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151 SCRA 208
Facts:
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Throughout the years, the scope of the regulation has
gradually narrowed from that of public services in 1902 to the
electricity industry and water resources in 1972 to the electric
power industry and oil industry in 1977 to the electric industry
alone in 1998. The ERC retains the ERBs traditional rate and
service regulation functions. However, the ERC now also has
to promote competitive operations in the electricity market. RA
9136 expanded the ERCs concerns to encompass both the
consumers and the utility investors.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the
restructuring of the industry, including the privatization of the
assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition
to a competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of
various government agencies and the private entities. The law
ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors,
namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and
its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.
In tandem with the restructuring of the industry is the
establishment of a strong and purely independent regulatory
body. Thus, the law created the ERC in place of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB).
To achieve its foretasted goal, the law has reconfigured
the organization of the regulatory body.
There is no question in our minds that, because of the
expansion of the ERCs functions and concerns, there was a
valid abolition of the ERB. Thus, there is no merit to KERBs
December 6, 2006
Facts:
MERALCO filed before the former Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB), now the ERC, an "Application for Approval of Revision
of Rate Schedules and Appraisal of Properties with Prayer for
Provisional Authority" which would result in an increase in its
basic charge by about thirty centavos per kilowatt hour (Php
0.30/kwh).
While the aforesaid application was still pending, Republic Act
No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)," took effect on 26 June 2001. It
abolished the ERB and created ERC to succeed the former.
Section 36 of EPIRA required all electric distribution utilities to
file their application for the unbundling of their rates for the
approval of the ERC.
On 30 October 2001, pursuant to Section 36 of EPIRA, the
ERC issued an order requiring all electric distribution utilities to
file their application for unbundled rates. In compliance
thereof, MERALCO filed its application with the ERC for the
approval of its unbundled rates3 and appraisal of its properties.
This application also proposed an increase of P1.1228/kwh in
MERALCOs electricity rates. Said application was docketed
as ERC Case No. 2001-900.
Several oppositors objected to the said application, including
Mr. Genaro Lualhati, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),
In the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court, the issues were
narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate
traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial
bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and
existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a
common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public
Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus
operators would be deprived of their real properties without
due process of law should they be required to use the
common bus terminals.
It held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of
the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter
and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property
rights must yield to police power.And petitioners maintain that
the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available
for use government property along EDSA and South
Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created
by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Issue:
WON E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no
relation with third persons.
Ruling:
It does not persuade.
Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for
which the concerned government agencies are directed to
coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus
terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like
respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents
would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals. It
cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect
on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would
mean, among other things, the loss of income from the
operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely,
respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to
property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and
substantial interest in the case such that they have sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the E.O.s
enforcement."
Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of
a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement
has been satisfied by respondents. Respondents posit that the
MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their
bus terminals under the E.O. which, they argue, is
unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and
the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDA clothed
with such authority under R.A. No. 7924. It is readily apparent
from the above quoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as
amended, that the President then possessed of and exercising
legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary
policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,
regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and
regulate networks of transportation and communications. The
FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of
Republic v. CA
324 SCRA 237
Facts:
The Republic dissatisfied with the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the decision of the Trial court that the
Precision Printing Incorporated the avail of tax amnesty
pursuant to Executive Order No. 41 amended by Executive
Orders No. 54 and 64 dated August 26, 1986, November 4,
1986 and Novemeber 17. 1986.
Petitioner Anchor is submission of facts, that the
corporation was already been assessed as tax deficiency prior
to the promulgation of Revenue Memorandum 4-87 which
was implemented by Executive Order 41.
Issue:
Ruling:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
It is decisively clear that R,O 4-87 reckoned the applicability of
the tax amnesty from August 22, 1986 the date when
Executive Order 41 took effect. However, Executive 41
contained no limitation whatsoever delimiting its applicability to
assessment made prior to its effectivity. Rather, the said
Executive Order 41 merely provided for general statement
covering all tax liabilities incurred from 1981-1985.
The Executive Order 41 did not provided exclusionary clauses
regarding the tax liabilities covering only tax liabilities incurred
only from 1986. It must of a general grant of tax amnesty
subject only to cases excepted by it.
The above ruling is in consonance of the rule in Administrative
law that administrative issuance seeking into effect the act of
Congress must be in harmony with the provision of the law, it
cannot modify or supplant the same.
October 18,
1977
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing
in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the
Fisheries Commission is valid.
Held:
No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not
warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No.
3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Facts:
Issue:
Facts:
The wife Gloria Montederamos filed on her behalf and
of their 4 minor children claim for compensation with the
Department of Labor of the death of the driver Felepe Cabalde
an employee of the People Land Transportation Company.
After
appropriate
proceeding
the
Workmen
Compensation Commission awarded to claimants P 3 494.40
with burial expenses not exceeding P 200.00.
Santos v. Estenzo
Petition is denied.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus before the CFI of Manila
alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under the
Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65, for having been
permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first
awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00
HELD:
Petition is affirmed. CFI is reversed.
The Court cited the case of Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine
Veterans Administration, promulgated just a month before the
case at bar, where it categorically held that a veteran suffering
from permanent disability is not to be denied what has been
granted him specifically by legislative enactment, which
certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated
by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the
implementation thereof.
It added that the decision of the CFI where it held that the
respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to
process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and
regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions,
unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or
against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained"
is clearly erroneous.
The Court also cited United States v. Tupasi Molina, which
held that "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however,
as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law, they are valid." As well as its ruling in
People v. Santos, wherein it held that an administrative order
betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the
Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be
followed."
Finally, the Court said there must be strict compliance with the
legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute
requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No
deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present
Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act
of Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if
it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated
by them were in accordance with what the Veterans' Bill of
Rights provides.
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the claim of
petitioner to a commutation of his vacation and sick leave not
exceeding ten (10) months must be upheld, inasmuch as the
facts show that the total amount sought to be paid to him was
precisely in accordance with the controlled legal provisions.
The ruling now on review must be versed and petitioner's plea
granted.
Deluao v. Casteel 29 SCRA 350
Facts:
In 1940 Nicanor Casteel filed a fishpond application for
a big tract of swampy land in the then Sitio of Malalag (now the
Municipality of Malalag), Municipality of Padada, Davao. No
action was taken thereon by the authorities concerned. During
the Japanese occupation, he filed another fishpond application
for the same area, but because of the conditions then
prevailing, it was not acted upon either. On December 12,
1945 he filed a third fishpond application for the same area,
which, after a survey, was found to contain 178.76 hectares.
However, his third application was denied by reason that the
area needs a firewood protection.
Despite the said rejection, Casteel did not lose interest. He
filed a motion for reconsideration. While this motion was
pending resolution, he was advised by the district forester of
Davao City that no further action would be taken on his
motion, unless he filed a new application for the area
concerned. So he filed on May 27, 1947 his fishpond
application 1717.
After the issues were joined, the case was set for trial. Then
came a series of postponements. The lower court (Branch I,
presided by Judge Enrique A. Fernandez) finally issued on
March 21, 1956 an order in open court that the hearing of this
case is hereby transferred to May 2 and 3, 1956 at 8:30
o'clock in the morning. And any circumstance this Court will
not entertain any other transfer of hearing of this case and if
the parties will not be ready on that day set for hearing, the
court will take the necessary steps for the final determination
of this case.
Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which,
as an instrumentality of the Dept of Finance may properly
come within the purview of R.A. No. 422, but goes as far as
depriving the CFIs of their jurisdiction to act on internal
evenue cases, a matter which is foreign to it and which comes
within the exclusive province of Congress. This the Chief
Executive cannot do, nor can that power be delegated by
Congress alone has the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various department.
HELD:
Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held ultra vires as
long as the fine imposed is not less than ten or more than fifty
pesos, as to the suspension of registration to the suspension
of registration, it is valid. However as to the impounding of a
vehicle finds no statutory justification, it must be made clear
that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in
accordance with the procedure required by law.
HELD: No. What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but
a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense.
LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on streets and
highways and not those that are intentionally parked in a
public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. In the
case at bar, it is not alleged or shown that private respondents
vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the
flow of traffic. The charge against him is that he purposely
parked his vehicle in a no-parking area. The act, if true is a
Held:
The case become moot and academic considering the
CSC issued another resolution amending the rules.
No. The policy interpreted R.A. No. 2625 amending the
Revised Administrative Code. Its provision grant employees 15
days of vacation leave with full pay and 15 days of sick leave
with full pay each year. It does not say anything about leaves
without pay. The intent of such amendment is to exclude the
Saturday, Sunday, and Holiday in the computation of leaves
since employees are not require to go to office during those
days.
Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the
courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or
set aside by judicial department if there is an error of law, or
abused of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of
the legislative intent.
Facts:
The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San
Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and
Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn
the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition
the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel
authority of law. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small
immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of
the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our
supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations
and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to
preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President,
in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of
Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by
means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel
Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare
of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues
of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law.
Grego vs. COMELEC
GR. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
FACTS: On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was
removed from office as Deputy sheriff by the court upon finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran for
councilor in the second district of Manila and had won the race
for 3 term. On his final term, an election protest was filed
against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to disqualify him on
the ground that he was removed previously in an office as a
result of an administrative case. On May 14, 1995, COMELEC
ordered the parties to submit memoranda, but before the
parties able to comply the directive, the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Basco as duly elected councilor and took his oath
of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC
should have suspended the proclamation. Such act according
to the petitioner violated the provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646,
which prohibits the proclamation of the elected candidate by
the COMELEC pending final judgment on the case filed, uses
Facts: On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the
Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872
(Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode
review was filed with the Court of Tax Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs as an
administrative body is allowed to resolve questions of law in
the exercise of it quasi-judicial function as an incident to its
power of regulation.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
According to the Supreme Court Considering that the
Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing
and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code,
the construction placed by it thereon should be given
controlling weight. In applying the doctrine or principle of
respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts
often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases
of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as
independent rules in themselves. These factors are the
respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application of the
statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and
experiences, or improvements in the statute.
If it is further considered that exemptions from taxation
are not favored, and that tax statutes are to be construed in
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority, then we are hard put to sustain the
petitioner's stand that it was entitled to an extension of time
within which to export the jute bags and, consequently, to a
refund of the amount it had paid as customs duties.
"While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which
defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings
paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in
the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and
Regulations which categorically exclude from the definitions of
basic salary earnings and other remunerations paid by
employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets of
Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a
broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The
Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the seeming
tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and
earnings within the definition of basic salary.
"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations'
which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within
its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves,
premium for works performed on rest days and special
holidays, pays for regular holidays and right differentials. As
such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall
not be considered i the computation of the 13th month pay. If
they were not excluded it is hard to find any 'earnings and
other remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation of
the 13-month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would
prove to be idle and with no purpose.
Espanol v. Philippines Veterans Administrations
137 SCRA 314
Facts:
Maria U. Espaol was the widow of the deceased
veteran German Espaol, who died in the service during World
War II, She applied for monthly pension under R.A. No. 65 with
the Philippine Veterans Administration (now Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office).
Her application was approved and she received her
monthly pension and her minor children their monthly
dependent's pension. But on November 1, 1951, the Philippine
Veterans Administration (PVA), in pursuance of its
administrative policy, providing that those beneficiaries of
veterans receiving pensions from the U.S. Veterans
Administration are no longer entitled to receive pension from
the PVA, cancelled Maria U. Espaol's monthly pension and
that of her minor children.
After more than 22 years from the date when her
monthly pension was cancelled, Maria U. Espaol filed with
the CFI of Manila a petition for mandamus against PVA for the
restoration and continued payment of her monthly pension
including that of her dependents effective from the date of
cancellation.
The lower court rendered its decision in favor of the
restoration of the monthly pension of the petitioner and
whatever increased approved by law except of the children
above 18 years of age. The Philippine Veterans Administration
appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the lower
court.
Issue: Whether the lower court erred the mandamus in ruling
the restoration of the monthly pension of the petitioner.
Ruling:
The appeal is without merit.
The appellee cannot be said to have a cause of action, in
compelling appellant to continue paying her monthly pension
on November 1, 1951, because appellant's act of cancellation,