G.R. No.

L-8670, May 18, 1956

EUTIQUIO BERMOY, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, V.S. PHILIPPINE NORMALCOLLEGE, ET AL. DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.D E
CISION
REYES,A.,J.:
On July 6 1954, twenty employees of the Philippine Normal College, who were working as cooks, waiters, dishwasher, and in various other
capacities in its dormitory known as Normal Hall, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the said Philippine Normal
College and/or Philippine Normal School for the recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The Solicitor General filed an answer on
behalf of the defendants denying the latters liability. But before the case was tried on the merits, the court ordered it dismissed on the ground
that neither one of the defendants was a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued. Reconsideration of this order having been
denied, plaintiffs took this appeal to this Court, alleging that it was error to dismiss their case on the ground mentioned. The appeal is,incur
opinion, meritorious. Republic Act No. 416, which took effect In July 1949, converted the old Philippine Normal School into the present
Philippine Normal College and endowed it with the "general powers set out In section thirteen of Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fiftynine, as amended" (Corporation Law).entrusting Its government and the administration of its affairs to a board of trustees therein created,
which was to exercise for It" all the powers
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 26, 1967
G.R. No. L-26947
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUSTOMS ARASTRE SERVICE and/or BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and/or REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellants.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for plaintiff-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Plaintiff Caltex (Philippines) Inc., suit on February 4, 1964 in the City Court of Manila against defendants Customs Arrastre Service and/or
Bureau of Customs and/or Republic of the Philippines, to recover the amount of P223.77, plus P100.00 as attorney's fees, due to alleged
short delivery or loss, in the hands of defendants as arrastre operator in the port of Manila, of a shipment of goods.
The shipment was part of 99 packages taken on board SS "President Garcia" on February 16, 1963, in New York, U.S.A., to plaintiff's
consignment at Manila. The carrying vessel arrived in Manila on March 24, 1963 and discharged the aforesaid shipment into the custody of
defendants as arrestre operator. The specific goods allegedly short delivered or lost in courts of defendants' arrestre operations consist of one
vial special reagent napthalene and one gallon tygon thinner worth, as aforestated, P223,77.
Defendants answered the complaint and raised as a special defense their non-suability upon the facts stated in the pleading.
Rendering judgement on January 16, 1965, the City Court ordered defendants jointly and severally, to pay P223.77, plus interest at legal rate
from demands, and P100.00 attorney's fees.
Appealing to the court of First Instance, defendants again lost. In its decision of May 14, 1966, said court ordered defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay P223.72 plus interest at the legal rate from the demand.
Defendants appealed to Us on the point of law: Are defendants suable without their consent in this case? Appellants filed their brief on
November 28, 1967. Appellee, on submitting the case for decision without appellee's brief, in view of the ruling of this Court in Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, L-23139, December 17, 1966, holding that the government is not subject to suit in
court without its consent for damages resulting from its arrastre operations, for the reason that said operations are a necessary incident to the
prime governmental function of taxation, so that public policy considerations bring them within the scope of the doctrine of government
immunity from suit.
Accordingly, We have granted the aforesaid motion of appellee. Applying herein the ruling in the Mobil Philippines Exploration case, supra, as
well as the subsequent cases mentioned in appellants' brief along similar lines.[[1]] We find that the court a quo erred in not sustaining
defendants' special defense of non-suability.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for reason of non-suability herein of
defendants-appellants. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Footnotes
[[1]] Insurance Co. of North America v. Republic, L-26532, July 10, 1967; Insurance Co. of North America v. Republic, L-24520, July 11, 1967;
Insurance Co. of North America v. Republic, L-25663, July 21, 1967; Manila Electric Co. v. Republic, L-25515, July 24, 1967; The American
Insurance Co. v. Republic, L-24031, Aug. 19, 1957; Insurance Co. of North America v. Republic, L-27515, Sept. 5, 1967; Insurance Co. of
North America v. Republic, L-27515, Sept. 15, 1967. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-5122

April 30, 1952
NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE TEODORO, SR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for petitioner.
Ozeata, Roxas, Lichauco and Picazo for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law
applicable to the said corporation. On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and
to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created. Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports
Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are
said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport,
and the owner commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines, Inc., in 1951 to
recover the above amount. The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which
by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid
to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the
operators and maintainers of said Bacolod Airport No. 2 and, further, that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly
the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands."
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain the third- party complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical personality," and, second, because
agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and
being sued."
Section 7 of Executive Order No. 365 reads:
All records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities and contracts of the National Airport Corporation
abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to, vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. All works, construction,
and improvements made by the National Airports Corporation or any agency of the National Government in or upon government airfields,
including all appropriations or the unreleased and unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be transferred to the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase
property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline,
accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be
sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration with greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation,
having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the National Airports
Corporation's creditors access to the courts of justice against the Civil Aeronautics Administration is to say that the government could impair
the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
But repudiation of the National Airports Corporation's obligation was far from the intention in its dissolution and the setting up of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration. Nor would such scheme work even if the executive order had so expressly provided.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of
the obligations for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernment capacity, and various
suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary
business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The Latter is true, although
the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the state divests itself
so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. (59 C. J., 313.)
This rule has been applied to such government agencies as State Dock Commissions carrying on business relating to pilots, terminals and
transportation (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. U.S., 26 Fed. (2d) 480), and State Highway Commissions created to build public roads,
and given appropriations in advance to discharge obligations incurred in that behalf (Arkansas State Highway Commission of Missouri vs.
Bates, 269, S W 418.)
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the
National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues
be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which,
far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns.
In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple justice to the parties who dealt with the National Airports Corporation
on the faith of equality in the enforcement of their mutual commitments, the Civil Aeronautics Administration may not, and should not, claim for
itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state.

The case of National Airports Corporation vs. Hon. V. Jimenez Yanzon et al., (89 Phil. 745), relied upon by counsel, is not controlling. That
was a labor dispute and can be distinguished from the case at bar in at least one fundamental respect.
Involving labor demands and labor- management relations, any decision in that case would, if given force and effect, operate prospectively
and for an indefinite period against the Civil Aeronautics Administration whose rights and obligations with respect to its officers and employees
were regulated by the regular law on civil service. Moreover, some of the petitioners might already have ceased. By Sections 5 and 8 of
Executive Order No. 365 all employees of the National Airports Corporation were, upon the latter's dissolution, automatically separated from
the service, and the part of the personnel whose employment was "necessary and convenient" to the Civil Aeronautics Administration would
have to be reappointed and, what was more important, "in accordance with the Civil Service rules and regulations." If the petitioners in that
case had been absorbed into the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the Matters raised in their petition were outside the jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations, and of this Court on Appeal, to entertain. Their rights, privileges, hours of work, and rates of compensation were
already governed by the Civil Service Law.
The Philippine Airlines' third party-complaint is premised on the assumption that the National Airports Corporation is still in existence, at least
for the limited object of winding up its affairs under Section 77 of the Corporation Law. Our opinion is that by its abolition that corporation
stands abolished for all purposes. No trustees, assignees or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation and, what is more, there is
nothing to liquidate. Everything the National Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. To all legal
intents and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal
representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better practice then should have been to make
the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation. The error, however, is purely
procedural, not put in issue, and may be corrected by amendment of the pleadings if deemed necessary.
Wherefore, the petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-15751

January 28, 1961
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA
and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul Certain orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving
due course to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without bond.
The action in question was upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula,
Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner
Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the
Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by
interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the
exercise of their right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from
pursuing the union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor
practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto
Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of
Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of
Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. For
relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus
Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the
case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the
Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of
Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been
also denied by the court in banc, the petitioners brought the case to this Court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of
the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the
execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work
of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in
business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for
overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively
proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm.
Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the
Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly
proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request, as
distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon
terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence
of the petitioners, most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and for printing of
checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to
use, is embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary stamps
appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent, and in computing the
costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include profit because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of
Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there
is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general
governmental functions.
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of
Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that the
Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not
organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace Act was intended to

apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of
gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto.
Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L-13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See
also the cases cited therein.) .
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3,
Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against
the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See
Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44,
December 28, 1957).
The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau
of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave
misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs
against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute and
investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it,
which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under them, would be to
interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders
complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents
other than the respondent court.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-26947, Caltex (Philippines) Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, Bureau of Customs and Republic, 21 SCRA 1390

G.R. No. 42204 January 21, 1993

HON. RAMON J. FAROLAN, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and BAGONG BUHAY TRADING, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jorge G. Macapagal counsel for respondent.
Aurea Aragon-Casiano for Bagong Buhay Trading.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated December 27,
1974 (CTA Case No. 2490) reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Customs which affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs. 1
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" with Registry No. 170 arrived at the Port of Manila carrying, among others, 80 bales of
screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay). Said importation was declared through a customs broker under Entry No. 8651-72
as 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a gross weight of 12,777 kilograms valued at $3,750.00 and classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of
the Tariff and Customs Code 2 at 35% ad valorem. Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment reflective of the declaration, Bagong
Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00 which was paid through the Bank of Asia under Official Receipt No. 042787 dated
February 1, 1972. Thereafter, the customs appraiser made a return of duty.
Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon dutiable under Tariff Heading No.
62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a
re-examination of the shipment. A report on the re-examination revealed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing
20 rolls or a total of 1,600 rolls. 3 Re-appraised, the shipment was valued at $37,560.00 or $10.15 per yard instead of $.075 per yard as previously
declared. Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the subject shipment as made of synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric classifiable
under Tariff Heading No. 51.04-B at 100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the
shipment in question. 4 Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of Customs forfeited the subject shipment in
favor of the government. 5
Private respondent then appealed the decision of the Collector of Customs by filing a petition for review with the Commissioner of
Customs. On November 25, 1972 the Commissioner affirmed the Collector of Customs. 6 Private respondent moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied on January 22, 1973. 7
From the Commissioner of Customs, private respondent elevated his case before the Court of Tax Appeals. Upon review, the Court of Tax
Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. It ruled that the Commissioner erred in imputing fraud upon private respondent
because fraud is never presumed and thus concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question was not in accordance with law. Moreover, the
appellate court stated that the imported articles in question should be classified as "polyethylene plastic" at the rate of 35% ad valorem instead of
"synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric" at the rate of 100% ad valorem based upon the results conducted by the Bureau of Customs Laboratory.
Consequently, the Court of Tax Appeals ordered the release of the said article upon payment of the corresponding duties and taxes. (C.T.A. Case
No. 2490). 8
Thereafter, the Commissioner of Customs moved for reconsideration. On November 19, 1975, the Court of Tax Appeals denied said motion
for reconsideration. 9
On August 20, 1976, private respondent filed a petition asking for the release of the questioned goods which this Court denied. After
several motions for the early resolution of this case and for the release of goods and in view of the fact that the goods were being exposed to the
natural elements, we ordered the release of the goods on June 2, 1986. Consequently, on July 26, 1986, private respondent posted a cash bond of
P149,443.36 to secure the release of 64 bales 10 out of the 80 bales 11 originally delivered on January 30, 1972. Sixteen bales 12 remain missing.
Private respondent alleges that of the 143,454 yards (64 bales) released to Bagong Buhay, only 116,950 yards were in good condition and
the 26,504 yards were in bad condition. Consequently, private respondent demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for
the 43,050 yards 13 it actually lost. 14
Hence, this petition, the issues being; a) whether or not the shipment in question is subject to forfeiture under Section 2530-M
subparagraphs (3), (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code; b) whether or not the shipment in question falls under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B
(should be 39.02-B) of the Tariff and Customs Code subject to ad valorem duty of 35% instead of Tariff Heading No. 51.04-B with ad valorem of
100% and c) whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by private respondent.
Section 2530, paragraph m, subparagraphs (3), (4) and (5) states:
Sec. 2530.
Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Law. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, cargo, article and other objects
shall, under the following conditions be subjected to forfeiture:
xxx
xxx
xxx
m.
Any article sought to be imported or exported.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3)
On the strength of a false declaration or affidavit or affidavit executed by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee concerning the
importation of such article;
(4)
On the strength of a false invoice or other document executed by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee concerning the importation or
exportation of such article; and.
(5)
Through any other practice or device contrary

to law by means of which such articles was entered through a custom-house to the prejudice of government. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner contends that there has been a misdeclaration as to the quantity in rolls of the shipment in question, the undisputed fact being
that the said shipment consisted of 1,600 rolls and not 500 rolls as declared in the import entry. We agree with the contention of the petitioner. In
declaring the weight of its shipment in an import entry, through its customs broker as 12,777 kilograms when in truth and in fact the actual weight is
13,600 kilograms, an apparent misdeclaration as to the weight of the questioned goods was committed by private respondent. Had it not been for a
re-examination and re-appraisal of the shipment by the Collector of Customs which yielded a difference of 823 kilograms, the government would
have lost revenue derived from customs duties.
Although it is admitted that indeed there was a misdeclaration, such violation, however, does not warrant forfeiture for such act was not
committed directly by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee as set forth in Section 2530, paragraph m, subparagraph (3), and/or (4).
In defense of its position denying the commission of misdeclaration, private respondent contends that its import entry was based solely on
the shipping documents and that it had no knowledge of any flaw in the said documents at the time the entry was filed. For this reason, private
respondent believes that if there was any discrepancy in the quantity of the goods as declared and as examined, such discrepancy should not be
attributed to Bagong Buhay. 15
Private respondent's argument is persuasive. Under Section 2530, paragraph m, subparagraphs (3) and (4), the requisites for forfeiture
are: (1) the wrongful making by the owner, importer, exporter or consignees of any declaration or affidavit, or the wrongful making or delivery by the
same persons of any invoice, letter or paper all touching on the importation or exportation of merchandise; and (2) that such declaration, affidavit,
invoice, letter or paper is false. 16
In the case at bar, although it cannot be denied that private respondent caused to be prepared through its customs broker a false import
entry or declaration, it cannot be charged with the wrongful making thereof because such entry or declaration merely restated faithfully the data
found in the corresponding certificate of origin, 17 certificate of manager of the shipper, 18 the packing lists 19 and the bill of lading 20 which were all
prepared by its
suppliers abroad. If, at all, the wrongful making or falsity of the documents above-mentioned can only be attributed to Bagong Buhay's foreign
suppliers or shippers.
With regard to the second requirement on falsity, it bears mentioning that the evidence on record, specifically, the decisions of the Collector
of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs, do not reveal that the importer or consignee, Bagong Buhay Trading had any knowledge of any
falsity on the subject importation.
Since private respondent's misdeclaration can be traced directly to its foreign suppliers, Section 2530, paragraph m, subparagraphs (3)
and (4) cannot find application.
Applying subparagraph (5), fraud must be committed by an importer/consignee to evade payment of the duties due. 21 We support the
stance of the Court of Tax Appeals that the Commissioner of Customs failed to show that fraud had been committed by the private respondent. The
fraud contemplated by law must be actual and not constructive. It must be intentional fraud, consisting of deception willfully and deliberately done or
resorted to in order to induce another to give up some right. 22 As explained earlier, the import entry was prepared on the basis of the shipping
documents provided by the foreign supplier or shipper. Hence, Bagong Buhay Trading can be considered to have acted in good faith when it relied
on these documents.
Proceeding now to the question of the correct classification of the questioned shipments, petitioner contends that the same falls under
Tariff Heading No. 51.04 being a "synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric." On the other hand, private respondent contends that these fall under Tariff
Heading No. 39.06 (should be 39.02), having been found to be made of polyethylene plastic.
Heading No. 39.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:
39.02 Polymerisation and copolymerisation products (for example, polyethylene, polytetrahaloethylene, polyisobutylene, polystyrene, polyvinyl
chloride, polyvinyl acetate, polyvinyl chloroacetate and other polyvinyl derivatives, polyacrylic and polymethacrylic derivatives, coumaroneindene
resins).
The principal products included in this heading are:
(1)
Polymerization products of ethylene or its substitution derivatives, particularly the halogen derivatives.
Examples of these are polyethylene, polytetrafluro-ethylene and polychlorotrifluro-ethylene. Their characteristic is that they are translucent, flexible
and light in weight. They are used largely for insulating electric wire. 23
On the other hand, Tariff Heading No. 51.04 provides:
51.04. Woven fabrics of man-made fibers (continuous) including woven fabrics of monofil or strip of heading No. 51.01 or 51.02.
This heading covers woven fabrics (as described in Part [I] [C] of the General Explanatory Note on Section XI) made of yarns of continuous
man-made fibers, or of monofil or strip of heading 51.01 and 51.02; it includes a very large variety of dress fabrics, linings, curtain materials,
furnishing fabrics, tyre fabrics, tent fabrics, parachute fabrics, etc. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
To correctly classify the subject importation, we need to refer to chemical analysis submitted before the Court of Tax Appeals. Mr. Norberto
Z. Manuel, an Analytical Chemist of the Bureau of Customs and an Assistant to the Chief of the Customs Laboratory, testified that a chemical test
was conducted on the sample 25 and "the result is that the attached sample submitted under Entry No. 8651 was found to be made wholly of
Polyethylene plastic." 26
A similar result conducted by the Adamson University Testing Laboratories provides as follows:

The submitted sample, being insoluble in 10% sodium carbonate; hydrochloric acid, glacial acetic acid, toluene, acetone, formic acid, and nitric acid,
does not belong to the man-made fibers, i.e., cellulosic and alginate rayons, poly (vinyl chloride), polyacrylonitrile, copolymer or polyester silicones
including Dolan, Dralon, Orlin, PAN, Redon, Courtelle, etc., Tarylene, Dacron; but it is a type of plastic not possessing, the properties of the manmade fibers. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, the Court of Tax Appeals, relying on the laboratory findings of the Bureau of Customs and Adamson University correctly classified the
questioned shipment as polyethylene plastic taxable under Tariff Heading No. 39.02 instead of synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric under Tariff
Heading 51.04, to wit:
While it is true that the finding and conclusion of the Collector of Customs with respect to classification of imported articles are presumptively correct,
yet as matters that require laboratory tests or analysis to arrive at the proper classification, the opinion of the Collector must yield to the finding of an
expert whose opinion is based on such laboratory test or analysis unless such laboratory analysis is shown to be erroneous. And this is especially so
in this case where the test and analysis were made in the laboratory of the Bureau of Customs itself. It has not been shown why such laboratory
finding was disregarded. There is no claim or pretense that an error was committed by the laboratory technician. Significantly, the said finding of the
Chief, Customs Laboratory finds support in the "REPORT OF ANALYSIS" submitted by the Adamson University Testing Laboratories, dated
September 21, 1966. 28
On the third issue, we opine that the Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard
to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the
Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious
that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. 29
On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent," categorically applies. 30 As an unincorporated government
agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental
function of collecting revenues which is definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner
of Customs must fail.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Collector of Customs is directed to expeditiously re-compute
the customs duties applying Tariff Heading 39.02 at the rate of 35% ad valorem on the 13,600 kilograms of polyethylene plastic imported by private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1
Customs Case No. 72-29 entitled
"Republic of the Philippines versus 80 bales screen
net, Entry No. 8651 (72) ex S/S "Pacific Hawk," Reg.
No. 170 marks B.B.T. Manila, Bagong Buhay Trading,
Claimant."
2
Should be Tariff Heading No. 39.02-B.
3
Rollo, pp. 227-228, Exhibits "D" and "D1."
4
Rollo, pp. 229-230.
5
Rollo, pp. 42-43, Annex C.
6
Rollo, pp. 48-51, Annex E.
7
Rollo, pp. 54-55, Annex G.
8
Rollo, pp. 30-37, Annex A.
9
Rollo, pp. 38-41, Annex B.
10
Consisting of 143,454 yards.
11
Consisting of 160,000 yards the total
yardage of the questioned goods.

12
Consisting of 16,546 yards.
13
Derived by adding 26,504 yards in bad
order condition plus 16,546 yards missing.
14
Rollo, p. 372.
15
Rollo, p. 143 and Brief for RespondentAppellee, p. 9.
16
Farm Implement and Machinery Co. v.
Commissioner of Customs, L-22212, August 30,
1968, 24 SCRA 905.
17
Exhibit "4," p. 220, Customs Records.
18
Exhibit "5," p. 239, Customs Records.
19
Exhibit "6," pp. 217-218, Customs
Records.
20
p. 193. Customs Records.
21
Farm Implement and Machinery Co., Id
at Footnote 11.

22
Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L20569, August 23, 1974, 58 SCRA 519.
23
Commentaries on the Revised Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, pp. 11701171, 1984 Revised Edition, Montano A. Tejam.
24
Ibid, p. 1351.
25
TSN, p. 96, Hearing of May 11, 1972.
26
Rollo, p. 251, Exhibit "F," Emphasis
supplied.
27
Exhibit "I," p. 223, Records, Rollo, p.
248.
28
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
29
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312.
30
Sec. 3, Article XVI, General Provisions,
1987 Constitution.

Araneta v Gatmaitan
Facts:
The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a
response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the
area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to
restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.
Issue:
W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.
Held:
VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it
authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in
itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the
inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.
Distinction bet:
Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves discretion of what law shall be
Execution of Law authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of law.
Facts:
Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and detailed to the Office of the District Engineer. While driving his truck, Sabas
ran over Proceto Palafox resulting to the latters death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he pleaded
guilty. The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against him, the Province, the District Engineer and the Provincial Treasurer.
Issue:
Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held liable.
Held:
NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of its employees while they are performing governmental
functions or duties. In this case, the driver was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was a governmental duty.
Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act. However tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on
the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. (Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte, 102 Phil 1186)

G.R. No. L-7048

January 12, 1912
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MONCADA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PIO CAJUIGAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Thomas D. Aitken, for appellants.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This case comes before us on appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac, the Honorable Julio Llorete
presiding, condemning the defendants, the first as principal and the other three as sureties, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,855, together
with penalties, interest, and costs.
The municipalities of Moncada and the defendant, Pio Cajuigan, entered into a contract of lease whereby the plaintiff leased to this defendant
certain fish ponds situated within the jurisdiction of that municipality for the term embracing July 1, 1908, to June 30, 1909, for which this
defendant agreed to pay P3710, in quarterly installments. By virtue of this lease, the fish ponds were duly delivered into the possession of the
defendant Cajuigan by the plaintiff, and he forthwith began placing therein nets, corrals, and other accessories necessary for the conduct of a
fishery. The lessee failing to meet his payments as provided in the contract of lease, petitioned for and received an extension, first until
October 1, 1908, and second until November 30 of the same year.
The defendant Cajuigan claims that on this last-mentioned date he tendered to the municipal treasurer the sum P1,855, but was told to return
on December 2 as he, the treasurer, was then very busy; that he returned on said date and again tendered this money, which was refused.
The plaintiff denies that either of these tenders was ever made by the defendant. The least was declared rescinded by the municipal council
on November 30, 1908, and on or about the sixth day of the following month the plaintiff, through its officials, entered the property and ejected
the defendant and his tenants. Subsequently thereto and on February 15, 1910, this complaint was filed by the plaintiff, wherein judgment
was asked against the defendant Pio Cajuigan as principal, and Florentino Sugui, Juan Isla, and Antero Alegado as sureties, for the sum of
P3,710, together with penalties, interest, and costs. The plaintiff further asked the court to declare that the property of the sureties described
in the complaint be sold to satisfy the judgment thus asked in case it was not satisfied otherwise. The defendants, after specifically denying all
the allegations in paragraphs, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the complaint, alleged as a special defense that the failure to pay the rents as stipulated in
the lease was not due to the fault of the defendant, but to that of the plaintiff, inasmuch as the plaintiff, through its treasurer, agreed to accept
on December 2 the amount then due, but that when the tender was made, said treasurer refused to comply with the agreement. The
defendants asked by way of cross complaint damages in the sum of P9,800 against the plaintiff for forcibly taking possession of the leased
premises and for the value of certain nets, corrals, etc., left in the fish ponds and seized by the plaintiff.
The lower court awarded P1,855 in favor of the plaintiff, this being the amount of rent for the fish ponds for the period from July 1, 1908, to
December 31, 1908, together with the penalties, legal interest, and costs of the cause. Recovery on the cross-complaint was denied.
The defendants appealed and made the following assignment of errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the noncompliance with the terms of the contract in question was due to the fault or failure of Pio
Cajuigan.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant Pio Cajuigan did not pay the first trimonthly payment due.
3. The lower court erred in holding that Pio Cajuigan owed P1,855, or any amount to plaintiff.
4. The lower court erred in not giving judgment against plaintiff and in favor of defendants or of Pio Cajuigan on their cross-complaint.
5. The lower court erred in deciding against defendants or either of them and in favor of the plaintiff.
The first, second, and third assignments of error raise question of fact and can be decided together.

The plaintiff, after presenting Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which were admitted without opposition, called Aguedo Ibarra, who, after being duly
sworn, testified that he was municipal treasurer on Moncada during the year 1908 and up to May, 1909; that the lessee, Pio Cajuigan, during
that time paid nothing on the lease, notwithstanding the fact that he had been requested to do so at various times and that the municipality
was very anxious to collect this amount. The witness further testified that the lessee never at any time attempted or offered to pay any
amount; and that he did not see the said lessee, either on the 30th of November or the 2d of December.
The first witness presented by the defense was Balbino Fabian, a subtenant of the lessee. This witness testified that he, together with Antero
Alegado, one of the lessee's bondsmen, accompanied the lessee to the office of the municipal treasurer on the 30th of November and was
present when the lessee offered to pay the municipal treasurer all that he, the lessee, was due to pay up to that time; that the municipal
treasurer declined to receive this money, giving as an excuse that he was very busy, and told them to return on the 2d of December; that they
did return on the 2d of December, the lessee carrying the money with him, and that they were then told by the treasurer that the lessee could
not pay the amount due for the reason that the municipality had rescinded the lease. This witness also testified as subtenant he had bought
four hundred bamboos at P20 per hundred and made a fish corral and placed the same in the fish ponds, paying for the making of this corral
P30.
Antero Alegado, the second witness, corroborated the testimony of the first witness with reference to what occurred in the municipal treasury
on the 30th of November and the 2d of December.
The lessee, Pio Cajuigan, testified that not being able to pay either the first or the second quarter payments when due, asked twice for an
extension of time, which requests were granted, the last extension including the 30th of November; that on that day, the 30th of November,
he, in company with Balboa Fabian and Antero Alegado, went to the municipality treasury, taking with him a sufficient amount of money to pay
for both quarters; that on arriving there and saying to the treasurer that he had come for this purpose, the treasure told him that he, the
treasurer, was very busy, and for him to return on the 2d day of December; that he returned on this date and was then informed by the
treasurer that he could not make the payment as the municipality had already rescinded the lease; that he never paid anything at any time on
this contract except P186, which he had deposited as a guaranty of good faith before he took the possession of the leased premises; that on
being notified that the municipality had rescinded that lease on the 30th of November and after he had been forcibly evicted by the said
municipality on or about the 6th of December, he filed a protest with the provincial board; that the provincial board notified him that his relief
should be sought through the courts; that he had spent P100 in making nets, etc., which he had placed in the fish ponds; that all of these nets
and other materials which he and his subtenant had placed upon the leased premises were appropriated at the time the municipality evicted
him by means of force; and that it is true, according to the conditions of the lease, that if he failed to make the payments as required therein,
the contract would be rescinded and he would lose the amount deposited.
The lessee testified as to the profits which he might reasonably expect if he had continued in possession of the premises until the expiration
of the time stipulated in the contract. He also called witnesses who corroborated testimony on this point.
As whether or not the lessee did on the 30th of November and the 2d of December try to pay the amount which he then owed, the trial court
accepted a true the testimony of the municipal treasurer, and found as a fact that the lessee never did at any time offer to make any payment.
This finding of fact, we think, is supported by the preponderance of the evidence. This witness, as well as the municipality, was anxious that
the lessee comply with the contract and make the payments. This is shown by the fact that the municipality, at the request of the lessee, gave
two extensions of time in which these payments might be made. It was to the interest of the municipality that the lessee comply with his part
of the contract. On the other hand, we have the testimony of the lessee, his subtenant, and one of his bondsmen, all of whom testified that the
lessee did offer the treasurer the money. If the lessee had gone there with this money on the 30th of November, the treasurer would have
unquestionably accepted it, or, even if the treasurer had refused to accept it under the pretense that he was busy, the lessee could have
notified the municipal president, whose office was in the same building, and demanded that the treasurer be required to accept the money.
Again, when the lessee filed his protest with the provincial board against the action of the municipal council in rescinding the contract, he had
nothing about his offering to pay this money on the 30th of November and on the 2d of December. If he had made such an offer, this fact
would have formed the very basis of his protest filed with the provincial board. By preponderance of evidence is not necessarily meant the
greater number of witnesses. (Union Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Estes, 16 Pac., 131, 134, 37 Kan., 715; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Retfod, 18 Kan.,
245, 251; McCarthy vs. Birmingham, 89 N. W., 1003, 2 Neb. (Unof.), 724; San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. vs. Manning, 50 S. W., 177, 179, 20
Tex. Civ. App., 504; Pelitier vs. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co., 60 N. W., 250, 251, 88 Wis., 521; North Chicago St. Ry. Co. vs. Fitzgibbons, 54
N. E., 483, 180 Ill., 466 Turner vs. Overall, 72 S. W. 644, 649, 172 Mo., 271.)
It is well settled that by the term "preponderance of evidence," is not meant the mere numerical array of witnesses, but it means the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side. (Coles vs. Anderson, 2 Tenn. (Lea) Rep., 14; Hills vs. Goodyear, 72 Tenn. (4 Lea),
233, 243, 40 Am. Rep., 5.)
The preponderance of the evidence may be determined, under certain conditions, by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or
state of facts. For instance, one or two witnesses may testify to a given state of facts, and six or seven witnesses of equal candor, fairness,
intelligence, and truthfulness, and equally well corroborated by all the remaining evidence, who have no greater interest in the result of the

suit, testify against such state of facts. Then the preponderance of evidence is determined by the number of witnesses. (Wilcox vs. Hines, 100
Tenn. 524, 66 Am. St. Rep., 761.)
In determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. (Foulke vs. Thalmessinger, 28 N. Y.
Supp., 684, 685.) A preponderance of evidence means that the testimony adduced by one side is more credible and conclusive than that of
the other. (Clayton vs. Keeler, 42 N. Y., Supp., 1051, 1056; Button vs. Metcalf, 80 Wis., 193.)
The lessee, Pio Cajuigan, testified that he had not paid at any time any amount on this contract of lease except P186 which was deposited as
before stated. This testimony settles the second assignment of error.
Counsel for defendants says in his printed brief that plaintiff admitted having received from the defendant P1,484. Counsel is in error on this
point. He has made an unintentional mistake. It is true that according to the fifth paragraph of the complaint as printed in the bill of exceptions
of the plaintiff made this admission. The fifth and sixth paragraphs of said complaint are as follows:
5. The lessee has broken this obligation (that of paying the rent), and notwithstanding various extensions of time, has paid only P1,484.
6. The said lessee has been requested on various occasions by the municipal treasurer to pay the remainder of the rental charges, which
amounts to P2,226, but up to the date of this complaint he has not done so.
These same paragraphs, in the original complaint, which is signed by the attorney for the plaintiff, read as follows:
5. The lessee as broken this obligation (that of paying the rent), and notwithstanding various extensions of time, has been paid nothing on his
obligation.
6. The said lessee has been requested on various occasions by the municipal treasurer to pay the price of the concession, which is P3,710,
but up to date of this complaint he has done so.
In the prayer of the complaint as it appears in the bill of exception, the plaintiff asks judgment against the lessee as principal and the other
defendants as sureties for the sum of P2,226, together with legal interest on this amount from the first day of December, 1908, and for the
cost of the cause, while in the original complaint the plaintiffs asked judgment against the lessee as principal and the other defendants as
sureties for the sum of P3,710, together with 20 per cent penalties, legal interests, and costs. There is no explanation in the record as to how
these mistakes were made in the bill of exceptions, which was approved by the trial court. That they are mistakes can not be questioned. The
case was tried upon the theory that the lessee had made no payments whatsoever.
In support of the fourth and the fifth assignment of error, counsel for the defendant says:
There is but one way to oust an intruder who is in peaceable possession of the property in question. That is the legal way, by means of the
court. A municipal corporation has no more right than a private individual to constitute itself a judge and executioner and take the law into its
own hands to enforce what it believes to be a civil grievance.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The wrongful act of plaintiff is established beyond the peradventure of a doubt.
It was doubly wrongful as far as the bondsmen were concerned. Even if the defendant Cajuigan were delinquent (which we no way admit) the
bondsmen would not be liable under the terms of their mortgage unless Cajuigan failed to pay by the end of June of 1909.
xxx
xxx
xxx
That Cajuigan has been injured by plaintiff's wrongful acts can in no sense be termed a doubtful issue. It is a certainty.
Counsel then endeavors to show that the fish ponds for the remainder of the year would have netted the lessee a profit of at least P9,500;
that the lessee has been damaged in this amount; and that he, the lessee, is entitled to judgment accordingly.\
In the contract of lease there are three principal conditions: First, the lessee obligated himself to pay the rents quarterly in advance, that is, on
or before the tenth day of each quarter; second, if the lessee should fail to make the payment within the time specified, it was agreed that the
plaintiff would be entitled to collect the same penalties as are imposed upon delinquent taxpayers; and third, if the lessee failed to make his
payments during any quarter, the contract would or could be rescinded, the defendants would be responsible to the plaintiff for all damages
caused by the breach of the contract, and the lessee would forfeit his deposit.
The bondsmen guaranteed not only the payment of the P3,710, but also interest and penalties in case the lessee failed to comply with his
part of he contract.
The parties knew and understood all conditions in these contracts and were bound by them. The contracts, being legitimate ones, were the
law between the contracting parties. The lessee having failed to comply with the plain provisions of this contract by not making the payment

as reacquired therein, the plaintiff had a right to have the contract rescinded, collect the penalties, and confiscate the deposit as agreed
between the contracting parties in said contract. (Arts. 1101, 1555, Civil Code.)
If the plaintiff had gone into the court and prayed for a rescission of the contract, it could have no doubt obtained not only this relief but also a
judgment for the amount of the rents during the time the lessee occupied the premises, together with the penalties, interest, costs, and for the
forfeiture of the deposit. The plaintiff did not, however, apply to the courts for this redress, but attempted itself to rescind the contract, and did
not forcibly eject the lessee, who was in peaceable and quiet possession; but the lessee did not obtain nor seek a reentry of the premises.
Consequently, the plaintiff must be held responsible in damages for its illegal acts in forcibly ejecting the lessee, but such damages must be
limited to the simple trespass. (Smith vs. Wunderlich, 70 Ill., 426, wherein the following cases and authorities are cited: Case vs. Shepard, 2
Johns. Cases, 27; 1 Ld. Raym., 692; 6 Salk., 639; 2 Raym., 974; 1 Leon., 302, 319; 13 Coke, 600; Menvil's Case, 3 Blanc. Com., 210; Co.
Litt., 257; Holmes vs. Seely, 19 Wend., 507; Rowland vs. Rowland, 8 (Ham.) Ohio R., 40; Shields vs. Henderson, 1 Lit. (Ky.) R.,239.) The
lease not expiring until months after the ouster, the lessee is not, upon the principle of the authorities above cited, entitled to recover mesne
profits from the ouster to the end of the term, but the damages must be confined to the ouster itself or the simple trespass. He is, however,
entitled to recover for all the necessary and natural consequences of plaintiff's illegal act, which in this case, according to the proof, amounts
to P210, this being the value of the corrals, etc., placed upon the leased premises by the lessee and appropriated by the plaintiff.
The lessee was, as we have said, evicted about December 6. The trial court allowed recovery for the month of December. We think this was
error. The ouster relieved the lessee from the payment of rent accruing after his possession ceased, but rent already accrued and overdue is
not forfeited by the eviction. The rule that the eviction suspends the payment of rent results from the meaning of the term "rent" and from the
obligations for the use of landlord and tenant. Rent is compensation for the use of land, and what the tenant pays rent for is quiet possession,
or beneficial enjoyment. When, therefore, the use or possession ceases, the consideration for the payment ceases. (Gommes vs. St. Paul
Trust Company, 147 Ill., 634, reported in 37 Am. St. Rep., 248; 1 Taylor's Land. and Ten. (eight ed.), secs. 377, 378; 2 Wood's Landlord and
Tenant (second ed.) sec 477; 12 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 743; Morris vs. Tillson, 81 Ill., 607; Hall vs. Gould, 13 N. Y., 127; Home Life Insurance
Company vs. Sherman, 46 N. Y., 370.) Consequently, the plaintiff is entitled to recover rent for five instead of six months.
The lessor and lessee agreed that in the case the lessee failed to comply with the contract the lessor would be entitled to recover the same
penalties as those imposed upon delinquent taxpayers, and also that the lessee would forfeit his deposit. There is nothing illegal or improper
in this agreement, and there exist no reason why it should not be valid. It was a material part of the contract, and is the law between the
contracting parties.
Counsel of the defendants appear to be of the opinion that under no circumstances can a judgment be entered against the lessee's
bondsmen in this case for the reason that said bondsmen obligated themselves to pay the rents in the case the lessee failed to pay by the
end of the term of the lease, and for the further reason that the lessee was evicted before the said term expired. In reference to this point, it is
sufficient to say that this action was not instituted until long after the full term of the lease had expired.
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified by allowing the plaintiff to recover the five months' rest, together with 20 per cent penalties
thereon, and by deducting from this amount P210, the amount of the actual damages caused by the plaintiff's trespass. As thus modified, said
judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
Torres, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

TORIO v. FONTANILLA
GR No. L-29993; October 23, 1978
FACTS:
On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 156 whereby it resolved to manage the 1959
Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the town fiesta committee
with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the construction of two stages, one for the zarzuela and
the other for the cancionan. On January 22, while in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla who died
thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for recovery of damages. Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting as agents
of the municipality.
ISSUE:
1) Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of the municipality?
2) Are the councilors liable for the death of Fontanilla?
HELD:
The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of municipality. The provision on
Section 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose
upon it a duty to observe one. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent-superior, the municipality is held liable for damages for the
death of Fontanilla. Since it is established that the municipality was acting a proprietary function, it follows that it stands on the same footing
as an ordinary private corporation where officers are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official
relation to it. Thus, the municipal councilors are absolved from any criminal liability for they did not directly participated in the defective
construction of the stage.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Villacicencio Vs Lukban
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the
feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing
public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes
are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of
profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to
compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being
exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished

G.R. No. L-46863

November 18, 1939
IRINEO MOYA, petitioner,
vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.
Elpidio Quirino for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above entitled case declaring the respondent, Agripino
Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines Norte, with a majority of three
votes over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties herein were contending candidates for the
aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the municipal council of Paracale, acting as board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
the elected mayor of said municipality with a majority of 102 votes. On December 27, 1937, the respondent field a motion of protest in the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the Court of Appeals, on July 13, 1939 rendered the judgment hereinbefore mentioned which is
sought by the petitioner to be reviewed and reversed upon the errors alleged to have been committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary to the controlling decisions of this Honorable
Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."
Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the eight (8) ballots now to be mentioned. (1) With reference
to ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2, alleged to have been inadvertently admitted in favor of the respondent, such inadvertence raises a
question of fact which could have been corrected by the Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a position to determine in this
proceeding for review by certiorari. Upon the other hand, if the error attributed to the Court of Appeals consisted in having admitted ballot
Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2 instead of the ballot bearing the same number corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot clearly
appears admissible for the respondent because the name written on the space for mayor is "Primo del Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is
technical and deserves but scanty consideration. (2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was erroneously admitted for the respondent by the
Court of Appeals, the name written on the space for mayor being "G.T. Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the councilor "Alcalde
Pinong del Fierro": appears; but the intention of the elector is rendered vague and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was improperly
counted for the respondent. As to this ballot, the contention of the petitioner is sustained (3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should also
have been rejected by the Court of Appeals. The ballot bears the distinguishing mark "O. K." placed after the name "M. Lopis" written on
space for vice-mayor. The contention of the petitioner in this respect is likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was properly
admitted for respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote within the space for mayor the name of Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial
board and wrote the respondent's name immediately below the line for mayor but immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted by him for
vice-mayor. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of the mayor is clear under the circumstances. (5) Ballot F-131
in precinct No. 1 was also properly counted for the respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote the respondent's name on the space for vicemayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake, he placed an arrow connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed
on the left side of the ballot. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor is thus evident, in the absence of
proof showing that the ballot had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for the respondent and the Court of
Appeals committed no error in so adjudicating. Although the name of the respondent is written on the first space for member of the provincial
board, said name is followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in the next line by word "consehal" and
the name of a candidate for this position. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor being manifest, the
objection of the petitioner to the admission of this ballot is overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for the respondent. On this ballot
the Christian name of the respondent was written on the second space for member of the provincial board, but his surname was written on
the proper space for mayor with no other accompanying name or names. The intention of the elector being manifest, the same should be
given effect in favor of the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein "Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the proper space, is
valid for the respondent. In his certificate of candidacy the respondent gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The conclusion of the trial

court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and "Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not without justification
and, by liberal construction, the ballot in question was properly admitted for the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in precinct No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and
Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots appear to be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of Appeals as acceptable for the
respondent on the ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of
candidacy of the respondent. The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and not "P". Even if we could reverse this finding, we do not feel
justified in doing so after examining the photostatic copies of these ballots attached to the herein petition for certiorari. The second
assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in adjudicating to the
respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. We are of the opinion that the position taken by
the Court of Appeals is correct. There was no other candidate for the office of mayor with the name of "Rufino" or similar name and, as the
respondent was districtly identified by his surname on these ballots, the intention of the voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to vote
for the respondent of the office for which he was a candidate.lawphi1.net
The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor, and it is the contention of the
petitioner that said ballots should not have been counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the respondent. For the identical reason indicated
under the discussion of petitioner's second assignment of error, namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name
mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we hold that there was no error in the action of the Court of Appeals in awarding
the said ballots to the respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2, we are inclined to
accept the rest of the disputed ballots for the respondent not only for the specific reasons already given but also and principally for the more
fundamental reason now to be stated. As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be
the modality and form devised, must continue to be the manes by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular
agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far
as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever called upon to act in
justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and
appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality. Counsel for both parties have called our attention to the different and divergent
rules laid down by this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us to engage in the task of
reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be exactly the same
in factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that whatever might have been said in cases heretofore
decided, no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself,
not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the
suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been erroneously admitted by the Court of Appeals for the
respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In view whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider the counter-assignment of errors of the
respondent.
With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement
regarding costs.

G.R. No. L-14639

March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus submits for
decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great
difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount
purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall the judiciary
permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the
government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16
and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of
Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that
awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they
were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not
been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The
involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary
soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales,
provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in
the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings
to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of
this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others
went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and
friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to
Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the
salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the
full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation,
and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun
in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under
their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit
attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and Governor
Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila
without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton

Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of
Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their
testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918,
none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those
who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the
court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition
copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had
passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women
were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible
to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of
Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the
women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10,
1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court
nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents
Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge
of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal
motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would
later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the
provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who
had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the
respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas
corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao
with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila,
transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that
despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit
memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao,
Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal
requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from
the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to
do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case
is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law
chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police
presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the
statutes and we find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the
eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act
No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and
other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a
law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is
done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of
the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense
lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens

to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not
being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so
elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President
of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either
inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and
the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then
the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take
to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just
as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country,
then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold,
or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna
Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon
the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same
high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why
we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws
to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action,
and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in
interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any
person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall
compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twentyfive and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision
of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this
action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant
proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to
an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and
therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In
the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are
left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal
has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person
in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police
of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the
expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently
proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The
law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence
that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made
returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus
may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests
in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other
hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown
that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of
their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the
benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose
behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found
to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city,
who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved
parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could
forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his
official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over
this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his
power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to
whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should
not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao,
the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process,
may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close
examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in
nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue
from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State,
who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It
was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally
divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished
American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell
was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken
a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta,
and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that
"Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right,
bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which
is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the
legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state seems to me to be based
upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its
jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights
which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person
confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison
doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is
spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment.
This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place
of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be
compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state,
except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other
remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs.
People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of
habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to
produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that
the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it
was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the
child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being
taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to
excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before
the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful
reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse.
Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was
done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The
question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands.
(The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.],
233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court
of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before
the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that
Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive
and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered
that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law.
The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and
been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C.,
622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the
granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas
corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named
in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November
before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of
having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day
named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the
persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney
waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ
was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those
interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which
have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the
women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this
number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of
contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from
sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must
be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every
effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if
necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear
proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women
was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the
public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another
chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents
were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be
expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there
is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident
finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be
done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of
police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally
should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to
vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to
produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the
court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents,
with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate
them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn into the case through
a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill
his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike

from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is
said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police
to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of
Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila,
was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful.
His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ,
and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many
thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would
also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt
of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding.
The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such
an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without
being unduly oppressive such an amount is P100.
In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax,
Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to
strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against
respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the
fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of the habeas corpus proceeding against Justo Lukban,
the mayor of this city.
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great number of women of various ages,
inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of public houses of prostitution, as those in the said
Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this reason, when more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer
and transported to Davao, considering that the existence of the said houses of prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it is
undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown, acted without authority of any legal provision which constitutes an
exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city of Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying with the order of the mayor of the city; neither
do we believe in the necessity of taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to
suppress the segregated district or the community formed by those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said women to return
to their former residences in this city or in the provinces, without the necessity of transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said official is
obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they may return to the places in which they lived prior to their becoming
inmates of certain houses in Gardenia Street.
As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not find any apparent disobedience and marked
absence of respect in the steps taken by the mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties encountered in
bringing the said women who were free at Davao and presenting them before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear
that the said women were living together in a given place. It was not because they were really detained, but because on the first days there
were no houses in which they could live with a relative independent from one another, and as a proof that they were free a number of them
returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living separate from their companions who continued living together.

To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and whether he has acted in good or bad faith in
proceeding to dissolve the said community of prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the
rights and interests of the said women and especially of the patrons who have been directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise
and shameful business in one of the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of the very numerous people of Manila where
relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days reside, the inhabitants thereof being more than three hundred thousand (300,000)
who can not, with indifference and without repugnance, live in the same place with so many unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality are to be taken into account, it is not possible to
sustain that it is legal and permissible to establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an enlightened population, for, although
there were no positive laws prohibiting the existence of such houses within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates of
conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public administration, acting correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the
closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the public, and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although
such a house is inhabited by its true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty, his
individual rights, and his right to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot invoke in his favor the constitutional law which
guarantees his liberty and individual rights, should the administrative authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a certain
island or distant point in order to free from contagious the great majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such
diseases. The same reasons exist or stand good with respect to the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons become
stronger because the first persons named have contracted their diseases without their knowledge and even against their will, whereas the
unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its consequences, knowing positively that
their constant intercourse with men of all classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to adopt, gives way to
the spread or multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men
and women, is still prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest,
typhoid, and other contagious diseases which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can give her sufficient remuneration for her
subsistence, prefers to put herself under the will of another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a
house of prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own
knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident that she can not join the society of
decent women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the community or
society with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she should therefore be
comprised within that class which is always subject to the police and sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency and
morality and to the conservation of public health, and for this reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to
prostitution evade the just orders and resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those who have been worrying so much about the
prejudice resulting from a governmental measure, which being a very drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with
due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in general and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the
authorities which administer and govern it; they have forgotten that many of those who criticize and censure the mayor are fathers of families
and are in duty bound to take care of their children.
For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they assumed, were obliged to
change their residence not by a private citizen but by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and
social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken, availing himself of the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose
of protecting the immense majority of the population from the social evils and diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia
Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true center for the propagation of general diseases and other
evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the change of the domicile
of the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of
every Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have
voluntarily renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative authorities similar measures, more or less
rigorous, respecting prostitutes, considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such measures more
humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in forma, have been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view the
ultimate object of the Government for the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to the living together in a certain place of women
dedicated to prostitution and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope that they adopt another manner of living which is better and
more useful to themselves and to society.

In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is obliged to take back and restore the said
women who are at present found in Davao, and who desire to return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc
District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should expressly make known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao, which
manifestation must be made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to the mayor within the shortest time possible for its due
compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in these proceedings, with respect to the finding as to
the importance of the contempt committed, according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the consequent
imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named
in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November
before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of
having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day
named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the respondents, for the purpose of complying with the
order of the court, could have, (1) produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on
account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not safely be brought before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the same decision, the said respondents ". . . did not produce
the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; did not show impossibility of performance; and did not present writings, that
waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contented
with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary
diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during
this time they were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were
produced at the second hearing by the respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the
non production of the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority decision cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo,
Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made
by the respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed, my opinion was that Mayor Lukban should
have been immediately punished for contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was issued on December 10, 1918,
requiring the respondents to produce before the court, on January 13, 1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they could show that
it was impossible to comply with the said order on the two grounds previously mentioned. With respect to this second order, the same
decision has the following to say:
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents
were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be
expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there
is a substantial compliance with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of the issuance of the first order on November 4th
till the 21st of the same month before taking the first step for compliance with the mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st of
November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to the provincial governor o f Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so
qualified in the decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared before this court on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not
complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstances that seven of the said women having returned to Manila at
their own expense before the said second day of December and being in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was known to Chief

of Police Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the attorney for the respondents, were not produced before the court by the
respondents nor did the latter show any effort to present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was called to this particular by the
undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the respondents, on January 13th, the day fixed for the
protection of the women before this court, presented technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to the city at their
own expense and the other eight (8) women whom the respondents themselves brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and
subordinates succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in Davao they found eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if
they desired to return to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the affidavits presented by the respondents to
this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made to find them
it was not possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women
who, as has been previously said, have been illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao
against their will, only eight (8) have been brought to Manila and presented before this court by the respondents in compliance with the said
two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have returned to Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of whom were
brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation
of the said twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers the other seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own expense before
January 13 we have a total of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the respondents in their
first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons for their inability to present any of the said women that the latter
were content with their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that the respondents, especially the first
named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this court,
could bring before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case, as well as before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance
with the second order, if not the seventy-four (74) women already indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as
is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the said respondent could count upon the aid of the Constabulary forces and the municipal
police, and had transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women before this court
on January 13th. This fact can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the said respondent
has substantially complied with the second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he had not complied with the mandate
of this court in its first and second orders; that neither of the said orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, who is, according to the majority decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which conclusion I agree. The
conduct of the said respondent with respect to the second order confirms the contempt committed by non-compliance with the first order and
constitutes a new contempt because of non-compliance with the second, because of the production of only eight (8) of the one hundred and
eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by virtue of his order and transported to Davao against their will, committing the
twenty-six (26) women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals
with the remedy of habeas corpus, presented by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be granted their liberty,
the respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he made any effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has
disobeyed the said two orders; has despised the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to justice; and lastly, he has created
and placed obstacles to the administration of justice in the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious
disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with the promptness which the nature of the same required.
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct
is such as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply
therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 502.)
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a
person hinders or prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any means, the result is the same as
though he had obstructed by some direct means. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing respect for the law and for the means it has provided
in civilized communities for establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power to
enforce decorum in the courts and obedience to their orders and just measures is so essentially a part of the life of the courts that it would be
difficult to conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it may be said generally that where due respect for the
courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual respect as to
compel obedience or to remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from the earliest times. In England it has been exerted
when the contempt consisted of scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, the law-making power, or the courts. In the American states the
power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive department and the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so far as the
legislative department is concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost universally preserved so far as regards the judicial department. The

power which the courts have of vindicating their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether of record or not; and
the authority for issuing attachments in a proper case for contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial
usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . . (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss of the prestige of the authority of the court which
issued the said orders, which loss might have been caused by noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the respondent Justo
Lukban; the damages which might have been suffered by some of the women illegally detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought
to Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court and of the further fact that some of them were obliged to come to this city at
their own expense while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the
transportation of the said women; and the delay which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition interposed by the said
petitioners and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not opportunately and duly obeyed and complied with, are circumstances
which should be taken into account in imposing upon the respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by
him, a penalty which, according to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment
not exceeding months, or both such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken into consideration the
special circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first executive authority of the
city, and consequently, the person obliged to be the first in giving an example of obedience and respect for the laws and the valid and just
orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as for the orders emanating from the courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to the said
courts in order that justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.
I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine
of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the records
of this proceeding should be transmitted to the Attorney-General in order that, after a study of the same and deduction from the testimony
which he may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of Davao,
both the latter shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution and punishment of the crimes which have been committed on
the occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of Police
Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes committed by reason of the same detention and while the women were in Davao. This will be one
of the means whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should exist
a government of laws and not a government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly Government of
laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.

chong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the
Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights
and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare
it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual,
positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in
that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of
the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use
of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in
times of crisis and emergency.

GONZALES v. HECHANOVA
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without
complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence,
Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very
act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification
can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is
in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but,
also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
In re Garcia, G.R. No. _____, August 15, 1961
RESOLUTION
(En Banc)
BARRERA, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, studied law, became a lawyer and practiced law in Spain. Later, he applied for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations. He cited the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain and argued that he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines
even without submitting to the required bar examinations.
II. THE ISSUE
Can the petitioner validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition to be admitted to the practice law in the Philippines without taking the
Philippine bar examinations?
III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the petitioner CANNOT validly invoke the subject treaty to justify his petition to be admitted to the practice law in the Philippines without
taking the Philippine bar examinations.
[T]he provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish
State cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof:
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the
stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions within the territory of the Other, . . . (Emphasis supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain,
and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting
States, issued by competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject
to the laws and regulations of the latter. . .
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations
of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections
2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first
successfully pass the required bar examinations.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify
the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not
encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
the lower to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
[NOTE (in relation to the incorporation clause): Pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of international law, cannot be invoked in
this case since the treaty cited as justification for Garcia's petition was not even applicable in the first place.]

People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690

FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated
Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and
Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has
already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and
confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was
deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her
vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario
prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified
that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. As evidence, Rosario
herself said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her
vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian. Ritter was also acquitted for the criminal case of rape with homicide. However, it does not
exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victims heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also
free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
DECS vs. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Facts:
Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner
rejected his application based on the three-flunk-rule. He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal
protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. It is not enough to simply
invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation
and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.

G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980

ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner,
vs.
VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
and/or THE COMPENSATION APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of Labor, respondents.
Fernardo R. Moreno for petitioner.
Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.
E. V. Espanol for public respondent.
FERNANDO, C.J.:t.hqw
The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation filed by petitioner, the mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was
drowned while in the employ of private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so, it is admitted that there
was no controversion. Such omission, fatal in character, was sought to be minimized by the filing of a motion to dismissed based on the
alleged absence of an employment relationship. What cannot be ignored, however, is that subsequently, in the hearing of such claim private
respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased a fisherman, was in that ship,
undeniably a member of the working force, but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found
dead. The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect "that sometime in October, 1968,
while Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on
October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty." 1 The hearing officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit. 2 A motion for
reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order dated August 29, 1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas F. Ople, denied such
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 3 Hence this petition for review.
1.
In La Mallorca v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 this Court explicitly held that the failure to controvert "is fatal to any
defense that petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a host of decisions in compliance with the clear and express language of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. 5 The opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Bachrach
Motor Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 6 to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 7
Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted that
nine more decisions had been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 9 to Abong v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission. 10 By the time respondent secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration, a host of
decisions that speaks to the same effect had been promulgated. 11 It clearly, appears, therefore, that the failure of the referee to grant the
award ought to have been remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted.
2.
The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation v. Otadoy, 12 there was not even
any direct testimony that the deceased was drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was that he "was lost at
sea while in the employ of petitioner. 13 Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained. Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v.
Villanueva 14 was cited with approval. Thus: "The fact that the employee was found missing while on board the petitioner's vessel MV 'Caltex
Mindanao' became known to the captain of the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956 when the petitioner
transmitted to the respondent Compensation WCC For in No. 3 stating that the employee was 'Lost at sea and presumed dead as of October
10, 1956,' and that it was controverting the respondent's claim. 15 In the present case, there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning.
That was not controverted. Under the circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law.
3.
It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned while "in the actual
performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on
the presumption of compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of employment, with the
burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim. Time and time again this Court has stressed such statutory
provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from January to April of this year. 16 An appraisal of the counter-affidavits submitted by two
employees of private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly
cannot meet the standard required to negate the force of the presumption of compensability.

4.
Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because of the doctrine that the findings of facts of
an administrative agency must be accorded due weight and consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission 17 finds pertinence: "The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is authorized to inquire into the facts
when the conclusions are not supported by substantial or credible evidence. 18
5.
This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this
Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. So it has been since the first leading case of Francisco v. Conching 19 decided a year after
the 1935 Constitution took effect. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 20 is not amiss:
"There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high estate accorded the
Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor. 21 Further: "No other judicial attitude may
be expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice
and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would
result in frustrating such a national policy. 22 Lastly, to quote from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social
justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As
between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.' 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrelita B. Ondoy is awarded the sum of, P6,000.00 as compensation for the
death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for burial expenses; and P600.00 as attorney's fees. This decision is immediately executory. Costs
against private respondent Virgilio Ignacio.
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Barredo, J., is on leave.
Footnotest.hqw
1
Annex C-1.
2
Petition, par. 8.
3
Ibid, par. 11.
4
L-29315, November 28,1969,30 SCRA 613.
5
Ibid, 619-620.
6 99 Phil. 238 (1956).
7
L-25274, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 877.
8
L-29455, September 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 207.
9
L-26763, December 26, 1969,30 SCRA 811.
10
L-32347. December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 379.
11
Cf. Security Services v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-40739, Jan. 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 269; Dinaro v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42457, March
31, 1976, 70 SCRA 292; Talip v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42574, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 218; Reynaldo v. Republic, L-43108, June 30,1976, 71 SCRA 650; Laude v.
Moderna, L-43009, Aug. 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 569; Vda. de Lauron, v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43344; Sept. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 84; Pros v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-43348, Sept. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 92; Camarillo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42831, Oct. 21, 1976, 73 SCRA 497; Vallo vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-41816, Oct. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 623; Dometita v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43612, Nov. 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 217; Arzadon v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-42404, Dec. 8, 1976, 74 SCRA 238; Delgado Brothers v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42753, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 343; People v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, L-42828, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 350; Bihag v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43162, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 357; Gomez v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, L-43617, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 395; Baterna v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43932, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 409; Buenaventura v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42835, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 485, Romero v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42617, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 482; Evangelista v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43572, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 497.
12
L-27699, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 456.
13
Ibid, 456.
14 112 Phil. 897 (1961).
15
Ibid, 905-906.
16
Cf. Guzman v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-38911, Jan. 28, 1980; Pajarillo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42927, Jan. 28, 1980;
Villones v. Employees Compensation Commission, L-44301, Feb. 14, 1980; Cabriera v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43363, Feb. 21, 1980; Del Rosario v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, L-44114, Feb. 21, 1980; Macatol v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43127, Feb. .28, 1980; Barga v. Employees Compensation Commission, G. R.
No. L-49227, April 25, 1980; Reyes v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-46579, April 28, 1980; Guillen v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-46692,
April 28, 1980; Cenabre v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-46802, April 28, 1980; Avendano v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-48593, April 30,
1980.
17
L-43389, April 28, 1980.
18
Ibid, 15. The opinion of Justice Makasiar cited the following cases: International Factory v. Vda. de Doria and WCC, 109 Phil. 553 (1960); Abong v. WCC, L-32347-53, Dec.
26, 1973, 54 SCRA 379; Mulingtapang v. WCC & Marcelo Steel Corporation, L-42483, Dec. 21, 1977, 80 SCRA 610; Yutuc v. Republic of the Philippines, L-43270, Dec. 29, 1978, 87
SCRA 436.
19
63 Phil. 354.
20
L-25665, May 22,1969, 28, SCRA 285.
21
Ibid, 296.
22
Ibid, 297-298.
23 Ibid, 298. Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission is reported in 120 Phil. 846 (1964). The ponente is Justice J.B.L. Reyes. It must be stressed that the present Constitution
has expanded and made more specific the principles of social justice and protection to labor.