I.

Introduction to Civil Law

II. Effect and Application of Laws
A. When do laws take effect
1. NCC 1-18

Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights,
it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five
days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours;
and nights from sunset to sunrise.

New Civil Code.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be

computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the

Philippines." (n)
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication. (1a)
Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith. (2)
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. (3)
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. (4a)
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (5a)
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines. (n)
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail. (n)
Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or
public policy shall not be countenanced. (n)
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the
rules of evidence. (n)

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the

last day included. (7a)
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine
territory, subject to the principles of public international law
and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found. (10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic
or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have, for their object, public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of
Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied
by the provisions of this Code. (16a)

2. Revised Administrative Code

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
unless it is otherwise provided.

Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect

unless the contrary is expressly provided.
Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance
promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall
control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of
ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be
consulted.
Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law
which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so
provided.
Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which
impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law
shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides
otherwise.
Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith.
Sec. 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official
Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature;
all executive and administrative issuances of general
application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank,
as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to
be so published; such documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by law; and such
documents or classes of documents as the President shall
determine from time to time to have general application or
which he may authorize so to be published.
The publication of any law, resolution or other official
documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
evidence of its authority.

3. Executive Order 200

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless
it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as
the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

Pesigan v Angeles
Facts: Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao
dealers transported on April 2. 1982, twenty-six (26) carabaos &
a calf from Camarines Norte with Batangas as its destination.

They were provided with health certificates from the provincial

veterinarian and three (3) other permits attesting that the cattle
was not part of lose, stolen or questionable animals.
Despite this, the said cattle was confiscated by respondents
Zenarosa and Miranda, who were respectively the police
station commander and provincial veterianarian of Basud,
Camarines Norte. The confiscation was on the basis of said EO
626-A which was dated October 25, 1980 but was published in
theOfficial Gazette on June 14, 1982.
Executive Order 626-A provides, "that henceforth, no carabao,
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of
this Executive Order as amended shall be subject
to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be
distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos".
The Pesigans filed an action for replevin against herein
respondents for the recovery of the subject cattle but this
could not be executed by the sheriff. Subsequently, the judge
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. Hence, the
petitioners filed an appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A dated
October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture
by the government of cattle transported from one province to
another, can be enforced even before its actual publication in
the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982
HELD: NO
The Supreme Court held that EO 626-A is a penal regulation
published more than two months after the confiscation of the
cattle or in June 14, 1982. Hence, it became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil
Code. It should therefore not be enforced against the
petitioners.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. (People v Que Po). Justice and
fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that
provision by means of publication in the Gazette before
violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
Note: The word "laws" in Article 2 of the NCC also includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.

People v Veridiano
Facts: On 2nd week of May in 1979, private respondent Benito
Go Bio Jr. issued a check amounting to P200,000 to one
Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and
despite repreated demands, the respondent failed to make
the necessary payment hence the filing of charges against him
for violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Check law.
Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information
did not charge an offense on ground that BP 22 has not yet
taken effect when the offense was committed on May 1979.
Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution

opposed the motion and contended that the date of the

dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the
commission of the offense, hence BP 22 is applicable.
The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed
the criminal action. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends
that BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4,
1979, and hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on
April 24, 1979. PR contends however that said publication was
only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check
was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could
not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for
circulation at the time.
Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was
committed
HELD: NO. It is proved that the penal statute in question was
made public or circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its
printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary
so that the public can be apprised of the contents and or
penalties of a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a
statute had not been published before its violation, then in the
eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence,
the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
When the alleged offense was committed there was still no law
penalizing it.
The term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary
accepted meaning -- or to make known to the people in
general. Moreover, if BP 22 intended to make the printed date
of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in the
determination of its the effectivity, it could have provided a
special effectivity provision.

Tanada v Tuvera
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and
administrative
orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved
for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have
no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is
required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object
of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a

law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a

constructive
one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall
be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given
substance
and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The
Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and
effect.

MRCA v CA
The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a complaint against private
respondents spouses (who were defendants in said civil case).
Said case was dismissed by the trial court due to the nonpayment of proper filing fees when petitioner failed to include
in the complaint the amount of moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be
recovered.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said ruling, hence the
petitioner comes to SC by petition for review. Petitioner
contends that the Manchester ruling does not apply to the
case since said court decision was not published in the Official
Gazette. It should be noted that petitioner filed said complaint
ten months after the promulgation of the Manchester ruling.
Issue: w/n court rulings need to be published in the Official
Gazette order to be effective
HELD: NO.
Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the
effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule or
procedure. It is a well-established doctrine that the procedure
of the court may be changed at any time and become effective
at once so long as it does not affect or change vested rights.
(Aguillon v Dir. of Lands)
As such, the court granted the petition and held that the
Manchester ruling should apply to the case of the petitioner
though it was modified by the Sun Insurance case where the
court allowed the payment of docket fees within a reasonable
period but not beyond the reglamentary period. Petitioner was
allowed to amend the complaint and specify therein the
amount of damages it seeks from defendant and pay the
proper filing fees

Yaokasin v Commissioner
Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined
sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being
unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the
custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the
District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo

to the petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on

June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue of Customs
Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the
Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides
that in protest and seizure cases where the decision is adverse
to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the
power of automatic review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan
and CMO 20-87 contending that these were not published in
the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was
however published in the Official Gazette.
Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be
published in the OG to take effect
NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO
20-87 which is an administrative order of the Commissioner of
Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors.
Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly
with Section 12 of the Plan, is addressed only to particular
persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence
no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, It need
not be published, on the assumption that it has been
circularized to all concerned.
Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration
of what shall be published in the Official Gazette. It provides
that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of
Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations
shall be published except when these have no general
applicability.

Commissioner of Customs v Hypermix Feeds

November 7 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued
CMO 27-2003 (Customs Memorandum Order). Under the
memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat is classified according
to: 1. Importer or consignee, 2. Country of origin, and 3. Port of
discharge. Depending on these factors wheat would be
classified as either as food grade or food feed. The
corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for food
feed grade 7%. A month after the issuance of CMO 27-200
respondent filed a petition for declaratory for Relief with the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City.
Respondent contented that CMO 27-2003 was issued without
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with University of the Philippines Law Canter.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily
adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of
prior assessment and examination, despite having imported
food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon
the arrival of the shipment, forcing to pay 133%. Respondent
also claimed that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution was violated and asserted that the retroactive
application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: 1. The
RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

case, 2. an action for declaratory relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 who

may file petition) was improper, 3. CMO 27-2003 was internal
administrative rule not legislative in nature, and 4. The claims
of respondent were speculative and premature, because the
Bureau of Customs had yet to examine respondents products.
RTC held that a petition for declaratory relief was proper
remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the
requirements for the Revised Administrative Code? Whether or
not the content of the CMO 27-2003 met the requirement of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
RULLING: No, they did not. The petitioners violated
respondents right to due process in the issuance of CMO 272003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the
Administrative Code which are:
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectively of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that
date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against
any party of persons.
Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise
required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity to submit
their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the
fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published
in a newspaper of general circulation at least 2 weeks
before the first hearing thereon.(3) In case of
opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
No. CMO 27-2003 did not meet these requirements. For a
classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that 1. it rests
on substantial distinctions; 2. it is germane to the purpose of
the law; 3. it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4. it
applies equally to all members of the same class. Petitioners
violated respondents right to equal protection of laws when
they provided for unreasonable classification in the application
of the regulation. Petitioner Commissioner of Customs went
beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation
limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and
assess imported articles.

Nagkakaisang Maralita v Military Shrine Services

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President
Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities
of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City
for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known
as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres
Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio). On 28 May 1967, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation
No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a

certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national

shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent
Military Shrine Services Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423
and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of
Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten
addendum, which reads:"P.S. This includes Western
Bicutan(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986,
without the above-quoted addendum. Years later, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 which
substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published,
but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said
lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and
730. Through the years, informal settlers increased and
occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of
the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General
Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the
demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio. On 27 August
1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio
Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission
on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). Thus, on 1
September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the
Petition and declaring the portions of land in question
alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina
Aguilar-General dissenting. The COSLAP ruled that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral
part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling.
The intention of the President could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others. Herein respondent MSSPVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by
the COSLAP. MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of
Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions. The
Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision
granting MSS-PVAOs Petition, Both NMSMI and WBLOAI
appealed the said Decision.
ISSUE:Whether or not the handwritten addendum
was
considered published also at the time the Proclamation was
published.
HELD: No. Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3
and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were
anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former
President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable
public land when he made a notation just below the printed

version of Proclamation No. 2476. However, it is undisputed

that the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as
reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether
the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force
and effect of law. Under Art 2, the requirement of publication
is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself
has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after
fifteen days following the completion of the laws publication
in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement
of publication may be dispensed with.
The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled
in the landmark case Taada v. Hon. Tuvera. Court cannot rely
on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No.
2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had
any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under Section 24,
Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication
of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus,
whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western
Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words appearing in the law. This
Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when,
evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon.
Trajano, we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code,
'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can
create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for
enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole
function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities
becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of
legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not
judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would
amend the law to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.
B. Ignorance of the Law
Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith. (2)

Kasilag v Rodriguez
Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to
recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its
improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana
Ambrosio
(EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure
the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In
clause V, the parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2

yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event the mortgage

would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that
the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence
of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in
clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of
the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the
CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and
that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of
RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to
redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs,
she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in
favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of
the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was
stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under
clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the
contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and
the
mortgage
would
subsist
in
all
its
force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to
pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well
as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason,
she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land
on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on
the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would
benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements
thereon.
HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the
fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the
contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec.
the such contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited
by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that
petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land bec. he
knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale,
and further, that the latter could not sell the land bec. it is
prohibited
by
Sec.
116
of
Act
2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows
that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition,
by
w/c
it
is
invalidated.
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be
deemed a possessor in GF bec. he was unaware of any flaw in
his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is
invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule.
From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition
contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is w/n
GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the
basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is
based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner
is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In
accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded
on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he

did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession

and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of
antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec.
116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions
of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF.
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to
have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying
the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner
to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants
are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the
court
of
origin,
upon
hearing
the
parties.
C. Retroactivity
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. (3)
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. (4a)

Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid
down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall
have no retroactive effect.
For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are
not specified elsewhere in this Code, the following articles
shall be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions).
Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall
govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or
events which took place under their regime, even though this
Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not
recognize them. But if a right should be declared for the first
time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the
act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or
may have occurred under prior legislation, provided said new
right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right,
of the same origin. (Rule 1)
Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or
omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the
rights of others. (n)
Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts
with a condition or period, which were executed or entered
into before the effectivity of this Code, even though the
condition or period may still be pending at the time this body
of laws goes into effect. (n)
Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws,
if they are valid in accordance therewith, shall continue to be
fully operative as provided in the same, with the limitations
established in these rules. But the revocation or modification
of these acts and contracts after the beginning of the

effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this

new body of laws. (Rule 2a)

amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can every

compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code.
(Rule 12a)

Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction

or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which
were not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to
those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed
the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by
this Code.

Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal

fiction referred to in article 89 and illegitimate children
mentioned in Article 287, shall also be acquired by children
born before the effectivity of this Code. (n)

If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less

severe sanction shall be applied.

Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property

arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those
things which came into the creditor's possession before said
date. (n)

If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced

before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the
same subsists or is maintained or repeated after this body of
laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed
in this Code shall be applied, even though the previous laws
may not have provided any sanction or penalty therefor. (Rule
3a)
Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were
not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in
full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their
exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be
regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the
exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under
the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect,
and the procedure was different from that established in this
new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which
method or course to pursue. (Rule 4)
Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts
and contracts is governed by this Code, even if her marriage
was celebrated under the former laws. (n)
Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take
place according to this Code, even if the child was born before
the effectivity of this body of laws. (n)
Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article 302 shall also be
applicable to any support, pension or gratuity already existing
or granted before this Code becomes effective. (n)
Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by
the courts before this Code goes into effect, shall continue to
act as such, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 320. (n)
Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with
or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be
governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws,
and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with
or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of
this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance
with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the
testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may
be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments,
legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their

Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but
also retroactive effect:
(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in
a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants;
(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of
legal separation and annulment of marriage;
(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of
illegitimate filiation;
(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of
the testator himself;
(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of
instruments;
(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;
(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote
compromise. (n)
Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to
future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code
becomes effective:
(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the
accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries. (n)
Art. 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are
pending at the time this Code goes into effect shall be
suspended, under such terms as the court may determine, in
order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of
legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if
possible, a reconciliation. (n)
Art. 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional
provisions are based shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not
specifically regulated by them. (Rule 13a)

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall

have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty
of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

Puzon v Abellera
The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon
her death by Domondon) was the owner of the subject 2hectare parcel of land situated in Baguio City, a land which was
previously part of the public domain but was titled pursuant to
RA 931. In another case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme
Court declared that all titles issued under RA 931 are null and
void since the said Act was applicable only to places covered
by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio which
was covered by a townsite reservation.
This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a law,
P.D. 1271 with the title "An act nullifying decrees of
registration and certificates of title covering lands within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant to RA 931 which took
effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered as valid
certain titles of lands that are alienable and disposable under
certain conditions and for other purposes. Hence, the lot in
question was reverted to the public domain.
The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the nonpayment of taxes. Petitioner took interest and subsequently
won the bid. A year after, a certificate of sale was issued. In this
connection, the petitioner filed a case to consolidate his
ownership of the lots. Meanwhile, Domondon found out about
the auction sale and filed an opposition to the petition for
consolidation filed by petitioner. The trial court ruled that said
auction sale is null and void and that the assessments were
illegally made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence this petition with petitioner contending that the tax
assessments were valid and that PD 1271 has a curative effect.
Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively
YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive
application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule
allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the
exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such
titles valid from the time they were issued. This implies that the
intent of the law is to recognize the effects of certain acts of
ownership done in good faith by persons with Torrens titles
issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated, honestly
believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such
would be possible only by validating all the said titles issued
before 31 July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue.
However, the validity of these titles would not become
operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271 are
met.

Acosta v Plan

Petitioners filed
an accion
publiciana against private
respondent Magday at the CFI of Isabela. Believing that as
pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on
appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire
records of the case to CA (as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court).
On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for
failure to file a record on appeal, hence this petition. Under the
Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was indeed
required to be filed by a pauper appellant although it did not
have to be printed.
Issue: Whether or not a timely submission of a record on appeal
is required for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant
NO.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it
could be decided, a record on appeal is no longer required for
the perfection of an appeal. This law was given retroactive
effect.
As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature,
those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of
petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.'

BPI v IAC
Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a
dollar savings account and a peso current account. An
application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgillo
Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain
Leovigilda Dizon. In the application, Garcia indicated that the
amount was to be charged to the dollar savings account of the
Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the
purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable
to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal
from his account, he demanded an explanation from the bank.
In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the
withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of
Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers
check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation
payable to Ernesto.
Issue:
Whether
the contract between
respondent bank is a deposit?

petitioner

and

Held: The document which embodies the contract states

that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping.
The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of
the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars
and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack
demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over
five months later.

The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article

1962,
New
Civil
Code,
which
reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person
receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of
safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping
of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the
contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
But because the subject of the contract here is a foreign
exchange, it is covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20 which
requires that, All receipts of foreign exchange by any resident
person, firm, company or corporation shall be sold to
authorized agents of the Central Bank by the recipients within
one business day following the receipt of such foreign
exchange.

Issue:

Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given

retroactive effect.

Ruling:

Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive

effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception
concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a
remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested
rights but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive application
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises
from procedural law.
D. Waiver of Rights

Since the document and the subsequent acts of the parties

show that they intended the bank to safekeep the foreign
exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his
complaint that he is a Philippine resident, the parties did not
intend to sell the US dollars to the Central Bank within one
business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of
depositum would never have been entered into at all.
In other words, the transaction between Zshornack and the
bank was void having been executed against the provisions of
a mandatory law (CB Circ No. 20). Being in pari delicto, the law
cannot afford either of them remedy.

Spouses Dacudao v Gonzales

The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso
Delos Angeles and his associates after the petitioners were
defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary
issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in
the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso
Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ
in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order
which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that
cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the
Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not
be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because
of such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was
forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in
Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the
respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which
according to the violated their right to due process, right to
equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of
the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were
unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already
filed and pending at the Prosecutors Office of Cagayan De
Oro City. They contended that the assailed issuances should
cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not
those already being investigated. They maintained that DO
182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing
laws with retroactive effect.

Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to

law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced;
nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be
compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.
E. Repeal of Laws

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their

violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (5a)
Art. XVIII, Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

Guingona v Carague
Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget
which was authorized by PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81,
PD 1177 (Sec 31), and PD 1967 be declared unconstitutional,
and (2) restrain the disbursement for debt service under the
1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. While respondents
contend that the petition involves a political question
(repeal/amendment of said laws)
Issue: Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed
by the 1987 Constitution

NO.
(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by
implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the
principle that construction of the Constitution and law is
generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless
it is so clearly stated.
(2) The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are
complete in all their essential terms and conditions and
sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount
needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable
the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest,
taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits
or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall
become due without the need to enact a separate law
appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose
of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain
the credit standing of the country.

shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to

their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary
laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
ROC, Rule 129.
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionaryA court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Section 3. Judicial notice, when necessaryDuring the trial,
the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case.

F. Duty to Render Judgment

Martinez v Van Buskirk

CC, Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
(6)
RPC, Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and
in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.
G. Applicability of Custom

Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or

public policy shall not be countenanced. (n)
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the
rules of evidence. (n)
Art. XII, SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and programs,

On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez,

was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery
wagon owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of
fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from the
opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the
sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However,
instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into
the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and
overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiffs head.
The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good
servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He
also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage
at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendants
employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end
of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage
to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and
made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run.
The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown
upon the ground.
From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was
guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of
Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse
such decision.
Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle
and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is
liable for the negligence of such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in

leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in
this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a
long time, have not been destructive and which are approved
by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot
be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by the society is
that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not
easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to
an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the
cochero negligent because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of
merchants during that time to deliver products through horsedrawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to
leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during
the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and
generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the
judgment is therefore reversed.
H. Legal Periods

CC, Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or
nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be
computed by the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
last day included. (7a)
ROC, Rule 22 (28). Section 1. How to compute timeIn
computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act or event from which the designated period of
time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of
performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in
the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day.
Section 2. Effect of interruptionShould an act be done which
effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable
period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after
notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.
The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be
excluded from the computation of time.
RAC, Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood
to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be
computed according to the number of days the specific month

contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night,"

from sunset to sunrise.

Armigos v CA
The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint
against the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos
Davao del Sur, for the collection of damages and attorney's
fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private
respondent.
A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8
June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a
notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June
1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection
of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the
payment of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the
case was elevated to the CFI for the consideration of the
appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was
filed beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he
dismissed the appeal.
Petitioners contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he
received a copy of the decision of the municipal court, to 24
June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days
had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to
law. The petitioner contended that the computation of the
period to appeal should commence on the hour he received
copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period
comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to
4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00
o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June
1977.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner's contention is correct
NO. The Court considered the day as synonymous with the
date. Consequently, the 5th day shall be the 15 days after the
appeal regardless of the time when it was submitted.
The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and
the last day included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4
of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless
otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is
required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding
the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or
a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28
of the Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed
by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any other
applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after
which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be
included. The last day of the period so computed is to be
included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event
the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither
a Sunday or a legal holiday."
Human memory is frail - Human memory on dates or days is
frail and unless the day is an extraordinary one for a person,

there is no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more

for the exact hour when a pleading, order or decision is
received by a party? The period laid down by the law is not
only mandatory but jurisdictional.

Namarco v Teczon
December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a
complaint, docketed as civil case no. 6370 1on the same court,
as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the
same defendant from 10 years ago. Defendant Miguel Tecson
moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of
action. The court, then, issued an order of dismissal with
regards the article 13 of the civil code. However, National
Marketing Corporation appealed to the court of appeals from
such order. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is a leap
year, they insisted that a year means a calendar year and a leap
year would still be counted as 1 year even if it consists of 366
days. The case reached its conclusion with the appellants
theory with regards to the article 13 of the civil code.
Issues: Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of
the civil code is limited to 365 days.
Ruling: The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code
is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if
public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in
the revised administrative code, this may be done through
legislative process and not by judicial decree.
I. Binding Effect

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the

status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)

Barreto-Gonzales v Gonzales
The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines,
married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of
1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived
together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together.
After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow
Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her childrens support of
P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly to be increased in cases of
necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be
put in her name.
Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant),
went to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an
absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November
28, 1927. On that same date he went through the forms of
marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3 children
with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the
amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of
Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments
fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to

the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto

brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm &
ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada &
invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced,
and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what
would have been due to their children as their legal portion
from respective estates had their parents died intestate on
November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage
existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved &
Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel
fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3
minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as
intervenors in the case. After the hearing, the CFI-Manila
granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors,
butreduced the attorneys fees to P3000 instead & also
granted the costs of the action against the defendant, Hence,
this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in
their decision.
ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except
it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of
the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce?
RULING: NO. Securing the jurisdiction of the courts to
recognize & approve the divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot
be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on
the question of divorce.
Articles 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the
Philippines does not allow such to be done the effect of
foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot
compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit
the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be
affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner
which out government believes is contrary to public order &
good morals.
Article 9 thereof reads as follows: The laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they
reside in a foreign country.
And article 11 the last part of which reads:. . . the prohibitive
laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and
those intended to promote public order and good morals,
shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered
into a foreign country.

Tenchavez v Escano
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent
Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24,
1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and exarmy officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and
was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita
Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had
an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.

Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/

marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicentas father, he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued living with her
parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Subsequently, Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that
she was single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor
which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial
Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the
annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta
married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents
whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her
husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid
and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
RULING: NO. Divorce, although successfully obtained in
another country, cannot be applied in the Philippines since it is
contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established, in
private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be
enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. At the
time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband,
was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine
law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC
then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only
provides for legal separation. For Phil. courts to recognize
foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent
violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view
of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would
give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens to the detriment of those members of our society
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorce outside the Philippines. Therefore, a
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction.

Van Dorn v Romillo

After a divorce was granted by a United States court between
petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipina and her American
husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here in the
Philippines alleging that the her business was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce is valid
YES. There can be no question as to the validity of the Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the US. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our

concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may

obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. He has no standing to sue as
husband of the petitioner over their conjugal assets. He is
estopped by his own representation before his own country's
court from asserting that right to exercise control over their
conjugal assets.

Pilapil v Ibay-Somera
Petitioner, Filipina Imelda Pilapil and respondent, German
Erich Geiling got married in Germany and lived in Manila. After
3 years of discordant cohabitation, respondent filed for
divorce in Germany, while petitioner filed for legal separation
in the Philippines. After 5 months after the issuance of the
divorce decree by the Germany court, respondent filed 2 cases
of adultery against petitioner, alleging that she had affairs with
different men during the subsistence of their marriage.
Petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari and prohibition,
assailing the jurisdiction the lower court to try and decide the
criminal cases because adultery is a private offense that cannot
be prosecuted de officio, since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse, having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to
his filing the criminal complaint.
ISSUE: W/N the divorce decree by the Germany court may be
recognized in the Philippines, thereby depriving respondent of
his legal standing to file the 2 criminal cases
RULING: YES. The fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned, in view of the nationality
principle. Under this principle, respondent, being no longer
the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
J. Human Relations

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

People v Ritter
On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez
and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter
masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he
inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next
morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told
Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina.
Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has
already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987,
Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario
was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital.
An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using
forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and
covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the
attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her
vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with
homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was
only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter happened. And
that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As
evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning.
A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the
vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that
which caused her death. As evidence, Rosario herself said to
Jessie the following day that the object has been removed
already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her
vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian. Ritter was also
acquitted for the criminal case of rape with homicide.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary
damages he must award to the victims heirs. It does not
necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Ritter was deported.

Ardiente v Spouses Pastorfide

Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente
where the latter sold, conveyed, and transferred all their rights
and interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to the former. It
has been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in
the account of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's
water supply was disconnected without notice. She
complained to the Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD)
and she found out that the account has become delinquent.
She paid the three months due and wrote a letter through her
counsel to the COWD to explain why her water supply was cut
without notice.
The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied
that it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the disconnection of
the water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against
Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC ruled
in favor of Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants
committed abuse of their rights. The ruling was upheld by the
CA on appeal with modification on the award of the amount
for damages. Hence this petition before the SC.

ISSUE: Are the defendants liable for damages?

RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of
rights under Section 19 of the Civil Code was violated. It
provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of illegality (Globe
Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when it is exercised in a
manner that does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and the same causes damage to another. The
person exercising an abuse of right is thus liable for damages
caused to another. The herein petitioner is liable for damages
by ordering the cutting of the water supply of the respondent
without giving notice about such intention. The COWD and
Gonzalez are likewise liable for damages by disconnecting the
water supply without prior notice and for their subsequent
neglect of reconnecting the water supply even when the
respondent already paid the delinquent account.
III. Civil Personality
A. Persons and Personality
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost
only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do
acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a
deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or
limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being
a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage,
absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of
these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes,
the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not
limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified
for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)

B. Commencement and Termination of Personality

1. Natural Persons

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child

shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to
it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article. (29a)

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is

alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's
womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less
than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within
twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal
womb. (30a)

Art II, Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.

PD 603, Art. 5. The civil personality of the child shall commence

from the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to
him, subject to the requirements of Art. 41 of the CC.

FC, Art 154. Children conceived or born during the marriage of

the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the
wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both
are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate
of the child.

Art. 256. Intentional abortion. Any person who shall

intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any
violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he
shall act without the consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the woman shall have consented.
Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be
imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by
violence, but unintentionally.
Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself of by her
parents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman who

shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that any

other person should do so.
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her
dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant
woman or either of them, and they act with the consent of said
woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the
offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and
dispensing of abortives. The penalties provided in Article
256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively,
upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in
causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a
physician, shall dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Roe v Wade
Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit
challenging the constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws.
These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion
except on medical advice to save the life of the mother.
Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who
faced criminal prosecution for violating the state abortion laws;
and the Does, a married couple with no children, who sought
an injunction against enforcement of the laws on the grounds
that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was county
District Attorney Wade (D).
A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and
held that Roe and Hallford had standing to sue and presented
justiciable controversies, and that declaratory relief was
warranted. The court also ruled however that injunctive relief
was not warranted and that the Does complaint was not
justiciable.
Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court
held that the Texas abortion statutes were void as vague and
for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however,
because the district court ruled that injunctive relief against
enforcement of the laws was not warranted.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States and Wade cross-appealed the district courts
judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford.
Issues
1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except
those required on medical advice to save the life of the
mother, violate the Constitution of the United States?
2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protect
the right to privacy, including the right to obtain an
abortion?
3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact
laws prohibiting abortion?

4.

5.

Did the fact that Roes pregnancy had already terminated

naturally before this case was decided by the Supreme
Court render her lawsuit moot?
Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?

Holding and Rule (Blackmun)

1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from
criminality only life-saving procedures on the mothers
behalf, and that do not take into consideration the stage
of pregnancy and other interests, are unconstitutional for
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to
privacy, including a womans right to terminate her
pregnancy, against state action.
3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman
the right to terminate her pregnancy, it has legitimate
interests in protecting both the pregnant womans health
and the potentiality of human life at various stages of
pregnancy.
4. No. The natural termination of Roes pregnancy did not
render her suit moot.
5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive
relief.
The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first
trimester, the decision must be left to the judgment of the
pregnant womans doctor. In regard to second trimester
pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the
mothers health by regulating abortion procedures related to
the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester
pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the
potentiality of human life by regulating or even prohibiting
abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother.
The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy,
which is capable of repetition, yet evading review, is an
exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must
exist at each stage of judicial review, and not merely when the
action is initiated.
The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. 1253 does not authorize a
party seeking only declaratory relief to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court, review is not foreclosed when the case is
brought on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and
the arguments on the issues of both injunctive and declaratory
relief are necessarily identical.
The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on
contingencies which might or might not occur and was
therefore too speculative to present an actual case or
controversy. It was unnecessary for the Court to decide
Hallfords case for injunctive relief because once the Court
found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were
prohibited from enforcing them.

Geluz v CA
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to
know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her
aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950
before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her

aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it

aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on
October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was
employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21,
1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by
her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz
clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was
in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his
consent on the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from the
physician who caused the same.
HELD: The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award
fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases
of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which
trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an
award of moral damages evidently because Oscars
indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates
he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case
against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal
profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he
but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that
hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued
Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that
serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was
clearly exaggerated.

Quimiging v Icao
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the
defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married,
he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times under force and intimidation and without her
consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs
supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen
stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per
month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the
ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a
baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was
allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of
action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
HELD: Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as
yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child
may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons
who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring

that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate
children does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a
married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus,
she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

De Jesus v Syquia
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a
cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in
law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years
of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila
was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber
shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a
baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a
constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a
rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his
name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the
country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding
her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant
ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital
arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a
House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together
for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married
with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the
defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the
ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead
of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other
letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy
proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had
been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural
child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as
a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission
of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the
admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere
requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the
continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the
period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's
resolution to admit the status.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in
refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed

breach of promise to marry since action on this has no

standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which
a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found
no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of
maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50
pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the
trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.

Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Limjoco v Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death,
applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and
maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing
said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner
claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be
extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial
judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a
dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person
for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of
those surviving rights involved the pending application for
public convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the
prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service
Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended,
within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged
and decreed.

Dumlao v Quality Plastics

Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28,
1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio,
Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum
of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958
before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is
hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to
pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an

area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold
by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which
he has given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13,
1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Orias death. The
summons and copies of complaint was personally served on
June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter
acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his codefendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao
and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued
Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution
against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Orias testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against
his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.

HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873

just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was
filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed
Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they
acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the
judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower courts
judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction
over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more
civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to
be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to
annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are
entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the corporation.

Eugenio v Velez
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers
death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus
on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner,
Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but
petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the
sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to
habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died
of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios
residence. The court ordered that the body should be
delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed
the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the
deceased.
HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters
pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an
unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty
of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated
under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not
recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman
not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and
wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled
in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner
has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal
impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana.

Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons

who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that
they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission
of rights from one to the other.

Rule 131.
(jj)
That except for purposes of succession, when two
persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are
no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from
the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
1.
If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older
is deemed to have survived;
2.
If both were above the age sixty, the younger is
deemed to have survived;
3.
If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the
former is deemed to have survived;
4.
If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be
different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be
the same, the older;

5.
If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other
between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk)
That if there is a doubt, as between two or more
persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the
other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall
be considered to have died at the same time. (5a)

Joaquin v Navarro
During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945,
the following sought refuge on the ground floor of German
Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67);
daughter Pilar (32-33); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son
Joaquin Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The
building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting the
daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave the building. His wife
didnt want to leave so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.s wife
and neighbor Francisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit
and fell on the ground and rest lay flat on the ground to avoid
bullets. German Club collapsed trapping many people
presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and
Francisco sought refuge in an air aid shelter where they hid for
3 days. On February 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa
Academy, they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit
and killed. The trial court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived
her son while CA ruled that son outlived his mother.
ISSUE: W/N the son/mother died first before the other.
[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of
succession. If mother died first, respondent Antonio, son of Jr.
by his first marriage, would inherit]

HELD: Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before

his mother did. This presumption was based on speculations,
not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence on which civil cases are to be decided, this inference
should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be direct, indirect,
circumstantial or inferential.
2. Juridical Persons
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as
soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (35a)

Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the

preceding article are governed by the laws creating or
recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general
application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose
are governed by the provisions of this Code concerning
partnerships. (36 and 37a)
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of
all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal
actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their
organization. (38a)
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and
other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2
of Article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed
of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing
has been specified on this point, the property and other assets
shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the
region, province, city or municipality which during the
existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from
the same.

Smith Bell v Natividad

Smith Bell. is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippine but a majority of its stockholders are
British subjects. When Simith Bell applied for a certificate of
Philippine registry of the vessel owned by it, the Collector
refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the
stockholders of Smith Bell were not citizens either of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands.
Issue: Whether the Government can deny the registry of a
vessel to corporations having alien stockholders
Ruling: Yes the Government can deny the registry of a vessel to
corporations having alien stockholders since it is within the
purview of the police power. . However, the SC acknowledge
that a corporation having alien stockholders, is still entitled to
the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal
protection of the laws clause of the constitution

Barlin v Ramirez
The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish
priest, took possession of the church on 7/5/01. He
administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until
11/14/02. His successor having been then appointed, the latter
made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the
church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments,
books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def.,
by a written document of that date, refused to make such
delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/
the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/
the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and
to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.

In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his
amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the
owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books,
money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it
be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render
an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was
retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos
Camarines
ruled
in
favor
of
the
pltff.
HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman
Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine
Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution
w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other
personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian
eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still
worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious
consideration.
IV. Restrictions on Capacity
A. General Rule: presumption of capacity

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified

for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.
1. Minority
Art. V, Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or otherwise substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Art. V, Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they
propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or otherwise substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Standard Oil Co.v Arenas

Standard Oil sued 5 debtors for payment, including appellant
Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. CFI Manila
ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs. While the judgment was in the course of execution,
Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente, appealed and alleged that her
husband was declared insane.
ISSUE: W/N suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily
warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity
to act
HELD: Villanueva possess the capacity to act. No evidence that
a person suffering from a monomania of wealth is really insane
and incapable of binding himself in a contract. Capacity to act
must be presumed to attach to every person who has not been
previously declared to be incapable, and to continue until the
contrary is proven
B. Restrictions on capacity to act
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a
deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or
limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being
a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage,
absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of
these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes,
the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not
limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

FC, Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or

upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Art.
37 and 38, may contract marriage.

Mercado v Espiritu
April 9, 1913, Josefa Mercado through counsel brought
suit (in the CFI of Bulacan) against Luis Espiritu, but the
respondent died thereafter. Domingo and Josefa allege that
they and their sister were the children and sole heirs of
Margarita Espiritu (sister of deceased Luis Espiritu), who left as
her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares situated
in Barrio Panducot, Calumpit, Bulacan.
Plaintiffs allege that their uncle Luis Espiritu by cajolery
succeeded in getting them to sign a deed of sale of the land
left by their mother for the sum of P400, which was divided
among the plaintiffs and their sisters. The land was assessed to
be valued at P3,795. They claim that of the land belongs to
Margarita Espiritu (mother), belongs to the plaintiffs, and
belong to their sisters.
Defendant Jose as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Luis, denied the allegations of the plaintiffs and
alleged that the land had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed
rice, that Margarita, with due authorization of her husband sold
the land for the sum of P2000, a portion of said land, and
subsequently sold the remainder of said land under pacto de
retro at the price of P375. Further, the plaintiffs, alleging
themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters the
Notarial Instrument ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of
the land, that they sold absolutely and perpetually to Luis
Espiritu in consideration for P400 (in addition to the amount
already paid for the rest of the property).
Defendant filed a cross complaint stating that plaintiffs
complaint was unfounded and malicious, and demanding
damages for P1000. Plaintiffs denied the cross complaint and

alleged the special defense of minority, claiming that the

period for annulment had yet to elapse.
issue
Whether or not the plaintiffs have a right to recover the land.
NO
ratio
The ownership over the land has been conveyed to the
purchaser Luis by means of a singular title of purchase and
sale. The evidence sufficiently shows that the execution of
Exhibit 3 (Notarial Instrument ratifying the sale), definitely
transferred ownership of said parcel to Luis Espiritu. The
signatures in the documents presented were found to be
authenticated.
The minority of the parties signing Exhibit 3 was not a fatal
defect in the contract. There was no evidence presented to
establish the minority of the plaintiffs Domingo (19) and Josefa
(18) at the time of the execution of the document. However,
even without such doubts, it is clear that they stated that they
were of legal age at the time they executed and signed the
notarial deed.
The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when
in fact they are not, will not be permitted to excuse themselves
from the obligations contracted by them, or to have them
annulled in pursuance of the provisions of law. Further, it has
not been shown that the minors have suffered actual losses as
a result of the execution of said document. Neither has it been
proven that the transaction has given occasion for
damage/prejudice. The total price paid for the land,
amounting to P3,000 is sufficient compensation for the
property.

Young v Tecson
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

[Feb. 19, 1935] Macondray & Co., Inc. (MCI) sold to

Jose TECSON (who is a minor) a De Soto Airflow
Coupe. An initial payment of PHP500 was made, the
balance was to be paid by installments.
Carlos YOUNG drew a check in the name of TECSON
for the sum of PHP2,250 (the unpaid balance). MCI
caused TECSON to indorse the check.
a. To secure payment, MCI caused TECSON to
execute a promissory note for PHP2,250 and
a chattel mortgage on the car in favor of
YOUNG (doing business as Tunasan
Estates).
Two months later, the car was damaged due to an
accident.
TECSON failed to pay the balance of the note and
the interest stipulated.
YOUNG et al. filed a complaint. TECSON pleaded
nullity of the contract on the ground that he was a
minor at the time the contract was entered into.
a. YOUNG et al. contend that TECSON, having
held himself out to be of age cannot now be
allowed to avoid the consequences of his
misrepresentation.

6.

The CFI dismissed the complaint.

issue
W/N the contract between MCI and TECSON is void YES, it
is. Judgment AFFIRMED.
ratio

For a valid contract, consent of the parties is required.

Persons under age cannot give consent.
While it is true that Art. 1263 of the (old) Civil Code
refers to unemancipated minors and that the
defendant was already married, his emancipation was
only as to his person, but did not extend to his
property.
Liability resulting from misrepresentation has its
juridical source in the capacity of the person making
the misrepresentation to bind himself.
o If the person making the misrepresentation
cannot bind himself by contract, he cannot
also be bound by any misrepresentation he
may have made in connection therewith.
A person entering into a contract must see to it that
the other party has sufficient capacity to bind himself.
o It is for this reason that the law provides for
mutual restitution or return if the contract of
sale is declared null. Also, if nullity is on
account of incapacity of one of the
contracting parties, the party suffering from
incapacity is only bound to return what he
has profited by the thing sold or by the price
paid.
The reciprocal return of the thing sold and the price
paid therefor need not be ordered since MCI is
already in possession of the car and that the sum of
PHP1666 paid and its interest are sufficient to
compensate for the use of the car.

Bambalan v Maramba
Plaintiff Isidro Bambalan is the sole heir to a parcel of land. The
defendants claim that they bought the land in question from
plaintiff as evidenced by a document. However, plaintiff avers
that he was a minor at the time he signed the document.
issue
Whether or not the plaintiff sold the land to the defendants.
NO
ratio
The document is vitiated to the extent of being void as
regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the
time he signed it, was a minor. Further, it does not appear that
it was his real intention to sell the land in question.
The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado v. Espiritu,
wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting
the contract executed by him pretending to be of age, is not
applicable herein. In this case, the plaintiff did not pretend to
be of age. His minority was well known to the purchaser, the

defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first
cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.
At any rate, even supposing that the document in
question embodies all of the requisites prescribed by law for
its efficacy, it is not binding because of non-registration with
the Register of Deeds.

Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v AlcantaraOn Aug 3, 1931, Rufino

Alcantara and his sons Damaso and Ramon executed a deed
of sale conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon was
then 17 years, 10 months, and 22 days old. On Aug 27, 1931,
Gaw Chiao (Sia Suans husband) received a letter from
Ramons attorney informing him that Ramon was a minor and
disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao,
Ramon executed an affidavit ratifying the deed of sale. Ramon
received from Gaw Chiao P500 on the same occasion. Sia Suan
sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whome Antonio
Azores inherited the same.
On Aug 8, 1940, Ramon instituted an action in the CFI for
the annulment of the deed of sale in as regards his undivided
share in the two parcels of land. CFI absolved all the
defendants. CA reversed on the ground that the deed of sale
is not binding against Ramon in view of his minority on the
date of its execution. Petitioners now appeal by certiorari.
Issue: W/N the deed of sale is valid. YES.
Ratio
The deed of sale signed by Ramon showed that he, like his cosigners, was then of legal age. There is nothing to indicate that
the petitioners did not believe and rely on such recital of fact.
CA remarked that the fact that the petitioners took no steps for
nine years to protect their interest beyond requiring Ramon to
execute a ratification of the sale strongly indicates that they
knew of his minority. But this is sufficiently negatived by its
positive pronouncements that petitioners were informed of the
minority within one month after the transaction was completed
when they were notified in writing.
CA erred in not applying the Mercado v. Mercado
doctrine. Under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents
himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to
actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by
a valid consideration. Since the conveyance in this case was
admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness, a
valid consideration, it should produce its full force and effect,
in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the
same.
That Ramon informed Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao of his
minority is of no moment because the previous
misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing
the contract. The belated information merely leads to the
inference that the petitioners did not know that Ramon was a
minor on the date of the contract and somewhat emphasizes
Ramons bad faith. The effect of estoppel in proper cases is
unaffected by the promptness with which a notice to disaffirm
is made.
concurring opinion

Padilla, J. The deed of sale executed is null and void

insofar as Ramon is concerned because he was only 17 years
old on the date of sale. Consent being one of the essential
requisites for the execution of a valid contract, a minor could
not give his consent thereto. The fact that Ramon executed an
affidavit ratifying the sale is of no moment as he was still a
minor. There is no provision in the Civil Code similar to that
Law 6, Title 19, or the 6th Partida which is equivalent to the
common law principle of estoppel.
Nevertheless, as the action was brought on Aug 6, 1940,
the same was barred, because it was not brought within four
years after the minor had become of age pursuant to Art. 1301,
CC. Ramon became of age in Sept 1934.
dissenting opinion

Pablo, J. (The opinion is in Spanish! I used Google

Translate but the translation was weird.)
The circumstances surrounding the sale demonstrate that
the conclusion of estoppel is untenable. Sia Suan was the
creditor of Rufino because of a transaction in his copra
business. When Rufinos wife died, it became difficult to collect
the credit because Rufino only had three lots as properties and
two lots as marital properties. The deed of sale was nothing
more than a payment of a debt. If the deed was not granted,
the creditor to undergo lengthy intestate proceedings to
obtain payment. The shorter and less expensive procedure
then was to appear of competent age to execute the deed of
sale. Ramon did not receive a single penny. His inheritance to
be received from his mother was used to pay the debt of his
father. The signing of a child is worth nothing.
Sia Suan claims that it was Ramon who misled her. If
someone deceived anyone, it had to be the creditor or
someone who helped her obtain payment. Therefore, Mercado
v. Mercado does not apply since in that case the child
pretended and made buyers believe that he was of age. That is
true estoppel; but in this case there is none.
Laches is also not applicable. It must be used only when
the application of the law would result to injustice. Sia Suan
was enjoying the lots without dramatic improvements and
there is no evidence that she was brought damage. For this,
Ramon has a 10-year term starting on Aug 3, 1931 within which
to request the cancellation of the sale. This case was presented
within that period and therefore the action has not prescribed.

De Braganza v De Villa-Abrille

On October 30, 1944, Mrs. Rosario and her two minor

sons received from de Villa Abrille, as a loan, P70, 000
in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof,
promised in writing to pay him P10, 000 "in legal
currency, two years after the cessation of the present
hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has
been established in the Philippines", plus 2 % per
annum.
Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille
sued them.
Petitioners averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were
minors when they signed the promissory note.

There can be no question about the responsibility of

Mrs. Rosario because the minority of her co-signers
did not release her from liability; since it is a personal
defense of the minors. However, such defense will
benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such
minors may be responsible, (Article 1222, NCC). It is
not denied that at the time of signing, Guillermo and
Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 years old
respectively.
The CA found them liable on the ground that they did
not make it appear in the promissory note that they
were not yet of legal age. If they were really true to
their creditor, they should have appraised him on
their incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the
information relative to their age, parted with his
money, then he should be contended with the
consequence of his act. When a minor, pretended to
be of legal age, when in fact they were not, they will
not later on be permitted to excuse themselves from
the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or
to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu)

Issue: Whether or not being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo

Braganza could be legally bound by their signatures in the
promissory note. NO.
Ratio

From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in

the promissory note they signed, it does not follow as
a legal proposition that they will not be permitted
thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to
disclose their inability.
In fact, according to Corpuz Juris Secundum: In order
to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be
actual and not constructive. It has been held that his
mere silence when making a contract as to age does
not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of
an action of decit.
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one
who contracts with him in the belief that he is of full
age must be actual not constructive and mere failure
of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient.
The Mercado case cited is different because the
document signed therein by the minor specifically
stated he was of age; here, the promissory note
contained no such statement.
In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was
guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in this
case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt,
it is of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation.
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be
entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. Even if

their written contact is unenforceable because of nonage, they shall make restitution to the extent that they
have profited by the money they received. (Article
1399, NCC) There is testimony that the funds
delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their

support during the Japanese occupation. Such being

the case, it is but fair to hold that they had profited to
the extent of the value of such money.
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of
P70, 000 of P46, 666.66, they should now return P1,
166.67. Their promise to pay P10, 000 in Philippine

currency, cannot be enforced, as already stated, since

they were minors incapable of binding themselves.
Their liability is presently declared without regard of
the promissory note but solely in pursuance of Article
1399, NCC.

RPC, 12. Exemption from Criminal Liability

(2) A person under nine years of age.
(3) A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he
has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80
of this Code.chanrobles virtual law library
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible,
the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the
preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and
custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance
and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of
some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
RPC, 13. Mitigating Circumstances.
(2) That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over
seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
PD 603. The Child and Youth Welfare Code.
Article 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is
one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense.
A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed
to the care of his or her father or mother, or nearest relative or
family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its
supervision. The same shall be done for a child over nine years
and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which case he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192.
The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
deemed modified by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 190. Physical and Mental Examination. - It shall be the
duty of the law-enforcement agency concerned to take the
youthful offender, immediately after his apprehension, to the
proper medical or health officer for a thorough physical and
mental examination. Whenever treatment for any physical or
mental defect is indicated, steps shall be immediately
undertaken to provide the same.

The examination and treatment papers shall form part of the

record of the case of the youthful offender.
Article 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or
Trial. - A youthful offender held for physical and mental
examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail,
shall from the time of his arrest be committed to the care of
the Department of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation
center or a detention home in the province or city which shall
be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required:
Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency
within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the
provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for
youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court
may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the
Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies
authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on
recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable
person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever
required.
Article 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of
Youthful Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender
has committed the acts charged against him the court shall
determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability
chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing
judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further
proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or
care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training
institution operated by the government, or duly licensed
agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have
reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the
court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the
agency or responsible individual under whose care he has
been committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and
supervision by a representative of the Department of Social
Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the
Court may designate subject to such conditions as it may
prescribe.
Article 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender whose sentence is
suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same
manner as appeals in criminal cases.
Article 194. Care and Maintenance of Youthful Offender. - The
expenses for the care and maintenance of the youthful
offender whose sentence has been suspended shall be borne
by his parents or those persons liable to support him:
Provided, That in case his parents or those persons liable to
support him can not pay all or part of said expenses, the
municipality in which the offense was committed shall pay onethird of said expenses or part thereof; the province to which
the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining
one-third shall be borne by the National Government.

Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in

case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of the
internal revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid portion
shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of said
indebtedness.
All city and provincial governments must exert efforts for the
immediate establishment of local detention homes for youthful
offenders.
Article 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The Department of
Social Welfare or its representative or duly licensed agency or
individual under whose care the youthful offender has been
committed shall submit to the court every four months or
oftener as may be required in special cases, a written report on
the conduct of said youthful offender as well as the intellectual,
physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by him.
Article 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is shown to the
satisfaction of the court that the youthful offender whose
sentence has been suspended, has behaved properly and has
shown his capability to be a useful member of the community,
even before reaching the age of majority, upon
recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, it shall
dismiss the case and order his final discharge.
Article 197. Return of the Youth Offender to Court. - Whenever
the youthful offender has been found incorrigible or has
wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation
programs, or should his continued stay in the training
institution be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the
committing court for the pronouncement of judgment.
When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one
while in commitment, the court shall determine whether to
dismiss the case in accordance with the next preceding article
or to pronounce the judgment of conviction.
In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall
be credited in the service of his sentence with the full time
spent in actual commitment and detention effected under the
provisions of this Chapter.
Article 198. Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct.
- The final release of a child pursuant to the provisions of this
Chapter shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages. Such
release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of
execution for the recovery of civil damages.
Article 199. Living Quarters for Youthful Offenders Sentence. When a judgment of conviction is pronounced in accordance
with the provisions of Article 197, and at the time of said
pronouncement the youthful offender is still under twenty-one,
he shall be committed to the proper penal institution to serve
the remaining period of his sentence: Provided, That penal
institutions shall provide youthful offenders with separate
quarters and, as far as practicable, group them according to
appropriate age levels or other criteria as will insure their

speedy rehabilitation: Provided, further, That the Bureau of

Prisons shall maintain agricultural and forestry camps where
youthful offenders may serve their sentence in lieu of
confinement in regular penitentiaries.
Article 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where a youthful
offender has been charged before any city or provincial fiscal
or before any municipal judge and the charges have been
ordered dropped, all the records of the case shall be
destroyed immediately thereafter.
Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court
acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an
institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to this
Chapter, all the records of his case shall be destroyed
immediately after such acquittal, dismissal or release, unless
civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal action, in
which case such records shall be destroyed after satisfaction of
such civil liability. The youthful offender concerned shall not be
held under any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of
concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
"Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those
which may be in the files of the National Bureau of
Investigation and with any police department, or any other
government agency which may have been involved in the case.
Article 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil
liability for acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve
upon the offender's father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother, or in case of her death or
incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender.
Article 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social
Welfare shall establish regional rehabilitation centers for
youthful offenders. The local government and other nongovernmental entities shall collaborate and contribute their
support for the establishment and maintenance of these
facilities.
Article 203. Detention Homes. - The Department
Government and Community Development shall
detention homes in cities and provinces distinct and
from jails pending the disposition of cases of
offenders.

of Local
establish
separate
juvenile

Article 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian or Any Person in

the Commission of Delinquent Acts by Their Children or
Wards. - A person whether the parent or guardian of the child
or not, who knowingly or wilfully,
1. Aids, causes, abets or connives with the commission by a
child of a delinquency, or

2. Does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a

child's being or becoming a juvenile delinquent, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

2. Insanity

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.

the following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act
which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order
his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established
for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

RULE 101. Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons

Section 1.
Venue, Petition for commitment. A
petition for the commitment of a person to a hospital or other
place for the insane may be filed with the Court of First
Instance of the province where the person alleged to be insane
is found. The petition shall be filed by the Director of Health in
all cases where, in his opinion, such commitment is for the
public welfare, or for the welfare of said person who, in his
judgment, is insane and such person or the one having charge
of him is opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other
place for the insane.
Section 2.
Order for hearing. If the petition filed is
sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting
the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date for the hearing
thereof, and copy of such order shall be served on the person
alleged to be insane, and to the one having charge him, or on
such of his relatives residing in the province or city as the judge
may deem proper. The court shall furthermore order the sheriff
to produce the alleged insane person, if possible, on the date
of the hearing.
Section 3.
Hearing and judgment. Upon satisfactory
proof, in open court on the date fixed in the order, that the
commitment applied for is for the public welfare or for the
welfare of the insane person, and that his relatives are unable
for any reason to take proper custody and care of him, the
court shall order his commitment to such hospital or other
place for the insane as may be recommended by the Director
of Health. The court shall make proper provisions for the
custody of property or money belonging to the insane until a
guardian be properly appointed.
Section 4.
Discharge of insane. When, in the opinion
of the Director of Health, the person ordered to be committed

to a hospital or other place for the insane is temporarily or

permanently cured, or may be released without danger he may
file the proper petition with the Court of First Instance which
ordered the commitment.
Section 5.
Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding. It
shall be the duty of the provincial fiscal or in the City of Manila
the fiscal of the city, to prepare the petition for the Director of
Health and represent him in court in all proceedings arising
under the provisions of this rule.

US v Vaguillar
Vaquilar was charged and convicted of murder and
parricide for killing his wife and daughter with a bolo, hence
this appeal to the SC.

There is a vast difference between an insane person

and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger
that he fails to use reason. An extremely angry man often acts
like a madman.
The popular meaning of crazy is not synonymous with
legal terms insane, non compos mentis, unsound mind, idiot or

lunatic.
The witness conception of the word crazy is doing
some act by which an ordinarily rational person would not think
of doing. It is not at all unnatural for a murdered, caught in the
act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and attack
those who attempt to capture him. The conduct of the
appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his

Several witnesses for the defense testified that Vaquilar

fellow prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane

appeared insane to them at and subsequent to the

person. The reflection and remorse which would follow the

commission of the crimes. They also testified that he had been

commission of such deeds.

complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the

killing.
Martin Agustin (LOL), nephew of accused: saw the
appellant kill his wife and daughter, with very big and red eyes.
On the morning of that day, Gregoria Villamar said Vaquilar
had pains in his head and stomach. He was crazy because if
he was not crazy he would not have killed his family. He and 7
others were also cut by the appellant.
Alexandra Vaquilar, sister: Vaquilar had headache and
stomach trouble about five days" prior to the commission of
the crimes. "He looked very sad at the time He must have
been crazy because he cut me."

Some cases cited:

People vs. Mortimer: passion and insanity are very different

things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to
persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed
from criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost control of
their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their
tempers and restrain their passions, and are liable to the law if
they do not. There would be no safety for society if people
could with impunity lash themselves into fury, and then do
desperate acts of violence.

US v Carmona: In the absence of proof that the defendant had

lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior to

Estanislao Canada, prisoner in same jail: His head is not

or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he

all right. Vaquilar oftentimes he goes without saying anything

was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude

when he is sent for something and comes back still not saying

that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from

anything. Every other night Vaquilar cries aloud, saying, What

responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition,

kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you

unless his insanity and absence of will are proven.

are beasts."

State v Bundy: there is a presumption that the accused is

Health Officer: made a slight examination of the

sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the

defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether

fact. If the killing and nothing more appears, this presumption,

defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not.

without other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficient to

Issue WON appellant is insane as to warrant an exception from

criminal liability? NO
Ratio
The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The
appellants conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged
criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he
committed the crimes.

support a conviction and as the State must prove every

element of the crime charged 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' it
follows that this presumption affords such proof. This
presumption however may be overthrown. It may be shown on
the part of the accused that the criminal intent did not exist at
the time the act was committed.

Standard Oil v Arenas

Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as
principals, and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the

Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay,

15, 1908, and his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a

jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil

guardian for him, was not declared until July 24, 1909.

Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months

from date, with interest at P1 per month.
Standard Oil then sued the debtors for payment. CFI
sentenced the debtors to pay the company.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa
Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente Sixto Villanueva,
appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter was
declared to be insane by the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila; (2) that she was appointed his guardian by the same
court; (3) that, on October 11, following, she was authorized by

People v Rafanan
Rafanan was charged with the crime of rape for raping
their household helper Estelita Ronaya. Basically he threatened
her with a bolo and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of
her in their sari-sari store.
Rafanan: (1) The testimonies of Estelita and her mother are
contradictory (re: what Estelita did after the incident);

the court, as guardian, to institute the proper legal

(2) He was suffering from a mental aberration characterized

proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her

as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon

husband while in a state of insanity, among them that

Estelita, based on Art. 12 RPC.

concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of The

Standard Oil Company of New York.
The Court initially reopened the case but eventually found
that when Vicente Villanueva, on the 15th of December, 1908,
executed the bond in question, he understood perfectly well
the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and
that the consent that was given by him for the purpose was
entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid and efficacious.
Hence, the ordered that the execution be carried out.
Defendant: My husband was suffering from monomania of
great wealth!
Issue WON suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily
warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity
to act (NO)
ratio
The SC said it would have been necessary to show that
such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable
mental perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by
the defendant Villanueva was the result of such monomania,
and not the effect of any other cause.
SC also said: In our present knowledge of the state of
mental alienation such certainly has not yet been reached as to
warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who
suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very
wealthy when he is not, is really insane and it is to be
presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts
under the influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind is
deranged when he executes an onerous contract .The bond, as
aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December

Trial was suspended and Rafanan was admitted to the

National Mental Hospital. The hospital prepared 4 clinical
reports, all concluding that Rafanan was indeed schizophrenic.
However, he was still convicted. Hence, this appeal.
Issue WoN Rafanan was legally insane when he raped Estelita,
and thus fell under the exempting circumstance. NO.
ratio
Re: standards of legal insanity (Formigones case)
For it to be an exempting circumstance, it is necessary that
there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason that
there be no responsibility for his own acts that he acts without
the least discernment; or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties
does not exclude imputability.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
provedthat the defendant had previously lost his reason or
was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime. If not, it will be presumed that he
was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always
reputed to be voluntary.
2 distinguishable tests established by Formigones: (a) test
of cognition complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, AND (b) test of volition total deprivation
of freedom of the will.
Applied: The expert testimony from the hospitals doctor
negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged. The fact that Rafanan

threatened Estelita with death should she reveal she was raped
shows that he was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of
the assault.

V. Domicile and Residence

However, it has been previously held that schizophrenic

reaction, although not exempting because it does not
completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his
acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under
Art. 13(9) RPC as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the
offenders

8. Absence
9. Insolvency and Trusteeship

will-power

without

depriving

him

of

the

consciousness of his acts. But it has no effect since the penalty

imposed upon him is reclusion perpetua, which is a single
indivisible penalty.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by Estelita
were clarified by her on cross. In any case, inconsistencies
related to minor and inconsequential details which do not
touch upon the manner in which the crime had been
committed and did not impair the credibility of complainant.
3. Deaf-Mutism
4. Prodigality

Abella v Comelec

Emeterio Larrazabal, husband of petitioner Adelina, filed

for candidacy for the position of Leyte provincial governor, but
was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence,
Thereafter, petitioner Adelina filed her own certificate of
candidacy as her husbands substitute.
Respondent Silvestre de la Cruz then filed a petition with
the COMELEC (with petitioner Abella intervening) seeking to
disqualify petitioner Larrazabal, on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her COC as Kananga, Leyte,
even though she and her husband were in fact residents of
Ormoc City.
The COMELEC earlier dismissed the complaint and
referred it to the Law Department, stating that it should be
prosecuoted as an election offense. The Supreme Court held
that such dismissal was improper: since the issue of residence
had been raised squarely before the COMELEC, it should have
directly and speedily disposed of the said issue. The

Rule 92, Section 2.

Meaning of word "incompetent."
Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are
hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable
to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even
though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
5. Civil Interdiction
RPC Art. 34. Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive
the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to
manage his property and of the right to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their
accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.

COMELEC was thus directed to determine Larrazabals

residence qualification.
The COMELEC found that Larrazabal was neither a
resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, and was
therefore disqualified from running as governor for the
province of Leyte.
Larrazabal alleges that the COMELEC erroneously relied
on the provisions o the Family Code to rule that the petitioner
lacks the required residence qualifications, and that under
Election Law, the determination of residence is based on the
principle of animus revertendi, or intention to return. Her
physical transfer of residence to Ormoc, therefore, did not
necessarily erase her Kananga residence, for which she still had
intention to return, evidenced by her continuous and regular
acts of returning there, though she had physically resided in
Ormoc. Hence, this appeal.
Issues Whether the COMELEC correctly held that Adelina had
failed to establish her residence in Kananga, Leyte. YES. She
had failed to establish that Kananga was her habitual
residence, as required by the Civil Code. Moreover, as per the
Family Code, a husband and wife shall live together in one legal
residence. Her husband had already been disqualified for lack
of residence in Leyte: based on the spouses mutual obligation
to live together, she should also be disqualified.

6. Family Relations
7. Alienage

ratio
The reliance by COMELEC on the provisions of civil law
and the Family Code was proper and in consonance with
human experience. The petitioner did not present evidence to
show that she and her husband maintain separate residences.
A witness testified before the COMELEC that she had
leased a house and lot to the Larrazabal couple and had seen
them in it, and that the couple had decided to buy the
property. But the contract of lease itself indicates that the
spouses

are

residents

of

Ormoc

City,

and

the

acknowledgment indicates that Emeterio presented his

Residence Certificate issued in Ormoc City.
The Civil Code states: [F]or the exercise of civil rights and
the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is the place of their habitual residence. Thus, for the
purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement
should be read as legal residence or domicilenot any place
where a party may have properties or which they may visit from
time to time.
Furthermore, Arts. 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to

live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the

family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide. The court may exempt one
spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family.
As a matter of principle, therefore, the husband and wife
should live together in one legal residence, which is their usual
place of abode.
As regards animus revertendi, there is no evidence to
prove that Larrazabal temporarily left her residence in Kananga
to pursue a calling, profession or business in Ormoc City: it is
clear that she already established her residence in Ormoc City
and considers herself a resident therein. The fact that she
occasionally visits Kananga through the years does not signify
an intention to continue her residence therein.
The petition is thus dismissed.