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Name Sayan DasGupta

Invading the Middle East: Then and Now


Napoleons Egypt is a substantive eyewitness documentation of the cultural, military and political
encounter between the First French Empire and Ottoman Egypt during Napoleons ill-fated occupation. A
plethora of eyewitness memoirs and letters, including those of Napoleon Bonaparte himself, illustrate
what Juan Cole describes as a unique clash of civilization occurring in the day-to-day lives of the
conquerors and the conquered.

Historically, the expedition was a precursor of all Western occupations in the Middle East, which will
become the norm in the next century. The Battle of the Nile will establish the legacy of Admiral Nelson
and an unmatched British naval supremacy in the world till the end of the empire. The Battle of
Alexandria will result in the total defeat of the French forces and an end to the occupation with the British
backed Muhammad Ali taking the throne of Egypt. These battles served as a proxy to the Coalition wars
soon to plague mainland Europe. Napoleons defeat in Waterloo will forever change the balance of power
in the Old Continent. This was also the unraveling of Ottoman rule in Egypt, the foreshadowing of a
dynasty in decay. Finally, Napoleons invasion of Egypt also led to significant scientific discoveries,
grand-scale excavations and finding of historic artifacts including the Rosetta Stone. A lot of the artifacts
in Louvre were found during this invasion. Napoleon promised a grandiose adventure of enlightenment,
retracing the steps of Alexander the Great himself. In reality, Napoleon was shrewd enough to realize the
socio-political and economic dissatisfaction toward his regime back home can be quelled by diverting
mind and resources to this magnificent scheme.

But, aside from its rich history, what is the relevance of this book in the modern world? To
answer the question, it must first be emphasized that Juan Cole did not simply name the book

Napoleons Egypt, he named it Napoleons Egypt: Invading the Middle East. More than two centuries
later, the western world still finds itself bogged down in a clash of civilization of sorts in the Middle
East. The players and their motives have changed, but the patterns and dynamics are still very same. After
all, we have always been told how important it is to learn about the past so that we dont make the same
mistakes again. This book review will exhibit how the important lessons of Napoleons futile campaign
still hold true to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

At a glimpse, it may seem that there are very little similarities between the French invasion and
occupation of Egypt and that of the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. After all, the French conquest was to
spread the principles of Western Enlightenment - life, liberty, freedom, reason, democracy, scientific
revolution in the Orient; whereas the US invasion marked a struggle against worldwide terrorism. But as
we uncover the veils of superficiality, the two events, more than 200 years apart, exhibit some very
disturbing similarities.

Reminiscent of the shock and awe campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq, Napoleons Egyptian invasion
started off with overwhelming success. The sweeping initial victories in the Battle of Shubrakhit, Battle
of the Pyramids or the Battle in Cairo, established what the French perceived as the superiority of Western
strategies over those of the Orientals (Cole, 68). Murad and Ibrahim Beys formidable cavalry and their
Mamluk supporters were no match to the well organized infantry squares, wheeled cannons and long
range artilleries of the French Army (Cole, 49-50)
Neither the Taliban, nor the Baath Party Loyalists could match the might of the US war machine the
regimes toppled like packs of cards and Kabul and Baghdad fell soon after the subsequent invasions.
But this was only the beginning. The Afghan/Iraqi resistance shared some eerie similarity with those of
the Egyptians. Destroyed in conventional combat, the Egyptian forces led a war of attrition against the
tired and homesick French army. They burned boats, ambushed village patrols, deserted entire villages,

utilized a scorched earth policy to starve and demoralize the French, attacked army garrisons, pillaged
caravans; all of which led to a disastrous occupation and French power was never consolidated in most of
Upper Egypt. This psychological weapon of terror was utilized to perfection during both the Afghan and
Iraq War. The suicide squads, the car bombs, IEDs and other 21 st century techniques of guerilla warfare
turned the US occupation a very deadly affair.

Compromise and cooperation during the occupations also have some resounding similarities. Supporting
the corrupt and inefficient Hamid Karzai administration, fraternizing with the Northern Alliance warlords,
negotiating and collaborating with various anti-Taliban or even moderate Taliban sects in the rugged
terrains of the North-West Frontier Province, were all necessary to regain any chance of stability in the
region. Napoleon of course, knew that appeasement of Islam was central to the success of his expedition.
He went to great lengths to demonstrate how he was the champion and protector of the faith, and tried to
legitimize his rule by installing Sharia law (Cole, 130) and Muslim clerics as figureheads of the Divan
(Cole, 75). And thus the French cult of reason was instrumental in creating the first modern Muslim state
in the world (Cole, 130)! Even though, the Bush administration made clear distinctions between ordinary
Muslims and terrorists in their rhetoric, ironically, they often failed to do so in their action.

Napoleon also exhibited the age-old colonial practice of divide and conquer by supporting the local
Coptics, the Christians in Damascus, the Greeks and other minorities (Cole,72). He pitted disgruntled,
over-taxed farmers against Beys men or the Coptic tax collectors (Cole 102-104), encouraged hostility
between poor peasants, Bedouins and different tribesmen, just as we had exploited the Shia-Sunni
hostility in Iraq. All influences of the Baath Party regime were eradicated. After elections, Prime Minister
al-Maliki was selected in a process closely monitored by the US. Similarly, Napoleon took great pains
in expelling, extorting and taxing the family members of the Beys and other Egyptian elites, thereby
crippling their political clout. A process of de-Mamlukization was undertaken and power was vested upon
the countrys theologians, religious jurists and clerics (Cole, 75). Much like al-Maliki in Iraq, the French

made sure to appoint minority Circassians and Georgians to fill high-offices in the Divan (Cole, 75).

The other significant reaction to the fall of the regimes was the initial jubilation of the people. Images of
looting in Saddams palaces, desecration of ancient statues and monuments of Baghdad are welldocumented. Freed from the despotism of the Mamluks, the Egyptian people also turned up in the
mansions of the Beys and led an orgy of plunder and pillage (Cole, 70). As the Afghan people also
welcomed the Taliban in 1996 when they entered Kabul after the victory over Mujahedeen, it seems this
fleeting sense of freedom is a natural reaction of the liberated, just before they fully realize that the
liberators themselves have become tyrants.

Bonaparte encapsulated the task of practical imperialism centering on diplomacy, terror, spying and food
(Cole, 83). In short, the day-to-operations of the ground forces often included carrying out harsh
repressions, tortures and even killings of civilians to send a strong message against growing dissention,
such as the Cairo Uprising. Bounded by the Geneva Convention, the US army in general, could do no
such thing. But as in case of most wars, the rules of warfare were thrown out during the treatment of
Afghan-Iraqi POWS, many of whom were civilians arrested under mere suspicion. Medieval methods of
water-boarding, extreme physical humiliation and other forms of tortures were carried out systematically
and with the full awareness and tacit support of the executive branch. This coincides well with
Napoleonic diktats of murder over petty issues such as disrespecting the French occupation or uneducated
villagers having ties with Bedouins.

The long marches, military stagnation and frequent guerilla ambushes, added with the British threat and
destruction of the entire French fleet in the Battle of the Nile severely demoralized the occupying French
army. Lofty visions of civilizational glory (Cole, 48), exploration and scientific revelry were replaced by
the harsh reality of misery, sadness, despair, suffering and reactions ranging from apathy to outright
hatred towards the occupation. In moments of despair and uncertainty, the French expedition often

blamed the Beys for impoverishing the country by grabbing the lions share of resources. French
philosophers now blamed the pyramids as ostentatious work of tyrants trying to immortalize themselves
at huge public expense. No longer was Egypt the land of the Ptolemies, the empire of Alexander, they
were unvaried scenes of devastation and misery (Cole, 110). The French soldiers, who had come to
liberate the people from the grip of the Beys, now found themselves being despised by the Beys, the
Arabs and the Fellahs (Cole,111)! It is not very hard to imagine a young Marine, once filled with
pragmatic ideals of saving the oppressed populace from the tyranny of Saddam, harboring the same
thoughts as those of the French while patrolling the Triangle of Death near Fallujah long after Saddam
was removed from power. In order to crackdown the Upper Egyptian Redoubt and the Bedouin
strongholds, the French themselves resorted to some of the most brutal repression and violence in order to
punish the resistance. Their techniques would have been appreciated by Louis XVI or the Ottoman sultans
and the Beys (Cole, 112). The conquest had come full circle- the Jacobian liberators were now the tyrants.
Present day methods of unprovoked drone attacks and bombing raids with mostly civilian casualties,
capture of innocent victims on the quest for terror cells and networks, all echo the French actions of more
than two centuries ago.

Another underlining similarity is the reaction at home. The French Republic, under the Directory in Paris
was still going through a process of normalization after the chaotic years of the Revolution and the
subsequent Reign of Terror under Robespierre. The Directory had envisioned Napoleons invasion as a
tool of promoting Republican ideals of democracy, liberty, scientific reasoning and self-determination in
essence, the Rights of Man. Moreover they viewed the invasion, with all its glory and vanity, as a
stabilizing and unifying factor within the Republic (Cole 15-16). The stalemate, the failure to subdue
resistance and the humiliation at the hand of Admiral Nelsons British Navy, had immense negative
impact on the psyche of the French people. After 9/11 George Bush got an overwhelming mandate to
carry out his lofty War on Terror. The public was more unified than ever at the commencement of
Operation Enduring Freedom. After several years of stagnation, a second unnecessary war over false

pretenses of WMDs, billions of dollars wasted and thousands of soldiers dead, the American people grew
not only severely disenchanted, but outright hostile with the two wars. The futility of a global war against
terror became evident. Afghanistan-Iraq became the most unpopular wars in American history.

In conclusion, it must be highlighted that Napoleons glorious enterprise in the Orient was
foremost motivated to protect French trade interests, create a buffer zone in the Mediterranean and
undermine Britains access to the vast resources of the Jewel in the Crown, India (Cole, 17).
Similarly, we are foremost motivated by self-preservation and not just lofty ideals of democracy. Hence
we pick and choose between Iraq and Rwanda.

Bibliography:
Cole, Juan. Napoleons Egypt: Invading the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan:Ney York, 2007

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