Grasping Natural Law--Synderesis

The grasp of the principles of natural law is achieved by a

special capacity called synderesis. This is a natural intellectual
habit, in one sense of habit but not in the central sense.
It is natural because all human beings are born with it.
It is intellectual because it makes possible the grasp of
principles.
As something found in the soul which is the foundation for
grasping principles, it might be a capacity (power) or a habit.
But mere capacities can go either way, towards good or
evil; synderesis is oriented towards the good. So it's not a mere
capacity, but a habit.
Habit (habitus) is a Latin Aristotelian's way of expressing what
Aristotle called a hexis (state or disposition). A habit is a first act
of the soul, which can be actualized, in a second act; here the act
of conscience. Conscience is related to synderesis as actively
thinking what you know (2nd act) is to the knowledge which
you have but which may or may not be active at any given time
(1st act). We do not always experience conscience but every
human being has the capacity called synderesis.
Aquinas, however, denies that synderesis is a habit in the fuller
sense (q94, a1), i.e., a moral habit. He quotes Augustine, who
says "a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary"
(p. 45). The moral virtues, therefore, are habits; the person of
courage may not exhibit courage at every moment (because not

every action requires courage)--yet when necessary, she will do

the courageous thing.
And unlike most conditions that we call habits, synderesis is not
acquired but innate or, as Aquinas puts it, "natural."
Now, synderesis is not a habit of the sort described by Augustine
since it can be overridden by the appetities, as in infants and
wicked persons.
The term synderesis has every appearance of being a Greek
term. Yet it is not found in Aristotle or in any classical Greek
author near to him in time. I have never seen it in any text earlier
than Aquinas himself, though I am not sure that he invented it. It
would seem to be a sometimes weak intellectual habit whose
subject-matter is ethical.
Synderesis must not be confused with prudence, which is the
Thomas' term for what Aristotle calls phronesis, or practical
wisdom. A person with the intellectual virtue of prudence will
necessarily possess the moral virtues and will make good moral
choices. Aristotle and Thomas agree on that. But you can have
synderesis, i.e. know the principles of natural law, and yet not
act accordingly. Synderesis, which all humans have, implies
neither moral virtue nor prudence.