Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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American Journal of Sociology
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(1946), Stark (1958), and Mayer (1975). And rightly so. For understanding Weber's idea of history and thus the logic of his social science no
term is more crucial than "elective affinity." For Gerth and Mills, elective
affinity is "the decisive conception by which Weber relates ideas and interests" (1946, p. 62); for Stark, elective affinity is Weber's theoretical alternative to "mechanistic causalism and quasi-organological functionalism"
(1958, p. 256); for Mayer, Weber's thought moves generally "in concepts
potential, for it would yield as idea the 'possibility of social science altogether within the bounds of Weber's order of discourse, which is to say,
within the bounds of Kant's pure reason. To be sure, few if any of Weber's
terms pose more resistance to explanation. The Kantian tradition to which
Weber was heir has largely been lost on succeeding generations of social
scientists, particularly in America. Instances of elective affinity in Weber's
1 This paper grew out of a seminar conducted by Robert Alun Jones at the University
of Illinois in the fall of 1975. To him and to my wife, Marcia Kirkpatrick, I am grateful for their patience and persevering support.
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work are altogether rare (1904a, pp. 29, 34 [1949, pp. 56, 61]; 1905a, p. 54
[1958, pp. 91-92]; 1906a, p. 148 [1949, p. 118]; 1906b, p. 347; 1910, pp.
581, 596; 1916, pp. 19, 20 [1946, pp. 284, 285]; 1918, p. 76 [1968, p.
1429]; 1922, pp. 183, 270, 780, 795, 796, 815 [1968, pp. 341, 472, 1160,
1180, 1208]). His usage is diverse and moreover quite informal. Nowhere
does he enter a definition of elective affinity into his categorical casuistic.
Some instances of his usage are striking enough in context to draw a second
look, but even there the term defines its contexts so much more strikingly
than those contexts condition the term that little can be gleaned from those
contexts alone. Thus, his use of the term has continued to fascinate while
remaining an enigma, and efforts to understand it have become symptomatic
of the helplessness with which mere exegesis confronts the order of a discourse other than its own. It is one thing to sense the term's importance,
another to establish it, and yet another to find its locus in the order of his
thought. No reading of his work alone, be it ever so close, could ever accomplish all this, and least of all would pseudoetymology (see Gerth and Mills
1946, p. 63) or the commonplace-however true-that "like attracts like"
suffice (see Stark 1958, p. 257). The problem is one for history and not for
exegesis (see Skinner 1969; Jones 1977). To discover what elective affinity
meant to Weber is to discover its place in the order of his discourse. The
term "elective affinity," as it was known to Weber, has its source in the
chemistry of the 18th century. From there it entered into literature, above
all through Goethe, and into an order of intellectual discourse, where it was
joined with the related expression "inner affinity" (innere Verwandtschaft)
and with Kant's idea of reason which he had termed "affinity" (Afinitdt).
In Weber's unique order of discourse, his use of elective affinity stands at
the intersection of two sets of historical coordinates, the one defined by
his order of discourse, the other by that rare combination of erudition and
insight which was Max Weber himself. Then as now, the potential of that
intersection has remained more virtual than actual. With what alchemy
the transmutations of its elements into the idea of Weber's social science
as one within the bounds of Kant's pure reason was accomplished is the
object of the present inquiry. Such an inquiry has no fear of the counter-
factual, of inference in the subjunctive mood. For only thus can elective
affinity be brought into its full relief. In the light of the virtual-the
the order of Weber's discourse becomes just visible within his own work as
the latent structure of his thought.
INSTANCES
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discussing the sources and the inevitability of conflict in the arena of social
similar ideals will . . . allow the circle of [its] contributors to hold together
and to recruit new members, and this will stamp the journal . . . with a
But a year later, closing the first installment of the "Protestant Ethic"
with a caution to his readers, he states that, ". . . in view of the immense
of the cultural epochs of the Reformation, one can proceed only by first of
significance. Within the chaos that the social scientist confronts, there is
an order; this order exists not only for himself but also for the actors in
history and largely affects history's course. The logic of history would be
the logic of the elective affinities.
Weber used elective affinity twice more in connection with the "Prot-
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Econowiy and Society he speaks of the lack of any such elective affinity of
the warriors for the conception of an ethically transcendental god (1922,
p. 270 [1968, p. 472]); of the "elective affinity of the religiously demanded
life-style with the socially conditioned life-style" (1922, p. 796 [1968, p.
[1968, p. 341]). These brief remarks can only suggest that for Weber the
sole significant universal propositions that social science could make would
be propositions of elective affinity, which would be to say that the very
possibility of social science would rest on the logic of elective affinity. But
why this would be so and what that logic would be for materials as diverse
as those encompassed by his own usage remains unstated, and nowhere
else did he elaborate upon the term. But then, he had no need to. His
order of discourse took care of all that.
369
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term (see vol. 13, cols. 597-99) entering German in 1779 as the translator
Weigel's neologism for the Swedish chemist Torborn Bergman's term "attractio electiva," referring to the laws of association and dissociation among
as the root metaphor for a novel, The Elective Affinities ([1809] 1951),
which Weber's contemporaries found to be a rich expression of the conflict
between the natural and the moral and social orders.
But the place of elective affinity in the general order of the German
language was never so secure, as may be discerned from its fate in the
keepers of that order, the great encyclopedic dictionaries. Twenty years
after Weigel, it was not to be found in Adelung's (1801), but Campe's
listed it a decade later, most likely as a result of the notoriety lent it by
Goethe, whose recent novel the entry mentions (1811, p. 542). It is not in
Sanders's (1865) or in Weigand's (1876) or in Sanders's later supplement
(1885), although it is in Heyne's (1895, p. 1770), and it is picked up
later by Sanders's eighth edition (1910, p. 643) and by Weigand's fifth
(1910, p. 803). Paul's lists it (1908, p. 1199), while Kluge's does not
(1915). These entries ranged from mere acknowledgments of the word's
existence to brief descriptions of its source in chemistry and in the novel
by Goethe. More thorough treatment had to wait until the vast enterprise
of the brothers Grimm, begun in 1854, reached the letter "W" in 1922, just
two years after Weber's death.
elective affinity was a marginal word, though its position had improved
somewhat by the decade before the First World War. Acquaintance with it
could be presupposed only for those familiar with the history of chemistry
or for the somewhat larger circle of those who read the German classics.
But as a segment of the entire German language community, that circle
was small indeed. To have known the meaning of elective affinity was to
have been part of a very special order of discourse: the discourse of the
humanistically educated elite (see Wehler 1973, pp. 124-29; Ringer 1969).
To the rest, the word could well have seemed a contradiction in terms.
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Krug's (1829), but it does appear in the supplement to the second edition
(1838, p. 446). It is not in Kirchner's (1896) or in Eisler's (1899), but a
decade later it appears in Schmidt's little paperback (1912b, p. 98). That
may have been due to Schmidt's other interests: that same year he published a Goethe lexicon in which, of course, the term is entered (1912a, p.
refers the reader back to the entry for affinity (Affinitdt), which states that
". . . the Law of A[ffinity] (principle of the continuity of the forms) bids
a continuous transition from every single species [Gattung] to every other
via the stepwise increase in multiplicity (Kant)" (1912b, p. 9). From there
the reader is referred back to the entry for elective affinity, with the usual
mention of chemistry and Goethe, thus closing a circle and opening a network in the order of philosophical discourse.
Elective affinity was unknown to the handbooks and lexica of the social
sciences, yet it was known to the social scientists themselves-after all,
they belonged to the humanistically educated elite. Riehl, for example,
made use of the term, writing that ". . . one of the most remarkable monuments to the elective affinity of the North German coastal states with the
South German highland is the gothic Church of Our Lady in Munich"
(Grimm and Grimm, vol. 13, col. 599). And Treitschke too had used the
term, writing that ". . . the Romans were truly intimate only with the old
Roman world; the Germans were drawn by a feeling of elective affinity toward the Hellenic genius" (Grimm and Grimm, vol. 13, col. 599). Treitschke had been Weber senior's household intimate in Berlin, where Max
junior heard his lectures at the university (Marianne Weber 1926, pp. 42,
102), while later on the Webers, Max and Marianne, were frequent guests
in Riehl's home in Freiburg (Marianne Weber 1926, p. 216). In company
such as this, the company of men of letters and learning, a familiarity with
the meaning of elective affinity could be taken for granted, and Weber did
just that when he wrote. The term was a touchstone, even of itself, of the
GOETHE
If elective affinity had entered the order of the German language through
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dustry was no respecter of the disciplines. Kuno Fischer, the leading figure
of the Kant revival of the 1860s, produced a number of shorter studies and
then a nine-volume series (1890-94); Simmel likewise wrote shorter studies
and then two books (1906, 1913); Gundolf, Weber's connection to the
charismatic circle around the poet Stefan George, wrote what became a
classic study of the poet (1916); even Weber's colleague Rickert wrote
a book on Goethe (1932).
Though he eventually came to an appreciation of Goethe, as a young
man Weber set himself apart from his contemporaries by judging Schiller
the better poet, noting in a letter to his cousin Emmy that "the exaggerated,
exclusive Goethe worship" of his friends had spoiled their taste in literature
and made them unjust to other poets (Marianne Weber 1926, p. 164). In
fact, he continued, Goethe's obsession with happiness resulted in a badly
one-sided view of life; Goethe was ". . . sensitive to the debased as such
only when it was at the same time the hateful and trivial; he had, on the
other hand, no clear sensitivity to it when he encountered it in the form of
first encountered the elective affinities nine years before while reading
through, "hidden under his desk during class, all forty volumes of the Cotta
edition of Goethe" (Marianne Weber 1926, p. 50).
Eduard's; and Ottilie, Charlotte's young and beautiful niece. As the novel
opens, Eduard and Charlotte are busy with the renovation of Eduard's
country estate. Eduard proposes that the captain join them to help with
third but wishes one herself: her niece Ottilie. The third arrives, and the
fourth too; and, as might be expected in any novel with such an opening
situation, Eduard falls in love with his wife's niece, Charlotte with her husband's friend. The novel develops the unhappy consequences of these elective affinities.
Goethe was not only a poet, he was also a scientist with an interest in,
among other things, the progress of chemistry (see Geitel 1911). So it is
not surprising that in the advertisement to The Elective Affinities he writes:
"It appears that the author's continued studies in the physical sciences have
occasioned this strange title. He would like to remark that in the study of
nature one very often makes use of moral imagery in order to bring closer
372
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novel . . . was to portray social relationships and their conflicts symbolically" (von Wiese 1951, p. 620).
The novel awoke immediate controversy; the number of negative judgments was "astonishing, for a work by Goethe" (Kolbe 1968, p. 30, n. 55).
Jacobi called it "an ascension of evil lust" (von Wiese 1951, p. 645). By
the end of the century, such judgments had been tempered, if not forgotten.
Cotta's Goethe editor, Karl Goedeke, whose prefaces appeared in all the
later editions, took note of them, writing that "the name of the novel derives from the chemical designation of the process wherein different substances united with one another break out of their union in favor of another.
This designation, merely borrowed from science, has been so construed by
the poet's opponents (whom he was lacking at no time in his life) as if he
had attempted to deny the law of free will and to justify a waywardness
caught in conflict with civil morality as a law of nature. He did just the
opposite" (Goedeke 1885, p. 4). However they judged its morality, the
degree of elective affinity between the novel and the problematics of Weber's contemporaries was strong. Whether the analogy between natural and
moral and social processes was to suggest that nature itself was somehow
"ensouled" (Zeitler 1918, p. 511) or rather that the soul of man stood
under the sway of nature (Gundolf 1916, p. 553), the problem it posed was
the central one of the relationship between the order of nature and the
moral and social orders. And so, however tangentially, the novel touched
upon the question of how a social science would be possible if society were
a realm of freedom.
CHEMISTRY
Goethe took the metaphor of the elective affinities from chemistry, indi-
p. 621). But here Goethe errs, for while Bergman may well have been the
most famous exponent of the theory of elective affinity in the chemistry of
the 18th century, he was not its originator. The history of elective affinity
Max Weber may have known that history, as evidenced in the opening
paragraph of his review of Wilhelm Ostwald's "energy theory of culture,"
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where he speaks of "... the most complete layman ... [who] has read the
expositions in the general sections-usually so lean-of the older com-
pendia on chemistry, say on atomic weights and equivalences and all that
goes along with that; on the concept of 'solutions' as opposed to the 'combinations'; on the electrochemical problems; on isomerism, etc... ." (1909,
p. 575). This most complete layman who had read compendia on chemistry
In 1648 Glauber discussed the fact that "a body did not have the same
this led to various attempts to order the elements according to their differing inclinations to combine with one another. In 1718 these efforts bore
chemist Etienne-Francoise Geoffroy proposed as law the following statement: "Whenever two substances which have some inclination to combine
with one another are combined with one another and a third which has
more affinity for one of the two is added, then it will combine with that
one and exclude the other" (Ostwald 1902, p. 21). This is elective affinity
in everything but the name. Geoffroy backed his proposed law with a table
in which the differing affinities of some 24 substances were displayed in
order. The remainder of the century saw the production of many revisions
The climax of the theory of elective affinity came with Torborn Bergman's De attractionibus electivus of 1775. Bergman published complete
tables of affinity for all 51 elements known then. His work was soon widely
known. It reached Germany in 1783, where its translator, Hein Tabor,
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This became the classic formulation of elective affinity, the one that appeared in paraphrase in all the handbooks and dictionaries, including the
one that Goethe used to weave the definition into the after-dinner conver-
sation of the characters of his novel, where Weber and his contemporaries,
even those who had never read compendia on chemistry could find it spelled
out even to the letters (Goethe [1809] 1951, p. 276).
Even in its late 18th-century heyday, the theory of elective affinity had its
critics. Guyton de Morveau, leading exponent of the theory in France,
complained in 1776 that "some chemists . . . have been unable to restrain
"assume just as many little lawlets of affinity as there are special cases of
association and dissociation" (both in Ostwald 1902, pp. 29-30). Over and
above the strivings of these early chemists, there loomed the for them as
yet unattainable ideal of Newton's mechanics, whose mathematical neces-
sity knew no need for "little lawlets." So it is not surprising that Immanuel
Kant, who had heard of Bergman (see Kant 1902-, 9:198; 10:219, 234)
In his Metaphysical Bases of Natural Science, Kant stated that "in every
a priori to be found therein" (1902-, 4:470), and on this basis he pronounced his judgment that ". . . chemistry can never become anything more
ity ... ." (1902-, 4:471). Accordingly, chemistry must content itself with a
mixed position between mechanics, the pure science of outward envisagement which is space, and psychology, the pure description of inward en-
to his benefit as an analogy in the final paragraph of his Critique of Practical Reason: "To follow that same path [of analysis] in the treatment of
the moral capacities of our nature, that example [mechanics] can counsel
us and give us hope for a similarly good success. We do have the examples
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through repeated trials . . . make both known to us, purely . . . and with
Goethe later also made ([1809] 1951, p. 273), and only through an equally
artful divorce had Kant been able to argue the possibility of man as a moral
agent, for only after such a divorce of the empirical from the rational could
reason rejoin and order anew what its critique had put asunder.
AFFINITIES
maxim of reason, which is to say, an idea. Kant introduced the term first
in connection with his "axiom of complete determination," which states that
for any single thing to be possible, its predicates must include, positively
or negatively, all possible predicates of things in general (see 1902-, 3:385).
From this it follows that ". . . every thing is referred to a common correlatum, namely, the totality of all possibility, which, were it . . . to be met
in the idea of one single thing, would prove an affinity of everything pos-
field of intellect: (1) through a principle of the equivalence of the multiplicitous under higher species; (2) through an axiom of the variety of the
unity, it adds, further, (3) a law of the affinity of all concepts, which bids
a continuous transition from every single species to every other via the
stepwise increase in multiplicity" (1902-, 3:485). Kant called such prin-
ciples "regulative," for the ideas underlying his reason form no part of his
Through Kant's usage, affinity survived in the order of philosophical discourse in a manner akin to that of elective affinity. The connection between
the philosophical and the chemical affinities was not to be missed. The first
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is, for example, that they are salts which have a sharp, burning, uremic, but
not sour taste. . . . The alkaline salts and calcareous earths have . . . in
their concepts a common feature through which they are affine to one
another . . . namely, that they both absorb or can unite with acids" (1797,
pp. 89-90). Mellin went on at once to discuss "the logical law of the affinity
of all concepts" and its treatment by Kant, and then, true to the order of
late 18th-century thought, he put forth a table of affinities with combinations of Greek and Roman letters standing not for chemicals but for concepts, letters in common representing shared features (1797, p. 92). The
closing pages of the entry, however, provide a key to those letters with
concepts drawn from chemistry (1797, pp. 104-6).
Over the course of the next 100-odd years, the philosophical idea of
affinity fared no better but perhaps no worse than its chemical counterpart
elective affinity. The entry in Krug's dictionary is broadly conceived, mentioning beside the philosophical and chemical affinities the ones of aesthetics
and ethics (1838, pp. 406-7). Kirchner's ignores affinity altogether, just
as it ignores elective affinity (1896); the entry in Eisler's, on the other
hand, is replete with citations from Kant (1899, p. 20). Fritz Mauthner's
"new contributions to a critique of language" allows affinity the space of
would have known that sense of the word through Kuno Fischer, whose
lectures on the history of philosophy he heard bleary eyed in the early
mornings of 1882 (Marianne Weber 1926, p. 70), if not directly from reading Kant, which he had done from boyhood on (Marianne Weber 1926, p.
63). Among his Heidelberg colleagues, neither Windelband nor Rickert nor
Lask dealt with the term as their teacher and grand-teacher Kuno Fischer
for Fischer a crucial one. Through Kant the Platonic doctrine of the ideas
had suffered a radical change. No longer were the ideas to relate to the
things as their concepts and their archetypes. Now the ideas were to serve
knowledge, not its object. As an idea of reason, affinity stood as an ideal for
concept formation, a maxim for the conduct of intellect (see Fischer 1869,
pp. 592-97). A similar conception would hold for his pupil Weber also. In
377
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therefore, he is mortal'" (1904b, pp. 440-41). While the term here is "inner
affinity" rather than "elective affinity," the reference to "adequacy" may
serve to connect this passage with the later one in Economy and Society,
more, important here for the logic of elective affinity in Weber's usage are
his reference to the analysis of constructs into judgments and his denial of
necessity in the relationships between those judgments. The former would
yield the framework for the idea of elective affinity; the latter, its locus in
the order of his thought.
As with so many points of epistemology and logic, it was his friend and
explicitly display everything that was already conceived within the concept. Accordingly, analytical definition translates the concept into a judgment or into a series of judgments each of whose subjects is the concept to
be analyzed and whose predicates form the features . . ." ([1888] 1915,
pp. 57-58). But this translation of an individual concept into judgments
goes much further in its consequences, as Rickert continues:
... we know that the logical ideal of our knowledge consists of a complete
system of judgments, whose subjects and predicates are constant, therefore defined concepts. Let us imagine this systematization of our knowledge
accomplished in that direction. We could then compare the content of our
knowledge with a net of threads in which the fixed knots represent the
concepts; the threads, on the other hand, which go from one knot to the
other are to delineate the connections between the concepts, that is, the
judgments.... Human thought ... could never "envisage" this net in its
totality, but could only traverse it in that it now forms concepts from out
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analyzes these concepts back into judgments. . . . just as the knots in the
net consist only of threads, concepts are nothing else but the transition
or, in the sense of Mellin's table of conceptual affinities and Kant's idea
of reason before it, they possess inner affinity.
But these inner affinities hold not only for Rickert's "net" of constant,
ness of its 'intended meaning.' The actor vaguely 'feels' it rather than
knowing it. . . . Actually effective, that is, fully conscious and clear meaningful action is in reality always only a limiting case. . . . But that is not
the inner affinities of the words will be reflected at their limit in those
concepts. Whether inner or elective, in the meanings of the words the af-
MUNDUS INTELLIGIBILIS
"Action," said Weber in the most basic of his definitions, "is . . . to mean
a human behavior . . . if and insofar as the actor or actors attach a sub-
a possible action and that, conversely, every action portrays the meaning
in that lexicon to which it is referred. Thus, the world of actions, both
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published the year after Weber's death but no doubt composed and discussed while he was still alive, Rickert states that ". .. 'incorporeal' need
of his universe of meanings. For the actors of Weber's sociology have that
choice. Very late in its history and much circumscribed in scope, Kant's
doctrine of the empirical and the intelligible characters (1902-, 3:368-77)
makes itself felt in Weber's definitions of action as behavior oriented to
meaning and of sociology as "a science that seeks to understand social action
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acter into the chain of empirical causality by means of ethically normative actions" (1905b, p. 108) remained a limit concept in two related
senses. First, and most familiarly, in the sense of the value neutrality of his
social science: "An empirical science can teach no one what it is he ought
to do but rather only what it is he can do and-in certain circumstanceswhat it is he wants to do" (1904a, p. 27 [1949, p. 54]). But then con-
by the inner affinities of the elements of his lexicon. Just as these structure
its elements into networks of meanings, so do they structure his possible
actions into constellations. And the more and with the greater constancy
his actions are oriented to his ultimate values, the more they fall under the
values is beyond the ken of social science. Therefore, Weber denies necessity
in the relationships constituting the conceptual constructs of his science,
despite all adequacy or inner affinity. But with that denial comes a second
one: without that necessity there could be no a priori foundation for the
chemistry of the 18th century, social science could never be anything more
than a systematic art based on a divorce of the empirical from the rational.
That yields the locus of elective affinity in the order of Max Weber's
thought.
ELECTIVE AFFINITY
values that renders Weber's social science problematical within the Kantian
bounds of his order of discourse, even as this freedom derives from that
Kantian frame. The logic of elective affinity would provide a solution. Here
a metaphor may be of use. Values are related to meanings as are the constellations to the stars. They are not their source and in no way could knowledge
of meanings determine choice of values. For the elements of the mundus in-
telligibilis are multivalent. Their affinities are manifold and may be of three
kinds. They may join the elements of the mundus intelligibilis to one
another through the intersections of their meanings. They may exclude
those elements from one another through a like intersection with change
of sign. There may be no intersection, but through the former all meanings
are joined, however indirectly. A meaning in total isolation from the rest
is no meaning at all. The greater the number of positive inner affinities
between two elements vis-a-vis the total possible number, the more strongly
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Weber's erudition and insight would meet with his order of discourse. From
chemistry and Bergman would come the basic paradigm of elective affinity;
from literature and Goethe, its application to the portrayal of social relationships; from philosophy and Kant, the art of divorce of the empirical
from the rational and the affinity of all things in their possibility. As a
maxim for the conduct of scholarship, elective affinity would suggest the
construction of ideal-types derived from the universe of ordinary language
and the analysis of those types according to their judgments in order to
trace in their elective affinities the actors' choices of possible actions. That
yields a logic for a sociology--die verstehende-which would "in the con-
POSTSCRIPT
Weber never worked out the logical consequences implicit in his own usage
of elective affinity. But despite the informality of his usage, these consequences can be inferred from its diversity through recourse to the order of
discourse which formed its substrate. For Weber, in the great tradition of
words in their ordinary usage by the actors in history. Viewed from within
the Kantian bounds of his order of discourse, those actors are free in their
choice of actual actions. Thus, history would be a logical chaos were it not
for an order in the universe of the meanings to which those actors orient
the greater or lesser extents to which they possess inner affinity through the
sible actions are given by the elective affinities of their universe of meanings.
The order of the actual, the course of history and the structure of society,
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is to be read from this order of the possible. The task of Weber's science is
to portray its changing constellations.
REFERENCES
Adelung, Johann Christoph. 1801. Grammatisch-kritisches Worterbuch der hoch-deutschen mundart. Vol. 4. Leipzig: Breitkopf.
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