Civil Law Reviewer Cases IV

Civil Law Review 1: Atty.
Legaspi
CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 175-176); RA 9255
Title
1. Grande v.
Antonio
GR# 206248,
Feb. 18, 2014,
716 SCRA 698
In relation to:
Title XIII. USE OF
SURNAMES
(Articles 364380, NCC)
RA 9255 An
Act Allowing
Illegitimate
Children to Use
the Surname of
their Father
(Amending Art.
176 of the Family
Code); IRR of
9255; Passport
Law (RA 8239)
Facts
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio
Antonio for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else. Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on
February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October
13, 1999). The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record
of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. Grande
left for the United States with her two children in
May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file
a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, appending a
notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of
Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio,
ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming
that the best interest of the children can be
promoted if they are under the sole parental
authority and physical custody of [respondent
Antonio]." Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA
attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and
jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody
to the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In
resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in
part the Decision of the RTC.
Petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of
the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the
minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was
denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present
Issue/s
The sole issue at
hand is the right of
a father to compel
the use of his
surname by his
illegitimate children
upon his recognition
of their filiation.
Held
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code,
originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now
reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname
of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent xxx wanted: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens
surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is
given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
xxx Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the
surname to that of respondent? Clearly, there is none. xxx
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the
Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No.
(RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive
languagemay not be invoked by a father to
compel the use by his illegitimate children of his
surname without the consent of their mother.
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
xxx On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where
there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word
"may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child
is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The
word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies
affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of
childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that
the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In
Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to
continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate
father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent
her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in
Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child
concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames
of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs
surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the
best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the
choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would
best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. xxx
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed
of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After
hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the
evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her
in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification
of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of
2. Salas v.
Whether the trial
the fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255. xxx
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. xxx Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic
law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance
an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
xxx This Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down
and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution. xxx
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the
IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their fathers surname upon the latters recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls,
and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they
will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these
letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not
provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the
children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
xxx
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children; b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week,
and may only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]: c.
The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at
the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and d. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the
sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation

Matusalem
GR 180284, Sept.
11, 2013, 705
SCRA 560
and appellate
courts erred in
ruling that
respondents
evidence sufficiently
proved that her son
Christian Paulo is
the illegitimate child
of petitioner.
may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit A-1) of
Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father
but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled
up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was
petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that
the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if
the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity.26Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a
public instrument27 and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the
alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also
indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the childs paternity.30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten
notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and
respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
xxx
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a
clear admission that he is the father of private respondents daughter and
were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence
which established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the
father of private respondents daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court
of Appeals, the Court sustained the appellate courts finding that private
respondents evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner
was overwhelming, particularly the latters public acknowledgment of his
amorous relationship with private respondents mother, and private
respondent as his own child through acts and words, her testimonial
evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary evidence. The
Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous
possession of status of a spurious child.
xxx
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by

any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the
totality of respondents evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the
father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the
birth of Christian Paulo, petitioners financial support while respondent lived
in Murillos apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment,
though replete with details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial presented in Ilano. xxx
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by
themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of
respondents evidence failed to establish Christian Paulos filiation to
petitioner.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required
to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioners counsel
informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was
still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have
also held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action
commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
3. Uy v. Chua
GR 183965, Sept.
18, 2009, 600
SCRA 806
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent,

who was then married, had an illicit relationship with
Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had
two children, namely, petitioner and her brother,
Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter
was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and
instructed that petitioners birth certificate be filled
out with the following names: "ALFREDO F.
SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as
mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name
of Irenes father, and Ducay was the maiden
surname of Irenes mother. Respondent financially
supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had
consistently and regularly given petitioner
allowances before she got married. Petitioner and
Allan were introduced to each other and became
known in the Chinese community as respondents
In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9
December 2003, respondent denied that he had an
illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was
his daughter. Xxx Subsequently, on 27 March 2008,
respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence5 on the
ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of
RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB
had already been barred by res judicata in Special
Whether the
Compromise
Agreement entered
into between
petitioner and
respondent, duly
approved by RTCBranch 9 in its
Decision dated 21
February 2000 in
Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB,
constitutes res
judicata in Special
Proceeding No.
12562-CEB still
pending before
RTC-Branch 24.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal

concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.18 In
Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,19 the Court pronounced that a
judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
xxx Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null
and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It
produces no legal effect at all.
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of
the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1)
The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The
jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, xxx
obviously intended to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation,
i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children
of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00
each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said
Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future
support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently,
the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
In Advincula v. Advincula, this Court declared that although Civil Case No.
3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela

Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003,
petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against
respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9.
Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a
Compromise Agreement.
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner
and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830CEB, intended to settle the question of petitioners
status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that
they are not the children of respondent, respondent
would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each.
4. De La Cruz v.
Gracia
GR 177728, July
31, 2009, 594
SCRA 648
In 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan

Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques
parents.
Whether or not the

unsigned
handwritten
statement of the
deceased father of
minor Christian
of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case
No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil
status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no
compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the
lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is
for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.23
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The
void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
xxx RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to
grant the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow
itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article
2035 of the Civil Code. xxx
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not
barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in
its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
petitioner and respondents Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to
law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February
2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having
been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have attained
finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise
Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to
law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be
appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch
24 is only reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary
value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to
the RTC-Branch 24 for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings
No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for respondents presentation of evidence.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public
or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After
almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie,
who continued to live with Dominiques parents,
gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino".
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth,
using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office
of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of
which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live
Birth,2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father3 (AUSF) which she had executed and
signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed
by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino.Both
affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime
of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged
his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had
never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF
a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which
Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting.
By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil
Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent),denied Jenies application for
registration of the childs name.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for
injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City.
They maintained that the Autobiography executed
by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity
in a "private handwritten instrument" within the
contemplation of the Article 176 of the Family Code.
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the
author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same
does not contain any express recognition of
paternity.Hence, this direct resort to the Court via
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Dela Cruz can be

considered as a
recognition of
paternity in a
"private handwritten
instrument" within
the contemplation
of article 176 of the
family code, as
amended by RA
9255, which entitles
the said minor to
use his fathers
surname.
paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.19

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state
that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity
must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read
in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that
recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signedby the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written
instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of
the Family Code. xxx
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that
Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies
the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the
relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by
Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence
Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his
brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by
the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his
statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MYWIFE" as
"WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
xxx
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections
of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,

death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation
or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the
witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as
evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, xxx under Article 278 of the
New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative
father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. xxx
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in
Dominiques Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken
together with the other relevant facts extant herein xxx they sufficiently
establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to
adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece
of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by
other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount
consideration" in resolving questions affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic xxx.
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate

children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development."xxx
6. People v.
Magtibay
GR# 142985,
Aug. 06, 2002,
386 SCRA 332
On September 15, 1997, at about 8:00 p.m.,

Rachelle went to the store, about 40 meters from
their house. When she got to the store, she saw
accused-appellant standing there. She noticed that
the latter kept staring at her.
On her way home, accused-appellant
approached her and pulled her right hand. He
covered her mouth and told her that he will kill her if
she tried to shout for help. Accused-appellant raped
Rachel.
Because of accused-appellants threat on her
life, Rachelle kept silent about the incident. It was
not until she became pregnant that she was
constrained to tell her mother what happened. She
eventually gave birth to a baby boy.
On August 5, 1999, the trial court sentenced
accused- appellant to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, together with the
accessory penalty provided by law and to pay the
cost. Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the
victim Rachelle Recto the amount of P50,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment.
Whether or not
the accusedappellant should
be ordered to
indemnify and
support the
victims child.
The record shows that when Rachelles mother, Gaudiosa Recto,

discovered about her ordeal, Rachelle was already eight months pregnant.
[37]
She eventually gave birth to a baby boy.[38] These facts confirm the
commission of rape sometime in September 1997. There was no showing
that Rachelle has previously been sexually abused or she had sexual
relations with other men during that time. Thus, with respect to the
acknowledgment and support of the child born out of rape our recent ruling
in People v. Justiniano Glabo[39] states:
Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article
345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that
may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of
the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in
every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code,
the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by
legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code
upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion
perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no further
positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs
status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and
support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall
be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance
with Article 201 of the Family Code.
7. Tonog vs. CA
GR# 122906,
Feb. 07, 2002,
376 SCRA 523
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B.

Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar
V. Daguimol. They lived with private respondents
parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon
City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome
addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner
left for the United States of America where she
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the

welfare and well-being of the child.[5] In arriving at its decision as to whom
custody of the minor should be given, the court must take into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending
parents
In turn, the parents right to custody over their children is enshrined in
law. Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals
exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled,
among other rights, to keep them in their company. xxx. We explained this
10
found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was

left in the care of her father (private respondent
herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed
a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith.
OnMarch 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment
appointing private respondent as legal guardian of
the minor, Gardin Faith.
Petitioner filed a petition for relief from
judgment. In a related incident, petitioner filed
on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of
Gardin Faith to her.
On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued a
resolution denying private respondents motion for
reconsideration and granting petitioners motion for
custody of their child, Gardin.
Due to the adverse turn of events, private
respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35971, questioning the actuations of the trial
court. On March 21, 1995, the appellate court
dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of
merit. However, after private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, the appellate court
issued
a
Resolution[3] dated August
29,
1995 modifying its decision granting custody of the
child to respondent. Petitioner thus interposed the
instant appeal after the appellate court denied her
motion
for
reconsideration
in
its
Resolution[4] dated November 29, 1995.
in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals: [7]

The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the
juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection
of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latters
needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents
for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as
well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and
senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for
the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to
a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation
is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
xxx Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides
that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be
observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the
mother. xxx As explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a
mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good
of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to
be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any
effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.[8]
11
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in
the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both
parents complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic
care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental,
social and spiritual needs of the child.[9] Neither does the law nor
jurisprudence intend to downplay a fathers sense of loss when he is
separated from his child xxx.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of
her child who is below seven years of age for compelling reasons.
Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years
of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound
by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the
childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which
instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third
person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on
the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the
proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated,
and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody
of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody
over her. xxx
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of
fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial
court.[13] It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule
only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the
parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet
another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith,
has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference
and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have
the custody over her person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to
12
imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to

the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. xxx It shall be only understood
that xxx temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with private
respondent pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-9211053
8. Aruego v. CA
GR# 112193, Mar.
13, 1996, 254
SCRA 711
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for

Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors,
private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her
alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their
mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian.
Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr.
and the five (5) minor children of the deceased
Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and
natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the
petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late
Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an
amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime
in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of
this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and
Evelyn F. Aruego. The complaint prayed for an
Order praying that herein private respondent and
Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that herein
petitioners be compelled to recognize and
acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and
participation in the estate of their deceased father
be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory
recognition is their alleged open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children as
stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint.
Should the
provisions of the
Family Code be
applied in the
instant case? As a
corollary Will the
application of the
Family Code in this
case prejudice or
impair any vested
right of the private
respondent such
that it should not be
given retroactive
effect in this
particular case?
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the
regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We
herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of
the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.[7] where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it
and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with
the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced
or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application

to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of
private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she
represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the
provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought
by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the
Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by
Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be
given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her
case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her
by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
13
Petitioners denied all these allegations.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment
declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of
Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian, but not Evelyn
Fabian. And granting Antonia Aruego a share equal
to portion of share of the legitimate children of
Jose Aruego
Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative
father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor
when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285
of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the
case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same
despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of
the Philippines. xxx
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial

Reconsideration of the decision but was denied.
9. David vs. CA
GR# 111180, Nov.
16,1995, 250
SCRA 82
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with

prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed
by herein petitioners before respondent Court of
Appeals, the petition was dismissed and so was the
Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman
in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married
man and the father of four children. After a while,
the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a
result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on
March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed
by two Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy
Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private
respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J,
to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City
sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's
legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought
by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip,
Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he
Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of
the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the
parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from
each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation. For example, in the case ofSalvaa v. Gaela, 1 it was held that the
writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a
third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to
marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of
his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of
the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother,
the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to
have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her
rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother
14

had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family
Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of Christopher J. After hearing, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City,
rendered a decision, in favor of the petitioner and
against the respondent granting the rightful custody
of the minor Christopher J. T. David to the natural
mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the
respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in
a habeas corpus case. Daisie in turn, filed this
petition for review.
who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child
and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him
custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving
petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has
been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. xxx It
is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to
support her children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary
support to petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing
of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any
support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of
P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. xxx
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose,
the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent
has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment
of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the
child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support
can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to
support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being
less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the
RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is
over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be
upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and
here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child. xxx
CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN (Articles 177-182); RA 9858

Title
1. De Santos vs.
Facts
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married
Issue/s
Whether or not only
Held
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states: Only natural children can be
15

Angeles
GR# 105619 Dec.
12, 1995, 251
5CRA 206
Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a

daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de
Santos. Antonio fell in love with Conchita Talag,
private respondent herein. Antonio obtained a
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry
private respondent, with whom he had been
cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia.
This union produced eleven children. On March 30,
1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month
later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private
respondent contracted a marriage celebrated under
Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died
intestate.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to
court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the
settlement of her late husband's estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was
survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself,
their ten surviving children, and petitioner.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings,
however, petitioner decided to intervene. She
argued inter alia that private respondent's children
were illegitimate. This was challenged by private
respondent although the latter admitted during the
hearing that all her children were born prior to
Sofia's death in 1967.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private
respondent's account of her administration, the
court a quopassed upon petitioner's motion. The
court declared private respondent's ten children
legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared
them, along with petitioner and private respondent,
as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but
this was denied in the court's order dated January 9,
1992.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on
June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural
natural children can

be legitimized and
the trial court
mistakenly declared
as legitimated her
half brothers and
sisters.
legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry
each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private
respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when
the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. xxx
It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading
of "Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children,"
Article 89, a provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals
principally with void and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of
said marriages on their offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate
children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from
the beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they
are classified as "acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the
same status, rights and obligations as such kind of children. In the case at
bench, the marriage under question is considered "void from the beginning"
because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still
subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be
considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their
parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of
a prior subsisting marriage.
What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children
proper (those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other")? xxx In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was
invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly
not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269 but by
fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and,
consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter. xxx
Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the
basis of rights granted by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing
the substantive provisions of the law in force.
Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the
new provisions of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid on
the classification of children vis-a-vis their parents, and the corresponding
rights they are entitled to under the law. xxx The well-ordered delineation of
such distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part
of the framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize and separate one from
16

children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly
declared as legitimated her half brothers and
sisters.
the other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the substantive rights

accruing to the different categories of children.
xxx On the whole, the status of a marriage determines in large part the
filiation of its resultant issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is
legitimate, while one born outside of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the
latter's parents were, at the time of the child's conception, not legally barred
from marrying each other and subsequently do so, the child's filiation
improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child eventually
enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy. Without such
marriage, the natural child's rights depend on whether he is acknowledged or
recognized by his parents, but he does not rise to the level of a legitimate
child in the manner that the legitimated child does.
A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is
declared a nullity is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it is
the law which accords him the rights of an acknowledged natural child.
Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or
derisively denominated as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins. There
is no marriage valid or otherwise which would give any semblance of
legality to the child's existence. Nothing links child to parent aside from the
information appearing in the birth certificate. When such child is recognized
by one or both parents, he acquires certain rights nowhere approaching
those of his legitimate counterparts.
The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed
by children, depending on their filiation: use of surname, succession, and
support.
Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. 2 Thus,
they "shall principally use the surname of the father," 3 and shall be entitled to
support from their legitimate ascendants and descendants, 4 as well as to a
legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents, 5 and
to other successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights
as effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced." 6
Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal
fiction shall principally use the surname of the father. 7 If a natural child is
recognized by only one parent, the child shall follow the surname of such
recognizing parent. 8 Both types of children are entitled to receive support
from the parent recognizing them. 9 They also cannot be deprived of their
legitime equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate
children or descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the free
disposable portion of the latter's estate. 10
Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in
17

their minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally,
take the latter's surname. 11 The only support which they are entitled to is
from the recognizing parent, 12 and their legitime, also to be taken from the
free portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural
child or two-fifths that of each legitimate child. 13
It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly
secured by law, 14 the legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as it
is from the free portion of the hereditary estate which the child shares with
the surviving spouse, may be reduced if it should exceed said portion. 15
Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above
mentioned. 16
These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a
legitimated child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to
legitimate children, a natural child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to
which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his hereditary
rights are concerned.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that
petitioner's half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized,
for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of
legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within the meaning of Article
269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that they be
legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed by acknowledged
natural children.
It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged
natural children and, therefore, by the same token, to natural children by
legal fiction. xxx
Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege,
available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although
natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged
natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that,
therefore, they likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not
necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the legally existing marriage
between the children's father and his estranged first wife effectively barred a
"subsequent marriage" between their parents.
The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring of the
second union affected by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of
a valid marriage between her widower and his ostensible second wife?
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. xxx
Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children
as defined thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to
18
2. Abadilla vs.
Tabiliran, Jr
A.M No. MTJ-92716., Oct. 25,
1999, 249 SCRA
447
The herein administrative case arose from a

complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma.
Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the
sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of
the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged
with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and
corruption unbecoming of a judge."
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in
respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part
of the respondent, contends that respondent had
scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain
Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his
legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
Respondent contracted marriage with the said
Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant
claims that this was a bigamous union because of
the fact that the respondent was then still very much
married to Teresita Banzuela.
Furthermore, respondent falsely represented
Whether or not
respondent is
culpable for gross
immorality for
scandalously and
openly cohabiting
with Priscilla
Baybayan.
exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of
the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be
legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of
acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As
has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to
be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at
bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be
reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on
par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share.
xxx The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the
corresponding gradation of their rights may conceivably be shattered by
elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate
children to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would
otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their union with a valid
marriage.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided
under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now
recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural
children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
We hold the respondent culpable for gross immorality, he having
scandalously and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla Baybayan during
the existence of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran.
xxx it appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly
living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that
he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all
surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on
September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975.
Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived
together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and
subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of
the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be
considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be
invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran
left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that
respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years
had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B.
Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of
cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B.
19

himself as "single" in the marriage contract and
dispensed with the requirements of a marriage
contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for
five years.
Earlier, respondent's wife filed a complaint in the
case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood
charged therein for abandoning the family home
and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with
whom he had a son.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct,
complainant claims that respondent caused to be
registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate
children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing
separate affidavits stating that the delayed
registration was due to inadvertence, excusable
negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact,
respondent knew that these children cannot be
legally registered as legitimate.
Respondent declared that his cohabitation with
Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous
nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla
Baybayan only after his first wife had already left
and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since
then, and until the present her whereabouts is not
known and respondent has had no news of her
being alive. He further avers that 25 years had
already elapsed since the disappearance of his first
wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.
Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code in order to
show the legality of his acts: After the absence of
seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all
purposes except for those of succession. (Rule 131,
Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.)
The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179,
where this Court held that for the purpose of the civil
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee is to
Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It
makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social
institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract,
but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C.
Aquino).
By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust
reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and
strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v.
Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).
As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We
are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a
proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the
Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of
the Civil Code.
With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has
likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates of
respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly
indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. xxx. It is important to
note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior
to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer
and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent
marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any
way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an
existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.
Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides: Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of
adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code:
(Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated
the above-mentioned provision.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The rationale of
legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate
children in terms of successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public
20

respondent's mind, a case in point.
He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract
that he was then "single", but he denied the charge
that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation.
Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two
(2) counts of corruption
scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege
of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of
marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many
years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia v. Sempio
Diy).
It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita
disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears that
on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent
entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (G.R. No. 1155451) which was decided by this
Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of his
family home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedly begot
a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure of his
wife to substantiate the charges. xxx It was also in the same case where
respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio
and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues. Thus,
his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn
and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are erroneous,
deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children.
TITLE VII. ADOPTION

See also: See Domestic Adoption Act of 1988 (RA 8552) as amended by RA 9523 (March 2009); A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC - Re: Proposed Rule on Domestic Adoption; Inter
country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043); Amended IRR (January 8, 2004)
Title
1. Adoption of
Michelle Lim
GR# 168992, May
21, 2009, 588
SCRA 98
Facts
Petitioner, on 23 June 1974, married Primo Lim
(Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a
certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to
have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that they
were the childrens parents. The children were
named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude
P. Lim (Michael).
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if
they were their own. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner
married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Issue/s
Whether or not
petitioner, who has
remarried, can
singly adopt.
Held
xxx It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex.
The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and
legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring
for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in
a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means
of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the
21
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children

by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act
No. 8552 to those individuals who simulated the
birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner
filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle
and Michael before the trial court.. At the time of the
filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25
years old and already married, while Michael was
18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband, Michael, and Olario gave
their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.
The DSWD issued a certification that Michelle and
Michael were considered as an abandoned children
and the whereabouts of her natural parents were
unknown.
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court
ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with her new
husband.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision but the motion was denied.
age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for
at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered,
that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt
in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
22

spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.
xxx Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the
petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until
the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own
country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the
latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
xxx
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
23

consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14
Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental
authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be
the guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However,
parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V
of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights
of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents
shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.
xxx
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. xxx Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar,
for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
against judicial legislation. xxx
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our
own legislation to suit petitioner.
24
2. Lahom vs.
Sibulo
GR#143989, July
14, 2003, 406
SCRA 135
Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom take into

their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo
and to brought him up as their own. The couple
treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr.
and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose
Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a
petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order
granting the petition was issued. In keeping with the
court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed
the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin
Lahom."
In December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City. In her
petition, she averred 7. That x x x respondent
refused to change his surname from Sibulo to
Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly
her husband until the latter died, and even before
his death he had made known his desire to revoke
respondent's adoption; 10. That respondent
continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner; 13.
That respondent remained indifferent and would
only come to Naga to see her once a year; 14. The
times when petitioner would need most the care and
support from a love one, respondent all the more
remained callous and utterly indifferent towards
petitioner which is not expected of a son.
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22
March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also
known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into
effect. The new statute deleted from the law the
right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition.
1. May the subject

adoption, decreed
on 05 May 1972,
still be revoked or
rescinded by an
adopter after the
effectivity of R.A.
No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative,
has the adopter's
action prescribed?
xxx The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. xxx Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. Xxx Since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
xxx R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most
importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child xxx. The new
law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave
to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely
affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty
of due process15 that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it includes not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and
irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, xxx the Court concluded that
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. xxx In Republic vs. Miller, the xxx
Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of
the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently
with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside
the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules
of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
25

person has no vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not
naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on
what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away
at anytime before it has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, xxx an adopter, while
barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons
cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may
deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court

dismissed the petition.
3. Republic vs.
Miller
GR#125932/Apr.
21, 1999, 306
SCRA 183
On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A.

Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified
petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno
Madayag.
The trial court scheduled the petition for
hearing on September 9, 1988, at 9:00 in the
morning. At the hearing, with the attendance of an
assistant city fiscal of Angeles City, in representation
of the Solicitor General, respondents adduced
evidence showing that: Claude A. Miller and Jumrus
S. Miller, both American citizens, are husband and
wife, having been married on June 21, 1982.
They were childless and "do not expect to have
sibling out of their union on account of a medical
problem of the wife."
"The family maintains their residence at Don
Bonifacio Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, since
1985."
"The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the
Whether the court

may allow aliens to
adopt a Filipino
child despite the
prohibition under
the Family Code,
[4]
effective on
August 3,
1988[5] when the
petition for adoption
was filed on July
29, 1988, under the
provision of the
Child and Youth
Welfare
Code[6] which
allowed aliens to
adopt.
This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the
petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3,
1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a
Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the
petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. "A
vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend
upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept
of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny." "Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from
new obligations created after the right has vested."
"As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed,
the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the
case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
26

legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and
Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San
Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the
custody of respondents since the first week of
August 1987. They executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development
recommended approval of the petition on the basis
of its evaluation that respondents were morally,
emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents
and that the adoption would be to the minor's best
interest and welfare."
force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a

court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by
a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance."[10]
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity
of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said
Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the
Family Code.
On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered

decision granting the petition for adoption. The
Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic,
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court.
Cang v. CA
Written consent of
the natural parent
as a requirement
in a petition for
adoption may be
dispensed with if
such parent have
abandoned
his
child.
Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano

begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3,
1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison,

Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation
which was granted by virtue of the spouses joint
manifestation that they had agreed to live
separately.
Herber then left for the United States and custody of
the children was granted to Anna Marie. The trial
court granted the petition and disregarded the
necessary written consent from the father (Herbert)
on the ground that the latter had already abandoned
his children.
Whether or not
minor children be
legally adopted
without the written
consent of a natural
parent on the
ground that the
latter has
abandoned them.
Yes. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity
of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such
parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or
one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment

imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe their children."
However, In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did
not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount
27

to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he
was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He
used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Herbert filed an appeal alleging that the petition for

adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his
written consent as a natural father as required by
Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of
the Family Code.
Republic v.
Vergara
An alien who is
married
to
a
former Filipino is
not allowed to
adopt
in
the
Philippines
pursuant to Article
184 (3) of the
Family Code
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr.

and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition to adopt
Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12
years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina.
Samuel R. Dye, Jr. is an American citizen who
resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife
Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a
naturalized American.
After trial, the lower court granted the petition and
declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the
spouses Dye by adoption.
Whether or not an
alien married to a
former Filipino may
adopt in the
Philippines.
No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is

proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

xxx xxx xxx
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of
the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as
may be provided by law.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is

disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does
28
not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law.
He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although
he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not
married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American
at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the
exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to
a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may
not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law
mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article
185 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the

following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other.
Republic v.
Toledano
Exceptions
provided
for
On February 21, 1990, spouses Clouse sought to

adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the
younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse. Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of
the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a
Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On
Whether or not an
alien married to a
former Filipino may
adopt in the
Philippines.
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they
did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", spouses Clouse are clearly
barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
29

under Article 184
(3) regarding the
capacity
of
a
former Filipino to
adopt a relative
by consanguinity
must
be
interpreted in the
light of Article 185
which
requires
that
spouses
must adopt jointly.
NB: similar to
Republic v.
Vergara
August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized

citizen of the United States of America in Guam.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates
the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or
her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as
may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not

qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases
in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino
citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the
second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity
nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private
respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse
was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she
was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to

qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
30
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband
and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in

the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other.
Republic v. CA
and Hughes
Pursuant to
Article 185 in
relation to the
exceptions set
forth in Article
184, an alien who
is a former
Filipino may
adopt a relative
by consanguinity
provided he/she
must adopt jointly
with his/her
spouse who must
also be
capacitated to
adopt in
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of

the United States of America, married Lenita
Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself
was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On
29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch
60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all
surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of
Lenita, who had been living with the couple even
prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well
as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.
Whether or not
making the alien
spouse a nominal
party to a petition
for adoption filed by
his/her spouse who
is
previously
a
Filipino to adopt the
latters relative by
consanguinity
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that
must be read along together with Article 184.
No. The view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a
status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as,
but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional
rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered
inconsequential to the parties. Hence, compliance to the requirement of joint
adoption by spouses is mandatory and cannot be circumvented by making
the alien spouse, a person not capacitated to adopt under Philippine Laws,
as nominal party in a petition for adoption.
On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court

rendered a decision granting the petition.
31

accordance with
law. Thus, an
alien spouse of a
former Filipino
may not be
considered as a
nominal party in a
petition for
adoption for
purposes of
compliance with
Article 185 of the
Family Code
Republic v.
CA/Wong
While the law

provides that the
adopted
child
shall
use
the
surname of his
adopters,
the
change of the
surname of the
adopted child is
more an incident
rather than the
object of adoption
proceeding.
Therefore
the
adopted child is
not prohibited to
have his surname
change back to
his
biological
parents surname.
Republic v. CA
and Bobiles
On appeal, CA affirm the decision of the trial court.

CA has theorized that as Article 185 of the Family
Code mandates joint adoption by the spouses,
James Anthony should merely be considered a
"nominal or formal party" in the proceedings.
Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo

Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was
but two and a half years old, he was adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong,
both naturalized Filipinos.
: Whether or not an
adopted child may
revert back to the
use of the surname
of his biological
parents.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein

Maximo filed a petition to change his name to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the
surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from
his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a
Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a
Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and
he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of
alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for
carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his
business and social life; and that his adoptive
mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his
former surname.
Yes. Article 365 which mandates that "(a)n adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter," in correlation with Article 341 on the effects of
adoption, among which is to"(e)ntitle the adopted person to use the adopter's
surname.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to
the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings. 30 The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and
child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and
affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related
by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of
another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights
and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect
this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the
change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an
incident than the object of the proceeding. 31The welfare of the child is the
primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption. On
this point, there is unanimous agreement.
The law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does
not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and
only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction.
What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed

a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years
old and who had been living with her family since he
Whether or not a
spouse who was
not named as one
Yes. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in
32
An affidavit of
consent showing
explicit intention
the spouses to
adopt jointly is
sufficient
compliance to the
requirement
of
joint
adoption
regardless if the
spouse
who
executed
such
affidavit was not
named
as
petitioner in a
petition
for
adoption.
In the case of In
re: Adoption of
Michelle
&
Michael
Lim,
affidavit
of
consent executed
by
an
alien
spouse
who
seeks to adopt
was
not
considered
for
purposes
of
complying
with
the joint adoption
rule
on
the
ground that such
alien must, other
than
give
its
consent, meet the
qualifications set
forth in Section 71
was four (4) months old. Zenaidas husband,

Dioscoro Bobiles was not name as one of the
petitioners in the pleasding. However, his affidavit of
consent is attached to the petition.
The petition for adoption was filed when the law
applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a
petition for adoption may be filed by either of the
spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial
court rendered its decision and while the case was
pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals,
Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took
effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law,
joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
of the petitioners in
a
petition
for
adoption but merely
attaches
his
affidavit of consent
is deemed to have
jointly adopt with his
spouse named in
the petition.
the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to
the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows
that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child.
The pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually
desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a
minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial
Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in

open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he
must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his
affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal
requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations
of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules
on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not
apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule
therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to
adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.
33

of RA 8552
NB: Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Zenaida had the right to file a
petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When
Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and
unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file
such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in
accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
A petition for adoption cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply

with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the
petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with
the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction
and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.
TITLE VIII. SUPPORT
RA 9262; Contracts, Quasi-Contracts; Rule 61, Rules of Court; A.M. 02-11-12 SC
Title
Lim-Lua v. Lua
Facts
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself
and her two children, petitioner sought the amount
of
P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing
respondents huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses
here and abroad. After due hearing,RTC cited Art.
203 of the Family Code, stating that support is
demandable from the timeplaintiff needed the said
support but is payable only from the date of judicial
demand,and thus also granted support pendente lite
of P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7months
Issue/s
W/N the CA erred in
deducting said
amount from the
current total support
in arrears
Held
The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
As a matter of law, theamount of support which those related by marriage
and family relationship is generallyobliged to give each other shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation,
inkeeping with the financial capacity of the family. The general rule is to the
effect thatwhen a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother
money for thesupport of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter
of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the
children. Here, the CA should not haveallowed all the expenses incurred by
respondent to be credited against the accruedsupport pendente lite.
1 An Alien Spouse must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
34
Calderon v.
Roxas
The grant of
support pendente
lite is an
interlocutory order
which cannot be
that lapsed). Respondent filed an MFR asserting

that petitioner is not entitled tospousal support
considering that she does not maintain for herself a
separate dwellingfrom their children and respondent
has continued to support the family for their
sustenance and wellbeing in accordance with familys social and
financial standi
ng. Asto the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court
as monthly support pendente lite, as wellas the
P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent
found it unconscionable andbeyond the intendment
of the law for not having considered the needs of
therespondent. The MFR was denied. His second
MFR also having been denied,respondent filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA.
CA nullified RTCs ruling and changed
the amount to P115,000.00. The appellate court
said that the trial court should not havecompletely
disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchaseand maintenance of the
two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses,
and thecredit card purchases involving groceries,
dry goods and books, which certainly inuredto the
benefit not only of the two children, but their mother
(petitioner) as well, and thusordered the deduction
of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current
total supportin arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan
Lim Lua and their two children. It also noted thelack
of contribution from the petitioner in the joint
obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner appealed.
Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and Jose Antonio F.
Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and
their union produced four children. On January 16,
1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an
Whether or not an
order granting
support pendent lite
is an interlocutory
order and is
therefore not
appealable by
ordinary appeal.
Yes. an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory" e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion
for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or
inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order,
which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not
35

appealed by way
of ordinary
appeal. The
remedy against
an interlocutory
order not subject
of an appeal is an
appropriate
special civil action
under Rule 65
provided that the
interlocutory order
is rendered
without or in
excess of
jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of
discretion.
Order granting Calderons application for support

pendente lite. On February 11, 2003, Roxas filed a
Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other
grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for
the children as fixed by the court was even higher
than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city
councilor. Motion for reduce support was granted.
Calderon filed an ordinary appeal contesting the
grant of motion to reduce support. CA dismissed the
appeal on the ground that the petitioner failed to
avail of the proper remedy to question an
interlocutory order.
Gotardo v.
Buling
On September 6, 1995, Divina Buling filed a

complaint
for
compulsory recognition
and
support pendente lite, claiming that the Charles
Gotardo is the father of her child Gliffze. The Divina
testified for herself that her intimate sexual relations
with the Gotardo started on March 1993.
Support consists
of
everything
indispensable for
sustenance,
dwelling, clothing,
medical
attendance,
education
and
transportation, in
keeping with the
financial capacity
of the family.
Thus, the amount
of
support
is
variable and, for
this reason, no
final judgment on
the amount of
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified

for
himself.
He
denied
the
imputed
paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact
with the respondent in the first week of August 1994
and she could not have been pregnant for twelve
(12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving
Gliffzes filiation.
CA departed from the RTC's appreciation. It noted
that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual
relationship even before August 1994; that the
be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may

eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and
support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition
of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and
are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did
they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the
ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support and conjugal assets.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in
questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's
appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.
Whether or not
filiation may be
proven by testimony
of the mother that
she had sexual
relations with the
putative father at
the time of
conception of the
child.
Yes. In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. We
explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by
corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father;
at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. We
explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either
physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations
with other men at the time of conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner
is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters
with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the
respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September
36

support is made
as the amount
shall
be
in
proportion to the
resources
or
means of the
giver and the
necessities of the
recipient. It may
be reduced or
increased
proportionately
according to the
reduction
or
increase of the
necessities of the
recipient and the
resources
or
means of the
person obliged to
support.
respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner,

from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the
petitioners allegation that the respondent had
previous relationships with other men remained
unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to
recognize his minor son Gliffze.
1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed
to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary
support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and
categorical assertions.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a

parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support
is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is
made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support
Once the issue on

filiation is settled,
support follows as
a
matter
of
obligation;
a
parent is obliged
to support his
child,
whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate.
Lim v. Lim
The obligation to
provide
legal
support
passes
on to ascendants
not only upon
default of the
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued her

husband, Edward Lim and grandparents-in-law,
Chua Giak and Mariano Lim for support.
The grandparents theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority,
conceivably
either
by
its
termination or
suspension during the childrens minority. Because
Whether or not the

wife has the right to
seek support from
her husbands
ascendants in case
of the latters
inability to provide
sufficient support
No. The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only
upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide
sufficient support.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives,
by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
37

parents but also
for the latters
inability to provide
sufficient support.
at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl

and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to
support the latters offspring ends with them.
category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family
extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
NB:
Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under
However, the wife

may not seek
spousal support
from
the
ascendants of her
husband.
Such
obligation extends
only
to
her
husband, arising
from their marital
bond.
Uy v. Chua
A
compromise
agreement which
denies
filiation
and has the effect
of waiving any
action for future
support
and
succession
is
void.
The application of Article 204 which provides that

The person obliged to give support shall have the option to
fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or
by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 a

Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
filiation against JOSE NGO CHUA. Jose filed a
Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the instant
petition is barred by by res judicata as the issues
involve was already resolve in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB wherein Joanie filed a similar
petition in 2000 which ended up in a compromise
agreement duly approved by the court. In the said
compromise agreement, Joanie admitted that she is
not an illegitimate child of Jose Chua.
Joanie opposed the Demurrer and argued that the
question on the civil status, future support and
future legitime cannot be subject to compromise.
Whether or not a
judicially approved
compromise
agreement denying
filiation may serve
as proof to deny
filiation
and
consequently
bar
any future action for
recognition, support
or succession.
is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive

support are petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting
petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a wellprovided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house
which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not rising to the
level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward for
concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast
insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the
case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its
application.
No. Article 2035 of the Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the
following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The
validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal
separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; and (6) Future
legitime.
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent obviously
intended to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e., whether
she is an illegitimate child of respondent.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no
compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the
lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is
for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.
38
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The
void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise
Agreement, already made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would
already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal.
Sy v. CA
A
person
convicted of rape
is liable to three
kinds
of
civil
liability
under
Article 345 of the
RPC:
a)
indemnification,
b)
acknowledgment
of the offspring,
unless the law
should
prevent
him
from
so
doing, and c) in
every case to
support
the
offspring.
Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas

corpus against petitioner Wilson Sy. Mercedes
prayed that said writ be issued ordering petitioner to
produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah
before the court and that after hearing, their care
and custody be awarded to her as their mother.
After trial, the trial court caused the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus and awarded custody of the
children to respondent. Court further orders the
Wilson to pay by way of monthly support for the
minors, the amount of P50,000.00. Wilson contest
the award and argued that the court had no
jurisdiction to award support in a habeas corpus
case as support was neither alleged nor prayed for
in the petition.
Whether or not
support may be
granted in a habeas
corpus proceeding
even though not
prayed for by the
petitioner.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise
Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to
law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be
appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch
24 is only reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary
value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
No. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same
needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand. The case of Jocson v. The Empire Ins. Co.
and Jocson Lagniton (103 Phil. 580, 1958) explains the rationale for this rule:
x x x Support does include what is necessary for the
education and clothing of the person entitled thereto (Art.
290, New Civil Code). But support must be demanded and
the right to it established before it becomes payable (Art.
298, New Civil Code; Marcelo v. Estacio, 70 Phil. 215). For
the right to support does not arise from the mere fact of
relationship, even from the relationship of parents and
children, but "from imperative necessity without which it
cannot be demanded, and the law presumes that such
necessity does not exist unless support is demanded (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Tolentino, Vol. 1, p.
181, citing 8 Manresa 685). In the present case, it does not
appear that support for the minors, be it only for their
education and clothing, was ever demanded from their
father and the need for it duly established. The need for
support, as already stated, cannot be presumed, and
especially must this be true in the present case where it
39

appears that the minors had means of their own.
Lacson v. Lacson
When the person

obliged to support
another unjustly
refuses or fails to
give
support
when
urgently
needed by the
latter, any third
person
may
furnish support to
the
needy
individual,
with
right
of
reimbursement
from the person
obliged to give
support.
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, filed a

complaint and averred that their father Edward,
despite being gainfully employed and owning
several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided
them support since 1976. They also alleged that,
owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their
mother had, from time to time, borrowed money
from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later
testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a
loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00.
The trial court ruled in favor of Maowee and
Maonaa and ordered their defendant father Edward
to pay them a specific sum which represented 216
months, or 18 years, of support in arrears.
Whether or not a
parent
may
be
required to pay
support in arrears.
However, support even if not pleaded may still be awarded if such issue was
properly tackled during the trial. Applying Section 52, Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was tried with the implied
consent of the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been
raised in the pleadings. And since there was implied consent, even if no
motion had been filed and no amendment had been ordered, the Court holds
that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the issue.
Yes. Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully
exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give
support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish
support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical
relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an
equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of another.
Edward contests the award and contends that he

should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e.,
from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let
alone judicial, demand having been made by the
respondents. He invokes the following provision of
the Family Code to complete his point:
Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a
right to receive the same needs it for maintenance,
2 Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
40

but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the
aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil
Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that
moment can it be said that an effective demand for
support was made upon
Mangonon v. CA
The
person
obliged to give
support
may
either provide a
fix allowance in
the
family
dwelling
the
person who has a
right to receive
support.
The
second
option
cannot be availed
of in case there
are
circumstances,
legal or moral,
which should be
considered.
On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed,

in behalf of her then minor children Rica and
Rina with Federico, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for
support pendente lite against the latters father,
Frederico and grandfather, Francisco.
Ma. Belen concedes that under the law, the
obligation to furnish support to Rica and Rina
should be first imposed upon their parents. She
contends, however, that the records of this case
demonstrate her as well as respondent Federicos
inability to give the support needed for Rica and
Rinas college education. Consequently, the
obligation to provide support devolves upon
respondent Francisco being the grandfather of Rica
and Rina.
Frederico and Francisco both denied filiation to Rica
and Rica. They further argued that assuming the
minors are indeed their descendants who are
entitled to support, they have the option under the
law as to how they could perform their obligation to
support Rica and Rina. Francisco insists that Rica
and Rina should move here to the Philippines to
study in any of the local universities. After all, the
quality of education here, according to him, is at par
with that offered in the USA.
Whether or
not
a
grandfathe
r, in lieu of
his
son
who is still
alive, may
be
required to
provide
support to
his
grandchildr
en.
Whether or
not
the
right of the
person
obliged to
give
support to
exercise
option as
to
how
support
will
be
given
is
absolute.
1)
Yes. ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support,
the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
According to Arturo Tolentino, an eminent author on the subject explains that
the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related
to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder
the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to
provide support do not have the means to do so.
(2)
Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option
under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica
and Rina.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or
legal obstacle thereto.
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to how he
could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the
determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to
stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case
there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.
41

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail
himself of the second option.
People v.
Magtibay
A
person
convicted of rape
is liable to three
kinds
of
civil
liability
under
Article 345 of the
RPC:
a)
indemnification,
b)
acknowledgment
of the offspring,
unless the law
should
prevent
him
from
so
doing, and c) in
every case to
support
the
offspring.
Gan v. Reyes
Unless
ordered
by the trial court,
judgments
in
actions
for
support
are
immediately
On September 15, 1997, accused Magtibay with

lewd and unchaste design, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one RACHELLE RECTO y Rafal, by
means of force and threats to kill, to the irreparable
damage of the said Offended Party.
As a consequence of the said offense, Rachelle got
pregnant and eventually gave birth to a baby boy.
Bernadette S. Pondevida instituted in behalf of her

daughter a complaint against petitioner for support
with prayer for support pendente lite.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support
was adequately proved, the trial court rendered
its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to
recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S.
Whether or not a
court which tackles
a rape case may
accord the status of
illegitimacy
and
grant support to the
child conceived thru
rape.
Whether or not an
order granting a
petition for support
pendente lite may
be immediately be
executed even if
judgment has yet to
attain finality.
With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the
parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected.
Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they
had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship
with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back
here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
Yes. With respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out
of rape our recent ruling in People v. Justiniano Glabo (G.R. No. 129248, 7
December 2001) states:
Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article
345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that
may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of
the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in
every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code,
the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by
legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code
upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion
perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no "further
positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs
status." Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and
support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with
Article 201 of the Family Code.
Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered
by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory
and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule
which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the
judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent
reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate
execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between
those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To
42

executory
and
cannot be stayed
by an appeal
Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her

with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or
before the 15th of each month starting 15 April
2000.
consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the
advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit
language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
When words of a legal provision are plain, we should make no further
explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget.
Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution

of the judgment of support, which the trial court
granted by issuing a writ of execution.
Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was
issued despite the absence of a good reason for
immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as
the judgment sought to be executed did not yet
attain finality there should be an exceptional reason
to warrant its execution.
Part 3 and 4 missing
11. De Asisvs CA
GR# 127578/ Feb
15, 1999
Vircel D. Andres, in her capacity as the

legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de
Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
support against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the
defendant Manuel de Asis is the father of subject
minor and the former refused and/or failed to
provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite
repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his
paternity. Case was dismissed because of the
Manifestation executed by both parties.
Another Complaint for maintenance and
support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this
time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D.
Andres.
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss
the Complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of
Appeals found that the said Petition devoid of merit
and dismissed the same
Whether or
not
the
public
respondent
acted
with grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction
in
upholding the denial
of the motion to
dismiss by the trial
court, and holding
that an action for
support cannot be
barred
by
res
judicata.
In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff
in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed
futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child.
Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation
between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to
believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from
him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for support.
The admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a
motion of the husband, in which the latter prayed that his obligation to
support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the prayer,
and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status,
from which the right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no
effect can be .given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has
been made as to the existence of the cause.
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding
upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not
conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to
third parties and future support cannot be the subject of. This being true, it is
indisputable that the present action for support can be brought,
43

notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against the same defendant
was dismissed. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No.
3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right
of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and
acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff
arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that
her cause for action is accrues. .
12. David vs CA
TITLE IX. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS (ARTICLES 209-215)
1.
Becke
tt vs.
Sarmi
ento
AM
RTJ-122326/ January
30, 2013
Beckett, an Australian national, was

previously married to Eltesa a Filipina. Out of the
marriage was born Geoffrey Jr. Beckett. They
eventually separated and, worse still, they sued each
other.
Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation of RA
7610, otherwise known as the Violence against
Women and Children Act, followed by a suit for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Both cases
ended in the sala of Judge Sarmiento.
The couples initial legal battle ended when
Judge Sarmiento, rendered judgment based on a
compromise agreement. They categorically agreed
too that Beckett shall have full and permanent
custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old,
subject to the visitorial rights of Eltesa.
Thereafter, Beckett left for Australia, taking
Geoffrey, Jr. with him. Moreover, as agreed upon,
they would come and see Eltesa in Cebu every
Christmas.
In the 2010 visit, Beckett consented to have
Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the holidays,
provided she return the child on January 9, 2011.
January 9 came and went but Geoffrey, Jr. remained
Whether or not
respondent Judge
Sarmiento is guilty
of gross ignorance
of the law.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in

favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more
appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15,
2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned
to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential
command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it
were, the matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, "is
not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and
adjusted." And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin,
a custody agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and unbending,"
the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child
can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer
be to the latters best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment
involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and
effect of res judicata.
Now to another point. In disputes concerning post-separation
custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under seven (7)
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of age,
the childs choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody
shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Finally, in
Perez v. Court of Appeals,We held that in custody cases, the foremost
consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected
in no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides
44
2.
Lim
vs
Lim
GR# 1632029/
October
30,
2009
with Eltesa, prompting Beckett to file a petition against

Eltesa for violation of RA 7610, this petition was again
raffled to the sala of Judge Sarmiento. And because
Geoffrey remained in the meantime in the custody of
Eltesa, Beckett later applied for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.Judge Sarmiento issued an Order,
Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett.
Eltesa moved for reconsideration of the
courts, praying that it be set aside insofar as it
directed her to return the custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to
Beckett. Beckett moved for the reconsideration of the
judges Order, on the main contention that Judge
Sarmiento can no longer grant provisional custody to
Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on
compromise agreement.
Cheryl married Edward Lim the son of
petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. They resided at the house of petitioners in
Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards
ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband
Mariano. Edwards family business, which provided
him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the
family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of
income.
Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park
residence, bringing the children with her after a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught
with the in-house midwife.
Cheryl, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak
and Mariano (defendants) for support. The trial court
ordered Edward to provide monthly support of
P6,000pendente lite.
that "in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or

private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration."
In the light of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held guilty
of the charges hurled by the complainant against him for the reason that
absent a finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise, the preference of a child
over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be respected.
Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor
of a parent, is not, to reiterate, permanent.
As Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu in Espiritu, Geoffrey, Jr., at the
time when he persistently refused to be turned over to his father, was already
over 7 years of age. As such, he was very much capable of deciding, based
on his past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay.
Whether petitioners
are
concurrently
liable with Edward
to provide support
to respondents.
The governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil
Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental
Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority
encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they differ in other
concerns including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among
relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the obligation to provide support
arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the
same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts
during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and
the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants
only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but
also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the
ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners
theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material
deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support
even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their
descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by
blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family
extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
45
3.
Syvs
CA
4.
Madrin
anvsM
adrina
n
GR#
159374/
July 12, 2007
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent

Francisca R. Madrian were married and their union
was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick,
Phillip, Francis Angelo, and Krizia Ann. After a bitter
quarrel, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode
and took their three sons with him to Albay.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas
corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo,
alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal
dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna
disrupted the education of their children and deprived
them of their mothers care. They initially agreed that
petitioner would return the custody of their three sons
to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of
heart and decided to file a memorandum alleging that
respondent was unfit to take custody of their three
sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently
went home late at night or in the wee hours of the
morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and
neglected her duties as a mother.
CA rendered a decision asserting that
respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and
Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and
four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of
petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should
be determined by the proper family court in a special
proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is
lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
Whether FC has the

exclusive
jurisdiction over the
case
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA
8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue. (emphases supplied)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus
was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty
there was has been settled with the adoption of
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule
provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within
46

its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.
xxx
x xx
x xx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where
the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits.
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which
seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will
be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been
the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369].
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals
that family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody
cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be
issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for
custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the
issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before
the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting
of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and
judicial instability.
5.
Viesca
vs.
Glinsk
y
GR#171698/
July 04, 2007
Petitioner and respondent, a Canadian citizen, met at

the Makati Shangri-La. After a few months, a
relationship blossomed between the two.Respondent
executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission
of Paternityof the child. Unfortunately, the relationship
between petitioner and respondent soured and they
parted ways.
Respondent filed a Petition praying that he be
entitled to the company of Louis Maxwell at any time
of any given day. During the pendency of
respondents petition, the parties arrived at a
compromise agreement.
On 5 April 2005, respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. It was
Whether it is proper
for the trial court to
alter
the
compromise without
the consent of the
parties
A compromise agreement has been described as a contract

whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced. A compromise agreement that is
intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is normally called a
judicial compromise. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive
between the parties. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made
and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res
judicata, although no execution may be issued unless the agreement
receives the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and
compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed.
To reiterate, a compromise judgment has the force of res
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of
consent or forgerywhich private respondent does not allege in this case.
More importantly and as correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is settled that
47

alleged in said motion that petitioner had repeatedly
refused to abide by the terms of the compromise
judgment, particularly the provision allowing Louis
Maxwell to spend a night with him at any day of the
week. Atty. Manuel received the copy of the Writ of
Execution but informed the court sheriff that they
would not comply with the courts order and would
challenge the writ.
As expected, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
Writ of Execution that said writ was issued with
indecent haste violative of her right to due process,
and that the writ varied the terms of the Compromise
Agreement since it failed to take into consideration
the parties understanding that in the enjoyment of
respondents visitorial rights, petitioner shall have the
right to designate any person of suitable age to
accompany the child. The court ruled to deny the
motion to quash the writ of execution
The parties disagreed in some part
of the Compromise agreement. Especially Clause
II(b) of the Compromise Judgment which pertains to
the overnight visits of Louis Maxwell with respondent
and the last paragraph of the same clause regarding
the appointment of the childs accompanying
guardian.
The court then altered the provisions in
the Compromise Agreement to fix the conflict.
However, petitioner argues, that court should not be
permitted since a compromise agreement, once it
was approved by the court, has the force of res
judicata between the parties and should not be
disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. The
court is not allowed to impose a judgment different
from the terms of the agreement.
6.
neither the courts nor quasi-judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a
judgment different from their compromise agreement or against the very
terms and conditions of their agreement without contravening the universally
established principle that a contract is the law between the parties. The
courts can only approve the agreement of parties. They can not make a
contract for them.
Nevertheless, we cannot totally blame the trial court for having
granted respondents Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial
Rights. Perhaps, in its desire to finally put to rest the bothersome issue
concerning Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment and to prevent future
disagreements between the parties, the trial court saw the wisdom, as this
Court does, in providing the specifics in the said indefinite portion of the
Compromise Judgment. As we previously held in the case of Hernandez v.
Colayco
This is not the first unfortunate instance that a compromise judgment
of a trial court has given rise to subsequent prolonged controversy, only
because the trial judge failed to exercise the required degree of care in
seeing to it that neither ambiguity nor incompleteness of details should
characterize the agreement, much less the judgment rendered on the basis
thereof. The expressed desire of the parties to end their judicial travails by
submitting to a compromise deserves the utmost attention from the court,
and no effort should be spared in helping them arrive at a definite and
unequivocal termination of their problems and differences. It is high time that
the matter-of-fact treatment usually accorded by trial courts to motions to
approve compromises were abandoned in favor of the more positive activist
attitude the situation demands. In acting in such a situation, the judge
should bear in mind that the objective is to end the disagreement between
the parties, not to begin a new one. Thus, if the parties and their counsel
are unable to do it, the judge is expected to assist them in attaining
precision and accuracy of language that would more or less make it
certain that any disputes as to the matters being settled would not
recur, much less give rise to a new controversy.
Roehr
vs
Rodrig
48

uez
7.
Laxam
anavs
Laxam
ana
GR#
144763/
Sept 03, 2002
Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and

respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime
in 1983. After a whirlwind courtship, petitioner, 31
years old and respondent, 33, got married on June 6,
1984. Respondent quit her job and became a full-time
housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand, operated
buy and sell, fishpond, and restaurant businesses for
a living. The union was blessed with three children
twin brothers Joseph and Vincent.
All went well until petitioner became a drug
dependent. In October 1991, he was confined at the
Estrellas Home Care Clinic in Quezon City. He
underwent
psychotherapy
and
psychopharmacological
treatment
and
was
discharged. On April 25, 1997, the court issued an
order declaring petitioner already drug-free and
directing him to report to a certain Dr. Casimiro for
out-patient counseling for 6 months to one (1) year.
Despite several confinements, respondent
claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug
dependence worsened and it became difficult for
respondent and her children to live with him.
Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable
Petitioner filed with the RTC, the instant
petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his
three children
On December 7, 1999, after the parties
reached an agreement, the court issued an order
granting visitation rights to petitioner and directing the
parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological
examination by a psychiatrist of their common
choice. The findings on the examination of the
MENTAL STATUS and MENTAL PROCESSES of
REYMOND showed an individual who presented
himself in the best situation he could possibly be.
Whether or
not the trial court
considered
the
paramount interest
and welfare of the
children in awarding
their custody to
respondent.
In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor

children, the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who
shall make the selection according to the best interest of the child. The child
if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she
prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so
chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations
of the opposing parents.
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have
conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the
case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr.
Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a
trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the courts primary
basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the
decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the
welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a
history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral,
financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation
showing that he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit to take
custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is
unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as
moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in
this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the
decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they
want to live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court merely
stated that: The children were asked as to whether they would like to be
with petitioner but there are indications that they entertain fears in their
hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent.
There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the
children. These inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive
trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampos report and the capacity of
both parties to raise their children. The trial court was remiss in the
fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to
submit the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts.
In Lacson v. Lacsoncase,It is clear that every child [has] rights
which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less
49

the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to
the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the
parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in
whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by
law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes
imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence
was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual
agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to
determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest is now eleven
years of age and should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live
with. xxx.
8.
Vancil
vsBel
mes
GR#
132223/
June 19, 2001
Petitioner, BonifaciaVancil, is the mother of

Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United
States of America who died in December 22, 1986.
During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children
named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,
Helen G. Belmes.
BonifaciaVancil commenced before the RTC
a guardianship proceedings over the persons and
properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time,
Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2year old child. On July 15, 1987, petitioner,
BonifaciaVancil was appointed legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil
and Vincent Vancil Jr.
On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of
the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to
the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating
that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship. After due proceedings, the trial court
rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or
to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and
Vincent Jr.
irement to become guardian.
Who
between the mother
and grandmother of
minor
Vincent
should
be
his
guardian.
Art. 211 FC. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. xxx.
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has
the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. InSagala-Eslao vs.
Court of Appeals, this Court held: Of considerable importance is the rule
long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their
minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one,
which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from
the nature of the parental relationship.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only
in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent,
still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that
she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will
not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the
duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a
guardian.
50

9.
Silva
vsCa
10. Perez
vs CA
GR#
118870/
March 29, 1996
Ray Perez and Nerissa were married in

Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages,
two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner
finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July
20, 1992. Petitioner who began working in the United
States, used part of her earnings to build a modest
house in Cebu. She also sought medical attention for
her successive miscarriages in New York. She
became a resident alien in February 1992.
Private respondent stayed with her in the
U.S. twice and took care of her when she became
pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a
tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17,
1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.
After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S.
She alleged that they came home only for a five-week
vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets.
However, her husband stayed behind to take care of
his sick mother and promised to follow her with the
baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was
in New York, she changed her mind and continued
working. She was supposed to come back
immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before
Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on
good terms. She longed to be with her only child but
he was being kept away from her by her husband.
Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus
asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the
custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her. The court
a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the oneyear old child to his mother. The Court of Appeals, on
September 27, 1994, reversed the trial courts order
and awarded custody of the boy to his father.
Sole issue is the

custody of Ray
Perez II, now three
years old.
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the
Family Code is the applicable law. It provides:
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall
take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (
Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean
legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact,
such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms.
The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory
character.
The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than
seven years of age to their mother was explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound
the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good
of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to
be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any
effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that
a child below seven years old should not be separated from the mother
(Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of
the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) which
reduced the childs age to five years.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother finds its raison detrein the basic need of a child
for his mothers loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify
the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his
mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past
the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother
of
custody
and
parental
authority:
neglect,
abandonment,unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
51

addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.
The mothers role in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh
irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a mothers love has been
immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its justification, not in
fantasy but in reality.
11. Santos
Sr. vs
CA
GR#
113054/
March 16, 1995
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., and Julia

Bedia were married and beget only one child, Leouel
Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released from
the hospital he had been in the care and custody of
his maternal grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place
Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter
alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well
as the subsequent support of the boy because
petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for
the United States to work. Private respondents claim
that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been
sending financial support to them for her son.
Petitioner along with his two brothers, visited
the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr.
was staying. Private respondents contend that
through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner
abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away
to his hometown.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for
Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the RTC, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent. The trial court issued an order on the
same day awarding custody of the child Leouel
Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of
Appeals in awarding custody of the boy to his
grandparents and not to himself.
The Bedias argue that although the law
The issue to be
resolved here boils
down to who should
properly
be
awarded custody of
the minor Leouel
Santos, Jr.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be

transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to
a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation
is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only
in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining
in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is
working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is
present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally
separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's
attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to
be (sic) best interest of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under
the care, custody, and control of his maternal grandparents the petitioners
herein. The petitioners have amply demonstrated their love and devotion to
their grandson while the natural father, respondent herein, has shown little
interest in his welfare as reflected by his conduct in the past. Respondent
had never given any previous financial support to his son, while, upon the
other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his maternal
grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully employed in the
United States.
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat
petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over
52

recognizes the right of a parent to his child's custody,
ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for
the happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal
grandparents who have amply demonstrated their
love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they
claim to be in the best position to promote the child's
welfare.
the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be
an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position
to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support
for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from
his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of
his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be
construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against
him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help
enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a
chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth
and support which a father can give.
CHAPTER 2. SUBSTITUTE & SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY (ARTS. 216-219); ARTS. 2176. 2180
St.
Marys
Academy
vsCarpitanos
GR#
143363/
Feb. 6, 2002
Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of

Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment
campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of
St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of
the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful
day, Sherwin, along with other high school students
were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep
was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove
the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep
turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of
the injuries he sustained from the accident.
Claiming damages for the death of their only
son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos
filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents,
Whether the Court

of Appeals erred in
holding
the
petitioner liable for
damages for the
death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special
parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is
a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Respondents
53

James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle
owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy
before RTC.
Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James
Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence
of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of
the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
CHAPTER 3. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN (ARTICLES 220-224)
Obedenciovs
Murillo
A.M No. RTJ03-1753/ Feb 5,
2004
Capistrano
Obedencio,
Jr.,
charged
respondent Judge Joaquin M. Murillo of unjustly
dismissing Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000) for rape,
entitled People v. Dexter Z. Acenas.
Complainant averred that he and his wife
assisted
their
14-year-old
daughter,
LicelAcenasObedencio, in filing with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor a criminal complaint for rape
allegedly committed upon her when she was 11 years
old by her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas.
To his great surprise, respondent judge told
him that the case had been dismissed three days
earlier on May 22, 2001. According to respondent
judge, LicelObedencio had come to court,
accompanied by her maternal grandparents and Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Hallazgo. There she
was presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance.
Then, Licel took the witness stand and was asked on
matters contained in her affidavit. She recanted the
allegations in her affidavit-complaint and denied
having been molested by her uncle, Dexter. She
explained that her mother forced her to file the rape
charge because of family inheritance problems.
Complainant claims that the dismissal was
marred by serious irregularities.
Whether
the
dismissal of the
criminal case is
proper despite lack
of
consent
of
maternal parents
Article 220(6) of the Family Code gives to complainant and his wife the right
and duty to represent Licel in all matters affecting her interest. Thus, they
were entitled to be notified and to attend every hearing on the case. As a
judge, respondent is duty-bound to acquaint himself with the cases pending
before him. He should have known that Licel filed the criminal complaint with
the assistance of her parents, who are her natural guardians. It was
incumbent upon respondent judge to inquire into the reason behind their
nonappearance before the court instead of simply relying on the bare
explanation of the defense counsel that he and his client could not find Licels
parents. Respondent judge ought to remember that the accused, Dexter
Acenas, is the maternal uncle of the victim. That Licel came to court with her
maternal grandparents, and not her parents, on the day she was examined to
affirm her affidavit of desistance, should have alerted respondent judge to be
more circumspect. Being still a minor, Licel cannot fully comprehend for
herself the impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of desistance.
Given her tender age, the probability is that Licel succumbed to illicit
influence and undue pressure on her to desist from pursuing her complaint.
54
CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN (ARTICLES 225-227)
1.
Neri
vs.
Heirs
of
HadjiY
usop
GR#
194366/
October
10,
2012
During her lifetime, Anunciacion had seven

children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo,
namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her
second marriage with Enrique, namely: Napoleon,
Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the
marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they
acquired several homestead properties with a total
area of 296,555 square meters.
Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband,
Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural
guardian of his minor children executed an ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed
of Saleadjudicating among themselves the said
homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying
themto the late spouses spousesUy.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique
filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said
homestead properties against spouses Uy (later
substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the validity of the sale
for having been sold within the prohibited period. The
heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond
the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the
homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of
Eutropia and Victorias exclusion from the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties, and
interposed further the defenses of prescription and
laches.
ong period of time.
Whether sale of
property is proper
despite lack of
consent
parents
or children of the
deceased
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably

legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with
Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit
from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code
which read:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria
were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon
them and consequently, a total nullity.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of
the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father,
Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the
laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in
the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority.
If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother
shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the
childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the
Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child
under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or
the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the childs
property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and
shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the
court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of
55

his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them
upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with
Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without
being authorized by the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent
him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall
be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person
on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they
are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxx
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosas
Manifestation before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated: "Concerning
the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred
in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the other
plaintiffs), in favor of HadjiYusopUy and his spouse HadjaJulpaUy on July 7,
1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made by all
of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as
we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;"
Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification of the
settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale.
2.
Cabale
svs CA
GR#
162421/
August
31,
2007
RufinoCabales died and left a 5,714square meter parcel of land. Brothers and co-owners
Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property
to Dr. CayetanoCorrompido with right to repurchase
within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided
the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each
getting a share of P666.66. Alberto died leaving his
wife and son, petitioner Nelson. On December 18,
1975, within the eight-year redemption period,
Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment of
P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido
only released the document of sale with pacto de
retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her
Whether the sale

made
by
their
mother is valid
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the

brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to
their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing
his share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his
heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show
that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased
for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not
subrogated to Albertos or his heirs rights to the property when she
repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,we held that a co-owner who
redeemed the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it.
The property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did
not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. But the one who
56

deceased son, Alberto, including his vale of
P300.00.
Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio,
Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel
of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and
AnunciacionFeliano. Saturnina and her four (4)
children executed an affidavit to the effect that
petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of
P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches
the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr.
CorrompidoP966.66 for the obligation of petitioner
Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share
in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as
well as his vale of P300.00
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson,
then residing in Manila, went back to his fathers
hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he
learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of
subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to
redeem the subject land during a barangay
conciliation process that he initiated, Contending that
they could not have sold their respective shares in
subject property when they were minors.
redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until
reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Based on Articles 320 and 326 of the
New Civil Code.
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian
without necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his
property or one-seventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less
than two thousand pesos.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration
of the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which
needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner
Rito, sold the latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the
legal authority to do so.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of
sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and
all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided
share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the
others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they
only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part
which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently,
petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided
share of subject property.
CHAPTER 4- EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHIILDREN (Articles 225-227)
Title
Pineda v CA
Facts
Issues
Ruling
PMSI obtained a group insurance policy for its 1. WON Insular Life YES
sailors. 6 of the sailors, during the effectivity of should still be liable 1. The special powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and clear
the policy, perished while the ship sank in to the complainants terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent
Morocco. The families of the victims then wanted when they relied on company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-insured.
to claimthe benefits of the insurance. Hence, the specialpowers Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the
57

under the advice of Nuval, the president of PMSI,
they
executed
a
special power
of
attorney authorizing Capt. Nuval to, "follow up,
ask, demand, collect and receive" for
their benefit the indemnities.
Insular drew against its account 6 checks, four for

P200,00.00 each, one for P50,000.00 and
another for P40,00.00, payable to the order the
families. The checks were given to PMSI. Nuval,
the PMSI president, pocketed the amounts in his
bank account.
When the families went to insular to get

the benefits, their request was denied because
Insular claimed that the checks were already
given to PMSI.
The families filed a petition with the Insurance

Commission. They won and Insular was ordered
to pay them 500 a day until the amount was
furnished to them. The insurance Commission
held that the special powers of attorney executed
by complainants do not contain in unequivocal
and clear terms authority to Nuval to obtain and
receive from respondent company insurance
proceeds arising from the death of the seamaninsured; also, that Insular Life did not
convincingly refuted the claim of Mrs. Alarcon
that neither she nor her husband executed a
special power of authority in favor of Capt. Nuval
and that it did not observe Sec 180(3), when it
released the benefits due to the minor children of
Ayo and Lontok, when the said complainants did
notpost a bond as required
Insular Life appealed to the CA. CA modified the
decision of the Insurance Commission,
eliminating the award to the minor children.
Hence, this petition by the beneficiary families.
of attorney, which
Capt.
Nuval
presented
as
documents, when
they released the
checks to the latter.
2. WON Insular Life
should be liable to
the
complainants
when they released
the check in favor of
Ayo and Lontok,
even if no bond was
posted as required.
collection and receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with
respect to group policies.
They gave the proceeds to the policyholder instead of the beneficiaries
themselves. Even the Isnular rep admitted that he gave the checks to the
policyholder.
Insular Life recognized Capt. Nuval as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners.
However, it acted imprudently and negligently in the premises by relying
without question on the special power of attorney.
Strong vs. Repide- third persons deal with agents at their peril and are bound
to inquire as to the extent of the power of the agent with whom they contract.
Harry E. Keller Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez- The person dealing with an agent
must also act with ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence. Obviously, if
he knows or has good reason to believe that the agent is exceeding his
authority, he cannot claim protection the party dealing with him may not
shut his eyes to the real state of the case, but should either refuse to deal
with the agent at all, or should ascertain from the principal the true condition
of affairs.
Insular delivered the checks to a party not the agent of the beneficiaries.
2. Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child without
the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's
decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child
exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in
such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum
(10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
If the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee
the performance of the obligations of a general guardian.
On group insurance :
Group insurance is essentially a single insurance contract that provides
coverage for many individuals, particularly for the employees of one
employer.
There is a master agreement issued to an employer. The employer acts as
the collector of the dues and premiums. Disbursement of insurance
payments by the employer is also one of his duties.
They require an employee to pay a portion of the premium, which the
employer deducts from wages while the remainder is paid by the employer.
This is known as a contributory plan as compared to a non-contributory plan
58

where the premiums are solely paid by the employer.
Although the employer may be the policyholder, the insurance is actually for
the benefit of the employee. In a non-contributory plan, the payment by the
employer of the entire premium is a part of the total compensation paid for
the services of the employee.
The primary aim of group insurance is to provide the employer with a means
of procuring insurance protection for his employees at a low cost and thereby
retain their loyalty and efficiency.
Lindain v CA
Plaintiffs as minors, owned a parel of registered land

which their mother (Dolores) as guardian, sold for
P2,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale to the
spouses Apolonia and Federico. The latter knew that
the sale was without judicial approval but still
proceeded with the transaction. The plaintiffs now
contend that the sale is null and void as it was without
the court's approval. The Regional trial Court ruled
that the sale is indeed null and void, while upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) confirmed the sale
as valid and dismissed the complaint. Hence this
petition.
Whether or not a
sale by a guardian
of
a
minors
property
requires
judicial approval.
YES.
Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of
the property of his minor children does not have the power to dispose of or
alienate the property of the said child without judicial approval. And under
Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of the widow as
legal administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of
possession and management. Hence, the power to sell, mortgage,
encumber or dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89). Moreover,
the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith as they
knew right from the beginning the the transaction was without judicial
approval. Further, the minors' action for reconveyance has not yet
prescribed.
CHAPTER 5. SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Arts. 228-233)

Title
Bondagyjy v
Bondagjy
Facts
Respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy filed with the
Sharia District Court an action to obtain custody
of his two minor children.
the Sharia Court rendered a decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment

is hereby rendered:
Awarding the custody of the minors

Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouaje
Issues
Ruling
Is
a
wife,
a
Christian
who
converted to Islam
before her marriage
to a Muslim and
converted back to
Catholicism
upon
their separation, still
bound by the moral
laws of Islam in the
determination of her
The burden is upon respondent to prove that petitioner is not worthy to

have custody of her children. We find that the evidence presented by the
respondent was not sufficient to establish her unfitness according to Muslim
law or the Family Code.
In Pilipinas Shell Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (April 20, 2001, G.R. No.
114923), we said that in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing
evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is
59
Artadi Bondagjy in favor of their natural

father, petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy; and for
this purpose ordering the respondent
Sabrina Artadi Bodagjy or any person
having the care of said minors in her stead
or behalf, to turn over, relinguish and
surrender the custody of said minors to their
natural father, the petitioner in this case
Fouzi Ali Bondagjy;
fitness to be the
custodian of her
children?
Ordering the petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy

to ensure that the said minors are provided
with reasonable support according to his
means and in keeping with the standard of
his family, and, a suitable home conducive
to their physical,
not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into
consideration
in
deciding
whether
a
non-Muslim
woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid
down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the
ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial
support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and
moral situations of the parents.
The record shows that petitioner is equally financially capable of
providing for all the needs of her children. The children went to school at De
La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with their tuition paid by petitioner
according to the schools certification.
mental and moral development; and, with

his knowledge and under reasonable
circumstances allow the respondent and
natural mother of the said minors Mrs.
Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy to visit her minor
children Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and
Amouje Artadi Bondagjy
Silva. Ca
Title XIII. USE OF SURNAMES (Articles 364-380, NCC)
Grande v Antonio
Petitioner
Grace
Grande
(Grande)
and
respondent
Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although
Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else.Out of
this illicit relationship, two sons
Whether or not the

father has the right
to compel the use
of his surname by
his
illegitimate
children upon his
recognition of their
filiation.
The petition is partially granted

CIVIL LAW Filation
Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall
remain in force.
60
were born: Andre Lewis and

Jerard Patrick, both minors. The
children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his
own in the Record of Births of
the children in the Civil Registry.
The
parties
relationship,
however, eventually turned sour,
and Grande left for the United
States with her two children.
This
prompted
respondent
Antonio to file a Petition for
Judicial Approval of Recognition
with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,
appending
a
notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the
children.
RTC- ruled in favor of Antonio
The CAmodified in part the
Decision of the RTC, directing
the Offices of the Civil Registrar
General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City to enter
the surname Antonio as the
surname of the minors in their
respective certificates of live
birth, and record the same in the
Register of Births; ordering
Antonio to deliver the custody to
their mother; Antonio shall have
visitorial rights upon Grandes
consent; parties are directed to
give and share in support of the
minor children.
The appellate court, however,
maintained that the legal
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of
the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary
public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtis enough to establish the paternity of
his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental
custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be
taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname,
therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity,
one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that
an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
61
Remo v. Sec of
Foreign Affairs
consequence of the recognition

made by respondent Antonio
that he is the father of the
minors, taken in conjunction
with the universally protected
"best-interest-of-the-child"
clause, compels the use by the
children
of
the
surname
"ANTONIO."
Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo)
is a Filipino citizen, married to
Francisco R. Rallonza. Her
Philippine passport, which was
to expire on 27 October 2000,
showed Rallonza as her
surname, Maria Virginia as her
given name, and Remo as her
middle
name.
While
her
marriage was still subsisting,
she applied for the renewal of
her
passport
with
the
Department of Foreign Affairs
office in Chicago, Illinois,
U.S.A., with a request to revert
to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement
passport.
When her request was denied,
she made a similar request to
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
denied the request, holding that
while it is not obligatory for a
married woman to use her
husbands name, she could use
her maiden name in her
passport application only if she
had not used her married name
in her previous application. The
Secretary explained that under
Whether or not
Remo,
who
originally used her
husbands surname
in
her
expired
passport, can revert
to the use of her
maiden name in the
replacement
passport,
despite
the subsistence of
her marriage.
Petition denied.
Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage
subsists. No conflict between Civil Code and RA 8239 Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil
Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court (supra),
a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husbands surname upon
marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not
conflict with this principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does
not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in
recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman
who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is
not required to adopt her husbands surname. In the case of renewal of passport, a married
woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If
she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally
requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if
she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not
prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport,
she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or
(4) nullity of marriage. Since Remos marriage to her husband subsists, she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married
womans reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of
the marriage. Yasin case not in point Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in
Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to
another woman, Remos marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request
to resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume ones
maiden name in view of the dissolution of ones marriage.
Special law prevails over general law Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code,
the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance
62

the implementing rules of
Republic Act No. 8239 or the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996,
a woman applicant may revert
to her maiden name only in
cases of annulment of marriage,
divorce, and death of the
husband. Remo brought the
case to the Office of the
President which affirmed the
Secretarys ruling. Remo filed a
petition for review before the
Court of Appeals which denied
the petition.
Dela Cruz v
Gracia
When
her
motion
for
reconsideration was denied,
Remo filed a petition for review
before the Supreme Court.
Remo argued that RA 8239
conflicted with and was an
implied repeal of Article 370 of
the Civil Code which allows the
wife to continue using her
maiden name upon marriage, as
settled in the case of Yasin vs.
Honorable Judge Sharia District
Court [311 Phil. 696, 707
(1995)]
Jenie
was
denied
the
registration of her child's birth
because the document attached
to the Affidavit to use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF)
entitled "Autobiography," did not
include the signature of the
deceased father, and because
he was born out of wedlock and
the father unfortunately died
prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge
must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on
the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails
over a general law. Implied repeals are disfavored Remos theory of implied repeal must
fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently
conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so
that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the
latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.
State is mandated to protect integrity of passport Remo consciously chose to use her
husbands surname in her previous passport application. If her present request would be
allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her
husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport,
which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced.
Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport
applicants constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from
it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder
is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.
Whether or not the

unsigned
handwritten
instrument of the
deceased father of
minor Christian can
be considered as a
recognition
of
paternity.
Yes!
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use
the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the
putative
father
in
the
private
handwritten
instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of
63

his
paternity
to
the
child.
filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1)
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
Jenie and the child promptly

filed
a
complaint
for
injunction/registration of name
against Gracia. The trial court
held that even if Dominique, the
father, was the author of the
unsigned
handwritten
Autobiography, the same does
not
contain
any
express
recognition of paternity.
2)
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
TITLE XIV. ABSENCE (Article 381-396, NCC

Valdez v Republic
Angelita Valdez was married

with Sofio in January 1971. She
gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly
because Sofio was unemployed
and did not bring home any
money.
In March 1972, the latter left
their house. Angelita and her
child waited until in May 1972,
they decided to go back to her
parents home. 3 years had
passed without any word from
Sofio until in October 1975
when he showed up and they
agreed
to
separate
and
executed a document to that
effect.
It was the last time they saw
each other and had never heard
of ever since. Believing that
Sofio
was
already
dead,
petitioner married Virgilio Reyes
in
June
1985.
Virgilios
application for naturalization in
Whether or not
petitioners
marriage
with
Virgilio
is
valid
despite
lack
of
declaration
of
presumptive death
of Sofio.
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because
Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of
absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their
marriage is legal and valid.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no
impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded
belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this
requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to
Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The
Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to

exhibit well-founded belief will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage,
which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and
would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the
64

US was denied because
petitioners marriage with Sofio
was subsisting.
Hence, in
March 2007, petitioner filed a
petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
Title X. EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY
Republic v Olaybar
presumption of Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption
having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to
marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said
marriage is legal and valid.
1.
Republic v Uy
Fujiki v Marinay
Rep. v CosetengMagpayo
Julian Edward Emerson

Coseteng Magpayo claimed that
his parents were never married
and filed a petition in QC to
change his name to Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim
Coseteng (using the maiden
name of his mother)
Respondent submitted proof
o Mother has no record
of marriage from NSO
o Records which show
that he has been using
the surname of
Coseteng since
childhood (academic
records)
Trial Court granted petition and
ordered Civil Registrar to:
o Delete the entry date
and place of
marriage(of parents)
in respondents live
birth certificate
o Change entry of Last
name from Magpayo
to Coseteng
WON respondents
change of name
was
affected
through
an
appropriate
adversary
proceeding
Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of the
recognized grounds in rule 103(respondent denies his legitimacy by affecting his
legal status in relation to his parents)
Since respondents desired change affects his legitimacy, rule 108 should apply
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be
filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected
(Makati, not QC) and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated
Decision of Trial Court was nullified
65

Delete entry of
Coseting from Middle
name
o Delete entry of Fulvio
Miranda Magpayo Jr in
the entry for Father
Republic filed a motion
against the order of the
court stating that:
o The change of
name of
respondent also
calls for a change
of civil status from
legitimate to
illegitimate.
o Court exceeded
jurisdiction when it
ordered deletion of
name of the father
A person can effect a
change of name under rule
103 using valid grounds:
o when the name is
ridiculous,
dishonorable or
extremely difficult
to write or
pronounce
o when the change
results as a legal
consequence such
as legitimation
o when the change
will avoid
confusion
o when one has
continuously used
and been known
since childhood by
a Filipino name,
o
66
Republic v
Marcadera
and was unaware

of alien parentage
a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino
name to erase
signs of former
alienage, all in
good faith and
without prejudicing
anybody
when the surname
causes
embarrassment
and there is no
showing that the
desired change of
name was for a
fraudulent purpose
or that the change
of name would
prejudice public
interest
Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera),

represented by her sister and
duly constituted Attorney-inFact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga),
sought the correction of her
given name as it appeared in
her Certificate of Live Birth from
Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn
L. Mercadera before the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog
City
pursuant
to
Republic Act No. 9048.
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or
municipal civil registrar or
consul
general
is
now
authorized to effect the change
of first name or nickname and
Whether or not the

court of appeals
erred on a question
of law in granting
the
change
in
respondents name
under rule 103.
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or
both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an
independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his
relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of ones
existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter ones
legal capacity or civil status.
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in
the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law.
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is
not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of
name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a
substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule
108.
67

the correction of clerical or
typographical errors in civil
registry entries. The Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City, however, refused
to effect the correction unless a
court order was obtained
"because the Civil Registrar
therein is not yet equipped with
a
permanent
appointment
before he can validly act on
petitions for corrections filed
before their office as mandated
by R.A. No. 9048."
Mercadera then filed a Petition

For Correction of Some Entries
as Appearing in the Certificate
of Live Birth under Rule 108
before the Regional Trial Court
of Dipolog City (RTC). Upon
receipt of the petition for
correction of entry, the RTC
issued an order, , for the hearing
of said petition. The Office of the
Solicitor
General
(OSG)
deputized the Office of the City
Prosecutor to assist in the case.
Without any objection from the
City Prosecutor, the testimony of
Oga and several photocopies of
documents
were
formally
offered and marked as evidence
to prove that Mercadera never
used the name "Marilyn" in any
of her public or private
transactions.
A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law,
there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. In petitions for correction, only
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be
raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of
name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to
say, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for
clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it
simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make
or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From
the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the
faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the
same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." The CA did not allow Mercadera
the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name
which she had been using ever since she could remember.
Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower
court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia
of an adverse proceeding. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the
motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now
complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Wherefore
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
The RTC granted the petition

and ruled that the documentary
68

evidence
presented
by
Mercadera
sufficiently
supported the circumstances
alleged
in
her
petition.
Considering that she had used
"Merlyn" as her given name
since childhood until she
discovered the discrepancy in
her Certificate of Live Birth, the
RTC was convinced that the
correction was justified.
Title
Corpus v Sto.
Tomas
Baldos v Ca
The OSG timely appealed

praying for the reversal and
setting aside of the RTC
decision. For the OSG, the
correction in the spelling of
Mercaderas given name "is in
truth a material correction as it
would modify or increase
substantive rights", which would
have been proper had she filed
a petition under Rule 103 and
proved any of the grounds
therefor.
The appellate court affirmed the

questioned RTC order.
Facts
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo

Baldos, was born on October 30,
1948. However, his birth was not
registered in the office of the local
Issues
Ruling
Whether or not the

late registration of
Reynaldos birth is
valid.
In the realm of the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the oppositor is petitioners
son. Petitioners reason for disowning the oppositor is obvious; he did not live up to her
expectation; his wife is ungrateful to everything she did for her and the oppositor. Bad blood
runs in the veins of the parties. But while oppositor may have done an act that caused
69
Republic v
Cagandahan
civil registrar until roughly 36 years

later or on February 11 1985. His
certificate of live birth indicated
Nieves Baldos as his mother and
Bartolome Baldos as his father.
Nieves Baldos also appeared as the
informant on the certificate of live
birth. On March 8, 1995, Nieves
Baldos filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City a complaint
for cancellation of the late
registration of Reynaldos birth. She
claimed that Reynaldo was not
really her son.
Jennifer
Cagandahan
was
registered as a female in her
Certificate of Live Birth. During her
childhood years, she suffered from
clitoral hypertrophy and was later on
diagnosed
that
her
ovarian
structures had minimized. She
likewise has no breast nor
menstruation. Subsequently, she
was diagnosed of having Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a
condition where those afflicted
possess
secondary
male
characteristics because of too much
secretion of male hormones,
androgen. According to her, for all
interests and appearances as well
as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. She filed a
petition at RTC Laguna for
Correction of Entries in her Birth
Certificate such that her gender or
sex be changed to male and her
first name be changed to Jeff.
Silverio v Republic
Republic v Kho
Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family
plaintiff to regret that she gave him life, such acts however, are not justifications of what she
prays from this Court.
An ungrateful act is not a ground to cancel a validly executed document, nor a reason to
strip a person of ones filiation. It may be a ground for disinheritance though. The
documents adduced on record are the best evidence of the parties relationship.
WON correction of
entries in her birth
certificate should be
granted.
Whether or not
Khos request for
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that
the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of
70
applied for the correction of various

details in their birth certificate. Kho
petitioned for (1) change the
citizenship of his mother from
Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete
John from his name; and (3)
delete the word married opposite
the date of marriage of his parents.
The last correction was ordered to
be effected likewise in the
birth certificates of
respondents
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy
Moira.
Republic v Bolante
The petition from a non-adversarial

nature of the change is premised on
Republic Act No. 9048, which allows
first name and nickname in
birth certificates without
judicial
order.
The
Municipal
officer
approved of the change. The
Solicitor General objected to the
correction on the ground that the
correction not merely clerical but
requires an adversarial proceeding.
The Court of Appeals found in favor
of Kho.
Respondent filed a petition for

change of name before the
RTC. She alleged that her
registered
name
(birth
certificate) is Roselie Eloisa
Bringas Bolante which she did
not use; but instead the name
Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante
appears in all her school as
well as in her other public and
private records.
The RTC upon finding that the
change
in the
details of their birth
certificate requires
an
adversarial
proceeding
Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the married status of
Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change the
date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship
and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were married alters
their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with significant implications on their
successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an
adversary proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as An Act
Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical
or Typographical Error In An Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
Register Without Need of Judicial Order, has been considered to lend
legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil
status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a
petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate
adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil
register is satisfied.
whether
or
not
respondent's bare
testimony,
unsupported by any
other evidence, is
sufficient to prove
that the change of
her name is not
resorted for illegal
purposes.
On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional
law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals for purposes of identification, and that changing one's name is a privilege and
not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either
his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. 12 Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds
to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid
confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes
71
petition is sufficient in form and

substance ordered respondent
to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements of notice and
publication, and set the hearing
on Feb. 20, 2001. At the
scheduled Feb. 20 initial
hearing the RTC ordered the
respondent to file a written
formal offer of evidence.
The Clerk of Court acting on
courts express directive for a
resetting issued another notice
for a hearing and a second
resetting was made after notice
was given scheduled on
September 25, 2001 and
actually held.
On the Sept. 25 hearing,
respondent presented several
documents
without
any
objection on the part of
petitioner, represented by the
OSG. She also took the witness
to state the purpose of her
petition which was to have her
registered name changed to
that which she had actually
been using thru the years. She
testified that she wanted to
secure a passport issued with
her correct name and to avoid
any complication on her
records upon her retirement.
The RTC granted the petition
and the appellate court affirmed
the same, hence; the current
case. Petitioner argued that the
jurisdictional facts were not
complied with as prescribed by
Rule 103 Section 3 in which
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.13
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of
what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court.
The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best
evidence available.14 What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to
borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of
the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the
event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged
in the courts."
In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in
order to avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground
under the afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the
less cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight.
Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is
not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police
clearance to the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements
of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact
that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the
declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further
fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition.
There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to
present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said petition is not resorted to for
purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused
by oppositor-appellant
72

xxx the date set for hearing
shall not be within 30 days prior
to an election nor within 4
months after the last publication
of the notice. Petitioner argued
that the notices were published
on these dates: Nov. 23, 30 and
December 7 and the hearing
was set on Feb. 20 which is
within the prohibited period of 4
months. Petitioner also argued
that the reasons given by
respondent is not sufficient to
grant the request for change of
name.
CHAPTER 4. OTHER MATTERS SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS (Art. 253)
Republic v Granada
Republic v. Tango
o In 1987, Ferventino Tango, Whether Tango has
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
respondent, and Maria Jose established a basis shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal
Villarba were married in civil to form a well- can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
rites. Tango and Villarba had founded belief that presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without
only spent a night together and his absent spouse saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
had been intimate once when is already dead
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Villarba told Ferventino that she
Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
and her family will soon be
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
leaving for the USA. Villarba
freedom of choice of court forum.
assured Tango that the former
will file a petition so that the
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition
latter can live with her in the
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
USA and in the event that the
because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely
petition is denied, Villarba
errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
promised to return to the
Philippines to live with Tango.
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed
Thereafter, Villarba and her
a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC
family flew to Seattle, USA.
equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records
Tango and Villarba kept in
of the case to the appellate court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction
touch for a year before Villarba
to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately
stopped responding to Tangos
final and executory. Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal
letters. Tango had inquired from
and treated the same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it
Villarbas uncle of Villarbas
73

whereabouts but it turned out
that even the latters relatives
had no idea. Tango solicited the
assistance of a friend in Texas,
but to no avail. Finally, Tango
sought the aid of his parents in
Los Angeles and his aunt in
Seattle, but again, to no avail.
o
Republic v
Bermudez-Lorino
were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the
erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express
provision of the law, the judgment was not appealable.
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at this level, the
hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the trial court had long become
final. Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
This prompted Tango to file a

petition before the RTC for the
declaration of presumptive
death of Villarba under Article
41 of the Family Code. The
RTC issued an Order declaring
Villarba presumptively dead.
On appeal by the Republic of
the Philippines, the CA affirmed
the RTCs order.
Gloria Bermudez and Francisco

Lorino were married in June 1987.
The wife was unaware that her
husband was a habitual drinker with
violent attitude and character and
had the propensity to go out with his
friends to the point of being unable
to work. In 1991 she left him and
returned to her parents together
with her three children. She went
abroad to work for her support her
children. From the time she left him,
she had no communication with him
or his relatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her
husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the RTC under the
rules
on
Summary
Judicial
In light of the foregoing, it would be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the

issues raised by petitioner. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on
some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction
of clerical errors, the so called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here to
merit the review sought.
Whether or not the

factual and legal
bases for a judicial
declaration
of
presumptive death
under Art 41 of the
Family Code were
duly established.
Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law,
sets the tenor for cases scoured by these rules, to wit:
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall
be decided in an expeditions manner with out regards technical rules.
The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending
judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.
74

Proceedings in the Family Law. The
lower court issued an order for the
publication of the petition in a
newspaper of general circulation.
In November 7, 2001, the RTC
granted the summary petition.
Although the judgment was final and
executors under the provisions of
Act. 247 of the Family Code, the
OSG for the Republic of the
Philippines filed a notice of appeal.
75

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty.

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Whether the trial

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent,

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

In 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan

Whether or not the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Dela Cruz can be

paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.19

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

On September 15, 1997, at about 8:00 p.m.,

The record shows that when Rachelles mother, Gaudiosa Recto,

On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B.

In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was

in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals: [7]

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to

On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Petitioners denied all these allegations.

Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial

A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN (Articles 177-182); RA 9858

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a

natural children can

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

the other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the substantive rights

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

The herein administrative case arose from a

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

TITLE VII. ADOPTION

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom take into

1. May the subject

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court

On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A.

Whether the court

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a

On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered

Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano

Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison,

In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment