Taada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no
force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the
law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as
a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal
or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Umali vs. Estanislao May 29, 1992

Case Digest on UMALI V. ESTANISLAO [209 S 446 (1992)]
UMALI V. ESTANISLAO [209 S 446 (1992)] - Reiterating Tanada v. Tuvera, The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in
every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or extended.
Facts: Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending the NIRC (adjusting the basic and additional exemptions
allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty threshold level). The said Act was signed and approved
by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general
circulation. On 26 December 1991, the CIR promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations
shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel
the CIR to implement RA 7167 in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and prohibition to enjoin the CIR from
implementing the revenue regulation.
Issue: Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its publication in Malaya),
whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or received during calendar
year 1991.
Ratio: The Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned
or received during calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L], Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more often
than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among others, the
movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels.
The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did not do so. The
poverty threshold level refers to the level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress. The Act is a social
legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers.
Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be available after the law shall have become
effective. These exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax returns, done not later than the 15th
day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, on 30 January 1992,
the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But
these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or
received during the calendar year 1991. The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 are not available in
respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of said income had
already accrued, and been presumably paid (The law does not state retroactive application). The personal exemptions
as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income received during 1992
because it would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993. The

implementing regulations collide with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon
its approval.
The revenue regulation should take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991. Since this
decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, those taxpayers who have already paid are entitled to refunds or credits.

417 SCRA 503 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department How a Bill Becomes a Law
Bicameral Conference Committee Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Equal Protection Clause Valid Classification
Election Law Appointive Officials vs Elective Officials

Rodolfo Farias vs Executive Secretary

In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006,
an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while
he is still in office.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act.
Rodolfo Farias, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on
the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67
gave elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination).
The Farias group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to
the creation of the said law. Farias explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741;
that there were contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee was created;
that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its
record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in
the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even though there was no meeting at all and
that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached was instantly made and made to be passed around for
signing all these irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.
On Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If
the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other.
In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be

removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Further, appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political
activity or take part in any election except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under
this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the
Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Supreme Court is
not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever irregularities there may
have been in the Bicameral Conference Committee involve internal rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court.

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC vs RAMOS Case Digest

This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine
Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGBDENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March
30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation
organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao
del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be
declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and
develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian
company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated
assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical
or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides
for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully foreign
owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. The same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By
such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire
over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the
point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973
Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the
operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the
evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in
the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources
just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the
aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral
resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 6040% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts
are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or
financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize
and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same
agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership
over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These
stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to
avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.