San Beda College of Law

Mendiola, Manila
CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
De Leon vs. Esguerra [G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987]
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]

De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay
election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as
Barangay
Election
Act
of
1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum
antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino
G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other
respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of
February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall
commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall
have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor
no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their
successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective
and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in
office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not
because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision
in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to
six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with
Sec.
2,
Art.
3
of
the
Provisional
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners
was validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent
OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force
and
effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art
3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by

petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further

provides
in
part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public
auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid
of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match
the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino
corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions.
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xxx

xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII
is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are
not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing
because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by
its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of

rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx

xxx

xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity
of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim
that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes
the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered state action
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second
and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into
by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in
this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared
the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder
will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee

respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award
the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm
the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Magallona vs. Ermita, [G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011]
Gov. of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad [G.R. No. 11524, Oct 12, 1916]
Laurel vs. Misa [G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947]
Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff [G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]
THE DOCTRINE OF SATE IMMUNITY
Sanders vs. Veridiano [G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988]
Festejo vs. Fernando [G.R. No. L-5156, Marzo 11, 1954]
United States vs. Guinto [G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990]
Merritt vs. Government of Philippine Islands [G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916]
Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]
United States vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985]
Republic vs. Villasor [G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973]
PNB vs. Pabalan [G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978]
Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass. [G.R. No. L-15751,
January 28, 1961]
Mun. of San Miguel vs. Fernandez [G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984]
Mun. of Makati vs. CA [G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990]
City of Caloocan vs. Judge Allarde [G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003]
Lim vs. Brownell [G.R. No. L-8587, March 24, 1960]
ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Section 1
Villavicencio vs. Lukban [G.R. No. 14639, March 25, 1919]
Section 2
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni [G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949]
Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
Section 4
People vs. Lagman [G.R. No. 45892, July 13, 1938]
Section 6
Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]
Garces vs. Estenzo [G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981]
Estrada vs. Escritor [A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006]
Section 10
Calalang vs. Williams [G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940]
Almeda vs. CA [G.R. No. L-43800, July 29, 1977]
Section 11
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906,October 7, 2008
Section 12
Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Section 16
Oposa vs. Factoran [G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA [G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994]
Section 19

Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Garcia vs. Board of Investments [G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990]

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First
policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
II.

THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of
the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did
not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services
in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
xxx

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xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially
in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without
discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality
and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade

environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
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xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or
prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true
that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves
sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles
relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity
and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism
by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous
to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute
grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a
valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside
the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy
makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political
desire of a member.

Section 21
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, [G.R. No.
171101, July 5, 2011]
Section 25
Basco vs PAGCOR [G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991]
Section 26
Pamatong vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004]
Section 28
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
Valmonte vs. Belmonte [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
SEPARATION OF POWERS
In re: Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]
Angara vs. Electoral Commission [G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]
Taada vs. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957]
DELEGATION OF POWER
Garcia vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992]
Araneta vs. Dinglasan [G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]
People vs. Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]
Ynot vs. IAC [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]
Pelaez vs. Auditor General [G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965]
ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 3
Espinosa vs. Aquino [G.R. No.
Pimentel. Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008
Section 5
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010]
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 177271, May 4,
2007]
Section 6
6

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995]

Aquino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995]
Section 7
Dimaporo vs. Mitra [G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991]
Section 11
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang [G.R. No. 15905, August 3, 1966]
Osmea vs. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]
Section 13
Zandueta vs. De la Costa [G.R. No. 46267, November 28, 1938]
Section 14
Puyat vs. De Guzman [G.R. No. 51122, March 25, 1982]
Section 16
Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr. [G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998]
Avelino vs. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949]
Arroyo vs. De Venecia [G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997]
Osmea vs. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]
Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11,
1993]
Section 18
Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]
Section 21
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee [G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991]
Arnault vs. Nazareno [G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950]
Senate vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]
Gudani vs. Senga [G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]
Section 22
Senate vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]
Section 24
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]