1.

CHI MING TSOI VS CA (CHI MING TSOI,

petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI,
respondents.) GR NO. 119190 JAN. 16, 1997 TORRES JR.
(ponente)
FACTS:
Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral,
Intramuros, Manila. After the celebration and reception,
they
proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they
slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of
their married life but nothing happened, contrary to what she
expected. The same happened to the subsequent nights. In an effort
to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife they went to
Baguio City. But Ching brought along his mother, uncle and nephew.
During the time they were in Baguio, still no sexual intercourse
happened because Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during
siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living
room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed for
10 months but they never had sex, until their separation on March 15,
1989. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private
parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves
for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results showed
that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination
was kept confidential. Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a
closet homosexual (she has seen him using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother), and only married her
to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The defendant also submitted himself to a physical examination. His
penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. It is stated there, that there is
no evidence of impotency, and he is capable of erection. The doctor
said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or
not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of
two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that
the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in
its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his

soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse

with a woman.
Ching then claimed that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason
of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want
their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable,
and whatever differences they have are reconcilable and curable.
Ching admitted that they havent had sexual intercourse yet but it was
because of Ginas refusal and whenever he caresses her private
parts, she always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual
intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court
and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into
by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. One of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage. The abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court
clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
2. CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs SIAYNGCO
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Juanita Carating Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco.
Their marriage did not produce children however, the adopted a boy.
Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the court
seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological
incapacity exhibited through over domineering attitude and causing

him embarrassment and humiliation. The lower court denied his

petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on
the doctors findings that bith parties are psychologically
incapacitated.
ISSUE
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven
psychologically incapacitated sufficient to warrant the nullification of
their marriage.
RULING
The court ruled in the negative. Manuels relationship with
another was caused merely by his sexual infidelity which does not fall
within the purview of psychological incapacity. This act is caused by
his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies
of the doctor failed to show that this infidelity is caused by a
psychological illness or disorder. It is necessary that it his by reason of
a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to perform
his marital obligations.
With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions
constitute psychological incapacity that would render her unable to
perform her marital obligations and that a doctor has in fact stated
otherwise. The evidence adduced failed to show sufficiently that the
couple or either of the spouse were psychologically incapacitated,
rather it showed that they were merely having the marital trouble of
becoming strangers to each other and wanting to get out of it. The
marriage thus cannot be declared null and void.
Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngco
Facts: Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent
Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the
Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could
not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy
in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
After twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent
Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita.
He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an
over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was
exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she

incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone

connected with him
He stated that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, her
resentment and vindictiveness, lack of love and appreciation from her
own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent
and incurable; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent
and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is
still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he
invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to
marry his paramour and that it was respondent Manuel who was
remiss in his marital and family obligation. Respondent Manuel then
denied that he was a womanizer or that he had a mistress.
DR. VALENTINA GARCIA stated that Manuel Siayngco and Juanita
Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a
partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the
marital bond with love, support and understanding.
Issue: Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations toward each other,
warranting the dissolution of their marriage.
Ruling: No. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that
his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with
cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with
respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents
are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any
showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.
An unsatisfactory marriage, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the trial courts
decision.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.

3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Versus COURT OF

APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA
FACTS:
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing
by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in
Manila and had a son, Andre O. Molina. After a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred
to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them. Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family. In October 1986, the
couple had a very intense quarrel of which their relationship
was estranged.

In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and

went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child and abandoned
them. Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual
who thought of himself as a king to be served, and that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted

that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior
of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure
to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were

stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married
on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named
Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for
more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her
and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for
damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioners wife.

The marriage was declared by the Regional Trial Court of La

Trinidad, Benguet as void ab ignition on the ground of
psychological incapacity and was later affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code)
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case.
RULING:
YES. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" doesnt constitute
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons. It is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that
she and her husband could not get along with each other.

There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem. In

the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
NOTE:
The following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the
bar:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability
and solidarity
(2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.

Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and

clinical psychologists.
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.

(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our
law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.

4. Marcos vs. Marcos G.R. No. 136490

FACTS: Brenda Marcos and Wilson Marcos were married on September 6,
1982 in Pasig City. They met in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacanang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential
Guard of President Marcos. After the downfall of President Marcos, he left
the military service in 1987 and engaged in businesses that did not prosper.
As a wife, Brenda always urged him to look for work so that the children
would see him as the provider. They would often quarrel. He would hit her
and force her to have sex with him. The final straw came on October 16,
1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. She lambasted him. He turned violent
and inflicted harm on her. Later on, the petitioner submitted herself to a
psychologist while her husband did not. RTC ruled for the nullity. CA
reversed the decision as psychological incapacity has not been proven by
evidence presented.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA could set aside the findings by the RTC of
psychological incapacity because the respondent did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the
petition.
RULING: The Court ruled that personal or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of evidence she presented does not show incapacity.
The husband is not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
celebration of marriage, but said condition can only be traced to the period
when he was not gainfully employed and failed to give material support to
his family. There is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable.
NOTES: (FROM THE SC DECISION OF THAT CASE)
1.) Brenda argues that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information
because her husband does not want to submit himself to examination. BUT
the Court pointed out that the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
2.) Psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Incapacity must be proven at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, and should be shown as medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such illness should be grave enough to bring about

the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
3.) Essential marital obligations are found in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code, while Articles 220, 221 and 225 pertain to obligation of parents. (PAKI
CHECK NA LANG SA CODAL NYO.)
4.) In cases of psychological incapacity, the Court looks at three
requirements: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
5.) Article 36 should not be confused as a divorce law. It is different from
legal separation that does not have psychological incapacity as ground but,
physical violence, moral pressure, drug addiction, abandonment, etc.
5. Buenaventura VS. CA G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449 In
relation to Art. 41-43 of FC
Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between
petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the
assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular
support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the
minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA,
upon respondents motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants
like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the
RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of
the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the
general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the

property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that

of equal co-ownership.

Lucia and therefore when he contracted the marriage with another

woman he was not considered married. Thus, no bigamy took place.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found,
both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the
parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a
separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
involved in said distribution.

MORIGO VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates for four
years at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Bohol. After school year 1977-78 Lucio and Lucia lost contact
with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo received a card from
Lucia from Singapore. Morigo replied and they started to
exchange letters and became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia
came back in the Philippines. Lucio and Lucia then were
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional
at Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia left the Philippines for
work in Canada leaving Lucio behind.
In 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against Lucio which was granted on January 17, 1992
and took effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in RTC Bohol on September 21, 1993. The complaint
seek the declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage with Lucia,
on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place.
On October 19, 1993 Lucio was charged with Bigamy in an
Information filed by City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City.

6. MORIGO vs PEOPLE
FACTS
Lucio Morigo decided to marry Lucia Barrette when she came
home from Canada after being sweethearts for some time. They were
married in 1990 at the Iglecia Filipina Nacional. Lucia eventually left
for Canada again leaving Lucio. Lucia then petitioned for a divorce
decree in Ontario which was later on granted by the Court of Ontario.
After discovery of this fact, he married Maria Lumbago and later on
paryed for the declaratgion of the nullity of his marriage with Lucia
because no marriage ceremony actually took place. The lower court in
turn filed a case for bigamy against him. They said that nullification of
marriage is not a defense for bigamy. Also, that the divorce acquired
by Lucia is not recognized in the Philippines, Ontario having no
jurisdiction over the marriage of the couple.
Upon appeal, the CA declared the marriage between Lucio
aqnd Lucia as null and void ab initio. Lucio then seeked the dismissal
of his case for bigamy by reason of the declaration of his marriage
with Lucia as null and void meaning no marriage took place. The
lower court and court of Appeals found that said nullification is not a
valid defense for bigamy.
ISSUE
Whether or not a declaration of marriage as void ab intio is a
valid defense for bigamy
RULING
The court ruled in the affirmative. In the present case, the
marriage was declared void ab initio. This means that the marriage
was null from the very beginning and no marriage took place by
reason of the absence of an authorized solemnizing officer which is
an essential requisite. It is considered that Lucio was never married to

ISSUE: Whether or not Lucio violated Article 40 of the Family

Code that can render him guilty of bigamy.
HELD: NO. The marriage between Lucio and Lucia is void ab
initio. There was no marriage ceremony at all performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. Morigo and Barrete
merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere
private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity.
8. GOMEZ vs LIPANA GR No. L-23214 June 30, 1970
FACTS: The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two
marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second

with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second

marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana
concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired
by purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of
P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No.
25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on
February 1, 1944, in the name of Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra
Gomez. On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless,
and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7,
1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced
the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husbands share in
the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed on
Article 1417 of the old Civil Code.
ISSUE: (1) WON a collateral attack on the validity on the second
marriage in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio.
(2)WON that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in
this case.
HELD: Yes. The party who challenges the validity of the second
marriage can be challenged collaterally. There is no suggestion here
that the defendants 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been
annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and
there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in
sub-section (b). the burden is on the party invoking the exception to
prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged
that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by
him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than
seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was
then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
On the second issue, the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there
has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very
action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and when
Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.
Even though the said provision was no longer in force it is still
presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that
neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and
hence such spouse has no right to share in the conjugal properties;
but this legal effect of such presumption derives from the premise that
Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is of doubtful application
if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of the
other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership formed

thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its

existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize
the right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
9. VILLANUEVA vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Orland Villanueva was married to Lilia Canalita-Villanueva in
1988. Orland eventually filed for annulment of their marriage by
reason of force and duress employed on him in order to marry Lilia
who was then pregnant. He claims to have received harassing phone
calls and visits from three men. He also claims that the never
cohabited and that he couldnt have impregnated her before marriage
and that the child died upon delivery. Lilia however contests that he
freely entered into the marriage and that they lived together for one
month and he wrote her letters while he was in Manila. He visited her
and knew of her pregnancy and the child dying because of premature
birth. The case was dismissed and Orland was ordered to pay Lilia
damages.
ISSUE Whether or not the marriage may be annulled
RULING
The court ruled in the negative. The court said that it took
Orland four years to claim that he was coerced into the marriage
which then justifies the possibility that he is asking for the annulment
of said marriage by reason of a bigamy case he is facing. Also, his
being a security guard must have given him proper knowledge when it
comes to defending himself making the claims of force due to facts
stated above untenable. Also, his claim that they did not cohabit is not
a ground for the annulment of marriage especially since he failed to
prove that this was due to fraud, intimidation, lack of consent and the
other grounds for annulment.
Facts: Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa,
Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a
petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence

and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant;
that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that
private respondents child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In
her answer with compulsory counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the
dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a
month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he
returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.
Trial court dismissed the prayer of Orlando to annul marriage.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition.
Issue: Whether or not lack of cohabitation is ground to annul marriage
Held: Appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due
to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of
cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise,
the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who
can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure
to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as
lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue
influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to
cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his
marriage must be upheld.
10. SANTOS vs. CA and JULIA BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4 1995
In relation to Article 36
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Leouel
Santos, the petitioner in his attempt to have his marriage with Julia
Bedia-Santos be declared a nullity. Leouel, a first rank lieutenant in
the Philippine Army, first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting proved to
be an eventful day between the two, as they have later on exchanged
their vows before the Court in Iloilo City on September 20 1986, then
followed by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents in
the same city. On July 18 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy named
Leouel Santos, Jr. However, due to the interference of the wifes
parents over their marital affairs, they started to quarrel over a number

of other things, i.e. their plan to move out from his parents-in-laws
abode, and the frequent days wherein the petitioner spends a few
days with his own parents. In 1988, Julia decided to work abroad (US)
as a nurse, despite the petitioners efforts to dissuade her. She called
after 7 months of her departure, promising that she will return.
However, she never did the same. Leouel tried to desperately reach
and contact her when he went to the United States, but all of his
efforts turned in vain. Having failed to make Julia return home, the
petitioner filed a complaint for Voiding of Marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. He argued that the failure of Julia to return home,
or communicate with him for more than five years shows that the
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
Thereafter, summons were made, wherein the respondent argued that
the petitioner was irresponsible and incompetent. The trial court later
on dismissed the case, which was then affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Leouel Santos and
Julia Bedia-Santos be nullified on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36.
RULING: No. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing percepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (NOT
PHYSICAL) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discahrged by the parties to the marriage which include obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. Psychological incapacity has been confined with the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give significance to the marriage.
Note: You may read the whole case in Sta. Maria, hehe. Page 222223.
11. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel
Molina
Facts:
Roridel Molina filed a case on August 16, 1990 for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Reynaldo Molina before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet.
They were married on April 14, 1985 at San Agustin Church, Manila and had

a son Andre Molina. A year after the marriage, according to Roridel,

Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money and depended on his parents for aid and
assistance. He was also never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them. Sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family and in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged. All
these had thus shown that Reynaldo was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served and it would be to the couples best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start. The RTC affirmed her petition and
declared her marriage with Reynaldo null and void. The Solicitor General
appealed to the CA on the ground that Art. 36 of the Family Code was
erroneously applied by the RTC. The CA affirmed RTCs decision in toto.
Issue: W/N Article 36 of the family code on declaring a marriage null and
void on the ground of psychological capacity was erroneously applied by the
RTC and by the CA.
Ruling:
Yes. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental capacity
and not merely a physical though manifested physically. The psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. It must also exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconciliable differences and
conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
Moreover, private respondent herself stated that her husband is living with
another woman. Thus he is not psychologically incapable but is actually
capable but with a different person. Respondent and her husband could not
just get along well with each other. If at all, the case merely shows loves
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
An Excerpt from the Case of Republic vs CA Regarding the
Interpretation and the Application of the Article 36 of the Family Code

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the
facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many
trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,
[9]
Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
Puno,[10] a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes
this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family,[11] recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
The Family Code [12] echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis,[13] nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not

be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against every
one of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.[14]
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on
evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be

given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
12.
Lucita Hernandez vs. CA G.R. No. 126010
Dec. 8, 1999
FACTS: Lucita Estrella Hernandez and Marrio C. Hernandez
met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when
Lucita was Marios teacher for two consecutive semesters.
Lucita was 5 years older than Mario. They later on became
sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a
child. Lucita supported the family as her husband continued
studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of
their marriage went okay. But this eventually changed. Mario
had an extra-marital relation with another student who was
also married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked Mario to
end it. He promised to but did not fulfill it and left their
conjugal home and child. After some time, he returned to
Lucita and she accepted him. However, his attitude worsened
when he got employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He
engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter
part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted
gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on
one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit
their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private
respondent is not close to any of their children as he was
never affectionate and hardly spent time with them. On July
10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking
the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the
ground of psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the
petition. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: W/N Mario is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill

his marital obligations.
HELD: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground
for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time
of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual
infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited
drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a
spouse. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that at
the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands
character was on the borderline between a responsible
person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
13. DEDEL vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Deldel was married to Sharon Corpuz and said marriage produced
four children. During the course of their marriage, petitioner asserts that
Sharon demonstrated immaturity and irresponsibility. He claims that Sharon
entered into extra marital affairs and was even confined in a hospital for
treatment by a clinical psychiatrist. Said extra-marital affairs continued
specifically that with Ibrahim which bore two children. When Ibrahim left
the country, she went back to Dedel and Dedel took her in and her children
with Ibrahim. However, Sharon eventually followed Ibrahim to Jordan with
her two children. With this abandonment of Sharon, Dedel seeks the
nullification of their marriage. The lower court garnted this by reason of
psychological incapacity as attested to by Dr. Daya. He says that the affairs
that Sharon had, were due to an Anti-social Personality disorder. This
decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not it was sufficiently proven that Sharon was
psychologically incapacitated enough to warrant an annulment of their
marriage
RULING
The court ruled in the negative and affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals. A persons sexual infidelity and her marriage to another which
caused her abandonment of her family with Dedel, as much as these are

unfortunate in nature, cannot be considered as psychological incapacity

because they are mere products of immaturity and other factors. What is
necessary in psychological incapacity is to show that there is a psychological
illness or disorder which is grave in nature that would cause the spouses
failure to perform the marital obligations and not just a show of rejection or
irresponsibility toward said obligations.
G.R. No. 151867
January 29, 2004 DAVID B.
DEDEL, Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L.
CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel exchanged their marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on
September 28, 1966. The civil marriage was ratified in a church
wedding on May 20, 1967. They have four children and the conjugal
partnership acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital
affairs with several men. Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila
Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,
petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of
nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as
defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 149.
Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity.
After trial, judgment was rendered, their civil and church declared null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Court of
Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and
ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion.
Issue: Whether or not the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent
adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity.
Held: NO. "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity. Psychological incapacity stated in
Article 36 of FC is not to be equated with legal separation in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction,

habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In

short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
14. LAM vs CHUA
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals
Lam and Chua were married in the eyar 1984 and said
marriage conceived a son. Chua claims that Lam was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations. To justify the
claims, Chua says that he is irresponsible and keeps on asking for
money for luxury items. Lam does not support his family and he rarely
comes home. He was also said to be a womanizer and mismanages
their conjugal properties. With this set-up, Chua had no choice but to
agree to dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and
separation of properties. This was granted by the regional trial court.
The spouses have been living separately and Chua seeks the
nullification of her marriage with Lam. Chua presented evidence
stating the facts given above but failed to show how much is needed
for child support. The case was reopened at her instance and she
presented evidence showing that Lam has been married twice before
their marriage which renders it bigamous. The Trial Court declared
their marriage void and ordered Lam to pay child support of 20,000 a
month. This was contested by Lam stating that a common fund was
agreed upon wherein they would both contribute 250,000 each for the
support of their child. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void
for psychological incapacity or for being bigamous in nature and
whether or not the 20,000 monthly support is justified.
RULING
The court ruled in the affirmative on the first issue and
declared it null and void by reason of bigamy. It was sufficiently
proven that Lam was previously married and incapacitated to marry
again. Said claim was not even contested by Lam through his
petitions which only questioned the monthly support. He then is
estopped from questioning the nullification of marriage.

With regard to the second issue, the court decided that the
monthly support was not justified because it was decided beyond the
scope of the questions raised. Also, Chua failed to show the amount
of support actually needed and so the court upheld the cpncept of a
fund agreed upon.
Lam v Chua G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004
FACTS
On March 11, 1994, Adriana Chua filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose Lam in the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109) on the ground of psychological
incapacity. During the trial, she testified that her marriage with Jose
was arranged by their parents, that their marriage was abnormal
because Jose very seldom came home, and he never worked thus
she was the only one spending for all the expenses of their only child,
John Paul. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of
support needed by John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-open on the
ground that she was able to secure additional evidence which were
the two Marriage contracts of petitioner, one with Cecilia Santiago
dated May 25, 1977 and the other with Evan Lock dated May 26,
1982. The court declared their marriage null and void for being
bigamous by nature and ordered Jose to give a monthly support to his
son in the amount of P20,000. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration
in the RTC and CA but was denied. Hence, petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring their marriage null
and void even if the ground which the decision was based was
different from her petition
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering Jose to give a
monthly support to his son even if it was not included in Adrianas
petition
RULING
1. The court ruled that the trial court had acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and deprived Jose of due process. It was a serious error to
have rendered judgement on issues not presented as it was beyond
its jurisdiction to do so. However, since petitioner Jose did not assail
the declaration of nullity of marriage in his motion for reconsideration
which he filed in the RTC, CA and SC, he is estopped from
questioning it. Therefore, the court will not undo the judgement of the
Pasay RTC declaring their marriage null and void.

2. Yes. The trial courts action of merely ordering in open court that a
prayer for support be written and inserted in the petition filed by
respondent Adriana does not constitute proper amendment and notice
upon petitioner Jose, considering that Petitioner was not present
during the July 6, 1994 hearing. The determination of amount of
support of the child, should be in proportion to the resources or means
of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.
15. MALLION vs ALCANTARA

Facts: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the
Family Code, citing respondents alleged psychological incapacity. After trial
on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision dated November 11,
1997 upon the finding that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence
to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.

FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Mallion was married to Alcantara and in 1995, Mallion filed a
petition seeking thhe nullification of their marriage by reason of
psychological incapacity. Due to his failure to sufficiently prove the
incapacity, the court denied the petition for nullification. Once again, in
1999, he filed a petition for nullification of their marriage now by reason of
lack of marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized. Alcantara
contested the petition by invoking res judicata and forum shopping. The
petition was denied as well as the motion for reconsideration subsequently
filed.
ISSUE

After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner
filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a
motion to dismiss dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

Whether or not the issue of marriage invalidity due to lack of

marriage license may be raised when the nullification of marriage was also
seeked by reason of psychological incapacity.

In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents motion to

dismiss

RULING
The court ruled in the negative. The concept of res judicata prohibits
this. Res judicata is a bar due to prior judgment. In the present case the same
relief is sought which is the nullification of marriage now for a different
ground. Said issue has already been settled. In fact, in the first petition,
Mallion claimed that their marriage was solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. This admission prevents him from taking a different
stand in the present case where he claims otherwise. The court does not favor
those who present their claims in pieces on different actions.

Issue: Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of
an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in
the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of
a partys psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Ruling: No. Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to
the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary

MALLION VS. ALCANTARA

doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and
the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is
in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether
the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
In the case at bar, the same evidence shall sustain similar actions, which is
the nullity of marriage. Thus, a judgment on the ground of one
(psychological incapacity) bars a judgment on the other (without marriage
license).
16. NAVARRO Jr. vs CECILIO-NAVARRO
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Petitioner and respondent were childhood sweethearts who
eventually got married and their marriage gave birth to four children. The
first part of their marriage was lived in harmony. However, the petitioner
claims that even before their marriage respondent would complain when she
didnt get what she wanted from him and she quarreled with him a lot during
their marriage for not having time for her and was always jealous. A marriage
counselor testified that when she saw petitioner he was harassed, distraught
and unhappy and that she found the marriage to be dysfunctional and
destructive. Reconciliation, she said, was impossible. Velasco, another doctor
testified that professionals per se are incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage because of their time and goals. The respondent was
said to be incapacitated because she did not support her husband and was not
understanding of his profession as a doctor.
Respondent on the other hand fmclaims that she had no marital
problems until petitioner had an affair with another doctor and she caught

him in a motel where they had an altercation. Petitioner eventually stopped

coming home. She said she only refused to have sex with his husband, as his
husband claims, due to her discovery of the affair. She also said that she did
love her husband. The trial court held that both were psychologically
incapacitated and that the marriage is now null and void. Upon appeal, the
Court of Appeals decided that the marriage still subsists.
ISSUE
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated and such
should warrant the nullification of their marriage.
RULING
The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Psychological Incapacity
must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability for it
to nullify a marriage. It must be a mental incapacity that truly renders a
person incapable of performing basic marital obligations such as living
together, observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as well as render mutual
help and support. It must be confined to the most serious cases that would
truly remove the significance of marriage. In this case, the quarrels and
bickering as well as the constant arguments cannot be considered as
psychological incapacity. Difficulty, refusal or neglect in performing then
marital obligations is not sufficient, it must be some psychological illness. A
previous decision of the court gave guidelines for deciding similar cases. One
of the guidelines says that the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff and any
doubts should be decided in favor of the subsistence of marriage. The
testimony of the marriage counselor was based only on the claims of
petitioner and has no probative value and the statement of the other witness is
highly debatable, hence there is doubt.
G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., petitioner vs. CYNTHIA CECILIONAVARRO, respondent
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time
they got married, both in civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting
their first child. Since petitioner was still a medical student, while respondent
was a student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioners parents, on whom they
were financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children.
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didnt have
time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him even before marriage
when he could not give her the things she wanted. He added that she was not

supportive of his career. Even marriage counseling did not work. Petitioner
stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even
told him to look for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of
their marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made
pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him.
Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly accredited by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, testified that when
petitioner saw her on April 6, 1994, he was distraught, harassed, and
unhappy. She concluded from meetings with the petitioner that the marriage
was dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out of the question
since he claims he would go insane if he were to go back to his wife. Relying
on the view of another expert, one Dr. Gerardo Velasco, witness de Castro
opined that professionals are per se incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage because they spend a lot of time in the pursuit of
their profession and have very little time to spend with their family. She
concluded that respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to perform
the marital obligations because she knew, from the start, that her husband
was going to be a doctor, yet she did not give him the support and
understanding that was expected of a doctors wife.
A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted a psychiatric test on
petitioner, testified that tests showed that petitioner was a perfectionist, shorttempered, critical, argumentative and irritable when people do not meet his
expectations. He married Cynthia only after he got her pregnant. He had
depressions and tended to escapism when beset with problems. He was vocal
about his marital problems. He believed that the lack of communication,
absence of quality time, inadequacy in problem-solving, and many problems
caused the failure of the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage
parties psychological incapacity.

is

void

on the

ground

of

the

RULING:
Petitioner failed to show that any psychological incapacity in either of the
two parties existed at the time of the celebration of marriage. The marriage
still subsists.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a)
gravity,
(b)
juridical
antecedence,
and
(c)
incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the

basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged

by the parties to the marriage. These include the obligations to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.[5].
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations, [9] it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness[10] existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Both
petitioner and respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor, an adverse integral element in their personality structure that
effectively incapacitates them from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.[13]
17. Antonio vs. Reyes G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 In relation to Art. 36
of the Family Code
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in
church on December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5
months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying, insecurities
and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He
attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage did he learn about
her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the
marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of
evidence presented was insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not
been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina
guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist

and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological
incapacity.
Respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. She lived in a make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning
and significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and
was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him
prove that her psychological incapacity was have existed even before the
celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to
commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust,
and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is
the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical
courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to
reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.
17. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs QUINTERO-HAMANO
FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Quintero-Hamano was married to a Japanese National named Tosho
Hamano. There relationship started when they lived together in Japan in 1986
and said relationship eventually gave birth to a child. On January of 1988,
they were married in Cavite. However, Tosho left for Japan a month after and
did not return as promised. He only gave two months of financial support and

eventually stopped. Her attempts at communication failed and later on found

out that even as Tosho visited the Philippines, he did not come to see them.
This prompted respondent to file for the nullification of their marriage,
however summons remained unserved. After presentation of evidence, the
trial court declared their marriage null and void by reason of psychological
incapacity. Herein petitioner through the Solicitor General questions the
correctness of said decision as it failed to meet the standards meant by Article
36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE Whether or not Tosho can be considered psychologically
incapacitated to warrant the nullification of their marriage
RULING
The court ruled in the negative and petition was granted. Based on
the case of Molina, psychological incapacitys root cause must be a)
medically and clinically defined b) alleged in the complaint c) sufficiently
proven by experts d) clearly explained in the decision. In these guidelines,
Quintero-Hamanos evidence failed. Psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. The evidence
failed to show that it was a psychological illness. Abandonment cannot be
considered psychological in nature. For psychological incapacity to prosper,
the failure of performance of the marital obligation must be due to the
psychological incapacity or illness of a person not mere failure or dismissal
of a marital obligation.
REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO (GR. No. 149498, May 20,
2004)
Facts:
At bar is a petition to review the decision of the CA and
RTC of Rizal declaring as null and void the marriage between
respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Japanese husband Toshio
Hamano on the ground of psychological incapacity. In 1986, they had
a common law relationship in Japan and then lived for a month in the
Philippines. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
until mid-1987 while Lolita was left here and on November 1987 gave
birth to their daughter. In January 1988 they were married by Judge
Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities which became manifest only after their
celebration of marriage. A month after their marriage, Toshio went
back to Japan and promised Lolita to be home by the holidays and
that he will take steps to make them Japanese citizens. Toshio sent to
respondent money for 2 months after which he stopped giving

financial support despite Lolitas letters. He even came back to the

Philippines but did not visit them.
Complaint for declaration of nullity was filed by Lolita in June
1996. Since Toshio was no longer residing at the given address, the
summons remained unserved so the respondent filed an ex parte
motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication which the
trial court granted. The summons and copy of the petition were
published in a newspaper of general circulation giving him 15 days to
respond but he did not. The respondents motion to refer the case to
the prosecutor for investigation was granted by the trial court and then
Lolita testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. Trial court ruling:
Toshio failed to fulfill his obligations as husband and father as he
remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare
of his family. That he was very immature and such behavior could be
traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into
marital life. The CA affirmed this decision adding that pursuant to
Article 68 of the Family Code, the husband failed to observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic arguing that the CA erred in
holding that the respondent was able to prove psychological
incapacity of Toshio to perform his marital obligations, despite
respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the
Molina case.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent successfully proved Toshios
psychological incapacity to fulfil his marital responsibilities
Held:
NO. The petition was granted and the decisions of RTC
and CA were reversed and set aside. The Court ruled in favor of the
petitioner with the latter contending that mere abandonment by Toshio
of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated
simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent also failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina which states that The
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the

parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an

extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
The Court determined that the totality of evidence presented
fell short of proving Toshios psychological incapacity to assume his
marital obligations. That his abandonment, though doubtlessly
irresponsible, was never proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. Respondent merely testified on the
abandonment by Toshio without presenting evidence that the latter
was mentally ill as identified clinically or medically. Although, as a rule,
there was no need for an actual medical examination (as mandated
by the Court in Santos case), expert witness proving that Toshio was
mentally ill as identified clinically or medically would have greatly
helped respondents case. Santos case further states that What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
18. LANDICHO vs RELOVA
FACTS
This is an original petition in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Rolando Landicho was married to Elvira Makatangay when he
contracted a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia. He was charged with
the offense of bigamy for the fact stated above. Pasia eventually filed an
action before the Court of First Instance seeking to declare her marriage null
and void ab initio because there was force, threats and intimidation and
because it was bigamous in character. Landicho then filed a third party
complaint against Makatangay seeking the declaration of their marriage as
null and void due to force, threat and intimidation beings what compelled
him to marry Makatnagay. He then moved to suspend the proceedings of the
criminal case claiming that it raises a prejudicial question due to the pending
annulment case filed by him against Makatangay. The lower court denied the
motion.
ISSUE

Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy should be suspended

while a civil action for the annulment of marriage is pending because the
latter raises a prejudicial question
RULING
The court ruled in the negative. It agreed with the decision of the
lower court due to some points. One is that annulment cases do not always
raise a prejudicial question that would render it a hindrance to a criminal
proceeding. Also, an annulment of marriage is not for the parties to decide
but should be left to the determination of the competent courts. A subsequent
marriage cannot be contracted before a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the previous marriage is shown. Otherwise, the party contracting a
subsequent marriage is at risk of being charged of bigamy. This means that
Landicho can still be tried for bigamy because the subsequent marriage was
contracted despite the fact that there was no declaration that the previous
marriage is already null and void.
ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO
RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents
FACTS: That on February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I,
presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of
bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner
"being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which
marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an
action was filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe
Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner
as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner
and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15,
1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira
Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with
the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on
the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation,

she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her

before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
ISSUE: W/N the subsequent marriage conducted was valid
HELD: NO. In this case, Landicho was charged with bigamy
for contracting a second marriage without the first being
declared as void or null. He appeals that the first should be
declared void ab initio as it was conducted by means of force
and intimidation. Yet, given the facts, the second marriage
conducted was bigamous because the first was still existing
when he contracted the second one. This falls under, ART.
35 (4) of the Family Code which declares the marriage
as bigamous and void.
19. DONATO vs LUNA
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to review the resolution of the Court of First Instance.
Leonilo Donato contracted a marriage with Rosalinda Maluping on
June 30, 1978. He also contracted a marriage with Paz B. Abayan on
September 26, 1978. Upon finding out that Donato had a subsisting marriage,
Abayan filed for annulment of their marriage by reason of deceit because she
did not know he was married. Maluping eventually filed a criminal case
against Donato for bigamy. Maluping then moved for the suspension of the
trial for the criminal case because the case on the nullity of his second
marriage was still pending and it raises a prejudicial question. He claims that
he wants his second marriage annulled because there was no valid marriage
license presented and there was use of threat and force and that the decision
in said case is material to the criminal case. Luna, the judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila denied the motion.
ISSUE
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy should be suspended
while a civil action for the annulment of marriage is pending because the
latter raises a prejudicial question
RULING
The court decided in the negative. A prejudicial question arises in a
case the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another

tribunal. It is necessary that the decision in the case would determine the
outcome of the other. The court relied on Landicho vs Relova wherein it was
stated that a prejudicial question does not necessarily arise from a bigamy
case when there is a pending annulment proceeding. In the present case, it
was the second wife who filed for the annulment of their marriage by reason
of deceit and not petitioner. It is necessary that for a prejudicial question to
arise, it was the one accused of bigamy who also filed for annulment of the
subsequent marriage because of reasons such as force or threat meaning he
had no choice but to contract another marriage. It was only a year after his
second marriage when he claimed to have been forced to marry for the
second time and has been living with private respondent for 5 years as if they
were husband and wife which made the marriage license dispensable. The
petition for annulment was not his initiative hence, he cannot claim that a
prejudicial question arises.

marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on

the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial
question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and
was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show
that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be
the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the
order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980
should be sustained.
20. WIEGEL vs SAMPIO-DIY

DONATO vs LUNA GR No. 53642 April 15, 1988

FACTS
FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato
was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This
was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan.
Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed
with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on
September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that
Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos
second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was
already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the
solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5
years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26,
1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed
with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live
with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon
learning that Donato already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of

This is a petition to review the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court.
Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action before the court for the declaration
of the nullity of his marriage with Lilia Olivia Wiegel because there was a
subsisting marriage between her and Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia admitted said
marriage but claims it is null and void because she and Eduardo were forced
into the marriage. In the pre-trial the issue agreed upon was the status of the
previous marriage assuming there was force. Lilia asked the court for an
opportunity to present evidence that the first marriage was vitiated by force
and that her first husband was already married to someone else. Respondent
judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the presence of
force in the first marriage has already been agreed upon. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Whether or not the previous marriage was void or voidable
Whether or not there is ground for nullity of marriage
RULING
The court found the marriage merely voidable and that there remains
to be a ground for nullity of marriage. The marriage is just voidable because
assuming there is force, it only falls under the Article 80 of the Civil Code
wherein force is classified. This means that the marriage is valid until
annulled. With this it can be said that there was a marriage subsisting when
Lilia married Karl making their marriage void. The presentation of evidence
with regard to the marriage of the first husband to another is also unnecessary

because a marriage needs a judicial declaration of its nullity before it can be

considered as a void marriage.

no property of the private respondent in his possession. The court denied the
motion to dismiss.

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy 143 SCRA 449

ISSUE

FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia
was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a
petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters
former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital
union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia
likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
HELD: It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage
was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable.
Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly
married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is
void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior
marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias
marriage are regarded void under the law.
21. DOMINGO vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Delia Domingo married petitioner Roberto Domingo in 1976. In
1983 however, she found out that Roberto was already married when they
contracted their marriage to one Ermelina dela Paz who sued them for
bigamy. Delia also claims that she works in Saudi Arabia and visits only for a
month in a year and that she has purchases properties with her earnings and
entrusted the administration of these to Roberto. Petitioner is said to be
purely dependent on Delia and is not employed. Delia filed an action before
the court seeking the declaration of the nullity of their marriage by reason of
a previous marriage as well as Separation of Property. Roberto moved to
dismiss this petition claiming that since there is a subsisting marriage, theirs
is void from the beginning and needs no judicial declaration and that he had

Whether or not the court erred in ruling that a judicial declaration is

still necessary hence motion to dismiss should be denied
RULING
The court ruled in the negative and affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals. Pursuant to New Civil Code which provides that a judicial
declaration of the nullity of marriage is necessary before the acquisition of a
subsequent marriage, the court decided that proceedings for a judicial
declaration must not be dismissed. This provision is for purposes of
acquiring another marriage and also for the protection of the party who may
be at risk of being charged of bigamy. The court also ruled that the separation
of property is to be ruled by provisions provided in the new civil code as
related to marriages eventually rendered void by reason of a subsisting
marriage. This means that when the court decides upon the nullity of their
marriage or declares it to be so, the court also has jurisdiction over the terms
of property separation in accordance with law.
Domingo vs CA
FACTS: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A.
Domingo filed a petition. The petition was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1989 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
entitled Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. Unknown to Delia, he had a
previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them
for bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only
when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted
by her foreign employer; since 1983 up to the present, he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00,
which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties

without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-infact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over
the possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and
possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The
petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any
act of administration and ownership over said properties; their
marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and
Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all
properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its
nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private
respondent has no property which is in his possession. On August 20,
1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit. On September 11, 1991, Judge
Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner
fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer. Petitioner
instead filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the
ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. On
February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.

Petitioners suggestion that in order for their properties to be
separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose
is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of
nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction
to decide the incidental questions regarding the couples properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in
finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
22. BELTRAN vs PEOPLE
FACTS
This is an instant petition filed for review to the Supreme Court.
Meynardo Beltran was married to Charmaine Felix with whom he
stayed married to for 24 years and produced four children. Eventually,
Meynardo filed a petiton for the nullification of their marriage by reason of
psychological incapacity. In her answer, Charmaine avers that Meynardo was
living with another woman and has abandoned them. Charmaine eventually
filed a criminal case for concubinage. Petitioner filed a petition to defer the
criminal proceeding because he claims that it raises a prejudicial question
seeing as there is a possibility that the civil case and criminal case would
give rise to conflicting decisions. This petition was denied by the lower
court, hence the present petition.

ISSUE: whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void

marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should
be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

ISSUE Whether or not the pending case for the nullification of marriage
raises a prejudicial question to the criminal case

HELD: That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant

clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of

RULING The court ruled in the negative. For a prejudicial question to arise,
it is necessary that the criminal case is dependent upon the same set of facts
as the civil case and that the decision in the civil case would determine the
guilt or innocence in the criminal case. In the present case Article 40 of the
Family code governs which states that the absolute nullity of a marriage
requires a final judgment from the courts. In this case, the cohabitation with
another began before a judgment that the previous marriage is void, giving
the respondent the right to file a criminal case. The result of the civil case is
immaterial since a subsequent judgment of nullification of marriage cannot
be a defense to concubinage. This is because it is not for the couples to
decide and declare the nullity of their marriage but a task given to the courts.

23.MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
Facts: Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaine Felix were
married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion
Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. After 24 years of
marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her Answer to said
petition, Charmaine alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain
woman named Milagros Salting. She then filed a criminal
case for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour.
Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial
question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge
Alden Cervantes denied the motion, so was with a Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati,
on certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge
Cervantes. The RTC denied the petition also a Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N declaration of nullity of marriage a prejudicial
question in a criminal case for concubinage
Ruling: No. The pendency of the case for declaration of
nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to
the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

In the case of concubinage, the accused, like the herein

petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal
case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void. It must be held that
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore,
he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore,
has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action
for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in
a criminal case for concubinage.
The petition was dismissed.
24. MERCADO vs TAN
FACTS
This is a petition for review on the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Dr. Vincent Mercado was married to Ma. Consuelo Tan in 1991 and
produced a child. However Tan discovered that Mercado was already married
to one Maria Thelma Oliva in 1976 with whom he also had children. Tan
eventually filed a complaint for bigamy against Mercado. Mercado on the
other hand, filed a petition for the nullification of his marriage with Oliva
which was granted by the court. The bigamy case proceeded and Mercado
admits that the two marriages were consummated but contests that since the
first marriage has already been declared null and void, bigamy could no
longer be charged against him. The lower court as well as the Court of
Appeals found him guilty, hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner can still be proceeded against for bigamy after a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of marriage of the first one
consummated
RULING

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Family Code now provides
that for the absolute nullity of marriage to be considered, it is necessary that a
judicial declaration of nullity be obtained. This is most helpful before
contracting a subsequent marriage. Said provision is a safeguard so as to
lessen the risk of being charged of bigamy. Such circumstance is present in
this case. The subsequent acquisition of a judicial declaration of the nullity of
marriage cannot be a hindrance to a bigamy case. Besides, said nullification
was seeked only after a complaint for bigamy was filed against him. It is
necessary that before contracting a marriage one is already capacitated to
remarry by virtue of a declaration of marriage and not after.
FACTS:
Dr. Vincent G. Mercado and Maria Consuelo Tan got
married on June 27, 1991 in Bacolod City. A Marriage
Contract was duly executed and signed by them. Mercado
entered in that document his status as single. Unknown to
Tan, Mercado was already married to Thelma Oliva. The first
marriage was solemnized in Cebu City on October 10, 1976.
Oliva bore Mercado two children. Tan therefore filed a
complaint for bigamy (Art. 349, RPC) against Mercado in
Bacolod City. Mercado, in his defense, said that his first
marriage was already declared null and void and that Tan had
knowledge of his first marriage. The trial court ruled that
Mercados first marriage was still subsisting and was liable.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the element of previous legal marriage is present
in order to convict petitioner Mercado of bigamy.
HELD:
1. Yes. The element of previous legal marriage is present
in this case. Under Article 40 of the Family Code The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgement declaring such previous marriage void. In
this case, petitioner Mercado contracted a second
marriage even though there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity in his first marriage. In fact, he
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after Tan had filed a complaint
charging him of bigamy. By contracting a second

marriage while the first was still subsisting, Mercado is

liable for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
25. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NOLASCO
FACTS
Gregorio Nolasco met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England
during a port call, Nolasco being a seaman. Parker then lived with him in the
ship for 6 months and married her after his semans contract expired. After
said marriage, he was able to be employed as seaman again and left the
country while Janet stayed with his parents in Antique. The parents
eventually wrote to him saying that Janet has left Antique and that she has
already given birth. He claimed that he has looked for her in England and
even wrote letters to the bar where he met her but the same was returned to
him. He also asked friends for information but to no avail. Nolasco
eventually filed for a petition of declaration of presumptive death of Janet.
Basing from the above fact, the trial court granted the petition. The Republic
of the Philippines appealed this case saying that the presumptive death
Nolasco claims is not based on a well-founded belief and thus cannot be
granted by the Court. The CA affirmed the lower courts decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not Nolasco was able to comply with the requisites of
Article 41 of the Family Code specifically the need for a well-founded belief
that the spouse is dead, which would warrant the declaration of presumptive
death
RULING
The Court ruled in the negative and reversed and set aside the
decision of the lower and appellate courts.
One of the requirements for the declaration of presumptive death is
that it is based on a well founded belief. The others are the year of absence
and the wish to remarry. In the present case, Nolasco claims that he searched
for Janet in England, asked friends and wrote to a bar. It can be seen that his
search was not a diligent one. He merely depended on chance when he
looked for her in a big city abroad and asked acquaintances. He did not, as he
should have, acquired the help and assistance of authorities both local and
that of the British Embassy so as to perform a better search. The court thus
cannot declare Janet presumptively dead by reason of lack of well founded
belief.

26. ARMAS vs CALISTERIO

Marietta Calisterio had a second marriage to Teodorico Calisterio who died

in April 24, 1992, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of
P604,750.00.

FACTS
Teodorico Calisterio was married to Marietta. He is the seond
husband of Armas since she was previously married to James Bounds in
1946. James diappeared in 1947 and Marietta married Teodorico 11 years
after the disappearance. In 1992, Teodorico died intestate leaving properties
amounting to about six hundred thousand pesos. Antonia Armas, the
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition to have her son declared as
adminsitartor of the estate of Teodorico, her being the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico because his marriage to Marietta was bigamous in nature. Marietta
contested this saying that his marriage with Teodorico is valid having
contracted it only 11 years after the disappearance of the first husband. The
lower court ruled in favor of Armas and garnted their petition. The CA upon
appeal however, reversed the decision basing on Mariettas claim that it is the
Civil Code in force at the time of the marriage to Teodorico that should be
upheld and not the present Family Code.
ISSUE

Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on 13

January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on
11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or
on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration
that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed
that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without
bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to
her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.

Whether or not the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta is valid

RULING
The court ruled in the affirmative. The marriage between Teodorico
and Marietta took place in 1958. During said year it was the Civil Code
which was in force and the provision governing their marriage states that a
subsequent marriage may validly be contacted so long as the spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years and it is with good faith that the spouse
left remarries. Since James Bounds has been absent for 11 years before the
marriage between Teodorico and Marietta took place, the marriage must be
declared valid. It was way beyond the seven years prescribed by law. A
judicial declaration was not yet deemed necessary at that time so long as the
party involved is able to show that they have complied with the necessary
requisites. It was the time when the issue arose that should be considered and
not the present time.
Antonia Calisterio Armas vs Marietta Calisterio
In reference to Art 41 of the New Civil Code

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence,
his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of
the estate of the decedent. February 5, 1993, the trial court issued an order
appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta
administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of
Teodorico. However January 17, 1996, the lower court handed down its
decision in favor of Antonia Calisterio.
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that her marriage to the deceased is valid under the Civil
Code, that the marriage is not of bigamous nature for failing to secure a
declaration of presumptive death of her first husband James Bound. In
August 31, 1998, Court of Appeals revised and set aside the RTC decision,
hereby setting that the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico is valid.
Thereby, the estate of Teodorico is divided to her and her heirs and the other
half to Antonio Calisterio as surviving kin. Also, the court ordered the trial
court to determine the competence of Marietta as the administrator of the
estate, if not, the court should determine who among the deceased's next kin

is competent. However Antonia Armas filed motion for reconsideration but

was denied by CA. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage of the respondent (Marietta) to
the deceased is valid
RULING: Yes. The marriage between the deceased and the respondent
remains valid given at that period the law in force was the Civil Code which
in Art 83 states that a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
marriage shall be illegal and void unless the first spouse had been absent for
less than seven years, is generally considered dead. The marriage of the
deceased was contracted in May 8, 1958 , eleven years after the
disappearance of the James Bound. Therefore, the marriage is valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
James Bounds. Therefore, the Court AFFIRMS the CA decision, however
finding that CA erred in awarding the other half of the estate to the nephew
( Antonia's son) the respondent is solely the owner of said estate it is hereby
declared that the other half of the deceased's estate is owned by the
respondent's children.
Notes: Below is the full text of Art 83 which is amended and is now Art 41 in
the New Civil Code, pls take note the difference. The above mentioned
statement is for simplicity and conciseness. :)
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during
the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives

exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in
the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse
present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must
have done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of
fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
[7] The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as
long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that
the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of
Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent
court."
27. MANUEL vs PEOPLE
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals finding petitioner guilty of bigamy.
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gana in
Makati. Said wife was eventually convicted for estafa and Manuel has had no
communication with her for 20 years. Sometime in 1996, Manuel met Tina
Gandalera, a student, in Dagupan. She was then 21, and Eduardo was 39. He
then visited him and they even went to a motel where, despite Tinas
resistance, Eduardo was able to have his way with her. He offered her
marriage and even brought his parents to Baguio to meet Tinas parents and
assured them that their son was single. This is also what appears in the
marriage contract. They were married in April of 1996. After being able to
build a home together, eventually Eduardo rarely came home and did not
send money for support. Tina claims that everytime she asks him about these
matters he slaps her. Eventually, Eduardo got all his things and left. Upon
investigating, Tina discovered in the NSO that Eduardo was already married
and so she filed a case for bigamy. Eduardo contends however, that Tina
knew of his previous marriage and that he believed in good faith that his
marriage was already dissolved because of his wifes absence for 20 years.
The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Tina
Gandalera.
ISSUE Whether or not Eduardo should be held liable for bigamy and that
moral damages should be awarded to Ganadalera.

RULING The court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. In the issue
of bigamy, the court justified their decision by the fact that ignorance of the
law does not excuse Eduardo from complying with the necessary
requirements before a person can contract a second marriage. In his case,
what was important was the judicial declaration of presumption of death of
his first wife. This is because of provisions in the Civil Code as well as the
Revised Penal Code which requires said judicial declaration to avoid being
charged of bigamy. This was also found necessary in order to prevent
problems in the future with respect to the second marriage.

In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera

When it comes to the moral damages, the respondent claimed that

said damages cannot be granted because bigamy is not included in the
specific cases where moral damages is to be granted according to Article
2219 of the Civil Code. The court ruled that although bigamy was not
included in the list of cases provided for by Article 219, moral damages may
nevertheless be granted in light of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 19 provides for the principle of Abuse of Rights which has three
requisites in order to be invoked. They are 1) that there is a legal right or duty
2) exercised in bad faith and 3) the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. The court finds the elements present in said case because he assured
Gandalera that he was single and even indicated this in the marriage contract.
Also, according to Article 20, if the standards setforth in the previous
provision is not met, the person who willfully violates this is to responsible
and in Article 21, said person must compensate the person damages or
injured by his act. From these provisions, a grant of moral damages is
justified because Gandalera was willfully made to believe that she was
marrying a single man and she dutifully served him as a wife only to be
deceived by him.

marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against

learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married

him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo
Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in
his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed
in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
him.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he
was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the
private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the
RTCs decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the wife can be legally presumed dead under Article
390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of
presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family

FACTS:

Code.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus

Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged
with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen
again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in
January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months
after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in
Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage.

HELD:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to
have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such

defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the

law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged
and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce
evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if
the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
The court ruled against the petitioner.

ISSUE
Whether or not Tenebros marriage to Villareyes was valid and
whether he may invoke psychological incapacity in the judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on liability for bigamy
RULING
With regard to the first issue, the court ruled in the affirmative
and ruled in the negative on the latter. For the first issue, Villareyes
was able to present a valid marriage certificate and her handwritten
statement. These were sufficient documentary evidence that can
prove that a marriage was solemnized since that is what is stated in
the document and signed by the parties.
When a court declares a marriage null and void by reason of
psychological incapacity it does not declare the marriage non-existent
from the very beginning. This means that a marriage is still considered
to have taken place. With this, the court ruled that a subsequent
marriage was considered contracted while another marriage subsists
thus constituting bigamy.
Veronico Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals 423 SCRA 272

28. MORIGO
29. TENEBRO vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Tenebro was married to Ancajas before a judge in a trial court
in Lapu-lapu city. This marriage took place in 1990. Eventually
Tenebro showed Ancajas a marriage certificate involving him and a
Villareyes, a marriage consummated in 1986. Tenebro left their home
and said that he will cohabit with Villareyes. However, in 1993, he
married another woman named Villegas. After discovering this,
Ancajas corresponded with Villareyes asking her if their marriage did
take place and Villareyes answered in the affirmative. With this,
Ancajas filed a case for bigamy. Tenebro claimed that he only had
children with Villareyes but there was no existing valid marriage
between them because there was no ceremony that took place and
also there is no record of their marriage in the civil registrar. The lower
court found him guilty of bigamy and said decision was later on
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner contested this by
invoking psychological incapacity in the second marriage.

FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia

Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and
without interruption until the later part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a
certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether she was
indeed married to Tenebro. Villareyes confirmed that the
Tenebro was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. However, Villegas
denied the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes. He
further argued that the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
which is an essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the

date on which the second marriage was celebrated. Hence,

petitioner argues that the elements of the crime of bigamy
are absent and prays for his acquittal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage can be declared

null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
No. The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the
first marriage. As to the second or subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Moreover, the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.

30. SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE

CARINO, respondent.
Facts: During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Carino, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings, and
the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee
Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Carino became ill and bedridden. He

passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies.Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total
of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and]
Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00
from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by
Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted
that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of,
and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage
between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she
became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the
deceased. In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao
appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Issue: Whether or not respondent (Susan Yee) can claim half the
amount acquired by Nicdao.
Ruling: No.
SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the
Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first
marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the
subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the
same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if
a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second

marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for

purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary.
31. TY VS. CA
OTHERS
BUCCAT vs BUCCAT
FACTS
Petitioner met defendant in 1938 and married her the same
year. Eighty nine days into the marriage, defendant gave birth to a
child. It is for this reason that petitioner is seeking the annulment of
their marriage. He said she claimed to be a virgin entering into the
marriage. The court decided in favor of the defendant despite the fact
that she did not appear. The court found it untenable that petitioner
did not notice that defendant was pregnant at the time of marriage
because she was about 6 months pregnant then. Upon appeal, said
decision was affirmed.
ISSUE Whether or not the marriage can be declared annulled based
on the evidence adduced
RULING
The court affirmed the decision of the lower court. This is due
to the fact that it was impossible for a person whose intelligence
cannot be questioned, being a first year law student, to not have
noticed the severe stage and advanced stage that the person he was
marrying was in at that time. His claim of developed abdomens being
normal is not something the court can accept because it was not just
a normal developed abdomen but one in an advanced and severe
stage of pregnancy. The court cannot accept that there is fraud.
AQUINO vs DELIZO
FACTS This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Conchita Delizo married Fernando Aquino in 1954 while she
was pregnant. Aquino now claims that her pregnancy was concealed
from him because it was of another man while Delizo claims that it
was their child out of wedlock. Aquino filed a petition for nullification
of marriage by reason of fraud. He presented the marriage contractv

while Delizo did not present any. The court ruled in favor of Delizo and
did not invalidate the marriage because the concealment of the
pregnancy does not constitute the fraud that would invalidate a
marriage. Aquino tried to reopen the case but it was denied and the
CA eventually affirmed the lower courts decision saying that it was
impossible for him not to have noticed that the girl was pregnant. A
motion for reconsideration was filed or chance to present further
evidence to the lower court which he id. These evidences were his
brothers statement that he himself fathered the child and hid this fact
from petitioner and showed pictures of Delizo saying she was
naturally plump. The petition was denied.
ISSUE Whether or not concealment of pregnancy constitutes fraud
that could annul the marriage
RULING
The court ruled in the affirmative. In the Family Code, the law
includes fraud as grounds for nullification of a marriage. In the present
case, the pregnancy was concealed from petitioner at the time of the
marriage and said child was of another man. This constitutes fraud
and can justify an annulment. Petitioner was able to show that the girl
was naturally plump or fat which does not make it obvious that she is
pregnant. It has been shown that pregnancy is usually obvious on the
6th month when the roundness actually appears. The case was then
remanded for a new trial.
TUASON vs COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS Maria Tuason and Emilio Tuason were a married in 1972 and
this relationship produced children. Maria now claims that Emilio
manifested psychological incapacity through violence causing her
physical injuries and drug use which causes him a suspended penalty.
Maria then filed a petition for annulment by reason of this. Tuason
responded with denial stating that their relationship was lived in
harmony until some differences manifested themselves. The marriage
was annulled and eventually Maria filed for administration of conjugal
properties which Emilio opposed. His counsel asked the court to have
the hearing moved because the counsel was out of the country. On
the day of the hearing Emilio failed to show up and so he was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence. The court
declared the marriage null and void. Maria then filed a Motion for

Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to

Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was eventually contested by
Emilio and he later on filed for relief from the decision of the court.
This was denied and the CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE Whether or not Emilio may claim for relief from the judgment of
the CA
RULING
The court ruled in the negative. It is necessary when
attempting to have a final judgment set aside to be justified by fraud,
accident or mistake. In this case it was the negligence of petitioner
which caused his failure to present evidence. He claims that it was for
medical reasons that he was not able to make it to the hearing but
failure to notify counsel is not the fault of the court. He was given the
chance to be in court but he negligently threw away this chance. He
cannot blame the court for this because said decision was well within
due process of law. This means, he cannot claim relief from judgment.
CORPUS vs OCHOTORENA
FACTS
Mariano Macias filed a petition for the nullification of his marriage with
Margie Macias. This was raffled to Judge Ochotorena. Said judge

immediately served summons to Margie which she did not receive

because her whereabouts were unknown and she only found out
about it through a newspaper. Margie then filed a Motion to dismiss
which the judge disregarded and proceeded with the petition of
Mariano. The judge proceeded with the hearing without the resolution
of the motions.
ISSUE Whether or not respondent acted with bias and partiality as
well as ignorance of the law

RULING The court ruled in the affirmative. Then judge acted on the
petition for nullification and proceeded with it without acting on the
motion to dismiss which was filed within the period prescribed by law.
The judge performed a so called procedural shortcut and ignored the
motion of the petitioner. The judge also did not follow the Rules of
Court which requires an investigation to be made first by the
prosecuting attorney with regard to collusion and if none, to intervene
and check for fabrications in the evidence. It is only after this that a
case may be tried on its merits. Said order by the court did not take
place thus, the judges actions were erroneous.