BWAKANGINANGSHET; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

SUBJECT MATTER!
Laktaw vs. Paglinawan
Doctrine: A person who published a Spanish-Tagalog dictionary and copied the
equivalents, definitions and different meanings given in another author's SpanishTagalog dictionary, although making some additions of his own and some
unimportant changes in the examples to illustrate the meanings of the words, has
merely reproduced the dictionary of the other author in violation of the Law on
Intellectual Property.
Facts: Plaintiff is an author of a literary work entitled Diccionario Hispano-Tagalog
and allges that the defendant, without the consent of the plaintiff, reproduced said
literary work and improperly copied greater part thereof in the work published by
the latter and entitled Diccionariong Kastila-Tagalog which is in violation of the
Intellectual Property Law. The trial court absolved the defendant. Laktaw now
contends that the court aqou erred in not pronouncing the defendant guilty of Art. 7
of IPL , which reads: Nobody may reproduce another person's work without the
owner's consent, even merely to annotate or add anything to it, or improve any
edition thereof. Laktaw further averred that it is not necessary for the work to be
an improper copy of another work, it is enough that it is reproduced without consent
of the owner.
Issue: w/n there is a violation of the IPL?
Held: Yes.
In the judgment appealed from, the court gives one to understand that the
reproduction of another's dictionary without the owner's consent does not constitute
a violation of the Law of Intellectual Property for the court's idea of a dictionary is
stated in the decision itself, as follows:
Dictionaries have to be made with the aid of others, and they are improved by the increase of words. What
may be said of a pasture ground may be said also of a dictionary, i. e., that it should be common property
for all who may desire to write a new dictionary, and the defendant has come to this pasture ground and
taken whatever he needed from it in the exercise of a perfect right.

Such idea is very erroneous, especially in relation to the Law of Intellectual Property.
Danvilla y Collado the author of the Law of January 10, 1879, on Intellectual
Property, which was discussed and approved in the Spanish Cortes, in his work
entitled La Propiedad Intelectual (page 362, 1st ed.) states with respect to
dictionaries and in relation to article 7 of said law:
The protection of the law cannot be denied to the author of a dictionary, for although words are not the
property of anybody, their definitions, the example that explain their sense, and the manner of expressing
their different meanings, may constitute a special work. On this point, the correctional court of the Seine
held, on August 16, 1864, that a dictionary constitutes property, although some of the words therein are

explained by mere definitions expressed in a few lines and sanctioned by usage, provided that the greater
part of the other words contain new meanings; new meanings which evidently may only belonged to the
first person who published them.

Ching vs. Salinas

Facts: Plaintiff is the owner and general manager of Jeshicris Manufacturing Co., the
maker and manufacturer of a Utility Model, described as Leaf Spring Eye Bushing
for Automobile made up of plastic, which was issued by the National Library
Certificates of Copyright Registration and Deposit.
Plaintiff requested the NBI for police/investigative assistance for the apprehension
and prosecution of illegal manufacturers, producers and/or distributors of the works.
After due investigation, the NBI filed applications for Search Warrants against
Respondent alleging that the latter therein reproduced and distributed the said
models penalized under R.A. No. 8293. RTC granted the application and issued SWs
for the seizure of the aforecited articles.
R filed a motion to quash the search warrants averring that the works covered by
the certificates issued by the National Library are not artistic in nature; they are
considered automotive spare parts and pertain to technology. They aver that the
models are not original, and as such are the proper subject of a patent, not
copyright.
RTC quashed the SW. Ps MR having been denied; he filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA. The petition was dismissed.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Ps certificate of copyright registration over said utility models
are valid; and
(2) Whether or not Ps utility models can be considered literary and artistic works
subject to copyright protection.
Ruling:
(1) The petition has no merit. To discharge his burden, the applicant may present
the certificate of registration covering the work or, in its absence, other evidence. A
copyright certificate provides prima facie evidence of originality which is one
element of copyright validity. It constitutes prima facie evidence of both validity and
ownership and the validity of the facts stated in the certificate. The presumption of
validity to a certificate of copyright registration merely orders the burden of proof.
The applicant should not ordinarily be forced, in the first instance, to prove all the
multiple facts that underline the validity of the copyright unless the respondent,
effectively challenging them, shifts the burden of doing so to the applicant.

A certificate of registration creates no rebuttable presumption of copyright validity

where other evidence in the record casts doubt on the question. In such a case,
validity will not be presumed. No copyright granted by law can be said to arise in
favor of the petitioner despite the issuance of the certificates of copyright
registration and the deposit of the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing
Cushion.
(2) We agree with the contention of the petitioner (citing Section 171.10 of R.A. No.
8293), that the authors intellectual creation, regardless of whether it is a creation
with utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful article produced on an industrial
scale, is protected by copyright law. However, the law refers to a work of applied
art which is an artistic creation. It bears stressing that there is no copyright
protection for works of applied art or industrial design which have aesthetic or
artistic features that cannot be identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of
the article. Functional components of useful articles, no matter how artistically
designed, have generally been denied copyright protection unless they are
separable from the useful article.
In this case, the petitioners models are not works of applied art, nor artistic works.
They are utility models, useful articles, albeit with no artistic design or value. Being
plain automotive spare parts that must conform to the original structural design of
the components they seek to replace, the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle
Bearing Cushion are not ornamental. They lack the decorative quality or value that
must characterize authentic works of applied art. They are not even artistic
creations with incidental utilitarian functions or works incorporated in a useful
article. In actuality, the personal properties described in the search warrants are
mechanical works, the principal function of which is utility sans any aesthetic
embellishment.
In this case, the bushing and cushion are not works of art. They are, as the
petitioner himself admitted, utility models which may be the subject of a patent.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.

Manly vs Dadodette
Facts:
NBI applied for a SW before the RTC based on the information that R were in
possession of goods, the copyright of which belonged to P. After finding reasonable
grounds that a violation of Sections 172 and 217 of RA No. 8293 has been
committed, a SW was issued.

R thereafter moved to quash and annul the SW contending that the same is invalid
since the requisites for its issuance have not been complied with. R insisted that the
sporting goods manufactured by and/or registered in the name of P are ordinary and
common hence, not among the classes of work protected under RA 8293.
RTC granted the motion to quash and declared the SW null and void based on its
finding that the copyrighted products of P do not appear to be original creations and
were being manufactured and distributed by different companies locally and abroad
under various brands, and therefore unqualified for protection under RA 8293.
Moreover, Ps certificates of registrations were issued only recently, whereas there
were certificates of registrations for the same sports articles which were issued
earlier than Ps, thus further negating the claim that its copyrighted products were
original creations.
RTC denied Ps MR. Hence it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which was
denied for lack of merit. P filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not registration with the National Library and Supreme Court
Library is a condition for copyright protection.
Ruling:
We deny the petition.
Further, the copyright certificates issued in favor of MANLY constitute merely prima
facie evidence of validity and ownership. However, no presumption of validity is
created where other evidence exist that may cast doubt on the copyright validity.
Hence, where there is sufficient proof that the copyrighted products are not original
creations but are readily available in the market under various brands, as in this
case, validity and originality will not be presumed and the trial court may properly
quash the issued warrant for lack of probable cause.
Besides, no copyright accrues in favor of MANLY despite issuance of the certificates
of registration and deposit pursuant to Section 2, Rule 7 of the Copyrights
Safeguards and Regulations which states:
Sec. 2 Effects of Registration and Deposit of Work. The registration and deposit of
the work is purely for recording the date of registration and deposit of the work and
shall not be conclusive as to copyright ownership or the term of the copyrights or
the rights of the copyright owner, including neighboring rights.
At most, the certificates of registration and deposit issued by the National Library
and the Supreme Court Library serve merely as a notice of recording and
registration of the work but do not confer any right or title upon the registered
copyright owner or automatically put his work under the protective mantle of the
copyright law. It is not a conclusive proof of copyright ownership. As it is, non-

registration and deposit of the work within the prescribed period only makes the
copyright owner liable to pay a fine.

EXCLUDED WORKS!
Joaquin vs Drilon
Facts: BJ Productions, Inc (BJPI) is a holder of a Certificate of Copyright no. M922
issued on January 28, 1971 of Rhoda and Me which is a dating show aired from
1970 to 1977. It submitted to the National Library an addendum its certificate of
copyright specifying the shows format and style of presentation. While watching
the television, its President, Francisco Joaquin saw on RPN Channel 9 the episode on
Its a Date produced by IXL Productions. He wrote a letter to IXLs president
Gabriel Zosa informing him that BJPI has a copyright of the same format as shown
on their Its a Date show in their Rhoda and Me show. Zosa sought to register
IXLs copyright to their first episode of Its a Date to the National Library.
Petitioner filed a complaint in violation of PD No. 49 against the respondent before
the RTC of Quezon City. Respondent sought a review of the resolution from the Asst.
City Prosecutor before the Department of Justice.
Sec. of Justice Franklin Drilon directed to move for dismissal of the case against the
respondents and denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration hence this
petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the format or mechanics of the petitioners television show is
entitled to a copyright protection.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the format of a show is not copyrightable as provided
by Section 2 of PD no. 49 otherwise known as the Decree on Intellectual Property
which enumerates the classes of work that are covered by the copyright protection.
Similarly, RA 8293, the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines provides that
format or mechanics of a television show is not included in the list of the protected
work by the copyright law of the Philippines. PD 49 enumerates the works subject to
copyright protection which refers to finished works and not on concepts. It does not
extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method or operation, concept,
principles or discovery regardless of the form to which it is described, explained,
and illustrated or embodied in the work.

Pearl&Dean vs SM

Pearl & Dean (Phil), Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of advertising
display units called light boxes. In January 1981, Pearl & Dean was able to acquire
copyrights over the designs of the display units. In 1988, their trademark
application for Poster Ads was approved; they used the same trademark to
advertise their light boxes.
In 1985, Pearl & Dean negotiated with Shoemart, Inc. (SM) so that the former may
be contracted to install light boxes in the ad spaces of SM. Eventually, SM rejected
Pearl & Deans proposal.
Two years later, Pearl & Dean received report that light boxes, exactly the same as
theirs, were being used by SM in their ad spaces. They demanded SM to stop using
the light boxes and at the same time asked for damages amounting to P20 M. SM
refused to pay damages though they removed the light boxes. Pearl & Dean
eventually sued SM. SM argued that it did not infringe on Pearl & Deans trademark
because Pearl & Deans trademark is only applicable to envelopes and stationeries
and not to the type of ad spaces owned by SM. SM also averred that Poster Ads is
a generic term hence it is not subject to trademark registration. SM also averred
that the actual light boxes are not copyrightable. The RTC ruled in favor of Pearl &
Dean. But the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of SM.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. The light boxes cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered
as either prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags or box wraps,
to be properly classified as a copyrightable; what was copyrighted were the
technical drawings only, and not the light boxes themselves. In other cases, it was
held that there is no copyright infringement when one who, without being
authorized, uses a copyrighted architectural plan to construct a structure. This is
because the copyright does not extend to the structures themselves.
On the trademark infringement allegation, the words Poster Ads are a simple
contraction of the generic term poster advertising.
In the absence of any
convincing proof that Poster Ads has acquired a secondary meaning in this
jurisdiction, Pearl & Deans exclusive right to the use of Poster Ads is limited to
what is written in its certificate of registration, namely, stationeries.