Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs.

The House of Representatives

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a

one-year period.

Carpio Morales, J.:

GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

415 SCRA 44

Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a

Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was endorsed and
was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution.

Certiorari and prohibition

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October
23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense?
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Held:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although
Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of
public trust, elude a precise definition.
2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the
term initiate a meaning different from filing.

Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011

Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept. 1 and
7, 2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the petitioner, simultaneously
referred to the House Committee on Justice, sufficient in form and substance on
grounds that she was denied due process and that the said resolutions violated the
one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers.
Court dismissed the petition.
Facts:

22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session,
private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestao
(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao

27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker

Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in
the Order of Business

3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John

Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon
(Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed
by Representatives Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment

Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to
House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules
to include it in the Order of Business

11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House

Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both

complaints sufficient in form

2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the

15th Congress was published

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two

complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions

of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these
violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings

3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.

Issue/s:

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June
2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23,
2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

1.

Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

2.

Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of

Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process to the
Petitioner

3.

Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the

Constitution

Ratio:
1.

1.

NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

 Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary
the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,
and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable standards for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review
1.

2.
DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of
promulgation the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?

(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the
impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJs, Rep.
Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the Sandiganbayan

Presumption of regularity

The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant

of rule-making power in the HOR

the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional

requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or
resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of
facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the committee

The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating
the Rules.

impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic,

and not for the punishment of the offender
1.

3.

THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26,
2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no
second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking

initial action of said complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice)

IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

Rationale of the one-year bar: that the purpose of the one-year bar is twofold: 1)to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature
to do its principal task [of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once
the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitionerintervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the
Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a

summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng

gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a
panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the
incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified
the panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as
principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases
fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are
government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under
said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249
was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting
the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of
R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249,
including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners
right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as
the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to
continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto
statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the
Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the
case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is
presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving
certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all
cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally,
provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws
are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish

penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for
their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction,
its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds
can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office
of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information
which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not
indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and
then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that
the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the
exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to
his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the
charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
FELICITO S. MACALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN

accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a

crime within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
International Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Facts:

[G.R. Nos. 140199-200. February 6, 2002]

Facts:
On September 16, 1992, two informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner,being then the Assistant Manager of the
Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance
Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a
government-controlled corporation, and his wife, Liwayway S. Tan,
charging them with estafa through falsification of official documents and
frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.
However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the
defense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not
a public officer because the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), formerly the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned or controlledcorporation
with original charter.

On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a

resolution denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
The Issue:
Whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public officer
within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.
Ruling:
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was
incorporated under the general law on corporations, it follows inevitably
that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019,
as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The
only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private
individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal,

June 7, 1995: Congress passed R.A. 8046, authorizing

COMELEC to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a
computerized election system and allowed the poll body to test
the system in the March 1996 elections in the ARMM.
December 22, 1997: Congress enacted R.A. 8436 authorizing
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the
process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating
the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated
the acquisition of automated counting mechanisms (ACMs),
computer equipment, devices and materials.
During the May 11, 1998 elections, COMELEC decided not to
pursue a national implementation and instead limited
implementation of the AES to the ARMM. However, due to the
failure of the machines to read some of the automated ballots
correctly, the poll body later ordered a manual count for the
entire province of Sulu.
October 29, 2002: COMELEC adopted in its Resolution 020170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved
to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated
Election System; namely, Phase I Voter Registration and
Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and
Canvassing System; and Phase III Electronic Transmission.
January 24, 2003: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion
to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the
request of COMELEC, she authorized the release of an
additional P500 million.
January 28, 2003: the Commission issued an "Invitation to
Apply for Eligibility and to Bid
February 17, 2003: the COMELEC released the RFP to procure
the election automation schemes.
February 18, 2003: The Bids and Awards Committee convened
a pre-bid conference and gave prospective bidders until March
10, 2003 to submit their bids.
Out of the 57 bidders, BAC found MPC and the Total Information
Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. After being referred to
the BACs Technical Working Group and the DOST, it was found
that both of them obtained failed marks in the technical
evaluation.
April 15, 2003: COMELEC promulgated Resolution no. 6074
awarding project to MPC. The Commission publicized this
resolution and the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.
May 29, 2003: five individuals and entities (including the herein
Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and
Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to COMELEC Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to
Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in
which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein
the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and
procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at
length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.

Issues:
1.
2.

WON the petitioners have locus standi.

WON the instant petition is premature.

3.

WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the

bidding process and the awarding of the contract to MPC.

Held/Ratio:
1.

2.

Yes, petitioners have standing. According to the court, the

matter at hand is a matter of public concern and imbued with
public interest and possesses transcendental importance.
Moreover, the court has held that taxpayers are allowed to
sue when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds, or if public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose; or when petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In the
case, the petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material
interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
used. In the petition, they claim that the bidding was defective,
the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the
contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to
restrain respondents from implementing the contract and from
making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds.
No, the petition is not premature. The respondents claim that
the petitioners acted prematurely, given the fact that they had
not first utilized the protest mechanism available to them under
RA 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement
Reform Act. The court disagreed with this assertion. The letter
addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29,
2003 28 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was
an actual written protest against the decision of the poll
body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter
alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president,
Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is
sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to
the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184. Even
without the letter of protest, the Court still holds that the
petitioners need not exhaust administrative remedies, citing
Paat v. Court of Appeals. The case enumerates the instances
when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would
be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and

(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of

judicial intervention."
According to the court, the issue falls within the exception within nos.
7, 10 and 11.
3.

Yes, there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

COMELEC.
Bidding:
a. The Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what
manner and by what standards or criteria the
condition, performance and/or readiness of the
machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and
thereafter given the passing mark.
b. The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project
involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM
hardware but also the development of three (3) types
of software, which are intended for use in the
following:
1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
3. Election Day Use."
c. In short, the COMELEC evaluated the bids and made
the decision to award the Contract to the "winning"
bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the
ACMs running a base" software. That software
was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo"
software, which would not be the actual one that
would be used on Election Day.
d. The COMELEC violated the public policy on public
biddings by (1) allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in
the bidding even though it was not qualified to do
so and (2) by eventually awarding the contract to
MPC/MPEI. The further desecrated the law on public
bidding by allowing the winning bidder to change
and alter the subject of the contract (software), in
effect allowing a substantive amendment without
public bidding.
e. According to the Court, the whole point in going
through the public bidding exercise was completely
lost. The very rationale was totally subverted by the
commission.

Awarding:
a. The public bidding system designed by COMELEC
under its RFP (Request for Proposal for the
Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of
a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first
envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish
its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to
perform the contract if its bid was accepted, while the
second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself.
b. The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal
documents such as articles of incorporation, business
registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit,
VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents
containing documentary evidence to establish the track
record of the bidder and its technical and production
capabilities to perform the contract; and financial
documents, including audited financial statements for
the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial
capacity.
c. However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint
venture agreement, consortium agreement,
memorandum of agreement, or business plan

executed among the members of the purported

consortium. So, it necessarily follows that, during the
bidding process, COMELEC had no basis at all for
determining that the alleged consortium really
existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the
arrangements among the members were satisfactory
and sufficient to ensure compliance with the contract.

Ruling: The Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and
VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074
Dissenting Opinion:
Tinga, J:

no constitutional provision or letter of a statute was

alleged to have been violated. The Court nullified the
contract for an automated election system (AES)
simply on the ground that in making the award the
COMELEC has allegedly violated its bidding rules and
an unfounded apprehension that the counting
machines would not work on Election Day. On the
other hand, not one of the losing bidders has joined
the petition; neither did the petitioners question the
fairness of the price tag for the machines.
In deciding the instant case, the Court shall consider only
the undisputed or admitted facts and resolve only the
specific questions raised by the parties. The Court is
not a repository of remedies or a super-legal-aid
bureau. We cannot grant relief for every perceived
violation of the law or worse, on the basis of prophetic
wisdom.
It is not the Courts function to actively ensure that the
automation is successfully implemented or that the
elections are made free of fraud, violence, terrorism and
other threats to the sanctity of the ballot. This duty lies
primarily with the COMELEC.
The Court has constantly underscored the importance of
giving the COMELEC considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the objective for which it was created to promote free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, at no time
during the entire bidding process did the petitioners
question the determination of the COMELEC Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) finding Mega Pacific
Consortium (MPC) eligible to bid. Under R.A. 9184,
decisions of the BAC should be appealed to the COMELEC
en banc. Consequently, the determination of the BAC that
MPC was eligible to bid, adopted subsequently by the
COMELEC, became final.
Considering the circumstances, the premature invocation
of this Courts judicial power is fatal to the petitioners
cause of action.
[W]hatever perceived deficiencies there are in the
supplementary contracts entered into by MPEI and the
other members of the consortium as regards their joint and
several undertaking were cured, or better still prevented
from arising, by the above-quoted provisions from which it
can be immediately established that each of the
members of MPC is solidarily liable with the lead
company, MPEI, albeit only for the particular contract
or aspect of the joint venture of which it is in charge.
[The] paper requirements should yield to the reality that,
collectively, the members of the consortium have
furnished the COMELEC with sufficient information to

enable it to judiciously gauge MPCs eligibility and

qualifications. The strict and inflexible adherence to the
bidding requirements by each and every component of the
consortium advanced by the petitioners would negate the
salutary purpose of R.A. 8436 and frustrate the longanticipated modernization of the electoral system.
Reckoned from the standpoint of the established legal
presumptions of validity of official acts and regularity
in the performance of official duty, it is unjustified to
speculate, as the ponencia does, on the good or bad
motives that impelled the COMELEC to award the Contract
to MPC.

PCGG vs Desierto
G.R. No. 140231
July 9, 2007
Facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans,
determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate
actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No.
61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and
review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a
"behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation
is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government
officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or
agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation
of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate
layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being
sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was
made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group
(TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said
loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by
NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital
and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation
revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters
of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value
from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required
percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a
public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the
marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII
was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the
mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time
of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6%
of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador,
petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint
against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the
following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the
Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. DiazSalcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a
Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo
recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for

prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the

recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated
July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23,
1999.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g),
specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Held:
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it
must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter,
to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is
the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers
without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise
of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not
interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the
office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if
they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public
prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the
prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary
for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where
the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied, none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner,
the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must
have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there
is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling
of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the
Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned.
Rabe vs. Flores, A.M. No. P-97-1247. May 14, 1997
FACTS:

Narita Rabe filed an administrative complaint "Conduct Unbecoming a

Government Employee, Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service and
Abuse of Authority" against Delsa M. Flores, Interpreter III at the Regional
Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao. The charge alleged that Mrs. Flores
took advantage of her position as a court employee by claiming a stall at
the extension of the Public Public and talking the law into her hands when
she destroyed the stall of Narita Rabe and brought the materials to the
police station of Panabo, Davao.
The Supreme Court issued a Resolution, absolving Mrs. Flores of the
charge but the Court required respondent to explain why she should not be
administratively dealt with for securing certification which resulted to
conflicting dates of employment as a court interpreter and as assessment
clerk in the Office of the Municipal Assessor and collecting her last salary
in the latter capacity, taking oath in the former on a later date; the nonreporting of her business interest in sworn statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service for
several years; non-divestment of her interest in said business within sixty
(60) days from her assumption into office; and reporting in her daily time
records that she was present in the court on several dates but the contract
of lease over the market stall expressly provides that she has to personally
conduct her business and be present at the stall otherwise the same would
be cancelled.
In her letter of explanation, respondent claimed that her work assumption
in the court is in pursuance to a directive sent to her and in fact, she
already reported to the court in order to familiarize herself with the scope of
her duties even before the formal date of assumption. Mrs. Flores also
admitted to have received the salary from the local government covering
the period after the date of her formal assumption in the court to augment
the educational expenses of her children and refunded the same only
when her attention was called by the court. Respondent avers that she did
not divulge any business interest in her because she was never engaged
in business during said period although she had a stall in the market. She
also answered that she was in fact present on the dates indicated in her
daily time records and that the lease contract was never implemented
because it became the subject of a civil case.
The court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In its report, the OCA found
respondent guilty of dishonesty and failure to report her business interest,
and recommended that the penalty of dismissal be imposed on her. The
Supreme Court En Banc then reviewed the OCA's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Delsa M. Flores is guilty of conduct (dishonesty and failure
to report her business interest) unbecoming a government employee, acts
prejudicial to the interest of the service and abuse of authority and should
therefore be removed from office?
RULING:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness
from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should
conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and
suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal
behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their
everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character
at all times and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage

public decency.
The failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she
herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No.
6713.
Delsa M. Flores is dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement

benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in

any branch or instrumentality of the government, including governmentowned and controlled corporations.