KIERULF v.

CA
1994
FACTS:

February 28, 1987 7:45 pm: Pantranco bus driven by Jose Malanum lost control and swerved to the
left flying over the center island occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA.

The front of the bus hit the front of the Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi smashed to pieces and inflicting
physical injury to Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf.

Both were treated at the Quezon City General Hospital

The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA

Despite the impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against a Caltex
gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing equipment

RTC: proximate cause was the negligence of the defendant's driver.

Pantranco North Express, Incorporated to pay Lucila Kierulf, Victor Kierulf for the damages of the Isuzu pickup and Porfirio Legaspi

CA: Affirmed with modification by adding P25,000 attorney's fees and to pay costs
ISSUE: W/N both Lucila should be awarded moral damages
HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages to Lucila and Legaspi is hereby
INCREASED to P400,000.00 and P50,000.00

Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of giving
love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real
personal loss.
The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse
and separate and distinct from that of the injured person. Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium,
although argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on record.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages.
no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and
highly scornful reference" was given her awarded only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct
despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing
proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and
wounded feelings
She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to
undergo several corrective operations and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb
and thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo a second
operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the
vehicular accident.
Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed
to compensate the claimant for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of
defendant
in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court it is nevertheless
essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal
connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation,
are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose
a penalty on the wrongdoer.
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements
that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's
culpable action.
Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. The yardstick should be that the
amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of
passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs
salt to the injury already inflicted on plaintiffs.

Flordelis v. Mar
1982
FACTS:

Fermin Mar and Graciano M. Ligan were appointed teachers in the Bohol School of Arts and
Trades by the Secretary of Education.
Mar and Ligan were not paid their salaries beginning December, 1975 although they had been
holding classes.
Flordelis, the school admin, suspended them. He ordered the security guards to prevent Mar and
Ligan from entering the school premises
His version was that during the second semester of the school year, 1975-76, Mar and Ligan
were no longer teaching because of their refusal to accept their new assignments regarding "nonformal education." Since they did not work, their salaries were stopped.
He filed against Mar and Ligan an administrative complaint for abandonment of office,
malversation, insubordination, etc. and continued their suspension from office. The Secretary of
Education and Culture in a decision dated January 18, 1978 directed that Mar and Ligan, together
with a certain Emilio Dominguez, also a teacher in the Bohol School of Arts and Trades, whom
Flordelis had suspended, should be reinstated, given their subject loads and paid their back
salaries
The Secretary found "the actuations of Mr. Flordelis to be highly irregular, unlawful, unjust and
revolting to clear conscience, because without an administrative case" he relieved Dominguez,
Mar and Ligan of their teaching loads and denied the payment of their salaries, which actions
were tantamount to suspension.
Trial court in its decision dated September 5, 1978 ordered Flordelis to reinstate Mar and
Ligan with back salaries, to give them their subject loads and to pay them P100,000 as moral
damages
CA reduced the moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: May said administrator be held liable for moral damages?

HELD:
No, because the case does not fall under anyof the cases (Arts. 2219, 2220) when moral damages can
be granted.

There is no showing by the lower court and the Appellate Court and by Mar and Ligan that this
case falls within any of the cases enumerated in articles 2219 and 2220.

Dissenting
(Abad Santos):
Yes (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Art. 21 of the Civil Code directs that "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Clearly, Mar and Ligan were the victims of harassment and vendetta perpetrated by a vindictive superior
contrary to morals and good customs. There is no doubt that they suffered mental anguish, fright, serious

anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation because a petty school off icial had
delusions of grandeur and omnipotence.
Bagumbayan Corp. v. IAC
1984

The Sps. Sena went to the Tropical Place Hitel to see the Reycard Duet Show.
They occupied a table and ordered drinks before the show. The hall was crowded and as anyone who
attended such show can attest, excitement and confusion prevailed.
Lelisa's version was that when a waiter named Baez was going to serve the tray containing the drinks was
overturned and fell on her. She was drenched. Later, she felt some chill. The drinks and the splinters from
the broken glasses allegedly destroyed her dress which, with her handbag and shoes, cost one thousand
pesos.
She was shocked. She sensed that some persons were laughing at or pitying her.
Lelisa testified that she was claiming moral damages of P100,000 for herself and her husband due to
embarrassment and the fact that the management did not even offer any apology on that night.
She was claiming exemplary damages in the same amount to teach the management a lesson. The
husband, Arturo Seta, testified that the incident infuriated him. There was no apology from the management.
Rudy Tanchanco, the food and beverage manager, was one of three persons in charge of the show. He
testified that the admission was on a "first come, first served" basis. An the waiters were extras performing
under twelve supervisors. In open court, Tanchanco apologized
In fact, in its answer it apologized to the plaintiffs. It labelled the incident as a fortuitous event.
After hearing, the trial court awarded the Seas P1,540 as actual damages consisting of the value of Mrs.
Sea's outfit and P540, the cost of the six tickets used by the Sea family which was considered a loss
because of their alleged failure to enjoy the show. It also awarded the Seas P50,000 as moral damages,
P10,000 as exemplary damages and P5,000 as attorney's fees.
The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the judgment with the modification that the moral and exemplary
damages were reduced to P15,000 and P5,000, respectively. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WoN the award of moral damages was proper?

Held:

While the award for actual damages has some basis, the grant of moral and exemplary damages is devoid
of legal justification because it was not predicated upon any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code (Not
in Art. 22217 and 2219)
The instant case is not specifically mentioned in article 2219 which refers to quasi-delicts causing physical
injuries. The Appellate Court erred in considering it as analogous to the cases mentioned therein without
indicating what specific case the instant case resembles or is analogous to.
Generally, there can be no recovery of moral damages if the case is not mentioned in articles 2219 and
2220
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong
"Mental suffering means distress or serious pain as distinguished from annoyance, regret or vexation.
Mental anguish is intense mental suffering"
"Generally, damages for mental anguish are limited to cases in which there has been a personal physical
injury or where the defendant wilfully, wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally caused the mental anguish
"Nor will damages generally be awarded for mental anguish which is not accompanied by a physical injury,
at least where maliciousness, wantonness, or intentional conduct is not involved"
"Damages for mental anguish and suffering have been held recoverable where the act complained of was
done with such gross carelessness or recklessness as to show an utter indifference to the consequences"
it was held that where the act is wanton or willful there may be a recovery for humiliation and mental
suffering without any physical injury. It was further held that in negligence cases, where there is no willful or
wanton wrong, there can be no recovery for mental suffering unless there is also physical injury.
We hold that the "embarrassment" to which Mrs. Sea was exposed by the incident is not the mental
anguish contemplated in article 2217 for which moral damages can be recovered.

In this case, it would not be just and proper to include moral damages in the corporation's vicarious liability
as employer. The award of P5,000 as exemplary or corrective damages cannot also be sustained because
there was no gross negligence in this case.

UCPB v. CA
2003
Facts:

(UCPB) granted a loan of P2,800,000 to Zamboanga Development Corporation (ZDC) with Venicio Ramos and the
Spouses Teofilo Ramos, Sr. and Amelita Ramos as sureties. Teofilo Ramos, Sr. was the Executive Officer of the Iglesia ni
Cristo
Petitioner granted an additional loan to ZDC, again with Venicio Ramos and the Spouses Teofilo Ramos and Amelita
Ramos as sureties.
However, the ZDC failed to pay its account to the petitioner despite demands. The latter filed a complaint with the RTC of
Makati against the ZDC, Venicio Ramos and the Spouses Teofilo Ramos, Sr. for the collection of the corporations
account.
Reniva, an appraiser of the petitioners Credit and Appraisal Investigation Departmentto ascertain if the defendants had
any leviable real and personal property.
The lawyer furnished Reniva with a copy of Tax covering a property in Quezon City. In the course of his investigation,
Reniva found that the property was a residential lot
He stated therein that the fair market value of the property as of August 1, 1992 was P900,000 and that the owner thereof
was Teofilo C. Ramos, married to Rebecca Ramos.
Ramdustrial Corporation applied for a loan with the UCPB, a sister company of the petitioner, using the property covered
by TCT No. 275167 (PR-13108) as collateral therefor. The Ramdustrial Corporation intended to use the proceeds of the
loan as additional capital as it needed to participate in a bidding project of San Miguel Corporation. [10] In a meeting called
for by the UCPB, the respondent was informed that upon verification, a notice of levy was annotated in TCT No. 275167 in
favor of the petitioner as plaintiff
The respondent was shocked by the information. He was not a party in the said case and denied the same
1993, the respondent was informed by the UCPB that Ramdustrial Corporations credit line application for P2,000,000 had
been approved.[
As business did not go well, Ramdustrial Corporation found it difficult to pay the loan. It thus applied for an additional loan
with the UCPB which was, however, denied.
Pending negotiations with UCPB, the respondent discovered that the notice of levy annotated on TCT No. 275167 (PR13108) at the instance of the petitioner had not yet been cancelled.
When apprised thereof, PDB withheld the release of the loan pending the cancellation of the notice of levy. The account of
Ramdustrial Corporation with UCPB thus remained outstanding. The monthly amortization on its loan from UCPB became
due and remained unpaid. When the respondent went to the petitioner for the cancellation of the notice of levy annotated
on his title, the petitioners counsel suggested to the respondent that he file a motion to cancel the levy on execution to
enable the court to resolve the issue.

Despite the cancellation of the notice of levy, the respondent filed, on May 26, 1994, a complaint for damages against the
petitioner and Sheriff Villapaa before the RTC

Therein, the respondent (as plaintiff) alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 275167; that
Teofilo Ramos, Sr., one of the judgment debtors of UCPB in Civil Case No. 16453, was only his namesake; that without
any legal basis, the petitioner and Sheriff Villapaa caused the annotation of a notice to levy on the TCT of his aforesaid
property which caused the disapproval of his loan from UCPB and, thus made him lose an opportunity to participate in the
bidding of a considerable project; that by reason of such wrongful annotation of notice of levy, he suffered sleepless
nights, moral shock, mental anguish and almost a heart attack due to high blood pressure.

RTC awarded P800,000.00 as moral damages;

The trial court further stated that while it was Ramdustrial Corporation which applied for a loan with UCPB and PDB, the
respondent, as Chairman of Ramdustrial Corporation, with his wife Rebecca Ramos, signed in the promissory note and
acted as sureties on the said obligations. Moreover, the property which was levied was the respondents only property
where he and his family resided. Thus, the thought of losing it for reasons not of his own doing gave rise to his entitlement
to moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to moral damages

HELD:

The award of moral damages to be granted, the following must exist: (1) there must be an injury clearly sustained by the
claimant, whether physical, mental or psychological; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3)
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the
award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[35]

In the case at bar, although the respondent was not the loan applicant and the business opportunities lost were those of
Ramdustrial Corporation, all four requisites were established. First, the respondent sustained injuries in that his physical
health and cardio-vascular ailment were aggravated; his fear that his one and only property would be foreclosed, hounded
him endlessly; and his reputation as mortgagor had been tarnished. Second, the annotation of notice of levy on the TCT
of the private respondent was wrongful, arising as it did from the petitioners negligent act of allowing the levy without
verifying the identity of its judgment debtor. Third, such wrongful levy was the proximate cause of the respondents
misery. Fourth, the award for damages is predicated on Article 2219 of the Civil Code, particularly, number 10 thereof [

In sum, we rule that the petitioner acted negligently in levying the property of the respondent despite doubts as to the
identity of the respondent vis--vis its judgment debtor. By reason of such negligent act, a wrongful levy was made, causing
physical, mental and psychological injuries on the person of the respondent. Such injuries entitle the respondent to an
award of moral damages in the amount of P800,000. No exemplary damages can be awarded because the petitioners
negligent act was not tainted with malice and bad faith.

Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways

1973
Facts:
Plaintiff Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard defendants plane from Honolulu
to Manila.
Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a
stopover for about 30 minutes.
Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked 200 yards away.
Upon returning he told an employee of the defendant that they almost made him miss the flight
because of a defective announcing system.
He had a discussion with either the plane captain or the terminal manager.
He was told that they would open his bags which he refused and he warned them of the
consequences.
Just the same they opened his bags and found nothing prohibited.
They forced him to go out of the plane and left him at Wake Island.
His wife had to send him money and he was able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru
Honolulu and Tokyo after two days.
This action was to recover damages from the defendant.
Issue:
WON moral damages may be recovered.
Held:

The records amply establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral and exemplary damages.
Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner
when the latter met him at the ramp (What in the hell do you think you are? Get on that plane);
the menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton and the supercilious manner in which he had asked
plaintiff to open his bags (open your bag, and when told that a fourth bag was missing, I dont
give a damn); the abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one
of PAN AMs employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta remarked, will you pull these three
monkeys out of here?);

the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and
their being cordoned by men in uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with
Sitton;
the airline officials refusal to allow plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a
bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision to leave him in Wake;
Mrs. Zuluetas having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was hospitalized as a result of
the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct
of PAN AMs employees;
Mrs. Zulueta having suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received
by her parents at the airport all these justify an award for moral damages resulting from mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation thereby suffered
by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages, Pesos 200,000.00
exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00 attorneys fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.

Panay Electric v. CA
(1982)
Facts:

Florentino Sarabia was a bill collector for Panay Electric.

Relying on an erroneous report from SGV about shortages incurred in his collections, Panay
Electric Co. dismissed Florentino and filed a suit for reimbursement for the amount of the alleged

shortage amounting to Php 12,155.68.

Sarabia denied the shortgage, attributing it to erroneous accounting, and prayed for attorney's

fees in the sum of P800.00 and actual damages in the sum of P500.00.
The trial court found that the amount of shortages was only Php 41.85, that the case was the
product of "either a willful frame-up or a mistake in accounting"; ordered his reinstatement plus

exemplary and moral damages and attorneys fees.

CA Affirmed:

ISSUE: WoN it is proper to award moral damages?

HELD: NO

The award of moral damages is uncalled for.

In filing the present case, petitioner had not acted with malice, fraud, or in bad faith.
It relied solely on the letter of the accounting firm of Sycip, Gorres & Velayo.
However, such reliance was misplaced, for, as found by the Court of Appeals, that letter was "only

a brief letter mentioning some summarized findings which are unverified and undetailed.
It even stressed the fact that there are unascertained differences 'due to unavailable records
and/or customer's credit balances due to overpayment."

Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc.

2009
FACTS:

After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of American Express Card to
approve his credit card purchases worth US$13,826.00 at the Coster store, Pantaleon
commenced a complaint for moral and exemplary damages before the RTC against American
Express.
He said that he and his family experienced inconvenience and humiliation due to the delays in
credit authorization.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pantaleon.
CA reversed the award of damages in favor of Pantaleon, holding that AmEx had not breached its
obligations to Pantaleon, as the purchase at Coster deviated from Pantaleon's established charge
purchase pattern.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not AmEx had committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon.
2. Whether or not AmEx is liable for damages.
RULING:
1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved within seconds, there really is no
strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit card company to
approve or disapprove a customers purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon by the parties.
One hour appears to be patently unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card
purchase.
The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioners purchase, but the more
elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that AmExs
credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason why it
could not have promptly informed Pantaleon the reason for the delay, and duly advised him that resolving

the same could take some time.

2. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx incurred delay, but
because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries under Article
2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The somewhat unusual attending
circumstances to the purchase at Coster that there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase
by petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions gave rise
to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by
Pantaleon, as concluded by the RTC.

Robes-Francisco Realty & Devt Corp v. CFI-Rizal and Lolita Millan

(1978)

FACTS:
Robes Realty agreed to sell to Millan a parcel of land in Caloocan City.
Millan complied with her obligation and paid the installments. She made a total payment, including interests and
expenses for registration of title.
After which, she made repeated demands for the execution of the final deed of sale and the issuance of the TCT
over the lot.
The parties executed a deed of absolute sale. The deed had the provision:
o The seller warrants that the TCT shall be transferred in the name of the buyer within 6 months from full
payment.
o In case the seller fails to issue the TCT, the seller bears the obligation to refund the total amount
already paid, plus 4% per annum interest.
After 6 months, seller corporation failed to cause the issuance of the TCT. So, buyer Millan filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against the seller corporation. The complaint prays:
o Judgment ordering the reformation of the deed of absolute sale;
o Judgment ordering the seller corporation to deliver the TCT; or, if not possible, pay buyer Millan the
value of the lot
o Judgment ordering the seller corp to pay damages, corrective and actual (P15k)
Seller corp answered. They:
o Want the complaint to be dismissed because the deed of absolute sale was voluntarily executed
between them and the interest of the buyer Millan was protected by the provision of interest at 4% per
annum
TC awarded nominal damages of P20k.
Issue: Was award of nominal damages proper?
Held: Yes. Seller corporation was in delay, amounting to non-performance of obligation to buyer Millan who had fully paid
up her installments.
NCC170 provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Unfortunately, the buyer Millan submitted her case without presenting evidence on the actual damages suffered.
STILL, the facts show that the right of the buyer MIillan to acquire title was violated by seller corp and
this entitles her at the very least to nominal damages.
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in
article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.

NATURE OF NOMINAL DAMAGES

Under American jurisprudence, nominal damages by their very nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard to the extent of
the harm done to the injured party.
Fouraker v. Kidd : It is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such
case, the law presumes a damage, although actual or compensatory damages are not proven.
o Nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of a
wrong inflicted, but simply in recogniton of the existence of a technical injury.
In Phil jurisdiction, the SC in Medina v. Cresencia eliminated an award of P10k nominal damages, saying that the amount cannot in
common sense be deemed "nominal".
In a subsequent case (Northwest Airlines v. Cuenca) SC sustained an award of P20k nominal damages, the SC there found special
reasons to consider P20k as "nominal."
Actually, the Northwest Airlines case ruled that there is no conflict between that case and Medina.
o In Medina, the P10k nominal damages was eliminated because the aggrieved party had already been awarded P6k as compensatory
damages, P30k as moral damages and P10k as exemplary damages.
o While in Northwest, no such compensatory, moral, or exemplary damages were granted to the aggrieved party.
Northwest case said "nominal damages cannot coexist with compensatory damages."
PURPOSE OF NOMINAL DAMAGES
Based on the preceding articles, nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered, but for the vindication or recognition
of a right violated or invaded.
WHEN NOMINAL DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
They are recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being
left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.
The circumstances of a particular case will determine whether the amount assessed as nominal damages is within the scope or intent of the
law (NCC 2221)

Francisco v. Ferrer
2001

FACTS:
1.

2.

Mrs. Rebecca Lo and her daughter Annette Ferrer ordered a three-layered cake from Fountainhead Bakeshop, Mango
Avenue Branch.
a.

Wedding cake shall be delivered at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon at the Cebu Country Club, Cebu City

b.

First deposit was paid in the amount of P1,000 on November 19, 1992

c.

2 weeks after full payment was made

Wedding day the following transpired:

a.

6pm: no cake was found by respondents

b.

7pm: a follow-up was made Bakeshop informed that it was probably late due to traffic

c.

8pm: respondents were informed that no wedding cake will be delivered because the order slip got lost.
i.

Respondents were then compelled to buy the only available cake at the Cebu Country Club which
was a sans rival.
1.

d.

10pm: wedding cake arrived but respondents refused to accept

i.

3.

Even if a poor substitute, the cutting of the cake is always a part of the ceremony.

The cake delivered was a 2-layered cake rather than the ordered 3-layer cake

Erlinda Francisco sent a letter of apology accompanied with a P5,000.00 check

a.
4.

Respondents refused feeling it was inadequate

2 weeks after the wedding, Erlinda Francisco called Mrs. Rebecca Lo and apologized.
a.

Ricardo Ferrer, son-in-law of Rebecca Lo corroborated the latter's testimony: Ramon Montinola, the son-in-law
of Erlinda Francisco, went to Rebecca Lo's residence and offered the sum of P5,000.00 to indemnify for the
damage done, but it was rejected

5.

Rebecca Lo filed with the RTC of Cebu City an action for breach of contract with damages against petitioners

6.

TC favored Lo and ordered for Francisco to pay the following:

"1. The cost of the wedding cake in the amount of P3,175.00;
"2. Moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00;
"3. Attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and
"4. Cost of litigation.

7.

CA modified the decision.

a.

Increased the award of moral damages (30K250K)

ISSUE: W/N the respondents are entitled with the damages awarded by the CA.

HELD: NO. Petition granted. SC ordered the following:

1. The cost of the wedding cake in the amount of P3,175.00;
2. Nominal damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. Attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and
4. Costs of litigation.

1.

MORAL DAMAGES:

a.

PURPOSE: to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

b.

In breach of contract: breach must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive

i.

may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries

ii.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud."

c.

In the case: no fraud or bad faith.

d.

PROOF: person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith.

i.

ii.

It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party.

must be shown that the proximate cause thereof was the unlawful act or omission of the [private respondent] petitioners.

e.

f.

2.

i.

there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;

ii.

there must be culpable act or omission factually established;

iii.

the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and

iv.

the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219" of the Civil Code.

awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court judge
or appellate court

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES:

a.

wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or
malevolent manner.

b.

REQUIREMENTS:

c.

3.

REQUIREMENTS:

i.

they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been established;

ii.

that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant;

iii.

the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner

IN THE CASE: when confronted with their failure to deliver on the wedding day the wedding cake ordered and paid for, petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery
was probably delayed because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got lost

NOMINAL DAMAGES:
a.

'recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present
loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can
be shown

b.

may be awarded "to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing
that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.

c.

IN THE CASE: petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their
customer's anxiety and need of the hour.

Gonzales v. People
2007
Facts:
Gonzales allegedly willfully set fire an inhabited 2 story residence building where he was also a
tenant
Owner of the building said that he witnessed Gonzales putting the building on fire when his
attention was called and even saw Gonzales while the building was burning.
Witnesses testified in court and Trial Court convicted him with the crime of arson, which was
affirmed by the CA.
Civil liability not having been proved, the Court cannot grant the same and can only award
nominal damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each to the private
complainants who testified, namely, Carlos Canlas, Andres Villaflor and Francis Simpao.
In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence
establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of

the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by
proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus
delicti and to warrant conviction.
ISSUE: WoN the court should award Canlas nominal damages?
Held:

On the damages, we have consistently held that proof is required to determine the
reasonable amount of damages that may be awarded to the victims of conflagration.
As a rule, therefore, actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely
alleged. The records do not show concrete proof of the amount of actual damages suffered
by each complaining witness. Thus, we cannot grant actual damages. However, we may
award nominal and temperate damages.
The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the trial court according
to the circumstances of the case.
Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by the court without regard
to the extent of the harm done to the injured party.
However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a substantial claim, if based
upon the violation of a legal right; in such a case, the law presumes damage although
actual or compensatory damages are not proven.
In truth, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed,
not as an equivalent of wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury.
Now, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot from the nature of the case be proved with certainty.
Under the circumstances, we find it reasonable to award Canlas with P500,000 temperate
damages, and to the other complaining witnesses, Simpao and Villaflor, the amount
of P100,000 as temperate damages each.
In addition, exemplary or corrective damages should be awarded as a way to emphasize that
any future conduct of this nature is condemned so as to correct the anti-social behavior that is
deleterious in its consequences. Thus, Canlas and the other complaining witnesses, Simpao
and Villaflor, should be awarded P50,000 each as exemplary damages.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION

2007
Facts:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products.
One of its suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and
regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines.
The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.
Respondent would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner; if the latter
conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by
fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit
in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and
ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the
perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792,
because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal.
On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original
facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore,
the best evidence under the law and the Rules.
Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the nonproduction of the original fax transmittals.

Issue:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such?
Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an
electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the
writing must foremost be an electronic data message or an electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the Electronic Data Message refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
The phrase but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy in the IRRs definition
of electronic data message is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted
this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said
phrase is significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term electronic data message, it intended the same meaning as the term electronic
record in the Canada law. This construction of the term electronic data message, which excludes telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Laws focus on paperless communications and the
functional equivalent approach that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, paperless, but verily are paperbased.
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a
phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. [I]n a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to
speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the
laws definition of electronic data message, which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with electronic document, could not have
included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received.
These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine
transmission), when it defined the term electronic data message.

NECESITO, ETC. vs. PARAS, ET AL.

1958
FACTS:
- A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines.
- While entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control
and the truck fell into a breast-deep creek.
- The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries.
- These cases involve actions ex contractu against the owners of PRBL filed by the son and the
heirs of the mother.

- Lower Court dismissed the actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and
whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence
required by law (Art. 1755, new Civil Code)
HELD:
Yes.
- While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the
defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the
manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability.
- The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that the passengers has no privity with the
manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the
carrier has. We find that the defect could be detected.
- The periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide and
therefore the knuckles failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier
from responsibility.

PNR v. BRUNTY
2006
Facts:
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the
Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980.
Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to
Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita.
It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso
Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union

By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad
crossing at Barangay Rizal,Moncada, Tarlac.
Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track
up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71.
Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other
passengers suffered serious physical injuries.
A certain James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac,
where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival.
Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital.
PNR insisted among others that the sole and proximatecause of the accident was the negligence
and recklessness of Garcia and Mercelita. It insisted that it had provided adequate warning
signals at the railroad crossing and had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

ISSUE: WoN the should be an award of Temperate Damages?

HELD:
We note that the damages awarded by the appellate court consist of (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity
for the death of Rhonda Brunty; (2) P1,000,000.00 as actual and moral damages due the heirs of
Rhonda Brunty; and (3)P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees.
No damages, however, were awarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the latter never
interposed an appeal before the CA nor even before this Court.
The record is, likewise, bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita
(the driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of contributory negligence on the part
of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply.
As to the amount of damages awarded, a modification of the same is in order, specifically on the
award of actual and moral damages in the aggregate amount of P1,000,000.00. Actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he
suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be
recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely
on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend
upon competent proof that they have suffered, and on evidence of the actual amount
thereof. Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award
of actual damages cannot be sustained.
However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and
burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual damages as it would
be unfair for the victims heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kid, for the reason alone
that they cannot produce receipts.
Considering the circumstances attendant in this case, we find that an award of P500,000.00 as
moral damages to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty is proper. In view of recent jurisprudence,
indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of Rhonda Brunty and attorneys fees amounting
to P50,000.00 is likewise proper.
Republic v. Tuvera
2007
Facts:
Twin Peaks Development Corporation was organized on 5 March 1984 as a corporation with a
principal purpose of engaging in the real estate business. There were five incorporating
stockholders, including respondent Victor Tuvera (Victor) who owned 48% of the shares of the
fledgling corporation. Victor was the son of respondent Juan Tuvera, who was then Presidential
Executive Assistant of President Marcos.

President Marcos granted the award of a Timber License Agreement (TLA), more specifically in
favor of Twin Peaks to operate on 26,000 hectares of forest land with an annual allowable cut of
60,000 cubic meters of timber and to export 10,000 cubic meters of mahogany of the narra
species. As a result, Twin Peaks was able to engage in logging operations.
in 25 February 1986, President Marcos was ousted, and Corazon C. Aquino assumed the
presidency. Among her first acts as President was to establish the Philippine Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), tasked with tracking down the ill-gotten wealth procured by Marcos,
his family, and associates during his 20-year rule. Among the powers granted to the PCGG was
the power to issue writs of sequestration.
On 13 June 1988, the PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration on all assets, properties, records,
documents, and shares of stock of Twin Peaks on the ground that all the assets of the corporation
are ill-gotten wealth for having been acquired directly or indirectly through fraudulent and illegal
means.
Republic sought to recover funds allegedly acquired by said parties in flagrant breach of trust and
fiduciary obligations with grave abuse of right and power in violation of the Constitution and the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Juan Tuvera, who was abroad when the case was filed on 9 December 1988, later submitted his
own Answer and denied the allegations of the Republic and alleged that as Presidential Executive
Assistant of then President Marcos, he acted within the confines of his duties and had
perpetrated no unlawful acts. He merely transmitted communications of approval in the course of
his duties and had nothing to do with the decisions of then President Marcos. He denied having
anything to do with Twin Peaks.
Juan Tuvera filed a compulsory counterclaim on the ground that the instant action had
besmirched his reputation and caused serious anxiety and mental anguish thus entitling him to
moral and exemplary damages and litigation expenses.
Respondents argued that the Republic failed to present sufficient legal affirmative evidence to
prove its claim.
It is evident that Twin Peaks was of the frame of mind that it could simply walk up to President
Marcos and ask for a timber license agreement without having to comply with the elaborate
application procedure under the law.
The causes of action against respondents allegedly arose from Juan Tuveras abuse of his
relationship, influence and connection as Presidential Executive Assistant of then President
Marcos. Through Juan Tuveras position, the Republic claims that Twin Peaks was able to secure
a Timber License Agreement despite its lack of qualification and the absence of a public bidding.
The Memorandum signed by Juan Tuvera can be taken as proof that he persuaded, induced or
influenced the Director of Forestry to accommodate a timber license agreement in favor of Twin
Peaks, despite the failure to undergo public bidding, or to comply with the requisites for the grant
of such agreement by negotiation, and in favor of a corporation that did not appear legally
capacitated to be granted such agreement.

Juan Tuvera failed to disprove that he failed to act in consonance with his obligations under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue: WoN there is a sufficient basis to award TEMPERATE DAMAGES
HELD:
If only the Court's outrage were quantifiable in sums of money, respondents are due for significant
pecuniary hurt. The fault lies with those engaged by the government to litigate this case in behalf
of the State.
However, there is sufficient basis for an award of temperate damages, also sought by the
Republic notwithstanding the fact that a claim for both actual and temperate damages is internally
inconsistent.
Temperate or moderate damages avail when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.

The textual language might betray an intent that temperate damages do not avail when the case,
by its nature, is susceptible to proof of pecuniary loss; and certainly the Republic could have
proved pecuniary loss herein.
Still, jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear that temperate damages may be awarded even
in instances where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty.
In a host of criminal cases, the Court has awarded temperate damages to the heirs of the victim
in cases where the amount of actual damages was not proven due to the inadequacy of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. Another instance was in aa civil action for damages
involving a vehicular collision, temperate damages were awarded for the resulting damage
sustained by a cargo truck, after the plaintiff had failed to submit competent proof of actual
damages.
We cannot discount the heavy influence of common law, and its reliance on judicial precedents, in
our law on tort and damages.
Notwithstanding the language of Article 2224, a line of jurisprudence has emerged authorizing the
award of temperate damages even in cases where the amount of pecuniary loss could have been
proven with certainty, if no such adequate proof was presented.
The allowance of temperate damages when actual damages were not adequately proven is
ultimately a rule drawn from equity, the principle affording relief to those definitely injured who are
unable to prove how definite the injury.
There is no impediment to apply this doctrine to the case at bar, which involves one of the most
daunting and noble undertakings of our young democracy the recovery of ill-gotten wealth salted
away during the Marcos years. If the doctrine can be justified to answer for the unlawful damage
to a cargo truck, it is a compounded wrath if it cannot answer for the unlawful exploitation of our
forests, to the injury of the Filipino people.
The amount of P1,000,000.00 as temperate damages is proper.
The allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for the award of exemplary damages.
Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a showing that the plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages
allows for the award of exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages cannot be recovered
as a matter of right, the courts are empowered to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook demonstrations where damages by way of
example or correction for the public good should be awarded. Fewer causes of action deserve the
stigma left by exemplary damages, which serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive
to curb socially deleterious actions. The obtention of the timber license agreement by Twin
Peaks through fraudulent and illegal means was highlighted by Juan Tuveras abuse of his
position as Presidential Executive Assistant. The consequent exploitation of 26 hectares of forest
land benefiting all respondents is a grave case of unjust enrichment at the expense of the Filipino
people and of the environment which should never be countenanced. Considering the expanse of
forest land exploited by respondents, the volume of timber that was necessarily cut by virtue of
their abuse and the estimated wealth acquired by respondents through grave abuse of trust and
public office, it is only reasonable that petitioner be granted the amount of P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Ramos V. CA
(1999)
FACTS:

June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall bladder
removed after being tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka.

Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the
operation.

He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.

Erlinda's hand was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center together with her husband went down with her to the operating room.
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.
Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.
When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU)
where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then comatosed.
She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes.
She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage"
Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty.
fees, P800,000 moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest

ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages

HELD: YES.
The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether
a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference.

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury
itself provides the proof of negligence - applicable in this case

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a
diagnosis or of a scientific treatment

As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient according to witness Herminda

With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony

Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an
act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility

Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she
is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience.

Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy was due to an
unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate was not accepted as expert opinion

Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist
observed proper anesthesia protocols

Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in
fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding
the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient

private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with
the exception of the payment of wages.

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary
loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is
chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate
damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.

They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for
anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable.

the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the
physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years.

Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now

Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is
clearly a real one. Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be appropriate.

Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and
nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.

Bao v. Bachelor Express

2012
Facts:

Salvaa was driving the bus owned by respondent Bachelor Express

He overtook a Lawin PUJ jeepney while negotiating a blind curve in a descending road at Km. 60,
causing him to intrude into the opposite lane and bump the 10-wheeler Hino dump truck of
petitioner Cresencio Bao (Bao) running uphill from the opposite direction. The collision resulted in
damage to both vehicles, the subsequent death of the truck driver, Amancio Asumbrado
(Asumbrado), and serious physical injuries to bus driver Salvaa.

Bao and the heirs of Asumbrado (collectively called petitioners) filed a complaint 4 for quasi-delict,
damages and attorney's fees against respondents, accusing Salvaa of negligently driving Bus

4042 causing it to collide with the dump truck

Respondents denied liability, claiming that prior to the collision, Bus 4042 was running out of
control because of a problem in the steering wheel system which could not have been avoided
despite their maintenance efforts. Instead, they claimed that Asumbrado had the last clear chance
to avoid the collision had he not driven the dump truck at a very fast speed.
RTC found that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the reckless negligence
of the bus driver, Salvaa, in attempting to overtake a jeepney along a descending blind curve and
completely invading the opposite lane. Heirs were awarded with reimbursements and moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings on respondents' negligence and liability for
damages, but deleted the separate awards of exemplary damages in favor of petitioners for their
failure to prove that respondents acted with gross negligence.
Similarly, the appellate court deleted the awards for the value of and lost income from the dump
truck for lack of sufficient basis, awarding in their stead temperate damages in the sums
of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively. The CA also deleted the award of moral damages
to Bao for the damage to his property.

ISSUE: WoN temperate damages should also be awarded?

Held:

The Court finds the grant of P100,000.00 as temperate damages for the damaged vehicle to be
insufficient considering its type as a 10-wheeler dump truck and its good running condition at the
time of the incident. Instead, the Court finds the amount of P400,000.00 as fair and reasonable
under the circumstances. With respect to the adjudged lost income from the dump truck, the
Court sustains, for being just and equitable, the award of temperate damages in the sum of
P200,000.00.
CA erred in deleting the awards of exemplary damages, which the law grants to serve as a
warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar deleterious actions.
However, the award should be tempered as it is not intended to enrich one party or to impoverish
another.

Titan Construction Corp. vs Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc.

2007
Facts:
Petitioner Titan Construction Corporation (petitioner) is engaged in the construction business, while
respondent Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc. (respondent) is engaged in the business of selling various
construction materials.
From 1990 to 1993, petitioner purchased on credit various construction supplies and materials from
respondent. Petitioners purchases amounted to P7,620,433.12 but petitioner was only able to pay

P6,215,795.70, leaving a balance of P1,404,637.42. On 19 October 1994, respondent sent a demand

letter to petitioner. But the balance remained unpaid.
On 26 June 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for collection of sum of money with
damages against petitioner.
In its Answer dated 18 August 1995, petitioner admitted the purchases but disputed the amount claimed
by respondent. Petitioner also interposed a counterclaim and sought to recover P204,527.99 from
respondent based on damaged vinyl tiles, non-delivery of materials, and advances for utility expenses,
dues, and insurance premiums on the condominium unit turned over by petitioner to respondent.
On 9 September 1997, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, based on the following
grounds: 1) The principal amount of P1,404,114.00; 2) Interest Charges in the amount of P504,114.00
plus accrued interest charges at 24% per annum compounded yearly reckoned from July, 1995 up to the
time of full payment; 3) Liquidated Damages in the amount of P324,147.94; 4) Attorneys Fees
equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable and accumulated appearance fees at
P1,000.00 per hearing; and 5) Costs of suits.
Petitioner asks the Court to review the records of the case and re-examine the evidence presented before
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
As a rule, only questions of law may be appealed to the Court by petition for review. The Court is not a
trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors of law. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court. In this case, the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were based on substantial evidence which were
not refuted with contrary proof by petitioner. We thus find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
a) W/N the CA erred in finding legal basis for [awarding] liquidated damages, attorneys fees and Interest
in favor of respondent?
b) W/N the CA erred by overlooking certain facts or circumstances of weight and influence which if
considered would alter the results of the case?
Held:
Petitioner insists that the trial court and the Court of Appeals had no legal basis to award interest,
liquidated damages, and attorneys fees because the delivery receipts and sales invoices, which served
as the basis for the award, were not formally offered as evidence by respondent. Petitioner also alleges
that the delivery receipts and sales invoices were in the nature of contracts of adhesion and petitioner had
no option but to accept the conditions imposed by respondent.
On the allegation that the delivery receipts and sales invoices are in the nature of contracts of adhesion,
the Court has repeatedly held that contracts of adhesion are as binding as ordinary contracts. Those who
adhere to the contract are in reality free to reject it entirely and if they adhere, they give their consent. It is
true that on some occasions the Court struck down such contract as void when the weaker party is
imposed upon in dealing with the dominant party and is reduced to the alternative of accepting the
contract or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
Considering that petitioner and respondent have been doing business from 1990 to 1993 and that
petitioner is not a small time construction company, petitioner is "presumed to have full knowledge and to
have acted with due care or, at the very least, to have been aware of the terms and conditions of the
contract. The Court, therefore, upholds the validity of the contract between petitioner and respondent.

However, the Court will reduce the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. In this case, aside from the award of P324,147.94 as liquidated damages, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals also ordered petitioner to pay respondent attorneys fees "equivalent to 25% of whatever
amount is due and payable."
Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code empower the courts to reduce the penalty if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable. The determination of whether the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court and depends on several factors such as the type, extent, and purpose of
the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of breach and its consequences.
The Court notes that respondent had more than adequately protected itself from a possible breach of
contract because of the stipulations on the payment of interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys fees.
The Court finds the award of attorneys fees "equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable"
to be exorbitant because it includes (1) the principal of P1,404,114.00; (2) the interest charges of
P504,114.00 plus accrued interest charges at 24% per annum compounded yearly reckoned from July
1995 up to the time of full payment; and (3) liquidated damages of P324,147.94. Moreover, the liquidated
damages and the attorneys fees serve the same purpose, that is, as penalty for breach of the contract.
Therefore, we reduce the award of attorneys fees to 25% of the principal obligation, or P351,028.50.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision dated 7 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 56816 with MODIFICATION as regards the award of attorneys fees. Petitioner Titan
Construction Corporation is ordered to pay respondent Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc. attorneys fees of
P351,028.50. SO ORDERED.

LAO v. Standard Insurance Co.

2003
Facts:

Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate No. FCG-538. The truck was insured with respondent
Standard Insurance Co
While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. The insured truck bumped another truck,
also owned by petitioner Lao.
The latter truck was running ahead of the insured truck and was bumped from the rear. The
insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around P110,692, while the damage to the
other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were placed at P35,000 more or less.

Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy. However, the
claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to
investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not
possess a proper drivers license at the time of the accident.
He therefore violated the authorized driver clause [5] of the insurance policy.
Lao claimed that the truck was driven by another employee who possessed a drivers license.
He was ordered by the Court to pay exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Issue: WoN the imposition of exemplary damages was right? NO

Held:

On the issue of damages, we agree with petitioner that the award of exemplary damages was
improper.

In Tiongco v. Atty. Deguma we held that the entitlement to the recovery of exemplary damages
must be shown.

In the case at bar, respondent have not shown sufficient evidence that petitioner indeed schemed
to procure the dubious documents and lied through his teeth to establish his version of the facts.

What was found was that the document he presented was inadmissible, and its contents were
dubious.

However, no proof was adduced to sufficiently establish that it came to his hands through his
employment of underhanded means. In Tiongco, we further stated:

Although exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they also need not
be proved.

But a complainant must still show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded.

Thus, it was error for the courts below to award exemplary damages in the absence of any award
for moral, temperate or compensatory damages.

The award of attorneys fees must also be deleted. Such award was given in its extraordinary
concept as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. But it was
not sufficiently shown that petitioner acted maliciously in instituting the claim for damages.
Perforce, the award of attorneys fees was improper.

Cathay Pacific v. Sps. Vasquez

FACTS

Private respondents were passengers of petitioner booked on its Flight CX-905 with the route of Manila to Hongkong and back.

They, along with their maid and two friends, went to HK for pleasure and business.

While the maids boarding pass was for the Economy Class, the spouses and their two friends indicated that they were on the
Business Class.

However, while in Kai Tak Airport, after checking in their luggage and presenting their boarding passes to the ground stewardess,
they were informed by Ms. Chiu, a ground attendant, that there was a seat change from Business to First Class for the spouses. It
is to be noted that the Vasquezes are frequent flyers of the airline and are Gold Card members of its Marco Polo Club.

The Marco Polo Club is part of the marketing strategy of Cathay through which it accords its frequent flyers several privileges,
including priority for upgrading of booking without any extra charge whenever an opportunity arises.

Upon being informed of this change, Dr. Vasquez refused the same, saying that it would not look nice for them as hosts to travel in
First Class and their guests, in Business Class, not to mention that they also had to discuss business matters during the flight.

He asked Ms. Chiu to have other passengers transferred instead.

Shocked by this unusual reaction to a seat upgrade, Ms. Chiu, after consulting with her supervisor, informed them that if they
would not avail of the privilege, they would not be allowed to take the flight. Eventually, after talking with his friends, Dr. Vasquez
agreed. He and his wife took the First Class Cabin. Back in Manila, after apparent inaction on the part of Cathay, the Vasquezes
filed a damage suit, asking for temperate, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. They attributed discourteous
and humiliating behavior to Ms. Chiu. Cathay answered that seat upgrading is a common practice among airlines.

The TC ruled for the spouses, awarding them nominal (P100,000 each), moral (P2M each), exemplary (P5M each) and attorneys
fees (P1M each). The CA affirmed, but deleted the award of exemplary damages and reduced the awards of moral and nominal
damages and attorneys fees.

ISSUE/s
1.

WON Cathay breached its contract of carriage with the Vs when it upgraded their seat accommodation.

2.

WON the upgrading was made in bad faith or with fraud.

3.

WON the Vasquezes are entitled to damages.

RULING
1. YES. The Vazquezes never denied that they were members of Cathays Marco Polo Club. They knew that as members of the
Club, they had priority for upgrading of their seat accommodation at no extra cost when an opportunity arises. But, just like other
privileges, such priority could be waived. The Vazquezes should have been consulted first whether they wanted to avail themselves
of the privilege or would consent to a change of seat accommodation before their seat assignments were given to other passengers.
Normally, one would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for it would mean a better accommodation. But, whatever their reason
was and however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had every right to decline the upgrade and insist on the Business Class
accommodation they had booked for and which was designated in their boarding passes. They clearly waived their priority or
preference when they asked that other passengers be given the upgrade. It should not have been imposed on them over their
vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes.
2. NO. The Vazquezes were not induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious words or deceitful machination or through
willful concealment of material facts. Upon boarding, Ms. Chiu told the Vazquezes that their accommodations were upgraded to First
Class in view of their being Gold Card members of Cathays Marco Polo Club. She was honest in telling them that their seats were
already given to other passengers and the Business Class Section was fully booked. Ms. Chiu might have failed to consider the
remedy of offering the First Class seats to other passengers. But, we find no bad faith in her failure to do so, even if that amounted
to an exercise of poor judgment. Neither was the transfer of the Vazquezes effected for some evil or devious purpose. As testified to
by Mr. Robson, the First Class Section is better than the Business Class Section in terms of comfort, quality of food, and service
from the cabin crew.
3. YES. Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there must be an injury clearly
sustained by the claimant, whether physical, mental or psychological; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4)
the award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the carrier is guilty of
fraud or bad faith or where the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger. Where in breaching the contract of carriage the airline is
not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the liability does not
include moral and exemplary damages. The breach of contract of carriage, which consisted in the involuntary upgrading of the
Vazquezes seat accommodation, was not attended by fraud or bad faith. The Court of Appeals award of moral damages has,
therefore, no leg to stand on.
The deletion of the award for exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is correct. It is a requisite in the grant of exemplary
damages that the act of the offender must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner. Such
requisite is absent in this case. Moreover, to be entitled thereto the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages. Since the Vazquezes are not entitled to any of these damages, the award for exemplary damages has no
legal basis. And where the awards for moral and exemplary damages are eliminated, so must the award for attorneys fees.
The most that can be adjudged in favor of the Vazquezes for Cathays breach of contract is an award for nominal damages under
Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

SOCIEDAD EUROPEA DE FINANCIACION vs. CA

1991
Facts:

Julio Ramonet Muoz, in representation of a New York business firm, Carum Trading, Inc., gave
Antonio V. Rocha US $400,000.00 to open an insurance company in the Philippines. With the
money, Rocha organized the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. Under Rocha's direction, the
company prospered. A sister corporation was subsequently also set up by Rocha, the Capital Life
Assurance Corporation.
Rocha transferred all the shares of Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (hereafter, simply
CAPITAL INSURANCE) to Carum Trading, Inc. Joaquin G. Garrido replaced Rocha in the
insurance corporation

That control was exercised by Garrido, who was named General Manager of the insurance firms.
In 1966, Garrido and Araneta proposed to the board of directors that CAPITAL INSURANCE
obtain a loan of P600,000.00 from Progressive Commercial Bank. This, according to them, in
order that a better financial position could be projected when renewal was sought of the license of
its sister corporation, CAPITAL LIFE.
A year and a half later, on "the pretext," according to the Court of Appeals, "that the loan was
unpaid," and no doubt to the surprise and consternation of SEF and the other director of CAPITAL
INSURANCE, PROGRESSIVE caused the foreclosure of the pledged SEF shares and its sale at
public auction through a notary public
They sued in their own behalf and in behalf of CAPITAL INSURANCE and prayed for annulment
of the loan and the accompanying pledge of the SEF stock on the ground of breach of trust on the
part of Garrido, Araneta and the latter's bank.
They also accused defendants Garrido and Araneta of mismanagement of the corporation and
prayed for damages on account thereof.
the court sentences all the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P100,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages, plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00,
and costs of suit,
Plaintiffs appealed contending that the award of damages was quite inadequate.

ISSUE: WoN the award of exemplary damages was proper? Yes. And was INCREASED.
HELD:

The Court feels also that the award of P 100,000.00 in exemplary or corrective damages lets the
private respondents off too lightly for the part they played in this sorry affair. Both the Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals found that the defendants had concocted a scheme "to divest plaintiff
SEF of its interests in Capital Insurance and for themselves to own the controlling interest
therein," and carried out that illicit objective. Said award of damages should be increased to
P600,000.00.
WHEREFORE, MODIFIED so as to: (a) declare petitioners not liable to Progressive Bank for any
interests, penalties or charges on or on account of the "accommodation loan" in question, and (b)
increase to P600,000.00 the exemplary or corrective damages that the private respondents
are sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay said petitioners, the appealed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is otherwise AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

Munsayac v. De Lara
1968
Facts:
Munsayac suffered injuries while riding the jeepney owned and operated by the De Lara.
The trial Judge found the driver recklessly negligent: he drove at an excessive speed, unmindful of the
fact that the road was under repair and heedless of the passengers pleas that he go more slowly.
Besides the award of compensatory damages for actual expenses incurred and loss of income, the
defendant was ordered to pay P1,000.00 as exemplary damages and P500.00 as attorneys fees.
Defendant appealed

Issue: WoN the defendant should be imposed exemplary damages? NO

Held:

The Civil Code provides that "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good" (Act 2229); and that in contracts "the Court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner"
(Art. 2232).
Appellant points out that the act referred to in Article 2232 must be one which is coetaneous with and
characterizes the breach of the contract on which the suit is based, and not one which is subsequent
to such breach and therefore has no causal relation thereto, such as the herein defendants failure to
placate the sufferings of the plaintiff."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant relies on the case of Rotea v. Halili,which says that a principal or master can be held liable
for exemplary or punitive damages based upon the wrongful act of his agent or servant only where he
participated in the doing of such wrongful act or has previously authorized or subsequently ratified it
with full knowledge of the facts. Reasons given for this rule are that since damages are penal in
character, the motive authorizing their infliction will not be imputed by presumption to the principal
when the act is committed by an agent or servant, and that since they are awarded not by way of
compensation, but as a warning to others, they can only be awarded against one who has participated
in the offense, and the principal therefore cannot be held liable for them merely by reason of wanton,
oppressive or malicious intent on the part of the agent
Court affirmed and said that it is difficult to conceive how the defendant in a breach of contract case
could be held to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner within
the meaning of Article 2232 for something he did or did not do after the breach, which had no causal
connection therewith.
The law does not contemplate a vicarious liability on his part: the breach is his as party to the contract
and so if he is to be held liable at all for exemplary damages by reason of the wrongful act of his agent,
it must be shown that he had previously authorized or knowingly ratified it thereafter, in effect making
him a co-participant. From the decision under review, however, there is nothing to show previous
authority or subsequent ratification by appellant insofar as the recklessness of the driver was
concerned. The mere statement that the defendant failed, even refused, to placate the suffering of the
plaintiff, necessitating the filing of the action, is too tenuous a basis to warrant the conclusion that the
defendant approved of the wrongful act of his servant with full knowledge of the facts.
It is not enough to say that an example should be made, or corrective measures employed, for the
public good, especially in accident cases where public carriers are involved. For the causative
negligence in such cases is personal to the employees actually in charge of the vehicles, and it is they
who should be made to pay this kind of damages by way of example or correction, unless by the
demonstrated tolerance or approval of the owners they themselves can be held at fault and their fault
is of the character described in Article 2232 of the Civil Code. Otherwise there would be practically no
difference between their liability for exemplary damages and their liability for compensatory damages,
which needs no proof of their negligence since the suit is predicated on breach of contract and due
diligence on their part does not constitute a defense.

Pan Pacific Co. v. Phil. Advertising Corp. and Mears

1968
Facts:

Plaintiff seeks to recover moral damages for the alleged wanton refusal of the defendants to pay

their just obligation to the plaintiff and for taking advantage of the plaintiffs good faith.
The records of this case disclose that the defendant, in utter disregard of the rights of the plaintiff,
had refused deliberately and wantonly to pay the plaintiff what is justly due.

The installation of the bowling alleys, together with their equipment, and the billiard tables had

brought the defendant a lucrative income from the year of its opening in 1951, and yet outside of
the down payment which defendant had paid on the 18 bowling alleyes, defendant had absolutely
refused without just cause, to pay the balance thereof and the cost of the bowling and billiard
accessories this notwithstanding that the defendant had promised to pay the balance of the
price of the bowling alleys in installments the rest installment to be made on the day that the
plaintiff would commence work on the bowling alleys.
Defendant, taking advantage of the plaintiffs good faith, requested a deferment of the payment

until the installation shall have been completed; but the installation having been completed,
defendants under one pretext or another, refused without just cause to pay what is due the
plaintiff.
Not only that, but defendants attitude towards the plaintiff was characterized by arrogance and
his letters are replete with unsavory and discourteous remarks, which demonstrate not only the
character of the man but reveal his lack of intention to pay defendants just obligation.

Issue: Is the plaintiff entitled to damages?

Held: (1) Actual, moral, and exemplary damages. Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages consisting in
the payment of interest and attorneys fees, and considering that the defendants had acted wantonly,
oppressively, if not fraudulently, in the performance of their obligation, plaintiff is likewise entitled to moral
and exemplary damages, which the court fixes in the amount of P20,000
(2) Right to attorneys fees. under the first cause of action plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees, since
plaintiff, in accordance with Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, has been awarded exemplary damages,
and because defendant acted in gross and evident had faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly
valid, just and demandable claim, and it is just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
Considering the lengthy pleadings, the voluminous records, the lengthy and protracted trial, and the
professional standing of counsel, the Court hereby charges the defendants with the pay- ment of
attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00.

People v. Domingo
2007
FACTS:

Victim who was ten years of age was inside her residence in the afternoon, while sleeping on the
sofa in their living room
AAA was awakened by the Domingo, the son of AAA's maid.
He told her to transfer to her bed which she did.

While inside the room, she was asked to remove her shorts which she again did; then appellant
subsequently inserted his penis into her private organ until the satisfaction of his bestial act.
He, thereafter, warned her not to tell anybody about the incident, otherwise, something bad would
happen to her. The rape incident was repeated sometime in February 1998.
BBB, the mother of AAA, noticed that the latter was always crying and not happy and have seen a
stain on her panty
AAA thereafter, admitted that she was raped twice by Domingo which the medico-legal revealed
that there were lacerations.
Appelant denied the charges. He instead claimed that AAA fell in love with him and presented as
evidence love letters from her
Appellant's mother testified that it was impossible for appellant to have raped AAA because she
was with her son twenty-four hours a day.
Trial Court convicted Domingo disregarding the sweetheart theory
On the civil aspect, the court rightly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another
P50,000.00 for moral damages, but failed to award exemplary damages.

ISSUE: WoN the victim should be awarded with exemplary damages?

HELD:
YES
As we held in People v. Malones, this is not the first time that a child has been snatched from the
cradle of innocence by some beast to sate its deviant sexual appetite.
To curb this disturbing trend, appellant should, likewise, be made to pay exemplary
damages which is pegged at P25,000.00.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Geronimo Domingo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no
eligibility for parole.
In addition to the award of civil indemnity and moral damages, AAA is hereby
awarded P25,000.00 for exemplary damages.

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN BAKING

2007

Sebastian Baking went to Dr. Cesar Sys clinic for a medical check-up.
The next day, after undergoing several tests, Dr. Sy found that Bakings blood sugar and
triglyceride levels were above normal, so he gave him 2 medical prescriptionsDiamicron (blood
sugar) and Benalize (triglyceride).
Baking went to Mercury Drug Alabang branch to buy the medicines.

However, the saleslady misread the prescription as Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, so that
was what was sold to Baking.
Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking took one Dormicum pill a day for 3 days.
On the 3rdday of taking the medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular accident, as his car collided
with Josie Peraltas car.
Baking fell asleep while driving, and he could not remember anything about the collision nor felt
its impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his state at the time of the collision, he
returned to Dr. Sy, who was shocked to find that what was sold to Baking was Dormicum.
Baking filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Baking. CA affirmed RTC.

MERCURY DRUG EMPLOYEE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN SELLING DORMICUM

To sustain a claim based on NCC 2176, the following requisites must concur:

Damage suffered by plaintiff

Fault or negligence of defendant

Connection of cause and effect between A & B

The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into
jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling
medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed
must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the
employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified WON the
medicine she gave was what was prescribed by Dr. Sy.
MERCURY DRUG ALSO LIABLE UNDER NCC 2180
It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of the employee
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT NEGLIGENCE OF DRUGSTORE EMPLOYEE
Proximate cause any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise;
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent

Vehicular accident could not have occurred had the drugstore employee been careful in reading
the prescription; without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that Baking
would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision
AWARD 50k moral damages, 25k exemplary damages

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., ET AL. vs. RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE

2008
FACTS:

Cebu Country Club, Inc., is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock private membership club.
Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors.

Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of CCCI, designated respondent
Ricardo Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special nonproprietary member.

The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCIs Board of Directors.

In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership.

The application was indorsed by CCCIs 2 proprietary members, namely: Edmundo Misa and Silvano Ludo.

As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, respondent purchased the share of a certain Dr.
Butalid for only P3 million.

Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.

In a Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondents application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997,
respondent received a letter from Julius Neri, CCCIs corporate secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his
application for proprietary membership.

On August 6, 1997, Edmundo Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did not
answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent.

On November 5, 1997, respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his
application. Again, CCCI did not reply. Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 71,
Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 67190.

Both RTC and CA held petitioners liable to respondent for damages. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the CA erred in disregarding their defense of damnum absque injuria.

ISSUE: Whether in disapproving respondents application for proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent
for damages.
RULING: As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the "black ball system" of voting wherein each
member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball
means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When
respondents application for proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot
box contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was disapproved.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of the directors
present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was
printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of
an applicant as a proprietary member. Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to
economic reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was
introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed his application. We cannot fathom why such a
prestigious and exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose members are all affluent, did not have enough money to cause the
printing of an updated application form. It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application
was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a letter for

reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly,
respondent did not deserve this kind of treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary
member of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they should have informed
him why his application was disapproved.
As to petitioners reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same is
misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez, we held that this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a persons right , as in this
case.
Lastly, petitioners argument that they could not be held jointly and severally liable for damages because only one (1) voted for the
disapproval of respondents application lacks merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire
any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
Northwest Airlines v Chiong,
2008
Facts

Philimare, as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean, hired Chiong as third engineer of TransOceans vessel M/V
Elbia.
Subsequently, Philmare dispatched a letter of guarantee to CL Hutchins and Co., TranOceans agent at the San Diego
Port, confirming Chiongs arrival in time to board the vessel.
For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San Diego from Manila.
Chiong, on queue at the check-in counter, was informed that his name did not appear in the list of confirmed departing
passengers.
He was directed to speak to a man standing outside the Northwests counters from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a
boarding pass.
Posthaste, Chiong approached the man but having no $100 to pay for the boarding pass he went on queue at the checkin counter again and presented his ticket where he was made to wait.
When Chiong approached Calvo if she had money for the boarding pass, the latter found something amiss because his
plane ticket was already confirmed.
Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board the flight and was unable to work at the M/V Elbia.
It appears that Chiongs name was crossed out and substituted with "W. Costine" in Northwests Air Passenger Manifest.
Chiong demanded as recompense: (1) the amount equivalent to Chiongs salary under the latters Crew Agreement with
TransOcean; (2) P15,000 for Chiongs expenses in fetching and bringing his family from Samar to Manila; (3) P500,000 as
moral damages; and (4) P500,000 as legal fees. When Northwest demurred, Chiong filed a complaint for breach of
contract of carriage.
Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong had no cause
of action against it because per its records, Chiong was a "no-show" passenger.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for
breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled that the evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that
Chiong was deliberately prevented from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an
American passenger by the name of W. Costine. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue
Whether Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong and if so, whether it is liable for compensatory, actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit
Ruling

In addition to his testimony, Chiongs evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket, Chiongs passport and seaman
service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez, and
Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified the signature and stamp of
the PCG on Chiongs passport.
Northwest did not present any evidence to support its belated defense that Chiong departed from the Philippines on
April 17, 1989 to work as Third Engineer on board M/V Elbia under the original crew agreement. Its bare-faced claim
that Chiong was a no-show passenger was belied by the records.
Even if Chiong left the Philippines on April 17, 1989, it would not necessarily prove that Chiong was a "no-show" on
April 1, 1989. Neither does it negate the already established fact that Chiong had a confirmed ticket for April 1, 1989,

and first passed through the PCG counter without delay, then reached and was at the Northwest check-in counters
on time for the scheduled flight.
Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong.
Time and again, we have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case, air transport, is primarily intended to serve
the traveling public and thus, imbued with public interest. The law governing common carriers consequently imposes
an exacting standard of conduct. As the aggrieved party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract and
the fact of its non-performance by Northwest, as carrier, in order to be awarded compensatory and actual damages.
Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an award of moral damages, in breaches of contract, is in order
upon a showing that the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.
It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It means breach of a known
duty through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
The award of exemplary damages is also correct given the evidence that Northwest acted in an oppressive manner
towards Chiong.
Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest, or
where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim.

Japan Airlines, Inc. v Simangan

2008
Facts

Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin Loreto, in California. Simangan needed to go to the US to
complete his preliminary work-up and donation surgery. Upon UCLAs request, Simangan was issued an emergency US
visa by the American Embassy in Manila.
Respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from petitioner JAL and was issued the corresponding boarding pass.
On the date of the flight, he went to the airport and was allowed to check-in at JALs counter. His plane ticket, boarding
pass, travel authority and personal articles were subjected to rigid immigration and security routines. Respondent was
then allowed to board the airplane.
While inside the airplane, JALs crew suspected Simangan of carrying a falsified travel document and imputed that he
would only use the trip to the US as a pretext to stay and work in Japan.
Later, he was ordered to leave the plane. Respondent protested, explaining that he was issued a US visa. His pleas were
ignored and was bumped off.
Respondent went to JALs ground office and waited there for three hours.
Meanwhile, the plane took off and he was left behind. Afterwards, he was informed that his travel documents were,
indeed, in order.
Respondent was refunded the cost of his plane ticket less the sum of US$500.00 which was deducted by JAL.
Subsequently, respondent's U.S. visa was cancelled.
Respondent filed an action for damages against JAL. The latter denied the material allegations of the complaint.
The RTC ordered JAL to pay Simangan moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees, plus the cost of suit.
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision but lowered the amount of moral and exemplary damages and deleted the award of
attorneys fees. Hence, the present petition.

Issue
Whether JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage, and if so liable for moral and exemplary damages
Ruling

Since JAL definitely declared that the flight could not wait for respondent, it gave respondent no choice but to be left
behind.
The latter was unceremoniously bumped off despite his protestations and valid travel documents and
notwithstanding his contract of carriage with JAL.
Damage had already been done when respondent was offered to fly the next day on July 30, 1992. Said offer did not
cure JAL's default.
Moreover, the reason behind the bumping off incident, as found by the RTC and CA, was that JAL personnel imputed
that respondent would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan.
Apart from the fact that respondent's plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles already
passed the rigid immigration and security routines, JAL, as a common carrier, ought to know the kind of valid travel
documents respondent carried. As provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code: "A common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very

cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances." Thus, We find untenable JAL's defense of "verification
of respondent's documents" in its breach of contract of carriage.
The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL.
In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such contract
and its non-performance by the carrier through the latter's failure to carry the passenger safely to his destination.
Respondent has complied with these twin requisites.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for
it is not one of the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220.
JAL breached its contract of carriage with respondent in bad faith. JAL personnel summarily and insolently
ordered respondent to disembark while the latter was already settled in his assigned seat.
He was certainly embarrassed and humiliated when, in the presence of other passengers, the appellant's airline staff
shouted at him to stand up and arrogantly asked him to produce his travel papers, without the least courtesy every
human being is entitled to. Inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an
award of moral damages.
JAL is also liable for exemplary damages as its above-mentioned acts constitute wanton, oppressive and malevolent
acts against respondent. Exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of example or correction for the public
good, may be recovered in contractual obligations, as in this case, if defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.
It was therefore erroneous for the CA to delete the award of attorney's fees on the ground that the record is devoid of
evidence to show the cost of the services of respondent's counsel. The amount is actually discretionary upon the
Court so long as it passes the test of reasonableness. They may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages
when exemplary damages are awarded and whenever the court deems it just and equitable, as in this case.