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Moral intuitions are said to reveal ends which are superior to those of our worldly nature,
superior to mere pleasure and self-interest. Mill of course agrees that our moral feelings often
conflict with our inclinations of self-interest. But these feelings are not feelings that are
contrary to our pleasure. They like all ends are sought to the extent to which they are
enjoyable. It is just that different, and conflicting things, are enjoyable.
Mill can of course account for these divergent feelings and inclinations. On the psychological
account of human being that he defends, pleasure and pain are the prime motivators. Other
things are sought, at least initially, as means to pleasure or the avoidance of pain. But as the
associative mechanisms work, things that are sought as means come to be associated with the
ends for which they are means. These things come to be sought as ends in themselves, as
parts of pleasure. The variety of ends that persons suggest are morally demanded by their
intuitions are simply things that have come to be among those things that are for them part of
pleasure, ends that are in conflict with those ends that are other parts of pleasure. The appeal
to intuition does not solve the problems of moral philosophy. It is no more than a
commonplace of fact, that we feel better about some ends rather than others and that we
often feel that our ends are better that those that others have. The real problem is elsewhere:
how to resolve the conflict.