SMUN16 NATO Study Guide

SINGAPORE MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2016
Hosted by the National University of Singapore
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO
STUDY GUIDE
Table of Contents
CHAIRPERSON INTRODUCTIONS
WELCOME LETTER
COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION & MANDATE
SPECIAL ROP
TOPIC A: THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

1. Historical Backgronud
2. Current Situation
3. Past Actions and Case Studies
4. Country and Bloc Positions
8
8
12
15
16
TOPIC B: APPLICATIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

1. Introduction and Historical Background
3. Case Studies/ Past Actions
4. Major Bloc Positions
17
17
22
29
32
BIBLIOGRAPHY
33
Chairperson Introductions
Head Chair Hakim Ahmad Kamal
Having grown up between Singapore, Montreal, and Jeddah, his experience going to school
with people of different cultures led to an interest in global affairs and later on Model UN. An
avid MUNer since 2010, he spent the majority of high school in the European MUN circuit.
During the course of his studies at NTU, he has also served as Director General for NTUMUN
and chaired conferences such as SMUN, YMA, and YNCAP. His passion for history and international security puts this committees topic well within his area of interest. While MUN is one
of the most indoor hobbies ever, he also enjoys the outdoors hiking, trekking, camping,
and backpacking anything to get him a quick respite from city life. His pet peeve is having
to write short write-ups about himself for MUN study guides and he enjoys a good social just
as much as he enjoys debate.
Vice Chair Levonne Goh

Levonne may be considered a MUN junkie, having staffed, delegated, and chaired many conferences in which she has won Best Delegate thrice (SCMUN 2014, RVMUN 2014, PAMUN
2015). She has also chaired the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
committee at SMUN 2015, Asia-Europe Meeting at YMA 2015, African Union at YNCAP 2016
and UNESCAP at NTUMUN 2016. Other than Model United Nations, she has attended Singapore Model Parliament in 2015, where she was the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Her favourite
MUN experience (other than chairing and interacting with the delegates) was at PAMUN in
Taiwan in 2015, where she first tried her hand at a purely Chinese-speaking council.
Levonne is Political Science student at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. She claims that Tembusu is her second home but spends most of her
time in CCAs outside of Tembusu. Her hobbies include reading books (not readings), sleeping, and wearing shirts from other universities and faculties.
Vice Chair Ariel Lim Song Fang

Ariel is a first-year undergraduate in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the National University of Singapore. Her major is still undeclared, but she has always been
interested in politics, history and language. She has taken part in MUNs since
2011 and has attended seven MUN conferences as a delegate; SMUN 2016 will
be her second conference as a chairperson. In her spare time, she likes to read and
listen to music. She is looking forward to chairing NATO this year!
Chairperson Introductions
Vice-Chair Bianca Udella Djongianto
Bianca is a Year 6 student of NUS High School of Math and Science, where she is part of the
Organising Team of the schools Model UN conference focusing on sustainable development,
the Sustainable Development Youth Convention (SDYC). Bianca has taken part in various conferences since starting off as a delegate in SDYC in 2013 and has enjoyed her experiences in
various committees ranging from the World Health Organisation (WHO) to Historical UNSC
committees. In 2016, she has also chaired at Fundamental Model United Nations (FUNDAMUN) and she looks forward to chairing the NATO council in SMUN 2016.
Apart from MUNs, Bianca has a passion for scientific research, as expected of a Science student. She enjoys working on biology research projects and is very interested in the field of
bioinformatics. She also loves watching movies, musicals and listening to Metallica.
Welcome Letter
Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the SMUN 2016 NATO committee. This year, we have two riveting topics covering the ever-present question of the Situation in Afghanistan as well as its sister topic, the
Application of Collective Security. In the 21st centurys tense geopolitical environment, it has
become imperative that aging institutions such as NATO review their mechanisms to remain
relevant in an international security context. Central to this review would be an overhaul of
the Collective Security concept, a principle designed for use in a cold war world one whose
threats were distinctly more clear-cut than the asymmetric warfare often seen today. With the
situation in Afghanistan balancing precariously on the public opinion of coalition countries,
in particular that of the United States, any review of the principles of collective security will
could in turn influence long-term strategy in Afghanistan. As a conflict first started upon invocation of this principle, further developments will definitely set a precedent for actions to be
taken in response to future conflicts.
As the largest currently-standing military alliance with no comparable rivals and several permanent members on the United Nations Security Council, changes made by NATO have
the potential to make global repercussions. However, with various member states seeking
to advance their own agenda through the organization, delegates will have to balance the
needs of their individual member states with those of the alliance as a whole in order to pass
a declaration. Being a highly specialized committee, the dais looks forward to a high level
of debate and innovative solutions to problems that trouble real-life policymakers to this
very day. Over the course of the conference, we hope to see fresh perspectives, hear great
speeches and have a great time.
Sincerely,
Hakim, Levonne, Ariel, and Bianca
Committee Introduction & Mandate

History of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded on April 4th, 1949, where twelve nations
came together in Washington D.C. to establish a resistance to Communist aggression and
subversion.1 The creation of the Alliance sought to achieve three purposes, namely to deter
Soviet expansion, to inhibit the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through establishing
a strong U.S presence in the region, and to encourage European political integration.2 In
addition, U.S involvement in NATO symbolized the countrys new approach to diplomatic
relations, especially as a resistance towards its traditional policy of diplomatic isolationism
by being a member state of NATO, the U.S made good its promise to encourage multilateral
dialogue between the member states and various stakeholders, signifying a change in course
of direction and development for the international relations of the U.S. 3
Other than the U.S, the other countries that signed the Treaty were Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The
parliaments of these countries ratified the treaty five months later from the date of signing,
thereby formally turning them into member states of the Alliance. 4
Mandate of NATO
As a political and military alliance, NATO aims to safeguard the freedom and security of its
member states through consultations and peaceful resolutions of disputes.5 Since the inception of the Alliance, collective efforts in the European region has been furthered, especially
in the fields of democracy, human rights, and the (upholding of) the rule of law.6 As an inter-governmental organization, NATO aims to establish a common defence for the European
and Atlantic areas, as well as to address common issues faced by member states.7
1 Richard Cavendish, The Founding of NATO, HistoryToday, April 4, 1999, http://www.historytoday.com/

richard-cavendish/founding-nato (Accessed February 12, 2016)
2 http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html (Accessed February 12, 2016)
3 NATO, A short history of NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html (Accessed February 12, 2016)
4 UNESCO, NATO, Guides to Archives of International Organisations, http://www.unesco.org/archives/sio/Eng/presentation_print.php?idOrg=1026 (Accessed February 12, 2016)
5 NATO, What is NATO?, http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/ (Accessed February 12, 2016)
6 UNESCO, NATO, Guides to Archives of International Organisations, http://www.unesco.org/archives/sio/Eng/presentation_print.php?idOrg=1026 (Accessed February 12,
2016)
7 CBC News, Fast facts about NATO, CBCnews World, April 6, 2009, http://www.
cbc.ca/news/world/fast-facts-about-nato-1.778864 (Accessed February 12,
2016)
Special ROP
Being a highly specialized organization, NATO Summit operates under a rather different set
of debate procedures than a typical United Nations committee. Some points to note are:
All participants at a NATO Summit are Heads of State / Government. However, for the
purpose of brevity and convenience, the above terms will be used interchangeably over
in this study guide with the term delegates.
All motions will be decided by the basis of consensus. This means that if no delegate
objected to the motion, it will be automatically considered passed.
If an objection has been raised to a procedural motion, a vote which requires a
simple majority will be taken.
If an objection has been raised to a substantive motion, the motion will automatically be considered failed.
Yields are not in order at the Summit. Delegates will yield their time, by default, to the
Chairperson, at the end of his/ her speech.
All Points except the Point of Order are considered out of order. If Heads of State/ Government have queries, they may seek clarification from the Chairpersons in writing, or
during unmoderated caucuses or other such informal sessions.
A NATO Summit produces a Declaration. Only One Draft Declaration may be introduced
over the course of the Summit, which means that delegates must merge all documents
to form a single draft declaration before introducing it for debate. Any other documents
used before the introduction of the draft declaration will be considered working papers.
Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

1. Historical Background
Over the past few centuries, few places have seen turmoil and instability as consistently as
Afghanistan. Once strategically located between the British, Russian, and Persian Empires,
and eventually between Pakistan, India, and the Soviet Union, it found itself often subject to
occupation by several of these powers as each attempted to gain a foothold over the other.
While conflict is waged in Afghanistan today for vastly different reasons, mainly the Global
War on Terrorism, the spirit of Afghan resistance to foreign invaders can only be truly understood if traced all the way back to its roots in the previous wars waged against the British and
Russians.
1.1 The Great Game
Located at a strategic crossroads between East and West, the territory that is now Afghanistan had always been a coveted land. With imperialism at its peak in the 1800s, a natural rivalry between the expanding Imperial Russia and the established British Empire arose in central
Asia. During this time of intense rivalry between ambitious colonial powers, Afghanistan was
continuously subjected to attacks and coups orchestrated by the two empires. However,
while coups and manipulations of Afghan politics were often successful8, outright military
intervention could, and on occasion would, end in disaster, such as the First Anglo-Afghan
war, where an entire British garrison of sixteen thousand were slaughtered by Afghan tribespeople, leaving only a single survivor. While the Afghan rulers eventually gave in to limited
British influence in return for protection from the Russian threat, this did not prevent another
two attempts to expel the British in the form of the Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars, of
which the Third resulted in an armistice highly favourable to the Afghan state and eventually
resulted in its independence. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that despite British intervention
and control of foreign policy, the Afghan state was never entirely controlled by foreigners.
Instead, the state managed to maintain a degree of freedom while making concessions to
the British.9
While stories abound of conquered peoples rallying and expelling their colonizers, what is of
particular interest to us is the Afghan ability to maintain solidarity in response to overwhelming odds against them and wage a war against a far stronger enemy to regain their sovereignty. Although a doctrine for the resistance against foreign invaders had not yet solidified,
the success of the Third Anglo-Afghan War would inspire following generations of
Afghans to follow in the example of their forebears, setting the stage for the Jihad
mentality that would become prevalent during the Soviet occupation.
8 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-afghan-wars#pt1
9 http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-afghan-wars#pt3

1.2 The Cold War and Soviet Occupation
The Saur Revolution of 1978 ushered in a new era of conflict for the country. The Peoples
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a communist group, ousted the monarchy that had
existed since the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War and installed in its place a pro-Soviet
government, forming the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.10 Despite having a pro-poor
agenda, the Partys influence over the population was not absolute and it soon found itself
besieged by uprisings. Being a communist government, they decided to call for help from
the Soviet Union, who saw the opportunity to expand their influence in Central Asia and gladly accepted the task. While at first only providing advisory assistance, the situation quickly
worsened and the Soviets were invited to militarily intervene in the country. By the end of
1979, however, the Soviet Union had formally invaded Afghanistan, stationing thousands of
troops on Afghan soil and rearranging the government as it saw fit.11 Utilizing then-cutting
edge helicopter tactics, Soviet forces made large gains in urban centres and communication
routes. However, 80% of the country was still under various opposition groups.12 Sensing the
Soviets ambition for dominance in the region, the United States began a covert operation to
fund and supply militants with arms to combat the Soviet expeditionary force.13 Similarly, Pakistan also extended funding as well as covert aid.1415 These militants, known as Mujahideen,
had declared a Jihad against the Soviet Union and sought to push out these perceived invaders like their ancestors had done to the Russian Empire and the British Empire before it.
Armed with American-supplied Stinger missile systems16 to combat Russian helicopters and
trained in guerrilla tactics, the Mujahideen began to inflict devastating losses on the Soviet
army. Eventually, the growing confidence of the Mujahideen in guerrilla tactics led to greater
and greater incursions behind Soviet lines, undermining popular support both in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, news of losses sustained by Soviet forces combined with the shaky political
situation in Moscow eroded public support for the occupation at home, leading to the decision to end Russian involvement in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union declared its mission over
in 1989 and pulled out all remaining personnel, leaving the Peoples Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) to fend for itself.17
10 http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/afghan-president-is-overthrown-and-murdered
11 https://web.archive.org/web/20060722123446/http://www12.georgetown.edu:80/sfs/isd/
Afghan_1_WR_group.pdf
12 Amstutz, J. Bruce (1986). Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. Washington D.C.: NDU Press, p. 127.
13 http://www.millat.com/democracy/Foreign%20Policy/Briefing_Paper_english_11.pdf
14 http://www.millat.com/democracy/Foreign%20Policy/Briefing_Paper_english_11.pdf
15 http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/apr/babar.htm
16 http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240529702041382045765988511094467
80
17 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/15/
newsid_4160000/4160827.stm

The valuable strategic and tactical experience gained regarding asymmetrical warfare and
guerrilla tactics would later benefit the Taliban greatly in their resistance against NATO occupation. Furthermore, the anti-imperialist sentiments first fostered during resistance to the
British Empire had raised its head again and proved effective in motivating Afghans to victory
against foreign threats, leading to Jihad, or holy war as the pre-eminent ideology behind
Afghan insurgents. Similarly, the United States gained similarly valuable experience in covert
desert operations. Ultimately, the leading cause of the failure for all previous attempts at occupying Afghanistan was a failure to win the hearts and minds of the local populace, leading
to their recruitment by Mujahideen forces and the eventual expulsion of the invaders.18
1.3 Taliban Control
With Soviet influence in the region back to a minimum, the United States did little to interfere
in the internal affairs of post-Soviet Afghanistan. The power void left by the retreating Soviet
forces meant that the Soviet-backed PDPA government soon felt mounting pressure on it.
Various groups of Mujahideen, no longer supressed by Soviet intervention were free to attack
government territory and soon captured vast swathes of land. The largest of these, the Taliban, managed to organize itself well enough to control not only the majority of the country but
also set up government institutions such as ministries and run essential services.19 However,
an opposition group of militias in the north known as the Northern Alliance emerged and
began to fight the Taliban. Although never fully recognized internationally as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan, the Taliban had powerful backers in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
who funded the regime.
1.4 Operation Enduring Freedom and the ISAF
The horrifying attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon brought to the United
States attention a country which was supposedly harbouring the very people who had masterminded the deadliest attacks on American soil in decades. Although a cursory diplomatic
solution was attempted20 in the form of a demand for the extradition of Osama Bin Laden,
who had been identified as the mastermind behind the attacks, this diplomatic avenue was
quickly shut off when the request was firmly denied by the Taliban.21 Having failed at a diplomatic solution, the United States quickly gathered international support by taking the refusal
of the (already internationally unpopular) Taliban to hand over Bin Laden as admission of
guilt. With the Taliban cast as harbouring terrorists, intervention officially began and by
October 2001 bombing attacks had already begun on Taliban positions in the cap18 http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/lessons-soviet-withdrawal-afghanistan?print
19 https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-01.htm
20 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
21 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/14/afghanistan.terrorism5
10

ital of Kandahar. By November, intervention had escalated to a full scale invasion involving
thousands of troops on the ground as well as cooperation with the Northern Alliance. In December, the United Nation granted a mandate to form the International Security Assistance
Force, or ISAF, to help the Transitional government maintain security in the country. By early
the next year Taliban control had all but eroded to the fringes of the country, with some leadership elements escaping into neighbouring Pakistan to seek refuge. In 2003, NATO adopted
a leadership role in the ISAF and began to expand combat missions to retake the outlying
regions of Afghanistan. At the end of 2003, NATO ISAF forces found themselves locked in a
battle to secure the mountainous Northern regions of Afghanistan. By 2006, the force had expanded even further to encompass remote Western and Southern regions, including former
Taliban strongholds like Kandahar. Finally, by the end of 2006, NATO made a final expansion
to the ISAF, deploying units to the East of the country effectively taking responsibility for
the security situation in the entire country.22
Fig 3. Comparison between Afghan and ISAF losses23
Alongside combat missions, NATO personnel also engaged in humanitarian and rebuilding
duties, working to repair the damage caused by the bloody civil war. As the operation
lumbered on, support for what was becoming a very costly war for the United States
and its allies began to waver. Eventually, despite signs of the incompetence of the
Afghan security forces to provide adequate protection against the Taliban, it was decided that the mission of the ISAF had been accomplished and troops from all
member nations could be recalled home.
22 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm
23 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324665604579081193199072
318
11
Fig 4. NATO troop numbers in Afghanistan, culminating in the ultimate withdrawal of all combat personnel.24
Currently, Afghan security forces have been handed over to Afghanistan after the completion
of the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the end of 2014.25 However, NATO has continued its relationship with Afghanistan with the launch of the Resolute
Support Mission at the beginning of 2015, aimed at training, advising and assisting Afghan
security forces.26
24 http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-afghan-bilateral-security-agreement-signed-1412076436
25 Transition Ceremony Kicks off Resolute Support Mission. NATO. December 28, 2014.
Accessed February 06, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_116351.htm.
26 Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. NATO. December 8, 2015. Accessed February 06, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.
htm.
12

2.1 NATO involvement in Afghanistan
Starting from 2015, NATOs involvement with Afghanistan will be based on 3 areas:
1. A Resolute Support Mission headed by NATO aimed at advising, training and helping
Afghan security forces;
2. Contributing to the financial sustainability of Afghan security forces;
3. A stronger partnership between NATO and Afghanistan.27
2.1.1 Resolute Support Mission (RSM)
The RSM began on 2015, after the completion of the ISAF mission. The RSM aims to provide
training, advice and assistance to the Afghan security forces after they have assumed responsibility over security issues in Afghanistan, as well as many other roles, including ensuring
the accountability and transparency of Afghan institutions, supporting the practice of good
governance and adherence to rules of law and aiding in the recruitment of security forces.28
The RSM is planned to complete its mission at the end of 2016.
Fig 5. Map of Afghanistan with areas of control and primary participants29
The RSM faces some daunting challenges as it helps with the recruitment of security
forces. A majority of the recruits are illiterate and many recruits have tested positive for
drugs. There have also been cases of officers failing firearms tests and being sent to
fight with firearms. These problems have led to high casualty rates and thus compromise the recruitment efforts of these security forces. Another problem faced
27 NATO. A New Chapter in NATO-Afghanistan Relations from 2015. News release, May 2015.
NATO. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505-NATO-Afghanistan-relations-en.pdf.
28 NATO. NATOs Commitment to Afghanistan after 2014. News release, December 2014. NATO. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_12/20141201_141201-Media-Backgrounder-Afghanistan_commitment_en.pdf.
29 Afghanistan: Resolute Support Mission. Digital image. NATO. January 27, 2015. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pictures/
stock_2015/20150127_sg_report-2014-map.jpg.
13

is the ineffectiveness of the training conducted due to the lack of standardisation among
training agencies provide by different NATO stakeholders.30 This is due to a large lack of coordination between stakeholders providing training. While NATO often sends its own security
task forces to Afghanistan the US, has depended largely on private companies.31
This prompts the question of how the RSM should continue to support military forces and
whether it should continue to be the main area of support NATO provides to Afghanistan.
The problems of the lack of standardization with regards to military training could potentially
stem from the different agendas NATO stakeholders have with regards to what they wanted
to achieve in Afghanistan.
2.1.2 Financial Sustainment of Afghan Security Forces
NATO aims to continue to support Afghanistan financially through the development of funding mechanisms that are effective, accountable and transparent. One aspect of this is the
Afghan National Army (ANA) trust fund originally created in 2007 as part of the ISAF mission.
Originally, this ANA fund had main contributors from the international community contributing to it and was aimed at supporting the transportation and installation of military equipment
from the ISAF. The mandate of the ANA fund was later expanded to include promoting literacy among military members and professional military training.32 In order to ensure that the
ANA Fund becomes more accountable and transparent, it has been agreed that the funds will
be regulated by a yearly Implementation Plan and annual auditing will be conducted on the
management and implementation of the ANA fund. Until 2017, the USA will be responsible
for managing the fund and an ANA trust fund board will be created to assess the ANA fund.
In order to ensure the financial sustainability of this fund, Afghan authorities have pledged to
provide a minimum of 500 million Euros each year to the fund. By 2024, Afghan authorities
will undertake complete financial responsibility for their security forces.33
30 Nordland, Rod. With Raw Recruits, Afghan Police Buildup Falters. The New York Times. February 02,
2010. Accessed February 06, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/world/asia/03afghan.html?pagewanted=2.
Dempsey, Judy. Training of Afghan Police by Europe Is Found Lacking. The New York Times.
November 17, 2009. Accessed February 06, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/
europe/18training.html.
32 Frequently Asked Questions About Making Donations to the Afghan National Army
(ANA) Trust Fund. ISAF Topic. Accessed February 06, 2016. http://www.nato.int/isaf/
topics/ana/faq.html.
33 NATO. A New Chapter in NATO-Afghanistan Relations from 2015. News
release, May 2015. NATO. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/
pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505-NATO-Afghanistan-relations-en.pdf.
14
Topic A: The Situation in

Afghanistan
Corruption and misuse of resources, however, remains as a major problem in Afghanistan.
These actions include selling of oil from ANA funds, as well as reports of ANA officers abusing
their power. There remains a large problem of a lack of accountability within the ANA.34
2.1.3 NATO-Afghanistan Political Partnership
NATO has expressed an interest in maintaining a presence in Afghanistan after the end of the
RSM, with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg remarking during a meeting on 13 May
2015 that NATO intends to maintain a largely civilian presence in Afghanistan. This civilian
presence aims to advice Afghan security institutions and to help them remain self-sufficient.35
Previously in 2010, a Declaration on Enduring Partnership was signed between NATO and
Afghanistan, detailing plans for long-term cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan from
the start of 2015. This Declaration includes NATO providing continued political and practical support to Afghanistan as it transitions to a stable and sovereign Afghanistan. Good
government initiatives will be identified and the impact of corrupt practices will be made
known through courses such as the Building Integrity courses for companies in an attempt
to combat rampant corruption.36 This plan, however, remains flexible in order to adapt to the
different situations that countries may face.
3. Past Actions and Case Studies

3.1 Lisbon Road Map
During the NATO summit held in Lisbon in 2010, a roadmap was created regarding the goals
of NATO when working in Afghanistan. This outlined the fact that security forces will eventually be transitioned to be held under Afghanistans control and rather than being driven by
set dates, this transition will be carried out based on the situation and capabilities of Afghan
authorities.37
3.2 International Security Assistance Force
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was originally established by the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 and was headed by NATO on 11 Au34 Mnch, Phillip. Resolute Support Light. Afghanistan Analysts Network, December 01,
2015. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/20150112-PMuenc
h-Resolute_Support_Light.pdf.
35 NATO Decides to Maintain Presence in Afghanistan. NATO. May 13, 2015. Accessed February 06, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_119419.htm.
36 NATO. Afghanistan and NATOs Enduring Partnership. News release, April 14, 2014.
NATO. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_04/20110414_110414-AfghanPartnership.pdf.
37 Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. NATO. November
20, 2010. Accessed February 06, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm#afghanistan.
15

gust 2003. Its main aim was to develop an Afghan security force and to ensure that Afghanistan was no longer a conducive place for terrorism. Thus, fighting insurgencies was a large
part of its job scope from 2006 to 2009. From 2011 onwards, more emphasis was placed on
improving Afghan security forces and thus more advising and assisting took place. It ended
in 2014 and was a precursor to the RSM currently employed in Afghanistan.
38
The scope of
NATO involvement in Afghanistan post ISAF was described in the Wales Summit Declaration
on Afghanistan dated 4 September 2014.39
4. Country and Bloc Positions

4.1 United States of America
Although the United States has withdrawn the majority of its combat troops from Afghanistan, it remains the largest foreign presence in the country. Having wielded the moral high
ground of having allegedly been attacked by sinister forces within the country, the United
States has always acted heavy handedly in Afghanistan, walking a thin line in its combat
missions between self-defense and revenge. Although all but a core group of advisers and
support staff remain in Afghanistan, it remains clear that the primary objective of American
training of the local Afghan army is the complete destruction of all elements it deems dangerous in Afghanistan.
4.2 United Kingdom & Canada
Having always considered the broader perspectives of the mission in Afghanistan, the United
Kingdom and Canada have always placed an emphasis on the general improvement of the
country as opposed to simply the eradication of threats to the West. Even while combat missions were ongoing, the mission statement of Canadas detachment to the Afghan mission
included clauses that called for maintained security in various areas to allow Afghans to
rebuild as well as [facilitating] the delivery of programs and projects that support national
economic recovery and rehabilitation.40 Although the combat mission is all but over for the
ISAF, the UK and Canada will undoubtedly continue their strategy of holistic rebuilding for
the Afghan nation.
38 ISAFs Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived). NATO. Accessed February 06,

2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-25AAAA8A-FC179809/natolive/topics_69366.htm.
39 Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan : Issued by Heads of State and Government of Allies and Their International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Troop Contributing Partners. NATO. September 4, 2014. Accessed February 06, 2016.
40 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/cafla.page
16
Topic A: The Situation in

Afghanistan
4.3 Germany
During the height of German participation in the ISAF, German contributions leaned heavily
towards reconstruction efforts in war-torn Afghanistan. In a mid-campaign mission statement,
the German government emphasized this strategy of rebuilding by placing its developmental
and rebuilding contributions ahead of its combat contributions. Having been the first to send
out Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) outside the capital to extend its redevelopment
reach, it also places an emphasis on the importance of Afghanistan becoming self-sufficient
in dealing with security issues stating that eventually, security in Afghanistan should have
an Afghan face.41 Having achieved its reconstruction and security goals, Germany does not
intend to maintain a presence in the region any longer than necessary.
4.4 Netherlands
Although serving in smaller numbers, the Netherlands provided valuable assistance to the
combat mission in Afghanistan before the 2014 drawback of NATO forces. Now, in the reconstruction phase, the Netherlands has continued to contribute valuable resources and financial aid, although in an indirect fashion. However, unlike other member states which provide
direct developmental assistance in the country itself, the Dutch place a specific emphasis on
Afghan self-sufficiency not only in security matters but also in developmental and reconstruction progress.42 It maintains close working relations with relevant UN bodies and NGOs that
are working with the Afghan people towards repairing the physical and intangible damage of
decades of successive conflict.
41 http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/06__Foreign__Policy__State/02__Foreign__Policy/05__KeyPoints/Afghanistan__Key.html
42 https://www.government.nl/topics/international-relations/contents/afghanistan
17
Topic B: Applications of Collective

Security
1. Introduction and historical background
Collective security has always been a key principle of NATO, which was founded in the aftermath of World War II and at the beginning of the Cold War. As much of Europe lay in ruins,
Soviet expansionism engulfed Eastern Europe, forcibly installing communist governments in
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and elsewhere. Civil war broke out in Greece
in 1946, leading President Harry S. Truman to announce the Truman Doctrine of American
assistance for nations facing communist subversion; Stalins blockade of West Berlin in 1948
further inflamed fears of a Soviet threat to not just Eastern but Western Europe43.
It was against this backdrop that the 12 founding members signed the North Atlantic Treaty
on 4 April 1949 44. The Treaty established the basic structural provisions for collective security
within NATO, including the crucial Article 5, which states that an armed attack on one member would be considered an attack on all and obliges each member to assist the attacked party through such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force45. Ultimately,
this Article was never invoked during the Cold War and has only ever been invoked once, in
response to the 9/11 attacks in the United States.
The Treaty further defines parameters for the application of collective security. Article 4 provides for a response to situations that may not rise to the level of an armed attack but that
nonetheless constitute a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security
of any of the Parties46. In such circumstances, members are obliged to consult together.
Furthermore, Article 6 defined limits on what would be considered an armed attack on a
member, restricting this to attacks on members territories in Europe or North America or
in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, as well as on their forces, vessels
or aircraft in these and some other areas47.
During the Cold War, NATOs focus was on counterbalancing the Warsaw Pact and deterring
Soviet aggression; an integrated command structure known as Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) was created in 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean War. During this
time, NATO did not conduct operations abroad but played a deterrent48 and political role;
it adapted to and was influenced by the changing conditions of the Cold War. For example,
the advent of dtente, the period of thawed US-Soviet relations from the late 1960s to the
1970s, led to suggestions that NATO should play a political role in furthering dialogue
between its members and those of the Warsaw Pact49, as well as to the greater
independence of NATOs European members from the US50.
18
43 (US Department of State Office of the Historian n.d.)

47 Ibid.
48 (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe n.d.)
49 (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation n.d.)
50 (Kaplan 2004, 57-59)

Security
Nonetheless, differences of opinion between members over the form and method of collective security persisted. For instance, France withdrew from SHAPE in 1966 over the de Gaulle
administrations discontentment with American dominance of the NATO command structure
and desire for a more independent and influential French role in global security51. The French
government was also suspicious of the Kennedy administrations decision to move from a
nuclear strategy of massive retaliation, in which conventional provocations could be met with
nuclear strikes, to a more nuanced one of flexible response in which deterrence and retaliation through conventional warfare would be the first resort52. As dtente ended and relations
with the USSR worsened, the 1979 double-track decision to station nuclear missiles in
Europe from 1983 also led to disagreement, due to domestic opposition, tension between
the American and West German governments53, as well as the failure to reach the expected
agreement with the USSR that would have made the deployment unnecessary54.
However, the end of the Cold War drastically altered the international landscape. As the Eastern Bloc and then the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist, NATO lost its traditional rival and,
some thought, its reason for existence. To remain relevant, NATO had to identify new threats
and new ways to apply collective security in the post-bipolar world.
Among the greatest of these new threats has been the rise of terrorism. In 1999, after its operations in the Gulf War and in the former Yugoslavia55, NATO released a Strategic Concept
stating that it would have to face complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and security, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction56. Previously NATO had focused on deterring
aggression from states; now it was confronted by the breakdown of states elsewhere and the
fertile ground this provided for the rise of unpredictable non-state actors such as terrorists,
whose behaviour was more irregular than that of states, who could not be easily contained and who could not be deterred through the conventional means of military and
nuclear build-up, as 9/11 devastatingly reminded the world.
The rise of international terrorism means that the boundaries of collective security
may now extend beyond NATOs traditional territory of the North Atlantic. After
1991, NATO began conducting overseas operations for the first time; since 2001 it
has conducted many more, as it has become clear that developments in regions such
53 (Kaiser 2014)
19
Topic B: Applications of Collective Security

as the Middle East can have decisive impacts on the security of NATO countries. In 2003,
NATO took control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, its
first ground mission outside Europe or North America57; then-German Defence Minister Peter
Struck said that German security is being defended in the Hindu Kush58. Certainly, international security was already global in 1949, and the original Treaty accounted for this; Article
6 distinguishes between armed attacks on member states or their forces within the area of
NATO, which are valid grounds for the invocation of Article 5, and attacks on their forces
elsewhere, which are not. However, Article 5 has only ever been invoked once, meaning that
most of NATOs interventions and operations have been and are done without necessarily
qualifying for the standards of Article 5. The rise of international terrorism therefore poses
new questions: in an interconnected age, what foreign threats qualify as threats to the security of NATO? To what extent does NATOs mandate of collective security extend beyond
its own borders? Does NATO have the right to enforce NATO security beyond the limits of
Article 6, and how should it effectively do so, taking into account the capacities and interests
of its members as well as the views of the international community?
NATOs approaches to ensuring its security in the Middle East have run the spectrum from
diplomatic dialogue to coercive operations. NATO works with a number of Middle Eastern
countries through the Istanbul Security Initiative, a platform for bilateral cooperation on security issues such as intelligence-sharing on terrorism, border security and advice on defence
policy59, as well as through the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue60; it has also often conducted
joint military training with Israel and included Israel in NATO drills61. Additionally, it is instructive to compare the case studies of Afghanistan, where NATO organised a military intervention, and Iraq, where NATO did not take part in the 2003 invasion but focused on diplomatic
dialogue and precautionary measures on its own territory. NATO carried out measures such
as missile defence and surveillance aircraft in Turkey, which called for consultation under Article 4 over the potential threat to its security posed by the campaign; it also provided logistical support to Poland, a participant in the Multinational Stabilisation Force set up after the
invasion62. Delegates will have to confront the question of where along this spectrum NATOs
future efforts to apply collective security globally should lie.
The security environment of the 21st century is also characterised by new forms of warfare. NATOs most recent Strategic Concept, released in 2010, identified terrorism and
cyber-attacks as modern threats along with the proliferation of weapons of mass
57
58
59
60
61
62
20
(Associated Press 2003)

(Deutsche Welle 2012)
(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2011)
(Jewish Virtual Library 2008)

Security
destruction63. Terrorist groups often use tactics such as urban and asymmetric warfare that
are not easily countered by a conventional military, while cyber-attacks are non-military in
nature but can still be incapacitating; for example, in 2007, Estonia was hit by allegedly Russian cyber-attacks that crippled large parts of Estonian digital infrastructure and society64.
Russian aggression in Ukraine has also been done largely through hybrid warfare, in which
separatist little green men are clearly Russian-linked but at least appear to be acting independently of the Russian government, and attacks are accompanied by covert subversion
through legally permissible tactics such as media propaganda65. Article 5 only provides for a
military response to armed attacks; in the 21st century, should NATOs mandate of collective
security expand to include responses to these unconventional and often non-military attacks?
How should NATO decide what constitutes an attack on a member, and how should it defend
against unconventional threats without undue escalation?
Finally, the revival of Russian encroachment on Eastern Europe has also created new threats
for NATO, particularly for Eastern European members who still bear the memories of Soviet
repression as well as the burden of geographical proximity. Although the accession of Eastern
European members to NATO has been purely voluntary, Russia perceives this accession as
eastward expansion that threatens Russias sphere of influence66. Moreover, Russia is threatened by NATOs military presence in Eastern Europe67, which NATO has increased as a result
of Russias illegal annexation of Crimea and continued intrusion into Ukraine. In 2015, NATO
established bases in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as a
5000-strong spearhead force able to deploy at two days notice68; it also launched its largest military exercise in more than a decade69 and considered deploying up to 4,000 troops
under direct NATO command to states bordering Russia, an unprecedented action in peacetime70. Questions have arisen over the adequacy of NATO defences against possible Russian
aggression, as well as the type and level of measures that NATO should take. How great is
the threat posed by Russia, and how should NATO defend against this threat through
collective security?
In conclusion, the post-Cold War world has brought huge changes that have enormously altered the environment in which NATO must perform its mandate of collective security. Many questions remain: what constitutes an attack on a member,
and should this definition change? Article 5 allows for the use of armed force but
63 (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2014)
64 (The Economist 2007)
65 (Holehouse 2015)
66 (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2015)
67 (Alexe 2015)
68 (BBC 2015)
69 (Emmott 2015)
70 (Oliphant and Lawler 2015)
21

does not require it; how should NATO decide when armed force is necessary? Can NATOs
mandate of collective security justify intervention elsewhere in the world? Delegates must
grapple with these questions in order to maintain the relevance of NATO in the 21st century.
Collective security, in theories of international relations, is commonly defined as a type of
coalition building strategy in which a group of nations agree not to attack each other and to
defend each other against an attack from one of the others.71 In international organisations,
collective security can be seen as a plan for maintaining peace and to protect the sovereignty
of its member states.72 Specifically with regards to NATO, collective security therefore underlies the Washington Treaty upon which the organization was formed, and remains a principle
that enshrines a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.73
As seen in the section above, collective security has been applied by NATO in various instances post-Cold War. In the modern day, advocates of liberalism look upon NATO as the
prime agent for Europes collective security, with the Alliances Partnership for Peace programme74 seen as the key instrument in maintaining regional, and world peace. 75However,
observers have questioned if NATO is, in itself, an appropriate vassal for pursuing collective
security, and if NATO has infringed on the principles of sovereignty and self-determination
by acting as a bloc and on occasions, deciding for the bloc. As Michael Brenner noted in his
book, NATO and Collective Security, NATO has gained unquestioned primacy over European security affairs.76 The overarching nature of NATO as a regional organization then brings
forth debate on the practicality of NATOs unilateral actions and the definition of its role in
international relations.
71 Conflict Research Consortium, Collective Security, International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict, 1998, http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/collsec.htm (Accessed November
29, 2015).
72 Roland N. Stromberg, Collective Security, Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, 2016, http://
www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Collective-Security.html (Accessed November 29, 2015).
73 NATO, Collective defence Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, December 16, 2015,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm (Accessed January 3, 2016).
74 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between
respective Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. The programme allows partners to
establish individual relationships with NATO and define their priorities for cooperation.
NATO, Collective defence Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, December
16, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm (Accessed January
3, 2016).
75 Mark P. Lagon, The Illusions of Collective Security, Center for the National
Interest, Issue No. 4 (1995): p.51
76 Anand Menon, Review, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Volume 74, Issue No. 3 (1998) p. 647
22

Security
2.1. Controversy around Article 5
While the principle of collective security is enshrined within the Washington Treaty, ambiguities remain within the definitions of NATOs functional capacities, which then contradict its
peacekeeping mission in practice. In particular, the Article most pertinent to collective security, Article 5, remains controversial in theory versus its practice. In essence, Article 5 represents a one-for-all and all-for-one spirit within NATO member states, and sets the context
for possible collective security and collective defence.77 A NATO versus others mentality is
therefore substantiated in the realm of international relations.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 not only changed the focus of security threats in the world, but
also pre-empted the invocation of Article 5 by NATO.78 This was the first time in its history that
Article 5 manifested into NATOs practical actions79, which resulted in the expansion of the
organisations size (seven new members were added)80 and influence (the attacks triggered
NATOs intervention into Afghanistan).81 The purview of NATO is subsequently increased, allowing its control to spread beyond the North Atlantic region and encroach into other regions
of the world. However, inherent within Article 5 lies ambiguities in charting a proper course
of action for the Alliance definitions of what constitutes and defines an armed attack or
normal terrorism remain vague at best.82 This leaves much room for manipulation by member states who deplored the help of other member states in handling their domestic affairs.
Nearly fourteen years after 9/11, and in light of recurrent economic recessions, criticism has
grown more pronounced against the initial invocation of Article 5. Many ask if NATO was unwise in committing to a course of action which was not fully implemented, and to remain extremely active in Afghanistan (and Iraq) despite national constraints.83 This then undermines
the application of collective security by NATO, as doubt is casted upon the organisations
ability to maintain such intervention and courses of action in the long run.
77 Robert Coalson, What Are NATOs Articles 4 And 5?, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June
26, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/explainer-nato-articles-4-and-5/24626653.html (Accessed
January 3, 2016).
78 Joshua Stern, NATO Collective Security or Defense: The Future of NATO in Light of Expansion
and 9/11, DIAS-Kommentar, Issue No. 32 (2005): p. 1
79 NATO, Collective defence Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, December 16,
2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm (Accessed January 3, 2016).
80 Joshua Stern, NATO Collective Security or Defense: The Future of NATO in Light of
Expansion and 9/11, DIAS-Kommentar, Issue No. 32 (2005): p. 1
81 Tobin Harshaw, Islamic State Isnt NATOs War, BloombergView, November 20, 2015, http://
www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-20/islamic-state-isn-t-nato-s-war (Accessed January 3,
2016).
82 Edgar Buckley, Invoking Article 5, NATO Review: Invocation of Article 5: five years on,
2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html (Accessed January 3,
2016).
83 Edgar Buckley, Invoking Article 5, NATO Review: Invocation of Article 5: five
years on, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html
(Accessed January 3, 2016).
23

Juxtaposing the 9/11 attacks to the recent terrorist attacks on Paris, France, similar conditions
have been presented to NATO. Particularly, the possibility of establishing a NATO mission
against the Islamic State (ISIS), who has since claimed responsibility on the Parisian attacks
looks even more tantalizing as the war on terror persists. While Article 5 is not yet invoked by
France, observers claim that such a course of action is only a matter of time.
However, in the case that Article 5 is invoked, skeptics remain unconvinced of the extent of
collective security that NATO can provide in the war against ISIS. On the one hand, Article
5 consists a binding obligation and constitutional justification for member states to take up
arms and consider the Parisian attacks as an attack on their own countries. This then allows
for NATO to tap into their massive military capacities of over 3 million troops under arms84
and expedite the eradication of ISIS. On the other hand, however, lingering distaste towards
NATOs intervention in Afghanistan and the illegal bypassing of national jurisdiction in authorizing intervention in other situations the cause the invocation of Article 5 to be met with
apprehension and procrastination.85
For example, US involvement in Libya in 2011 under the Obama administration was considered unconstitutional and was said to bring the country closer to imperial presidency, where
the executive acts independently of Congress at home and abroad.86 In other words, Obama
(and his executive) disregarded the concerns of the Congress and proper parliamentary procedures in proceeding to involve the US in the war against Gaddafi. While it was presumed
that the foreign intervention could have led to greater stability for the Libyans, and while
there might be short term positive effects of preventing potential mass killing by the Gaddafi
dictatorship, the long term negative effects of regional destabilization questioned the benefits of foreign intervention (especially US intervention) in the first place.87
Also, the degree of coverage of collective security by NATO in terms of geographical extent
has not been delineated. The American vision of NATO as a global security organization is
not widely shared by her European allies.88 Hence, while Article 5 necessitates the assistance
84 James Starvridis, NATOs Turn to Attack, Foreign Policy, November 14, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/11/14/natos-turn-to-attack-paris-terrorist-isis/ (Accessed January 3, 2016).
85 Ilya Somin, Using Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to legalize the war against ISIS [Updated with
response to Julian Ku], The Washington Post, November 15, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/11/15/using-article-5-of-the-nato-treaty-to-legalize-the-war-againstisis/ (Accessed January3, 2016).
86 Bruce Ackerman, Obamas Unconstitutional War, Foreign Policy, March 24, 2011, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/24/obamas-unconstitutional-war/ (Accessed February 10, 2016)
87 Nick Robins-Early, Was The 2011 Libya Intervention A Mistake?, The World
Post, July 3, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/07/libya-intervention-daalder_n_6809756.html (Accessed February 10, 2016)
88 Ivo H. Daalder, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force, Brookings, March
1999, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/1999/03/globalgovernance-daalder (Accessed January 3, 2016).
24

Security
from Allies towards the affected member state, it does not justify involvement and dictate
the degree of said involvement of Allies in the situation. The application of collective security
therefore, becomes subjected to the domestic constraints and politics of individual member
states.
2.2. Practical Implications of NATOs Collective Security
Collective security has been conventionally understood as an arrangement that aims to protect status quo within its member states, and to defend against threats from without the Alliance.89 However, the way in which NATO enforces collective security may go against other
established international organisations, and thereon incite conflicts to manifest in the realm
of international affairs. When first introduced in 1945, the United Nations Charter sought to
establish the organization as a body that implements and protects the principle of collective
security.90 Yet, amidst the initial optimism that surrounded the altruistic goals of the UN,
NATO carried out a 78-day bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 under the pretext of humanitarian intervention into the Kosovo War a catastrophe that claimed hundreds of civilian lives
and created a much larger crisis than the one it tried to avert.91 Instead of assuring the peace
and stability NATO promised the international community, more calamity and violence was
unleashed onto the Balkan republic and the world.
Evidently, the legal basis for NATOs use of force in such situations remains mired in the synthesis between NATO and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). While Article 5 makes
concessions that any armed attack should be reported to the UNSC and can be terminated
under the purview of the council, consensus has yet to be achieved in deciding whether the
decisions made by NATO or UNSC with regards to urgent situations take precedence over
the other. The ability of NATO to bypass the UN Security Council in initiating collective attacks on its aggressors, perceived or otherwise, leaves the application of collective security
to exist in a zero-sum game where violence begets violence, and with some country
beyond NATO turning into a battleground for the Alliance and its greatest enemies.
Another implication that may arise from the implementation of collective security
would be the imbalance of power and bargaining power between the different
members of the Alliance. As of 2006, NATO member countries agreed to commit
a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to spending on defence.
89 Mark P. Lagon, The Illusions of Collective Security, Center for the National Interest, Issue No. 4
(1995): p.51
90 Pearson, The United Nations and the Dilemmas of Collective Security, http://catalogue.
pearsoned.co.uk/assets/hip/gb/uploads/M02_MAC7663_02_SE_C02.pdf (Accessed January 3, 2016).
91 RT, 15 years on: Looking back at NATOs humanitarian bombing of Yugoslavia,
RT, March 24, 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/yugoslavia-kosovo-nato-bombing-705/ (Accessed January 4, 2016).
25

By extension, when a member countrys military capacity is expanded, her ability to contribute to NATOs collective security is increased as well, and the Alliances credibility as a politico-military organization correspondingly increases.92 However, there lies a massive imbalance
in the funding of NATO, and the implementation of collective security since the Alliance was
formed in 1949 the United States continues to be the biggest spender when it comes to
defence, whereas non-US Allies together spend less than half that of the US.93
Fig 1. Total Defence Spending by NATO member countries in 1949 and 201394
As seen in the graph above, the US (in red) has dominated the biggest share of NATO member countries military expenditure since the Alliance was formed in 1949. Since a member
countrys military spending indirectly reflects its political will and commitment to uphold collective security, and its ability to take on defence as its individual responsibility rather than
rely on the Alliance for security measures, the imbalance in military spending between member countries illustrate the growing reliance on the US to continue the Alliances mission to
upkeep regional peace.
Consensus has yet to be achieved on what member countries should make out of NATO
missions while some insist that NATOs military capabilities should be strengthened to act
as deterrence to potential aggressors, the practical actions of member states in contributing
to the enhancement of the Alliances military capacities remain half-hearted at best. Despite
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenbergs call to redouble our efforts to reverse this
92 NATO, Funding NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, June 3, 2015, http://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm (Accessed January 4, 2016).
93 NATO, Funding NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, June 3, 2015, http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm (Accessed January 4, 2016).
94 Janine Davidson, Explainer: Thia Graph Shows How NATOs Military Capability Has Evolved Since 1949, Council on Foreign Relations, September 4, 2014,
http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/09/04/explainer-this-graph-shows-how-natos-military-capability-has-evolved-since-1949/ (Accessed January 4, 2016).
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trend (of cutting military expenditure)95, in 2015, only the US and Estonia are meeting NATOs defence budget goals.96 The promises and rhetoric that the Alliance put forth in response
to Russian aggression and the Crimean crisis are not matched by reality.97 Such inconsistencies in the practical implementation of collective security leave much to be desired from the
Alliance should it continue on its intended route to become a global security organization.
2.3. Expansion of NATOs application of collective security
With the strategic focus of NATO turning from direct threat to risk factors98 (ie taking precautionary measures rather than responsive measures), the question lies in whether the Alliances application of collective security should correspondingly diversify. Given that the
Washington Treaty on which the Alliance was formed upon was established in 1949, NATOs
existing constitution on collective security might be too outdated to encompass the threats
that lie within the cyber realm. Following the emergence of cybercrime and the increasing
need to enhance cyber security, calls have been made by scholars and national leaders alike
to modify NATOs stance towards cyber security. In particular, Article 5 needs to be clarified
to include plausible courses of action to take when a member state falls victim to cybercrime.
For instance, Estonia fell victim to a three-week wave of cyber-attacks in April 2007, where
the country experienced denial-of-service (DoS) attacks targeted at prominent government
websites and websites of banks, newspapers, universities and Estonian newspapers. Supposedly done in response to the removal of the Bronze Soldier monument in Tallinn (a Soviet
war monument erected in 1947), these cybercrime attacks have succeeded in shutting down
Estonia from the rest of the world in the three-week time span.99 Termed as a war in the
fifth domain100, these bouts of cyber-attacks were seen not only as a threat to Estonia, but a
threat to NATO as well especially since Russia was suspected as the main perpetrator of
the attacks. In response, NATO dispatched some of its top cyber-terrorism experts to Estonia
95 Naftali Bendavid, Just Five of 28 NATO Members Meet Defense Spending Goal, Report
Says, The Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-calls-for-rise-in-defence-spending-by-alliance-members-1434978193 (Accessed January 4, 2016).
96 Jeremy Bender, Only the US and Estonia are meeting NATOs defense budget goals,
Business Insider, February 27, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.sg/only-us-and-estonia-meeting-nato-budget-goal-2015-2/#.VooB0vl97IU (Accessed January 4, 2016).
97 Jonathan Beale, Nato defence spending falls despite promises to reverse cuts, BBC News,
February 26, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-31619553 (Accessed January 4, 2016).
98 Stefan Popov, NATO Expansion: from Collective Defene to Collective Security, Perspectives,
Volume 13, Special Issue: The Balkans, NATO and European Security after the Kosovo War
(1999): p. 60
99 Jason Richards, Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S.
National Security, International Affairs Review, 2007, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65,
(Accessed February 10, 2016)
100 The Economist, War in the fifth domain, The Economist, July 1, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792 (Accessed February 10, 2016)
27

in a bid to aid investigations and to improve on the countrys electronic defences.101 Given
that cyberwarfare constitutes a more insidious form of combat in the modern context, the
implementation of collective security against cyberwarfare attacks thus needs to become
more diversified and more nuanced to be able to cope with the unexpected elements that
characterize cyber-attacks.
In diversifying the factions of collective security, NATO needs to consider as well the inherent capabilities and limitations of member states in handling each form of security, and the
help that they can duly provide in terms of collective action. For instance, the difference in
each countrys financial capacities affects their individual capabilities to develop their defences not all member states can afford to, for example, develop defence capabilities on the
cyberspace when their physical defences still require substantial investment and emphasis.
Moreover, individual member states pump in different amounts of budget towards building
up their defence capacities (refer to diagram above). This means that it is highly improbable
for every member state to be able to accomplish what the member state with the most advanced defence mechanisms (usually also the one which invested the most money from the
budget towards defence, like the United States) within their limited budgets. With regards
to enhancing cyber security, for instance, the Alliance should then focus on information sharing and mutual assistance concerning the cyber domain, and work together to improve and
standardize the cyber capabilities of individual countries as well.102 The implementation of
collective security in the contemporary context cannot be carried out in isolation member
states need to come together to formulate comprehensive action plans and preventive measures, as well as ensure that each country is just as protected as the next, so as to safeguard
the security and stability of the Alliance as a whole.
Another potential threat to collective security is the rise of violent non-state actors. As security challenges depart significantly from the Alliances traditional concepts of war, there is now
a need to redefine the degree and coverage of collective security.103 Extrapolating the situation, there also lies a new possibility that state actors might be inciting non-state actors to
attack NATO and its member states. In such instances, the supposed direct course of action
to be undertaken by NATO becomes even more complicated and vague. While some mem101 Ian Traynor, Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia, The GuardianMay 17,
2007, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia (Accessed February 10,
2016)
102 Steffen Westerburger, Rethinking NATO Article 5: Challenges to Collective Security in
the Cyber Era, American Security Project, September 30, 2015, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/rethinking-nato-article-5-challenges-to-collective-security-in-the-cyber-era/ (Accessed January 4, 2016).
103 Jacquelyn K. Davis, NATO after 9/11: a US perspective, NATO Review
Magazine, 2015, http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2011/11-september/NATO-US-Perspective-9-11/EN/index.htm (Accessed January 4, 2016).
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ber states might remain more vested in territorial defence planning, other Allies might be
more willing to adopt unconventional ideas to tackle these diversified threats.104 Given that
NATO is after all, an organization that progresses based on consensus, how to bypass a stalemate and respond to a crisis directly and promptly becomes another obstacle the Alliance
has to face.
3. Case Studies/ Past Actions

3.1 NATO Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-2004)
NATOs intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was its first major crisis response operation
since the Alliances establishment in 1949.Key events that contributed to NATOs mission to
uphold collective security include the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton
Peace Agreement (1995), which called an end to the war in the region; and the deployments
of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995 and the NATO-led Stabilisation Force
(SFOR) in 2004. While IFOR held the emphasis as a peace enforcement operation, SFOR was
more referred to as a peace support operation.105 Following the conclusion of the war, Bosnia
and Herzegovina joined the Partnership for Peace in 2006, and aspires to join NATO as a
formal member.106
3.2 NATO Humanitarian War over Kosovo107
NATOs 78-day bombing campaign over Yugoslavia was the first sustained use of armed force
by the Alliance since its formation in 1949.108 The Alliance justified its actions on the basis
of preventing the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the semi-autonomous region of
Serbia, and coined its involvement as a humanitarian intervention. However, critics condemn this course of action, stating that there was no case of one nation assaulting another.109
Rather, the incident was seen as NATOs tacit expression to the international community that
severe tyranny and lack of compliance to an established moral consensus should not be, and
104 Jacquelyn K. Davis, NATO after 9/11: a US perspective, NATO Review Magazine, 2015,
http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2011/11-september/NATO-US-Perspective-9-11/EN/index.htm
105 NATO, Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, September 7, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm
106 NATO, Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Atlantic Treaty Orgnisation, December 8, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49127.htm (Accessed January 4, 2016).
107 Adam Roberts, NATOs Humanitarian War over Kosovo, Survival, Volume 41, Issue no. 3
(1999): p. 102
108 Adam Roberts, NATOs Humanitarian War over Kosovo, Survival, Volume 41, Issue
no. 3 (1999): p. 102
109 Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, Collective Security A new form of
interventionism, http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Collective-Security-A-new-form-of-interventionism.html (Accessed January 4, 2016).
29

will not be tolerated.110 The verdict remains open on whether NATOs intervention in Kosovo
can be justified along the terms of collective security or not.
3.3 Invocation of Article 5 and Intervention into Afghanistan
In light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time and took command of the United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. August 2003 marked the start of the Alliances decade-long involvement in the
region, and even after the ISAF operation ended in December 2014, NATO continued to
launch projects with Afghan authorities to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and
institutions. NATOs operations in Afghanistan are documented in the Alliances parliamentary document titled Operations in Afghanistan and the Expanding NATO Role (ref. number
158 DSC 04 E rev. 2).111
3.4 Operation Display Deterrence (20 February 30 April 2003)
Operation Display Deterrence was launched under the overall command of the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SHAPE) and run by NATOs regional headquarters in Southern
Europe (AFSOUTH). The operation was implemented in reply to Turkeys request for defensive assistance against Iraq in the event of a threat to its population or territory, especially
after Turkey formally invoked Article 4 of the Washington Treaty in February.112 This operation
was justified upon Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, and was enacted to deter Iraq from
furthering potential aggression.113
3.5 UN Resolutions regarding NATO interventions
Security Council Resolutions 1203 (S/RES/1203) and 1244 (S/RES/1244)
The UNSC adopted Resolution 1203114 and 1244115 in 1998 and 1999 respectively, to authorize NATO intervention into Kosovo. The former called for NATO to secure and enforce the
withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo, while the latter demanded
that Yugoslavia cooperate with the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo.116
110 Fernando R. Teson, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,
2009, http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/62/119 (Accessed February 10, 2016)
111 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 158 DSC 04 E REV. 1 OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE
EXPANDING NATO ROLE, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=504 (Accessed January 4,
2016).
112 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 158 DSC 04 E REV. 1 OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND
THE EXPANDING NATO ROLE, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=504 (Accessed
January 4, 2016).
113 NATO Press Release, Conclusion of Operation Display Deterrence and Article 4 security
consultations, Online library North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, April 16, 2003, http://
www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-040e.htm (Accessed January 4, 2016).
114 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1203 (1998), October 24, 1998, S/
RES/1203 (1998), New York City: United Nations
115 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), June 10, 1999, S/
RES/1244 (1999), New York City: United Nations
116 Security Council Report, UN Documents for Kosovo, http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/kosovo/ (Accessed January 4,
2016).
30

Security
Security Council Resolution 2189 (SC/11697)
In December 2014, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2189 (2014), welcoming the NATO-Afghan Government agreement to establish post-2014 non-combat mission (Resolute Support
Mission). Within the resolution, the UNSC noted that the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement
between NATO and Afghanistan provided a sound legal basis for the mission, which involved
training and assisting national forces after the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force on 31 December 2014.117
3.6 NATO Policy Recommendations regarding Collective Security
Resolution 361 on NATOs Ongoing Role in Afghanistan (2007)
NATOs Defence and Security Committee came to a conclusion in 2007 on the importance of
NATO mission in Afghanistan, further reaffirming that NATOs involvement in the region was
crucial to both the protection of the Afghan people and to establish greater credibility for
NATO as an international actor. In the resolution, NATO called for the Afghan government
to increase its efforts to provide a safe and secure living environment for its people through
working together with and carrying out dialogues with NATO and their internal stakeholders.118
Resolution 368 On A Way Forward in Kosovo (2008)
NATOs Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security presented this policy recommendation
in 2008 to re-establish the Alliances commitment to ensure peace and stability in the region,
and to re-define its role in the conflict. The main policy recommendation suggests for the
governments of the member states to coordinate their responsibilities and involvements in
Kosovo, and for Belgrade and Pristina (the most affected areas) to hold diplomatic dialogues
between them to foster mutual trust and confidence.119
Resolution 387 on Cyber Security (2011)
This is one of the few policy recommendations made by NATO that specifically addressed the issue of cyber security within the Alliance. This resolution identified the
new category of threats to be those that lie within cyberspace, and emphasized
117 United Nations Security Council, Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2189 (2014),
Welcomes NATO-Afghan Government Agreement to Establish Post-2014 Non-Combat Mission,
United Nations, December 12, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11697.doc.htm (Accessed
January 4, 2016).
118 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 361 on NATOs Ongoing Role in Afghanistan, NATO PA, 2007, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1312 (Accessed
February 10, 2016)
119 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 368 On A Way Forward in Kosovo,
NATO PA, 2008, http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1649 (Accessed
February 10, 2016)
31

the need to remain cautious towards cyber threats. The resolution also called for the Alliance
to implement the revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defence120 and related plans, as well as the
inclusion of the cyber dimension into all three of NATOs core tasks (collective defence, crisis
management and co-operative security).121
4. Major Bloc Positions

Although NATO is a bloc in itself and operates by consensus, it has certainly experienced
internal divisions over issues pertaining to collective security.
Among these is the issue of each countrys contribution to NATO and who should fund collective security. NATO requires its members to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence;
however, as of 2015, only the US, the UK, Greece, Estonia and Poland met this requirement,
reducing the resources available to NATO to exercise collective security122.
Another question is that of NATOs response to the Russian threat. The US is generally in
favour of a greater military presence in Europe; it has suggested the installation of a missile
shield system in Europe123, as well as the stationing of nuclear weapons124. Eastern European
states such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have often agreed and have lent their support to
such proposals125, unsurprising given their recent history and geographical location. However, Western European states such as France and Germany have often been more reluctant,
citing concerns about a heavy military presence in their countries as well as provocation of
Russia126.
120 NATO Policy on Cyber Defence states that the Alliance is responsible for the protection of its own
communication networks, and that individual member states are to be responsible for the security of their
own communication networks while at the same time ensuring that these networks remain compatible with
NATOs and each others. The Policy also called for greater information sharing between member states
and cooperation with industry to enforce security on the cyber realm.
NATO, Cyber Security, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, February 8, 2016, http://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm (Accessed February 10, 2016)
121 NATO, Resolution 387 on Cyber Security, NATO PA, 2011, http://www.nato-pa.int/
Default.asp?SHORTCUT=2629 (Accessed February 10, 2016)
122 (Bendavid 2015)
123 (Spiegel Online 2014)
32
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SINGAPORE MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2016

Hosted by the National University of Singapore

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION & MANDATE

TOPIC A: THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

TOPIC B: APPLICATIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Vice Chair Levonne Goh

Vice Chair Ariel Lim Song Fang

Committee Introduction & Mandate

1 Richard Cavendish, The Founding of NATO, HistoryToday, April 4, 1999, http://www.historytoday.com/

Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

Fig 3. Comparison between Afghan and ISAF losses23

Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

Fig 5. Map of Afghanistan with areas of control and primary participants29

Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

Topic A: The Situation in

3. Past Actions and Case Studies

Topic A: The Situation in Afghanistan

4. Country and Bloc Positions

38 ISAFs Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived). NATO. Accessed February 06,

Topic A: The Situation in

Topic B: Applications of Collective

43 (US Department of State Office of the Historian n.d.)

Topic B: Applications of Collective

Topic B: Applications of Collective Security

(Associated Press 2003)

Topic B: Applications of Collective

Topic B: Applications of Collective Security

Topic B: Applications of Collective

Topic B: Applications of Collective Security

Topic B: Applications of Collective

Topic B: Applications of Collective Security

Topic B: Applications of Collective

Topic B: Applications of Collective Security

Topic B: Applications of Collective

3. Case Studies/ Past Actions

Topic B: Applications of Collective Security

Topic B: Applications of Collective

Topic B: Applications of Collective Security

4. Major Bloc Positions

cessed January 4, 2016).

cessed January3, 2016).

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