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G.R. No. 146322, 6 December 2006
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino
Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for
robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100
motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the
original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again.
Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent's
business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and
accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis
to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation
managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the
motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the
obligation and continued the payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan
stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporation's collector,
Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent's
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by
policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader
of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for
respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching
paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left
to look for respondent in his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the
establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the
policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching's
instruction and over the clerk's objection, took the motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified
theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. Respondent moved for dismissal because the
complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the
motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint[8] and denied
petitioner Uypitching's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete
City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the
following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark
(that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious
complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.

ISSUE: Did the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the AntiFencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warrant the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs in favor of respondent?

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously,
not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are
the underlying principles of law and order in society.
YES. Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation's
exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary
to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They
are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to
enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined
procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is
unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he
must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the
sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal
possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on
respondent's establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the
motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal
seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly
disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of
respondent. Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public morals, and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person
should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he
opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a
legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was

established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

G.R. No. L-20089, 26 December 1964
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by
appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is
worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2,
1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
ISSUE: Is Velez liable for damages?
YES. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30,
1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere
breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions
that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law
may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides
that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go


G.R. No. 152259, 28 February 2005
Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged
that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his
friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. Mrs. Filart invited
him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the
hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him
for which she replied: "of course." Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart
carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant. At the
penthouse, after a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes
lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he
was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as
Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of
the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to
leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). Mr.
Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within
hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation. Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic
experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.
Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim are jointly and severally liable with
Dr. Filart for damages for the humiliation suffered by herein respondent.
NO. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr.
Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout
at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is
indeed incredible. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the
party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel
Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Its elements are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an
action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as
Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. A common theme

runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional. As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not
shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty
only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Petitioner clearly violated the Filipinos concept of morality and brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil
Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his obligations. No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,
customs and traditions.


G.R. No. 97336, 19 February 1993
Private respondent Marilou T. Gonzales, 22 years of age, single, Filipino and a lass of
good moral character met petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian citizen and
an exchange student taking a medical course at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in
Dagupan City. Private respondent alleged that petitioner courted and proposed to
marry her. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married after
the end of the school semester. Petitioner went to private respondents house to ask
her parents approval to the marriage. Petitioner forced private respondent to live with
him in his apartment. Private respondent was a virgin before she lived with him.
Because of petitioners persuasive promise to marry her, private respondent allowed
herself to be deflowered by petitioner. However, petitioners attitude towards her
changed and he maltreated her. Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and
asked her not to live with him anymore telling her that he is already married to
someone else. Consequently, private respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner. Petitioner, in his defense, denied all the allegations of private
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code may be applied in case of breach
of promise to marry.
YES. Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise,
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent court found that it was the petitioners fraudulent or
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellants part that made plaintiffs parents agree to their daughters
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage.

PE v. PE
G.R. No. L-17396, 30 May 1962
Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years
of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted
clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant
from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita
disappeared from her brothers house where she was living. A note in the handwriting
of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador The present action was instituted
under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs
ISSUE: May a married man be held liable for moral damages for seducing an
unmarried woman into an illicit relationship?
YES, on the ground that he has caused the woman and her family immeasurable
wrong considering the fact that he is a married man. No other conclusion can be
drawn from the chain of events that he not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the woman's affection and love to the extent of having
illicit relations with her. Verily he has committed an injury to the woman's family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article
21 of the New Civil Code.
G.R. No. 81262, 25 August 25, 1989
ISSUE: Are petitioners liable for damages to private respondent because of
petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he
got from them?
YES. Art. 19 states that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe

honesty and good faith. This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to
as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of
law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent.
This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of
the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes IIt bears repeating that even granting that petitioners
might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which
that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be
held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with
the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several
other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
G.R. No. 132344, 17 February 2000
Respondent Romeo Jader was enrolled in the University of the East College of Law
from 1984 to 1988. In the first semester of SY 1987-1988, he failed to take the regular
final examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He
enrolled the following semester, and filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade on February 1, 1988, given by Prof. Ortega which was approved by
Dean Tiongzon. Thereafter, he took the removal examination on March 28, 1988. On
May 30, 1988, Prof. Ortega submitted his grade of five (5).

Respondents name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for Graduation, with
the annotation that he had an incomplete grade in Practice Court 1.
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor
of Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 and in the invitation for that occasion
the name of the respondent appeared as one of the candidates, with footnote that the
list was tentative. Respondent attended the investiture ceremonies and tendered a
blow-out thereafter.
He took a leave from work for five (5) months to attend a review class in preparation
for the Bar examination. Upon learning of his deficiency, he dropped the review class
and was not able to take the Bar examination.
Respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from
the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages,
unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit. The petitioner denied liability
arguing that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for
an LLB degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students. The RTC ruled in respondents favor. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTCs decision.
ISSUE: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a
student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation
when such is not the case?
YES. When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract
of education is entered into between said institution and the student. The professors,
teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. It is the
contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied
with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be
included among those who will graduate.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams,
cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of
right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction unconscientious.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent
will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate
concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. Petitioners liability arose from its

failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in

misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for
the latter's actual damages; we hold that respondent should not have been awarded
moral damages. It is also respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a
senior law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that
all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on
the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of
requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.

On April 5, 1999, respondent, in order to get the 93 Toyota Corolla, filed a complaint
for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
City, which was raffled to Branch 45 thereof. 13 Two weeks later, or on April 19, 1999,
the respondent caused the enforcement of a writ of replevin and recovered
possession of the mortgaged vehicle. 14 On June 18, 1999, petitioner spouses filed
their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim for moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees. 15 Petitioners asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle
in compliance with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage. The lower courts ruled in favor of
the petitioner but the CA reversed their rulings and issued a writ of replevin in favor of
private respondents. The respondent Bank argued that no reversible errors were
made by the Court of Appeals, and to set aside its decision would result in the unjust
enrichment of the petitioners.

G.R. NO. 165661, 28 August 2006
In June 1993, petitioner spouses issued forty-eight (48) checks totaling P547,392.00
to cover installment payments due on promissory notes executed in favor of Toyota,
Quezon Avenue (TQA) for the purchase of a 93 Toyota Corolla. The promissory notes
were secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed by the petitioner spouses on the
vehicle in favor of TQA. Under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, petitioner spouses were
to insure thevehicle against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire, and endorse
and deliver the policies to the mortgagor.
On June 22, 1993, the promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to Rizal
Commercial BankingCorporation (RCBC). They were later assigned by RCBC to
RCBC Savings Bank. 5 In time, all forty-eight (48) checks issued by the petitioner
spouses were encashed by respondent RCBC Savings Bank. The evidence shows
that the petitioner spouses faithfully complied with the obligation to insure the
mortgaged vehicle from 1993 until 1996. 7 For the period of August 14, 1996 to
August 14, 1997, 8 petitioner spouses procured the necessary insurance but did not
deliver the same to the respondent until January 17, 1997. 9 As a consequence,
respondent had the mortgaged vehicle insured for the period of October 21, 1996 to
October 21, 1997 and paid a P14,523.36 insurance premium. 10 The insurance policy
obtained by respondent was later cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by
petitioner spouses over the mortgaged vehicle, and respondent bank was reimbursed
P10,939.86 by Malayan Insurance Company. 11 The premium paid by respondent
bank exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by Malayan Insurance Company by
On February 10, 1999, respondent sent a letter of demand to the petitioners for
P12,361.02 allegedly representing unpaid obligations on the promissory notes and
mortgage as of January 31, 1999. In lieu thereof, respondent demanded that
petitioner spouses surrender the mortgaged vehicle within five days from notice.
12The petitioner spouses ignored the demand letter.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners unjustly enriched when the respondent Bank paid the
insurance premiums on behalf of the former?
NO. Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long
as it is appreciable in money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and
other indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person. It may also include the
prevention of a loss or injury. In the case at bar, petitioner spouses were not enriched
when respondent obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the
petitioner spouses had already obtained the required insurance coverage for the
vehicle from August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997.

one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed
for moral damages.
ISSUE: Should the parents of Vicenta Escao be held liable for alienating the
affections of their daughter and influencing Vicenta Escao's conduct toward her
NO. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not
lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. The testimony
of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes the Court to be
merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written
before this suit was begun. In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants
for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity".
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
Vicenta Escao exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez without the
knowledge of her parents. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
register. She, thereafter, admitted to her parents that she had already married Pastor.
The shocked Escao spouses then sought an advice from the priest who suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage.The recelebration
did not take place because the father received a letter disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel, their supposed matchmaker.
To escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society, Vicenta had
gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted
by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the
petition. The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her nonappearance at
the hearing.
Without informing her husband, Vicenta left for the United States and subsequently
filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground
of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." A decree of divorce, "final and
absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal. Vicenta, thereafter, married
an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
and, by him, has begotten children; she also acquired American citizenship.
Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint against Vicenta F.
Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to
have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best
for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly
cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved.
In falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are
not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
G.R. No. L-46061, 14 November 1984
On December 15, 1968, St. Louis realty published an ad with the permission of
Arcadio Arcadio (but without permission from Dr. Aramil, an advertisement with the
heading WHERE THE HEART IS. In the advertisement, the house featured was
that of Dr. Aramil and not that of Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked
permission. The same advertisement was republished on January 5, 1969.
After Mr. Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demaning
explanation. No rectification or apology was published despite reciept of the letter by
Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement.
On March 18, 1969, St. Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but
no apology or explanation was given by the company about the error. Dr. Aramil then

filed a complaint for damages on March 29. On April 15, 1969, an ad with a notice of
rectification was published.
ISSUE: Is St. Louis Realty liable to pay damages for misrepresenting (in an
advertisement) the house of Dr. Conrado Aramil as that of Mr. Arcadio?
YES. St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under 21 and 26 of the
Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which
did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who was annoyed by the contretemps.
St. Louis Realty was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated
publication. It never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just
contented itself with a cavalier rectification.

G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites.
While petitioners marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner
contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella. Respondent filed an
action against petitioner for bigamy. Meanwhile, petitioner filed an action for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to
marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another
man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations.
Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a
motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case
for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy. The
Board denied the motion. The Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of petitioners
motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in
accord with law. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the
action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involved is a civil case.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals commit a serious error in refusing to suspend the
legal (criminal and administrative) proceedings despite the pendency of the civil case
for declaration of nullity of marriage?

NO. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in
view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be
suspended until said civil case is terminated. The outcome of the civil case for
annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. The prevailing
rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which states that the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. It is clear from the foregoing
that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension
of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial
question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is
no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000
Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on
June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason
of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As
entered in said document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute
either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused
was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in
a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares,
CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which
matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in
religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on
June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of
Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium,
Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired
by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan. On October 5, 1992, a lettercomplaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present

case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1,
1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than
a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed
an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br.
22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for
having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on
June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having
been legally dissolved.
ISSUE: Is the element of previous legal marriage present in order to convict a person
of bigamy?
YES. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. But in the instant case, the final judgment
declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before the celebration
of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was
already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any
person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been legally dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of
the Family Code states that, The Code Commission believes that the parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that a marriage is void.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet
no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a lettercomplaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first
is still subsisting, he committed acts punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
Morigo and Barrete got married in 1990. Barrete went to Canada to work, but after a
year filed a petition for divorce in Ontario court, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo
contracted a second marriage to Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony conducted because they merely signed a marriage contract without the
presence of the solemnizing officer. He was then charged with bigamy and moved for
a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. His motion was denie and he was convicted of bigamy. In his

appeal, he maintained that he contracted the second marriage in good faith and his
first marriage was void ab initio.
ISSUE: Should Morigo have filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage before
contracting a second marriage to be free from the bigamy case?
NO. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of
the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration
of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional

personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support
from its progenitors, even if the said child is unborn, it may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the Civil Code.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it adds further provided it be born later with the
conditions, specified in the following article (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it
is completely delivered from the mothers womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.

G.R. No. L-26795, 31 July 1970
Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in an action for support.
In her complaint it was averred that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in
having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support
at P120.00 per month, damages and attorneys fees. Duly summoned, defendant Icao
moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendants motion and dismissed the complaint.hereafter, plaintiff moved to amend
the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth
to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no
amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Is a conceived child entitled to support?


G.R. No. L-16439, 20 July 1961
Respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva who voluntarily procured her
abortion, filed an action to recover damages against petitioner Antonio Lazo who
caused the same. The trial court and the Court of appeals awarded damages in favor
of Lazo under Article 2206 of the Civil Code for the death of person. Hence, this
Petition for Certiorari.
The facts show that Nita Villanueva came to know petitioner Antonio Geluz through
her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and
Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her
parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted
again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and
was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz
clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of
Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any
idea nor given his consent on the abortion.

Does an unborn child acquire civil personality?
Can an action for damages be instituted on behalf of the unborn child?
NO. A conceived child has no provisional personality under Article 40 of the
Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it
be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
NO. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages
could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no
such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a
cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished
by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that
lacked juridical personality. Moreover, the prevailing American jurisprudence is to the
same effect; and it is generally held that recovery cannot had for the death of an
unborn child.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased child.
NOTE: A conceived child has no provisional personality under Article 40 of the Civil
Code, hence, no action for damages could be filed on its behalf. If no action for
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.

May the estate of Fragrante be considered as a citizen?

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself,such as under
the bill of rights (Article III), it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein
in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1
(1) and (2) thereof must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for
otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being
deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Among these artificial or juridical persons are estates of
deceased persons.
Thus, it has been the constant Ruling that the estate or the mass of property, rights
and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights
and obligations which survive after his demise. The underlying reason for the legal
fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is
considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
If by legal fiction the decedents personality is considered extended so that
any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving
rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, there is
no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his
The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle,
and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The
fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and
heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment.

G.R. No. L-770, 27 April 1948
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience(CPC)to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. Since
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service, the Public
Service Commission (PSC) issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate to
the estate is a contravention of law because, among others, it is neither a person nor
a citizen.
Is the estate of Fragrante a person for purposes of settlement and
distribution of his estate?


G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
The petitioners herein are the heirs of one Pedro Oria, one of the defendants in a civil
case filed by the respondent before the CFI of Pangasinan. Upon failure of the
defendants therein to satisfy the judgment obtained by the respondent, the lower
court ordered the foreclosure of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the
land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond.
It turned out that Oria died long before the action was filed but such death was not
known to the respondents.

The petitioners sued the respondent for the annulment of the judgment against Oria
and the execution against his land on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the deceased.
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel
for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire
jurisdiction over Oria. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead
co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
ISSUE: Is the judgment of the lower court valid as against Oria who was already dead
and was never served with summons?

She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was
permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On
the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country
or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962.

NO. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a
patent nullity.

On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of
respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation,
after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction.

He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no
more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

ISSUE: Did Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto become a Filipino Citizen upon her marriage
to Moy Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino citizen?

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel
for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire
jurisdiction over Oria. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead
co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.

YES. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

G.R. No. L-21289, 4 October 1971
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she
was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a
period of one month.

The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology
of the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be
deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized."
The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a
condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or
a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a
fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase,
precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien
woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in
force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283
[1869). That she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the
fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau
of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married
to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's
citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon
the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does
not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.
G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
Juan Frivaldo was disqualified to run for the office of Governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines, and Raul Lee, the candidate with
the second highest number of votes and the proponent of the petition for
disqualification was sworn in to office.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition docketed as SPC No.
95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for
his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order
(dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment
to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor.
ISSUE: Can Frivaldos repatriation cure his ineligibility and may it be given retroactive
YES. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines," laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to
this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides
for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D.
725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law
(C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their
husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be
benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who
marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of
the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before

said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women
the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which
right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a
new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost
their Philippine citizenship but now desire to reacquire Philippine citizenship,"
because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent
of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified
procedure of repatriation.

G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification with the Commission of Election alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitutions one year residency requirement
for candidates to the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made
by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.3349772 and in her Certificate of
ISSUE: Was petitioner Romualdez-Marcos a resident of Leyte for a period of one
year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections?
YES. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that for the exercise of civil and fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. In
Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individuals
permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure,
one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which the residence has taken up his abode
Residence in the civil law is material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without living in the place. The important thing for domicile is

that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay
there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.
A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioners being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:
An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one;
Acts with which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue.
When petitioner was married to the then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husbands actual
place of residence fixed by him. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile or residence.