Civil Law Reviewer Cases II

Civil Law Review I: Atty.
Legaspi
12. Arts 41-44, 49 FC; Art 83(2) NCC
1.
2.
TITLE
Republic v.
Cantor
Republic
v.Granada
GR 187512,
june 13, 2012
3.
Valdez v.
Republic
G.R.
No.180863,
Sept. 08, 2009
FACTS
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor
left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a
violent quarrel. After more than four years of
not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe
filed a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband. She
alleged that she conducted a diligent search
for her husband and exerted earnest efforts
to find him. The RTC granted her petition.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.
Respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada and
Cyrus Granada got married at the Manila City
Hall on 3 March 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, Sumida Electric
Philippines, an electronics company in
Paranaque where both were then working,
closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
employment.
Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had
not received any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate
him. Her brother testified that he had asked
the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters
whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a
Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead
Angelita married Sofio on January 11, 1971.
In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal
dwelling. In October 1975, Sofio showed up
at Bancay 1st and they agreed to separate.
After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of
Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive
or not.
Believing that Sofio was already dead,
ISSUES
Whether or not there is a
well-founded belief that
Jerry is dead.
Whether or not a decision

in a summary proceeding
for
declaration
of
presumptive death of an
absentee spouse may be
assailed by way of an
ordinary appeal.
Whether or not it is
necessary for the present
spouse, whose second
marriage was celebrated
during the effectivity of
civil code, to file a petition
for judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the
spouse of the first
RULING
Whether or not one has a well-founded belief that his or her spouse is
dead depends on the unique circumstance of each case and that there
is no set standard or procedure in determining the same. Maria Fes
alleged well-founded belief arose when: 1) Jerrys relatives and friends
could not give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did
not find Jerrys name in the patients directory whenever she went to a
hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband
in hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was not intentional or
planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent. Were it not for the
finality of the RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive death should
have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis
This Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic
v. Tango.
No. It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to

Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively,
were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded
belief" is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to
comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in
effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the
Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion.
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

Under the Civil
Code,
the
presumption
of
death
is
established
by
law19and no court
declaration
is
needed
for
the
presumption
to
arise.
4.
Republic v.
Tango
G.R. No.
161062, July
31, 2009
Angelita married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,

1985. Subsequently,
however,
Virgilios
application for naturalization filed with the
United States Department of Homeland
Security was denied because Angelitas
marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Hence, on
March 29, 2007, Angelita filed a Petition
seeking the declaration of presumptive death
of Sofio.
RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove
the well-grounded belief that her husband
SofioPolborosa was already dead. Under
Article 41 of the Family Code, the present
spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse
has been absent and that she has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. This belief,
the RTC said, must be the result of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts
to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse.
On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria
were married. On March 13, 1987, Maria and
her family flew to Seattle, USA. Ferventino
alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year
before she stopped responding to his letters.
Out of resentment, he burned all the letters
Maria wrote him. He claims to have forgotten
her address since.
On the belief that his wife had died,
Ferventino filed a verified petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of Maria
RTC issued an Order declaring MARIA JOSE
V. VILLARBA, wife of FERVENTINO U.
TANGO, presumptively dead. This prompted
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for
the Republic, to file a Notice of Appeal. The
marriage and
consequently, prove
before the court that she
has well-founded belief
that such absent spouse
is dead
Whether or not a decision

in a summary proceeding
for declaration of
presumptive death of an
absentee spouse is
appealable by way of an
ordinary appeal.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by

law19and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise.
Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of
absence,20 Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
No. By express provision of law, i.e. Article 247 of the Family Code, the
judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can
be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41
of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in
certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.13 From the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject
of an appeal.

Court of Appeals, treating the case as an
ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, affirmed the RTCs Order.
5.
Armas v.
Calisterio
G.R.
No.136467,
April 06, 2000
Teodorico and respondent Marietta was

married on 08 May 1958. On 24 April 1992,
TeodoricoCalisterio died intestate and was
survived by his wife.
Teodorico was the second husband of
Marietta who had previously been married to
James William Bounds on 13 January 1946.
James Bounds1 disappeared without a trace
on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta
were married eleven years later, or on 08
May 1958, without Marietta having priorly
secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, Antonia Armas y
Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed
a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate
Estate of the Deceased TeodoricoCalisterio.
Antonia claims to be the sole surviving heir
of TeodoricoCalisterio and that the marriage
between the latter and Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio is bigamous and thereby null and
void.
In the case before us, OSG committed a serious procedural lapse when
it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for
certiorari.
Whether or not a judicial

declaration
of
presumptive death of the
absentee
spouse
is
necessary
for
the
subsequent marriage of
the
present
spouse
celebrated during the
regime of the Civil Code.
Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision

that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such,
it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
No. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time
was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03
August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
xxxx
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he
has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met and the
spouse present so contracting the later marriage have done so in good
1Kontinalang James bond nahahaha


faith.
6.
Rep. v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 94053,
March 17, 1993
Uncorroborate
d assertions by
the spouse
present that he
had searched
for his missing
spouse with
such diligence
is not enough
to give rise to a
"well-founded
belief" that
he/she is dead
On 5 August 1988, Gregorio Nolasco filed a

petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of his wife Janet Monica Parker or, in
the alternative, that the marriage be declared
null and void.
Nolasco testified that in January 1983, while
working overseas, he received a letter from
his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son and that Janet
Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to

look for her himself whenever his ship docked
in England proved fruitless. He also stated
that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar
where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he
inquired from among friends but they too had
no news of Janet Monica.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the

petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the
Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not
possess a "well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead," 2 and
second,Nolasco's attempt to have his
marriage annulled in the same proceeding
was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the
law on marriage.
Whether or not
uncorroborated
assertions of the spouse
present that he had
diligently tried to locate
the whereabouts of his
absentee spouse is
enough to satisfy the
requirement of wellfounded belief that the
absent spouse was
already dead under
Article 41 of the Family
Code for a petition for
declaration of
presumptive death be
granted.
No. In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet
Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he
arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure,
instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British
Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a
vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to
give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to
locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters
respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters,
under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare

assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts,
considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony.
TITLE II. Legal Separation (Articles 55-67)


1.
Quiao vs.
Quiao
G.R.
No.176556,
July 4, 2012
Brigido and Rita tied the marital knot on

January 6, 1977. On October 26, 2000, Rita
C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal
separation against herein petitioner Brigido
B. Quiao. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision declaring the legal separation of
plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendantrespondent Brigido B. Quiao.
More than nine months from the
promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner
filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the
term "Net Profits Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for
Clarification, the RTC issued an Order dated
August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase
"NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the
remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of
each [of the] spouse and the debts." The
Order further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have
any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and
43, No. (2) of the Family Code.15
Whether or not a spouse

whose marriage was
celebrated during before
the effectivity of the
Family Code and is
adjudged as the guilty
spouse of the in a decree
of legal separation has
vested right over conjugal
partnership
properties
which may be impaired
by the application of
Article 129 of the Family
Code in defining net
profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of
legal separation.
No. The right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets
does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net
assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.
Furthermore, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the
conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a
legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given
the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim
may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found
him the guilty party.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is

wrong when it applied Article 129 of the
Family Code, instead of Article 102. He
confusingly argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned
subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
separation.
Petitioner claims that his vested rights over
half of the conjugal properties have been
2.
Ong v. Ong
G.R. No.
153206,
October. 23,
2006
impaired if the provisions of the Family Code

are to be given retroactive application to the
point of authorizing the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the net remainder of the
conjugal partnership properties, the same
impairs his rights acquired prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code.
OngEngKiam, also known as William Ong
(William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were
married on July 13, 1975. On March 21,
1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal
Separation alleging that her life with William
was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its
Decision decreeing legal separation. William
appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the
RTC decision. In its Decision dated October
8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for
Lucita were straightforward and credible and
the ground for legal separation under Art. 55,
par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical
violence and grossly abusive conduct
directed against Lucita, were adequately
proven.
3.
SSS v. Aguas
G.R. No.
165546,
February 27,
2006
William argues that: (1) that he did commit

acts of repeated physical violence against
Lucita and their children; and (2) that the real
motive of Lucita and her family in filing the
case is to wrest control and ownership of
properties belonging to the conjugal
partnership.
Pablo Aguas died on December 8, 1996.
Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas,
filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits
on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in
her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by
his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on
October 29, 1991.2 Her claim for monthly
Whether or not the

general denial of the
spouse against whom the
ground
for
legal
separation
is
being
charged may be given
greater weight than the
detailed and corroborated
testimony
of
the
petitioning spouse which
was already upheld by
the trial court.
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial
for William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former. The Court
also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the
unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the
stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. Indeed, it is settled that
the assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled
to great respect and weight having had the opportunity to observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
Whether or not a wife

who is separated in fact
from her husband may be
considered as the latters
dependent for support for
purposes of claiming
SSS death benefits.
No. A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be
said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any
showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and
wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to
presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is
shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

pension was settled on February 13, 1997.
Republic Act No. 1161, the prevailing law at the time of Pablos death
defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS member as
follows:
In April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter

from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos
sister, contesting Rosannas claim for death
benefits. She alleged that Rosanna
abandoned the family abode approximately
more than six years before. She further
averred that Pablo had no legal children with
Rosanna, but that the latter had several
children with a certain Romeo dela Pea.
Dependent. The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is

unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age
provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of selfsupport physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent
upon the covered employee for regular support.
Beneficiaries. The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries.
Consequently, SSS stop the payment of

pensions and ordered Rosanna to refund the
previously released pension. This prompted
Rosanna to file a claim/petition for the
Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the
Social Security Commission.
4.
Baez vs.
Baez
G.R. No.
132592,
January 23,
2002
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer

qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing
that she had contracted marriage with
Romeo dela Pea during the subsistence of
her marriage to Pablo. The SSC based its
conclusion on the birth certificate of
Jefrendela Pea stating that his mother,
Rosanna, and father, Romeo dela Pea,
were married on November 1, 1990.The SSC
concluded that Rosanna was no longer
entitled to support from Pablo prior to his
death because of her act of adultery. As for
Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth
certificate was signed by Pablo as her father,
there was more compelling evidence that
Jeylnn was not his legitimate child.
On September 23, 1996, the RTC decreed:
the legal separation between Aida Baez and
Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters
sexual infidelity.
Aida filed two petitions before the Supreme
Whether or not an action

for legal separation is
one where multiple
appeals are allowed
No. Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for

recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property
with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and
foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one
appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in
the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and
An action for legal

separation cannot
be a subject of
multiple appeals
Court assailing the following decisions of the

CA: (1) setting aside the RTC order of
execution pending appeal; and (2) denial of
her motion to dismiss Gabriels notice of
appeal to the decree of legal separation.
held to be final (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of

Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 194, 1996).
Splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule
against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved
in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship
between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement
to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the
decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that
may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the
decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal
separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
Petitioner prays that, in the event that we do

not dismiss Gabriel Baez appeal, we should
direct the appellate court to return the
records of the case to the RTC of Cebu.
Thereafter, according to her, respondent
should file his record on appeal for approval
and transmittal to the Court of Appeals. Aida
contends that an action for legal separation is
among the cases where multiple appeals
may be taken.
In the alternative, she prays that the
appellate court retain only the pleadings and
evidence necessary to resolve respondents
appeal pursuant to Section 6, Rule 442 and
Section 6, Rule 1353 of the Rules of Court,
and return the rest of the case records to the
RTC.
Title II. LEGAL SEPARATION

Title
Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ 00
Facts
The solemnization of a marriage between
two contracting parties who were both bound
by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
Issue/s
Whether or not Judge
Roque R. Sanchez is
liable for gross ignorance
Held
Article 34 of the Family Code provides that No license shall be
necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
2Section
6.Dispensing with complete record. Where the completion of the record could not be accomplished within a sufficient period allotted for said purpose due to
insuperable or extremely difficult causes, the court, on its own motion or on motion of any of the parties, may declare that the record and its accompanying transcripts and
exhibits so far available are sufficient to decide the issues raised in the appeal, and shall issue an order explaining the reasons for such declaration.
3Section 6.Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by
these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.

1329, Mar.08,2001, 354
SCRA 1
contention of the instant complaint against

respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.
For this act, complainant Herminia BorjaManzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful
wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966. On 22
March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge claims that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao, he did not know that Manzano
was legally married. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband
and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage. According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married,
he would have advised the latter not to marry
again.
The affidavits of both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they
were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo
Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by
constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore.
Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis
of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize
the marriage in question in accordance with
Article 34 of the Family Code.
of the law for solemnizing

a marriage between two
contracting parties who
were both bound by a
prior existing marriage.
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an
affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The
solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no
legal impediment to their marriage.6
It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior
existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that
both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make
the subsequent marriage null and void. Respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as
the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of
the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the
marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry.
This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in
the case at bar.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
Pacete vs. Carriaga

GR# 53880,Mar. 17,
1994, 231 SCRA 321
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed

with the court below a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between
her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and
one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for
legal separation (between Alanis and
Pacete), accounting and separation of
property. In her complaint, she averred that
she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938
before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato,
Cotabato; that they had a child named
Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943;
that Pacete subsequently contracted (in
1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato;
that she learned of such marriage only on 01
August 1979; that during her marriage to
Pacete, the latter acquired vast property; that
he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in
the names of his children with Clarita and
other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored
overtures for an amicable settlement; and
that reconciliation between her and Pacete
was impossible since he evidently preferred
to continue living with Clarita.
ground for exemption from marriage license.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally
sanctioned. The Civil Code provides: Art. 101. No decree of legal
separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
It is reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code. In Brown v. Yambao, the
Court has observed: The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code,
calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under
Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract;
that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that
its continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon the
parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 4 3
Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It
is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be
allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the
proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,"
obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further
underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene
for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
10
Sabalones vs. CA
GR#106169, Feb. 14,
1994, 230 SCRA 79
As a member of our diplomatic service

assigned to different countries, petitioner
Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein
respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones,
the administration of some of their conjugal,
properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985
and came back to the Philippines but not to
his wife and their children. Four years later,
he filed an action for judicial authorization to
sell a building belonging to the conjugal
partnership. He claimed that he was sixtyeight years old, very sick and living alone
without any income, and that his share of the
proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive
cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment.
The private respondent opposed the
authorization and filed a counterclaim for
legal separation. She alleged that the house
in Greenhills was being occupied by her and
their six children and that they were
depending for their support on the rentals
from another conjugal property, a building
and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease.
She also informed the court that his husband
did not return to his legitimate family and was
instead maintaining a separate residence
with Thelma Cumareng and their three
children.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant
the decree of legal separation and order the
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage
to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in
the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter
within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone
dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal
separation. 11 That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have
likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
Pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of
conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to
continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account
the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from
interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the
conjugal properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of
the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after
a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one
of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been
made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court
denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect
approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the
respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
xxx
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject
properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on
the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged that her administration has
caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is
that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better
terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals. In her
motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife
alleged that the petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes
Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the
income therefrom on which they depend for their subsistence. The private
respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner
executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San
Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve
his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate family.
11

liquidation of their conjugal properties, with
forfeiture of her husband's share therein
because of his adultery. After trial, the judge
ound that the petitioner had indeed
contracted a bigamous marriage on with
Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned
upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate
residence. The court thus decreed the legal
separation of the spouses and the forfeiture
of the petitioner's share in the conjugal
properties, declaring as well that he was not
entitled to support from his respondent wife.
This decision was appealed to the
respondent court. Pendente lite, the
respondent wife filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills
and Forbes Park. The petitioner opposed this
motion and filed his own motion to prevent
his wife from entering into a new contract of
lease over the Forbes Park property with its
present tenant, or with future tenants, without
his consent.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an
order dated April 7, 1992, granted the
preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that
the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private
respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal
assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right
and its actual or threatened violation. 5Regardless of the outcome of the
appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the
complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the
private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal
estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the
apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its
improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We
agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of
the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to
allow him in the meantime to participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the
respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal
assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties
in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the
express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of
the Family Code.
Title III. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND & WIFE

Title
Limbona v. Comelec
GR#181097, June 25,
2008, 555 SCRA391
Facts
Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
(Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G.
Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent
Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were
mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del
Norte during the 2007 Synchronized National
and Local Elections. Mohammad, Norlainie
and Malik filed their certificates of candidacy
with Acting Election Officer, Alauya S. Tago.
Issue/s
Whether or not the
Comelec gravely abused
its discretion in
disqualifying Norlaine for
not complying with the
residency requirement.
Held
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year
residency requirement. The term "residence" as used in the election law is
synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in
a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of the law in fixing
a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of
12

On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to
disqualify Mohammad and Norlaine for failure
to comply with the residency requirement.
On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit
of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy.
Thereafter, or on May 2, 2007, she filed
before the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor a Motion to Dismiss the petition
for disqualification on the ground that the
petition had become moot in view of the
withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy.
The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal
of Norlainies certificate of candidacy.
Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec
granted the petition filed by Malik and
disqualifying Mohammad from running as
municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte
for failing to satisfy the one year residency
requirement and for not being a registered
voter of the said place.
Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate
of candidacy as substitute candidate for
Mohammad which was given due course by
the Comelec en banc. Thus, Malik filed a
second petition for disqualification against
Norlainie.
After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the
winning candidate and accordingly took her
oath and assumed office.
However, on September 4, 2007, the Second
Division of disqualified Norlainie on three
grounds: lack of the one-year residency
requirement; not being a registered voter of
the municipality; and, nullity of her certificate
of candidacy for having been filed at a place
other than the Office of the Election Officer.
Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare
the petition in SPA No. 07-611 moot and/or
for reconsideration, arguing that the
Comelec en banc had approved the
withdrawal of her first certificate of candidacy
intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a

person actually resides. Three rules are, however, well established: first,
that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that
where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a
man can have but one domicile at a time.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.22 A persons "domicile" once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a
new one is established.23
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one,
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.24
Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually
residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the elections,25 is selfserving and unsubstantiated. As correctly observed by the Comelec:
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which
consists merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that
she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in
Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent "has been staying,
sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20
months" in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent
and competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents
intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The
filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is
not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new
residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered
voter in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a
candidate.26
We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is
Maguing, Lanao del Norte,27 which is also her place of birth; and that her
domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi
City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners husband, effected
the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on
13

and had given due course to her new
certificate of candidacy as a substitute
candidate for Mohammad. Malik opposed the
omnibus motion.
Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec
in SPA No. 07-621, promulgated on
November 23, 2007 a
Resolution10 disqualifying Norlainie from
running as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
It held thus:
On January 9, 2008, the Comelec en banc in
SPA No. 07-611 denied Norlainies motion for
reconsideration.
Ilusorio v. Bildner
GR# 139789, July 19,
2001, 361 SCRA 427
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and

Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony
and lived together for a period of thirty (30)
years. In 1972, they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6)
children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55);
Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo
(age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48);
and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos
arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo
City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin),
alleged that during this time, their mother
gave Potenciano an overdose of an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor.
As a consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
Whether or not a wife may

secure a writ of habeas
corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss.
November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live
together in one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the
change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of
the Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may
exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove
otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and
is in consonance with human experience.29
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
However, petitioners disqualification would not result in Maliks
proclamation who came in second during the special election.
No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal.16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.17 The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
14

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a
petition10 for guardianship over the person
and property of Potenciano Ilusorio.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate
meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio
did not return to Antipolo City.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus
to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents
refused petitioners demands to see and visit
her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City.
CA denied the Petition but nevertheless
granted Erlinda visitation rights.
Ilusorio v. Bildner
GR#139789, May 12,
200, 332, SCRA 169
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, filed a

petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas
corpus to have custody of her husband in
consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K.
Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an
1.
2.
Whether or not
Potenciano was
illegally
restrained.
Whether
Potenciano is
mentally
incapacitated to
choose whether
to see his wife or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the

issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his
actions.
xxx As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals
observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the
relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make
choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the
people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal
to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively
belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that
he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no
reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this
will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
xxx The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even
prayed for such right. xxx In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
womans free choice.
xxxThe fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at
the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16Potenciano himself declared
that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that
he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
xxx We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally
incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a
question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
xxx Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they
(Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for
15

appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to
have custody of her husband Potenciano
Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with
another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio
and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia
K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving
visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he
never refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition
for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and
granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of
Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to
Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's
motion to reconsider the decision.
3.
not.
Whether the
husband and wife
are obliged to live
together.
each other. We agree.

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor
is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.21
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We
defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
Go vs. Ca
G.R. No. 114791. May
29, 1997, 272 SCRA
572
No less than the

Constitution commands
us to protect marriage
as an inviolable social
institution
and
the
foundation
of
the
family.[1] In our society,
the importance of a
wedding
ceremony
cannot
be
underestimated as it is
the matrix of the family
and,
therefore,
an
occasion worth reliving
in
the
succeeding
years.
Private
respondents
spouses
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on
June 7, 1981. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by petitioners at a
contract price of P1,650.00. Three times
thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the
video tape of their wedding and thrice they
failed because the tape was apparently not
yet processed. The parties then agreed that
the tape would be ready upon private
respondents return.
When private respondents came, they
found out that the tape had been erased by
petitioners and therefore, could no longer be
delivered.
Furious at the loss of the tape which
was supposed to be the only record of their
wedding, private respondents filed on
September 23, 1981 a complaint for specific
performance
and
damages
against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to

human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video
coverage of their wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case
against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of
actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering
that private respondents were about to leave for the United States, they
took care to inform petitioners that they would just claim the tape upon
their return two months later. Thus, the erasure of the tape after the lapse
of thirty days was unjustified.
In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who
in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.
In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into
a contract whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover the latters
wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For whatever
reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape.
Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said
private respondents and are thus liable for damages.
The grant of actual or compensatory damages in the amount
of P450.00 is justified, as reimbursement of the downpayment paid by
private respondents to petitioners.[6]
16

Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for
breach of contract because this case is not among those enumerated in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. However, it is also accepted in this
jurisdiction that liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations, that is, the act which violates the
contract may also constitute aquasi-delict.[7] Consequently, moral
damages are recoverable for the breach of contract which was palpably
wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppresive or abusive.[8]
Petitioners act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage
of private respondents wedding was precisely the cause of the suffering
private respondents had to undergo.
Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by
petitioners in the case at bar, the award of exemplary damages by the trial
court is justified[10] to serve as a warning to all entities engaged in the
same business to observe due diligence in the conduct of their affairs.
The award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses are likewise
proper, consistent with Article 2208[11] of the Civil Code.
Finally, petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and
appellate courts holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife
Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. He argues that when
his wife entered into the contract with private respondent, she was acting
alone for her sole interest.[
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
GR#80116, June 30,
1989, 175 SCRA 652
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda

Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the
Whether or not the court is

without jurisdiction "to try
and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private
We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code
(now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In
the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go
who entered into the contract with private respondent. Consequently, we
rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages
awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect
only as between the parties who execute them.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as
well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.xxx.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
17

Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed
by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of
marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed
an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg Local
Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce
proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction. 4
More than five months after the issuance of
the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had
an affair with a certain William Chia as early
as 1982 and with yet another man named
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983", which was
later on filed with the Regional Trial Court.
offense that cannot be

prosecuted de officio (sic),
since the purported
complainant, a foreigner,
does not qualify as an
offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce
decree under his national
law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint."
Whether it is necessary in
the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds
between the complainant
and the accused be
unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of
the action by the former
against the latter.
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. xxx
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of
the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in
fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in
civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal
cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not
apply. xxx The present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the
offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively
within his power and option.
xxx Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for, adultery. xxx
xxx It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the
time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the
action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time
of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the
legal capacity to do so.
xxx American jurisprudence xxx yields the rule that after a divorce has
been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution
for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on
the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. xxx
xxx We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must
be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
18
Van Dorn vs. Romillo,

Jr.,
GR#L-68470, Oct. 08,
1985, 139 SCRA 13
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while

private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; that they were married in Hongkong
in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines;
that they begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively;
that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court stating
that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting
Whether or not the foreign

divorce is valid in the
Philippines and thus has
an effect in their alleged
conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that
respondent is estopped
from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property
because of the
representation he made in
the divorce proceedings
before the American Court
that they had no
community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons. xxx
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being
no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
xxx When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously
knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect
once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a
danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to
speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully
relied upon by private respondent. xxx What was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the
situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio.
The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the
termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid
foreign divorce.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent whoa uthorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to
the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that
there were neither community property nor community obligations. xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. xxx
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
19

of that business, and that private respondent
be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that
he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case.
not established through

conjugal funds, and that
respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
xxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
TITLE IV. PROPERTY RELATIONS BET. HUSBAND & WIFE (Articles 74 - 148)
CHAPTER 1. Gen Provisions; Pre-nuptial Agreement; (Articles 74 81, FC; Art. 119, NCC)
Title
Pana v. Heirs of Jose
Juanite St
GR#164201, Dec
10, 2012, 687 SCRA
414
In relation to: Section
4. Charges Upon &
Oblig. of the Conjugal
Partnership (Articles
121 123) See also
arts. 73, 111 FC, RA
10572
Facts
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren
Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of
murder before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC acquitted Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia
guilty and charged with death penalty. The
RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each
of the heirs of the victims, jointly and
severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and
P150,000.00 actual damages.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on the
conviction of both accused but modified the
penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to
the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed
the award of civil indemnity and moral
damages but deleted the award for actual
damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its
place, however, the Court made an award of
P15,000.00 each by way of temperate
Issue/s
Whether or not the CA
erred in holding that the
conjugal properties of
spouses Efren and
Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecias
civil liability in the murder
case.
Held
xxx While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their
conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to
have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256
of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically
convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal
partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with
prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements
cannot be modified except prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be
valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to
the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988
cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only
where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved
and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;18 (b) the spouses who
were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former
20

damages. In addition, the Court awarded
P50,000.00 exemplary damages per victim to
be paid solidarily by them. The decision
became final and executory on October 1,
2001.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the
deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of
the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Efren
and Melecia. A notice of levy7 and a notice of
sale on execution8 were issued.
On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife
Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties
were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets
of Melecia. The RTC denied the
motion.10 The spouses moved for
reconsideration but the RTC denied the
same.
CA denied the appeal on certiriorari under
rule 65 and Efrens motion for
reconsideration.
property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the
ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to
comply with his obligations to the family;20 (d) there was judicial separation
of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the
voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership
of gains.21None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and
Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by
Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the
fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or industry in
the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights
of ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to
automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got
married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988
when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or
vested rights to such separate properties.
xxx No evidence of a prenuptial agreement between them has been
presented. xxxThe presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is
that they were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of
gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code thus provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern
the property relations between husband and wife.
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal
partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership
of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the Family Code states:
"x x x x The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256."
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in
21

deciding whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may
be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder
case. Its Article 122 provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be
charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse
before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as
well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who
is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient;
but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be
charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no
exclusive property of her own,24 the above applies. The civil indemnity that
the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against
their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of
the Family Code have been covered.25Those responsibilities are as
follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
22

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded
to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor
of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found
to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities,
the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.1wphi1
xxx Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed
on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are
liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been covered." No prior liquidation of those assets
is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the
time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be
charged.
CHAPTER 2: DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE (ARTICLE 82-87)

1.
Valencia
vsLocquiao
GR# 122134/ October

2, 2003
The case involve a parcel of land

located in Pangasinan. This land was
originally
owned
by
the
spouses
Herminigildo and RaymundaLocquiao, On
May 22, 1944, the spouses executed a
deed of donation propter nuptiaswhich was
written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated
(1) whether the donation

propter nuptias is authentic;
(2) whether acceptance of
the donation by the donees is
required;
(3) if so, in what form should
1. The petitioners have launched a two-pronged attack against the

validity of the donation propter nuptias, to wit: first, the Inventario Ti
Sagut is not authentic; and second, even assuming that it is authentic, it
is void for the donees failure to accept the donation in a public
instrument. To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the
petitioners rely mainly on the Certificationdated July 9, 1984 of the
23

as Inventario Ti Sagutin favor of their son,
respondent Benito Locquiao and his
prospective bride, respondent Tomasa
Mara. By the terms of the deed, the donees
were gifted with four (4) parcels of land,
including the land in question, as well as a
male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the
conjugal house of the donor parents, in
consideration of the impending marriage of
the donees.
The donees took their marriage
vows and the fact of their marriage was
inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383.
Herminigildo and Raymunda died, leaving
as heirs their six (6) children. Benito and
Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut
with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan on May 15, 1970..
The heirs of the Locquiao spouses,
including respondent Benito and petitioner
Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with
Recognition of Rights and a Deed of
Compromise Agreementfor the partition of
the properties remaining.
Petitioner Constancia filed an
action for annulment of title against the
respondents. Petitioners alleged that the
issuance of the transfer certificate of title
was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut
is spurious; that the notary public who
notarized the document had no authority to
do so, and; that the donation did not
observe the form required by law as there
was no written acceptance on the document
itself or in a separate public instrument.
RTC- Dismissed
CA- Affirmed RTC
the acceptance appear, and;
Records Management and Archives Office that there was no notarial

record for the year 1944 of Cipriano V. Abenojar who notarized the
document on May 22, 1944 and that therefore a copy of the document
was not available.
The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence
or spuriousness of the challenged document. The appellate court is
correct in pointing out that the mere absence of the notarial record does
not prove that the notary public does not have a valid notarial
commission and neither does the absence of a file copy of the document
with the archives effect evidence of the falsification of the document.
This Court ruled that the failure of the notary public to furnish a
copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground for
disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or
for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
2. Concerning the issue of form, petitioners insist that based on a
provisionof the Civil Code of Spain (Old Civil Code), the acceptance by
the donees should be made in a public instrument.
Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or
donations by reason of marriage are those made before its celebration,
in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future
spouses. The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations
are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the
formal essential requisites.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be
made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides
that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts. In
otherwords, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary
couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough
to effectuate the donation propter nuptiasunder the Old Civil Code.
Under theNew Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127
thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated
by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the
Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need
be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129,
express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these
donations. Thus,implied acceptance is sufficient.
The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements
should be applied with respect to the donation propter nuptiasat hand.
Those under the Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code?
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a
24

contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter
are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the
Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter
nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only
on August 30, 1950.
Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be
applied. However, they invoked the wrong provisionsthereof.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case
of the petitioners would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even
implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New
Civil Code.
2.
Arcaba vs.
Batocael
GR#
146683/
November 22, 2001
Francisco Comille and his wife

ZosimaMontallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A located at the
corner of Calle Santa Rosa and Calle
Rosario. Zosima died on October 3, 1980.
Having no children to take care of him after
his retirement, Francisco asked his niece
Leticia Bellosillo, the latters cousin,
LuzvimindaPaghacianand
petitioner
CirilaArcaba to take care of his house, as
well as the store inside.
Conflicting testimonies were offered
as to the nature of the relationship between
Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said
Francisco and Cirila were lovers while
ErlindaTabancura claimed that the latter had
told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the
other hand, Cirila said she was a mere
helper.
On January 24, 1991, a few months
before his death, Francisco executed an
instrument denominated Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of
Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters,
together with his house, to Cirila, who
accepted the donation in the same
instrument.
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died
without any children. Respondents filed a
complaint against petitioner for declaration
of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos.
Whether the Court of

Appeals correctly applied Art.
87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case.
In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term cohabitation or living

together as husband and wife means not only residing under one roof,
but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course,
means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties
is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the
marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights
clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute
such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious
Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila
admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time.
It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since
Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in
the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that
theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of
exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
SeigfredoTabancura presented documents apparently signed by
Cirila using the surname Comille. As previously stated, these are an
application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,a
sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate,
and the death certificate of Francisco. These documents show that Cirila
saw herself as Franciscos common-law wife, otherwise, she would not
have used his last name.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
25

They alleged that Cirila was the commonlaw wife of Francisco and the donation inter
vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void
under Artile 87 of the Civil Code
RTC- Ruled in favor of respondents
CA- Affirmed
3.
Agpay
Palang
vs.
GR# 116668/ July 28,

1997
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage

on July 16, 1949 when he took private
respondent CarlinaVallesterol as a wife. A
few months after the wedding he left to work
in Hawaii and HerminiaPalanawas born.
When Miguel returned for good in
1972, he refused to live with private
respondents, but stayed alone in a house in
Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, the then 63
y/o Miguel contracted his second marriage
with 19y/o ErlindaAgapay, herein petitioner.
Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973,
Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land. A house and lot
in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise
purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole
vendee. Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation
produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang. On
February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
CarlinaPalang and her daughter
HerminiaPalang de la Cruz, instituted the
case at bar, an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages
against petitioner. Private respondents
sought to get back the riceland and the
house and lot both located at Binalonan,
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Lower
court
rendered
its
decisiondismissing the complaint after
declaring that there was little evidence to
prove that the subject properties pertained
to the conjugal property of Carlina and
Miguel Palang.
Court of Appeals reversed the
Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
WON the property is part of
the conjugal partnership of
gains of the first marriage.
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel
and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the
Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July
15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of
Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latters de
facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and
no presumption of equal shares
Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17,
1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang
was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973
she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to
the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no
basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased
Miguel and private respondent CarlinaPalang.
2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same
for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old.
The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance
for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty.
26

decision.
ConstantinoSagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for

the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as
the vendee
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to
Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express
provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery
or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt
would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY (ARTICLES 88-104)

1.
QuiaovsQuiao
GR# 176556/ July 4,

2012
2.
Romero
vsCa
GR# 188921/ April 18,

2012
Petitioners allege that upon their

fathers death, their mother, respondent
Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal
guardian who held several real and
personal properties in trust for her children.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and
Amando discovered that several Deeds of
Sale were registered over parcels of land
that are purportedly conjugal properties of
their parents. Petitioners claim that
sometime in August of 2005, their brother
Vittorio through fraud, misrepresentation
and duress succeeded in registering the
above-mentioned properties in his name
through of Deeds of Sale executed by their
mother, Aurora. Thus, Aurora signed the
Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing
their
contents.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and
Conveyance of Title (Amended)against
WON probate court can pass

upon question of ownership
and to determine whether
such property is to be
included in the inventory of
estate
The issue before the court is not really one of title or ownership,
but the determination of which particular properties should be included in
the inventory of the estate.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that
the determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernalfor
purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estaterests with the
probate court:
xxx
In the case now before us, the
matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain of the properties
involved whether they belong to the
conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within
the jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate
of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedingsxxx(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly
27

private respondents Aurora C. Romero and
Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed their
Answer, arguing that the properties in
question were acquired long after the death
of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence,
the properties cannot be considered
conjugal.
RTC rendered its Resolution
dismissing petitioners complaint.
CA Dismissed the Petition
3.
Sunga- Chan
vs CA
GR# 164401/ June 25,

2008
In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a

partnership to engage in the marketing of
liquefied petroleum gas. For convenience,
the business, pursued under the name,
Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite),
was registered as a sole proprietorship in
the name of Jacinto, albeit the partnership
arrangement called for equal sharing of the
net profit.
After Jacintos death in 1989,
his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and
married daughter, petitioner LilibethSungaChan, continued with the business without
Chuas consent.
Chuas subsequent
repeated demands for accounting and
winding up went unheeded, prompting him
to file a Complaint for Winding Up of a
Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal
and Recovery of Shares and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
After trial, the RTC rendered
judgment finding for Chua, as plaintiff a quo.
The RTCs decision would subsequently be
upheld by the CA Thefallo of the RTCs
decision reads: Directing the parties render
an accounting, to return and restitute to the
partnership any all properties, assets,
income and profits they misapplied and
concerted, ordering plaintiff to pay earned
but unreceived income and profits from the
partnership.
orchestrated by petitioners co-heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by

the probate court, because it is the probate court which is empowered to
identify the nature of the property, and that has jurisdiction over Auroras
actions and dispositions as administrator. In Peaverde v. Peaverde,
the Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-shopping for
filing a separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners
own case seeking that letters of administration be granted to them.
Whether or not the absolute

community of property of
spouses LilibethSunga Chan
with her husband Norberto
Chan can be lawfully made to
answer for the liability of
Lilibeth Chan under the
judgment
Given the solidary liability of petitioners to satisfy the judgment award,

respondent sheriff cannot really be faulted for levying upon and then
selling at public auction the property of petitioner Sunga-Chan to answer
for the whole obligation of petitioners. The fact that the levied parcel of
land is a conjugal or community property, as the case may be, of
spouses Norberto and
Given the solidary liability of petitioners to satisfy the
judgment award, respondent sheriff cannot really be faulted for levying
upon and then selling at public auction the property of petitioner SungaChan to answer for the whole obligation of petitioners. The fact that the
levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community property, as the case
may be, of spouses Norberto and
Sunga-Chan does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of
the property. Verily, said property is not among those exempted from
execution under Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Parenthetically, the records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and
Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Withal, their absolute community
property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either
spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently provides:
Art. 94. The absolute community of
property shall be liable for:
(1) xxxx
(2) All debts and obligations
contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit
of the community, or by both spouses, or by
one spouse with the consent of the other.
(3)
Debts
and
obligations
28

Chua, on the other hand,
submitted a new computation,his time
applying simple interest on the various
items covered by his claim. Under this
methodology, Chuas aggregate claim went
down
to
PhP
8,733,644.75. Chuas
computation is then approved by the RTC.
contracted by either spouse without the consent

of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited. (Emphasis ours.)
Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation
by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the
business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be
considered to have been used for her and her husbands benefit.
CHAPTER 4. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

1.
Lim
PCI/BDO
vs
GR# 183918/ Jan. 15,

2014
Petitioner Francisco Lim

(petitioner) executed an Irrevocable
Special Power of Attorney in favor of
his brother, Franco Lim (Franco),
authorizing the latter to mortgage his
share in the property which they coowned. Banco De Oro Savings and
Mortgage Bank released a loan in the
amount of P8.5 million. On December
28, 1992, the loan was fully paid by
Franco.
Franco, and their mother
Victoria Yao Lim obtained from
respondent Equitable PCI Bank a loan
in the amount of P30 million in favor of
Sun Paper Products, Inc. To secure
the loan, petitioner and Franco
executed in favor of respondent a
1.
WON signature is forged
WON Property is part of
Conjugal partnership of
gains?
Petitioner failed to prove that it was forged. He did not present any
evidence to prove it was forged.
2.
Petitioner failed to prove negligence on the part of respondent.
Before entering into a mortgage contract, banks are expected to
exercise due diligence. However, in this case, no evidence was presented to
show that respondent did not exercise due diligence or that it was negligent in
accepting the mortgage. That petitioner was erroneously described as
single and a Filipino citizen in the mortgage contract, when in fact he is
married and an American citizen, cannot be attributed to respondent
considering that the title of the mortgaged property was registered under
"FRANCISCO LIM and FRANCO LIM, both Filipino citizens, of legal age,
single."
The nature of the property was never raised as an issue.
The absence of his wifes signature on the mortgage contract also has no
bearing in this case.
We are not unaware that all property of the marriage is presumed to
be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or
29

Real Estate Mortgageover the same
property. However, when the loan was
not paid, respondent foreclosed the
mortgaged property.
Petitioner filed before the
RTC of Pasig a Complaintand alleged
that he did not authorize Franco to
mortgage the subject property to
respondent and that his signatures in
the Real Estate Mortgage and the
Surety Agreement were forged.
RTC rendered a Decisionin
favor of petitioner. It ruled that
petitioner was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that he
did not participate in the execution of
the mortgage contract giving rise to
the presumption that his signature
was forged.
CA reversed the RTC
Decision. It ruled that petitioners
mere allegation that his signature in
the mortgage contract was forged is
not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity of the
notarized document.
2.
Beumer vs.
Amores
3.
Quiao vs.
Quiao
4.
Dewara
Lamela
vs.
GR# 179010/ April

11, 2011
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner

ElenitaMagallanesDewara were
married before the enactment of the
Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code
governed their marital relations.
Husband and wife were separated-infact because Elenita went to work in
California, United States of America,
the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is
registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent
of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.
However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially
since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue
before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court.
Worth mentioning, in passing, is the ruling in Philippine National Bank
v. Court of Appeals to wit:
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of
the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the
properties were acquired by DonataMontemayor when she was already a
widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there
is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is
in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved.
The sole issue for

resolution is whether the
subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive
property of Elenita or the
conjugal property of
spouses Elenita and
Eduardo.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal

the wife.Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not
destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and the
wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot
retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the
30

while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
Eduardo, while driving a
private jeep registered in the name of
Elenita hit respondent Ronnie Lamela.
Ronnie filed a criminal case for
serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudenceagainst Eduardo.
The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of
the charge and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment and
to pay civil indemnity.
The writ of execution on the civil
liability was served on Eduardo, but it
was returned unsatisfied because he
had no property in his name. Ronnie
requested the City Sheriff, to levy on
Lots in the name of the spouses. The
lot was subsequently sold in a public
auction
Petitioner claimed that the
levy on execution of Lot was illegal
because the said property was her
paraphernal or exclusive property.
Respondent spouses
averred that the subject lot was the
conjugal property. They asserted that
the property was acquired by Elenita
during her marriage to Eduardo; that
the property was acquired with the
money of Eduardo because, at the
time of the acquisition of the property,
Elenita was a plain housewife.
RTC rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner.
CA reversed the decision of
the RTC.
presumption to arise.
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it
may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts,
obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and
obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown
that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have
redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary
indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be
charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should have
no exclusive property or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and
indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before the marriage, and that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 have
been covered,if the spouse who is bound should
have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.[
Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerates the obligations which the
conjugal partnership may be held answerable, viz.:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which
constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage
upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs
shall not be charged to the partnership;
31

(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of
both the husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional,
vocational or other course.
The enumeration above-listed should first be complied with before the conjugal
partnership may be held to answer for the liability adjudged against Eduardo.
5.
Hernandez vs.
Mingoa
GR# 146548/ December

18, 2009
On February 11, 1994, a

complaint was filed with the RTC by
herein
petitioners,
against
the
respondent
Dolores
Camisura,
Melanie Mingoa, Atty. PlaridelMingoa,
Sr. and all persons claiming rights
under the latter.
In their complaint, the
petitioners asked for (a) the
annulment and/or declaration of nullity
of TCT including all its derivative titles,
the Irrevocable Special Power of
Attorney (SPA), the SPA and the Deed
of Absolute Sale of Real Estatefor
being products of forgery and
falsification.
The evidence respectively
presented
by
the
parties
is
summarized as follows:x xx [It]
appears that in the early part of 1958,
Domingo Hernandez, Sr. and his
spouse Sergia V. Hernandez were
awarded a piece of real property by
the Philippine Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) by way of salary
deduction. On October 18, 1963, the
[petitioners] then having paid in full
the entire amount of P6,888.96, a
Deed of Absolute Sale of the property
was executed by the PHHC in their
favor. Hernandez, Sr. died intestate
and it was only after his burial that his
heirs found out that TCT No. 107534
Whether there was a valid

alienation involving the
subject property
The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus,

the sale of his share in the conjugal property was valid. With regard to the
consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the sale involving their conjugal
property, the trial court found that it was lacking because said wifes signature
on the SPA was falsified. Notably, even the CA observed that the forgery was
so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary
person.
However, Sergias lack of consent to the sale did not render the
transfer of her share invalid. Since all these events occurred before the Family
Code took effect in 1988, the provisions of the New Civil Code govern these
transactions. We quote the applicable provisions, to wit:
Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in
a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If
she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may
compel her to grant the same. x x x.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years
from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent
is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
(Emphasis ours.)
Here, the husbands first act of disposition of the subject property
occurred in 1963 when he executed the SPA and the Deed of Transfer of
Rights in favor of Dolores Camisura. Thus, the right of action of the petitioners
accrued in 1963, as Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may file
for annulment of a contract entered into by the husband without her consent
within ten (10) years from the transaction questioned. Petitioners filed the
32

was already cancelled a year before.
Upon diligent inquiry, petitioners came
to know that the cancellation of TCT in
favor of the respondents was based
upon Irrevocable Power of Attorney;
Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney;
and Deed of Absolute Sale. However,
they claim that Sergia did not give her
consent on the alienation of the
property,
6.
De Leon vs De
Leon
GR# 185063/ July 23,

2009
Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single,

and the Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered
into a Conditional Contract to Sell for
the purchase on installment of a lot
situated in Fairview, Quezon City.
Subsequently, Bonifaciomarried Anita
de Leon in a civil rite. To this union
were born Danilo and Vilma.
Following the full payment of
the cost price for the lot thus
purchased, PHHC executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio.
Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued in the name of
Bonifacio, single.
action for reconveyance in 1995. Even if we were to consider that their right of
action arose when they learned of the cancellation of TCT No. 107534 and the
issuance of TCT No. 290121 in Melanie Mingoas name in 1993, still, twelve
(12) years have lapsed since such discovery, and they filed the petition beyond
the period allowed by law. Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together with
her children, filed the action for reconveyance, the conjugal partnership of
property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of the
latter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore, petitioners action has
prescribed.
xxx [Under] Article 173 of the New Civil Code, an action for the annulment of
any contract entered into by the husband without the wifes consent must be
filed (1) during the marriage; and (2) within ten years from the transaction
questioned. Where any one of these two conditions is lacking, the action
will be considered as having been filed out of time.
Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an
action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10)
years from the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of
the subject property to third persons.
More than having merely prescribed, petitioners action has
likewise become stale, as it is barred by laches.The fact that the Mingoa's were
able to take actual possession of the subject property for such a long period
without any form of cognizable protest from Hernandez, Sr. and the plaintiffsappellees strongly calls for the application of the doctrine of laches.
Whether the CA gravely
erred in concluding that
the land
purchased on
installment by
Bonifacio O.
De
Leon before marriage
although
some
installments were paid
during the marriage is
conjugal and not his
exclusive property.
The Subject Property is the Conjugal Property of Bonifacio and Anita

Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the
time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to
arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appealsteaches, even necessary to prove that
the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of
acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties
were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal.
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio
after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment,
to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April
24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the
marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to
33

Subsequently, Bonifacio, for
PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her
sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio
Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein.
Thereafter, Bonifacio and Anita
renewed their vows in a church
wedding. On February 29, 1996,
Bonifacio died.
Three months later, the
Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale
and had TCT No. 173677 canceled.
They secured the issuance in their
names of TCT No. N-173911 from the
Quezon City Register of Deeds.
Petitioners assert that, since
Bonifacio purchased the lot from
PHHC on installment before he
married Anita, the land was
Bonifacios exclusive property and not
conjugal, even though some
installments were paid and the title
was issued to Bonifacio during the
marriage.
the conjugal partnership.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on
the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property
of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. To a specific point, the
sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a
rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in
several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to
the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent
any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like
causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is
in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since
Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows
that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void
except when the law itself authorized their validity.
Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between
Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void.
Interest in the Conjugal Partnership Is
Merely Inchoate until Liquidation
As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of
one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void.
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse
in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes
neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it
appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation
and settlement. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets
left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of
the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously
stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets
does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
CHAPTER 4. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

Sec 1. General Provisions
34

Title
7. Matthews v. Taylor
Facts
Respondent
Benjamin
A.
Taylor
(Benjamin), a British national, married
Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year
old Filipina.
While their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a
parcel of land located in Boracay.
The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also
using the latters funds, constructed
improvements thereon and eventually
converted the property to a vacation
and tourist resort known as the Admiral
Ben Bow Inn.
All required permits and licenses for
the operation of the resort were
obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyns sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a
falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
Kim Philippsen.
Joselyn executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin,
authorizing the latter to maintain, sell,
lease, and sub-lease and otherwise
enter into contract with third parties with
respect to their Boracay property.
Issues
Whether or not an alien
husband can nullify a
lease contract entered
into by his Filipina wife
bought during their
marriage?
Ruling
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as
more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands
through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or
indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens
wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their fathers estate; that
they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of
another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens) favor; and that a
contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent. Benjamin has no right to
nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and
public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing
that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement
for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In
any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property.
To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as
he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a
right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip

Matthews as lessee, entered into an
Agreement of Lease (Agreement)
involving the Boracay property for a
period of 25 years.
The agreement was signed by the
parties and executed before a Notary
Public. Petitioner thereafter took
possession of the property and
35

renamed the resort as Music Garden
Resort.
Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages against Joselyn
and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were
used
in
the
acquisition
and
improvement of the Boracay property,
and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyns husband, any transaction
involving said property required his
consent.
Borromeo
Descallar
v.
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met
Antonietta Descallar (respondent), a
Filipina, while the former was working in
the Philippines sometime in 1983. The
two became a couple and later
cohabited as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage.
During their cohabitation, the two
acquired some real properties in the
Philippines which they bought from
Agro-Macro Development Corporation.
The deed of sale of said real properties
were placed in the name of both
Jambrich and Descallar as buyers, but
were registered under the Torrens
system in the name of Descallar alone
as Jambrich is disqualified to own real
properties in the country. It is sufficiently
established though that the funds used
to buy said properties came solely from
Jambrich, as Descallar has no sufficient
source of income.
1. Having established
that the true buyer of the
disputed properties was
Wilhelm Jambrich, an
Austrian citizen, what is
the effect of registration
of the properties in the
name
of
respondent
Descallar?
2. Whether the sale or
assignment made by
Jambrich to Borromeo is
valid
1. The registration of the properties in question in the name of Descallar does

not make her the owner of the said properties. It is settled that registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of
its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a
source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true
owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. (Borromeo vs. Descallar, ibid.)
2. Given that aliens are disqualified to own real properties in the country,
[t]herefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro
Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been
declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to
petitioner who is a Filipino citizen.
In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian (G.R. No. L-34672,
March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 446), the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a
number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
36

After their relationship turned sour and
the two went their separate ways,
Jambrich sold his rights and interests in
the Agro-Macro properties to Camilo
Borromeo (the petitioner), a Filipino,
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment. When Borromeo, the
buyer, tried to register the properties in
his name, he discovered that it was
registered in the name of Descallar, and
that it had already been mortgaged.
Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery
of real property against Descallar.
Title
Muller v. Muller
Facts
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller
and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany.
Respondent inherited a house in

Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds to
purchase a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal and the construction of a house
on the said lot.
The Antipolo property was registered in

the name of petitioner.
Issues
Whether
or
not
respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the
amount
used
to
purchase the land as
well as the costs for the
construction
of
the
house?
Ruling
No.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of
the national patrimony.
In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held: Under section 1
of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural
37
Due to incompatibilities and

respondents alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated.
Respondent filed a petition for
separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The trial court rendered a decision

which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the
petitioner and respondent. It also
decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage.
With regard to the Antipolo property, the

court held that it was acquired using
paraphernal funds of the respondent.
However, it ruled that respondent
cannot recover his funds because
the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of
the Constitution.
lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional

purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5
is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will

be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may
be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens
may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they
may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes,
factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation
resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the
Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly

admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the
Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition.
His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
Respondent appealed to the Court of

38

Appeals which rendered the assailed
decision modifying the trial courts
Decision. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the
purchase of the Antipolo property, and
not acquisition or transfer of ownership
to him. It also considered petitioners
ownership over the property in trust for
the respondent. As regards the house,
the Court of Appeals ruled that there is
nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the
same.
Villanueva v CA et al.
Eusebia is the legal wife of Nicolas

Retuya. (married on October 7, 1926)
(5 children)
During their marriage, they acquired
real properties in Mandaue City and
Consolacion, Cebu.
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his
legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva. Procopio
Villanueva is their illegitmate son.
Nicolas, then was the only person who
received the income of the subject
properties.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and
resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save
for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation
of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result
in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of
equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the
law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case,
respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.
Whether or not the

subject
properties
acquired
during
the
marriage of Eusebia
Retuya
and
Nicolas
Retuya are conjugal
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as

opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property
which he is not allowed to own.
The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a factual issue. Both the trial and appellate
courts agreed that the subject properties were in fact acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The tax declarations covering the subject
properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias witnesses,
establish this fact. We give due deference to factual findings of trial
courts especially when affirmed by the appellate court. A reversal of this finding
can only occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to doubt its
correctness. Petitioners in the present case have not.
Since the subject properties, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these
are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to
prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption in Article
116, which subsists unless the contrary is proved, stands as an obstacle to any
claim the petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a property is
39

When Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke,
his illegitimate son was the only one
who received the income from the
subject properties.
Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before
the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and
Nicolas
son with Pacita, Procopio
Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from
Nicolas and Pacita several properties
(subject properties), claiming that such
are her conjugal properties with
Nicolas.
exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence
required must be clear and convincing. Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does
not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would be
giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral. What
petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to
the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living
with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of
Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebias
death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved
that any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.
Trial court ruled in favor of Eusebia

Retuya.
Petitioners appealed.
Eusebia died (substituted by heirs)
CA upheld the trial courts decision.
SECTION 2. EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF EACH SPOUSE ( Articles 109-115)

Villegas v Lingan
SECTION 3. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY (Articles 116-120); Article 160 NCC
1. De La Pena v. Antonia De La Pena, who was married
1. Whether or not the
Avila
to Antegono De la Pena, obtained a
CA
erred
in
loan from Aguila Sons and Co.
reversing the RTC
holding the house
As a security for the payment of the
and lot covered by
said loans, Antonia executed a Deed of
TCT No. N-32315
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Aguila
conjugal property of
on their residential lot in Marikina.
the
spouses
Antegono
and
However, Antonia also executed a Deed
1)
No. Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership,[30] proof of acquisition during the marriage is
an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of
the Civil Code, the Dela Peas did not even come close to proving that the
40

of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma
Avila over the same property because
of Antonias failure to pay her obligation
to Aguila.
Antonia Dela Pea;

2.
Whether or not the

CA
erred
in
reversing the RTC
declaring null and
void the Deed of
Absolute
Sale
executed by Antonia
to (Gemma); and
3.
Whether or not the

CA
erred
in
reversing the RTC
holding
(FEBTCBPI)
a
mortgagee/purchas
er in bad faith.
Furthermore, Gemma Avila mortgaged

the same property to Far East Bank and
Trust Company to secure the a loan
from the bank,
Antonia, together with her son, Alvin
John, fled against Gemma Avila a
complaint for annulment of the said
deed of absolute sale.
She claims that the said property was
conjugal property and was sold without
the consent of his husband who already
died by that time. She also invokes the
presumption of Conjugality under Art.
160 of the New Civil Code.
The CA reversed the decision of the

RTC.
3.
Imani v.
MBTC
Munoz v
Ramirez
Respondent-spouses mortgaged a
residential lot (which the wife inherited)
to the GSIS to secure a housing loan
(200k). Thereafter, they used the
money loaned to construct a residential
house
on
said
lot.
It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the
2)
3)
The RTC ruled in favor of Antonia and

upheld the presumption.
2.
subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. Beyond Antonias bare and uncorroborated assertion that the
property was purchased when she was already married. The record is bereft of
any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be
ascertained. When queried about the matter during his cross-examination,
even Alvin admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned
by his parents was Antonias unilateral pronouncement to the effect. Considering
that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing
of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, we find that the CA
cannot be faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonias exclusive
property.
1.
Whether or not
the
subject
property
is
paraphernal or
conjugal?
2.
Was
transaction
Viewed in light of the paraphernal nature of the property, the CA correctly

ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying Antonias 4 November 1997
sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required under
Article 130 of the Family Code.[39] That Antonia treated the realty as her
own exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization
thereof as security for the payment of the loan she borrowed from Aguila.
Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of
non-payment of the mortgage debt. FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well
within its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate mortgage
on the property upon Gemmas failure to pay the loans secured
thereby. Executed on26 November 1997, the mortgage predated
Antonias filing of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Register of Deeds
of Marikina on 3 March 1998 and the annotation of a Notice of Lis
Pendens on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999. The mortgage
directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfilment of the obligation for whose
security it was constitute. When the principal obligation is not paid when
due, the mortgagee consequently has the right to foreclose the mortgage,
sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of
the unpaid loan.
1.
the
PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule, all property acquired during the

marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In
this case, clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father
has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.
Consequently, the residential lot is the wifes exclusive paraphernal
property
(pursuant
to
Article
92
and
109
of
FC).
It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on
41

spouses a 600k loan, which the latter
used to pay the debt to GSIS. The
balance of the loan (400k) will be
delivered by MUNOz upon surrender of
the title over the property and
an affidavit of waiver of rights (over the
property) to be executed by the
husband. While the spouses were able
to turn over the title, no affidavit was
signed by the husband. Consequently,
Calimlim-Canullas. True, respondents were married during the

effectivity of the CC and thus its provisions should govern their property
relations. With the enactment of the FC however, the provisions of the
latter on conjugal partnership of gains superseded those of the CC.
Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and not the CC. And
under Article 120 of the FC (which supersedes Article 158 of the CC),
when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject
to reimbursement for
the
cost
of
improvement.
sale or equitable
mortgage?
MUNOZ refused to give the 400k

balance of the loan and since the
spouses could no longer return the
200k (which was already paid to GSIS),
MUNOZ kept the title over the property
and subsequently, caused the issuance
of a new one in his own name.
In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan
(60k). Thus, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the
residential lot is considerably more than the contribution paid by the
husband. Thus, the property remained the exclusive paraphernal
property of the wife at the time she contracted with MUNOZ; the written
consent of the husband was not necessary.
The spouses then filed a case for the

annulment of the purported sale of the
property in favor of MUNOZ. The RTC
ruled that the property was the wifes
exclusive paraphernal property (since
she inherited it from her father) and as
such, the sale is valid even without the
husbands
consent.
2.
The CA reversed and ruled that while

the property was originally exclusive
paraphernal property of the wife,
it became conjugal property when it
was used as a collateral for a housing
loan that was paid through conjugal
funds. Hence, the sale is void.
4.
5.
MBTC v
Pascual
Ferrer v
Ferrer
Prior to his marriage with Josefa Ferrer,

Alfredo Ferrer owned a real property.
He obtained a loan from the SSS to
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. Under Article 1602 of the CC, a contract is

presumed an equitable mortgage when: (a) price of sale with right to
repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) vendor remains in possession
as lessee or otherwise; (c) upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase, another instrument extending the period of redemption is
executed; (d) purchase retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(e) vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in
any other case it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the
parties is for the transaction to secure the payment of a debt.
In this case, considering that (a) the spouses remained in possession
of the property (albeit as lessees thereof); (b) MUNOZ retained a
portion of the purchase price (200k); (c) it was the spouses who paid
real property taxes on the property; and, (d) it was the wife who secure
the payment of the principal debt with the subject property the
parties clearly intended an equitable mortgage and not a contract of
sale.
Whether or not Josefa

Ferrer is entitled to
reimbursement from the
No. While there is an obligation to reimburse the cost of the improvements, the
obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire
property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the
42

build improvements on the land, but the
loan was paid during their marriage.
Alfredo sold the property to his brother.
After his death, Josefa demanded that
she be reimbursed one half (1/2) of the
value of the improvements and
demanded for such reimbursement
from the brothers of Alfredo who are
now the registered owners.
6.
Pisuena v.
Heirs of
Unating
Petra Unating inherited Lot No. 1201

from her mother. During her marriage
to Aquilino Villar, she registered the lot
in her name. They had two children
Felix and Catalina. In 1948, Petra died.
In 1949, Felix and Catalina sold the
entire lot to Agustin Navarra but
repossessed the same upon the latters
death in 1958. Meanwhile Aquilino died
in 1953.
In 1982, defendant Jessie Pisuena,
son-in-law of Agustin took possession
of the property from the heirs of Felix
and Catalina.
The latter filed a
complaint for its recovery, assailing the
validity of the deed of sale in favor of
Agustin.
The trial court ruled that since the
disputed lot was the conjugal property
of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino
Villar, its purported sale by Felix and
Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra could
be
considered
valid. The
court,
however, ruled that its validity pertained
only to the share of the late Petra
Unating, considering that at the time of
brothers of Alfredo
property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.

Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of
the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement,
the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the ownerspouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement
of the cost of the improvement.
1.
2.
Whether or not
Lot No. 1201 is
conjugal
property
Whether or not
the Deed of
Sale in 1949
transferred the
whole lot in
favor of Agustin
despite the fact
that Aquilino did
not consent to
the sale of his
share
1.
Thus, the finding of the cadastral court that Petra Unating inherited the
lot in question from her mother cannot be dismissed as an obiter, which
is an observation made by the court not necessary to the decision
rendered. The conclusion of the cadastral court was found in the
dispositive portion of its Decision, and it was material to the nature of
Petra Unatings ownership of the lot. Furthermore, it was based on the
evidence presented by the parties and considered by the said court. In
any event, it must be pointed out that the Decision became final a long
time ago, and a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding, or any
other in rem proceeding for that matter, is binding and conclusive upon
the whole world.Therefore, the lot in dispute can properly be
considered as a paraphernal property of Petra Unating.
Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to
be conjugal. However, this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over
the cadastral courts specific finding, reached in adversarial
proceedings, that the lot was inherited by Petra Unating from her
mother. Noteworthy is the fact that the parties do not assail the validity
of the cadastral courts Decision. The 1980 reconstitution of the title to
the lot in the name of Petra Unating, 40 years old, married to Aquilino
Villar, Filipino and resident of Ivisan, Capiz, having inherited said lot
from her mother Margarita Argamaso x x x was notice to the world,
including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that it belonged to Petra
as her paraphernal property. Thus, the words married to were merely
descriptive of Petra Unatings status at the time the lot was awarded
and registered in her name.
43

the sale, Aquilino Villar was still alive. It
likewise held that the respondents, as
heirs of Aquilino Villar, were entitled to
his one-half share in the disputed lot.
2.
The CA affirmed the decision of the

RTC.
No. In 1949, Felix and Catalinas interest in the share of their father is
still inchoate. They cannot dispose such share without the consent of
their father. At most they conveyed only their 2/3 share over the lost.
However, when Aquilino died in 1953 without disposing of his1/3 share,
Felix and Catalinas interest on it was actualized because succession
vested in them the title to their fathers share and consequently, the
entire lot. Thus, the title passed to Agustin pursuant to Art. 1434 of the
present Civil Code, which provides: When a person who is not the
owner of the thing sells or alienates or delivers it, and later, the seller of
grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to
the buyer or grantee.
Section 4. Charges Upon & Oblig. of the Conjugal Partnership (Articles 121 123) See also arts. 73, 111 FC, RA 10572
Title
Corpuz v. Sheriff
Pascual
AM P 11 2972,
Sept. 28, 2011, 658
SCRA 239
Facts
Upon the complaint of Alicia
Panganiban (Panganiban), Criminal
Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 for violations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were
instituted against Juanito Corpuz
(Juanito) before the MTCC. In an
Order1 dated June 16, 2009, the MTCC
approved the Compromise Agreement
wherein Juanito promised to pay
Panganiban the sum of P330,000.00)
and dismissed provisionally Criminal
Case Nos. 2079 to 2082. On January
25, 2010, the MTCC allegedly rendered
a judgment based on the Compromise
Agreement, but there was no copy of
said judgment in the records of this
case. When Juanito failed to comply
with his obligations under the
Compromise Agreement, Panganiban
filed Motions for Execution dated
January 4, 2010 and February 25, 2010
of the MTCC judgment. On March 17,
2010, the MTCC acted favorably on
Panganibans Motions and issued a
Writ of Execution addressed to the
Sheriff of the MTCC of Trece Martires
Issue/s
Whether Sheriff Pascua
is administrably liable for
levying the personal
property of Yolanda.
Held
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that Sheriff Pascua, in
levying upon Yolandas vehicle even though the judgment and writ he was
implementing were against Juanito, then parking the same vehicle at his home
garage, is guilty of simple misconduct. xxx In the instant case, Sheriff Pascua
failed to live up to the standards of conduct for his position.
Despite the undisputed facts that the MTCC Judgment and Writ of Execution in
Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 were against Juanito only, and the Toyota Town
Ace Noah with Plate No. 471 was registered in Yolandas name solely, Sheriff
Pascua proceeded to levy upon the vehicle, invoking the presumption that it was
conjugal property.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties

unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.
The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a
third person. xxx
A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor. The sheriff may be liable for enforcing execution on property
belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no
justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ.
Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal
44

City, with the following decree:
In (sic) the judgment obligor cannot pay
all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode of
payment acceptable to the judgment
obligee, you shall levy upon the
properties of the judgment obligor of
every kind and nature whatsoever
which may be disposed of for value
and not otherwise exempt for
execution, giving the latter, the option
to immediately choose which property
may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy
the judgment. If the judgment obligor
does not exercise the option, you shall
first levy on the personal properties of
any and then on the real properties.
On June 2, 2010, Sheriff Pascua
demanded that Yolanda surrender the
Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No.
471, which was registered in Yolandas
name, threatening to damage the said
vehicle if Yolanda would refuse to do
so. Sheriff Pascua tried to forcibly open
the vehicle. Yolanda surrendered the
key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua, but
she did not sign any document which
Sheriff Pascua asked her to sign.
Offended, humiliated, and
embarrassed, Yolanda was compelled
to file the present administrative
complaint against Sheriff Pascua. In
addition to the aforementioned incident
on June 2, 2010, Yolanda alleged in her
complaint that Sheriff Pascua kept
possession of the vehicle and even
used the same on several occasions
for his personal use. xxx Yolanda also
claimed that her vehicle was illegally
confiscated or levied upon by Sheriff
Pascua because the Writ of Execution,
property of Juanito and Yolanda. Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
the wife." However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must
first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the
property was acquired is material.20 There is no such proof in the records of the
present case.
Sheriff Pascuas assertions of diligence do not exculpate him from administrative
liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already discovered that the vehicle was
registered in Yolandas name only. This fact should have already prompted
Sheriff Pascua to gather more information, such as when Juanito and Yolanda
were married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle, which, in turn, would
have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could already presume that the
said vehicle is conjugal property.
xxx In this case, Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules.
Without giving Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under the
MTCC judgment in cash, certified bank check, or any other mode of payment
acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose which of his property may be levied upon
to satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon the vehicle
that belonged to Juanitos wife, Yolanda.
xxx The courts lack of storage facility to house the attached properties is no
justification. Respondent sheriff could have deposited the same in a bonded
warehouse or could have sought prior authorization from the court that issued the
writ of execution.
45

which Sheriff Pascua was
implementing, was issued against
Juanito, Yolandas husband. Yolanda
further pointed out that Sheriff Pascua
has not yet posted the notice of sale of
personal property, as required by Rule
39, Section 15 of the Rules of Court.
Ros v. PNB Laoag Br.
GR#170166, Apr. 06,
2011, 647 SCRA 334
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A.

Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a
complaint for the annulment of the Real
Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against
PNB, Laoag Branch before the Court of
First Instance.
Plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a
loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag
Branch on October 14, 1974 and as
security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee
Ros executed a real estate mortgage
involving a parcel of land, with all the
improvements thereon.
Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate
of Sale was issued in favor of PNB,
Laoag as the highest bidder.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee
Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of
the loan obtained by her husband nor
she consented to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property a
complaint was filed to annul the
proceedings pertaining to the
mortgage, sale and consolidation of the
property interposing the defense that
Whether or not the loan

contracted by husband
Joe A. Ros with
respondent Philippine
National Bank Laoag
redounded to the benefit
of his family, aside from
the fact that such had not
been raised by
respondent in its appeal.
The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The subject
property is thus considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains. Art. 153,
160, 161, 166 and 173 of the Civil code applies in the instant case.
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and
Aguetes marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the
subject property was acquired in 1968. There is also no doubt that Ros
encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23
October 1974. PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her
signature, consented to Ros mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the
other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies
affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the
contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros
encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not
guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment
will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the
present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete
gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of the subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public,
hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and
certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof,
the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of
the instrument or document involved. xxx Petitioners did not present any
corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively
declare that Aguetes signatures were really forged.
xxx Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before the
courts with unclean hands.1avvphi1 In their memorandum before the trial court,
petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged Aguetes signatures.
Joe A. Ros in legal effect admitted in the complaint that the signatures of his wife
in the questioned documents are forged, incriminating himself to criminal
prosecution. If he were alive today, he would be prosecuted for forgery. This
strengthens the testimony of his wife that her signatures on the questioned
documents are not hers.
46

her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the
loan did not redound to the benefit of
the family.
Buado v. CA
GR#145222, Apr. 24,
2009, 586 SCRA 397
Spouses Buado filed a complaint for

damages against Erlinda Nicol with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite,
which originated from Erlinda Nicols
civil liability arising from the criminal
offense of slander filed against her by
petitioners. RTC rendered a decision
ordering Erlinda to pay damages. It
became final and executory and later
on issued a writ of execution. Finding
Erlinda Nicols personal properties
insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the
Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy
on real property on execution
addressed to the Register of Deeds of
Cavite. Eventually, a notice of sheriffs
sale was issued. The auction sale
proceeded with petitioners as the
Whether the husband of

the judgment debtor may
file an independent
action to protect the
conjugal property subject
to execution.
Is the husband, who was
not a party to the suit but
whose conjugal property
is being executed on
account of the other
spouse being the
judgment obligor,
considered a "stranger?"
Whether the obligation of
the judgment debtor
redounded to the benefit
In filing the complaint, it must have been a remorse of conscience for having
wronged his family.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for
additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco."In her
testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to
be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by
Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the money." Debts contracted by the
husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he
contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and
private debts.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from
the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
For this reason, we rule that Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of
the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime orquasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of
the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal
partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make
advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, the civil
obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda did not redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have
accrued to the conjugal partnership.17
In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the third-party claim of the wife is
proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on
the conjugal property but on his separate property.
47

highest bidder.
A certificate of sale
was issued in favor of petitioners.
of the conjugal
partnership or not.
Almost a year later, Romulo Nicol, the

husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a
complaint for annulment of certificate of
sale and damages with preliminary
injunction against petitioners and the
deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff
therein, alleged that the defendants,
now petitioners, connived and directly
levied upon and execute his real
property
without
exhausting
the
personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.
Respondent averred that there was no
proper publication and posting of the
notice
of
sale.
Furthermore,
respondent claimed that his property
which was valued at P500,000.00 was
only sold at a very low price of
P51,685.00, whereas the judgment
obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only
P40,000.00.
SBTC v. Mar Tierra
Corp
GR# 143382, Nov. 29,
2006, 508 SCRA 419
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation,

through its president, Wilfrido C.
Martinez, applied for a P14,000,000
credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company.
Petitioner approved the application and
entered into a credit line agreement
with respondent corporation. It was
secured by an indemnity agreement
executed by individual respondents
Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson
and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound
themselves jointly and severally with
respondent corporation for the payment
of the loan.
On September 25, 1981, respondent
corporation availed of its credit line and
Whether or not the

conjugal partnership may
be held liable for an
indemnity agreement
entered into by the
husband to
accommodate a third
party.
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code,8 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." But when are debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal
partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into
by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said
provision?
We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia9 that, in acting
as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled
that xxx where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family
business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity
and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by
itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for
48
Ching vs. CA
GR# 124642, Feb. 23,
2004, 423 SCRA 356
received the sum of P9,952,000 but

was only able to pay P4,648,000 for the
principal loan and P2,729,195.56 for
the interest and other charges.
Respondent corporation was not able
to pay the balance as it suffered
business reversals.
Unable to collect the balance of the
loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a
sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against
respondent corporation and individual
respondents in the Regional Trial
Court.
On August 10, 1982, the RTC issued a
writ of attachment on all real and
personal properties of respondent
corporation and individual respondent
Martinez. As a consequence, the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses
Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez in Barrio
Calaanan, Caloocan City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
49158 was levied on.
The RTC and CA found that the
obligation contracted by individual
respondent Martinez did not redound to
the benefit of his family, hence, it
ordered the lifting of the attachment on
the conjugal house and lot of the
spouses Martinez.
Philippine Blooming Mills Company,
Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan
ofP9,000,000.00 from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue
of this loan, the PBMCI, through its
Executive Vice-President Alfredo
Ching, executed a promissory note for
the said amount promising to pay on
December 22, 1978 at an interest rate
of 14% per annum. As added security
the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. xxx Proof
must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the
husband to accommodate a third party.
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner
and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The
accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was
similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It
failed to discharge that burden.
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband
alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well
being of the family as a unit.15 The underlying concern of the law is the
conservation of the conjugal partnership.16 Hence, it limits the liability of the
conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
a) Whether the petitionerwife has the right to file

the motion to quash the
levy on attachment on
the 100,000 shares of
stocks in the Citycorp
Investment Philippines;
(b) whether or not the
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had
the right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No.
142729.[48]
xxx
In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on
attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband
claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable
49

for the said loan, on September 28,
1978, Alfredo Ching, together with
Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua,
executed a continuing guaranty with
the ABC binding themselves to jointly
and severally guarantee the payment of
all the PBMCI obligations owing the
ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00.
On December 28, 1979, the ABC
extended another loan to the PBMCI in
the amount ofP13,000,000.00 payable
in eighteen months at 16% interest per
annum. As in the previous loan, the
PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching,
executed a promissory note to
evidence the loan maturing on June 29,
1981.
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all
its loans, hence ABC filed a complaint
for sum of money with prayer for a writ
of preliminary attachment against the
PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88
exclusive of interests, penalties and
other bank charges. Impleaded as codefendants in the complaint were
Alfredo Ching, Emilio Taedo and
Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as
sureties of the PBMCI.
RTC committed a grave

abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in
issuing
the
assailed
orders.
for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for
said relief.
On the second issue, it was incumbent upon the private respondent to
adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the RTC acted whimsically in total
disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of, the controversy before
certiorari will lie. xxx
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired
during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v.
Court of Appeals,[53] we held that it is not even necessary to prove that the
properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties
were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be
conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were
acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will
still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same.[54]
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the
100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to
and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when
the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during
the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks
are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the
petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitionerhusband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. xxx
Instead of fortifying the contention of the respondents, the ruling of this
Court in Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court [59] buttresses the case for the
petitioners. In that case, we ruled that he who claims that property acquired by
the spouses during their marriage is not conjugal partnership property but
belongs to one of them as his personal property is burdened to prove the source
of the money utilized to purchase the same. xxx In this case, it was the burden of
the private respondent to prove that the source of the money utilized in the
acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the petitioner-husband alone. As
held by the trial court, the private respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove
50

this assertion.
xxx
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3] [60] of the
Family Code of the Philippines) provides:The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement as security for the payment of the loan obtained by the PBMCI from
the private respondent in the amount of P38,000,000. In Ayala Investment and
Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court ruled that the signing as
surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not
embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was
persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to
mean that he thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain
to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to
the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability
that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of
the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being
of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume
unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal
partnership.[62]
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal
partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of
executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the
private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No
presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband
entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened
to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.[63]
xxx The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They
51

cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.[64]
Carlos vs. Abelardo

GR# 146504, Apr. 09,
2002, 380 SCRA 361
(1) There was a check in the amount of

US$25,000.00 issued by petitioner; (2)
this amount was received by
respondent and his wife and given to a
certain Pura Vallejo for the full payment
of a house and lot located at #19952
Chestnut Street, Executive Heights
Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila; (3)
this house and lot became the conjugal
dwelling of respondent and his wife;
and (4) respondents wife executed an
instrument acknowledging the loan but
which respondent did not sign.
To prove his claim that the amount was
in the nature of a loan or an advance
he extended to respondent and his
wife, petitioner presented Bankers
Trust Check No. 337 in the amount of
US$25,000.00 he issued on October
31, 1989 to Pura Vallejo. He also
introduced in evidence an instrument
executed by respondents wife on July
31, 1991 acknowledging her and her
husbands accountability to petitioner
for the said amount which was
advanced in payment of a house and
lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street,
Executive Heights Subdivision,
Paranaque.
Respondent tried to rebut petitioners
evidence by claiming that the
US$25,000.00 was not a loan but his
share in the profits of H.L. Carlos
Construction. He alleged that he
Whether or not
the court of
appeals erred in
finding
insufficient
evidence to
prove that the
amount of
us$25,000.00
was a loan
obtained by
private
respondent and
his wife from
petitioner.
Whether or not
the court of
appeals erred in
holding that the
us$25,000.00
was given as
private
respondents
share in the
profits of h.l.
carlos
construction,
inc. And that the
filing of the
complaint is a
hoax.
This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or
receives services to be used for his own business or profession. In
the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one within the term
obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
All the checks presented by respondent, which he claims to be his share in the
profits of petitioners company, were all in the account of H.L. Carlos
Construction.17 On the other hand, the Bankers Trust Check in the amount of
US$25,000.00 was drawn from the personal account of petitioner.18Assuming to
be true that the checks presented by respondent were his profits from the
corporation, then all the more does this prove that the amount of US$25,000.00
was not part of such profits because it was issued by petitioner from his own
account. Indeed, if such amount was respondents share of the profits, then the
same should have been issued under the account of H.L. Carlos Construction.
Moreover, respondent failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the
profits and income of the corporation. xxx
We quote with favor the disquisition of the trial court on this point:
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged
to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit
of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00
was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the
same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the
same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife
binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit
of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and
severally liable in the payment of the loan.
Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US
$25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the
corporation and not as a loan. Firstly, xxx he has no right to participate in
the income or profits thereof. xxx Secondly, the amount advanced for the
purchase of the house and lot came from the personal account of the
plaintiff. If, indeed, it was to be construed as defendant-husbands share in
the profits of the corporation, the checks should come from the
corporations account and not from the plaintiffs personal account xxx.
Even granting that the checks amount to US $3,000.000.00 given by the
plaintiff to the defendant-spouses was their share in the profits of the
corporation, still there is no sufficient evidence to establish that the US
$25,000.00 is to be treated similarly. xxx Article 1278 of the Civil Code
52

received money from petitioner
amounting to almost P3 million as his
share in the profits of the corporation.
provides that compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own
right, are debtors and creditors of each other. As its indicates,
compensation is a sort of balancing between two obligations. In the instant
case, the plaintiff and the defendant-husband are not debtors and creditors
of each other. Even granting that the defendant-husbands claim to the
profits of the corporation is justified, still compensation cannot extinguish
his loan obligation to the plaintiff because under such assumption, the
defendant is dealing with the corporation and not with the plaintiff in his
personal capacity. Hence, compensation cannot take place.
xxx
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the
Family Code:
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
xxx
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
xxx
While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and
signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family
because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal
home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of
consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily
liable for such loan together with his wife.
We also find sufficient basis for the award of damages to petitioner, contrary to
the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is not entitled thereto.
Petitioners allegations of verbal and written threats directed against him by
respondent is duly supported by evidence on record. He presented two
53

witnesses, Irineo Pajarin and Randy Rosal, who testified on separate incidents
where threats were made by respondent against petitioner.
Xxx The letter recounted the instances when threats were made by her husband
against petitioner, particularly, the incident reported by Pajarin and the threats
made by respondent through the telephone. xxx
AIDC. vs. CA
GR#118305, Feb. 12,
1998, 286 SCRA 272
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM)

obtained a loan from Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC).
As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP
of PBM, executed security agreements
making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBM's indebtedness
to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC
filed a case for sum of money against
PBM and Alfredo Ching. After trial, the
court rendered judgment ordering PBM
and Alfredo Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal
amount of P50,300,000.00 with
interests. Pending appeal and upon
motion of AIDC, the lower court issued
a writ of execution and the Deputy
Sheriff caused the issuance and
service upon spouses Ching of a notice
of sheriff sale on three (3) of their
conjugal properties. Spouses Ching
filed a case of injunction to enjoin the
auction sale alleging that the judgment
cannot be enforced against the
conjugal partnership levied on the
ground that, among others, the subject
loan did not redound to the benefit of
the said conjugal partnership.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the
conjugal partnership of gains of
spouses Ching is not liable for the
payment of the debts secured by the
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the

terms redounded to the benefit of or benefited from on the one hand; and for
the benefit of on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1)
of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e.,
both use the term for the benefit of. On the other hand, Article 122 of the
Family Code provides that The payment of personal debts by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. As can
be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
xxx
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the
following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term x x x x obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough
that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business
or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or
profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and
rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot,
by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety
or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the
54

husband Alfredo Ching.
conjugal partnership.
Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that of the
three other companion cases, on the one hand, and that of Ansaldo, Liberty
Insurance and Luzon Surety, is that in the former, the husband contracted the
obligation for his own business; while in the latter, the husband merely acted as a
surety for the loan contracted by another for the latters business.
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo
Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of
PBM. Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Chings
acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
reason for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent court:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitionersappellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a personality distinct and
separate from the family of petitioners-appellees - this despite the
fact that the members of the said family happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity.
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditorparty litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondentappellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by
appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains. What is apparent from the facts of the case is that the
judgment debt was contracted by or in the name of the Corporation
Philippine Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only signed as
surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and respondentappellants right of recourse against appellee-husband as surety is
only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend
to the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of petitionersappellees. x x x
x x x. [17]
The conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement
which was clearly for the benefit of a third party. xxx No actual benefits of the
family need be proved in some cases.
xxx
55

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family
would reasonably anticipate were the following:
(a)
The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would be
prolonged and he would be entitled to his monthly salary
of P20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the loan he
guaranteed;
(b)
The shares of stock of the members of his family would
appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated through the loan
obtained;
(c)
His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his
career would be boosted should PBM survive because of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil
Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot
merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband,[18] we
underscored the requirement that: there must be the requisite showing x x x of
some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses or
benefits to his family or that such obligations are productive of some benefit to
the family.
xxx the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the
spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the
measure of the partnerships liability is to the extent that the family is benefited.[
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of
the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey
gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. Thus, when co-respondent Alfredo
Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then on, definitely put in peril the
conjugal property (in this case, including the family home) and placed it in danger
of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.
xxx
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require
the signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that being
a surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed to have
acted for the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
56

marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent
that they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of
the family.
57

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Civil Law Review I: Atty.

Whether or not a decision

No. It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

Angelita married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,

Whether or not a decision

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

Teodorico and respondent Marietta was

Whether or not a judicial

Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision

1Kontinalang James bond nahahaha

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

On 5 August 1988, Gregorio Nolasco filed a

Respondent further testified that his efforts to

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the

Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare

TITLE II. Legal Separation (Articles 55-67)

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

Brigido and Rita tied the marital knot on

Whether or not a spouse

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

impaired if the provisions of the Family Code

William argues that: (1) that he did commit

Whether or not the

Whether or not a wife

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

In April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter

Dependent. The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is

Consequently, SSS stop the payment of

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer

Whether or not an action

No. Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

An action for legal

Court assailing the following decisions of the

held to be final (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of

Petitioner prays that, in the event that we do

Title II. LEGAL SEPARATION

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

contention of the instant complaint against

of the law for solemnizing

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

Pacete vs. Carriaga

On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed

ground for exemption from marriage license.

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

As a member of our diplomatic service

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

Title III. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND & WIFE

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and

Whether or not a wife may

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, filed a

deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi

each other. We agree.

No less than the

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to

Civil Law Review I: Atty. Legaspi