Sie sind auf Seite 1von 35

Tio vs.

151 SCRA 208

FACTS: Valentino Tio is a videogram operator who assailed

the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also
reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal
Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be
collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video
tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought
about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has
adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessen the revenue being
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that
there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the
President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the
Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President.

HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains

an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11
of the PD of authority to the Board to "solicit the direct
assistance of other agencies and units of the government and
deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel
of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions
for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but
merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made."
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of
the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited
period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject
to the direction and control of the Board." That the grant of
such authority might be the source of graft and corruption
would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the
eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without
adequate remedy in law.

Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v.

Commissioner Fe Barin, et al.
G.R. No. 150974

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.


June 29, 2007

The RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power

Industry Reform Act of 2001), was enacted on 8 June 2001
and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 38 of RA 9136
provides for the abolition of the ERB and the creation of the
The ERC was composed of Commissioner Fe B. Barin and
Deputy Commissioners Carlos R. Alindada, Leticia V. Ibay,
Oliver B. Butalid, and Mary Anne B. Colayco (collectively,
Commissioners). The Commissioners assumed office on 15
August 2001. Pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9136, the
Commissioners issued the proposed Table of Organization,
Staffing Pattern, and Salary Structure on 25 September 2001
which the President of the Philippines approved on 13
November 2001. Meanwhile, KERB submitted to the
Commissioners its Resolution No. 2001-02 on 13 September
2001. Resolution No. 2001-02 requested the Commissioners
for an opportunity to be informed on the proposed plantilla
positions with their equivalent qualification standards.
The Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and
hiring of ERC employees. A portion of the guidelines reflects
the Commissioners view on the selection and hiring of the
ERC employees that Civil Service law, rules and regulations
will not apply directly apply to ERCs current efforts to establish
a new organization and it will have a suppletory application to
the extent possible regard to the selection and placement of
employees in the ERC.
KERB sent a letter to the Commissioners stating the KERB
members objection to the Commissioners stand that Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory
application in the selection and placement of the ERC
employees. KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the
ERB or change the ERBs character as an economic regulator
of the electric power industry. KERB insisted that RA 9136
merely changed the ERBs name to the ERC and expanded

the ERBs functions and objectives. KERB sent the

Commissioners yet another letter on 13 November 2001.
KERB made a number of requests: (1) the issuance of a
formal letter related to the date of filing of job applications,
including the use of Civil Service application form no. 212; (2)
the creation of a placement/recruitment committee and setting
guidelines relative to its functions, without prejudice to existing
Civil Service rules and regulations; and (3) copies of the
plantilla positions and their corresponding qualification
standards duly approved by either the President of the
Philippines or the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Commissioner Barin replied to KERBs letter on 15 November
2001. She stated that Civil Service application form no. 212
and the ERC-prescribed application format are substantially
placement/recruitment committee is no longer necessary
because there is already a prescribed set of guidelines for the
recruitment of personnel. The ERC hired an independent
consultant to administer the necessary tests for the technical
and managerial levels. Finally, the ERC already posted the
plantilla positions, which prescribe higher standards, as
approved by the Department of Budget and Management.
Commissioner Barin stated that positions in the ERC do not
need the prior approval of the CSC, as the ERC is only
required to submit the qualification standards to the CSC.
KERB, fearful of the uncertainty of the employment
status of its members, filed the present petition on 20
December 2001.
Issue: Whether the Commissioners of the ERC were correct in
disregarding and considering merely suppletory in character
the protective mantle of RA 6656 as to the ERB employees or
petitioner in this case

The petition has no merit.
Throughout the years, the scope of the regulation has
gradually narrowed from that of public services in 1902 to the
electricity industry and water resources in 1972 to the electric
power industry and oil industry in 1977 to the electric industry
alone in 1998. The ERC retains the ERBs traditional rate and
service regulation functions. However, the ERC now also has
to promote competitive operations in the electricity market. RA
9136 expanded the ERCs concerns to encompass both the
consumers and the utility investors.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the
restructuring of the industry, including the privatization of the
assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition
to a competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of
various government agencies and the private entities. The law
ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors,
namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and
its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.
In tandem with the restructuring of the industry is the
establishment of a strong and purely independent regulatory
body. Thus, the law created the ERC in place of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB).
To achieve its foretasted goal, the law has reconfigured
the organization of the regulatory body.
There is no question in our minds that, because of the
expansion of the ERCs functions and concerns, there was a
valid abolition of the ERB. Thus, there is no merit to KERBs

allegation that there is an impairment of the security of tenure

of the ERBs employees.
MERALCO v. Genaro Lualhati, et al.
G.R. No. 166818

December 6, 2006

MERALCO filed before the former Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB), now the ERC, an "Application for Approval of Revision
of Rate Schedules and Appraisal of Properties with Prayer for
Provisional Authority" which would result in an increase in its
basic charge by about thirty centavos per kilowatt hour (Php
While the aforesaid application was still pending, Republic Act
No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)," took effect on 26 June 2001. It
abolished the ERB and created ERC to succeed the former.
Section 36 of EPIRA required all electric distribution utilities to
file their application for the unbundling of their rates for the
approval of the ERC.
On 30 October 2001, pursuant to Section 36 of EPIRA, the
ERC issued an order requiring all electric distribution utilities to
file their application for unbundled rates. In compliance
thereof, MERALCO filed its application with the ERC for the
approval of its unbundled rates3 and appraisal of its properties.
This application also proposed an increase of P1.1228/kwh in
MERALCOs electricity rates. Said application was docketed
as ERC Case No. 2001-900.
Several oppositors objected to the said application, including
Mr. Genaro Lualhati, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),

Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Gabriela, Kalipunan ng Damayang

Mahihirap (KADAMAY), and BAYAN MUNA.
The ERC issued an Order consolidating the earlier petition for
increase of rate filed by MERALCO in ERC Case No. 2001646 with the application for rate unbundling, ERC Case No.
After conducting several public hearings with the oppositors
having been given opportunity to participate therein, ERC
rendered its consolidated Decision approving the increase of
rates of MERALCO and discontinuing the PPA upon the
effectivity of the unbundled rates.

Administrative Code could have repealed Section 2 of

Commonwealth Act No. 325. Perusal of the relevant provisions
of these two statutes, viz Commonweath Act No. 325
Sec. 2. In acting upon any proceedings, regarding the
approval of basic rates of amendments of existing rates
of any public service, the Auditor General shall assign
auditors to assist the Public Service Commission and
shall furnish such financial data as may be required by
the Public Service Commission.
The Administrative Code of 1987

The oppositors and MERALCO filed separate motions for

reconsideration of the ERC decision. The ERC modified its
decision. Hence, this instant petitions filed by Meralco and the
The Court of Appeals ruled that COA audit is a prerequisite to
an adjustment in rates and approval on the unbundled rates.
Issue: Whether the COA audit is a pre-requisite and an
indispensable procedure before the ERC can approve rate
increase and act on the unbundling application of MERALCO.
Ruling: No. The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Municipality of Daet case
was inapplicable to the case under consideration as it was
rendered before the promulgation of the Administrative Code
of 1987. The Court of Appeals, however, did not bother to
explain how Section 22, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Book V of the

Sec.22. Authority to Examine Accounts of Public

Utilities. (1) The Commission shall examine and audit
the books, records and accounts of public utilities in
connection with the fixing of rates of every nature, or in
relation to the proceedings of the proper regulatory
agencies, for purposes of determining franchise taxes.
readily shows that there is nothing in the cited provision of the
Administrative Code which indicates that it bars the regulatory
body from approving rates without prior COA audit, neither
does it give a hint that it effectively repeals the pertinent
provision of Commonwealth Act No. 325.
The established rule in this jurisdiction is that findings of
administrative or regulatory agencies on matters within their
technical area of expertise are generally accorded not only
respect but finality if such findings are supported by substantial

evidence.12 Rate-fixing calls for a technical examination and a

specialized review of specific details which the courts are illequipped to enter; hence, such matters are primarily entrusted
to the administrative or regulating authority.13 Thus, this Court
finds no reversible error on the part of ERC in rendering its
assailed decision and order.
However, while ruling in said manner, this Court is cognizant
that such ruling has far-reaching effects and is of utmost
significance to the public, especially to the poor, who face the
threat of deeper wallowing in the quagmire of financial distress
once the burden of electricity rate increases is passed on to
them. Better judgment, therefore, calls for this Court to temper
the rigidity of its decision.
Although affirming the decision and the order of the ERC
approving the rate increases for electricity, this Court is not
closing its eyes to the fundamental principle of social justice so
emphatically expressed by the late President Magsaysay in his
statement: "He who has less in life should have more in law."
The concern for the poor is recognized as a public duty, and
the protection of the rights of those marginalized members of
society have always dutifully been pursued by the Court as a
sacred mission. Consistent with this duty and mission, the
Court deems it proper to approve the rate increases applied
for by MERALCO provisionally, i.e., MERALCO to impose
provisional rate increases while directing the ERC, at the same
time, to seek the assistance of COA in conducting a complete
audit on the books, records and accounts of MERALCO to see
to it that the rate increases that MERALCO has asked for are
reasonable and justified. Stated otherwise, the provisional rate

increases will continue to be subject to its being reasonable

and just until after the ERC has taken the appropriate action
on the COA Report.
The Energy Regulatory Commission is, thus, directed to
request the COA to undertake a complete audit on the books,
records and accounts of MERALCO relative to its
provisionally-approved rate increases and unbundled rates.


The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the
traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order
the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. "Providing
for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport
System. As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the
primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been
the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient
connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA

had "recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating

the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to
the mass transport system to the commuting public through
the provision of mass transport terminal facilities" which plan
is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass
Transport System Project (the Project).The E.O. thus
designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the

Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another

provincial bus operator, later filed a similar petition for
declaratory relief against Executive Secretary Alberto G.
Romulo and MMDAChairman Fernando.

Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of public transportation with a
provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief
before the RTC11 of Manila.
Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando,
was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order
closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals
along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the
pretext of traffic regulation." This impending move, it stressed,
would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc,
Manila and two others in Quezon City. Alleging that the
MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct
provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus
terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property,
Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and
limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under
R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefore and For Other Purposes." Viron
also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of
provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public Service
Act and related laws which mandate public utilities to provide
and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege
of operating as common carriers.

In the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court, the issues were
narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate
traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial
bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and
existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a
common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public
Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus
operators would be deprived of their real properties without
due process of law should they be required to use the
common bus terminals.

Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional

and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners
and operators of public land transportation units over their
respective terminals.

It held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of
the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter
and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property
rights must yield to police power.And petitioners maintain that
the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available
for use government property along EDSA and South
Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created
by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.
WON E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no
relation with third persons.

It does not persuade.
Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for
which the concerned government agencies are directed to
coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus
terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like
respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents
would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals. It
cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect
on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would
mean, among other things, the loss of income from the
operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely,
respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to
property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and
substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the E.O.s
Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of
a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement
has been satisfied by respondents. Respondents posit that the
MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their
bus terminals under the E.O. which, they argue, is
unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and
the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed
with such authority under R.A. No. 7924. It is readily apparent
from the above quoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as
amended, that the President then possessed of and exercising
legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary
policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,
regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and
regulate networks of transportation and communications. The

grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish

and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for
transportation and communications.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not
repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the
people. This power to prescribe regulations to promote the
morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people flows from the
recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the
people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such
power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being
delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be
exercised by the President and administrative boards as well
as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
governments under an express delegation by the Local
Government Code of 1991. The authority of the President to
order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the
designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the
Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires , there being no
legal basis therefor. It bears stressing that under the provisions
of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the
MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the
primary implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the Project in question. By
designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the

Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the

authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires .
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in
the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions,
the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows
that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondents terminals.
Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power
must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted
ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this
Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Garin43 that the MMDA is not vested with police
WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing
disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires


G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of

National Labor Union Inc. (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios

act is not valid as it is not within the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. They also alleged that there are two labor unions
in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood (NWB).
They further contend that NWB is dominated by Toribio himself
hence he favors it over NLU. NLU prays for a new trial as they
were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they
were not able to obtain before, as they were inaccessible and
they were not able to present it before in the Court of Industrial
Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose

functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than
a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or
laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to,
and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 103 (Section 1). In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ

mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more

effective system of official investigation and compulsory
arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is
in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions,
which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may

be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character;
The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to

support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to

support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is

sufficient to observe that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the

thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national

way, a conclusion of law.

The SC further held that that the interest of justice would be

better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted, and the entire
record of the case was remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.

Republic v. CA
324 SCRA 237
The Republic dissatisfied with the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the decision of the Trial court that the
Precision Printing Incorporated the avail of tax amnesty
pursuant to Executive Order No. 41 amended by Executive
Orders No. 54 and 64 dated August 26, 1986, November 4,
1986 and Novemeber 17. 1986.
Petitioner Anchor is submission of facts, that the
corporation was already been assessed as tax deficiency prior
to the promulgation of Revenue Memorandum 4-87 which
was implemented by Executive Order 41.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the

decision of the Trial court finding that the private respondent
tax liability was extinguished when it availed tax amnesty
under Executive Order 41.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
It is decisively clear that R,O 4-87 reckoned the applicability of
the tax amnesty from August 22, 1986 the date when
Executive Order 41 took effect. However, Executive 41
contained no limitation whatsoever delimiting its applicability to
assessment made prior to its effectivity. Rather, the said
Executive Order 41 merely provided for general statement
covering all tax liabilities incurred from 1981-1985.
The Executive Order 41 did not provided exclusionary clauses
regarding the tax liabilities covering only tax liabilities incurred
only from 1986. It must of a general grant of tax amnesty
subject only to cases excepted by it.
The above ruling is in consonance of the rule in Administrative
law that administrative issuance seeking into effect the act of
Congress must be in harmony with the provision of the law, it
cannot modify or supplant the same.

People vs. Maceren

G.R No. 32166

October 18,


On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes,

Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were
charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint
that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted
to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta.
Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric
current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its
current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace.
The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI
affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.

and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize

it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied
in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute.

Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing
in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the
Fisheries Commission is valid.
No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not
warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources



Frank Tupasi Molina was charged of a crime of perjury, in

violation of Section 3, Act no. 1697, when defendant signed a
petition to be permitted to take the examination for the position
of municipal policeman and made a false declaration under
oath that he was qualified to the examinations for municipal
police and have not been charged of any crime

During trial, prosecution presented evidence that the

defendant was sentenced and imprisoned for disturbing public

Defendant argues that said Act was not applicable in the

present case since this Act was only authorizing the
appointment of commissioners, to make official investigations,
fixing their powers, for the payment of witness fees, and for the
punishment of perjury in official investigations.


WON lower court committed error in applying section 3 of Act


declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed is true,

willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty
or perjury, and shall be punished, etc.

Act No. 2169, provides for the reorganization of the municipal

police of the municipalities or provinces and subprovinces, it
further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall
prepare general regulations for the good government,
discipline, and inspection of the municipal police, "compliance
wherewith shall be obligatory for all members of the

Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be eligible for

examination, a candidate shall have the following
requirements: . . . (6) Have no criminal record."

Held: No, The respondent is guilty of the crime charged.

Under Section 3 of Act No. 1697 it provides that: Any person

who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer,
or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands
authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify,
declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,

In accordance with the requirements of said law, the Director

of Constabulary prepared an examination manual, prescribing
at the same time rules for conducting examinations, which
examination manual was approved by the Secretary of
Commerce and Police, and thereby was given the force of law.
We have, therefore, a law which authorizes the administration
of an oath in the present case.

109 Phil. 119, 125

A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of
the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute
authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and
renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with
the provisions of law.

The wife Gloria Montederamos filed on her behalf and
of their 4 minor children claim for compensation with the
Department of Labor of the death of the driver Felepe Cabalde
an employee of the People Land Transportation Company.
Compensation Commission awarded to claimants P 3 494.40
with burial expenses not exceeding P 200.00.

In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes

impracticable for the legislative department of the
Government to provide general regulations for the various
and varying details for the management of a particular
department of the Government. It therefore becomes
convenient for the legislative department of the Government,
by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct,
control, and management of the work of the particular
department of the Government; to authorize certain persons,
in charge of the management, control, and direction of the
particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations
providing for the detail of the management and control of such
department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to
have the force of law, whenever they are found to be in
consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and
objects of the law.

No appeal having been taken from the award, on

October 21, 1954, the mother of the deceased Manuela H. De
Cabalde having custody of the children filed a petition for the
enforcement of awards which was contested by the herein
When the petitioner moved for the postponement of the
trial was denied by the court and failed to appear on the day of
the hearing the Judge Estenzo rendered a decision for the
payment of award and burial expense with interest on the legal
rate together with P500 on Attorneys fees on the refusal of the
petitioner to comply with the said award.
Respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed notice of Appeal
Whether the court lost jurisdiction to enforce award in
Workmen Compensation cases.

Santos v. Estenzo

Petition is denied.

The petitioner contention is devoid of merit, the commission

cannot amend the act of the congress and also the court
acquired the main case (2) two years and half after the rules
was promulgated.
Section 6, Rule 26 of the Workmens Compensation
Commission regulates the fees that may be awarded either in
the Commission or when the decision thereof has been
appealed to the Supreme Court. It does not govern the fees
allowable by the Court of Justice, in proceeding for the
execution of the award of the Commission which is govern by
Rules of Court, when the employer unduly refuses to comply
with the said award.

a month contrary to the terms of the basic law as thereafter

amended. 3 His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective
May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21,
1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a
month, for each of his unmarried minor children below 18
years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the
difference of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of
his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from
July 1, 1963. He would likewise seek for the payment of moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
Respondent, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as
alleged in the petition, would rely primarily in its special and
affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its
administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one
against the government, which cannot prosper without its


The CFI found for respondents. Hence this petition.

The petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a

former member of a recognized guerilla organization which
participated actively in the resistance movement against the
enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a
permanent, physical disability. For having been permanently
incapacitated from work, he filed his claim for disablility
pension with the Philippine Veterans Administration under the
Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65. However,
respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received
by him in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by them.

ISSUE: W.O.N. rules and regulations promulgated by

administrative agencies can prevail over a statue.

Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus before the CFI of Manila
alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under the
Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65, for having been
permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first
awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00

Petition is affirmed. CFI is reversed.
The Court cited the case of Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine
Veterans Administration, promulgated just a month before the
case at bar, where it categorically held that a veteran suffering
from permanent disability is not to be denied what has been
granted him specifically by legislative enactment, which
certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated
by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the
implementation thereof.

It added that the decision of the CFI where it held that the
respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to
process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and
regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions,
unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or
against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained"
is clearly erroneous.
The Court also cited United States v. Tupasi Molina, which
held that "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however,
as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law, they are valid." As well as its ruling in
People v. Santos, wherein it held that an administrative order
betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the
Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be
Finally, the Court said there must be strict compliance with the
legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute
requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No
deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present
Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act
of Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if
it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated
by them were in accordance with what the Veterans' Bill of
Rights provides.

Benito Manuel vs. General Auditing Office

G.R. No. L-28952 December 29, 1971
Petitioner Benito C. Manuel applied for retirement, effective
December 31, 1967, according to law, after having to his credit
more than (20) years of service in the government, included in
which were four successive terms as Mayor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan from January 1, 1952 to December 31, 1967.
Such application was approved on December 5, 1967. He had
likewise sought the commutation of his vacation and sick
leave, filing with the Municipal Treasurer of Lingayen,
Pangasinan on December 22, 1967 a communication to that
In his memorandum filed with respondent General Auditing
Office to which the matter was referred, he stressed that he
was entitled to unused vacation and sick leave earned from
May 31, 1957 (date of effectivity Republic Act No. 1616) to
December 31, 1967, or a period of 10 years and 7 months,
and since his highest salary was P600.00 a month, the total
amount which should accrue to him is P6,000.00, (one month
for every year).
ISSUE: Whether or not an elective official may be entitled in
the event that he voluntarily retires or be separated from the
service without fault on his part to the commutation of his
vacation and sick leave
The petition is meritorious. The decision is reversed.
It is expressly provided under Section 286 of the Revised
Administrative Code that vacation and sick leave shall be
cumulative, any part thereof not taken within the calendar year
earned being carried over the succeeding years with the

employee voluntarily retiring or being separated from the

service without fault on his part, being entitled to the
commutation of all such accumulated vacation or sick leave to
his credit provided that it shall in no case exceed ten (10)
"Officials and employees retired under this Act shall be entitled
to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave,
based on the highest rate received, which they have to their
credit at the time of retirement."
Why then did respondent decide otherwise? It may have been
due to a misreading of Section 2187 of the Revised
Administrative Code. What must have misled respondent was
a failure to take due note that this section deals solely with a
situation when a municipal mayor is absent from his office
because of illness. It does not cover therefore the specific
case here presented of the right of the elective official to a
commutation of his vacation and sick leave upon his
retirement or separation from the service through no fault of
his own. Moreover it must have felt justified in view of the
endorsement of the Commission of the Civil Service, who
applied Section 9 of Civil Service Rule XVI, included in which
is the express injunction that the leave is not cumulative.
Further reflection ought to have cautioned it that certainly this
rule is far from being applicable as on its face it is based on
the aforesaid Section 2187, which as noted is not in point.
"The recognition of the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute,
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v.
Barrias decided in 1908. Then came, in a 1914 decision,
United States v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of the scope of
such competence. Thus: 'Of course the regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be

in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the claim of
petitioner to a commutation of his vacation and sick leave not
exceeding ten (10) months must be upheld, inasmuch as the
facts show that the total amount sought to be paid to him was
precisely in accordance with the controlled legal provisions.
The ruling now on review must be versed and petitioner's plea
Deluao v. Casteel 29 SCRA 350
In 1940 Nicanor Casteel filed a fishpond application for
a big tract of swampy land in the then Sitio of Malalag (now the
Municipality of Malalag), Municipality of Padada, Davao. No
action was taken thereon by the authorities concerned. During
the Japanese occupation, he filed another fishpond application
for the same area, but because of the conditions then
prevailing, it was not acted upon either. On December 12,
1945 he filed a third fishpond application for the same area,
which, after a survey, was found to contain 178.76 hectares.
However, his third application was denied by reason that the
area needs a firewood protection.
Despite the said rejection, Casteel did not lose interest. He
filed a motion for reconsideration. While this motion was
pending resolution, he was advised by the district forester of
Davao City that no further action would be taken on his
motion, unless he filed a new application for the area
concerned. So he filed on May 27, 1947 his fishpond
application 1717.

Meanwhile, several applications were submitted by other

persons for portions of the area covered by Casteel's

Sometime in January 1951 Nicanor Casteel forbade Inocencia

Deluao from further administering the fishpond, and ejected
the latter's representative,Jesus Donesa, from the premises.

Because of the threat poised upon his position by the above

applicants who entered upon and spread themselves within
the area, Casteel realized the urgent necessity of expanding
his occupation thereof by constructing dikes and cultivating
marketable fishes, in order to prevent old and new squatters
from usurping the land. But lacking financial resources at that
time, he sought financial aid from his uncle Felipe Deluao who
then extended loans totalling more or less P27,000 with which
to finance the needed improvements on the fishpond. Hence,
a wide productive fishpond was built.

Alleging violation of the contract of service (exhibit A) entered

into between Inocencia Deluao and Nicanor Casteel, Felipe
Deluao and Inocencia Deluao on April 3, 1951 filed an action
in the Court of First Instance of Davao for specific performance
and damages against Nicanor Casteel and Juan Depra.

He filed two administrative cases against the applicants when

the portion of the property was already occupied. However, the
Director of Fisheries rejected the protest of the respondent

After the issues were joined, the case was set for trial. Then
came a series of postponements. The lower court (Branch I,
presided by Judge Enrique A. Fernandez) finally issued on
March 21, 1956 an order in open court that the hearing of this
case is hereby transferred to May 2 and 3, 1956 at 8:30
o'clock in the morning. And any circumstance this Court will
not entertain any other transfer of hearing of this case and if
the parties will not be ready on that day set for hearing, the
court will take the necessary steps for the final determination
of this case.

Inocencia Deluao (wife of Felipe Deluao) as party of the first

part, and Nicanor Casteel as party of the second part,
executed a contract denominated a "contract of service".
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a
decision in DANR Case 353, rendered that Casteel be
reinstated and given due course of the area stated. On the
same day the Secretary of Agriculture also revoked the
Fishpond Permit of the rival applicants.

The plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a

preliminary injunction. The respondent filed a motion to
dissolve the injunction, alleging that he was the owner of the
fishpond. The court denied such motion.

The defendants' counsel received a notice of hearing dated

April 21, 1956, issued by the office of the Clerk of Court of the
Court of First Instance of Davao, setting the hearing of the
case for May 2 and 3, 1956 before Judge Amador Gomez of
Branch II. The defendants, thru counsel, on April 26, 1956 filed
a motion for postponement.

The branch II of the court under the examination of the record

of the case considering that various incidents have already
been considered and resolved by Judge Fernandez on various
occasions. The court referred back the case to Branch 1 for
the consideration and termination of the case.
On the scheduled date of hearing, that is, on May 2, 1956, the
lower court (Branch I, with Judge Fernandez presiding), when
informed about the defendants' motion for postponement filed
on April 26, 1956, issued an order reiterating its previous order
handed down in open court on March 21, 1956 and directing
the plaintiffs to introduce their evidence ex parte, there being
no appearance on the part of the defendants or their counsel.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
The defendant Casteel filed a petition for relief from the
foregoing decision, alleging, inter alia, lack of knowledge of the
order of the court a quo setting the case for trial. The court
denied the petition for relief of defendant stating that Atty. Ruiz
is present on the sala when the court set the hearing of the
trial and call the assistance of the same on his motion to
Dissatisfied on the ruling, hence this respondent appeal to the
Court of Appeals
Issue: Whether the lower court erred in ordering the issuance
ex parte of a writ of preliminary injunction against defendantappellant, and in not dismissing appellees' complaint.

The contention is meritorious.

Section 37 of Administrative Order No. 14 of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued in August 1937,
prohibits a transfer or sublease unless first approved by the
Director of Lands and under such terms and conditions as he
may prescribe.
In this jurisdiction, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources possesses executive and administrative powers
with regard to the survey, classification, lease, sale or any
other form of concession or disposition and management of
the lands of the public domain, and, more specifically, with
regard to the grant or withholding of licenses, permits, leases
and contracts over portions of the public domain to be utilized
as fishponds.21, Thus, we held in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al. (L15414, June 30, 1960), and reiterated in Ganitano vs.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al.
(L-21167, March 31, 1966), that
... [T]he powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce (Natural Resources) by law regarding
the disposition of public lands such as granting of
licenses, permits, leases, and contracts, or approving,
rejecting, reinstating, or cancelling applications, or
deciding conflicting applications, are all executive and
administrative in nature. It is a well-recognized
principle that purely administrative and discretionary
functions may not be interfered with by the courts
(Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, G.R. No. L-5750,
April 20, 1953). In general, courts have no supervising
power over the proceedings and action of the

administrative departments of the government. This is

generally true with respect to acts involving the
exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact.
(54 Am. Jur. 558-559) Findings of fact by an
administrative board or official, following a hearing, are
binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed
except where the board or official has gone beyond his
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers
or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his
duty or with grave abuse of discretion... (emphasis
In the case at bar, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources gave due course to the appellant's fishpond
application 1717 and awarded to him the possession of the
area in question. In view of the finality of the Secretary's
decision in DANR Cases 353 and 353-B, and considering the
absence of any proof that the said official exceeded his
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers, or acted
with arbitrariness and in disregard of his duty, or with grave
abuse of discretion, we can do no less than respect and
maintain unfettered his official acts in the premises. It is a
salutary rule that the judicial department should not dictate to
the executive department what to do with regard to the
administration and disposition of the public domain which the
law has entrusted to its care and administration. Indeed, courts
cannot superimpose their discretion on that of the land
department and compel the latter to do an act which involves
the exercise of judgment and discretion.
UST v. Court of Tax Appeals 93 Phil 376

Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner

that its income as an educational institution was taxable. Later
on UST submitted a memorandum before the Sec. of Finance
disputing the decision of the latter as regard the taxability of
the formers income from tuition fees.
The case was elevated before the Board of Tax Appeals in
accordance with the rules romulgated by said Board under
E.O. No. 401-A, whereby the petitioner questioned the
jurisdiction of respondent to take cognizance of the petition for

Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 401-A is tainted with invalidity

for the reason that it deprives the CFIs of their jurisdiction to
take cognizance of cases involving recovery of taxes.

Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which,
as an instrumentality of the Dept of Finance may properly
come within the purview of R.A. No. 422, but goes as far as
depriving the CFIs of their jurisdiction to act on internal
evenue cases, a matter which is foreign to it and which comes
within the exclusive province of Congress. This the Chief
Executive cannot do, nor can that power be delegated by
Congress alone has the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various department.

Bautista vs. Juinio

127 SCRA 329
Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979
the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to
1974 memorandum circular No. 39, provides fort the penalties.
Letter of Instruction No. 869 banning the use of the private
vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and on holidays
12am Saturday morning to 5am Monday morning, 1am of the
holiday to 5am of the day after the holiday.
Memorandum Circular No. 39 has penalties of fine,
confiscation of vehicles and cancellation of registration. The
exempted vehicles are service trucks, Diplomatic, Consular
Corps, and tourist cars. Petitioners contended that
Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued by the Minister of Public
works, Transportation and Communications (Alfredo L. Juinio),
and then respondent Land Transportation Commissioners
(Romeo Edu), is unconstitutional on the ground that is violative
of the non-delegation of legislative powers. However
respondent contend that said Memorandum Circular No. 39
were adapted pursuant to the land transportation and traffic

Metropolitan Traffic Command West Traffic District vs.

GR No. 91023, July 13, 1990
Atty. Dante David claims that the rear license plate of his car
was removed by petitioner while his vehicle was parked in
Escolta. He filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila. He
questioned the petitioners act on the ground that not only was
the car not illegally parked but that there was no law or
ordinance authorizing such removal. The lower court ruled that
LOI 43, which the defendant (petitioner) invoked, did not
empower it to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates or
motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended. It merely
authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are
obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets
and highways. Moreover, that the said LOI had been repeal
PD 1605.

ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 39 is ultra


ISSUE: W/N petitioner is authorized to penalize traffic

violations as removing license plate.

Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held ultra vires as
long as the fine imposed is not less than ten or more than fifty
pesos, as to the suspension of registration to the suspension
of registration, it is valid. However as to the impounding of a
vehicle finds no statutory justification, it must be made clear
that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in
accordance with the procedure required by law.

HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but
a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense.
LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on streets and
highways and not those that are intentionally parked in a
public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. In the
case at bar, it is not alleged or shown that private respondents
vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the
flow of traffic. The charge against him is that he purposely
parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The act, if true is a

violation that may not be punished under LOI 43. The

applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include removal
and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the
imposable penalties.

Eslao vs COA 236 SCRA 161

Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State
University asked the SC to set aside the COA decision which
denied honoraria and per diems claimed under the National
Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel
including petitioner.
PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11) government
reforestation operations in Pangasinan. The evaluation project
was part of the commitment of the Asian Development Bank
("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan
to the Republic of the Philippines and was one among identical
project agreements entered into by the DENR with sixteen (16)
other state universities.
Per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the
payment of honoraria and per diems of PSU personnel
engaged in the review and evaluation project, PSU Vice
President for Research and Extension and Assistant Project
Director Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the
President, PSU, to have the University's Board of Regents

("BOR") confirm the appointments or designations of involved

PSU personnel including the rates of honoraria and per diems
corresponding to their specific roles and functions.
Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, alleging that there
were excess payments of honoraria, issued a "Notice of
Disallowance" 8 disallowing P64,925.00 from the amount of
P70,375.00 stated in Voucher No. 8902007. The resident
auditor based his action on the premise that Compensation
Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4, dated 7 Augustun 1980,
issued by the Department of Budget and Management which
provided for lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 June 1988,
also issued by the Department of Budget and Management,
was the schedule for honoraria and per diems applicable to
work done under the MOA of 9 December 1988 between the
PSU and the DENR.
The PSU Vice President and Assistant Project Director
Espero to the Chairman of the COA requesting reconsideration
of the action of its resident auditor, however, COA denied the
reconsideration and ruled that No. 80-4 is the applicable
guideline in respect of the honoria as CPG No. 80-4 does not
distinguish between projects locally funded and projects
funded or assisted with monies of foreign-origin.
Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at
bar is valid.
The decision of COA is set aside.
The MOA state that the project is foreign assisted funded by a
loan of the Asean Development Bank in its commitment under

Forresty Program Sector Loan, and the Clarification issued by

DBM since the funding of the project is the proceeds of a loan
National Compensation Circular No. 53 should apply. Even in
its Comment respondent COA submit that the issue as to
whether or not the project was special already became moot in
the face of the opinion/ruling of the DBM that since it (the
project) is "foreign-assisted" NCC 53 should apply, for CPG
No. 80-4 applies only to "locally-funded projects.
Under the Administration Code of 1987, the Compensation
and Position Classification Bureau of the DBM "shall classify
positions and determine appropriate salaries for specific
position classes and review appropriate salaries for specific
position classes and review the compensation benefits
programs of agencies and shall design job evaluation
programs." In Warren Manufacturing Workers Union (WMWU)
v. Bureau of Labor Relations, the Court held that
"administrative regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force of law
and are entitled to great respect." It is difficult for the Court to
understand why, despite these certifications, respondent COA
took such a rigid and uncompromising posture that CPG No.
80-4 was the applicable criterion for honoraria to be given
members of the reforestation evaluation project team of the
Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
Mdiscretion in issuing and promulgating ex parte the assailed
resolution without complying with the provisions of Sections 5

and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of Rule

14, Sections 1 to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner were candidates for the position of Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12,
1997 barangay elections. After the counting of the votes,
petitioner (Concepcion) was proclaimed as the duly elected
Barangay Chairman. On May 21, 1997, private respondent
(Melendres) filed an election protest against petitioner
(Concepcion) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
contesting therein the results of the election in all forty-seven
(47) precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to
Branch 68.
On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election
case, it was shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by the
protestant therein, which payment is required in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner
Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of
failure to comply with this requirement. In the contested Order,
public respondent denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee is
merely an administrative procedural matter and [is] not
Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
Held: The instant petition for motion to dismiss is denied.
On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved
that the payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election

protest and counter-protest is not jurisdictional and, hence,

non-compliance therewith at the outset will not operate to
deprive the Court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and
acquired pursuant to the Rules. When an administrative
agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the court that finally
determine what the law means.

Decree, or the Civil Service Rules and Regulations that

support such CSC rule.
Commissioner Santo Thomas, promulgated a
resolution stating that the DTI s action was proper. The
resolution cited 2nd indorsement back in 1965 that involved the
case of another employee who was absent from Saturday,
Sunday and was on leave on Monday.
Civil Service denied the motion for reconsideration of
Peralta. Hence this case is brought to the Supreme Court.
Issue: whether the Civil Service policy is valid

Maynard Peralta v. Civil Service Commission

211 SCRA 425
Peralta was a Trade Specialist III in Department of
Trade and Industry and classified as Reinstatement or
Permanent position. DTI deducted his absences (6) days from
his salary for a certain period of time since he has no
accumulative leave credits. These absences were on 2 long
weekends Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.
After Peralta wrote the Chief General Administrative
Service sent his inquiry to Civil Service Commission Chairman
Santo Thomas. is an employee who was on leave of absence
without pay on the day or before a time immediately preceding
a Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday is also considered absence on
leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday, or
Holiday. Petitioner claim that there is no such provision in the
General Leave Law, Old Civil Service Law, Civil Service

The case become moot and academic considering the
CSC issued another resolution amending the rules.
No. The policy interpreted R.A. No. 2625 amending the
Revised Administrative Code. Its provision grant employees 15
days of vacation leave with full pay and 15 days of sick leave
with full pay each year. It does not say anything about leaves
without pay. The intent of such amendment is to exclude the
Saturday, Sunday, and Holiday in the computation of leaves
since employees are not require to go to office during those
Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the
courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or
set aside by judicial department if there is an error of law, or
abused of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of
the legislative intent.

In the case, the construction of the CSC is not in

accordance with the legislative intent. The law does not
distinguish between those who have exhausted their leave
credits and those who are not. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemus. The Supreme Court called upon the CSC
and Congress to handle the case of other employees with
similar situations. Deductions must be restored to the
employees. Petition is granted. CSC resolution is declared null
and void.
Antique Sawmills, Inc v Aquiles R. Zayco, et al.
17 SCRA 316
A public bidding was conducted for the award of a
12680-hectare forest area. The bid was initially awarded
exclusively to Zayco but it was later modified and the bid was
awarded in equal portions to Zayco and Antique Sawmills.
Zaycos Motion for Reconsideration was denied. A second
Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it was also denied
because it was filed too late or outside the reglementary period
of 30 days as prescribed in Sec 10 of Forestry Administrative
Order No. 6-2 as 50 days had already elapsed from Zaycos
receipt of the order to the filing of the second Motion for

Zayco appealed to the Office of the President.

Executive Secretary ruled that the bid must be awarded to
Zayco alone. Antique Sawmills Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Cout of First Instances also dismissed its petition
for certiorari. Hence, the respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President still retains or
possesses jurisdiction to review on appeal a decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which
has become final.
Ruling: No.
The Court ruled in this case that the order of the
Secretary of the Agriculture and Natural Resources had
already attained finality; hence, not appealable. The Office of
the President does not possess jurisdiction to review on
appeal a decision which has become final.
The requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal within
the reglementary period is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. Even administrative decisions must and
sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be
written on judicial controversies. In other words, public interest
requires that proceedings already terminated should not be
altered at every step. The rule of non quieta movere
prescribes that what was already terminated should not be
Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which

courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy. To

fulfill this purpose and to do so steadily, certain time limits,
more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful.
(Justice Malcolm).
Mauricio Cruz vs. Stanton Youngberg
GR No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which
prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into
the Philippine Islands. It was enacted for the purpose of
preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the
Philippine Islands from foreign countries. The Act provides:
SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and
twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into
this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly
prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine
Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however,
That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with
the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may
raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the
country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle
has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of
the lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power given by Act No. 3155 to the
Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful
delegation of the legislative powers.

HELD: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of

power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made. The Governor-General is authorized to
lift the prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of
the legislature, if he should determine after a fact-finding
investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion
from cattle. The lifting of the ban would have been effected
through a contingent regulation based on the prescribed
contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no
longer contaminate the local livestock.


G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957

The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San
Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and
Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn
the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition
the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel

Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed

that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel
Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22
prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was
amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the
Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the
allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only.
Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a
group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction
praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from
enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null
and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by
legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay
by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66
are invalid.

Issues: Whether or not the President has authority to issue

EOs 22, 66 and 80. Whether or not the said Executive Orders
were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers
unduly delegated to the President.
Held: Yes. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the
restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters
come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the
general supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and
authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and
proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary
concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of
trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by

authority of law. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small
immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of
the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our
supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations
and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to
preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President,
in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of
Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by
means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel
Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare
of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues
of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law.
Grego vs. COMELEC
GR. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
FACTS: On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was
removed from office as Deputy sheriff by the court upon finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran for
councilor in the second district of Manila and had won the race
for 3 term. On his final term, an election protest was filed
against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to disqualify him on
the ground that he was removed previously in an office as a
result of an administrative case. On May 14, 1995, COMELEC
ordered the parties to submit memoranda, but before the
parties able to comply the directive, the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Basco as duly elected councilor and took his oath
of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC
should have suspended the proclamation. Such act according
to the petitioner violated the provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646,
which prohibits the proclamation of the elected candidate by
the COMELEC pending final judgment on the case filed, uses

the word may, therefore giving discretion to order the

suspension of the proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the
provision of R.A 6646 when it did not suspend the
proclamation of the petitioner as the elected councilor pending
final judgment of the case filed against it.
HELD: It did not. The use of the word may in sec.6 of R.A
6646 indicates that the proclamation is merely directory and
permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction. What is
merely mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the
continuation of trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest. The rule or regulations should be within the scope of
the authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A 6646,
the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word may, it is,
therefore improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to
have used instead the word shall in its rules.

Sierra Madre Trust vs. Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources
121 SCRA 384

Facts: On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the
Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872
(Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode

mineral claims, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva

Vizcaya, and all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca
Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. The
Director of mines dismissed the claim, and Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the decision the

Issue: Whether or not the Director of Mines lapsed in validly

locating the mining claims.

Held: No. The officers of the Executive Department tasked

with administering the Mining Law have found that there is
neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims
involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the
questions will not materially serve the interests of the
petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone
individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws which are
entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In
his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings
of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees
were validly located, surveyed and registered."

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs

No. L-19337, September 30, 1969

FACTS: Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. was engaged in the

production and milling of centrifugal sugar for export, the
produced sugar was being placed in container known as jute
bag which were not locally made. Thus, in 1957, it made two
importations of jute bags. There were 44,800 jute bags in the
first importation, and 75,200 in the second importation. These
importations were made free of customs duties and special
import tax upon the petitioners filing of Re-exportation and
Special Import Tax Bond conditioned upon the exportation of
jute bags within one year from date of importation. The first
was imported on January 8, 1957 and the second on February
8, 1957. But it only exported 33,647 out of 120,000 jute bags
that it imported. The remaining 86,353 jute bags were
exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within
three years from their importation contrary to the
Administrative Order 66 and 389 issued by the Bureau of
Due to the petitioners failure to show proof of the exportation
of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their
importation, the collector of Customs of Iloilo required it to pay
the amount of 28,629.42 representing the customs duties and
special import tax due thereon, which amount paid under
protest. The petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it
had paid, on the ground that its request for extension of the
period of one year was filed on time, and that its failure to
export the jute bags within the required one-year period was
due to delay in the arrival of the vessel on which they were to
be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad line.
Alternatively, it asked for refund of the same amount in the
form of a draw back under section 106(b) in relation to section
105(x) of the Tariff and Custom Code. On June 21, 1960, the
collector of Customs of Iloilo, after hearing, rendered judgment
denying the claim for refund. Because of this judgment the
petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who
upheld the decision of the Collector. Eventually, a petition for

review was filed with the Court of Tax Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs as an
administrative body is allowed to resolve questions of law in
the exercise of it quasi-judicial function as an incident to its
power of regulation.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
According to the Supreme Court Considering that the
Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing
and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code,
the construction placed by it thereon should be given
controlling weight. In applying the doctrine or principle of
respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts
often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases
of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as
independent rules in themselves. These factors are the
respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application of the
statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and
experiences, or improvements in the statute.
If it is further considered that exemptions from taxation
are not favored, and that tax statutes are to be construed in
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority, then we are hard put to sustain the
petitioner's stand that it was entitled to an extension of time
within which to export the jute bags and, consequently, to a
refund of the amount it had paid as customs duties.

In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered view that the

one-year period prescribed in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff
Act of 1909 is non-extendible and compliance therewith is
Boie Takeda Chemicals vs Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329
Facts: This is a consolidated case questioning the
supplementary regulation issued by the Department of Labor
and Employment Secretary regarding the application and
implementation of 13th month pay law. The Department order
included commission as part of the computation of determining
the 13th month pay of the employees. Upon inspection, the
petitioners were found to be violators of the law for not
including the commission on its employees in the computation
of the 13th month pay. The petitioner contended that the
Secretary Drilon is acting in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
same. The Secretary however contended that the said order
was just a supplementary to the law which the same tried to
erase the cloud thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the said order is a valid administrative
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court
further ruled that the Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more emphatic
in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are
not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the
computation of the l3th-month pay.

"While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which
defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings
paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in
the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and
Regulations which categorically exclude from the definitions of
basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by
employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets of
Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a
broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The
Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the seeming
tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and
earnings within the definition of basic salary.
"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations'
which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within
its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves,
premium for works performed on rest days and special
holidays, pays for regular holidays and right differentials. As
such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall
not be considered i the computation of the 13th month pay. If
they were not excluded it is hard to find any 'earnings and
other remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation of
the 13-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would
prove to be idle and with no purpose.
Espanol v. Philippines Veterans Administrations
137 SCRA 314
Maria U. Espaol was the widow of the deceased
veteran German Espaol, who died in the service during World

War II, She applied for monthly pension under R.A. No. 65 with
the Philippine Veterans Administration (now Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office).
Her application was approved and she received her
monthly pension and her minor children their monthly
dependent's pension. But on November 1, 1951, the Philippine
Veterans Administration (PVA), in pursuance of its
administrative policy, providing that those beneficiaries of
veterans receiving pensions from the U.S. Veterans
Administration are no longer entitled to receive pension from
the PVA, cancelled Maria U. Espaol's monthly pension and
that of her minor children.
After more than 22 years from the date when her
monthly pension was cancelled, Maria U. Espaol filed with
the CFI of Manila a petition for mandamus against PVA for the
restoration and continued payment of her monthly pension
including that of her dependents effective from the date of
The lower court rendered its decision in favor of the
restoration of the monthly pension of the petitioner and
whatever increased approved by law except of the children
above 18 years of age. The Philippine Veterans Administration
appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the lower
Issue: Whether the lower court erred the mandamus in ruling
the restoration of the monthly pension of the petitioner.
The appeal is without merit.
The appellee cannot be said to have a cause of action, in
compelling appellant to continue paying her monthly pension
on November 1, 1951, because appellant's act of cancellation,

being pursuant to an administrative policy, cannot be

considered a violation of appellee's right to receive her
monthly pension.
It is elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law, are entitled to great respect and have in their
favor a presumption of legality. Thus, appellant's act of
cancelling appellee's monthly pension being presumed legal
and valid, cannot be taken as a violation of appellee's right to
receive her monthly pension under R.A. No. 65.
Appellant's contention that appellee's action for mandamus
cannot prosper because no prior exhaustion of administrative
remedy was made, as appellee had not made any prior
demand on appellant, is without merit.
It is a rule that when a case involves solely legal questions, the
litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before
judicial relief is sought.
The contention of appellant that it cannot be ordered by
mandamus to resume paying appellee's monthly pension
because in the case of Board of Administrators, Philippine
Veterans Administration vs. Hon. Maria Agcaoili and Mauro
Abrera (58 SCRA 72 [1974]), it was held that disbursement of
public funds must be covered by corresponding appropriation,
is likewise untenable.
In the case at bar, appellee does not seek to recover
increased benefits under R.A. No. 5753, but for the restoration

of her monthly pension and her children's monthly dependent's

pension provided for by R.A. No. 65, as amended, the
coverage of which Congress had already appropriated funds
therefor. Besides, R.A. No. 5753 covering disabled veterans is
alien to appellee's claim for benefits due to her as a surviving
spouse of a deceased veteran. The action by appellee for
mandamus against appellant, thus, exists.
China Banking Corporations v. Members of the Board of
Trustees HDMF
307 SCRA 443
Petitioners applied for the renewal of waiver of Fund
coverage for the year 1996. However, their applications were
disapproved by the respondent HDMF Board on ground that
their retirement plan is not superior to Pag-ibig Fund. Further,
Section 1, Rule VII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
R.A. 7742, and the HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the
Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for
Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, as
amended by R.A. 7742 provides that to qualify for waiver or
suspension of fund coverage, a company must have provident
and housing plan which are both superior to Pag-ibig Funds.
Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking to
annul and declare void the aforesaid Amendment and
Guidelines claiming that respondents exceeded its limit.
Furthermore, the law provides as a condition for exemption
from coverage, the existence of either a superior (retirement)
plan, and/or a superior housing plan, and not the existence of
both plans. On the other hand, respondents claimed that the

use of the words and/or in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 can

only be used interchangeably and not together, and the option
of making it either both or any one belongs to the Board of
Trustees of HDMF, which has the power and authority to issue
rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the
Pag-ibig Fund Law, and the guidelines for the grant of waiver
or suspension of coverage.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, which was
subsequently granted by the trial court. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari which, however, was dismissed by the
trial court ruling that respondents did not exceed its jurisdiction
and petitioners have lost their right to appeal. In addition, the
trial court ruled that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a
lost remedy of appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue: Whether the respondents acted in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the Amendment to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742 and HDMF Circular No.
124-B on the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing
Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under
P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, insofar as said
Amendment and Guidelines impose as a requirement for
exemption from coverage or participation in the Home
Development Mutual Fund the existence of both a superior
housing plan and a provident plan
Ruling: The contention of the petitioner is meritorious.
The law is set aside and declare null and void.
The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words
and/or. In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words
and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., either
and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or

butter or eggs. The term and/or means that effect shall be

given to both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or; or that
one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the
other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the
legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is
used to avoid a construction which by the use of the
disjunctive or alone will exclude the combination of several of
the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive and will
exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing
alone. It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the
legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and
the word or are to be used interchangeably.
It seems clear to us from the language of the enabling
law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, intended that an
employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan
superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from
coverage. If the law had intended that the employer should
have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in
order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words
and instead of and/or. Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19
requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that
the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or
continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the
existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the
grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of
both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of
both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition
for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law.
By removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules
the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.
It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the
product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency. Department zeal may not be

permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. While it

may be conceded that the requirement of the concurrence of
both plans to qualify for exemption would strengthen the Home
Development Mutual Fund and make it more effective both as
a savings generation and a house building program, the basic
law should prevail as the embodiment of the legislative
purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to implement
said law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions.
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr.
240 SCRA 100
The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the
validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders
promulgated by the President in the lawful exercise of
legislative powers.
Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced
by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system
of exploration, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable
lands of public domain through "license, concession or lease"
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions 1 allowed under the
1987 Constitution.
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
then legislative powers under Article II, Section 1 of the
Provisional Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987

Constitution, promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing

the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure
the continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten
the development of mineral resources.
President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive
Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate
and conclude joint venture, co-production, or productionsharing agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines
for such agreements and those agreements involving technical
or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the
DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR
Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned
"Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under
Executive Order No. 279. And the Administrative Order No. 82,
series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the
Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
through Negotiation.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the
DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association
of the Philippines, Inc. 8 to file the instant petition assailing their
validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Whether the Order No. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR

Secretary is valid and constitutional
The validity and constitutionally are sustained and effect
The principle that the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a
statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is
provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was
enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v.
Barrias. 15 The scope of the exercise of such rule-making
power was clearly expressed in the case of United States v.
Tupasi Molina, 16 decided in 1914, thus: "Of course, the
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can
not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate
solely to carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So
long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into
effect the provision of the law, they are valid."
Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision
which would lead us to conclude that the questioned order
authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and
agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to
production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of
Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or
agreements shall be converted into production sharing
agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines" could not possibility contemplate a unilateral

declaration on the part of the Government that all existing

mining leases and agreements are automatically converted
into production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use
of the term "production-sharing agreement" if they are so
minded. Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic
conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A
mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a
meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at
in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down
in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.
We, therefore, rule that the questioned administrative orders
are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the
purposes of the law under which they were issued and were
intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their
economic growth and welfare.

Conte v. Commissioner of Audit

264 SCRA 19
Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma
were former employees of the Social Security System
(SSS) who retired from government service. They availed
of compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No.
660. In addition, petitioners also claimed benefits granted
under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971 that
provides financial incentive and inducement to SSS
employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement
benefits under RA 660 as amended, rather than the
retirement benefits under RA 1616 as amended, by
giving them financial assistance equivalent in amount to
the difference between what a retiree would have

received under RA 1616, less what he was entitled to

RA 660.
COA issued
ruling disallowing in audit all such claims for financial
assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56 for the reason
that it results in the increase of benefits beyond what is
allowed under existing retirement laws.
Issue: whether the benefits provided for under Social
Security System Resolution No. 56 to be considered
simply as financial assistance for retiring employees, or
does such scheme constitute a supplementary retirement
plan proscribed by Republic Act No. 4968
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
The said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a
retirement benefit that has the effect of modifying existing
retirement laws particularly R.A. No. 660. It is simply
beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain
and implement such retirement plan and in the guise of
rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render
them nugatory. Hence, SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby
illegal, void and no effect.
We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for
promulgating Res. 56, and the positive results it must
have had, not only in reducing costs and expenses on
the part of the SSS in connection with the pay-out of
retirement benefits and gratuities, but also in improving
the quality of life for scores of retirees. But it is simply
beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain
and implement such retirement plan, particularly in the

face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the

guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse,
render them nugatory.
It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute
and an administrative order, the former must prevail. A
rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with
the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such
rule or regulation to be valid.] The rule-making power of a
public administrative body is a delegated legislative
power, which it may not use either to abridge the
authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or
to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended.

Constitutional and statutory provisions control with

respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to
what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the
statute it is administering or which created it, or which are
in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are
liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree, nevertheless,
there is really nothing to interpret in either RA 4968 or
Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any doubt
as to the ultra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed
resolution constrains us to rule against petitioners.