrested by the victims paternal grandfather, a
barangay tanod, and brought before the barangay captain who informed him of the accusation against him.
The Mayor of Merida thereafter arrived with police officers and brought him to the Merida jail.[19]
On cross examination and in response to questions propounded by the trial court, appellant also admitted
ordering the victims two older siblings to pasture the goats, leaving him alone with the victim Elizabeth.[20]
Appellants cousin, Bernaldo Claros, corroborated appellants testimony that they butchered a pig together.
However, Claros also testified that he left appellant at about 5:30 in the afternoon to go to the house of his
elder brother Oligario Claros, Jr. where he spent one hour before going back to his mothers house, and, upon
his return, he found appellant still there. Thereafter, they attended a friends birthday party. They arrived at the
party at 6:30 in the evening and stayed there until the barangay tanod arrested appellant.
On April 30, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35, Eighth Judicial Region, in Criminal
Case No. 50630-0 rendered a decision[21] finding accused-appellant Gorgonio Villarama guilty as charged and
imposing the death sentence on him. The trial court disposed thus:
Wherefore, for all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds the accused Gorgonio Villarama alias Baby guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, and hereby sentences him, it being proven that the crime of
rape was committed under the attendant circumstance of the victim being under eighteen (18) years of age
and the accused, the offender being an uncle and therefore relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree, to the penalty of DEATH pursuant to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11, RA
7659.
The accused is also penalized to pay the private offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Appellant now questions said conviction in this automatic review before us and anchors his appeal on the
general catch-all argument that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant makes much capital of the non-presentation of the victim Elizabeth on the witness stand and
invokes the doctrine of willful suppression of evidence which raises the presumption that such evidence was
adverse to the prosecution.
This argument is utterly without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that it is the prosecution which controls the presentation of its witnesses.
[23]

Unlike countless other rape cases perpetrated in relative isolation and secrecy, where only the victim can
testify on the forced coitus, the offense here was providentially witnessed by another person, an adult, who
was definitely more articulate in describing the sensitive details of the crime.
Moreover, Dr. Jane Solaas testimony sealed the case for the prosecution when she testified on the
presence of a contusion on the victims genital organ, specifically the labia minora. Thus, the prosecution
deemed the evidence sufficient to overwhelm the constitutional presumption of innocence of appellant.
While the victims testimony of the assault would have added support to appellants conviction, the same
was not indispensable. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the intent of the prosecution was to spare

the victim from further trauma which could have resulted from being placed on the witness stand. The
prosecutions apprehension in presenting the victim can be inferred from the records:
TESTIMONY OF ROSENDO TUMULAK
PROS. BELETA
/continuing
Q Now, since that incident up to this time, do you notice of (sic) any physical changes in her?
A Yes, maam.
Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court.
A Right after the incident, she was sick, she seemed to be, she cannot sleep and she seemed to be
scared.[24]
TESTIMONY OF MERLITA TUMULAK
Q Prior to that incident, could your child talk intelligently?
A Yes, she could talk intelligently.
Q After the incident, how did you observe her speech? Could she also talk intelligently the way she
talked prior to the incident?
A No longer.[25]
PROS. BELETA
Q After this incident of November 2, 1996, can you tell this court the behavior of your child Elizabeth
Tumulak. Did you find any unusual behavior?
A Yes, maam.
Q Can you tell this Court, what is that unusual behavior?
A We can no longer hear her speak, she used to have fever, and she was so sickly. If you talk to her, it
would seem nothing and she would easily cry.
Q Before the incident, do you find her to be jolly?
A Yes, maam.
Q Would you consider her very sick?
A Yes, maam.[26]

The Court is not convinced that the prosecution suppressed any evidence. The victim was present in the
court room a few times during the trial. The defense could have called Elizabeth to the stand as a hostile
witness but it did not.
Time and again, the Court has held that the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is
not a sufficiently plausible defense.[27] There should thus be no unfavorable inferences from the failure of the
prosecution to present Elizabeth. If appellant believed that her testimony would have exculpated him, then he
should have presented Elizabeth. And the coercive processes of the court would have been at his disposal had
Elizabeth refused to testify.[28]
Appellant likewise asserts that the testimonies of the victims parents were hearsay since they did not
witness the actual rape and were only relating the rape as allegedly told to them by Elizabeth.
This too fails to convince us.
There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Pertinent to the case at bar is Section 42 which provides:
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving
it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling
occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such
occurrence.[29]
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence when she
pointed to appellant as her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement was spontaneous
because the time gap from the sexual assault to the time the victim recounted her harrowing experience in the
hands of appellant was very short. Obviously, there was neither capability nor opportunity for the 4-year-old
victim to fabricate her statement.
The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her age, the victim could not have
had the sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her mother that her uncle made her lie down, took off her
panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old
child. Such a brutal experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth was still crying when
her parents arrived reinforces the conclusion that she was still in a traumatic state when she made the
statements pointing to appellant.
In People vs. Moreno,[30] the Court, sustaining the conviction of an accused for robbery with rape, ruled
that the affidavit of the accused who was not available for trial was properly admitted in evidence as part of res
gestae:
This exception is based on the belief that such Statements are trustworthy because made instinctively, while
the declarants mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the shocking influence of a startling
occurrence, so that all his utterances at the time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions,

unaided by retrospective mental action. Said natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more
convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness stand.
Immediately after the three accused left the house where the crime was committed, and the threatening
presence of the accused was gone, both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo told their employers, the
Mohnani spouses, that they were raped. The latter later testified in court as to these statements. These were
thus part of the res gestae since they were spontaneously made after their harrowing experience, as soon as
the victims had the opportunity to make them without fear for or threat to their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of its ruling in People vs. Contreras,[31] wherein the accused was acquitted in
one of the many statutory rape charges against him because, among other things, the prosecution failed to
present the child-victim.
At first blush, the facts of that case are deceptively similar to those of the case at bar. However, upon
careful scrutiny and analysis of the two cases, we rule that the instant case is not on all fours with
the Contreras case.
In Contreras, the main witness for the prosecution, Nelene Diaz, was not deemed by the Court to be in a
position to categorically state that the accuseds genitals had penetrated the victims vagina. In fact, what she
saw was merely the accused, with his zipper open and his penis exposed, facing the six-year-old victim who
was sitting on his lap with her legs apart. Although the victim had no underwear, it was, nevertheless,
established that the witness did not see any genital contact between the two as the genital organs were visibly
apart. However, in the case at bar, the eyewitness saw the appellant, without his briefs and pants, on top of the
naked victim - a position conclusively indicating sexual intercourse.
In Contreras, there was positive testimony of the victims companions that the rape was prevented by the
timely arrival of the witness. This circumstance is not present in this case.
Furthermore, in Contreras, the victims statement that she had been sexually molested by the accused was
not received under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, because her statement did not refer to the
incident witnessed by Nelene but to a general pattern of molestation of her and her companions by the
accused. In contrast, Elizabeths declaration to her mother regarding the then just concluded assault were so
full of details specific to the incident that there could be no doubt she was referring to the same incident
witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.
Finally, in the Contreras case, the mother of the victim did not testify in court for no explainable reason.
Here, Elizabeths mother actively pursued the prosecution of appellant who is her own brother. No mother will
falsely accuse a person of rape, specially if it involves her own sibling, unless she is convinced it will vindicate
the wrong done to her daughter.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on Ricardo Tumulaks testimony, branding the same as self-serving and
devoid of any evidentiary weight on the ground that Ricardo is the victims uncle.
This argument is flimsy.
First of all, a self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out of court and in his favor. It does not
include the testimony he gives as a witness in court.[32]

Second, Ricardo Tumulaks testimony was credible. He harbored no ill-motive against appellant which
could have impelled him to fabricate a story so repulsive as to attach a stigma on his niece, the victim, for the
rest of her life. Appellant himself admitted that, prior to the rape incident, he had been a friend of Ricardo.
Blood or conjugal relationship between a witness and the victim does not per se impair the credibility of a
witness. On the contrary, relationship itself can strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it is unnatural for a
relative of a victim to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit.[33]
The guilt of the appellant having been established, we now delve into the extent of his culpability, the stage
of consummation of the crime of rape.
Appellant insists that the medical report of the prosecution witness, Dr. Solaa, failed to support the finding
of consummated rape.
The Court, in People vs. Campuhan,[34] laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape cases, thus:
In People v. De la Pea, we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attackers penis merely
touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of
an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or
flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victims vagina, the Court nonetheless held that
rape was consummated on the basis of the victims testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to
insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labiaof her pudendum as the victim felt his
organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. Thus,
touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mans pubis, as
in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into
the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be touched by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mans pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree
of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of
the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area,
e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is
the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next
layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the
inner surface. The skin or the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the
inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath
the labia majora are the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to
be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the
surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted touching of the female organ,
but also progressed into being described as the introduction of the male organ into the labia of
the pudendum, or the bombardment of the drawbridge. But, to our mind, the case at bar merely constitutes a
shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency, or as earlier stated, a strafing of the citadel of passion.

As can be drawn from the above ruling, the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of
the pudendum is sufficient to consummate rape.
The Court is convinced that the medical report and testimony of Dr. Solaa provided enough bases to prove
that appellants sexual assault on the victim had reached the gynecological threshold for rape. The labia minora
are directly beneath the labia majora, thus, the contusion in labia minora of the victims vagina and the pain she
felt as reported by Dr.Solaa were decisive indications that appellant was able to enter the labia majora. Clearly,
this is way beyond the mere shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency or the strafing of the citadel of passion.
In most cases of rape committed against young girls where total penetration of the victims organ is
improbable due to the small vaginal opening, it has been held that actual penetration of the victims organ nor
rupture of the hymen is not required.[35]
We now come to the critical and crucial part as we discuss the propriety of the trial courts imposition of the
death penalty.
Article 335 as amended by R.A. 7659, provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.
The Court is convinced with moral certainty that appellant Gorgonio Villarama raped 4-year-old Elizabeth
Tumulak on November 2, 1996. We, however, hold that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on
him. Appellant can neither be convicted for incestuous rape under the first paragraph of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, nor for rape of a child below 7 years old under the fourth paragraph of the
same provision.

Under paragraph 1, although Elizabeth was less than 18 years at the time she was raped and the offender
was her uncle, the information failed to categorically state that said offender was a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree. Jurisprudence dictates that if the offender is merely a relative, not a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of the mother of the victim, the information must
allege that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree. It is not
enough for the information to merely allege that appellant is the uncle of the victim even if the prosecution is
able to prove the same during trial.[36]
Under paragraph 4, it is true that the penalty for raping a child below 7 years old is death. However, in the
case at hand, even if Elizabeth was only 4 years old when the appellant committed the dastardly crime, the
prosecution did not present, other than the testimony of the mother, independent evidence proving her age.
Court decisions on the rape of minors invariably state that, in order to justify the imposition of the death
penalty, there must be independent evidence showing the age of the victim. Testimonies on the victims age
given by the prosecution witnesses or the lack of denial of the accused or even his admission thereof on the
witness stand is not sufficient. This Court has held that, to justify the imposition of the death penalty for rape
committed against a child below 7, the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as
the crime itself. The failure to sufficiently establish the victims age with factual certainty and beyond reasonable
doubt is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.[37]
In the case at bar, the victim was presented in open court during the testimony of the mother to establish
Elizabeths age:
Q How about the victim Elizabeth Tumulak, is she your daughter?
A: Yes, maam.
Q How old is she at the time of the incident?
A Four (4) years and eleven (11) months.
Q Will you please point her out
INTERPRETER
(The witness pointed to a child and when asked about her name, she answered, Elizabeth
Tumulak)[38]
The above-quoted testimony, however, is not sufficient for the court to take judicial notice of the victims
age. In People vs. Liban[39], citing People vs. Tundag[40], the Court declared that, in cases calling for a
conviction of rape in its qualified form, the age of the victim, without qualification, is not a matter of judicial
notice, whether mandatory[41] or discretionary[42]. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing
under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules on evidence would not be sufficient to establish the age of the victim
to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
The matter of appreciating the age of the victim, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance, was settled when the Court, in the case of People vs. Pruna,[43] laid down the following
guidelines:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate
of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or
relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim[44].
It is clear then that even the admission of appellant as to the age of the victim could not be taken against
him in the case at bar because of the foregoing guidelines. Paragraph 4 which allows the appreciation of the
testimony of the complainant as to the victims age provided the same is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused, must be applied in relation to paragraph 3(a) which dispenses with the presentation of independent
proof of age only when the victim is below 3 and the age sought to be proved is less than 7. In this case, the
unfortunate victim was 4, a year too old.
In view of the moral uncertainty of the victims exact age on account of the failure of the prosecution to
present the birth certificate or similar authentic document (such as her baptismal certificate) and to make a
positive and unequivocal manifestation that the victim was indeed 4 years old, not to mention the absence of a
categorical finding by the trial court of the victims minority, the Court hesitates to impose the penalty of death
upon appellant.
As we affirm the appealed decision of the trial court convicting appellant for the crime of rape, we,
however, make the following modifications: the penalty imposed is reduced toreclusion pertpetua and P50,000
as moral damages is awarded to the offended party aside from the P 50,000 as civil indemnity already
awarded to her by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Ormoc City is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant Gorgonio Villarama is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and

ordered to pay the offended party Elizabeth V. Tumulak the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity and the
additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMEDIO CAJARA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ELMEDIO CAJARA alias Elming is before us on automatic review after having been found guilty by the
trial court of Qualified Rape and sentenced to death.
The Information alleged that on 30 May 1994 in Barangay Serum, Basey, Samar, the accused Elmedio
Cajara, a brother-in-law of Marita B. Cajote and husband of her older sister, by means of force and intimidation,
willfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent.[1]
On 16 March 1995 the trial court found the accused guilty of rape as defined in Art. 335 of The Revised
Penal Code in relation to Sec. 11 of RA 7659, and sentenced him to death.[2]
On 18 May 1994 16-year old Marita Cajote, a resident of Manila, arrived in Basey, Samar, and stayed with
her sister Marie. The following day, Marita was fetched by another sister, Merly Tagana also known as Meling,
and by the latters husband, accused Elmedio Cajara also known as Elming. Upon being told by Meling that
they would be going to Sulod to get copra, Marita went with Meling and Elming to the couples house in Sitio
Catuhaan in Barangay Serum. Since then until 30 May 1994 Marita stayed with Meling and Elming together
with their two (2) small children in a house consisting of only one room without any partition.
In the evening of 30 May 1994 complaining witness Marita Cajote slept at one end of the room with the
two (2) children, with Meling and Elming at the other end. At about two oclock the following morning Marita was
awakened by the weight of accused who was already on top of her. The accused who was holding a bolo told
her to keep quiet or he would kill her. He then placed his bolo aside and held Maritas hands with his right
hand. With his left hand accused lowered Maritas pants as well as her panty down to her knees. Marita
shouted for help but her sister Meling just wrapped her head with their mosquito net and pretended to be
asleep. Marita struggled continuously against the advances of the accused but he was much stronger, while
she was getting weak. The accused first inserted his fingers into Maritas private part and later succeeded in
inserting his penis into her vagina. Meling then pulled Elming away from Marita and hit Elming in the
eye. Elming boxed Meling on the mouth and kicked her when she fell on the floor. Elming went back to Marita
and continued with his beastly acts. By this time, Marita was already too weak to resist. Elming inserted his
fingers first and then his penis into her private organ. The older of the two (2) children
of Meling cried. Meling who was holding her youngest child helplessly watched the accused rape her younger
sister.

After satisfying his lust, the accused asked Marita to go away with him. Marita cried and dressed
herself. When accused went to the door, she jumped out of the window and ran away, but the accused chased
her and after overtaking her threatened to kill her if she would return to their house. So Marita pretended to
submit to his wishes. Fortunately she found an opportunity to hide herself from the accused. Then she dashed
for safety to the house of her sister Marie and then to another sister Lilia. Marita revealed to both of them what
the accused had done to her. But her sisters advised her not to file a criminal case against their brother-in-law
for fear that he might kill all of them. But Marita went to the chief of the barangay tanod"whom she called Mano
Henry, who accompanied her to the barangay captain. The barangay captain, Rolando Jaingue, also made the
same advice against filing a criminal charge against the accused as the latter might attack and kill them. The
accused was known in the community to have killed six (6) people. Finally, barangay captain Jaingue issued
an indorsement of the case to the Philippine National Police stationed in Basey, Samar.[3]
When physically examined by Dr. Danilo Fami, Municipal Health Officer of Basey, Samar, Marita was
found to have a healed laceration of her hymen at 4 oclock position.
In his defense, the accused Elmedio Cajara denied the charge against him. He alleged that Marita was the
maternal half-sister of Meling, his common-law wife; that at around 6 oclock in the evening of 30 May 1994 he
was in his house with Meling and their two (2) children when Marita arrived and invited them for a drink; that
since he was then busy gathering tuba he was able to join them only at around 8 oclock until 11 oclock that
evening after which he went to sleep. However, at around 2 oclock in the morning he was awakened by the
quarrel of his wife and Marita; that when his wife asked Marita why the latter placed her leg over him, Marita
answered that she did not know; and, that Meling ordered her to get out of their house, but before she left
Marita said that she would file a case against him who was on parole.[4]
Merly Tagana alias Meling, common-law wife of the accused, corroborated his testimony. When asked on
direct examination why her sister Marita would file a rape charge against her husband, Meling denied that her
husband raped Marita, saying that "it was not the mistake of (her) husband because he is a man and that she
is a girl."[5]
Persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that Elmedio Cajara did rape 16-year old Marita Cajote on 30 May
1994 in front of his common-law wife and his two small children, the trial court convicted him as charged and
sentenced him to death.
In his Brief the accused faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimony of the rape victim, Marita
Cajote, despite its failure to meet the test of moral certainty; that the testimony of Merly Tagana, his commonlaw wife, that there was no rape should have been given more weight than the testimony of Marita Cajote
because Meling being a half-sister of Marita would have sympathized with her if the rape incident was true;
and, that Maritas claim that she was a virgin before she was raped was belied by the testimony of the medicolegal officer that there was a laceration which could have healed even before the rape incident.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief, belittles the accused for failing to show any compelling or
justifiable reason to set aside his conviction for rape and his penalty of death, citing Art. 335 of The Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the relevant portion of which states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances: x x x x 3. when rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
The Solicitor General is correct in finding the accused guilty of rape. The bare denial of the accused and
his common-law wife cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.Denial when unsubstantiated by

clear and convincing evidence is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary
value than the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters. [6] No woman, especially of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert herself by
being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished.[7] A complainants act in immediately reporting the commission of the rape has been considered
by this Court as a factor strengthening her credibility. The immediate decision of Marita to report the crime to
her sisters and the barangay officials as well as to face police authorities and submit to a medical examination
are a mute but eloquent testimony of the truth of her charge against accused.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that Maritas positive identification of the accused as the person
who raped her was given in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner which rendered it worthy
of faith and belief Q: While you were asleep on May 30, 1994, at 2:00 in the morning, can you still recall if you were awakened and why?
A: I was awakened because I was surprised.
Q: Why were you surprised?
A: Because he was on top of me.
Q: Who was the person on top of you?
A: Elming Cajara.
Q: How do you know that it was Elming?
A: Because there was light for the whole morning.
Q: Where was this light being placed?
A: On the altar.
Q: How far was the light to the place where you were lying down?
A: About two meters.
Q: Did Elming say anything to you when he was on top of you?
A: Yes, ma'am x x x x He said keep quiet x x x x If you will make a noise I will kill you.
Q: What else?
A: I shouted x x x x Help, help Manding.
Q: Who is this Manding you are referring to?
A: Meling.
Q: Your elder sister?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And when Elming Cajara warned you not to make any noise did you observe if he has (sic) any weapon with him?

A: Yes he has x x x x Sundang.

Q: Where was the bolo?
A: Near the head x x x x Elming Cajara at the time he slept he has a bolo with him.
Q: Where is this bolo you are referring to?
A: Near the head he was holding.
Q: He was holding the bolo with what hand?
A: Right hand.
Q: About you when you shouted, what else did you do while he was on top of you.
A: I kept on asking for help because he was holding my two hands over my head.
Q: With what hand he was holding your hands as he was holding the bolo?
A: When he told me not to make any noise he was holding my two hands.
Q: With what hand and how did he hold your two hands?
A: His right hand.
Q: How about his left hand?
A: Undressing me.
Q: What was being undressed? (sic)
A: My maong pants x x x x Garterized.
Q: Do (sic) you have panty at that time?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: How about your panty, was it undressed?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Up to what portion of your body were you undressed?
A: Middle part of my legs.
Q: As you were shouting for your Manding to help you, what did your Manding do?
A: After I was shouting for help for a long time, Manding grabbed Elming from me and Meling punched Elming hitting his eye.
Q: When Meling grabbed and punched Elming, what was Elming doing at that time?
A: He inserted his finger into my vagina after which he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What did you do when Elming inserted his finger into your vagina?

A: I was trying to resist (from) him but I could not as he was holding my hands.
Q: While he was inserting his penis to your vagina, what did you do?
A: I was trying to resist and shouting and I was weak x x x x
Q: After Meling pulled her husband, what happened next?
A: Meling fell because she was punched by Elming x x x x She was hit on her mouth and she was kicked x x x x
Q: After kicking Meling what did Elming do?
A: After Elming kicked Meling and I was able to put on my panty Elming came back.
Q: When Elming went back to you, what did Elming do to you?
A: x x x x he undressed me again x x x x he abused me again x x x x he was inserting his finger and penis into my vagina.
Q: Was he able to insert again his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, ma'am x x x x
Q: For how many times have (sic) he inserted his penis?
A: Twice.[8]

The argument of the accused is untenable that the testimony of his common-law wife that there was no
rape should have been believed by the trial court because she was Maritas half-sister who would naturally
protect Maritas honor if she was indeed raped. Not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably
and conformably to the expectation of mankind. [9]We have noted that in some instances it was but natural for
witnesses not to come to the victims rescue for fear of their lives, especially when threatened with harm should
they do so. Self preservation is still recognized as the most fundamental human instinct.[10]
In the case of Merly Tagana, although she is half-sister to Marita, she is also the common-law wife of the
accused. While relationship between the accused and his witness is not necessarily detrimental to the formers
line of defense, this relationship taken together with the want of logic in the declarations of the witness, yields
to the conclusion that her testimony is not credible.[11] The trial court found evident discrepancies in Merly
Tagana's testimony which cannot but raise well-founded and overriding doubts on her testimony. Merly Tagana
contradicted the testimony of the accused and herself twice when she stated that Marita slept in the house with
her and the accused on 29 May 1994, the night before the rape.[12]Although she testified that the accused
did not rape her sister, she complained on the witness stand that it was not the mistake of the accused to have
done what he did because he was a man and Marita was a girl. The opinion of the trial court as to who of the
witnesses should be believed is entitled to great respect on the oft-repeated rationale born of judicial
experience that the trial judge who heard the witnesses testify and had the occasion to observe their demeanor
on the stand was in a vantage position to determine who of the witnesses deserve credence.[13]
The assertion of the accused that Marita was no longer a virgin when she was raped will not exculpate him
from criminal liability. The records show that Marita was sexually abused twice. After inserting his fingers, the
accused inserted his organ into her private part, and after awhile, accused repeated the sexual abuse. Clearly,
when Marita was raped for the second time, she was no longer a virgin; she could have already lost her
virginity during the first rape. Further, well-settled is the rule that prior sexual intercourse which could have
resulted in hymenal laceration is not necessary in rape cases for virginity is not an element of rape. [14] It should

be emphasized however that since the Information charged only one offense, even if the evidence showed a
second act of forcible intercourse, conviction for one rape was proper.[15]
The trial court in the case at bar imposed the penalty of death upon the accused after taking into account
the following circumstances, i.e., the minority of Marita Cajote who was only 16- years old at the time of the
rape; relationship by affinity where the victim was said to be the sister of the common-law wife of the accused;
and, finally, the fact that the rape was committed by the accused in the full view of his wife and children. The
relevant portions of Sec. 11 of RA 7659 amending Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, which took effect 31
December 1993, state:
When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and, 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua x x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. When the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of parent of the victim x x x x 3.
When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the
third degree of consanguinity x x x x
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court and the stand of the Solicitor General, the accused can only be
convicted of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. It was error for the trial court to impose the penalty
of death. Although the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the third civil degree was alleged in the
Information, evidence for the prosecution clearly showed the lack or absence of such circumstance to qualify
the rape because the accused and Merly Tagana, sister of the victim Marita Cajote, were mere common-law
husband and wife and were not legally married at the time of the rape. The accused and the victim cannot be
said to be related by affinity within the third civil degree at the time of the commission of the crime.
Neither can the accused be convicted of qualified rape on the basis of the circumstance that the rape was
committed in full view of the relatives of the victim within the third degree of consanguinity because this
qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the Information or in the Complaint against the accused.
The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Thus, it is fundamental that every element of the offense
must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime
to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.[16]
In People v. Morena[17] this Court explained that it would be a denial of the accused of his right to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process if he is convicted of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information. Hence, when the information alleges rape by force and
intimidation under par. 1, Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused cannot be convicted of rape under
pars. 2 or 3 of the same Article. [18] In this case, since the accused was charged with rape qualified by minority
and relationship under the first attendant circumstance where the death penalty is imposable, he cannot be
convicted of rape qualified by the third attendant circumstance of commission of rape within the full view of the
relatives of the victim, since this was not alleged in the Information.
The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised
Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated
homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his

sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted
conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November 1991. [19] Reiteracion or habituality under
Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously punished for an offense to
which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or for two
or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted
only of simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua.Where the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the
crime, such as in the instant case.
We note that the trial court did not award any civil indemnity. Pursuant to current jurisprudence and without
need of further proof, we award the victim Marita Cajote an indemnity ofP50,000.00 and moral damages
of P50,000.00. In People v. Prades[20] the Court resolved that moral damages may additionally be awarded to
the victim in the criminal proceeding in such amount as the Court may deem just without the need for pleading
or proof of the basis therefor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting the accused ELMEDIO CAJARA alias Elming of
Qualified Rape is MODIFIED to the effect that he is convicted instead only of Simple Rape and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the victim Marita B. Cajote civil indemnity
of P50,000.00 and moral damages of another P50,000.00. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183652

February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL
OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June
6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 211211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the
crime of rape for the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola werecharged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen
Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:
That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with

lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated,
brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del
Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of
AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged.5
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony. Afterwards, they
had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her
mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election
campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she
would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and
Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim
invited them to go to Alsons Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemenos house.
Outside the Alsons Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel.
After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw
Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and
one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the
rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy.
Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around:
one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to
drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with each
other. When it was AAAs turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first
shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and
they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her
face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already
sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even
heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard
someone say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oportos lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke
her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse
but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was asleep
again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She
recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up
again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on
different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt
pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto

abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She
cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt heavy and
exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was
on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she
hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was
already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to the
Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical
examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26, 2004, and
found an old hymenal laceration at 5 oclock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The
vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense witnesses, in the evening of
March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemenos house. Gemeno then invited
Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alsons Palace, owned by the latters family.
When they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one
Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alsons Palace but could not find AAA
and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz,
Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several
persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy,
Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil
Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the
latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on
Oportos lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoys
crotch, she remarked, "What was that, penis?" Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed
him back. Oporto did the sameand AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging House
drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested
Alquizola to accompany her to Alsons Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and
there they saw AAA lying on Oportos lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get angry. AAA
could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, "I just stay here." Alquizola and Fiel then went
back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alsons Palace again,and saw AAA and Oporto
kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back to the
lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed them to take her to
the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle
to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here
for the meantime." Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There
were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at
Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily
raised her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the
foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for
him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the
other hand, placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on

his shorts and went back to Alsons Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing.
Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a
problem." Alquizola thus started kissing AAAs breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his
penis and performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have
sexual intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto
went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At
3:00 a.m., he went back to Alsons Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back
to the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home.
Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he
arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame
for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay
AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and the
court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in the
commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and
another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy and Joseph
Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and e) Ordering accused
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall be
credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to the
present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to this
time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered
released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash
bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus resulted to an order of
even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution to prosecute the
case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6, 2008, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial courts ruling and, consequently, acquitted
private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA,
JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It
gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She
was wide awake and aware of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed
any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate
court further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAAs
genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also
stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her
daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather
than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule 65, questioning
the CA Decision which reversed private respondents conviction and ardently contending that the same was
made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated November 7, 2008 to assail
the petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION
CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.

CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED. IV. THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns the following
errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly
conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As
long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules
should be liberally construed.13 Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial
justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is
warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities.14
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor
of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to the
civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is
grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in
double jeopardy.17
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v. Santiago:18
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense,
the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the

trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party
or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged
that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest
in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of
the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19 Private
respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through the OSG. True, in criminal
cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals
of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the
aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal
prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject
of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained the private offended partys
right in a criminal case to file a special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of
dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor Generals intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant
to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In
any event, the OSG joins petitioners cause in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal
actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.23
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that AAA can file the
special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed
for petitioners failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration. True, a motion for reconsideration is a
condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity
to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.24
Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private respondents. There is also an
urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the
petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent

nullity for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when it is shown that the prosecutions right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted
was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court
blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice.25
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion, totally
disregarded her testimony as well as the trial courts findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker,
the private respondents narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is
grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus
effecting an injustice.27
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and
utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the facts28 of the case was
meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply
lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
Oporto,29 Carampatana,30and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the case before it. The appellate court
merely echoed the private respondents testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that transpired
during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemenos house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging
House. As a result, it presented the private respondents account and allegations as though these were the
established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented,
regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind
eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one partys cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes
particularly significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The
victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CAs blatant
disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave
abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioners right to due process.33
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy
findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The fact that she never
showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought against the private respondents,
bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.

But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim;
and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally
made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was
already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly
deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily
concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance,
disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the
commission of the crime.35 The appellate court never provided any reason why AAAs testimony should
deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the
lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to
be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense,
the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants
testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not
have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of
those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing experience.37
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist, but because
of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAAs testimony simple and candid,
indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and
humiliating questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony.38 Thus:
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
xxxx

Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you regain your
consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of Emperador Brandy.
xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of the bottle of
Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I was saying dont because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying.

xxxx
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was there
inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?
A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
A: I could not remember, sir.
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened?
A: I went asleep again, sir.
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him dont.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you feel (sic)
something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted that their account
of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible.40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was
belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never
mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their
turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that
when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was
consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must
be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the burden of
proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused who
is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty
of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the
trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case
arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and
adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress,
he needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or
sexual relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence.45
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed to
discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the lodging
house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her
shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAAs lower garments and then went to kiss AAA.

Carampatana then placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse with her.46 On the other hand,
Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While Carampatana was
removing AAAs shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants
and underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his
pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few
minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep
and after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for
the third and last time.47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove
that the lack of any physical resistance on AAAs part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show
that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply because she was seriously
intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when testifying,
even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed
witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the attending circumstances.49
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial
evidence.50Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the
appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have
personally appeared before him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial
and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of
witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court
whose findings must be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any
palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve
great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.53
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal laceration on AAAs
private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual
encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta,
when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any
laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering the presence of old
hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed
to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be
noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated from high
school on that same day. In a similar case,54 the Court held: x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to
have sexual intercourse with two men or three, according to Antonio Gallardo in the presence of each
other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no
indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On the
contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could
not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime
charged.55

No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true.56 And even if she were
indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually
committed. Even a complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victims moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is
shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the
private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman
against her consent.57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the
victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips
of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To
repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is not indispensable to a
conviction for rape.58 Neither does AAAs mothers act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove
anything. It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable, and the people react differently."59 Different people react differently to a given type of situation,
and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her
daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing
that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her
complaint is entitled to full faith and credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still
need to immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever
have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private respondents,62 nor
was she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved.63 She never
became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to
drag the private respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance
indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents simply because she was, in
fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already
acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been
debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the
logic and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65 contrary to common human
experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his participation in the
crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his participation was not in furtherance of the
plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that
Alquizolas liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the
malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common
objective pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating
a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.70
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's participation in the crime
conflict on material points.

Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during the mauling and whether
they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo
stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary.1wphi1 In this case, the rule is
not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their exact
participation in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the testimony of the
private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela
Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be
held liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually
helped one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous participation and
cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission
of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of
the crime.73
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizolas participation in the crime is not at all uncertain. As the
caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease
and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually
abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing
AAAs lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana,
Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them,
Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as
mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which
is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
accused-appellant.75
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however, actually
charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one
offense, otherwise, the same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which
might confuse him in his defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information under Rule117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the
same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80 The accused
herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning
the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to
question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts
specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak
of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them

because the Information, in fact, stated that they "took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of
AAA" on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal
that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused themselves, after
undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the
other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a
total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission of each of
the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other.
But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAAs mouth, the Court cannot convict
him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was not included in the Information. This is,
however, without prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not
yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the
lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each count. With regard to Oporto,
appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon
him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor(the
penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the range of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall impose the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape committed. 86
However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87which extends
even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when
he was still a child,88 and provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:89
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in
conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision should be taken into
consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond
twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
anotherP50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 shall likewise be
imposed by way of an example and to deter others from committing the same bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 6,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court
hereby renders judgment:

a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each
case;
b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4) counts of
rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six
( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4) counts
of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts
ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for
each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of
origin for the execution of judgment.
SO ORDERED.