G.R. No.

L-47448 May 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EMETERIO C. OCAYA, as District Judge, 15th Judicial District, Branch VI, Province of
Bukidnon, and ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA MARAPAO and DIOSDADO
MARAPAO, respondents.
Arcadio D. Fabria and Camilo E. Tamin, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for
petitioner.
Eusebio P. Aquino for private respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court declares the questioned orders of respondent judge dismissing the information for supposed lack of
jurisdiction as null and void. Respondent judge wrongfully dismissed the case before him in disregard to the
elemental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information and that the offense of
serious physical injuries charged in the information had duly vested his court with jurisdiction. The Court
orders the transfer of the case below to another branch of the Bukidnon court of-first instance, since it is
doubtful that the State and offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case
from respondent judge who with his erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections has adversely prejudged their
case for serious physical injuries as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries.
The office of the provincial fiscal of Bukidnon, after preliminary investigation filed an information dated
October 13, 1977 in the court of respondent judge, charging the three private respondents- accused (Esterlina
Marapao, Leticia Marapao and Diosdado Marapao) for serious physical injuries committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other,
did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloneously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Mrs.
LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still on the twelfth (12th) day from her child delivery, by then and there
wrestling her to the ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her with a fist-size stone at the face thereby
inflicting upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES:lacerated wound, transverse right at about 2.5 cm. x 0.5 cm. in width at the level of the m arch of the face, with
contusion and swelling all around the inflicted area
which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES to suffer a
relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising from her weak constitution due to her recent child delivery, which
relapse incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a period of more than thirty days.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held, much less that warrants for the
arrest of the accused had been issued. Instead, after "scanning the records of (the) case" and noting that the
thereto attached medical certificate stated that the injuries suffered by the victim Lolita Ares would require
medical attention from 7 to 10 days and, therefore, 4 "may either be slight or less serious physical injuries only"
contrary to victim's affidavit that she was incapacitated from her customary labor for more than 30 days and the
fiscal's findings as to the prominent sear left on the victim's face as a result "which considerably deforms her
face" (as duly alleged in the information), respondent judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as

the crime of slight or less physical injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court" as per his Order of October
27, 1977, stating as his reason that
The Court is of the opinion that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is the certificate issued by
the physician regarding the duration of treatment, and not what the victim declares because the same is selfserving.
The fiscal's motion for reconsideration proved futile with respondent judge in his Order of November 16, 1977
denying the same, evaluating the case without having heard the parties or their witnesses (particularly the
physician who issued the medical certificate) nor having received their evidence and ruling against the
deformity alleged in the information on the basis of his perception from a reading of the medical certificate and
the fiscal's written resolution finding proper basis for the filing of the information, that
Now, does the finding of the fiscal to the effect that he observed a big scar at the left cheek bone of Mrs. Lolita
Ares justify the filing of the charge of serious physical injuries, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code,
when the attending physician certified that what he found was a lacerated wound on the right side of the face?
Clearly, the scar found by the investigating fiscal could not be the result of the acts imputed to the accused but
for some other cause, for how could the scar be found on the left side when the injury inflicted was on the right
side? (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar as filed by the provincial fiscal for nullification of respondent judge's orders.
The Solicitor General in his comment has noted that there is ample legal and factual basis for the information
charging serious physical injuries, stating that "(T)hat the allegations in the Information that a fist-size stone hit
the face of Lolita Ares causing lacerated wound on the maxillary arch of the face which considerably deformed
her face (are) not only supported by the medical certificate, but also by the admission of accused Diosdado
Marapao during the pre investigation that he threw a fist-size stone which hit the face of Lolita Ares and the
personal finding of Fiscal Tamin during the preliminary in. investigation that there is a prominent scar on her
face," and that the offense as charged falls under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code which
imposes thereon a penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and is therefore properly
cognizable by respondent judge's court.
The Court finds that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in precipitately dismissing the case
for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the mere basis of his totally wrong notion that what governs in the filing of a
physical injury case is the medical certificate regarding the duration of treatment and "not what the victim
declares because the same is self-serving."
It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
information or criminal complaint and not by the result of the evidence presented at the trial,' much less by the
trial judge's personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the case
without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a proper trial.
It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would indicate that a lesser offense
outside the trial, 1 court's jurisdiction was committed does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which
had vested in it under the allegations of the information as filed since "(once) the jurisdiction attaches to the
person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a
character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached. 2

Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the dismissal of the case had only resulted in
duplication of work and wasted time in the remand of records when respondent trial judge dismissed the instant
case for want of jurisdiction, when it could have immediately proceeded to arraign the accused and try him. "
Once more the Court is constrained to admonish the trial courts to proceed with proper study and
circumspection before summarily dismissing cases duly filed within their court's cognizance and needlessly
burdening the appellate courts with cases such as that at bar which should not have reached us at all in the first
instance. Respondent judge's disregard of the established rule that the information for serious physical injuries
properly vested his court with jurisdiction to try and hear the case, and that if from the evidence submitted a
lesser offense was established, that he equally had jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such lesser offense, is
difficult of comprehension. Besides, the doctor who issued the medical certificate had yet to be presented at the
trial and conceivably could corroborate the victim's testimony that her injuries had taken longer to heal than had
at first been estimated by him as well as clearify the location of he victim's facial scar.
Respondent judge's actions and premature and baseless declaration that the victim's declaration as to the period
of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious doubts as to whether the State and the offended party may expect
a fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case from him, since seemingly with his erroneous preconceptions and predilections, he has adversely prejudged their case as one merely of slight or less serious
physical injuries. The case below should therefore be transferred to another court presided by another judge.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent judge are declared null and void. The case below for
serious physical injuries is remanded and ordered transferred to Branch V of the court of first instance below,
and the judge presiding the same is ordered to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest and to proceed with
dispatch with the arraignment of the respondents-accused and the trial and determination of the case on the
merits. Let copy of this decision be attached to the personal record of respondent judge. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of
the City Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to
resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We impleaded the People of the Philippines
as party respondents herein in a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and
three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap

(tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In
the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because
the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice,
which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. The
information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment, did
then and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air
rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness
and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries
which directly caused his untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A
LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO jurisdiction OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon.
However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD jurisdiction OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT
DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the
first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes
'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that
case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should

be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying
that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused acted with
discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent
manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a
cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasioffense under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We agree
with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as
is essential to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p.
1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and
intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as used in Article
12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen
years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong . . . (Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While
both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the
latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to
shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same
person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a
minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done.
He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the
undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic
reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the
accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human
acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because ... the infant 3 (has) no intelligence,
the law exempts (him) from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal
act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt.
However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could
be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted
with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually

embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case
of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent'
for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element
of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence,
freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains
as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be
possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be
criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor
over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A
reading of the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any
distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he
cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding
the ruling he now invokes, which reads:
That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that she. . ."with the intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of
the Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and
there.' This allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful
act of pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment." What We
meant was that the combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the part
of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly contend that
since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it in effect alleged "intent." The former may never
embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him
should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance
due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher
than arresto menor from an originalarresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as prescribed in
Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72
Phil. 263; People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451).
The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; ... (emphasis
supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or
ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant
circumstances affecting criminal liability. 5

The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section
2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered.
Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case
ofRoyales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
GONZALES VS ABAYA ( DIGEST)
FACTS:
On October 29, 1984, the Petitioner who was then 11 years old was playing with best friend Teodoro Almine
Jr. and three other children in their backyard. The children were target-shooting bottle caps placed 15 to 20
meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour.
In the course of game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
The examining fiscal after investigation exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate
appeared to be an accident.
Victims parents appealed to Ministry of Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a case against petitioner for
Homicide through reckless imprudence.
On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense
b) Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification
c) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of defendant
His primary argument was that the term discernment connotes intent under the exempting circumstance
found under Article 12, Section 3 of the RPC. If this was true, then no minor between the age of 9 to 15 may be
convicted of quasi offense under Article 265 which is criminal negligence.
On April 4, 1986, the said motion was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon decision
on and part was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.
A petition for certiorari was filed.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHR AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
2. WHETHER THE COURT HAD jurisdiction OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON.
HELD:
Yes.
Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a determination to do certain things; an aim;
the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment means: the mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human
acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because the infant 3 (has) no intelligence,
the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.

In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence,
freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains
as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be
possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be
criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor
over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A
reading of the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase Any person. . . without any
distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this presumption may be rebutted if it
could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they)
acted w/ discernment.
Because of this, Guevarra was not exempted.
Yes.
The petitioners contention that he was entitled to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to his
minority because of P.D. 1508. He argued that this can be applied to his case because the penalty imposable is
reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional
medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC.
The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the
offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed.
The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; (emphasis
supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says punishable, not punished. One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law
or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the
attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section
2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered.
Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of
Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.
G.R. No. 154473

April 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 155573

April 24, 2009

PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the
Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 20021 and the June 23, 20022 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No.
155573 challenging the June 25, 20023 and the September 18, 20024 Orders of the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.
The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual settings, thus:
G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines"
held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, Quezon City.5 The speech was
subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.6
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated in his speech
that
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration
solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isnt even a requirement
for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us
into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it
would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.7
filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint8 for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).9 Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information10 for
libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 102.
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,11 contending that Judge Jaime N. Salazar of
Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to the judiciary was made
possible through the recommendation of respondents father-in-law. Petitioner further moved that the case be
ordered consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R.
No. 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC.
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the
assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus,
could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be
criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be
filed with the Sandiganbayan.12
On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order13 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407 and
considering as moot and academic petitioners motion to inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no
longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case

had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in
relation to his officehe delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was
the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to
hear the libel case.14
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of law, the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari15 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE
RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS
COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO jurisdiction IN THIS CASE.16
G.R. No. 155573
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco
were guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23
channel. The television shows episode that day was entitled "COMELEC Wars."17 In that episode, the
following conversation transpired:
Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a "PR" campaign against you? Is
that what you are saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [its] not COMELEC funds, [its] Photokina funds. You know, admittedly, according
to [c]harg d[a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is whats been [so]
happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,]
thats about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldnt tell me, you see. Now you asked me,
[who is] funding this? I think its pretty obvious.18
Petitioner considered respondents statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized representative, filed a
Complaint-Affidavit19 for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.20 The City
Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding
Information21 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that the court had no
jurisdiction over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal prosecution were
possible, jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.22
On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order23 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further assailed September 18, 2002
Order,24 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.25
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed before this Court, on pure questions of
law, another Petition for Review on Certiorari26 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS

COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE"; AND

II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL
WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT IT HAD NO jurisdiction OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS jurisdiction OVER THE CASE,
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD
OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.27
Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and the same parties, the Court, upon
the recommendation of the Clerk of Court,28 consolidated the cases.29
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel
cases to the exclusion of all other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged
criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the conviction that the resolution
of the said question will ultimately determine which courtthe RTC or the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction
over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The
foremost concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our current
laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be
pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.30 Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),31 as amended by Republic Act No.
4363,32 is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall
be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx.33 [Underscoring and italics
ours.]1avvphi1.zw+
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya,34 acknowledged the unmistakable import of
the said provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is
specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one
of those statutory provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. What the
law ordains must then be followed.35
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v.
Estanislao,36 where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous
act is committed "by similar means,"37 and despite the fact that the phrase "by similar means" is not repeated in
the latter portion of Article 360.38 In these cases, and in those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in
its pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel
cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,39 we explained at length that:

The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction
over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon
City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In that case,
the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691.
Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent judges orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7,
1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said
Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it
is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper
disposition."
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter:
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public respondent Court of
Appeals in denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691
divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is
punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal
Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No.
7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni
vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial
courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A.
7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases."
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in ordering that the
criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding
the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not
alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively
with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the
jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later enactment like
RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction
that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of
their enactment. jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by
a general law on the MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the
jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so indicated
because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict
should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the jurisdiction of
the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of
certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the

RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The
inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the proper
jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:
"RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING,
DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS AND jurisdiction IN LIBEL CASES.
xxxx
C
"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING jurisdiction OVER
THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." (Underscoring
supplied)40
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,41
Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at
present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law
defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or
modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations
in writing or by similar means.42 The grant to the Sandiganbayan43 of jurisdiction over offenses committed in
relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of
its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is
committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,44 cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply
modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.45
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary
and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion
reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as
former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition,
gross error. This Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that, the
Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED.
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 160054-55

July 21, 2004

MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 90, which denied petitioners (1) motion to quash the information; and (2) motion for
reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order denying his motion to suspend the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also questioned its August 5, 2003 Order2
which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3
(a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save
for the dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of
ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said informations read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, owner/proprietor of
ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinsons Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas
Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for
sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which
are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using
trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying
public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following
internationally: "CATERPILLAR", "CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN", "CAT AND DESIGN",
"WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN."
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view of the
existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition
pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary
of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with
unfair competition. In an Order dated August 9, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment
and other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and motion for reconsideration of
the order denying motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense
charged. He contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty4 of imprisonment for unfair
competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the
Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioners twin motions.6 A motion for
reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed
orders.

The issues posed for resolution are (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for
violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to
suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of (a)
the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency of a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty for
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or
representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal
penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person who is found
guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition]
and Section 169.1 [False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under Sections 150,
155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under
existing laws, thus
SEC. 163. jurisdiction of Court. All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall be brought
before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark Law)
which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false
designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court)
SEC. 27. jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this Chapter [V Infringement] and
Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and False Description or
Representation], hereof shall be brought before the Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A. No. 8293. The
repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads
SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly Republic Act
No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code;
Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis
added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety, otherwise, it would not
have used the phrases "parts of Acts" and "inconsistent herewith;" and it would have simply stated "Republic
Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal
Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed." It
would have removed all doubts that said specific laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of
the phrases "parts of Acts" and "inconsistent herewith" only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions
which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.6 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166,
however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest
jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have
expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.

Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general law and a special
law, the latter must prevail. jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over
that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.7
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws8 conferring jurisdiction over violations of
intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691,
which is a general law.9 Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly
lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2
to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of intellectual property
rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain
Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution
consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange
Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,10 invoked by petitioner finds no application in the present case.
Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by R.A. No. 8293. Neither did
we make a categorical ruling therein that jurisdiction over cases for violation of intellectual property rights is
lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark in Mirpuri on the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A.
No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder to the enactment of the present Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus
be construed as a jurisdictional pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. In his
petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained the denial of his motion to
suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons,
however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he
attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the
existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.11 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought
by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A.
No. 8293 is fraud.12 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted13 by private respondent also relate to
unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in
the following cases
xxxxxxxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the

Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion in denying his
motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not show the date of filing of the
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.14 Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his
motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that he
was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c),
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who
alleges must prove his allegations.
In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not established that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion. So also, his failure to attach documents relevant to his allegations warrants
the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with
the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto.
xxxxxxxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

SAMSON VS DAWAY (DIGEST)

Facts:
The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation, allegedly sold or offers
the sale of garment product using the trademark Caterpillar to the prejudice of Caterpillar, Inc., private
respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case with the RTC. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction
of the trial court over the offense charged contending that the case should be filed with the MTC because
violation of unfair competition is penalized with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years under RA 7691.
Issue:
Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights?

Ruling of the Court:

The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be brought before the proper
courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplated in Section 163 of IPC is RA
166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law. Section 27 of the Trademark Law provides that jurisdiction over
cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description
or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a
general law and IPC in relation to Trademark Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair
competition therefore should be filed with the RTC.

Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan

460 SCRA 588
June 22, 2005, TINGA
NATURE
Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public respondent
Sandiganbayans Resolution[1] dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment[2] dated 2
November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further
proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of the assailed issuances.
FACTS
-Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP.
-On Sept27, 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Field
Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a COMPLAINT vs. Garcia
for VIOLATION OF
1. SECTION 8 (IN RE Section 11) of RA 6713(Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees)
2. Art 183, RPC
3. Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law
-based on this complaint, a case was filed vs. Petitioner
-Wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits,
dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of ill-gotten wealth
-Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs. Garcia, his wife and 3 sons:
Ombudsman, after conducting inquiry (similar to PI) has determined a prima facie case exists vs. Maj. Gen
Garcia since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income SB
GRANTED PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
-Garcia filed MTD then this PETITION (same day):
a.LACK OF jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA 1379 should be w/ RTC as
provided under SEC2(9) of the law
b. Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in Civil Actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully
acquired property vs. Pres. Marcos etc.
c. SB was intended principally as a criminal court
BASIS: Presidential issuances and laws
d. Granting that SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally defective for failing to comply with
jurisdictional requirements under RA 1379, SEC2:
i. inquiry similar to a PI
ii. Certification to SOLGEN of prima facie case here: no certification

iii. action filed by SOLGEN - here: by Ombudsman

COMMENT by SB:
1.Republic vs. SB: there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests
with the Sandiganbayan.
2. Under Consti and prevailing statutes, SB is vested w/ authority and jurisdiction over the petition for
forfeiture under RA 1379
3. Section4a(1), PD 1606, not Section 2(9), RA 1379 should be made the basis of SBs jurisdiction:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
.
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks;
.
4. SBs jurisdiction based on PD 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of RA 3019
IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASES ARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL IN NATURE
COMMENT BY OMBUDSMAN:
1. Republic vs. SB
2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379 did not change even under the amendments of RA7975 and
RA 8294, though it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials
3. It has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings vs. petitioner based on COnsti and RA 6770:
The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power
to investigate any act of a public official or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379
4. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful
acquisition of wealth.
5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted similar to PI + SOLGENs participation no
longer required since Ombudsman endowed w/ authority to investigate and prosecute
6. dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before SB
REPLY by Garcia
1. SBs criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction : SBs jurisdiction over
forfeiture cases had been removed w/o subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction
2. Petition for forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminal action against him, so not under jurisdiction
of Sandiganbayan
ISSUES
1. WON SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379
2. WON Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture
3. WON petitioner is guilty of forum shopping
HELD
Petition W/O MERIT, dismissed
1. SB HAS jurisdiction
Reasoning:
*Republic vs. Sandiganbayan: Originally, SOLGEN was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before

then CFI of the city or province where the public officer/employee resides or holds office [RA 1379, SEC2]
Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan [PD 1486], original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations
was vested in SB.
PD 1606: repealed 1486 and modified jurisdiction of SB by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions
brought in connection w/ crimes w/n exclusive jurisdiction of SB, including:
> restitution or reparation for damages
>recovery of instruments and effects of the crime
>civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code
>and forfeiture proceedings provided under RA 1379
BP 129: abolished concurrent jurisdiction of SB and regular courts, expanded EOJ of SB over offenses
enumerated in SEC4 of PD1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of imposable penalty.
PD1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD 1861 because of the proliferation of filing
cases w/ penalty not higher than PC or its equivalent and even such cases not serious in nature
jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and 1379 is lodged w/ SB
under RA 8249: SB vested w/ EOJ in all cases involving violations of :
>>RA 3019
>>RA 1379
>>ChapII, Sec2, Title VII, Book II of the RPC
Where 1 or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense (see above)
ON CIVIL NATUR OF FORFEITURE ACTIONS
-they are actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUT FORFEITURE OF AN ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED
PROPERTY PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A PENALTY [as discussed in Cabal vs. Kapunan]
SB VESTED W/ jurisdiction OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379 [An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of
the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.]: the law provides a procedure for forfeiture in case a public officer
has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. No
penalty for the public officer for unlawful acquisition but the law imposes forfeiture as a penalty for unlawfully
acquired properties
2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue there)
RA 1379, Sec2: SOLGEN authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
PD 1486: vested SB w/ jurisdiction over RA 1379 forfeiture proceedings
Sec12: Chief Special Prosecutor has authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases, not SOLGEN, to SB, not
CFI (BUT THIS IS JUST AN IMPLIED REPEAL as may be derived from the repealing clause of PD 1486)
PD 1487: created Ombudsman
PD 1606 repealed expressly PD 1486
PD 1607 provided that Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor has exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the SB, file info therefore, and direct and control prosecution of said
cases
also removed authority to file actions for forfeiture under RA 1379
the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor General to file
a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the
case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary
investigation therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special
Prosecutor.
PD 1630: expanded the Tanodbayans authority: given exclusive authority to conduct PI of all cases
cognizable by SB, to file info therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases
**1987 CONSTI enacted

RA 6770 + ART XI, SEC 13 of 1987 CONSTI: POWERS OF OMBUDSMAN:

1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases;

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed
after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeiture under RA 1379
BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is
restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed AFTER FEB 1986
3. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTY!
Garcia failed to inform the court that he had filed a MTD in relation to the petition for forfeiture before the
SB.
A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and prayed for
the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the Arguments and Discussion[89] in the Petition
of petitioners thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference
between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the petition for forfeiture to
comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the
Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November
2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same
intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that
petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to
dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party
concerned.
G.R. No. 189434

March 12, 2014

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government,Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 189505
IMELDA
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and
declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by
the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials,

and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to
Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition, reiterating the following arguments:
1. That the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because a) the Republic
had earlier stated that it will file a separate forfeiture action regarding the assets of Arelma and b) Civil Case
No. 0141 had already terminated; and
2. That the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma proceeds, which
are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States.
We agree with the view of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Opposition filed on 16 August 2012,
that the first issue has already been raised and exhaustively discussed in our 25 April 2012 Decision. In fact, the
discussion on the first issue is merely a restatement of petitioners original assertions that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction to render summary judgment over the assets of Arelma. According to petitioners, the
judgment in Civil Case No. 0141 applied only to the Swiss deposits subject of our Decision in G.R. No. 152154,
which were also listed in the Petition for Forfeiture.
It is clear from our 25 April 2012 Decision that this is a distorted reading of the facts.1wphi1 The said Petition
for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name "Arelma, Inc.," which maintained an
account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for the purpose of
hiding ill-gotten wealth.1 The Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 152154 affirmed the partial summary judgment
only over the Swiss deposits which the Sandiganbayan declared as forfeited in favor of the State.
This cannot be construed as a bar to a subsequent judgment over numerous other assets and properties expressly
sought to be forfeited in Civil Case No. 0141. Respondent Republics success in obtaining summary judgment
over the Swiss accounts does not mean its preclusion from seeking partial summary judgment over a different
subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No. 0141 pertains to the recovery
of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1) holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other
investments; (2) landholdings, buildings, condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties; (4) bills
amounting to Php 27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign currencies and jewelry seized by
the United States customs authorities in Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the Central
Bank in dollar-denominated Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate in the United States,
among others.2
The Swiss Deposits Decision, G.R. No. 152154, dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five Swiss
accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7 March 2000 specifically identified
the five Swiss accounts. It did not include the Arelma account. To subscribe to the view of petitioners is to
forever bar the State from recovering the assets listed above, including the properties it had specifically
identified in its petition for forfeiture. As we have discussed in our Decision, the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is
rightly characterized as a separate judgment, and allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36:
Separate judgments.When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage,
upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of
such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall
proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its
enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as
may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered.

Petitioners further insist that "Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma account because the respondent
unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture petition concerning it." However, petitioners failed
to prove that such a reservation was made, and never even substantiated how such reservation could operate to
deprive the State of its right to file for separate judgment. There is nothing in Republic Act 1379 3 or in the Rules
which prohibits the graft court from taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment only
because of statements allegedly made by one party. This Court cannot countenance the view advanced by
petitioners defeating the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379, 4 where
the laws themselves do not provide for such limitations.
Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledges that "the subject matter of the case (i.e. the power/authority to
determine whether an asset may be forfeited under R.A. 1379) is within the (Sandiganbayans)
jurisdiction."5However, he objects to the graft courts purported lack of territorial jurisdiction on the theory
that forfeiture is an action in rem. He argues that the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction
over the Arelma proceeds before the judgment may be enforced.
At the outset, this theory fails to make a distinction between the issuance of a judgment, and its execution. It is
basic that the execution of a Courts judgment is merely a ministerial phase of adjudication. 6 The authority of
the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets as ill-gotten cannot be conflated with petitioners
concerns as to how the ruling may be effectively enforced.
More importantly, petitioner should be reminded of his earlier insistence that R.A. 1379 is penal, therefore
petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are actions in personam, not in rem. 7 We reiterate our observations in
the Swiss Deposits case: "Petitioner Republic has the right to a speedy disposition of this case. It would readily
be apparent to a reasonable mind that respondent Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to every procedural
device to delay the resolution hereofThe people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment, free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x."8
In any case, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent
of the forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the
reach of the courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed
exhaustively in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem,
such that:
jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.9
The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As early as Perkins
v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held: "In order that the court may exercise power over
the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof
being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court
over the property is impliedly recognized by law."10
Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on 26
June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with the
dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights
abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject
to joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity:

(The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it has
asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture
law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to
amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal
Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent
determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the
Arelma brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the estate of Marcos to
be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines could irreparably
undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets.
xxxx
The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition because it has a
significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over property that may have been stolen from
its public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the Republic. The high courts of the United
States, the Philippines and Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that wresting
control over these matters from the Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity and reciprocal
diplomatic self-interests.11
These statements made by the foreign court; based on principles of comity and reciprocity, are highlighted if
only to assuage petitioner's concerns on the effective enforcement of the Decision and this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 April 2012 filed by petitioners Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan DIGEST
G.R. No. 161784-86
April 26, 2005
FACTS:
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman submitted three Amended Informations to the
Sandiganbayan against Virginio Villamor (Municipal Mayor) and Dinah Barriga (Municipal Accountant) of the
Municipality of Carmen, Cebu.
The First Amended Information charged Barriga and Villamor with Malversation of Public Funds.
The facts of this information stated that on or about January 1996, the said acccused had in their possession
and custody public funds amounting to P23,047.20 intended for the payment of 5 rolls of Polyethelene pipes
to be used in the Corte-Canumong Water System Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. Being public
officers, they were held accountable for the funds. However, by this same capacity, the said accused
misappropriated, took, embezzled, and converted the said amount for their own personal use and benefit
.
The second and third Amended Informations charged Villamor and Barriga with Illegal Use of Public
Funds.
The facts of the Second Information stated that on or about November 1995, the said accused had in their
possession and control public funds amounting to P1305.00, representing a portion of the CVWSP Fund
intended and appropriated for the Construction of Deep Well and Spring Box (Level I projects) and Water
Works System (Level II projects) of specific brgy beneficiaries and recipients. By reason of the duties of their
office, they are held accountable for the said funds. However, by such capacity, they connived, confederated
and helped each other to disburse the said amount for the Spring Box of Brgy. Natimo-an, Carmen, Cebu. - a
brgy not included as a recipient of the CVWSP Trust Fund. Thus, the accused used the said fund to a public
purpose different from which it was intended or appropriated.
The facts of the Third Information stated that on or about January 1997, the accused had in their possession

P267, 537.96 from the CVWSP Fund intended for the same purpose as that in the 2nd Information. However,
the accused disbursed the said amount for the construction & expansion of Brgy. Cantucong Water System,
a level II project, thus the public funds were used for a public purpose different from that which it was
intended or appropriated.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
2. If the court has jurisdiction, WON Barriga should also be held liable:
A. Despite the Amended Informations' failure to show the intimate relations between the crimes charged
and her official duties?
B. Despite being only of SG 24?
C. Despite the fact that she is not an accountable officer since, as Municipal Accountant, the funds in the
Amended Informations were not under her control of administration?
HELD:
1. Yes. Based on the allegations in the Amended Informations and RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
original jurisdiction over the crimes of Malversation and Illegal Use of Public Funds.
RA 8249 -SB has orig jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public officers and employees,
at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories thereunder enumerated at the time of the
commission of such crimes.
2 classes of public office-related crimes under Sec.4(b), RA 8249:
a. Public office is constituent element - offense cannot exist without office
b. Intimately connected with public office - perpetrated by p.o./employee while in exercise of functions
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and felonies
under the first classification. The Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in
Section(a)(1) to (5) under the second classification if the Information contains specific factual
allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the
accused, and the discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular.
The public office of the accused Municipal Mayor Virginio Villamor is a constituent element of
malversation and illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayors position is classified as SG 27.
Since the Amended Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her co-accused in committing
the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as SG 24 and
as such is not an accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive
original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her.
2. Yes.
A. Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent element of the
crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information specific factual
allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that the accused committed the
crime in the performance of his duties.
B. The classification of the petitioners position as SG 24 is of no moment. The determinative fact is that
the position of her co-accused, the municipal mayor, is classified as SG 27, and under the last paragraph
of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the principal accused is classified as SG
27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense.
D. Under Section 474 of the Local Government Code, she is not obliged to receive public money or
property, nor is she obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an accountable officer within the
context of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Under the said article, an accountable public officer
is one who has actual control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
Even then, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be
convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal Code.
The name or relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. The nature
of the duties of the public officer or employee is the factor which determines whether or not malversation
is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or
municipal government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and

misappropriates the same.

It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds/ property by virtue of
her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public
funds or property if such public officer/private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to
commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property.
The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial treasurer in committing six counts of
malversation is also a co-principal in committing those offenses, and that a private person conspiring
with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People v.
Sendaydiego, G.R. Nos. L-33252 to L-33254).

People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613

Crim Pro -jurisdiction
Facts:
Mayor Leroy Brown of Basilan City, Det. Joaquin Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano Lacema, and other co-accused
where charged with murder. It was alleged in the information filed against them that from May to June 1958, the
Mayor and his "organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes" whom he "armed with pistols and
high power guns" established a camp which they called as their 'sub-police headquarters' at Tipo-Tipo,
Lamitan.
The headquarters was placed under the mayor's command, orders, direct supervision and control, and in which
his co-defendants were stationed. It was further alleged that criminal complaints were entertained in the substation/headquarters where defendant Pollisco acted as "investigating officer and exercised authority to order
the apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and
without bringing them to the proper court."
Then, on or about June 4, and 5, 1958, Awalin Tebag, a Yakan, was arrested by order of Mayor Brown "without
any warrant or complaint filed in court". Tebag was then supposed to be brought to and detained in the substation; but, on their way to the sub-station he was allegedly maltreated and tortured by the defendants as also
ordered by Mayor Brown. Tebag died as a result of the violence done to him and to cover up his death, the
defendants made it appear that Tebag was a member of a band of armed bandits who attacked them prompting
them to shoot Tebag to death.
Issue:
Whether or not Mayor Brown is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
Held:
Yes, Mayor Brown committed an offense in relation to his office. A public officer commits an offense in
relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while performing his official functions and that he could not
have committed the offense without holding his public office. Although the performance of the official function
was improper or is an irregular manner, it was alleged in the information that Mayor Brown established the substation and was under his command,... supervision and control and that his co-defendants were acting upon
his orders. Thus, in this case, there is an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.

PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO I. SALCEDO, JOSEFINA

B. MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING, and ROMMEL M. LUARCA, petitioners vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises the issue of the propriety of the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan[1] in Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 both entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario
Matining and Rommel Luarca wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1829. The grounds for petitioners
Motion to Quash the Informations against them are that only petitioner Prudente D. Soller occupied a position
classified as Grade 27 and higher and because the offenses charged were not committed by him in violation of
his office as Municipal Mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot and killed
along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with petitioner
Sollers son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr.
Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health
Officer. The incident was reported to and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was
conducted on the same night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller with the assistance of
petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of
Jerry Macabael with the Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation
of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in
police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one; and d) falsely stating in an
autopsy report that there was no blackening around his wound when in truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and claimed, among
others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it was there where he was rushed
by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested
by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the
procedure involved sawing which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabaels consent was obtained before
the autopsy. The two (2) police officers denied having planted three (3) shells at the place where the shooting
took place.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for Obstruction of Justice
(Violation of P.D. 1829), and two (2) Informations [2] were filed with the Sandiganbayan which were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two (2) informations respectively read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 25521
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses
PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO
SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution
of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829, committed as
follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then being the
Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of

said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of JERRY MACABAEL with intent to
impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation of criminal case for murder
against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 25522
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses
PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO
SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution
of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829, committed as
follows:
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers, then being the
Municipal Mayor, Municipal health Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of
said municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
criminal give false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead or prevent the
law enforcement agency, from apprehending the offender by reporting that there are several gunshot wounds in
the body of the victim, JERRY MACABAEL and that there is no tattooing (blackening) around the wound of
the said victim when in truth and in fact, there is only one gunshot wound and there is tattooing (blackening)
around the wound which would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of the herein
respondents spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the offenses charged; this motion was opposed by respondent People. In its assailed Order dated April 14,
2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the
performance of the duties of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly
charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the
co-accused. The Order stated that the accused is the Mayor of the municipality where the alleged incident took
place and, therefore, any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a criminal offense
committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also in which the accused Mayor
would be probably held accountable before this Court.
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the premise that it is not among the functions of
the mayor to conduct autopsies so that any misdeed, if indeed there was any, could not be an offense which
would put him under the jurisdiction of the court. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the Sandiganbyan
ruling that:
The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly that he is the primary executive and,
therefore, necessarily the primary peace officer of the municipality, for which reason, any action on his part
which deviates from that function is an office-related offense. In this particular instance, the accused is charged
for having cooperated or co-participated with another public official of lower rank in the same municipality in
the supposed falsification of the results of an autopsy. Additionally, even if the functions of an autopsy were
totally unrelated to any of the administrative or executive functions over which the mayor may have supervision
and, more specially, control, the fact of the matter is that the jurisdiction of the Court covers not only the
offenses committed by the officials of Grade Level 27 or higher as the principal accused but even where such

officials are also accused together with some other public officials who may be at a level below Grade Level 27
in connection with the performance of their duties.
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies a position at Grade Level 27, is coaccused with his wife, the Municipal Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that,
necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking officer elevates the entire case to this Court primarily
because somebody over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together with the lower
ranking officer.[3]
Hence, this petition alleging thatRESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF jurisdiction OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF jurisdiction IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS
jurisdiction OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 25521 and 25522.[4]
Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners
claim that for an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense must have been
committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) in relation to their office, i.e. it should be intimately
connected with the office of the offender, and should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the
performance of his official functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in the
information. Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal cases, the Informations do not contain factual
averments showing that they committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e., the acts charged are
intimately connected with their respective offices and were perpetrated by them while they were in the
performance of their duties and functions.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, posits that even if the offense charged was not committed by the
accused while in the performance of his official functions, the same could still be considered done in relation to
his office if the acts were committed in line of duty. Respondents position is that an offense may be considered
committed in relation to office if it arose from misuse or abuse of public office or from non-performance of an
official duty or function; thus the offense of falsifying autopsy and police reports is office-related considering
that among the duties and functions of the municipal mayor in the exercise of general supervision and control
over all programs, projects, services and activities of the municipal government, is that he shall ensure that all
executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions. The fact
that the informations do not allege that the acts charged were committed by petitioner Prudente Soller while he
was in the performance of his official functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as the conclusion of law that his
acts are in violation of his duties as municipal mayor could necessarily be deduced from the informations.
Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the Information were fatally defective in
view of the absence of any specific allegation that would indicate that the crimes charged were committed by
the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of their official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law
should be inquired into.[5] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or
it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction
of the court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.[6]
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners
with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and
penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. The applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No.
1606 as last amended by the Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as amended provides insofar as
pertinent:

SEC. 4. jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as provided by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.
xxx xxx xxx
In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,[7] this Court held that the Municipal Mayor, who occupies Salary Grade 27 in
the hierarchy of positions in the government under Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational
Services. Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be considered as committed in relation to
their office as this phrase is employed in the above-quoted Section 4.
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,[8] this Court has interpreted the requirement that an offense be committed
in relation to the office to mean that the offense cannot exist without the office or that the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised
Penal Code (referring to the crimes committed by the public officers). People vs. Montejo[9] enunciated the
principle that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance, though improper or irregular of his official functions. The Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Concepcion said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in (the)
abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the accuseds) respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance though improper or irregular, of their official functions.Indeed
(the accused) had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not
held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown obeyed his instructions because
he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.[10]
The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs. Montejo were reiterated in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,
[11]
Republic vs. Asuncion,[12] and Cunanan vs. Arceo.[13] The case of Republic vs. Asuncioncategorically
pronounced that the fact that offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information:

That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office, must, however, be alleged
in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4 (a) (2). This
allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
information.[14]
For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase committed in violation to public office
appears in the information; what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific factual
allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official
duties and the commission of the offense charged in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office.[15]
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted earlier, fail to allege
that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to their offices. Neither are there specific
allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection between the commission of the offense charged and
the discharge of official functions of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution
of criminal offenders was committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as
Mayor is included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners were
described as being all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I,
Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, there was no allegation that the offense of altering and suppressing the gunshot
wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the
investigation of the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated
information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the
apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official
function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1829 may be committed by any person whether a public officer or
a private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the Information in
Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy report would
indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa
Soller. Thus there is a categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit
the offenses and they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the
position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as enumerated in Section 444 of the
Local Government Code will readily show that the preparation of police and autopsy reports and the
presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal cases are not among such duties and
functions, and the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis for construing that the
criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall under his functions as Municipal Mayor.[16] What is obvious is
that petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of the alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by
personal reasons rather than official duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately connected with the
discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases
fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are SET ASIDE and declared NULL
and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 162059
January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu. She was appointed by then

President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting
January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and
relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3 One of the
projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to
the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The
succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the
KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6 The Ombudsman
found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to the
Sandiganbayan.7 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have
any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied with finality.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa case? (2) Whether or not
petitioner is a public officer with Salary Grade 27?
DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan reads:
Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. (2) While the first part of
Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision
of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
RATIONALE:
(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded
by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 Evidently, from the
provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed
by public officials in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.
(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she does not have a salary grade 27, as
she is placed there by express provision of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees
of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated
by P.D. No. 1606.

G.R. No. 191894

July 15, 2015

DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the August 18, 2009 Resolution 1 and
February 8, 2010 Order2 of respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.
The facts are plain and undisputed.
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. 3 On March 24,
2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him
for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public
officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City,
and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and
net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial
and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his
family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his
son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest7before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a
Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan 8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No.
8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official of the executive
branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary
Grade 27.
In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly
show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive branch
other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional
Director" and "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and," which signifies that these two positions are
different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together "relating one to the other" to give effect to the
purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without
indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers intention that officials occupying such position,
regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue,
it is claimed, was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss
is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan 12 and Organo v.
Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss for being
devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued against the accused.
SO ORDERED.14
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A)
(1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the
executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Courts pronouncements in Indingand Binay v.
Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied;16 Hence, this petition.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required
respondents to file a comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto. 17 Upon compliance
of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed by petitioner.
At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified
under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not
included among the public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily
relying as well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a
Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director,
irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit
in the petition.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. 18 By
virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September
21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. 19 The decree was later amended by P.D.
No. 1606,20Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI
thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, 28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this
year, R.A. No. 10660.30
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section
4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one
or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
x x x"
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials
of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4
(A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. 31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of
the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32

That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher" qualifies "regional director and higher" is
apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos. 1353and 844, which
eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the cases assigned
to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the positions of
regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain
with the Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the
"larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it
provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or
lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public
officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving
the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial
for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.35
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.36 In this category, it is the position
held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion
constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989."38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying
to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials
specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the
proper trial courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or
higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory
construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect
to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought
which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word.39
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, 40 a department manager of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a student regent of the University of the
Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of
Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position
particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours
with Cuyco.1avvphi1Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region
IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his position was classified as
Director II with Salary Grade 26.44It was opined: Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the
offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the
cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.
We sustain petitioner's contention.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and
higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with
Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.45
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that,
although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II with Salary Grade
26.46
There is no merit in the OSPs allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that respondent
court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose that when a warrant of
arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on September
17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18, 2009
Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALT
Gregorio Honasan II petitioner vs.
The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
Of the Department of Justice
G.R.No. 159747 April 13,2004
Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of the Ombudsman (consti),
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)
Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code
Facts:

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood and
Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a house
located in San Juan, Metro Manila
o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying
Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to
the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to
risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe
is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the
NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision
of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood compact
and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said Kung kaya
nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain
Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press
conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands
and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound.
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification
questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public
office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ
Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo,
attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of
September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the
ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Issues:
1. Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman should deputize the
prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.
2. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not published
3. Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because the petitioner is a
public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan
Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit

1.

2.

3.

No.
Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority
to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised
by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or
their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the
Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All
recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges filed against public officers and employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of
the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the
Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the
Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an
agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its
primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

No.
In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of the
Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the
public, in general.

No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition
so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.
CONSIGNA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. Nos. 175750-51/ April 2, 2014 / Perez, J.

FACTS.

 Municipal Treasurer Consigna of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as
loan from private respondent Hermelina Moleta (Moleta), P320,000, to pay for the salaries of the employees
of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipalitys Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived.
As payment, Consigna issued three (3) Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime Rusillon
(Rusillon), the incumbent mayor.
After some time, Moleta demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail. Thus, Moleta
deposited the checks:
o First, she deposited the 3 LBP checks to her account in Metrobank-Surigao Branch; however, Metrobank
returned the checks to Moleta as the checks had no funds.
o The following day, Moleta again deposited the checks to her LBP account; however, the checks were again
returned for the reason, Signature Not on File. Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the
municipalitys account was already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the Philippines, and
that Consigna, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.
Moleta filed two sets of information against Municipal Treasurer Consigna and Mayor Rusillon:
o One for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA3019
o One for estafa (Art. 315 of the RPC)
Consignas defenses:
o The court a quo (Sandiganbayan) has no jurisdiction because:
The crime as charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific type of
Estafa;
Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo because the offense as
charged can stand independently of public office and public office is not an element of the crime.
o There was no fraud or misrepresentation. By demanding payment from Rusillon, Moleta attested that there
exists no fraud or misrepresentation.
Rusillons defense: He had no participation in the acts committed by Consigna.
Sandiganbayan: Consigna was found guilty of both charges and Rusillon was acquitted in both charges.
o Hence, the petition.
ISSUE & RATIO.
WON Consigna is guilty of estafa as penalized under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC. YES.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment, are the
following: (a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (b) such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that
is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Consignas representations were outright distortions of the truth perpetrated for the sole purpose of
inducing Moleta to hand to her the amount of P320,000.00 purportedly for the Municipality of General Luna.
Being the Municipal Treasurer, there was reason for Moleta to rely on Consignas representations that money
is needed for the payment of the employees salary as well as for the construction of the gymnasium. There
was also a ring of truth to the deception that the share of the municipality from the IRA is forthcoming. Added
to this, petitioners representations were even supported by the issuance of three (3) LBP checks to guarantee
payment taken from the account of the municipality and signed by no less than the municipal mayor, giving the
impression that the loaned amount would indeed be utilized for public purposes.
WON Consigna is guilty of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019. YES.
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Consigna, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer discharging official functions when she misused
such position to be able to take out a loan from Moleta, who was misled into the belief that petitioner, as
municipal treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
Consignas official function created in her favor an impression of authority to transact business with
Moleta involving government financial concerns. There is, therefore, a direct relation between the commission
of the crime and petitioners officethe latter being the very reason or consideration that led to the
unwarranted benefit she gained from Moleta, for which the latter suffered damages in the amount of P320,000.
WON the court a quo (Sandiganbayan) committed a reversible error for finding petitioner guilty of
estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the provision allegedly violated. NO.
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.
DECISION.
The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved
in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command,
that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said
incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the
panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents
including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After
a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was
charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of
R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or
ore of the principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the
said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to

continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls
within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of
the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who
challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when
the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class;
all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and under
the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal
laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or
those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law,
but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that
the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The
stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

.R. No. 141710

March 3, 2004

EVELYN V. RODRIGUEZ, AND ANDRES ABONITA, JR., petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The January 17, 2000 three separate Orders of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to quash the
second amended information,1 denying the motion to defer arraignment, 2 and entering a plea of "not guilty" for
petitioners in light of their refusal to plead to the information,3 are assailed in the present petition for certiorari.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On September 24, 1996, acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have been going on
in different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine Marines confiscated freshly
cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and sawing of the lumber,
which were alleged to have been done under the supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego
upon orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and Association of Barangay Captains President
Roberto Rodriguez, were without proper permit or license.
Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping, some were hauled
inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay and left under the custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan
Libao.
On September 25, 1997, Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC Compound demanding the release
of the lumber by presenting a letter-request addressed to the CENRO to salvage old cut timber, duly indorsed by
Mayor Rodriguez. As the request did not bear the approval of the CENRO, it was denied.
On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the other herein petitioner, Igang
Barangay Captain Andres Abonita, Jr., went to the RAC Compound upon orders of Mayor Rodriguez to haul the
lumber to the Municipal Hall, but the officer-in-charge refused to release the same without the advice of EIIB
authorities. On even date, acting upon the orders of Mayor Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to
the RAC Compound accompanied by two fully armed policemen who then and there forcibly took possession,
hauled, and transferred the lumber to the Municipal Hall of Taytay.
On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints for
robbery4 and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829 5 (Decree Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders) against petitioners Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before
the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan.
By Resolution6 of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended the filing of an
information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829, 7 and the forwarding of the records
of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon for review and further proceedings, petitioner Mayor
Rodriguez being a public officer and the charge against her being work-connected.
Following its review of the case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon, by a Joint Review Action 8 of
October 19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information9 for violation of Section 1(b) P.D. 1829 on December
8, 1998 against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 25065.

A warrant of arrest10 was accordingly issued against petitioners on December 14, 1998. Before the 1st Division
of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on January
4, 1999,11 as did Barangay Captain Abonita on January 29, 1999.12
On January 27, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment,13 they having filed on even date a Motion
to Quash14. By Order15 of January 29, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment to February 26, 1999.
During the scheduled arraignment on February 26, 1999, the special prosecutor moved to defer the arraignment
as recommended changes in the information were not yet acted upon by the Ombudsman. Without objection
from petitioners counsel, the arraignment was reset16 to April 8, 1999.
In the meantime, the special prosecutor filed on April 6, 1999 an opposition17 to petitioners Motion to Quash.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan, acting upon a Motion to Admit Information 18 which was filed by the special
prosecutor, admitted the amended information by Order19 of April 8, 1999.
Petitioners filed on April 26, 1999 a Motion to Quash 20 the amended information, to which motion the special
prosecutor filed a comment/opposition21 on June 9, 1999, explaining that the belated filing thereof was due to
the transfer of the records of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to its new office at the Sandiganbayan
Centennial Building in Quezon City.
Thereafter or on June 28, 1999, the special prosecutor filed another Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended
Information22 which was set for hearing on November 25, 1999. The scheduled hearing on November 25, 1999
was, however, cancelled and reset23 to December 3, 1999 upon urgent motion by petitioners counsel upon the
ground that on said date, he needed to appear before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong.
By Order24 of December 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to admit amended information, denied
the motion to quash the amended information, and ordered the arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000.
On January 14, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss25 the second amended information.
During the scheduled arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued in open court
the assailed separate orders denying petitioners motion to quash the second amended information, 26 denying
the motion to defer arraignment,27 and entering a plea of "not guilty" for both accused28 herein petitioners, which
orders petitioners allege have been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners argue that the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged for almost three
years is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as accused to due process, 29 they
citingTatad v. Sandiganbayan.30 They add that the repeated and ex-parte amendment of the information by the
Ombudsman resulted to inordinate delay in bringing the case to trial, which is a ground for dismissal of the
information under Section 13, in relation to Section 7 of R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998).31
Petitioners likewise argue that the simultaneous filing by the Ombudsman of two informations against them,
one before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 25065), and the other before the Regional Trial Court in
Puerto Princesa City (Criminal Case No. 14959), involving the same subject matter constitutes forum shopping
which is expressly prohibited under the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 directing the summary
dismissal of multiple complaints or charges, and necessarily places both of them in "double danger of
conviction and punishment for the same offense."32
Petitioners additionally question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are not tasked
with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law enforcement officers or prosecutors but are mere executive officials
of their respective local government units with entirely different official functions and, as such, the accusation
against them is not in relation to their office. 33 Petitioners thus conclude that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of R.A. 8249 limits the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code.34
The petition fails.
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan35 cited by petitioners has a different factual setting from the present case. The cases
against Tatad remained dormant for almost three years, drawing this Court to dismiss them in light of the
following observations: political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process; there was a blatant departure from established procedures prescribed by law for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation; and the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on
the basis of the record.36
From the records of the case at bar, it is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan took only three
months, from November 7, 1996 to February 18, 1997, to come up with its resolution finding probable cause
against petitioners. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon took eight months to review the case and come up with
the joint review action on October 19, 1998. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman acted on the case
for around two months. Considering that the records were passed upon by three offices, the period of
preliminary investigation, which did not exceed two years, cannot be deemed to have violated petitioners
constitutionally guaranteed rights to procedural due process and to a speedy disposition of cases.
As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan37 instructs:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings [are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when the unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the determination of whether or
not the right has been violated, the factors that maybe considered and balanced are: the length of the delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by
the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.38
Parenthetically, as reflected in the following observation of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners themselves
contributed to the delay, thus:
With respect to the alleged delay of the filing of the Information and for the delay in finally getting the case
ready for arraignment, Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero has stated that, to a certain extent, the claim is valid
although the delay is caused not unreasonably but because of the exercise of the right of the accused to
determine whether or not they could be charged under the Information for which they have filed Motions to
Quash; thus, the delay cannot be considered unreasonable nor the grounds for setting aside the amended
Information as it now stands.39 (Underscoring supplied)
The rule is well settled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.40

In further pressing for the dismissal of the case, petitioners cite Sections 7 41 and 1342 of R.A. 8493, averring that
the unreasonable delay in bringing them to arraignment is a ground for the dismissal of the case, they having
been arraigned only on January 17, 2000, after several and repeated amendments of the information.
The records show, however, that it was on account of petitioners continuous filing of motions that the
arraignment was deferred.
Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, Implementing Rules for R.A.8493, the pendency of
petitioners motion to quash takes the case out from the time limit for arraignment (and pre-trial) provided
under Section 2 of said law.
Sec. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. - The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused pleads not
guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. The period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or
other cause justifying suspension of arraignment shall be excluded. (Underscoring supplied)
On the claim of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should be faulted for granting the repeated amendments of
the information by the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that an information may be amended in form or in
substance without leave of court at any time before an accused enters his plea.43
In another attempt at having the case dismissed, petitioners aver that the Ombudsman committed forum
shopping by filing the same information before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Puerto
Princesa, Palawan in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 (Additional Requisites for Petitions filed
with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions
and Complaints).
Assuming arguendo that indeed the same information for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 was also filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, then as the People by the Office of the
Ombudsman through the Special Prosecutor contends in its Memorandum, "since the Information in Criminal
Case No. 25065 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on December 8, 1988, while the information before the
regional Trial Court was allegedly filed on February 24, 1999, then, if there is any case to be dismissed for
forum shopping, that case should be the one before the Regional trial Court, as it was the second action filed."44
Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense for which they were indicted.
Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge against them for instead of showing
that the offense with which they were charged - violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 (obstruction of justice) is not in relation to their office, they argued that they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of
P.D. No. 705 the offense subject of the investigation which petitioners allegedly obstructed or interfered
with.
Petitioners are charged not for violation of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners argument that the act
complained of was not done in relation to their office to take the case out of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan does not lie.
At all events, Republic Act 8249, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides that as long as
one (or more) of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying position otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,45 the Sandiganbayan
exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officials whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees in relation to their
office.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is whether petitioner Mayor
Rodriguez, who holds a position of "Grade 27" under the Local Government Code of 1991 47, committed the
offense charged in relation to her office.
In Montilla v. Hilario48, this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed in relation to the
office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, in that in the legal sense,
the offense can not exist without the office.49
As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo,50 held that although public office is not an
element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the
office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused
would not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, 51 the accused is held to have been indicted for
"an offense committed in relation" to his office.
Applying the exception laid down in Montejo, this Court in Cunanan v. Arceo,52 held that although public office
is not an element of the crime of murder as it may be committed by any person, whether a public officer or a
private citizen, the circumstances under which the therein petitioner, who was a member of the Philippine
National Police, shot and killed the victim in the course of trying to restore local public order, bring the therein
petitioners case squarely within the meaning of an "offense committed in relation to the [accuseds] public
office."53
In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice under
Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense alleged to have been
committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may not have been committed had said
petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez,
in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is tasked to exercise general and operational control and supervision
over the local police forces54, used her influence, authority and office to call and command members of the
municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an investigation for
violation of P.D. 705.
The joint-counter affidavits55 signed by petitioners during the preliminary investigation quoted the letter of
petitioner Mayor Rodriguez to the municipal police officers, viz:
To

SPO1

Juanito

G.

Gan

and

PO2 Emmanuel Nangit;

PNP
Municipal
Taytay Palawan

Members

of
Police

Taytay
Office,

Upon receipt of this order you are hereby directed to proceed to Sitio Igang, Poblacion Taytay, Palawan, at the
compound of the Rural Agricultural Center[, in order to] haul the flitches ipil lumber intended for the projects of
the Municipal Government of Taytay and to turn over to the DENR office of Taytay, Palawan.
For immediate strict compliance. 56
Reference to this above-quoted letter of petitioner Rodriguez is found in both the Resolution 57 of the Deputized
Ombudsman Investigator of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan and the Joint Review Action 58 of the
Graft Investigation Officer-Luzon.

What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations
in the information59. The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as municipal mayor, took
advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct the investigation
of the case for violation of P.D. 705 effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the amended information reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses EVELYN
VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS BONITA JR. of Violation of Section 1(b), Presidential Decree
No. 1829 committed as follows:
"That on or about October 5, 1996, at Sitio Igang, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Taytay, Province of
Palawan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ
and ANDREWS ABONITA JR., both public officers, being the Municipal Mayor and Barangay Captain of
Barangay Igang of the same municipality, respectively, committing the offense in relation to their office and
taking advantage of the same, confederating and conspiring with each other enter the compound of the Rural
Agricultural Center (RAC) at Sitio Igang, Poblacion, Taytay, Palawan and while inside with force, intimidation
and against the will of the one officially detailed thereat, 2LT. ERNAN O. LIBAO, did then and there willfully,
feloniously, unlawfully, knowingly and forcibly haul 93 pieces or 2.577.32 board feet of assorted dimensions of
ipil lumber, that were officially confiscated by a joint team of EIIB, PENRO, BANTAY PALAWAN, PNPTINIGUIBAN COMMAND and PHILIPPINE MARINES, stockpiled inside the RAC for safekeeping while
waiting for available transportation to haul the same to Puerto Princesa City, and brought the same ipil lumber
within the compound of the Municipal Hall of Taytay, with the primordial purpose of suppressing or concealing
the said ipil lumber as evidence in the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705, as amended.60(Italics
supplied)
There being no flaw or infirmity then in the amended information, respondent Sandiganbayan did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of January 17, 2000,
denying petitioners motion to quash.
The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to defer arraignment and entering a plea of not guilty for
petitioners in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered without any grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152398. April 14, 2005

EDGAR
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

CRISOSTOMO, Petitioners,

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure of
the SandiganbayanResolutions promulgated on 17 September 2001 and 14 January 2002, denying the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by petitioner SPO1 Edgar Crisostomo ("Crisostomo") assailing the courts
Decision1 promulgated on 28 November 2000. The Decision found Crisostomo guilty of the crime of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
The Charge
On 19 October 1993, Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the Solano
Municipal Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba ("Renato"), a detention prisoner at the Solano
Municipal Jail. The Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused, Dominador C. dela
Cruz ("dela Cruz"), Efren M. Perez ("Perez"), Raki T. Anggo ("Anggo"), Randy A. Lumabo ("Lumabo"),
Rolando M. Norberte ("Norberte") and Mario Calingayan ("Calingayan"), all inmates at the Solano Municipal
Jail, in murdering Renato. The Information reads in full:
That on or about the 14th day of February 1989, in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Pat. Edgar T. Crisostomo, a public officer,
being then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer
thereat, taking advantage of his public position and thus committing the offense in relation to his office,
conspiring, confederating and conniving with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail,
namely: Dominador C. dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo, Rolando M. Norberte and
Mario B. Calingayan, with intent to kill and with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength and with the
aid of armed men or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault one Renato Suba, a
detention prisoner, with the use of rough-surfaced instruments, including fist blows, inflicting upon him serious
injuries causing his internal organs to be badly damaged such as his liver, messentery and stomach resulting to
the death of said Renato Suba to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Arraignment and Plea
On 15 December 1993, Crisostomo assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 3 Thereafter,
trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On 13 February 1989, Renato was detained at the municipal jail in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya for allegedly hitting
the head of one Diosdado Lacangan. The following day, 14 February 1989, at 5:00 p.m., Renatos brother
Rizalino Suba ("Rizalino") visited him at the municipal jail. Renato asked Rizalino to bring him blanket,
toothbrush, clothes and food. Rizalino left the municipal jail that day at 5:20 p.m. At that time, Renato was in
good physical condition and did not complain of any bodily pain. Renato was 26 years old, single, and was
employed in a logging concession.
At 9:00 p.m., a barangay councilman informed Rizalino that policemen assigned at the Solano municipal jail
wanted Rizalino to go to the municipal building. Rizalino arrived at the municipal jail at 9:10 p.m. and saw his
brother Renato already dead on the floor outside his cell.

Renato was detained alone in the third cell, one of the four cells at the municipal jail. Although each of the four
cells had an iron grill door equipped with a padlock, the doors were usually left open. The keys to the padlocks
were with the jail guard. There was a common front door, which no one could enter but the jail guard. Only one
jail guard at a time was assigned at the municipal jail. Crisostomo was the one on duty at the time of the death
of Renato. At no time was Renato brought out of the cell during his detention on 13 February 1989 until his
death in the evening of the following day. Crisostomos position in relation to the cell where the victim was
killed was such that Crisostomo as jail guard could have heard if not seen what was going on inside the cell at
the time that Renato was killed.
There are unexplained discrepancies in the list of detainees/prisoners and police blotter. The list of
detainees/prisoners dated 20 February 1989 shows that there were eight prisoners on 14 February 1989,
including Renato, but after Renatos death, only six were turned over by Crisostomo to the incoming jail
guard. On 15 February 1989, nine "prisoners/detainees" were on the list, including Renato who was already
dead. However, the police blotter shows that only six prisoners were under custody. The persons who were
detained with Renato at the time of his death were released without being investigated by the Solano police.
Renato did not commit suicide. His body bore extensive injuries that could have been inflicted by several
persons. The exhumation and autopsy reports ruled out suicide as the cause of Renatos death. The deafening
silence of the inmates and the jail guard, Crisostomo, point to a conspiracy. Crisostomos guilt is made
apparent when he jumped bail during trial.
Version of the Defense
The presentation of evidence for Crisostomos defense was deemed waived for his failure to appear at the
scheduled hearings despite notice.
Calingayan, Crisostomos co-accused, was the sole witness for the defense. Calingayan was only 16 years old
at the time that he was charged with the murder of Renato. Calingayan denied killing Renato.
Calingayan was detained at the Solano Municipal Jail on 12 February 1989 because his brother-in-law,
Patrolman Feliciano Leal ("Leal"), also a jail guard, had him arrested for pawning some of the belongings of
Leal. Leal told Calingayan that he had him detained for safekeeping to teach him a lesson.
Renato was detained on 13 February 1989. Calingayan learned that Renato was detained for hitting
somebodys head.
There were four cells at the municipal jail. Calingayan was detained with five other inmates in the second cell.
Renato was detained alone in the third cell. The four cells had their own separate doors with padlocks but each
door was always open. It was up to the inmates to close the doors. A common door leading to the four cells was
always padlocked and no one could enter the door without the jail guards permission. The jail guard had the
keys to the cells and the common door. Only one jail guard was assigned to guard the cells. Crisostomo was the
jail guard on duty at the time that Renato died.
Calingayan was in jail for three days or until 15 February 1989. Calingayan last saw Renato alive between 5 to
6 p.m. of 14 February 1989. Just as Calingayan was about to take a bath after 6 p.m., he saw Renato lying
down. One of the inmates asked for Renatos food because he did not like to eat his food. After taking a bath,
Calingayan went back to his cell and played cards with his three cellmates whose names he could not recall.
Calingayan did not leave his cell during the four hours that he played cards but one of his cellmates went out.
Calingayan discovered Renatos body on 14 February 1989 between 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Calingayan went
to the fourth cell, where the comfort room was located, to urinate. While urinating, Calingayan saw at the corner

of the cell a shadow beside him. A bulb at the alley lighted the cell. Calingayan ran away and called the other
inmates, telling them that the person in cell number four was in the dark place. The other inmates ran towards
the place and shouted "si kuwan, si kuwan." Crisostomo was in the room at the left side from where Calingayan
was detained, about fifteen meters away. Upon hearing the shouts, Crisostomo opened the main door. Once
inside the cell, Crisostomo instructed the inmates to bring down Renatos body that was hanging from the iron
bars of the window of the cell. At that time, Calingayan did not notice what was used in hanging Renato but
when the body was brought outside, Calingayan saw that Renato had hanged himself with a thin blanket.
The four cells are not similar in area and size. The cell where Renato stayed is the smallest. The cells are
separated by a partition made of hollow blocks as high as the ceiling. The four cells are in one line so that if you
are in one cell you cannot see what is happening in the other cells. The inmates could go to any of the four cells
in the prison but they could not get out of the main door without the permission of the jail guard. The comfort
room is in the fourth cell, which is also open so that the inmates would not anymore ask for the key from the
office of the jail guard.
The blanket that Renato used to hang himself was tied to the iron grills of the window of the cell. The window
is small, only about two feet by one and one-half feet with eight iron bars. The window is nine feet from the
floor.
No other person was admitted on 14 February 1989. Calingayan does not have a grudge against Renato. He
could not recall if there was any untoward incident between Renato and the other inmates. The Solano police
investigated Calingayan the next morning.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
Only Crisostomo and Calingayan stood trial. The other accused, dela Cruz, Perez, Anggo, Lumabo and Norberte
were at large. The Sandiganbayan found sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict Crisostomo and
Calingayan of murder. The Sandiganbayan relied on the autopsy and exhumation reports in disregarding the
defense theory that Renato committed suicide by hanging himself with a blanket. The Sandiganbayan thus held:
Premises considered, accused Edgar Crisostomo and Mario Calingayan are hereby found guilty of the crime of
murder.
xxx
There being no attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the case of accused Edgar Crisostomo, and
taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the period from twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor,
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum.
xxx
As to the other accused, Dominador C. Dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo and
Rolando M. Norberte, considering they are still at-large up to the present time, let an alias warrant of arrest be
issued against them. In the meantime, the cases against them are hereby ordered archived.
SO ORDERED.4
The Issues
Crisostomo continues to assail the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. He raises the following issues:

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS jurisdiction OVER THE CRIME OF MURDER CHARGED
AGAINST CRISOSTOMO WHO IS A SENIOR POLICE OFFICER 1 (SPO1) AT THE TIME OF THE
FILING OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST HIM.
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS jurisdiction, WHETHER THE
SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF jurisdiction WHEN IT RULED THAT CRISOSTOMO IS GUILTY OF HAVING CONSPIRED
IN THE MURDER OF RENATO DESPITE THE SANDIGANBAYANS ADMISSION IN ITS DECISION
THAT THERE IS NO DIRECT EVIDENCE THAT WILL SHOW THE PARTICIPATION OF CRISOSTOMO
IN THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM.5
The Courts Ruling
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. However, the prosecution failed to prove Crisostomo and
Calingayans guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, we acquit Crisostomo and Calingayan.
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to Try the Case
Crisostomo argues that the Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to try the case. Crisostomo points out that
the crime of murder is not listed in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 ("PD 1606") as one of the crimes
that the Sandiganbayan can try. Crisostomo faults the Sandiganbayan for not applying the ruling in Sanchez v.
Demetriou6to this case. In Sanchez v. Demetriou, the Court ruled that public office must be a constituent
element of the crime as defined in the statute before the Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over a case.
Crisostomo insists that there is no direct relation between the commission of murder and Crisostomos public
office. Crisostomo further contends that the mere allegation in the Information that the offense was committed
in relation to Crisostomos office is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. Such
allegation without the specific factual averments is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that
would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of Crisostomos official duties.
We are not convinced.
Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the applicable provision of law is Section 4 of PD 1606,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861 ("PD 1861"), which took effect on 23 March 1983. The amended
provision reads:
Sec. 4. jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine ofP6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Crisostomo was charged with murder, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, a penalty within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Crisostomo would have the Court believe that being a jail guard is a mere incidental circumstance that bears no
close intimacy with the commission of murder. Crisostomos theory would have been tenable if the murdered
victim was not a prisoner under his custody as a jail guard. The function of a jail guard is to insure the safe
custody and proper confinement of persons detained in the jail. In this case, the Information alleges that the
victim was a detention prisoner when Crisostomo, the jail guard, conspired with the inmates to kill him.
Indeed, murder and homicide will never be the main function of any public office. No public office will ever be
a constituent element of murder. When then would murder or homicide, committed by a public officer, fall
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan? People v. Montejo7 provides the answer.
The Court explained that a public officer commits an offense in relation to his office if he perpetrates the
offense while performing, though in an improper or irregular manner, his official functions and he cannot
commit the offense without holding his public office. In such a case, there is an intimate connection between the
offense and the office of the accused. If the information alleges the close connection between the offense
charged and the office of the accused, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People v.
Montejo is an exception thatSanchez v. Demetriou recognized.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case will stand or fall on this test: Does the Information
allege a close or intimate connection between the offense charged and Crisostomos public office?
The Information passes the test.
The Information alleged that Crisostomo "a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his public position and
thus committing the offense in relation to his office" conspired, confederated and connived with his co-accused
who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail to kill Renato, "a detention prisoner."
If the victim were not a prisoner, the Information would have to state particularly the intimate relationship
between the offense charged and the accused public officers office to vest jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan.
This is not the case here. The law restrains the liberty of a prisoner and puts him under the custody and watchful
eyes of his jail guard. Again, the two-fold duties of a jail guard are to insure the safe custody and
proper confinement of personsdetained in the jail. The law restricts access to a prisoner. However, because of
the very nature of the work of a jail guard, he has access to the prisoner. Crisostomo, as the jail guard, could
not have conspired with the inmates to murder the detention prisoner in his cell if Crisostomo were not a
"jailer."
The Information accused Crisostomo of murdering a detention prisoner, a crime that collides directly with
Crisostomos office as a jail guard who has the duty to insure the safe custody of the prisoner. Crisostomos
purported act of killing a detention prisoner, while irregular and contrary to Crisostomos duties, was
committed while he was performing his official functions. The Information sufficiently apprised Crisostomo
that he stood accused of committing the crime in relation to his office, a case that is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, not the Regional Trial Court. There was no prejudice to Crisostomos substantive rights.
Assuming that the Information failed to allege that Crisostomo committed the crime in relation to his office, the
Sandiganbayan still had jurisdiction to try the case. The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 19
October 1993. Deloso v. Domingo,8 promulgated on 21 November 1990, did not require that the information
should allege that the accused public officer committed the offense in relation to his office before the
Sandiganbayan could assume jurisdiction over the case. The ruling in Deloso v. Domingo relied solely on PD
1606.
Aguinaldo v. Domagas,9 promulgated on 26 September 1991, modified Deloso v. Domingo. Aguinaldo v.
Domagas clarified that offenses specified in Section 4(a)(2) of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, must be

committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office and the information must allege this fact.
The succeeding cases of Sanchez v. Demetriou10 and Natividad v. Felix,11 reiterated the Aguinaldo v.
Domagasruling.
However, despite the subsequent cases clarifying Deloso v. Domingo, the Court in Republic v.
Asuncion,12promulgated on 11 March 1994, applied the ruling in Deloso v. Domingo. Since the effects of the
misapprehension of Deloso v. Domingo doctrine were still persistent, the Court set out the following directives
in Republic v. Asuncion:
The dismissal then of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 solely on the basis of Deloso vs. Domingo was erroneous.
In the light of Aguinaldo and Sanchez, and considering the absence of any allegation in the information that the
offense was committed by private respondent in relation to his office, it would even appear that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. However, it may yet be true that the crime of homicide charged therein
was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, which fact, however, was not alleged in the
information probably because Deloso vs. Domingo did not require such an allegation. In view of this eventuality
and the special circumstances of this case, and to avoid further delay, if not confusion, we shall direct the
court a quo to conduct a preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the crime charged in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-23224 was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. If it be determined in
the affirmative, then it shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and
proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a quo shall set aside the
challenged orders, proceed with the trial of the case, and render judgment thereon.
Republic v. Asuncion ordered the trial court to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the accused
public officer committed the crime charged while performing his office. If so, the trial court must order the
transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan as if the same were originally filed with the Sandiganbayan.
In the present case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan upon the recommendation of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman in a Resolution dated 30 June 1993. That Crisostomo committed the crime in
relation to his office can be gleaned from the Deputy Ombudsmans resolution as it stated that: (1) Crisostomo
was the jail guard on duty at the time that Renato was killed; (2) from the time that Crisostomo assumed his
duty up to the discovery of Renatos body, no one had entered the jail and no one could enter the jail, as it was
always locked, without the permission of the jail guard; (3) the key is always with the jail guard; (4) Renato
sustained severe and multiple injuries inflicted by two or more persons indicating conspiracy; and (5) the
relative position of the jail guard to the cell is in such a way that any activity inside the cell could be heard if not
seen by the jail guard.
Based on the foregoing findings, as well as on the Deloso v. Domingo ruling and the Courts instructions
inRepublic v. Asuncion, the Sandiganbayan had every reason to assume jurisdiction over this case. Crisostomo
waited until the very last stage of this case, the rendition of the verdict, before he questioned the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Crisostomo is already estopped from questioning the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction.13
Crisostomo s Guilt was not Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt
In the exercise of the Courts judicial discretion, this petition for certiorari will be treated as an appeal from
the decision of the Sandiganbayan to prevent the manifest miscarriage of justice 14 in a criminal case involving a
capital offense. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review.15 The reviewing tribunal can
correct errors though unassigned in the appeal, or even reverse the lower courts decision on grounds other
than those the parties raised as errors.16

In this case, the prosecution had the burden to prove first, the conspiracy to murder Renato, and second,
Crisostomos complicity in the conspiracy. The prosecution must prove that Renatos death was not the
result of suicide but was produced by a deliberate intent to kill him with the attendant circumstances that would
qualify the killing to murder. Since Crisostomo had no direct hand in the killing of Renato, the conviction could
only be sustained if the murder was carried out through a conspiracy between Crisostomo and his co-accused,
the inmates. It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that Crisostomos action and inaction were all part of
a scheme to murder Renato.
Renato was Killed with Deliberate Intent
To prove that Renatos death is a case of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct
or circumstantial, that he was deliberately killed. 17 Intent to kill can be deduced from the weapons used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. 18 If the victim dies because of a
deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.19
The prosecution established that Renato did not commit suicide. Witnesses for the prosecution vouched that
Renato was in good health prior to his death. Calingayan, the sole witness for the defense, did not point out that
there was any thing wrong with Renato prior to his death. The autopsy and exhumation reports debunked the
defenses theory that Renato hanged himself to death. Renatos injuries were so massive and grave that it
would have been impossible for these injuries to have been self-inflicted by Renato.
The extent of Renatos injuries indicates the perpetrators deliberate intent to kill him. Dr. Ruben M.
Agobung ("Dr. Agobung"), the NBI Medico Legal Officer 20 who exhumed and re-autopsied Renatos body,
stated in his affidavit21that Renato sustained several external and internal injuries, the most significant of which
are the ruptured liver, torn messentery and torn stomach. The injuries caused massive intra-abdominal
hemorrhage that ultimately caused Renatos death. Dr. Agobung further declared that Renatos injuries
could bring about death in a matter of minutes to a few hours from the time of infliction, if not promptly and
properly attended to by a competent surgeon.
Renatos internal injuries were so severe that the injuries could not have been sustained prior to his detention
at the Solano Municipal Jail. If this were so, Renato would have experienced continuous and severe body pains
and he would have fallen into shock, which could have been obvious even to those who are not doctors. Dr.
Agobung also concluded that Renatos injuries could have been inflicted by the application of considerable
force with the use of a hard and rough surface as well as hard smooth surface instruments, fist blows included.
While the blanket that was tied around Renatos neck caused abrasion and contusion on the neck area, these
injuries, however, did not cause Renatos death because the blood vessels on his neck were still intact. 22 The
Exhumation Report23 and Exhumation Findings24 stated that Renato died due to hemorrhagic shock, secondary
to multiple internal organ injuries. These findings lead to the inevitable conclusion that Renato was killed with
deliberate intent and his body was hanged just to simulate suicide.
Prosecution Failed to Prove Crisostomo s Involvement in the Killing
No direct evidence linked Crisostomo to the killing of Renato. The prosecution relied on circumstantial
evidence to prove that there was a conspiracy to kill Renato and Crisostomo participated in carrying out the
conspiracy. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. 25 Section 4, Rule 133
of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In convicting Crisostomo, the Sandiganbayan cited the following circumstantial evidence:

1. The deceased, Renato Suba, was brought to the police station on the night of February 13, 1989 for
investigation for allegedly hitting the head of a certain Diosdado Lacangan; and that after investigation, the
deceased was brought to the detention cell (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 5-11).
2. On the following day at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, the deceased was visited by his brother, Rizalino
Suba; that the deceased asked his brother to bring him a blanket, toothbrush, clothes and foods (ibid, pp. 13-14).
3. Rizalino Suba left the municipal jail on February 14, 1989, at almost 5:20 p.m., while his other brother,
Rolando, brought the things to the deceased in jail; and that Rolando left their house at about 5:30 p.m. and
came back at 6:00 oclock in which Rizalino asked him (Rolando) if he (Renato Suba) was able to finish the
food that he sent and he answered in the affirmative (ibid, pp. 16, 18-19).
4. At that time, the deceased was in good health and in good condition and that he was not complaining
anything about his body; and that the deceased was then 26 years old, single and had finished advance ROTC
and worked in a logging concession (ibid, pp. 16-18).
5. Accused Mario Calingayan saw the deceased still alive lying down after 6:00 p.m. when he was about to take
a bath; and that after taking a bath, he (witness) went to his cell and played cards with his three (3) cellmates
(whose names he could not recall) for about four (4) hours (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, pp. 16-17).
6. At around 9:00 oclock of the same day, Mr. Baldovino, a barangay councilman, informed them that they
should go to the municipal building as per request of the policemen; that Rizalino Suba, first asked his uncle
David Suba and Manuel Rollo, a barangay councilman, to accompany him; that they arrived at the municipal
building at 9:10 p.m. and they saw that the deceased was already lying dead on the cement floor outside the cell
1 in the municipal building (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 20-22).
7. Accused Mario Calingayan was detained with five (5) others at the second cell among four (4) cells in the
jail; that the deceased, Renato Suba, was detained alone at the third cell (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, pp. 6-7).
8. The four (4) cells, although having their own separate doors, made of iron grills and equipped each with a
padlock, were always open; that it was up to them whether to close the doors; that the keys of the padlocks are
held by the guard; and that any detention prisoner could go to any cell inside the prison (ibid, pp. 7-8, 21, 23).
9. There was a common door located in front, leading inside to the cells which no one could enter because it is
padlocked, except with the jail guards permission; and that the comfort room is located in the 4th cell which
is not equipped with a padlock so that if you want to go to the comfort room, you do not anymore need the key
in the office of the jail guard (ibid, p. 22).
10. There is only one guard assigned in the cells and accused Edgar Crisostomo was the one who was rendering
duty at the time of the death of the victim (ibid, pp. 9, 13).
11. There was no other person who was admitted on February 12, 13 and 14, 1989, and there was no instance
when Suba was brought out of the prison cell from the time he was detained on February 14, 1989 (ibid, p. 29).
12. The persons who were detained together with the deceased at the time of his death were released without
any investigation having been conducted by the local police (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 28-29).
13. The apparent inconsistency in the list of detainees/prisoners dated February 20, 1989 (Exhibit "I") and the
police blotter (Exhibits "J" and "J-1") whereby in the former there were eight prisoners on February 14, 1989

including the victim but only six were turned over by accused Crisostomo to the incoming jail guard after the
death of the victim; the list contains nine (9) detainees/prisoners on February 15, 1989 which includes the
victim, who was then dead, while the police blotter shows that only six prisoners were under their custody. Why
the apparent inconsistency?
14. Accused Mario Calingayans claim that he was detained on February 12, 1989, which is contrary to the
master list of detainees showing that he was detained only on February 14, 1989 (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995,
p. 19).
15. Accused Mario Calingayans allegation that when Renato Suba was brought outside, he saw that he
hanged himself with a thin blanket (tsn, hearing of April 4, 1995, pp. 12-13) which was what the policemen also
told the brother of the victim (tsn, hearing of April 21, 1994, pp. 23-24).
16. After the prosecution rested its case and after co-accused Mario Calingayan was finished with his testimony
in court, accused Edgar Crisostomo jumped bail and up to this day had remained at large (Rollo, pp. 297-298,
305).
17. The fact that accused Dominador C. Dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo and
Rolando M. Norberte are also still at-large.26
The Sandiganbayan also relied on the Memorandum Report 27 dated 22 October 1991 of Oscar Oida, then
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Regional Director for Region II, who evaluated the NBIs
investigation of the case. The Sandiganbayan quoted the following portions of the report:
xxx
5. That when he [victim] was brought to the Solano Municipal Jail at around 12:00 midnight on 14 February
1989 (the same was corrected by witness Oscar Oida to be February 13, 1989 when he testified in open court),
he was accompanied by his brother, Rizalino Suba, his cousin, Rodolfo Suba and Brgy. Councilman Manuel
Rulloda in good physical condition with no injuries[;]
6. That when Luis Suba, father of the victim, Renato Suba, visited him in jail at around 8:00 a.m., on February
14, 1989 and brought food for his breakfast, he was in good physical condition, and did not complain of any
physical injury or pain. In fact, he was able to eat all the food[;]
7. That when Rizalino Suba, brother of the victim, visited the latter at around 5:00 oclock p.m. on 14
February 1989, victim was in good spirit and never complained of any injury or bodily pain. He was in good
physical condition. He even requested that he be brought his clothes, beddings and food[;]
8. That when Rolando Suba, another brother of victim, brought the clothes, bedding and food as requested by
the latter at around 6:00 oclock p.m. on 14 February 1989, he was in good physical condition and did not
complain of any injury or body pain[;]
9. That the good physical condition of victim, Renato Suba was even corroborated by his four co-inmates,
namely, Arki Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo, Rolando M. Norberte and Mario B. Calingayan and by the jailer, Pat.
Edgar T. Crisostomo, when he was placed under detention in the Solano Municipal Jail;
10. That the jailer Pat. Edgar Crisostomo from the time he assumed his tour of duty from 4:00 oclock p.m. on
14 February 1989, up to the time the victim was discovered allegedly dead and hanging inside the jail at 9:00
oclock p.m. on that same day, nobody entered the jail and no one would enter said jail, as it was always
locked, without the permission of the jailer. The key is always with the jailer;

11. That the only companions of the victim at the time of the discovery of his death on 14 February 1989 at
around 9:00 p.m. were his six (6) co-inmates namely: Dominador C. dela Cruz, Edren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo,
Randy A. Luma[b]o, Rolando M. Norbert[e] and Mario Calingayan;
12. That definitely the cause of death was not suicide by hanging but due to several injuries sustained by the
victim. The most significant and remarkable of which are the ruptured liver, torn messentery and a torn stomach
which injuries resulted into massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage that ultimately caused the death of said victim
per autopsy examination;
13. That said injuries can bring about death in a matter of minutes to a few hours if not promptly and properly
attended by a competent surgeon;
14. That said injuries could not have been sustained by victim before he was detained at the Solano Municipal
Jail as he could have been experiencing continuous severe pain which can easily be observed by the policemen
who arrested him on 14 February 1989 at around 12:00 midnight and therefore should have been brought to the
hospital and not confined in the detention cell;
15. That the several injuries sustained by victim were caused by hard rough-surfaced as well as hard smooth
surfaced instruments, fist blows included;
16. That the multiple injuries and the gravity of the injuries sustained by victim indicate that they were inflicted
by more than two persons;
17. That the nature of the injuries sustained by victim were almost in one particular part of the body, shown by
the fact that the internal organs badly damaged were the liver, messentery and stomach indicating that the victim
was defenseless and helpless thus affording the assailants to pounce on continuously with impunity almost on
one spot of the body of the victim. The victim could have been held by two or more assailants while the others
were alternately or giving victim blows on his body with hard rough surfaced as well as hard smooth surfaced
instruments, fist blows included;
18. That with the location and gravity of the injuries sustained by victim, the persons who inflicted the injuries
know fully well that victim will die and knew the consequences of their acts;
19. That the motive was revenge, as victim before he was killed, hit in the head a certain Diosdado Lacangan
with a wood causing serious injury. Lacangan was in serious condition at the time victim was killed[;]
20. That the claims of the Solano police and the six (6) co-inmates of victim that the latter committed suicide by
hanging is only a cover up to hide a heinous offense[;]
21. That the extreme silence of the suspects regarding the death of victim is so deafening that it established only
one thing, conspiracy. It is unusual for a person not to volunteer information as to who could be the author of
the offense if he is not a participant to a heinous offense particularly in this case where the circumstances show
that there can be no other person responsible for the death of the victim except the suspects in this instant case[;]
22. That the victim was killed between 6:00 PM to 9:00 PM on 14 February 1989 inside the Solano Municipal
Jail[;]
xxx
The relative position of the jailer to the cell where victim was killed was such that the jailer and the policemen
present, could hear if not see what was going inside the cell at the time the victim was killed. The injuries

sustained by victim could not be inflicted without victim shouting and crying for help. Even the assailants when
they inflicted these injuries on victim could not avoid making loud noises that could attract the attention of the
police officers present. Conspiracy to kill the victim among the inmates and the police officers was clearly
established from the circumstances preceding and after the killing of victim.28
In sum, the Sandiganbayan believed that Crisostomo took part in the conspiracy to kill Renato because of these
three circumstances: 1) Crisostomo as the jail guard on duty at the time of Renatos killing had in his
possession the keys to the main door and the cells; (2) Crisostomo was in such a position that he could have
seen or heard the killing of Renato; and (3) there are discrepancies between the list of detainees/prisoners and
the police blotter. According to the Sandiganbayan, there is a prima facie case against Crisostomo.
Except for the extensive injuries that Renatos body bore, there is no other evidence that proves that there was
a prior agreement between Crisostomo and the six inmates to kill Renato. In People v. Corpuz,29 one of the
inmates killed by the other inmates sustained stab wounds that were possibly inflicted by ten persons. The Court
ruled that conspiracy could not be inferred from the manner that the accused inmates attacked their fellow
inmate because there was no sufficient showing that all the accused inmates acted pursuant to a previous
common accord. Each of the accused inmates was held liable for his individual act.
Although no formal agreement is necessary to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from
the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, yet conspiracy must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.30 Even if all the malefactors joined in the killing, such circumstance alone does not satisfy
the requirement of conspiracy because the rule is that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient
proof of conspiracy.31 Conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
offense itself.32
Thus, even assuming that Renato was simultaneously attacked, this does not prove conspiracy. The malefactors
who inflicted the fatal injuries may have intended by their own separate acts to bring about the death of the
victim.33No evidence was presented to show that Crisostomo and the inmates planned to kill Renato or that
Crisostomos overt acts or inaction facilitated the alleged plan to kill Renato. The prosecution had the burden
to show Crisostomos intentional participation to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
The pieces of circumstantial evidence are not sufficient to create a prima facie case against Crisostomo. When
the three circumstances are examined with the other evidence on record, it becomes all the more clear that these
circumstances do not lead to a logical conclusion that Crisostomo lent support to an alleged conspiracy to
murder Renato.
First, while Crisostomo as jail guard had in his possession the keys to the main door and individual cells, there
is no proof that Crisostomo allowed an outsider inside the prison. Calingayan, the sole witness for the defense,
testified that no new detainee was admitted from 13 to 14 of February 1989.34 The NBI Report35 relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan confirms Calingayans testimony that nobody entered the jail and that Renatos only
companions inside the jail were the six inmates.36
There is also no proof that Crisostomo purposely left the individual cells open to allow the inmates to attack
Renato who was alone in the third cell. Calingayan, who was detained ahead of Renato, 37 testified that while
each of the four cells had a padlock, the cells had always been kept open. 38 The inmates had always been
allowed to enter the cells and it was up to the inmates to close the doors of the cells. 39 The inmates could freely
go to the fourth cell, which was the inmates comfort room so that they would no longer ask for the key from
the jail guard every time the inmates would use the comfort room.40

Second, the Sandiganbayan should not have absolutely relied on the NBI Report41 stating that Crisostomo as jail
guard was in such a position that he could have seen or heard the killing. The prosecution failed to establish that
Crisostomo actually saw and heard the killing of Renato.
Based on Calingayans testimony, it was not impossible for Crisostomo not to have actually seen and heard
the killing of Renato. On cross-examination, Calingayan testified that all of the cells were in one
line.42 Crisostomos office was at the left side of the cells about 15 meters away from cell number two, the cell
where Calingayan was detained.43 Hollow blocks from the floor to the ceiling separated each of the four
cells.44 With the partition, an inmate in one cell could not see what was happening in the other
cells.45 Calingayan further testified that Renatos body was in a dark place,46 as it was lighted from outside
only by a bulb "at the alley," "at the corridor."47
Since Renatos body was found in cell number four, this would make the distance between Crisostomos
office and the crime scene more than 15 meters. Crisostomo could not have had a full view of cell number four
because of the distance between Crisostomos office and cell number four, the partitions of the four cells and
poor lighting in the jail.
Calingayans description of the jail, the cells, the location of Renatos body and Crisostomos actual
position was not contradicted by the prosecution. There is no other evidence on record that describes the layout
and conditions of the jail at the time of Renatos death.
The prosecution had the burden to present evidence that Crisostomo indeed saw and heard Renatos killing
and Crisostomo consented to the killing as part of the plan to kill Renato. The absence of such evidence does
not preclude the possibility that Renato was covertly killed and the sounds were muffled to conceal the crime
from Crisostomo, the jail guard. Or Crisostomo as jail guard was simply negligent in securing the safety of the
inmates under his custody. If Crisostomo were negligent, this would be incompatible with conspiracy because
negligence denotes the absence of intent while conspiracy involves a meeting of the minds to commit a
crime.48 It was the prosecutions burden to limit the possibilities to only one: that Crisostomo conspired with
the inmates to kill Renato. The prosecution failed to do so.
Third, the prosecution was not clear as to the implication of the discrepancies between the list of
"detainees/prisoners" and police blotter to the conspiracy to murder Renato. The prosecution did not even
pinpoint which of the two documents is the accurate document. The prosecution merely asked: why the apparent
inconsistency?49
Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures,
presumptions or suspicions.50 The inconsistency between the two documents without anything more remains as
merely that an inconsistency. The inconsistency does not even have any bearing on the prosecutions
conspiracy theory. The NBI Report and Calingayans testimony stated that six inmates were with Renato
inside the jail. This was also the same number of inmates turned over by Crisostomo to the incoming jail guard
after Renatos death.51
The alleged motive for Renatos killing was to avenge the attack on Lacangan who was then in a serious
condition because Renato hit him on the head with a piece of wood. No evidence was presented to link
Crisostomo to Lacangan or to show what compelling motive made Crisostomo, a jail guard, abandon his duty
and instead facilitate the killing of an inmate under his custody. Motive is generally held to be immaterial
because it is not an element of the crime. 52 However, motive becomes important when the evidence on the
commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.53 Motive is thus vital in this case.
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan had no basis to convict Crisostomo because the prosecution failed to produce the
evidence necessary to overturn the presumption of innocence. The insufficiency of evidence was the same

reason why the National Police Commission dismissed the administrative case for grave misconduct (murder)
against Crisostomo on 24 October 1990.54 The circumstances in this case did not constitute an unbroken chain
that would lead to a reasonable conclusion that Crisostomo played a role in the inmates supposed
preconceived effort to kill Renato. Thus, Crisostomo must be acquitted.
The "deafening silence" of all of the accused does not necessarily point to a conspiracy. In the first place, not all
of the accused remained silent. Calingayan put himself on the witness stand. Calingayan further claimed that the
Solano police investigated him and his handwritten statements were taken the morning following Renatos
death.55Secondly, an accused has the constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt from being
compelled to be a witness against himself.56
A judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.57 The circumstantial evidence in this case is not sufficient to create
aprima facie case to shift the burden of evidence to Crisostomo. Moreover, Calingayans testimony inured to
Crisostomos favor. The supposed waiver of presentation of evidence did not work against Crisostomo
because the prosecution failed to prove Crisostomos guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In Salvatierra v. CA,58 upon ruling for the defendants acquittal, the Court disregarded the issue of whether the
defendants jumped bail for failing to attend trial and whether their absence should be considered as flight and as
evidence of guilt. Even with this ruling in Salvatierra v. CA, which is applicable to this case, and
Crisostomos failure to question the violation of his right to procedural due process before the Court, we
cannot simply ignore the Sandiganbayans grave abuse of discretion.
The records show that the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses presentation of evidence on 21, 22
and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled because of "lack of quorum in the regular
membership" of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. 59 The hearing
was reset the next day, 22 June 1995. Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend the 22 June 1995 hearing. The
Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an order 60 directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Crisostomo and ordering the confiscation of his surety bond. The order further declared that Crisostomo had
waived his right to present evidence because of his non-appearance at "yesterdays and todays scheduled
hearings."61 The Sandiganbayan terminated the trial and gave the parties thirty days within which to file their
memoranda, after which, with or without the memoranda, the case would still be deemed submitted for
decision.
The Sandiganbayans error is obvious. Strictly speaking, Crisostomo failed to appear only on the 22 June 1995
hearing. Crisostomos appearance on the 21 June 1995 hearing would not have mattered because the hearing
on this date was cancelled for lack of quorum of justices in the Sandiganbayans Second Division.
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos non-appearance
during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not
for the succeeding trial dates.62 Section 1(c) of Rule 115 clearly states that:
xxx The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had
notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody
had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present
on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained.
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of his
right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. 63 Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even

through his counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement
of the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayans counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to
see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present
evidence.64In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to
attend the succeeding hearings.65 The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact
nature and consequences of a waiver.66 Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went
ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his
absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not assumed
and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could
personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver.67 Moreover, the searching inquiry must conform to the
procedure recently reiterated in People v. Beriber,68 to wit:
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their respective counsel on the desire or
manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially the accused with their respective
counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the
proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question[s] to determine whether he had conferred with and completely
explained to the accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and
consequences, together with the significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the
accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he wants to present evidence or
submit a memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any or
in default thereof, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution
evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the trial court shall give the
defense enough time for this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter, hence, the
record must state the language used for this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in
English.
If no waiver of the right to present evidence could be presumed from Crisostomos failure to attend the 22
June 1995 hearing, with more reason that flight could not be logically inferred from Crisostomos absence at
that hearing. Crisostomos absence did not even justify the forfeiture of his bail bond. A bail bond may be
forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court or the Rules of
Court and, despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him before the court on a given date, the accused fails
to appear in person as so required.69 Crisostomo was not specifically required by the Sandiganbayan or the

Rules of Court to appear on the 22 June 1995 hearing. Thus, there was no basis for the Sandiganbayan to order
the confiscation of Crisostomos surety bond and assume that Crisostomo had jumped bail.
Prior to his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing, Crisostomo had regularly attended the hearings of the case.
When it was Crisostomos turn to present his evidence, Atty. Anecio R. Guades ("Atty. Guades"),
Crisostomos former counsel, instructed Crisostomo to wait for the notice of hearing from him and the
Sandiganbayan. Crisostomo did not receive any notice from the Sandiganbayan or from Atty. Guades who
disappeared without informing Crisostomo of his new office address. Upon notification of the promulgation of
the case scheduled on 28 November 2000, Crisostomo voluntarily appeared before the Sandiganbayan.
Crisostomo then terminated the services of Atty. Guades and engaged the services of another counsel. In the
omnibus motion for new trial filed by Crisostomos new counsel, Crisostomo denied that he went into hiding.
If given the chance, Crisostomo would have presented his pay slips and certificates of attendance to prove that
he had been reporting for work at the Police Station in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.70
We could not absolutely fault the Sandiganbayan for not correcting its 22 June 1995 Order. The Sandiganbayan
lost the opportunity to review the order when Crisostomos new counsel changed his legal strategy by
withdrawing the omnibus motion for new trial and instead sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayans
decision for lack of jurisdiction over the case.
However, the withdrawal of the omnibus motion could not erase the Sandiganbayans violation of
Crisostomos right to procedural due process and Atty. Guades gross negligence. Atty. Guades failed to
protect his clients interest when he did not notify Crisostomo of the scheduled hearings and just vanished
without informing Crisostomo and the Sandiganbayan of his new office address. The 22 June 1995 Order was
served on Atty. Guades but he did not even comply with the directive in the Order to explain in writing his
absence at the 21 and 22 June 1995 hearings. Atty. Guades did not file the memorandum in Crisostomos
behalf required by the same Order. Atty. Guades did not also question the violation of Crisostomos right to
procedural due process. The subsequent notices of hearing and promulgation were not served on Atty. Guades
as he could not be located in the building where his office was located.71
Clearly, Atty. Guadess negligence was so gross that it should not prejudice Crisostomos constitutional right
to be heard,72 especially in this case when the imposable penalty may be death. At any rate, the remand of the
case is no longer necessary.73 The prosecutions evidence failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence warranting Crisostomos acquittal.
The Sandiganbayan imposed an indeterminate sentence on Crisostomo. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
("ISL") is not applicable to persons convicted of offenses punished with the death penalty or reclusion
perpetua.74 Since Crisostomo was accused of murder, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, the Sandiganbayan should have imposed the penalty in its medium period since it
found no aggravating circumstance.75 The medium period of the penalty is reclusion perpertua.
Calingayan must be also Acquitted
The Sandiganbayan cited only two circumstances as evidence of Calingayans guilt. The Sandiganbayan held
that Calingayans claim that he was detained on 12 February 1989 is contrary to the master list of detainees
showing that Calingayan was detained on 14 February 1989. 76 Second is Calingayans allegation that "when
Renato Suba was brought outside, he saw that he hanged himself with a thin blanket, which was what the
policemen also told the brother of the victim."77 The Sandiganbayan did not elaborate on this circumstance. The
Sandiganbayan was apparently suspicious of Renatos knowledge of the material that was used to hang
Renato.

Renato could have been killed by two or more inmates or possibly even by all of the inmates. However, since
no conspiracy was proven to exist in this case, the perpetrators of the crime needed to be identified and their
independent acts had to be proven.78 The two circumstances that were held against Calingayan are not sufficient
proof that Calingayan was one of the inmates who killed Renato. Thus, Calingayan must be also acquitted.
Section 11(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]n appeal taken by one or more [of] several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is
favorable and applicable to the latter." In this case, only Crisostomo questioned the jurisdiction and decision of
the Sandiganbayan. However, the evidence against Crisostomo and Calingayan are inextricably linked as their
conviction hinged on the prosecutions unproven theory of conspiracy. Thus, Crisostomos acquittal, which
is favorable and applicable to Calingayan, should benefit Calingayan.79
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 19780 convicting appellant EDGAR
CRISOSTOMO and co-accused MARIO B. CALINGAYAN is hereby REVERSED. EDGAR CRISOSTOMO
and co-accused MARIO B. CALINGAYAN are ACQUITTED of the crime of murder and ordered immediately
released from prison, unless held for another lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to report to this
Court compliance within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADAZA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
SB: Ludwig Adaza, found guilty of falsification of public document penalized undert Art. 172 in relation to
Art. 171, par. 1 of the RPC.
FACTS:
The DPWH of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte awarded to the PTA of Manawan National
High School a contract for the construction of a school building consisting of two classrooms at an
agreed sum of money.
Petitioner, Ludwig Adaza, at that tome was the municipal mayor.
Even after the project has been completed, the PTA failed to receive the last installment payment of
the building.
Upon verificaion with the DPWH, PTA President Felix Mejorada was informed by Hazel Penaranda
that the check for the last installment has been released to the petitioner.
Mejorada thereupon asked from the Office of the Auditor copies of the relevant documents
pertaining to the contract.
Upon perusal of the check, Mejorada noticed that there were two signatures: his forged signature and
that of Aristela Adaza, wife of petitioner.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Penaranda
One afternoon, petitioner approached her and inquired whether the check for the final installment
payment on the contract was already prepared.
Petitioner offered to take the disbursement voucher and have it signed by Mejorada.
When pwtitioner returned the voucher to Penaranda, the check already bore a signature purporting to
be that of Mejorada.
Petitioner thereupon requeested that the corresponding check be given to him in behalf of Mejorada.
In order to exculpate herself, Penaranda asked petitioner to sign the voucher before releasing the
check.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Mejorada filed to the NBI a complaint against petitioner and his wife, and executed a sworn
statement together with Penaranda.
During the pendency of the preliminary investigation, Mejorada executed an Affidavot of Desistance

alleging that his and the PTA's claims had been paid in full by the spouses Adaza and requesting that
the cases against them be dismissed.
The Adaza spouses also filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit stating that Mejorada's claim had been paid
in full; that the proceeds of the check were actually paid to the laborers.
Office of the Ombudsman
issued a resolution finding probable cause to conclued that the crime of falsification of public
document is probably commited by Mayor Adaza
and another falsification of public document was probably committed by both the spouses.
Sandiganbayan
The SB found petitioner guilty in the first case, and acquitted him and his wife in the second case for
insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sadiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
HELD:
Yes
The offender under Article 172 must be a private individual or maybe a public officer, employee or
notary public who does not "take advantage of his official position."
Under Article 171, an essential element of the crime is that the act of falsification must be committed
by a public officer, employee or notary who "takes advantage of his official position."

 It is thus apparent that for purposes of acquisition of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan, the
requirement imposed by R.A. 8249 that the offense be "committed in relation" to the offender's
office is entirely distinct from the concept of "taking advantage of one's position" as provided under
Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
R.A. 8249 mandates that for as long as the offender's public office is intimately connected with the
offense charged or is used to facilitate the commission of said offense and the same is properly
alleged in the information, the Sandiganbayan acquires jurisdiction.
"taking advantage of one's position" becomes relevant only in the present case for the purpose of
determining whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, but for purposes of determining whether
petitioner, if he is held to be liable at all, would be legally responsible under Article 171 or Article
172.
While the Sandiganbayan is declared bereft of jurisdiction over the criminal case filed against
petitioner, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate charge against him before the
proper court.
NOTE:
The offender under Art. 172, must be a private individyal or maybe a public officer, employee, or
notary public who does not take advantage of his official position.
Under Art. 171, an essential element of the crime is that the act of falsification must be committed by
a public officer, employee or notary who takes advantage of his official position.
The offender takes advantage of his official position in falsifiying a document when
1. he had the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the
document
2. he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.