FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,
the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas
City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio
Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had
lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or
Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for
executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in
Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the
Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is
within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional
encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling
state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine
the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.