asia policy, number 21 ( january 2016), 10121

http://asiapolicy.nbr.org

Between a Rock and a Hard Place:

South Koreas Strategic Dilemmas with
China and the United States
Ellen Kim and Victor Cha

ellen kim is a PhD student in Political Science and International Relations

at the University of Southern California and an Adjunct Fellow at the Center

for Strategic and International Studies. She can be reached at <ekim@csis.org>.

victor cha is Senior Adviser and inaugural holder of the Korea Chair

at the Center for Strategic and International Studies as well as a Professor

of Government at Georgetown University. He is also the Director of Asian
Studies and holds the D.S. Song-KF Chair in the Department of Government
and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He can be reached at
<vcha@csis.org>.

keywords:south korea; china; united states; strategy; entrapment

The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

asia policy

executive summary
This essay examines four strategic dilemmas that the Republic of Korea
(ROK) faces vis--vis China and discusses their implications for regional and
U.S.-ROK relations.

main argument
The current bilateral relationship between China and South Korea is the best
in the two nations modern histories. It is not clear, however, whether the
current positive trajectory can be sustained into the future, given the recurring
fluctuations in South Koreas policy toward China. This dynamic results from
four strategic dilemmas that South Korea faces in dealing with China: dilemmas
over power, economics, North Korea, and entrapment in the U.S. alliance.
Recent developments in Sino-ROK relations have led to new opportunities for
greater bilateral cooperation but also have important implications for regional
relations. In the triangular context of the U.S.-ROK-China relationship, South
Koreas closeness with China has not come at the expense of a diminished
relationship with the U.S. This demonstrates that its bilateral relationships
with China and the U.S. may not be mutually exclusive but could achieve
positive-sum gains. Nevertheless, South Korea still faces significant challenges
in managing relations with both countries.

policy implications
Understanding South Koreas strategic dilemmas vis--vis China is critical
for the U.S. in order to successfully manage its alliance with the ROK. The
two allies must address a misalignment of their policy priorities regarding
China and determine how to sustain a coordinated, if not common, strategy.
The U.S. must recognize that South Koreas outreach toward China is not
construed as alliance dissonance. Seouls active engagement with Beijing
can be a strategic opportunity to influence China to adhere to global norms
and behave as a responsible stakeholder.
South Koreas relationships with the U.S. and China need not be a zero-sum
game or mutually exclusive. A deep alliance with the U.S. actually strengthens
South Koreas position as it deals with China, but only if Seoul resists Beijings
efforts to demarcate the scope of its alliance with Washington.

kim and cha between a rock and a hard place

n September 2, 2015, South Korean president Park Geun-hye visited

Beijing upon invitation by Chinese president Xi Jinping to attend the
countrys celebration of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Joined
by Russian president Vladimir Putin and other foreign guests, Presidents Park
and Xi watched a massive military parade at Tiananmen Gate. Absent from
the celebration was the current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Ironically,
61 years ago it was Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung, founding fathers of the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea, respectively, who were
standing together in the same place to see a military review. Perhaps nothing
can better illustrate the current state of affairs in Chinas relations with the two
Koreas than a juxtaposition of these two contrasting images.
The bilateral relationship between the Republic of Korea (ROK)
and China under the current Park and Xi governments is undeniably at
its strongest point in modern history, with a series of efforts underway to
consolidate and institutionalize their strategic partnership. The first summit
between the two leaders in June 2013 led to the establishment of four strategic
communication channels to regularize high-level strategic dialogues. Both
countries also pledged to move forward on their previous agreement to set
up a military hotline between their defense ministers. With respect to the
economic relationship, the two countries signed the China-Korea Free Trade
Agreement and agreed to establish a direct trading market for the Chinese
yuan and Korean won to further boost bilateral trade. All these measures
are indicative of a new level of bilateral cooperation unprecedented in the
modern history of Sino-ROK relations.
Nonetheless, South Koreas relations with China remain complex, and it
appears unclear whether the current positive dynamic in the relationship will
or can be sustained into the future, given a pattern of recurring fluctuations
in South Koreas policy toward China. Some analysts may argue that this
pattern has emerged because South Koreas China policy is determined by the
administration in Seoul or the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance. However,
this vacillation actually results from far more fundamental conditions
underlying South Koreas political, economic, and security considerations
and geostrategic calculations, which create four strategic dilemmas for South
Korea in dealing with China: dilemmas over power, economics, North Korea,
and entrapment in the U.S. alliance. Understanding these four dilemmas
is important because South Koreas policy toward China holds important
geopolitical and regional implications. South Korea is a key U.S. ally in
Asia, yet Seouls growing closeness to Beijing amid emerging tensions and
competition between the United States and China complicates U.S. strategy as
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it rebalances to the region. This situation also raises concerns about the future
direction of the U.S.-ROK alliance. More broadly, South Koreas geostrategic
trajectory could directly affect the balance of power in Asia. Whether South
Korea inclines toward a rising China or stays anchored in the traditional
alliance relationship with the United States, it could become a marker of Asias
future direction.
This essay first will examine each of the four dilemmas identified above
and South Koreas position in them to promote a better understanding of
the current trends in PRC-ROK relations and the principles driving South
Koreas China strategy. It will then consider alternative arguments before
concluding with a discussion of implications for regional relations and the
U.S.-ROK alliance.

south korea s four strategic dilemmas

There is a basic puzzle with regard to the South Korean view of China. On
the one hand, South Korea views China as the second most favorable country
among regional powers after the United States.1 On the other hand, South
Korea also views China as a major threat. These diverging views mark a clear
departure from South Koreas negative perception of China in the 195060s,
when China was largely considered a Communist adversary during the
Korean War and later North Koreas staunch ally. Yet South Koreas perception
of China remains complex and ambiguous at best. This complexity is not
just limited to public attitudes and perceptions but is also mirrored in the
governments foreign policy toward China. Although South Korea pursues
close economic cooperation and a strategic partnership with China, it does
so while hedging, if not balancing, against a rising China. How do we then
unpack this exceedingly complex relationship?
South Koreas China policy has a tendency to vacillate because the
countrys strategy toward China has been largely a combination of engagement
and hedging. A primary driving force behind Seouls engagement with Beijing
has been the need for Chinese cooperation on North Korea, combined with
burgeoning economic ties. By contrast, other political and military issues and
concerns make South Korea hedge against China. Of these considerations, the
most pertinent is the fact that South Korea is a treaty ally of the United States,
which places what one scholar calls structural and perceptual limits on its
1 Jiyoon Kim, Karl Friedhoff, Chungku Kang, and Euicheol Lee, South Korean Attitudes on China,

Asan Institute for Policy Studies, July 2014.

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kim and cha between a rock and a hard place

engagement with China.2 In between these two opposing forces, South Korea
also faces a power dilemma with regard to China: smaller countries like South
Korea may feel threatened by the presence of a giant neighbor and thus opt
to accommodate that country.3 In addition to these general trends, South
Korea finds itself caught striking the right balance between contrary impulses
within each of these four areas. For instance, although strong economic and
trade relations draw it closer to China through greater economic cooperation,
South Korea is also concerned about its growing economic dependence on
China. Overall, the interplay of conflicting and competing forces within, and
between, each of the four dilemmas shapes Seouls dual hedging and engaging
strategy and results in vacillating policies.

The Power Dilemma

South Koreas power dilemma vis--vis China primarily stems from the
sheer presence of China as a great power and neighbor in Northeast Asia.
Although South Korea has always existed next to China, the latter has and
continues to exert significant influence on the Korean Peninsula, stemming
from thousands of years of historical relations that Koreans cannot ignore.
China is the worlds most populous country (estimated population of nearly
1.4 billion) and one of the largest countries by size, with a land mass of
roughly 9.3 million square kilometers (km), or roughly 3.6 million square
miles.4 South Korea, in comparison, is approximately 28 times smaller in
population (estimated at 49 million people) and 96 times smaller in area
(estimated a 96,920 square km, or 37,421 square miles).5 The vast disparity
in physical size matters more prominently in South Koreas security
perceptions because of geographic proximity. Although South Korea does
not directly adjoin China, the Korean Peninsula is connected to continental
Asia via a 1,416 km (880 mile) border with China. This geographic reality
will never change and will always directly affect South Koreas security
perceptionsincreasingly so as a rising China becomes more assertive in its
foreign policy.

2 Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York:

Columbia University Press, 2007), 114.

3 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest For Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia

(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 201.

4 East and Southeast Asia: China, in World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence

Agency, 2015) u https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.

5 East and Southeast Asia: Korea, South, in ibid. u https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html.

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In addition to population and territory, what also underlies and amplifies

South Koreas power dilemma is Chinas economic and military power,
which has grown apace over the past decades. For instance, in 2013 Chinas
economy ($9.240 trillion) was approximately seven times the size of South
Koreas ($1.304 trillion) in terms of GDP.6 Although South Korea spends more
on its military as a percentage of GDP, it still trails China in total military
spending. Chinas defense budget was $112.2 billion in 2013, whereas South
Koreas defense budget was only $31.8 billion.7 Furthermore, Chinas military
accommodates a greater number of troops than any other country in the world
at close to 2.3 million strong in 2012.8 Such gaps in sheer power undoubtedly
make South Korea vulnerable to Chinas economic influence and potential
military aggression. South Koreas insecurity may also derive from its political
and ideological differences with China. Dissonant value systems can breed
insecurity and suspicion between democracies and illiberal regimes that
share a common border. Political scientist Michael Doyle attributes this to the
perception by liberal states that non-liberal states are in a permanent state
of aggression against their own people.9 South Koreaseen as a successful
democracycannot but feel uncertain about the implications of the rise of a
mammoth Communist state in its neighborhood.
Above all, Chinas global rise deepens South Koreas power dilemma. To
South Koreans, Chinas rise augurs a resurgence of Sinocentric hierarchical
order. In light of their countrys own historical experiences as a tributary
state to old Chinese dynasties, and also given Beijings increasingly assertive
behavior and willingness to project its newfound power, South Koreans are
naturally wary and anxious about Chinas rise.10 Such apprehension surfaced
in 2004 when China claimed ancient Koreas Koguryo kingdom as part of
Chinese provincial history, which immediately invited strong rebukes
from South Koreans. Some argued that the action showed hegemonic

6 GDP (Current US$), World Bank, World Development Indicators u http://data.worldbank.org/

indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.

7 The Military Balance 2014 Press Statement, International Institute for Strategic Studies,

February 5, 2014 u http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20

releases/archive/2014-dd03/february-0abc/military-balance-2014-press-statement-52d7.

8 Ministry of National Defense (ROK), 2012 Defense White Paper (Seoul, 2012), 35053 u http://

www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201308140915094310.pdf.

9 Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs

12, no. 3 (1983): 32526.

10 Chung, Between Ally and Partner, 101.

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ambitions,11 while others saw it as an indication of Chinese strategic

intent in the event of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.12 In the end,
Chinas revisionist claim was a wake-up call for South Koreans and had a
dramatically chilling effect on their increasingly positive view of China.13
This power dilemma is a constant, not a variable, in South Koreas policy
calculations toward China. The sheer differences in various measures of
power between the two countries are a source of vulnerability and skepticism
while at the same time providing incentive to South Korea not to antagonize
its big neighbor.

The Economic Dilemma

If trade was one of the main conduits of limited cooperation and
bilateral exchanges in the pre-normalization period of the 1970s and
1980s, it has become an end in itself that provides a major impetus to
greater bilateral cooperation between China and South Korea given their
current robust trade and commercial ties. This economic logic gained
traction in Seoul when China surpassed the United States as South Koreas
largest trading partner in 2004. Ten years later, in 2014, China imported
approximately $145 billion worth of products from South Korea, which
constituted 25.4% of South Koreas total exports that year.14 In comparison,
the United States, the ROKs second-largest trade partner, imported only
$70 billion worth of South Korean products in 2014a little less than
half of what China imported.15 China has also remained the country with
which South Korea has the largest trade surplus, ranging from $62 billion
in 2013 to $55 billion in 2014.16 Furthermore, its total trade volume with
China dramatically increased to more than $270 billion in 2013, surpassing
South Koreas combined bilateral trade volume with the United States and
11 Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan,

and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress,
RL32882, January 13, 2006, 26. See also Jin-sung Chun, Our Dispute with China Isnt about
Ancient History, Chosun Ilbo, February 27, 2007 u http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2007/02/27/2007022761035.html.

12 See Dulyeoun yeogsa naljo Jung-gug-ui Dongbuggongjeong wangyeol [The Dreadful History

Hoax of Chinas Northeast Project Concludes], dongA.com, January 26, 2007 u http://news.donga.
com/3/all/20070126/8400671/1.

13 For South Korean views of China and the United States, see Jae Ho Chung, Leadership Changes

and South Koreas China Policy, Korea Economic Institute, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Series,
vol. 23, 2012.

14 Segyetong-gye: Hangug-ui 10dae muyeongguk [World Statistics: South Koreas Ten Major

Trading Countries], K-stat u http://stat.kita.net/stat/world/major/KoreaStats06.screen.

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.

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Japan.17 Naturally, South Koreans understand that their economic future

is tied to China, as was shown in a June 2014 survey of regional experts
across Asia-Pacific countries, where 86% of South Korean experts selected
China as their countrys most important economic partner in ten years.18
Inevitably, these burgeoning economic ties began to influence politics in
South Korea: enhancing greater economic cooperation with Chinaeven
in times of difficult political relations with Beijingbecame a major policy
imperative for many South Korean leaders. This led to the emergence of a
dual strategy of pursuing a strong economic partnership with China while
relying on a military alliance with the United States.
The current Park government is no less insensitive about South Koreas
economic reality. For her first state visit to China in 2013, President Park
brought a record 71 business leaders in her delegation, signifying the
importance her government places on its economic ties with China. (She
brought 159 business leaders for her latest visit to China in September 2015.)
In his reciprocal state visit to Seoul in July 2014, President Xis delegation
included 200 Chinese business leaders, setting a record as the largest
foreign business delegation to ever visit South Korea. To further strengthen
already robust economic ties, both governments agreed to establish a
direct trading market for their currencies and negotiated bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) and a trilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between
China, Japan, and South Korea. These ongoing trade cooperation efforts led
to the conclusion of the bilateral China-Korea FTA in November 2014 on the
sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.
While technical negotiations and legislative ratification of the agreement
still must be completed, this bilateral FTA with China is expected to eliminate
immediately $8.7 billion in tariffs on Koreas exports to China when it takes
effect, with another $45.8 billion to be eliminated over ten years.19 The FTA
will cover 91% and 92% of Chinese and South Korean goods, respectively,
within twenty years.20 The conclusion of the agreement also distinguishes

17 Jin Kai, Chinas Charm Offensive Toward South Korea, Diplomat, July 8, 2014 u http://thediplomat.

com/2014/07/chinas-charm-offensive-toward-south-korea.

18 Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of Regional

Expectations (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

19 Korea, China Strike Free Trade Pact, Korea.net, November 20, 2014 u http://www.korea.net/

NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId=122781.

20 Hanjung FTA sangseseolmyeongjalyo [Detailed Material for the Explanation of Korea-China

FTA], Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (ROK), March 2015 u http://www.fta.go.kr/
webmodule/_PSD_FTA/cn/doc/1_description.pdf.

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South Korea as the third country after Chile and Peru, and the largest
economy thus far, to have concluded FTAs with the worlds three largest
economies: the United States, the European Union, and China. However,
the agreement is not as high quality in scope as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, and the potential economic benefits are limited. For example,
the agreement covers only 70% of agricultural products and also excludes
key products such as rice, steel, and auto parts from tariff elimination, which
are points of sensitivity for both countries. The conclusion of negotiations
acts more as a political boost for ties between Beijing and Seoul because the
FTA adheres to the earlier summit agreement of the two countries leaders
to strike a deal by the end of 2014.
As South Korea becomes increasingly economically dependent on China,
however, South Koreans also have begun to perceive China as an economic
threat. The number of South Koreans who view China as an economic threat
has increased sharply from 52.7% in 2012 to 71.9% in 2014, even though their
favorable view of China was consistently high during this period.21 Equally
notable is the fact that more South Koreans perceived China as an economic
threat than a military threat (66.4%).22 Thus far, this trend has not translated
into any sort of action or had any policy implication in South Korea. Yet there
are underlying tensions and serious concerns emerging in the country about
China as both a major economic competitor and a rising economic influence.23

The North Korea Dilemma

North Korea lies at the heart of South Koreas strategic engagement
with China. Given decades of confrontation and deadlocked negotiations
between South Korea and North Korea as well as the latters isolation and
faltering economy, Chinas political ties with North Korea as that countrys
only ally and largest trade partner have given Beijing enormous leverage over
the North Korean regime. As a result, Chinas cooperation has long been
regarded as key to resolving the current nuclear standoff with North Korea
and achieving Korean reunification. In a public opinion survey in December
2013, almost 50% of South Koreans responded that China is the country

21 Kim et al., South Korean Attitudes on China, 22.

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.

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whose cooperation is the most critical for reunification.24 Another survey

found that the South Korean public believed that North Koreas nuclear
program (37.2%) and inter-Korean cooperation for reunification (20.6%) are
the two most important issues for PRC-ROK relations.25
Despite decades of diplomacy, however, South Koreas engagement
strategy has not been successful in gaining Chinese cooperation on North
Korea. The crux of the problem is that although Beijing publicly supports the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peaceful Korean unification, its
core geostrategic interest lies in maintaining the current status quo with North
Korea as a crucial buffer state. Chinas greatest fear is a reunification of the
North and South, presumably under the governance of South Korea, whereby
China loses that buffer zone and faces the U.S. Forces Korea immediately at
its border, as well the likely massive inflow of North Korean refugees. Only
by supporting the regime in Pyongyang can China avert such a daunting
outcome. As a result, these diverging interests have led China to apply
pressure on North Korea to rein in its nuclear weapons program and appease
other countries, on the one hand, but also provide oil and other political and
economic aid to North Korea so as to prevent the regimes collapse, on the
other hand.26 This two-track approach has been successful only in serving
Chinas interests.
Nonetheless, cracks in what was once called a lips and teeth relationship
between China and North Korea have slowly begun to emerge, especially after
Kim Jong-un took power. The quintessential example is the fact that there has
not yet been a summit between Xi and Kim, whereas Xi and Park have held
six summits, including two state visits. North Koreas missile tests in July 2014,
a day before Xis state visit to Seoul, were a clear sign of vehement protest over
Chinas increasing closeness with South Korea. To reduce its overwhelming
dependence on China, Pyongyang made diplomatic overtures to Japan,
Russia, South Korea, and even the United States, but to no avail. Meanwhile,
a growing distance between Beijing and Pyongyang has allowed the Park and
Xi governments to draw closer than had previously been possible. In Seoul,
this is regarded as a window of new opportunity to pull China farther away
from North Korea and closer to South Korea. Successful summits, diplomatic

24 Half of S. Koreans Pick China as Key Help in Korean Unification: Poll, Yonhap News Agency,

February 5, 2014 u http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/02/05/36/0301000000AEN201

40205007200315F.html.

25 South Koreans and Their Neighbors, Asan Institute for Policy Studies, April 19, 2014 u

http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-koreans-and-their-neighbors-2014.

26 Friedberg, A Contest For Supremacy, 191.

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gestures, and expanding bilateral cooperation between South Korea and

China have functioned as a means of strengthening their relationship and at
the same time causing further erosion in Beijing-Pyongyang ties.
However, South Koreas strategy has also received close scrutiny from
neighboring countries. Although Seoul maintained close communication
and cooperation with Washington, concerns and skepticism inevitably
emerged among the United States and Japan about South Koreas intention
and its future direction. President Parks attendance at the Chinese military
parade celebrating the end of World War II, in particular, spurred different
interpretations abroad. Some people saw her presence as evidence of South
Koreas tilting toward China at the expense of the U.S., while others
suggested a lure or effort on the part of South Korea to acquire the
higher-level strategic cooperation that it desires from China in dealing with
North Korea.27
China and North Korea are locked in a mutual hostage relationship
in which one cannot easily abandon the other. Despite noticeable strains in
relations and Chinas warm gesture toward the South, Beijing has not changed
its North Korea policy and seems highly unlikely to do so until its strategic
interests are at stake. One scholar argues that China sees Korean reunification
as inevitable and its strategy is only to delay unification as long as possible
given its concerns about instability.28 If that claim accurately reflects Chinas
thinking, building deep strategic ties with Beijing will be essential for Seoul,
no matter how limited the influence that such engagement can actually have
on Chinese strategic thinking about North Korea. Having a coordination
and cooperation mechanism and strategic communication channels between
Seoul and Beijing is crucial and is also in U.S. and Japanese interests. Yet one
important caveat in South Koreas North Korea dilemma deserves careful
consideration. Just as Seoul tries to peel China away from North Korea and
seeks greater cooperation from Beijing, there is also a danger that Beijing could
adroitly use this dilemma to its own advantage and cause erosion in Seouls
alliance with Washington. Ultimately, South Koreas strategic engagement
with China is a double-edged sword that poses a multidimensional challenge.
Seoul must exercise diplomatic finesse in furthering its strategic ties with

27 Shannon Tiezzi, South Koreas President and Chinas Military Parade, Diplomat, September 3,

2015 u http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-koreas-president-and-chinas-military-parade;
and Scott A. Snyder, Parks Decision to Join Xi Jinpings World War II Commemoration, Council
on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, September 2, 2015 u http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/09/02/
parks-decision-to-join-xi-jinpings-world-war-ii-commemoration.

28 Victor Cha, ed., Korean Unification in a New Era: A Conference Report of the CSIS Korea Chair

(New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 39.

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Beijing while at the same time managing its allies and partners perceptions
to avoid potential pitfalls down the road.

The Entrapment Dilemma

South Koreas strategies toward China also need to address the entrapment
dilemma, which largely stems from the notion that South Korea cannot afford
to isolate China even as it remains allied with the United States. South Korea
never wants to be in a situation where it will be caught between U.S. and
Chinese interests. Nowhere is this fear of entrapment more evident than in
debates about strategic flexibility. South Korea is extremely reluctant to allow
U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula to be used for contingencies in the region,
especially regarding China. This issue came to a head in the early 2000s when
the United States pushed for an explicit commitment, which South Korea was
unwilling to give. Even as it remains a U.S. treaty ally, Seouls worst nightmare
is to be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington. To avoid this
entrapment dilemma, South Koreas China strategies retain the U.S.-ROK
alliance as a core component, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
South Korean presidents historically have dealt with the entrapment
dilemma in one of two ways. One way is by playing a balancing role between
the two powers. This strategy operates on the premise that South Korea cannot
afford to choose between the United States and China and therefore will seek
to position itself between the two, at times siding with the United States and
at other times with China. This view retains the U.S. alliance but puts some
distance between Seoul and Washington in order for South Korea to be a
credible partner to China. This view was formally pronounced and upheld
by the late South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun, who in 2005 asserted that
South Korea could be a balancer in Northeast Asia. As simple as the concept
may have sounded, it was not easy to implement, and the policy generated
negative perceptions in Washington among pro-alliance constituents that
South Korea was tilting away from the United States.
The second strategy is what might be termed alliance-plus and is
based on the view that South Koreas relationship with China and the United
States need not be a zero-sum game. This strategy rests on an underlying
assumption that despite political sensitivities, differences, and the competing
natures of these relationships, there are converging areas of interest where
both the U.S.-ROK alliance and the PRC-ROK strategic partnership can
operate to achieve mutual benefits and greater public goods. This strategy also
encompasses the view that there are alternative ways to look at relations with
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China beyond the friend-threat dichotomy. Supporters of this view claim that
South Koreas alliance with the United States and partnership with China are
not mutually exclusive; to the contrary, a deep alliance with the United States
actually strengthens South Koreas position as it deals with China.29 Indeed,
one high-level South Korean official privately noted this by saying, If we have
a poor relationship with the U.S., China treats us like a province, but if we
have a good relationship, then they treat us with respect.30
The Park administrations China strategy reflects a delicate balance of
the two strategies described above. This was previously demonstrated in
January 2013 when President Park, then the president-elect, made an active
overture to China by sending her first diplomatic envoy to Beijing instead of
the traditional choice of Washington.31 Unlike her predecessors, who often
went to Japan for their second trip abroad after the United States, President
Park chose to return to China to show her resolve to improve relations. This
series of unusual diplomatic moves by the Park administration was welcomed
in Beijing and led to a reciprocal state visit by President Xi in July 2014. But
President Parks overtures to Beijing were carefully managed with regard to
Washington. In May 2013, she made her first overseas trip to Washington, D.C.,
to hold a summit with President Barack Obama, demonstrating that South
Koreas center of gravity in its foreign relations remains the alliance with
the United States. In addition to celebrating the 60th anniversary of the
U.S.-ROK alliance, President Obama publicly supported President Parks
Korean Peninsula trust-building initiative, and President Park was given
the honor of addressing a joint session of Congress, all of which shows the
strength of bilateral ties. In spring 2015, however, the Park government faced
a risk of entrapment between the United States and China over the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and issues surrounding Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Amid heightened tensions, a flurry
of visits to Seoul by high-ranking government officials in MarchApril 2015,
beginning with Chinese assistant minister of foreign affairs Liu Jianchao, U.S.
assistant secretary of state Daniel Russel, and U.S. secretary of defense Ashton
Carter, was seen in Seoul as a tug of war between the United States and

29 Dongbug-asin jilseoleul malhada: Hanmi meol-eojimyeonJung, ohilyeo Hangug-eul

gyeongsihal geos [Speaking of a Northeast Asian Order: If the U.S.-ROK Alliance Weakens,
China Will Not Take South Korea Seriously], Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 2014 u http://news.chosun.
com/site/data/html_dir/2014/07/18/2014071800344.html.

30 Authors private meeting with senior Korean official, Seoul, South Korea.
31 Lee Ji-seon, Park Sends First Envoy to China, Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 17, 2013 u

http://english.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201301171445397&code=710100.

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China, with pressure mounting on the Park government to make a zero-sum

choice between the two great powers.32
President Park is not the first leader to seek an improvement in relations
with China. Despite some hiccups and lingering issues, however, there has
been no time in the postCold War period when South Korea has maintained
a good bilateral relationship with both China and the United States. Clearly,
this is a unique moment. But it also brings greater risks and confronts South
Korea with much more perplexing challenges as the country will need to
carefully manage relationships with both the United States and China going
forward without being caught between their interests.

New PRC-ROK Relations:

Implications for Regional and U.S.-ROK Ties
Recent developments in PRC-ROK relations have led to new
opportunities for greater bilateral cooperation but also have had important
regional implications by creating new dynamics and uncertainties in Asia.
The most direct impact was felt in ChinaNorth Korea relations. A growing
distance in the relationship deepened North Koreas isolation and appears to
have prompted a change in its external relations strategy. More significantly,
closer ties between Beijing and Seoul allegedly undermined Chinas influence
on North Korea. During a recent U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing, U.S. government officials claimed that Chinas influence on North
Korea is waning and indicated this was a deep concern for the United States.33
In light of Pyongyangs provocative behavior, Beijings inability to rein in
North Korea would entail greater uncertainty and potentially higher risks
of conflict on the peninsula. As South Korea continues to cultivate a deeper
strategic partnership with China, policymakers in Seoul must be cognizant of
Pyongyangs perception of the changing security environment and how this
will affect its future behavior and nuclear strategy.
South Koreas warming relations with China also created new, complex
dynamics in the context of the China-Japan-Korea triangle against the
backdrop of resurgent historical and territorial disputes that damaged Japans
relationship with both countries. In light of the fact that Chinas rise and
growing assertiveness is largely perceived in Japan as a grave challenge to
32 Decision to Join China-Led Bank Tests South Koreas Ties to U.S., Wall Street Journal, March 24,

2015 u http://www.wsj.com/articles/decision-to-join-aiib-tests-south-koreas-ties-to-u-s-1427185565.

33 Harry B. Harris Jr., statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing to Receive

Testimony on Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region, September 17, 2015 u
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-72%20-%209-17-15a.pdf.

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Japans security and prosperity with the potential to undermine its position
in Asia,34 Seouls closeness to Beijing appeared to be a shift in the changing
balance of power. Although South Korea is a U.S. ally and a democracy that
shares common values and many overlapping global interests with Japan,
Seouls growing tilt toward Beijing amid its constrained relationship with
Tokyo has increased Japans susceptibility to the changing power transition
in the region and spurred serious concern and skepticism about South
Koreas intention and policy direction. Moreover, the fact that this expanding
cooperation with China coincided with South Koreas intense historical and
territorial disputes with Japan appears to have sent an unintended signal
to Tokyo, creating a perception that China and South Korea were forming
a united front against Japan on historical issues. This perception was partly
fed by Beijings entreaties toward Seoul to rally against Japan based on their
shared historical experiences under Japanese aggression.35 However, the
Park governments China policy is not driven by an anti-Japan agenda. Seoul
has deflected all invitations by Beijing to join forces in attacking Japan on
historical issues, arguing that its grievances with Japan are a bilateral issue.
Despite this, bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea have reached
the lowest point since the normalization of their ties. Public opinion also
significantly dropped in both South Korea and Japan. According to a May
2015 poll conducted by the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, 72.5% of
South Koreans and 52.4% of Japanese have a negative view about each other.36
In the short run, the current adverse dynamic may likely continue among
the three countries. Although China, Japan, and South Korea made small
progress by holding their first trilateral summit in early November, the trilateral
talks left much of their disputes unaddressed over historical grievances and
other thorny issues that battered their regional relationships. On the sidelines
of the trilateral summit, South Korean president Park Geun-hye and Japanese
prime minister Shinzo Abe held their first bilateral talks. While the summit
offered an opportunity to reset their strained bilateral relationship between
Seoul and Tokyo and the two leaders agreed to resolve comfort women
issues, the road ahead remains unclear as the two countries could not narrow

34 Sheila A. Smith, Disdain in Beijing and Edginess in Tokyo, Council on Foreign Relations, Asia

Unbound, June 30, 2015 u http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/06/30/disdain-in-beijing-and-edginess-in-tokyo.

35 Choe Sang-Hun, Chinese Leader, Underlining Ties to South Korea, Cites Japan as Onetime

Mutual Enemy, New York Times, July 4, 2014 u http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/world/asia/

in-south-korea-chinese-leader-cites-japan-as-onetime-mutual-enemy.html.

36 Yasushi Kudo, Perilous Perception Gaps Surge between Tokyo and Seoul 50 Years after

Normalizing Diplomatic Relations, Genron NPO, May 30, 2015 u http://www.genron-npo.net/en/

pp/archives/5184.html.

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down their outstanding differences in their views on wartime issues. Recent

developments in Japan also do not bode well. In late September, the Japanese
Diet passed security legislation that will allow the country to dispatch its
Self-Defense Forces for overseas combat missions. Largely viewing Japans
policy shift in the framework of the countrys remilitarization, both China
and South Korea immediately criticized these moves and will be watching
Japans new trajectory with great concern.
The strained relationship between Seoul and Tokyo has had adverse
impacts on the U.S. rebalancing strategy toward Asia by weakening
U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. Revamping the trilateral relationship
thus has become essential for Washington to effectively deal with challenges
in the region such as North Koreas nuclear weapons program and Chinas
growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. As part of such efforts, President
Obama brokered a trilateral summit in 2014 with President Park and Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe with the goal of paving the way for a breakthrough in the
relationship between the two U.S. allies. In this regard, South Korea and Japan
made a small positive step forward at the end of December 2014 by reaching
a new information-sharing agreement on North Korea, with the United States
serving as an intermediary. Washingtons active role and deep involvement to
ensure the stability of relations between Seoul and Tokyo are vital for regional
security in Asia.37
Meanwhile, South Koreas inclination to prioritize Korean Peninsula
issues over off-peninsula or other regional security issues with China does
not bode well for U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. This was evident
in November 2013 when South Korea attempted to negotiate with China
directly, rather than taking a united position with Japan and the United States
on Chinas newly declared air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which
overlapped with South Koreas ADIZ. In retrospect, had Beijing accepted
Seouls request to rewrite the ADIZ to remove the overlap, this could have led
to a critical breakdown in U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination.38
In the context of the U.S.-ROK-China relationship, South Koreas
closeness with China has not come at the expense of a diminished relationship
with the United States. Nevertheless, challenges remain ahead as to how South
Korea will manage its bilateral relationships with both the United States and
China. One of the immediate concerns is the disagreement over deploying the

37 Victor Cha, Lessons from Reischauer, Joongang Ilbo, June 28, 2015.
38 Victor Cha, Koreas Mistake on Chinas ADIZ Controversy, Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Korea Chair Platform, December 2, 2013.

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U.S. anti-missile system THAAD to South Korea. Beijing repeatedly called on

Seoul to reject the deployment of THAAD, arguing that such a move is aimed
at China and would seriously damage PRC-ROK ties. In the face of Chinas
vehement objections, the Park administration has been extremely careful,
and even strategically ambiguous, in order to avert a likely backlash from
Beijing. The question of Seouls political or strategic choice between the two
great powers still remains a focal point in the national debate over THAAD,
but South Korea must prioritize national security interests over any efforts by
China to delimit or demarcate the geographic scope of Seouls alliance with
Washington. For the United States and China, a policy that forces South Korea,
or any other country, to choose one over the other is not going to be in the
interest of either great power; this situation will only undermine the regional
stability and peace in Asia. In the end, THAAD is a top national security issue
that the South Korean government cannot afford to compromise on in the
face of external pressure. Just as Seoul prioritized its economic interests in
joining the AIIB (over U.S. entreaties to the contrary), its decision on security
issues should be determined by the extent of the missile threat emanating
from North Korea rather than a misplaced desire to please China.

alternative arguments
Other analysts may argue that South Koreas policy fluctuations toward
China are induced by factors other than the aforementioned strategic
dilemmas, such as domestic politics and changes of government in South
Korea. That is, South Korea under a progressive government would tilt more
toward China due to the popular anti-American sentiments more prevalently
shared among progressives. Conversely, the same argument posits that
South Korea under a conservative government would tilt more toward its
traditional alliance relationship with the United States. On the surface, this
argument appears to make a compelling case because historically it is more
or less consistent with political trends in South Korea. For over six decades,
the U.S.-ROK alliance has been the backbone of South Koreas foreign policy
under conservative governments in office. But the relationship began to
drift during the progressive Kim Dae-jung (19982003) and Roh Moo-hyun
(20038) administrations, and even became precarious during the latter.
The PRC-ROK relationship was upgraded from a cooperative partnership

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in 1998 to the level of a full-scale cooperative partnership in 2000 and a

comprehensive cooperative partnership in 2003.39
Nevertheless, the domestic politics argument does not adequately
explain South Koreas policy fluctuation because it does not hold in the case
of the current conservative Park government. What this indicates is that a
much more complex interaction of various forces drives South Koreas China
policy. How, then, can we better understand South Koreas tilt toward China
under the progressive governments? One plausible explanation can be
provided by South Koreas North Korea dilemma. Under the Kim Dae-jung
administration, South Korea actively engaged China because earning greater
Chinese cooperation for Korean reunification was an integral part of Kims
Sunshine Policy toward North Korea.40 Unlike the Roh administration, the
Kim administration did not exhibit an ideological drive in its engagement
toward China to balance South Koreas relations with the United States.41
Another counterexample is the fact that other conservative governments
also sought to improve bilateral ties with China. For instance, it was under
the conservative Roh Tae-woo administration that South Korea promoted
Nordpolitik to engage China and the Soviet Union after the end of the Korean
War, which led to a PRC-ROK dtente in 1982. Even the conservative Lee
Myung-bak administration, which bolstered the U.S.-ROK alliance as a top
priority, wanted to deepen strategic ties with China. President Lee publicly
noted that it is not desirable for Korea to lean toward a South KoreaU.S.
alliance, particularly from the perspective of a power balance in Northeast
Asia. South KoreaU.S. relations and South KoreaChina relations should be
complementary to each other.42 In May 2008, he and Chinese president Hu
Jintao agreed to further strengthen the PRC-ROK relationship by upgrading
it to a strategic partnership.
Another alternative explanation suggests that South Koreas policy
fluctuation is correlated with the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance.43 That
is, the status of the alliance may influence South Koreas foreign policy
stance, drawing the country closer to China when the alliance is weak while
distancing it from China when the alliance is strong. A quintessential example
would be the Roh and Lee administrations, which both shared an off-balance

39 Scott Snyder, China-Korea Relations: Establishing a Strategic Cooperative Partnership, Pacific

Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Comparative Connections, July 2008.

40 Chung, Leadership Changes.

41 Ibid.
42 Snyder, China-Korea Relations.
43 Chung, Between Ally and Partner, 1023.

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relationship with China and the United States. In particular, in navigating the
geopolitics in Northeast Asia, President Rohs proclamation of South Korea
as a regional balancer was widely interpreted as Seoul distancing itself from
the United States and moving toward China. Nevertheless, this argument fails
to acknowledge the notable bilateral cooperation that the United States and
South Korea achieved under the Roh administration. Indeed, the Roh and
George W. Bush administrations pushed to open new areas of bilateral alliance
cooperationincluding the deployment of troops to Iraq, visa waivers,
physical readiness training deployments in Afghanistan, and negotiations
for the Korea-U.S. FTA. The last of these became a strong foundation of
the U.S.-ROK comprehensive alliance after its successful conclusion and
ratification in 2012.44
Thus, there does not always appear to be an inverse correlation between the
state of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the state of Sino-ROK relations. Although
during the Lee administration strong ties with Washington correlated with
bad ties toward China, the intervening factor was Chinas failure in 2010
to respond to North Koreas sinking of the ROK corvette Cheonan and the
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. The Park government also seems to disprove
the correlation as President Park appears to have good relations currently
with both the United States and China.

concluding thoughts
There is no country in Asia that has a more complex and nuanced
relationship with China than South Korea. This complexity derives from the
convergence of South Koreas power, economic, and North Korea dilemmas
as well as its deep fear of entrapment in escalating U.S.-China competition.
As a result, the interplay of these factors causes South Koreas China policy
to vacillate, more so than do domestic politics alone or the state of the
U.S.-ROK alliance. Given the fluctuating nature of South Koreas China
policy, understanding these strategic dilemmas vis--vis China is critical for
U.S.-ROK alliance management. The two allies must address a misalignment
of their policy priorities regarding China and determine how to sustain a
coordinated, if not common, strategy. For the United States, understanding
Seouls outreach toward Beijing is important; Washington should view this
not as an alliance disruption but rather as a strategic opportunity for a U.S.
44 Katrin Katz and Victor Cha, Holding Ground as the Regions Linchpin, Asian Survey 52, no. 1

(2012): 5264.

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ally to influence China to adhere to global norms and behave as a responsible

stakeholder. The AIIB will be a good test case for this approach. South Korea
and other like-minded countries could come together and play a critical role
in ensuring that the China-led bank operates according to global standards of
governance and transparency. Instead of impeding Seouls cooperation with
Beijing, Washington should instead support such engagement, especially if it
helps South Korea gain insight into Chinese intentions and strategic views on
North Korea, and also promotes quiet U.S.-ROK-China dialogue on North
Korean contingencies. All these steps would help mitigate Seouls North
Korea and entrapment dilemmas.
The management of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia should also be in
tandem with bilateral or multilateral efforts to enhance the U.S.-ROK alliance
and U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relations, as well as to promote regional
stability and cooperation. As a balancing act against South Koreas growing
economic dependence on China, particularly following the conclusion of
the China-Korea FTA and ongoing negotiations of the RCEP, Washington
would do well to bring South Korea in as one of the first post-agreement
countries of the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.
The United States should also play a more active role in managing ROK-Japan
relations. In particular, it should work to prevent historical disputes from
undermining bilateral relations between its two allies while facilitating a
positive environment for constructive dialogue and also promoting and
enhancing cooperation on functional issue areas of common interest, such as
cybersecurity and disaster relief. Any misperceptions or misunderstandings
by South Korea and Japan of each others actions should be managed through
confidence-building measures among these three countries to prevent further
deterioration of bilateral relations. As part of these efforts, holding regular
U.S.-ROK-Japan summits or reinvigorating trilateral ministerial meetings
and other consultative mechanisms would be helpful. In addition, the United
States, Japan, and South Korea should make concerted efforts to slowly build
consensus for a collective security statement regarding North Korean threats.
Upgrading current information-sharing into a general security of military
information agreement and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
would be a logical next step.
Seoul certainly hopes that it can continue to operate strategically in a
space in which it can reap security benefits from the United States and
economic benefits from China, while maintaining good relations with both.
As argued above, this is the optimal path for South Korea to circumvent the
four dilemmas of power, economics, unification, and entrapment. However,
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the degree to which this strategic space remains open for Seoul is not fully
within its control. Indeed, the size of this space will depend greatly on the
actions of South Koreas great-power ally and its giant neighbor. Given Chinese
complaints about THAAD, Seoul may be finding that Beijing is willing to
afford South Korea little space to finesse the issue and that it instead may have
to make a choice. And with U.S. complaints about Chinese land reclamation
activities in the South China Sea, the space for South Korea to say nothing
about freedom of navigation may be shrinking. It would behoove strategic
thinkers in both Seoul and Washington to begin a serious discussion of how
the alliance should prepare for such contingencies.

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