Assignment No.

13
Case Digests in SCARP AND SPECPRO
Submitted by Christopher G. Halnin
To Atty. Christian Kit Villasis
1. BALAO et al vs. GMA
G.R. No. 186050
December 13, 2011
FACTS:
The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao who was
abducted by unidentified armed men earlier. Named respondents in the petition were then
President GMA, Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG Secretary
Ronaldo Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Alexander . Yano, PNP Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among others.
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-Baguio. In 1984, he was
among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs
working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region.
According to witnesses testimony, James was abducted by unidentified men, saying they
were policemen and were arresting him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white van.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed for (1) an
inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have
been previously reported as detention centers for activists abducted by military and police
operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the

petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on
James; and (3) a witness protection order.
The RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose
where James is detained or confined, (b) to release James considering his
unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from
further inflicting harm upon his person; and DENY the issuance of
INSPECTION

ORDER,

PRODUCTION

ORDER

and

WITNESS

PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein Petitioners to comply with the

stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the
same.
ISSUE:
WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule to
establish an enforced disappearance?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October
24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It
was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded rule-making power for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to
these two situations. Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of law.

The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing papers
supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the
military under the administration of President Arroyo included targeting of identified legal
organizations under the NDF, which included the CPA, and their members, as enemies of
the state.
We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counterinsurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo
Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity between the
circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous
instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove
that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case
cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past similar
incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning
groups.
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James on the very
positions held by the respondents. The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo had the
occasion to expound on the doctrine of command responsibility and why it has little bearing,
if at all, in amparo proceedings.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it
would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility,
as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for
individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In

other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability,
even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been
committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the
writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against
violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the
corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence
that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Of the same tenor, and by way of
expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis: It
does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats
thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial killings].
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction
are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out
these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal
Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that
only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x[
Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military
and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The
identities of the abductors have not been established, much less their link to any military or
police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or
detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial
court erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of
public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree
with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are very limited,
superficial and one-sided. Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the
respondents are borne by the evidence on record.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. In
this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified
several military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that the testimonies
of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar abductions involving activists
disclosed that those premises were used as detention centers. In the same vein, the prayer for
issuance of a production order was predicated on petitioners bare allegation that it obtained
confidential information from an unidentified military source, that the name of James was
included in the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial court could not have sanctioned
any fishing expedition by precipitate issuance of inspection and production orders on the
basis of insufficient claims of one party.
2. CASTILLO vs. CRUZ
G.R. No. 182165
November 25, 2009

FACTS:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz
(Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property),
refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.

Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The
pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of

Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which
was granted. However, the demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito
R. Mendoza instructing him to protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,
entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the
RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved
petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats.

Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

ISSUE:
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.

HELD:
On the 1st issue:

Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the
writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not
only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: As the Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Tapuz
v. Del Rosario also teaches: What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus
between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not
suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or
detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day
after their arrest.

On the 2nd issue:

Respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been
barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in
flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may
be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas
data.
3. RAZON, JR. vs. TAGITIS
G.R. No. 182498
December 3, 2009
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was
last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis
arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked
Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When
Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist related
that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters
Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she
advised Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of
Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn
affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P.

Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen.
Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land
Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of
their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband.
All of her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in
the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the
uniformed men. According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City,
being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in
Jolo, seeking their help to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police
that her husband was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere,
which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in
locating her missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely
Police Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the
National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no positive
results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial help
from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the

release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors, their
intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set
the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified
return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied
any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the
allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against
them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In
addition, they all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active
measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible
for his disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis
was an "enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports"
from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect"
Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police,
or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation"
police theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no
previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust
regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came
forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis
for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife,"
on the basis of the respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many

wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his
first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom
by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance,
since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of
Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of these
terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and
his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I.
Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief
Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life,
liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions
to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from
the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was
PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied
the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced
Tagitis?
HELD:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus
the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the

disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this
definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct
evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing
his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed
conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the
police authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was
never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others
(in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;(e) The actions and recourses taken
by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity
of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory

pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be
read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim
is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who
caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail
and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make
this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details
available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private
party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its
isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights
to life, liberty or security are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the
State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as
the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure
in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit,
as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the
proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule
incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be
used as the affiants direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an

absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed.
Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for
the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the
failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness
(Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February
18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the
petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in
Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The
Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied
territories "endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where
they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the
policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of these
targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, and
855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this
number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former
President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of
these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive
and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former
President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term
of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local nongovernmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there
were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M.
Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human Rights records show a total of 636
verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained
missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined
status.Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary

Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances

covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof."We note that although the writ specifically covers
"enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction.
The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal
that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of
the concept of enforced disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very
meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and
thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even
if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may
have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and
investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to
address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and
security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing

efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is
fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim,
by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and
security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty
parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (in Paris, France on February 6, 2007, "enforced disappearance" is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty
by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque
III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are
under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced

disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the
bar of justice. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not
as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these
difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall
encounter. These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose
involvement is alleged investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other
jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. In
addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually
afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct
possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the
enforced disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced
disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or

administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all
novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay
rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any
act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject
to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an
unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the
disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot
but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their
chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the
disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the circumstances of
the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the
Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo
Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at
hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and
government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials
and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the
protection of the law a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who
were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate
proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and

actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to
conduct.
4. SEC. OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. MANALO
G.R. No. 180906
October 7, 2008
FACTS:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the
CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right
to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation
and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The
CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos
custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved,
and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military
custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the
SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the writ of amparo is the proper remedy?
HELD:
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of

the Manalos right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private
individuals or entities. Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and
security. The circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained.
Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo from a search
warrant.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It said that
the production order should be likened to the production of documents or things under sec. 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control.
5. TAPUZ vs. DEL
G.R. No. 182484
June 17, 2008

FACTS:

The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible
entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the petitioners and other John Does numbering about 120. The private
respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of the disputed
land; (2) they were the disputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with
bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents permission and
against the objections of the private respondents security men, and built thereon a nipa and
bamboo structure.

In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that:
(1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the
private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents certificate of title to the
disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a
counterclaim for damages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents favor,
finding prior possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the
private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
upon posting of a bond. The writ authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC
decision was actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private respondents
had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance
of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition. The
respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners MR and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15)
days after the Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s
to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land. The
petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and
Order of Demolition in CA.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper?

HELD:
The Court held in the negative. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of
habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of
the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and
substance.

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for
certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same
material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and
deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In

sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for
violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for
substantive deficiencies.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It
is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or
as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
requires that every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of
physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to
the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence
of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to
the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to
the waist and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to
life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any
need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set
forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on
the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In
sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the fishing
expedition that this Court in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data had in mind
in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial
of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
6. CANLAS vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 182795
June 5, 2008
FACTS:
The petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of Amparo alleging that they have been deprived
of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution,
as the result of the nefarious activities of both the Private and Public respondents. Petitioners
are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City. Their
dwelling have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be
demolished pursuant to a court judgment which was affirmed with finality in four other
cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The writ of Amparo does not cover the cause of the
petitioners. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court

is not included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ. Hence, the court finding
no legal basis for the issuance of the writ dismissed petition outright. It rationed that new
remedy of writ of Amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the
protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty
and security. The Court will not spar any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to
petitions of this nature. However, the Court will not waste its precious time and effort on
matters not covered by the writ.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OFAMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA
G.R. No. 189689
November 13, 2012
FACTS:
The names of the petitioner are included in the infantry connected to the CPP and NPA.
Because of these, they are believed to be easy targets of extralegal killing- a real threat to
their life, liberty and security. Atty. Ladaga substantiated the threats against her life in an
Affidavit. She field a petition for writ of amparo with Application for a Production Order,
because allegedly the said list is the military hit-list wherein extrajudicial killing whose
violent deaths can be linked directly. The lower court dismissed the case for being a heresay.
ISSUE:
WON the allegation of the petitioner is justified.
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. Every petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be
supported by justifying allegations of fact including the right to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits. However, without substantial evidence of an
actual threat to petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security that consists more than just the

inclusion of their names in an OB List, an order for further investigation into, or production
of, the military's Order of Battle, would have no concrete basis.
8. LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC vs. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, 184495, 187109
May 31, 2011
FACTS:
Following the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel
Merino (Merino) by armed men from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan, spouses
Asher and Erlinda Cadapan (Spouses Cadapan) and Concepcion Empeo (Empeo) filed a
petition for habeas corpus before the Court (habeas corpus case), impleading then Generals
Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col.
Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By
Resolution of the Court, a writ of habeas corpus was issued, returnable to the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals.
By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits
from the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino; that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and
disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition there being no strong evidence
that the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. They also moved to
present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino,
Sherlyns mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo
who allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military
camp.

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Erlinda Cadapan and Empeo filed
before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo (amparo case), with Prayers for Inspection of
Place and Production of Documents. The petition impleaded the same respondents in
the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., (Gen. Esperon)
then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe
Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas.
Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from
suit while in office.
By Resolution, the Court issued a writ of amparo returnable to appellate court, and ordered
the consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.
In the habeas corpus case, the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and
ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the amparo case.
In reconsidering its earlier decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied
heavily on the testimony of Manalo. It held that there is now a clear and credible evidence
that the three missing persons, (Sherlyn, Karen and Merino), are being detained in military
camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being not held for a lawful cause, they
should be immediately released from detention.
In the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order
or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case,
it found that the three detainees right to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence,
the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to
direct the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as
indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges against those
responsible for the abduction and detention of the three.

Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the
Decision of the appellate court.
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo, on the other hand, filed their own petition for
review also challenging the same Decision of the appellate court only insofar as
the amparo aspect is concerned.
Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the appellate court a
Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in
the amparo and habeas corpus cases to comply with the directive of the appellate court to
immediately release the three missing persons. By Resolution, the appellate court denied the
motion, ratiocinating that while the Court, ordered the respondents to immediately
RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino, the decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term
immediately does not mean that that it is automatically executory. Neither did the decision
become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the Decision/Resolution
before the Supreme Court.
Via a petition for certiorari filed before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Empeo challenged
the appellate courts Resolution denying their motion to cite respondents in contempt.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present
Chief of Staff has command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued
detention of the three aggrieved parties, Sherlyn, Karen and Merino?
Whether or not there is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or
in an Amparo case to cause the release of the aggrieved parties?
HELD:

Petition DISMISSED.
There is no showing that Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino were even remotely
accountable and responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino.
On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his
subordinates in an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command
responsibility and its application insofar as amparo cases already decided by the Court is in
order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo expounded on the concept of command responsibility as
follows:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context
in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly
a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible forcrimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in
the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and
thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of
individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative
suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of
aggrieved individuals.
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial
killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearancefor purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies
to address the disappearance (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes responsibility and accountability, viz:
x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases,
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his

liberty and security are restored. (emphasis in the original; underscoring

supplied)
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to
determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far
as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command
responsibility

in amparo cases

to

instances

of

determining

the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any
transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these
proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the
first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court
to

devise

remedial

measures

that

may

be

appropriate

under

the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated

earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative

disciplinary proceedings

under

existing

administrative

issuances, if there be any. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever
processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not
impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best
position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by
the appropriate government agency.
Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851 (RA 9851) to include
command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international
humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes. RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that
definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite their position, still fail
to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the
commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the
respondents that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the responsible and
accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac,
Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the
September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of
merit as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for
the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
There is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution
for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a
person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision
thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may
jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.

The Solicitor Generals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in
an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of
the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in
securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion
for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by
an amparo proceeding.
In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose
of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears
emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken
therefrom.
9. MERALCO vs. GOPEZ-LIM
G.R. No. 184769
October 5, 2010
Facts:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at
MERALCO. An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector. The letter reads: Cherry
Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG
UTANG NA LOOB. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO
linesmen.
Petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the
transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS

Clerk,". The transfer was in light of the reposts regarding the accusations and threats directed
against respondent that would compromise her safety and security. Respondent appealed her
transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the
matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due
process.
Issue:
Whether an employee invoke the remedies available under the writ of habeas data where an
employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter
posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which
imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Held:
No. Respondents plea does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. The habeas
data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this
age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided
under prevailing Rules. In Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v.
del Rosario, that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of
the due process clause of the Constitution.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life,

liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to
privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations
from unknown individuals in her letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes
if they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work
"betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
10. RODRIGUEZ vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 191805
November 15, 2011
FACTS:
On September 6, 2009, Petitioner was forcibly taken to a military camp and was forced to
confess to his membership in the NPA. During his 11 days of captivity, he was repeatedly
threatened, detained and mauled. He was also forced to confess the whereabouts of NPA
camp and his fellow NPA comrades, sign documents declaring the he had surrendered to the
military and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset. On his
last day of incarceration, September 17, 2009, he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating
that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he
signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.
On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for
Writ of Habeas Data with prayers for the Protection Order, Inspection of Place and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The Supreme Court granted the respective
writs on December 15, 2009, after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez
had been abducted, tortured and later released by the members of the 17 th Infantry Battalion
of the Philippine Army.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by the Petitioner maybe granted after the writs
of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the provisional relief, such as the interim reliefs of temporary
protection order, inspection order and production order are intended to assist the court before
it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can
only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be
underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the
protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the petitioner the privilege of
the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of
the former.
11. ROXAS vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 189155
September 7, 2010,
FACTS:
Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, she is enrolled
in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang MakabayanUnited States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of
her immersion, Roxas toured various provinces and towns in Central Luzon and, in April of
2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health
survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, Roxas and her companions, Carabeo amd Jandoc,
decided to rest in the house of Mr. Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La
Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, Roxas, her companions and Mr. Paolo
were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding
that they open-up. Suddenly 15 heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, banged inside,
tied and blindfolded Roxas and her companions, Carabeo and Jandoc, then dragged them

inside a van parked outside the house. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and were
wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
After about an hour of travelling, the van stopped. Roxas, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered
to alight.

After she was informed that she was detained for being a member of the

Communist Party of the Philippines New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), Roxas was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room which she believed is a jail cell from the
sound of the metal doors. From there she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of
planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle. Roxas inferred that she was
taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
On May 25, 2009, Roxas was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon
City. Before being release, the abductors gave her a cellphone with a sim card, a slip of
paper cantaining an email address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,
the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. She was also sternly warned not to
report the incident to the group Karapatan or else something bad will happen to her and her
family. Sometime after her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from one of her
abductors via the cellular phone given to her. Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, Roxas threw away the cellphone.
Roxas filed a petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. The Court of Appeals
granted her petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. However, the appellate court
absolved the respondents from the petition. Her prayer for the return of her personal
belongings and for the inspection order and production order were denied. Roxas invokes he
doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military
authorities.
ISSUES:
Whether or not her prayer for inspection order may be granted?
Whether or not the grant of writ of habeas data is proper?

HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The prayer of Roxas for the grant of the inspection order is
equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo
Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. An inspection order is an interim
relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition,
in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo
court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably
determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does
not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting
allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was
shown above, petitioner failed to do. Since the very estimates and observations of the
petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort
Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot
issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
The Court held in the negative. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals. The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding
himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable
requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main
problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on
record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents
that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping
records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was
not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually
unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and

photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No

evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or
photograph. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals
enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public
any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the
petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The
public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first
place, it was not proven to have.