Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo [No. 20329. March 16, 1923]
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, petitioner, vs. JOAQUIN JARAMILLO, as
register of deeds of the City of Manila, respondent.
1.CHATTEL MORTGAGE; REGISTRATION; NOTICE.The efficacy of the act of
recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that registration operates as
constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the
instrument must be discovered in the document itself, in relation with the fact of
notice. Registration adds nothing to the instrument, considered as a source of title,
and affects nobody's rights except as a species of constructive notice.
2,ID. ; ID. ; FUNCTION OF REGISTER.The duties of a register of deeds in
respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are purely of a ministerial
character, and he is clothed with no judicial or quasi-judicial power to
determine the-nature of the property, whether real or personal, which is
the subject of the mortgage. Generally speaking, he should accept the
qualification of the property adopted by the person who presents the
instrument for registration and should place the instrument on record,
upon payment of the proper fee, leaving the effects of registration to be
determined by the court if such question should arise for legal
determination.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.
STREET, J.:
230
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Refining Co. vs, Jarque
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a
chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel
mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is
essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the
record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a
vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity.
5.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; EFFECT OF ABSENCE OF AFFIDAVIT OF GOOD FAITH.The
Chattel Mortgage Law, in its section 5, in describing what shall be deemed sufficient
to constitute a good chattel mortgage, includes the requirement of an affidavit of
good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The absence of the
affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers.
As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith
required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third
persons.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Hontiveros, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Thos. G. Ingalls, Vicente Pelaez and DeWitt, Perkins & Brady for appellant.
D. G. McVean and Vicente L. Faelnar for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.;,
626
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Presbitero vs. Fernandez
Property; Sugar quotas deemed immovable property; Levy not valid if copy of order
and description of property is not filed with Register of Deeds.As an improvement
attached to land, by express provision of law (Section 9, Act 4166), though not
physically so united, sugar quotas are inseparable therefrom, just like servitudes
and other real rights over an immovable, and should be considered as immovable or
real property under Article 416 (10) of the Civil Code. The fact that the Philippine
Trade Act of 1946 (U.S. Public Law 371-79th Congress) allows transfers of sugar
quotas does not militate against their immovability. There cannot be a sugar
plantation owner without land to which the quota is attached; and there can exist no
quota without there being first a corresponding plantation. Hence, a levy made by
the sheriff upon a sugar quota is null and void if not in compliance with the
procedure prescribe in Section 14, Rule 39, in relation with Section 7, Rule 59, of the
Rules of Court, requiring the filing with the register of deeds of a copy of the orders
together with a description of the property.
PETITION for a writ of certiorari against the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto and Hilado & Hilado for petitioner.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Manuel Soriano for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L.,J.: Presbitero vs. Fernandez, 7 SCRA 625, No. L-19527 March 30, 1963
682
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Lacson Ledesma
Australia & China, 41 Phil., 596; Te Pate vs. Ingersoll, 43 Phil., 394). It cannot be
denied, however, that section 4 of Act No. 1508, otherwise known as the Chattel
Mortgage Law, implicitly modified article 1865 of the Civil Code in the sense that a
contract of pledge and that of chattel mortgage, to be effective as against third
persons, need not appear in public instruments provided the thing pledged or
mortgaged be delivered or placed in the possession of the creditor (Mahoney vs.
Tuason, 39 Phil., 952).
2.CORPORATIONS; STOCK CERTIFICATES; NEGOTIABLE CHARACTER THEREOF.
Certificates of stock or of stock dividends, under the Corporation Law, are quasi
negotiable instruments in the sense that they may be given in pledge or mortgage
to secure an obligation. The question is settled in this wise by the weight of
American authorities and it is the modern doctrine of general acceptance by the
courts. "In view, however, of the fact that certificates of stock, while not negotiable
in the sense of the law merchant, like bills and notes, are so framed and dealt with
as to be transferable, when properly indorsed, by mere delivery, and as they
frequently convey, by estoppel against the corporation or against prior holders, as
good a title to the transferee as if they were negotiable, and, inasmuch as a large
commercial use is made of such certificates as collateral security, and it is to the
public interest that such use should be simplified and facilitated by placing them as
nearly as possible on the plane of commercial paper, they are often spoken of and
treated as quasi negotiable, that is, as having some of the attributes and partaking
of the character of negotiable instruments, in passing from hand to hand, especially
where they are accompanied by an assignment and power of attorney, executed in
blank, to transfer them to anyone who may obtain possession as holders, even
though such assignment and power are under seal." (14 C. J., 665, sec. 1034; South
Bend First Nat Bank vs. Lanier, 20 Law. ed., 172; Weniger vs. Success Min. Co., 227
Fed., 548; Scott vs. Pequonnock Nat. Bank, 15 Fed., 494.)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Barrios, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
William E. Greenbaum and Ohnick & Opisso f or appellant.
Nolan & Hernaez for appellee Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
683
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tumalad vs. Vicencio
Same; Property; Status of buildings as immovable property.It is obvious that the
inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of
what may constitute real properties (art. 415, New Civil Code) could only mean one
thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property irrespective of whether or
not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.
Same; Same; Same; Deviations from rule.Certain deviations, however, have been
allowed for various reasons. In the case of Manarang vs. Ofilada, No. L-8133, 18 May
1956, 99 Phil. 109, this Court stated that it is undeniable that the parties to a
contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would
be real property. Again, in the case of Luna vs. Encarnacion, No. L-4637, 30 June
1952, 91 Phil. 531, the subject of the contract designated as Chattel Mortgage was
a house of mixed materials, and this Court held therein that it was a valid Chattel
mortgage because it was so expressly designated and specifically that the property
given as security is a house of mixed materials, which by its very nature is
considered personal property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason; Owner is estopped.The view that parties to a
deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for
the purposes of said contract, is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Hence, if a house
belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may
be mortgaged as a personal property as so stipulated in the document of mortgage.
It should be noted, however, that the principle is predicated on statements by the
owner declaring his house to be a chattel, a conduct that may conceivably estop
him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
Same; Contracts; By ceding, selling or transferring house by way of chattel
mortgage, house is treated as chattel.In the contract, the house on rented land is
not only expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that the
mortgagor . . . voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel
Mortgage the property together with its leasehold rights over the lot on which it is
constructed and participation. . . Although there is no specific statement referring
to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a
property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could not have meant
to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so
that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming
otherwise. Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which defendantsappel145
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tumalad vs. Vicencio
Same; Mortgagor is entitled to remain in possession during period of redemption
and to collect rents.Since the defendants-appellants were occupying the house at
the time of the auction sale, they are entitled to remain in possession during the
period of redemption or within one year from and after 27 March 1956, the date of
the auction sale, and to collect the rents or profits during the said period.
Remedial law; Review by Supreme Court of palpable errors even when not assigned.
It will be noted further that in the case at bar the period of redemption had not
yet expired when action was instituted in the court of origin, and that plaintiffs
appellees did not choose to take possession under Section 7, Act No. 3135, as
amended, which is the law selected by the parties to govern the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. Neither was there an allegation to that effect.
Since plaintiffs-appellees right to possess was not yet born at the filing of the
complaint, there could be no violation or breach thereof. Wherefore, the original
complaint stated no cause of action and was prematurely filed. For this reason, the
same should be ordered dismissed, even if there was no assignment of error to that
effect. The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors
not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just decision of the case.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Lantin, J.