PFR - Article 45 To 55

1
EN BANC
GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941
GODOFREDO BUCCAT,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs..
Luida MANGONON OF BUCCAT,
defendant-appellee.
D. Feliciano Leviste, D. Tomas P. Panganiban and Doa
Sotera N. Megia in representation of appellant. Doa Luida
Mangonon of Buccat in their own representation.
HORRILLENO, J .
This issue has been raised to this superiority by the Court of
First Instance of Baguio, as only raises a pure question of law.
The March 20, 1939 the plaintiff inico the present case, in
which the defendant is not arraigned, despite having been duly
summoned. So, allowed the plaintiff to present evidence, the
lower court ruling on the matter in favor of the defendant.
Hence this appeal. The applicant seeks the annulment of her
marriage with the defendant been Luida Mangonon Buccat of
the November 26, 1938 in Baguio City on the grounds that, in
consenting to the marriage, he did so because the defendant
had assured him that she was virgin. From the decision of the
lower court reveals the following facts:
The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several
interviews, both were committed on 19 September of the same
year. On 26 November the same year, the plaintiff married the
defendant in the Catholic cathedral Baguio City. After living
maritally for about eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth
to a child of nine months, the February 23, 1939. As a result of

this event, the defendant abandoned plaintiff and did not return
to do her marital life. We do not see any reason to overturn the
original ruling. Indeed, it is improbable the plaintiff and
appellant's allegation that the suspect had not even gravido
status of the defendant, being this, as is proved, very
advanced in pregnant condition. So it is not necessary to
estimate the fraud who speaks the appellant. I argued this in
the sense that countries not rare to find people of the
abdomen developed, it seems childish to merit our
consideration, the more so as the plaintiff was freshman of law.
Marriage is a very sacred institution: is the foundation upon
which society rests. To cancel, are necessary to clear and
irrefutable evidence. In this case no such evidence exists.
Finding the original ruling consistent with the law, should be
confirmed, as it hereby confirm it, in its entirety, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, Pres, Imperial, Diaz and Laurel, MM.,
are satisfied.
2
[No. 47101 April 25, 1941]
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant, v.
LUIDAMANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-appellee
Marriage; Validity Marriage is a most sacred institution. It
is the foundation upon which society rests. To nullify it would
need clear and authentic proof. In this case no such proof
exists. Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio.
Carlos, J. Feliciano Leviste, Toms P. Paganiban and Sotera,
N. Megia for appellants
Luida Mangonon de Buccat on her own behalf.
The facts are stated in the decision of the court. Horrilleno, J.:
This case has been elevated to this court from the Court of
First Instance of Baguio, since it only raises a question purely
of
law.
On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff initiated the present case, in w
hich the defendant did not appear, despite being duly
summoned.
On account
of this, plaintiff was permitted to present his proof, and the
lower court decided in favor of the defendant. Thus this
appeal.
The plaintiff prays for the annulment of his
marriage to Luida Mangonon de Buccat on November 26,
1938 in the City of Baguio, on the grounds that when agreeing
to the marriage promise, he did so because the defendant
assured him that she was a virgin.
From the decision of the lower court, the following facts are
given:
The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938.After several

meetings, they became engaged in September 19 of the same
year. In November 26, the plaintiff married the defendant in the
Catholic cathedral of Baguio City. After living together
for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a son (of nine
months) in February 23, 1939. As a result of this event, the
plaintiff left the defendant and never returned to married life
with her. We see no reason to revoke the appealed sentence.
In effect, it is unlikely that the allegation of the plaintiffappellant that he did not even suspect the serious situation of
the
defendant,
being
as
it
is proven, an advanced pregnant condition. On account of this,
there is no reason to consider the fraud of which the plaintiffappellant speaks. The allegation that it is not rare to find
persons with developed abdomens, seems to us childish to
deserve our consideration, all the more that the plaintiff is a
first-year student of law. Marriage is a most sacred institution.
It is the foundation upon which society rests. To nullify it would
need clear and authentic proof. In this case no such proof
exists. Finding the appealed sentence reconciled to law, it
must be affirmed, and we hereby affirm it in toto.
Costs to plaintiff-appellant. So ordered. Avancea, C.J.,
Imperial, Daz, and Laurel, JJ., concur. Decision affirmed.
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in
March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married
in Nov 26. On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married)
Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son.
Godofredo left Luida and on March 23, 1939, he filed for an
annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he
agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a
virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
3
Issue: WON Luidas concealment of her pregnancy
constituted a ground for the annulment of marriage (fraud)
Held: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in
order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the
State is interested. In this case, the court did not find any proof
that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting
a ground for annulment; it was unlikely that Godofredo, a firstyear law student, did not
suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she
was in an advanced stage of pregnancy when they got
married.
Decision: SC affirmed the lower courts decision.
4
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15853
July 27, 1960
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his
marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6,
1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged,
among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein
respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein
petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954,
concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by
another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her
answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of
lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the
court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to
represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion.
Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the
parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any
evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he
would present evidence on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth

certificate was presented to show that the child was born
within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and
holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the
plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a
marriage dismissed the complaint. Through a verified
"petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence",
plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of
the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which
documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier
and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence.
The petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there
has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the
proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for
that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for
reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that
it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had
sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child
could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim
that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was
pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the
decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be
denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for new
trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes
thereof the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's
brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom
defendant was living at the time plaintiff met, courted
and married her, and with whom defendant has
begotten two more children, aside from her first born, in
5
common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father
of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and
that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff
at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B")
admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brotherin-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact
from plaintiff before and up to the time of their
marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he
knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as
husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date
of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine
Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26,
1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino,
the second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her
brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel
Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant;
and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural
plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as November,
1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show
defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost
four months old at the time the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the

defendant Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, who was representing the Government, to answer the
motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer
for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As both the
defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating
that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the
motion and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6,
1959, denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought
the case to this Court thru the present petition for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact
that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86,
par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in
the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action
for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's
claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the
defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven
that the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy
(7th month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement,
however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant
wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at
the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not
prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by
plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th
month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen
is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is
limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat
formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the
6
6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See
Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by plaintiff,
defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to
know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at
the time of their marriage more so because she must have
attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians
and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows
and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only
claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months.
and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery,
etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before
they got married and therefore the child could be their own.
This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no
support or justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at
the new trial, taken together with what has already been
adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the
fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should,
therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial
simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto.
Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of
collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered
of represent the Government precisely to prevent such
collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and
its annexes, the same can best be determined only after
hearing evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice
would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the
case remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion,

and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
7
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975
February 9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in
Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda
Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married
Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina
Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage
certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20,
1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M.
Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag,
born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their inlaws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his
family without explanation. He would disappear for months,
suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again.
During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in
drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He

would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she
refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last
they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job
in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her
children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned
for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22,
1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was
issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains atlarge to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be
located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo
News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3,
10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to
establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17,
1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda
and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino.
She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they spend
their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always
quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a
long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an
Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991,
to manifest in writing whether or not he would present
8
controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file
said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for
decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor
conducted an investigation and found that there was no
collusion between the parties. However, he intended to
intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating
prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial
court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda
and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda
Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be
null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is
hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this
declaration after this decision shall have become final
and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a
Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision
was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2,
1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting
evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After

requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion
for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as
follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27,
1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of
the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and
abusiveness are not enough to show psychological
incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in
marriage. There must be showing that these traits,
stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the
time of celebration of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as
the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The
defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present
whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his
family for the same period of time, actuations clearly
indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage defined
and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code.
These findings of facts are
uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at
the time of marriage and became manifest only after
the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are
manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and
appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver
since the family members are now left to fend for
themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the SolicitorGeneral, these are not common in marriage.
9
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the
New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the
more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See:
Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to
dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the
motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising
the sole assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG
NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER,
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing
thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not
only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic,
and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now
endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration
of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of
such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the

integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff.
(Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated,
1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor
General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological
incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court
of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her
Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological
incapacity were proven by preponderance of evidence during
trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband
suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally
immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive
from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case
10
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid
down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA
100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause

must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in
11
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code20 as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that

Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2
which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven
by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as
to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from
justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which
he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was
prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed
the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the
petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence
presented. We further explained therein that "Moreover, expert testimony should have been
presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy
of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec.
12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, supra.)"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993,
in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
12
No pronouncement as to costs.
17
Id. at 6-26.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214
(1997), Padilla, J., Separate Statement.
19
268 SCRA 198 (1997).
20
Article 68, Family Code. The husband and wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69, Family Code. The husband and wife shall fix
the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide. x x x
Art. 70, Family Code. The spouses are jointly
responsible for the support of the family. The expenses
for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be
paid from the community property and, in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said
income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from
their separate properties.
Art. 71, Family Code. The management of the
household shall be the right and duty of both spouses.
The expenses for such management shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
21
Article 220, Family Code. The parents and those
exercising parental authority shall have with respect to
their unemancipated children or wards the following
rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity,
self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and
18
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnote
1
Rollo, pp. 28-38.
2
Id. at 29.
3
Id. at 30-31.
4
TSN, December 17, 1990, p. 6; Records, p. 47.
5
Rollo, p. 29.
6
The records did not specify what crime.
7
Records, p. 32.
8
Originally, Article 39 of the Family Code provided:
"Art. 39, The action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
However, in the case of marriage celebrated before the
effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such
action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this
Code shall have taken effect." However, Republic Act
No, 8533 was eventually enacted and approved on
February 23, 1998, which amended Article 39 to read
as follows: "Art. 39, The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe."
9
RTC Records, p. 16.
10
TSN, December 17,1990, pp. 22-23.
11
RTC Records, p. 33.
12
Id. at 38-40.
13
Id. at 96.
14
Rollo, p. 10.
15
Id. at 28-38.
16
Id. at 37-38 only.
13
inspire in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain
their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect
them from bad company, and prevent them
from acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
(6) To represent them in all matters affecting
their interests;
(7) To demand from them respect and
obedience;
(8) To impose discipline on them as maybe
required under the circumstances; and
(9) To perform such other duties as are imposed
by law upon parents and guardians.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall, jointly
exercise legal guardianship over the property of their
unemancipated common child without the necessity of
a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the
father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual
income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such
amount as the court may determine, but not less than
ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or
annual income, to guarantee the performance of the

obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition, for approval of the bond shall be filed
in the proper court of the place where the child resides,
or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper
court of the place where the property or any part
thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special
proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding
the performance of the obligations referred to in the
second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and
resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely
suppletory except when the child is under substitute
parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a
parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules
on guardianship shall apply. 1wphi1.nt
22
Id. at 209-213.
23
320 SCRA 76 (1999).
24
Id. at 88.
14
THIRD DIVISION
MANUEL G. ALMELOR,
DECISION
G.R. No. 179620

REYES, R.T., J.:
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
REYES, JJ.
COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY,

BRANCH 254, and
Promulgated:
LEONIDA T. ALMELOR,
August 26, 2008
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses right to the

community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true
intertwining of personalities.[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for
annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The
CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong
remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent
Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the
Manila Cathedral.[3] Their union bore three children: (1) Maria
Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon
Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer,
born on July 4, 1994.[4] Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.[5]
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a
petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the
ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled
off to Branch 254.
15
[13]
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel
in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical
student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very
thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon
became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.[6]
Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did
not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At
home,
Leonida
described
Manuel
as a
harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuels
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the
cause of their frequent fights as a couple.[7] Leonida complained that
this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has
for his mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his
dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to
Leonida.[8]
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed
Manuels peculiar closeness to his male companions. For
instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation
manifesting his affection for a male caller.[9] She also found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. [10] Her worse
fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man
on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. [11] When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took
her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
stopped giving support to their children.[12]
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was
presented to prove Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that
she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests
on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and
face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).
She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.

Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before
the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
[14]
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some
petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their
marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility
against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he refused
to heed the memorandum[15]released by Christ the King Hospital. The
memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in
clinic to a primary or secondary hospital. [16] Leonidas family owns
Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as
Manuels clinic and residence.[17] In other words, he and her family
have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father
to their children. He denied maltreating
them. At
most,
he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He
said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection
of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This
is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.
[18]
Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise
healthy
relationship
because
of
her very
jealous
and possessive nature.[19]
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel
to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid
any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead
conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also
fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.[20]
16
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.

Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuels house
during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness
to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel
and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a
husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what
Leonida described in her testimony.[21]
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day
Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He
denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, [22] he
and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no
other person with them at that time, except their driver.[23]
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso
Garcias findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no
psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the
petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted
by herein parties on 29 January
1989 and all its effects under
the law null and void from the
beginning;
2. Dissolving
the
regime
of
community property between
the same parties with forfeiture
of defendants share thereon in
favor of the same parties

children
whose
legal custody is awarded to
plaintiff with visitorial right
afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give

monthly financial support to all
the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch

Clerk of this Court to
enter this Judgment
upon its finality in the
Book of Entry of
Judgment and to issue
an Entry of Judgment
in accordance thereto;
and
b. Directing the Local
Civil Registrars of
Las
Pias
City
and Manila City to
cause the registration
of the said Entry of
Judgment in their
17
respective Books of
Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of

marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of
Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth
analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the
allegations in the complaint and of the evidence
presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this
case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality
x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this
jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a
special contract exclusively only between a man and
a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has
trespassed into marriage, the same law provides
ample remedies to correct the situation [Article
45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6,
Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the
biological fact that no matter how a man cheats
himself that he is not a homosexual and forces
himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will
surely come a time when his true sexual preference
as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and
thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of
his own family.[25]
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was,

however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA.[26]
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in
excess of the lower courts jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to
dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his
conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for
Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The
Court
AFFIRMS in
toto the
Decision
(dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case
No. LP-00-0132. No costs.[27]
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by
filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment
of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is
questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by
the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was
a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of
judgment may be reversed or corrected only by
appeal.
18
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of
judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the
subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of
the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise
thereof. Excess assuming there was is not covered by
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the
exercise thereof.[28]
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule
45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION
FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER
DECLARING
THE
MARRIAGE
AS
NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PETITIONERS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER

TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN
HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the
demands of substantial justice and in the Courts exercise of equity
jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court
or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
[30]
This is to prevent the party from benefiting from ones neglect
and mistakes. However,
like
most
rules,
it
carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all
rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously
as possible.[31]
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It
can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no
longer
available
through
no
fault
of
petitioner.
[32]
[33]
However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified
the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to
promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore, they should not be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense. The exception is that
while the Rules are liberally construed, the
provisions with respect to the rules on the manner
and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly
applied. As an exception to the exception, these
rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme
Court has given due course to an appeal perfected
19
out of time where a stringent application of the rules
would have denied it, but only when to do so would
serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
[34]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves petition for certiorari for being the wrong
remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.[39] The CA opined that
under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x
x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is
by a petition for review.[40]
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions
to the stringent rules governing appeals. [35] It has, in the
past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.[36]
This
Court
granted Nerves
petition
and
held
that
she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The
Court stated:
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the
indulgence
of this
Court to consider his petition before
the
CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the
appeal. x x x
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed

grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his
marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the
first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v.
Civil Service Commission,[37] petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to
the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her
for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is
deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during the
pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without
back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1.
This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant
to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of
the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
2.
But
per
Supreme
Court
Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised
Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant
petition with this Honorable Court instead of
the Supreme Court.[38] (Underscoring supplied)
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to

be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial
defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to
the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing
sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be
liberally construed in order to promote their object
and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid
application of the rules would frustrate substantial
justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate
grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.
[41]
(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner
Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review
on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary
appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the
petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
20
This Court found that based on Tans allegations, the trial

court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a
judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great
injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong
showing that grave miscarriage of justice would
result from the strict application of the Rules, we
will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served
by giving
due
course
to the
present
petition and
treating petitioners CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule
65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of
a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[44] citing Labad v. University of
Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely
technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right
to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.[45]
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the
merits to attain the ends of justice.[46]
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuels

counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty.
Christine
Dugenio, repeatedly
availed
of
inappropriate
remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move
for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also
erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather
than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsels
incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuels
appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still,
this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
(2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the
clients liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so
require.[47]
The
negligence
of Manuels
counsel
falls
under
the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless
or
gross negligence of
petitioners former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He
should not be made to suffer for his counsels grave mistakes. Higher
interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate
his case in a higher court.
In Apex
Mining,
Court explained thus:
Inc.
v.
Court
of
Appeals,[48] this
It is settled that the negligence of counsel

binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the scope of his general
or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross
ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which
resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in
a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court
21
and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In
the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity
demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence
on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer
for the lawyers mistakes. This Court will always be
disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by
perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the
consequence of depriving their clients, of their day
in court.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case
from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice
require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case
involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided
with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of ones action.[50]
The client was
likewise
spared
from counsels
negligence
in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial
Buildings, Inc.[51] and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.[52] Said the
Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the
rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors
must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the
court has the power to except a particular case from
the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of
justice require it.[53]
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a
marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his

marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy
accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at
him.
The trial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had no basis
at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally
make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further
by citing Republic v. Molina:[54]
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities,
irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or
beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities,
vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or
failure in the performance of some marital
obligations do not suffice to establish psychological
incapacity.[55]
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the
petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What
Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuels homosexual
tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals.[56] She wanted to prove that the perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential
marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the
marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated
consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15
December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is
fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant,
there is preponderant evidence enough to establish
22
with certainty that defendant is really a
homosexual. This
is
the
fact
that
can
be deduced from the totality of the marriage life
scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very
well that people around him even including his own
close friends doubted his true sexual preference
(TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15
December
2003). After
receiving
many
forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the
rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything
to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth
of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those
people but nothing happened after that. There may
have been more important matters to attend to than
to waste time and effort filing cases against and be
effected by these people and so, putting more
premiums on defendants denials, plaintiff just the
same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be
advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross
defendant for his act of initially concealing his
homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one
thing is certain even during his marriage with
plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real
preference continued and even got thicker, reason
why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy
and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their
children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if,
like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even
small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded
bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in
knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife
(pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these
admissions of defendant taken in the light of

evidence presented apparently showing that he had
extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent
that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14
February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff
kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual
magazines
and
tapes
likewise
allegedly
discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits L and M),
the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes
stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of
defendant may be the name of the game in this case;
but the simple reason of professional rivalry
advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to
justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should
accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the
expense and humiliation of their children and family
as a whole.[57]
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate
the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed
this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference
without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a
homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul
his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear a marriage may be
annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
[58]
such as concealment of homosexuality.[59] Nowhere in the said
decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel
was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he
deliberately hid such fact to his wife. [60] It is the concealment of
homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad
23
faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the
marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it
must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family
Code
has
enumerated
an
exclusive
list
of
circumstances[61] constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not
among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the
deliberations[62] of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family
Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground
should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds
for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out
that in Article 46, they are talking only of
concealment, while in the article on legal separation,
there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal
separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while
in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the
marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they
add the phrase existing at the time of the marriage at
the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved
the suggestion.[63]
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal
separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul
a marriage.[64] Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket
denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental
element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a
basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike
so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
exclusive sexual bond between the spouses. [65] In Crutcher v.

Crutcher,[66] the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here
are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which
would make the marriage relation so revolting to her
that it would become impossible for her to discharge
the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole
purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things,
they would cause mental suffering to the extent of
affecting her health.[67]
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in
the Philippines,
the
legal
overtones
are
significantly
different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality
and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not
sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our
jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and
board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively
blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which
produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this
onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to
a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals.[68] In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent,
appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator
of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
especially if they coincide with those of the trial
court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on
this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of
24
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so, thus
Appellant anchored his prayer for the
annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did
not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He
cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x
x
The Court is not convinced that appellants
apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being
harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a
bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the
very least, the proper way to keep himself out of
harms way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his
marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they
were married. Appellants excuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee because he did not
have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best,
and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft
of any reference to his inability to copulate with the
appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes

relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity,
fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since
the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of these grounds, the
validity of his marriage must be upheld.[69]
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion,
not only by solely taking into account petitioners homosexuality per
se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from
its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.[70] The State and the public
have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social
institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence. [71]Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer
and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute
community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the
community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
25
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the common properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
[72]
A similar provision, Article 124 prescribes joint

administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal
partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration
and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of
the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath,
the trial court forfeited Manuels share in favor of the
children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and
subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuels share in the
property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators
of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the
petition
is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
[1]
See Separate Opinion of Justice Romero in Republic v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 22-42. Dated July 31, 2007. Penned by Associate Justice
Jose L. Sabio, with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and
Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 46.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id. at 26.
[9]
Id.
26
[10]
Id.
[22]
Id. at 47. Dated November 1, 2002.
[11]
Id.
[23]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[24]
Id. at 51-52.
[13]
Id. at 47.
[25]
Id. at 49.
[14]
Id. x x x defendant x x x suffer(s) from Narcissistic Personality

Disorder of lack of empathy or unresponsiveness to the needs and
feelings of his spouse and children, sense of entitlements or
expectations of automatic compliance, manipulative and deceit
stance, grandiose sense of self-importance, the strong need to seek
approval and recognition and to prove his self-worth with Anti-social
Features of irritability, verbal and physical aggression and lack of
genuine remorse. Rigidly pervasive and egosyntonic in nature and
hence no effective psychiatric therapeutic modality could
satisfactorily remedy his unremitting psychology, defendants
psychological incapacity has its antecedence as early as before his
marriage. x x x
[26]
Id. at 22. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93817. Penned by

Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, with Associate Justices Regalado E.
Maambong and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
[27]
Id. at 41.
[28]
Id. at 36-37.
[29]
Id. at 10.
[30]
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 (1994).
[31]
[15]
Id. at 48. Dated October 27, 1998.
Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994,

234 SCRA 192.
[16]
Id.
[32]
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 47, Sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment
by the Court of appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
which ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of petitioner.
[33]
G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 563.
[34]
Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, id. at 568.
Id.
27
[35]
Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44050, July 16, 1985,

137 SCRA 570.
[46]
[36]
[47]
Id. at 574.
[48]
G.R. No. 133750, November 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 456.
[49]
Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 465.
Gerales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85909, February 9, 1993,

218 SCRA 638; Teodoro v. Carague, G.R. No. 96004, February 21,
1992, 206 SCRA 429; Cabutin v. Amacio, G.R. No. 55228, February
28, 1989, 170 SCRA 750;American Express International, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70766, November 9, 1988,
167 SCRA 209; Fonseca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L36035, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 40; Calasiao Farmers
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 50633, August 17, 1981, 106 SCRA 630; A-One Feeds, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35560, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA
590; Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43511, July 28, 1976,
72 SCRA 120; Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910).
[37]
G.R. No. 123561, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 610.
[38]
Nerves v. Civil Service Commission, id. at 613.
[39]
Id. at 613-614.
[40]
Id. at 614.
[41]
Id. at 615.
[42]
G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 659.
[43]
Tan v. Dumarpa, id. at 665.
[44]
G.R. 142920, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 459.
[45]
Salazar v. Court of Appeals, id. at 471.
Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R.

No. 143783, December 9, 2002, 393 SCRA 566.
[50]
Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114282, November 28,

1995, 250 SCRA 371.
[51]
G.R. No. 137448, January 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 431.
[52]
G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 140.
[53]
Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial

Buildings, Inc., supra note 51, at 445.
[54]
Supra note 1.
[55]
Rollo, p. 49.
[56]
Id.
[57]
Id. at 49-50.
[58]
Family Code, Art. 45(3).
[59]
Id., Art. 46(4).
[60]
Rollo, pp. 49-51.
[61]
Article 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute

fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
28
1) Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment
of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of
the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband;
[70]
Philippine Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 12 provides:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. x x x
Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 provides:
3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease,

regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the

foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or

homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the
marriage.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
[62]
Minutes of the 154th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees held on September 6, 1986, 9:00 a.m. at the Conference
Room, First Floor, Bacobo Hall, U.P. Law Complex,
Diliman, Quezon City.
[63]
Id. at 12.
[64]
Id.
[65]
78 ALR 2d 807.
[66]
38 So. 337 (1905).
[67]
Crutcher v. Crutcher, id. at 337.
[68]
G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 565.
[69]
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, id. at 569-570.
[71]
Tolentino v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974, 56

SCRA 1.
[72]
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal

partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
29
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
THIRD DIVISION
VERONICA
ALCAZAR,
Petitioner,
CABACUNGAN
G.R. No. 174451

Present:
- versus -
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
REY C. ALCAZAR,
Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
30
Promulgated:
October 13, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the
Decision[1] dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil
Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica
Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint for the annulment of her marriage
to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed
by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged
in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October
2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters
residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for
five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of
respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila,
but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode
at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October
2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where
he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working
in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone
or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but
respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent
left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was
about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why

she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when
respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to
petitioner
at 2601-C
Jose
Abad
Santos
Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents house
in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was
in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brotherin-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not
aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had
been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in
the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded
that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their
marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of
reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriffs Return[3] dated 3 October 2002, a summons,
together with a copy of petitioners Complaint, was served upon
respondent on 30 September 2002.[4]
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a
Motion[5] to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation
of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27
November 2002 an Order[6] directing the public prosecutor to
conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between
the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of
the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or
suppressed.
31
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de

Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she had
conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in
January 2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public
Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place
between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression
of evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown
trial be conducted to determine whether petitioners Complaint was
meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of
Appearance of the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita
Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag
(Tayag) as witnesses.
breakdown of marital life between petitioner and

respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed
personality disorder that the respondent is harboring,
making him psychologically incapacitated to
properly assume and comply [with] essential roles
(sic) of obligations as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the
respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a
disorder
clinically classified
as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be
grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and
incurable by any treatment.
People
suffering
from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive
pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need
for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by
early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts,
as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the

allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioners
testimony.
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g.

exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be
recognized as superior without commensurate
achievements)
Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the

psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited

success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love
following
After meticulous scrutiny and careful

analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to
be free from any underlying personality aberration
neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits,
which may possibly impede her normal functioning
(sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned
arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden
3. believes that he or she is special and

unique and can only be understood by, or should
associate with, other special or high status people
(institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
32
5.
has
sense
of
entitlement, i.e.,
unreasonable expectations of especially favorable
treatment or automatic compliance with his or her
expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes
advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize
or identify with the feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes that
others are envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or
attitudes.
The root cause of respondents personality
disorder can be attributed to his early childhood
years with predisposing psychosocial factors that
influence[d] his development. It was recounted that
respondent is the first child of his mothers second
family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation
composed his immediate environment in his growing
up years. Respondent had undergone a severe
longing for attention from his father who had been
unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he
was left alone to fend for the family needs. More so
that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers
failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and
overlooked the love and attention he yearned which
led to develop a pathological need for self-object to
help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so
great that everything other people offer is
consumed. Hence, he is unable to develop
relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There

is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.
The psychological incapacity of the
respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence
as it already existed long before he entered into
marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is
deeply engrained within his system and becomes
a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby
rendering such to be permanent and incurable.[7]
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond
repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic)
ceased to exist and have their different life priorities.
Reconciliation between them is regarded to be
(sic). The essential obligations of love, trust, respect,
fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife,
mutual help and support, and commitment, did not
and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due
consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the
undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity
of marriage between petitioner and respondent. [8]
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who
replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to
the admission of petitioners evidence and manifested that she would
no longer present evidence for the State.
33
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying
petitioners Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent,
holding in substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the

acts of the respondent in not communicating with
petitioner and not living with the latter the moment
he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their
marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his defects were already
present at the inception of their marriage or that
these are incurable.
RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove
respondents psychological incapacity. Other than petitioners bare
allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondents
personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court
of Appeals,[13] the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be
able to establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have known
the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital
obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At most,
respondents abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal
separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution[14] dated 28 August 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
That being the case, the Court resolves to

deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby
DENIED.[9]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [10] but it was

denied by the RTC in an Order[11] dated 19 August 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a
Decision[12] dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY

THE
LAW
AND
JURISPRUDENCE,
RESPONDENT
IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
TO
PERFORM
THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.[15]
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally
filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of
marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code,
which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled
for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
34
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically
incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to
copulate.[16] Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of
sexual intercourse.[17] Non-consummation of a marriage may be on
the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a
physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it
may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in
whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused
by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has
the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing
the marriage act.[18]
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his
marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her crossexamination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after
their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously
being no physical incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no
ground for annulling petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners
Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As
can be gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the
observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent based on the latters psychological incapacity
to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint

before the RTC to her former counsels mistake or gross ignorance.
[19]
But even said reason cannot save petitioners Complaint from
dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by
the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural
technique.[20] Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits
of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross,
palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his clients
substantive rights,[21] petitioner failed to convince us that such
exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the
Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit,
consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court declared that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer,
rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.[23]
35
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently
proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle

of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos.
The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
36
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the
personality
structure
that
effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x.
Being
accordingly
guided
by
the
aforequoted
pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the
totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same
was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers
testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon
after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent
returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to
live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact
petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though
do not give us much insight into respondents psychological state.
Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and
hardly helps petitioners cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not
able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear
for examination despite Tayags invitation. [25] Tayag, in evaluating
respondents psychological state, had to rely on information provided
by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent
and thorough in her evaluation of respondents psychological
condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was
hardly impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latters
experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of
the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe
the pattern of behavior that showed that respondent indeed had a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain
how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically
incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize
that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent
suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders him truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. [26] Psychological incapacity
must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence
adduced, to peek into petitioners marital life and, as a result, we
perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of
love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from
his wife.
37
To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse

are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling
out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is
to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate
ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our
laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific
situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly been
concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a
grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage
was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and,
thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. [27]
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos[28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. x x x.
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity.[29]
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent
declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity
of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion[30] dated 21 August
2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by one
Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as
respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with

another woman named Sally.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which
makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state.[31]
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of
married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.[32] Presumption is always in
favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.[33] In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that
respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for
Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to
the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him
from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in
finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer
working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.[34]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May
2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June
2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch
85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint
in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
38
[10]
Id. at 91-95.
[11]
Id. at 96.
[12]
Rollo, p. 24.
[13]
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[14]
Rollo, p. 27.
[15]
Id. at 6.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[16]
Alicia V. Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of

the Philippines, p. 58.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal de Leon with Justices

Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano C. del Castillo (now a
member of this Court) concurring; rollo, pp. 18-24.
[17]
Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law

(2004 Edition,) p. 278.
[18]
Id. at 279.
Records, pp. 3-5.
[19]
Rollo, p. 8.
Id. at 10.
[20]
Tan Hang v. Paredes, 241 Phil. 740 (1988).
Id. at 75
[21]
[5]
Id. at 12.
[6]
Id. at 13.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 67-68.
[8]
Records, p. 69.
[9]
Id. at 80.
Heirs of Pael and Destura v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 222,

244-245 (2000).
[22]
310 Phil. 21, 30 (1995).
[23]
Id.; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
[24]
Supra note 13 at 676-678.
[25]
TSN, 21 January 2004, p. 6
39
[26]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22.
[27]
Renato Reyes So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, 5 June 2009.
[28]
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 23 at 851.
[29]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 41-43.
[31]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22; Hernandez v. Court of

Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 931-932 (1999); Dedel v. Court of
Appeals, 466 Phil. 226, 233-232 (2004).
[32]
Carating-Siayngco v Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396, 412 (2004).
[33]
Id.
[34]
Dedel v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31.

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1

to a child of nine months, the February 23, 1939. As a result of

The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938.After several

July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth

Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He

not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After

such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the

100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that

annual income, to guarantee the performance of the

G.R. No. 179620

THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY,

August 26, 2008

MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses right to the

She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.

To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.

favor of the same parties

3. Ordering the defendant to give

4. Pursuant to the provisions of

a. Directing the Branch

Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of

Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was,

THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER

That it was erroneously labeled as a petition

A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed

More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to

This Court found that based on Tans allegations, the trial

Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuels

It is settled that the negligence of counsel

Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his

admissions of defendant taken in the light of

exclusive sexual bond between the spouses. [65] In Crutcher v.

x x x The failure to cohabit becomes

A similar provision, Article 124 prescribes joint

See Separate Opinion of Justice Romero in Republic v. Court of

Id. at 47. Dated November 1, 2002.

Id. x x x defendant x x x suffer(s) from Narcissistic Personality

Id. at 22. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93817. Penned by

Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 (1994).

Id. at 48. Dated October 27, 1998.

Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994,

Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 47, Sec. 1 provides:

G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 563.

Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, id. at 568.

Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44050, July 16, 1985,

G.R. No. 133750, November 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 456.

Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 465.

Gerales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85909, February 9, 1993,

G.R. No. 123561, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 610.

Nerves v. Civil Service Commission, id. at 613.

G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 659.

Tan v. Dumarpa, id. at 665.

G.R. 142920, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 459.

Salazar v. Court of Appeals, id. at 471.

Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R.

Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114282, November 28,