The Brexit Shock

Richard Hyman
Progressives in Britain and across Europe are still struggling to come to terms with what
happened. On 23 June, with a 72 percent turnout far higher than in most recent
parliamentary elections there was a 52 to 48 percent vote in favour of leaving the EU; in
other words, 37 percent of registered electors supported Brexit. There is little tradition of
referendums in British politics, but it is interesting that in those held on Scottish and Welsh
devolution in 1979, it was specified that over 40 percent of the electorate would need to vote
in favour if the result should be valid. This threshold has evidently not been met in this case.
The referendum was a political manoeuvre by prime minister David Cameron, in the
face of growing Europhobia in his Conservative party and an escalating threat from the right
by UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) under Nigel Farage. The hope was that such
an initiative would resolve the conflict within his party and would sideline the UKIP challenge:
a fatal miscalculation. His pledge before the 2015 election to hold a referendum may well
have been based on the assumption that he would continue to govern in coalition with the
Liberal Democrats, who would then block the idea. In the event, Cameron won an absolute
majority and had to put the referendum into practice. His attempt to renegotiate the terms of
the UK relationship with the EU was largely unsuccessful, but nevertheless pragmatically
he decided to campaign for continued EU membership, alongside his chancellor, George
Osborne.
The majority of Conservative MPs supported the Remain campaign, but the party
membership took the opposite position. After sharp conflicts within the government, it was
agreed that ministers would be allowed to campaign for Brexit without being required to
resign their office. The official Leave campaign was headed by the former mayor of London,
Boris Johnson, a late convert to Brexit; he was widely viewed as making a cynical bid for
grassroots support in a future election for the party leadership. UKIP headed a separate
Leave campaign. Most of the overwhelmingly right-wing mass newspapers gave unqualified
and uncritical support for Brexit, featuring sustained attacks on refugees and immigrants.
The vast majority of Labour MPs opposed Brexit, but ran a separate campaign from
the government. For many, however, Remain was supported as the lesser evil, given
widespread disaffection with the neoliberal trend in EU policy. Many of the small groups on
the far left used this trend as an argument for supporting Leave. The Trades Union Congress
(TUC), and most of its major affiliates, gave strong support to Remain, though some of the
main white-collar unions in the public sector took a neutral stance. Only a few smaller
unions, notably the RMT rail union, supported Brexit.
The campaign was marked by acrimony and hyperbole. Cameron and Osborne
highlighted the economic damage which would result from Brexit. Supporters of Brexit
ridiculed these claims as Project Fear, dismissed the overwhelming warnings of economic
experts, and proclaimed that support for the EU was the monopoly of a metropolitan elite. It
was an irony that the leaders of the Leave campaign, Johnson and Farage, had been
educated at expensive private schools, like Cameron and Osborne, but succeeded as
posing as representatives of the common people.
The Leave campaign was negative and failed to indicate what would happen after
Brexit. Two themes dominated. First, by leaving the EU, Britain would no longer be subject to
the requirements of free movement of labour, but could somehow retain access to the single
market. Second, Brussels was an expensive bureaucracy; by leaving, the country would
save 350 million a week which could be devoted to the National Health Service (NHS). In
fact, the UK contribution to the EU, following the rebate which Thatcher negotiated, is 276
million, and a substantial sum is received back from social funds and subsidies.
Many commentators denounced aspects of the Leave campaign, correctly, as
Project Hate. Racism and xenophobia were barely concealed elements in the arguments for
Brexit even though the actual level of net immigration is far lower than claimed by many

campaigners, and much migration is from outside the EU. Immigrants were blamed for
unemployment, low wages, pressures on the health service and overcrowded schools
even though all these problems are attributable to austerity and underinvestment. Totally
dishonest claims were made that Turkey was on the point of joining the EU, and that Britain
could not prevent this. A tragic consequence of this incitement to xenophobia was that Jo
Cox, a young Yorkshire Labour MP, was murdered by a racist gunman a few days before the
referendum. There were hopes that this might shift opinion towards the Remain camp; alas,
this was not to be.
A Nation Divided
The gap of less than 4 percent between the Leave and Remain votes is evidence of a deeply
divided nation. The divisions followed a number of different fault lines, of geography, age and
class. Unlike in parliamentary elections, there were no exit polls on this occasion, but
inferences can be made both from pre-referendum polling and from the detailed results by
local district.
In London, 60 percent of voters chose Remain. In most of the rest of England, and in
Wales, there were majorities, often substantial, for Leave. The support for Brexit was
particularly high in areas which have suffered decades of industrial decline and are bearing
the brunt of cuts in public services: what have been described as the left behind parts of
Britain. In many of these regions, UKIP fared particularly well in the 2015 parliamentary
elections (although, because of the first-past-the-post electoral system, failing to win seats).
This was a sign of a disconnect between the Labour Party and the working class in many of
its traditional industrial heartlands. Conversely, the highest Remain vote, 62 percent, was in
Scotland, where the Scottish National Party (SNP) swept the board in the 2015 election and
campaigned strongly for a continuing Scottish role in the EU, whatever the result elsewhere
in Britain. There was also a 56 percent majority for Remain in Northern Ireland, in part
reflecting fears that Brexit would impose new barriers with the Republic of Ireland to the
south, jeopardising the long and painful process of reconciliation between the two
communities.
The age division was even starker. Almost three-quarters of those aged 25 and under
voted to Remain, as did a small majority of those aged 25-50. Older voters, and particularly
those over 65, supported Leave. Older electors are far more likely actually to vote (and to be
registered to vote), which was decisive for the final outcome.
Class was also a major factor in the divide. Those in professional occupations, and
with higher educational qualifications, substantially favoured Remain; the opposite was the
case for those in manual and routine white-collar occupations, and those with only basic
education. In this sense, the Labour Party, in campaigning for Remain, was at odds with
much of its traditional working-class constituency.
A post-referendum survey asked respondents about the main motives for their vote.
Two-thirds of Remain voters cited the economy, as against virtually none of the Leave
voters. Over half the latter cited the ability of Britain to make its own laws, and a third cited
immigration (for which the sovereignty argument may have served as a proxy, since free
movement of labour was a major point of reference here); these issues were barely
mentioned by Remain voters.
Given the central emphasis on immigration by the Leave campaign, it was a paradox
that it won its greatest support in areas with the lowest numbers of immigrants, and in
particular of immigrants from the enlarged EU. London, which had the strongest Remain
support apart from Scotland, also has the highest proportion of residents born outside
Britain. This correlation was not perfect: for example, East Anglia, which had seen a
substantial influx of East European migrants to work in the agriculture sector, also registered
a high Brexit majority. But regions further north, less affected by post-enlargement migration
(for which Britain imposed no transitional period) recorded larger Leave majorities.

Two explanations can be suggested, one socio-cultural and the other socioeconomic. It seems that the Leave campaign provided a proxy for broader working-class
discontent and alienation, particularly among those left behind by the economic and social
transformations of recent decades. Some observers focus on the assertion of a distinctive
English national identity. With the creation of devolved Scottish and Welsh parliaments, as
well as the Northern Ireland Assembly, England became the only part of the United Kingdom
although by far the largest without a separate system of political representation.
Englishness could then become the basis for rejection of alien policies and institutions.
Symbolically, one may note the proliferation of England flags in car windows during the
European Cup, and the chants by England football fans demanding Brexit and often
descending into racist abuse. Polls show the close connection between self-conscious
Englishness and support for Brexit: at the beginning of 2016, 57 percent of voters who
identified themselves as English supported Leave, compared to only 35 percent of those
who identified as British. The key demand of the Brexit campaign, to take back control from
Brussels, thus acquired a more general resonance in non-metropolitan England. London is
only two hours by train from Brussels, but four hours from South Tyneside, which voted 62
percent for Leave. The London-based politicians who supported Remain were seen as
closer to the European elites than to ordinary citizens in remote parts of England.
As a qualification, one must note the high support for Brexit in some working-class
areas of South Wales though Wales as a whole had a higher proportion of Remain voters
than most of England. Here, and more generally, socio-economic factors must be an
important part of the explanation. The long-term trend to de-industrialisation, already eroding
traditional working-class communities in the 1970s, accelerated under Margaret Thatcher,
particularly with her assault on the mineworkers. Many once proud working-class localities,
with dense networks of community institutions and deep commitment to the trade unions and
the Labour Party, have been turned into deprived wastelands. In Britain as a whole, after
Thatchers election in 1979, inequality increased rapidly. Since the 1990s this has stabilised,
but Britain remains one of the most unequal countries in Europe. Poverty has increased in
line with inequality, and austerity measures have removed many of the social safety nets.
None of this is directly attributable to EU policies, and indeed many of the deprived areas
which voted most heavily for Brexit have received substantial sums in EU social funding. But
Europe was successfully presented as a scapegoat for the alienation and anger of the
losers from social and economic transformation, whose disaffection has been successfully
captured by racists and demagogues. Racist hate crimes escalated in the days following the
referendum result. Progressives, many of whom had become transformed into soft
neoliberals, could provide no persuasive alternative narrative. Perhaps the same story could
be told across much of Europe.
The Immediate Impact
Following the announcement of the referendum result on 24 June, Project Fear has been
shown to be exaggerated but not fundamentally incorrect. Of course the government and the
Bank of England had contingency plans for a Brexit vote, and they attempted to shore up the
economy. Osbornes threat during the campaign that a Leave vote would require an
emergency budget, with increased taxes and further cuts in public spending, was
abandoned; on the contrary, corporation tax has been reduced and Osborne has announced
that his timetable for eliminating the public debt no longer applies. Whether this will be
enough to prevent a recession is unclear. What is already evident is a sharp devaluation in
sterling: the pound exchanged at over $1.50 (and over 1.40) in late 2015, but has now
fallen below $1.30 (and below 1.20). A further slide is forecast. While some exporters may
benefit, costs of imported food, consumer goods and fuel are rising to reflect the lower
exchange rate. This probably implies a cut of over 10 percent in living standards.
The result has caused a crisis in the main political parties. Cameron immediately
announced that he would resign in the autumn, precipitating a bitter election for his

successor. The party rules require Conservative MPs to choose a shortlist of two, who are
then submitted to a ballot of party members. Johnson, whose role in the Leave faction was
widely seen as part of a leadership bid, withdrew his candidacy after being denounced by
Michael Gove, the justice secretary, who had been his ally in campaigning for Brexit. The
favourite among MPs is Theresa May, the home secretary, who supported Remain but
played no active role in the campaign. In the ballot among party members she will face the
relatively inexperienced junior minister, Andrea Leadsom, a fervent Brexit supporter who
stands on the far right of the party. Members may well take the opportunity to express their
anti-EU sentiments by electing her.
A different kind of crisis has enveloped the Labour Party. Jeremy Corbyn, elected
leader a year ago on a left-wing platform and never accepted by the majority of Labour MPs,
was widely criticised for taking a low-key role in the referendum campaign. Some suggested
that he sympathised with far-left supporters of Brexit who seem to be important activists in
Momentum, the unofficial body mobilising on behalf of his leadership. Within days of the
referendum result, the party in parliament passed a no confidence resolution by a margin of
more than four to one. Corbyn refused to resign, but there are prospects of a new leadership
contest which he may still win. Key union leaders are desperately trying to broker a
compromise. Corbyn has helped shift Labour policies away from the Blairite legacy, but he
lacks charisma and has arguably made a number of tactical mistakes. No doubt many of
those now overtly challenging him were always hostile, but he seems to have lost some
support in the soft left of the party. However a major underlying problem, for which he can
hardly be held responsible, is that he is a member of the London intelligentsia, in a party
increasingly run by graduates in professional occupations with few organic links to its
working-class heartlands. The erosion of electoral support, often linked to the rise of UKIP, is
a major factor behind the Brexit vote; it is unclear whether Corbyn, or any potential
successor, has a vision of how to reverse the trend.
The immediate aftermath of the vote has also seen a kind of fightback by many of
those proclaiming themselves the 48 percent, arguing that the Leave vote was won on the
basis of lies and deception (an argument with which many Leave voters now seem to agree).
Many of those whose support for Remain was half-hearted have come to articulate a sense
of loss: the destruction of the values of tolerance and solidarity which once seemed part of
the British character, the rise of a harsher, more divided Britain with frighteningly fascist
colorations. After the predominantly negative tone of the referendum campaign itself, there is
now a widespread assertion that the idea of European integration has a moral value in its
own right. Perhaps part of the problem is that the concept of a European Union, adopted at
Maastricht in 1992, was an act of hubris on the part of the European leaders. The term could
easily be interpreted as signifying a distant, top-down, bureaucratic super-state. The
previous title, European Community, implied by contrast a solidarity of peoples pursuing
their common interests. This possibility of community is one which many Britons are now
seeking desperately to protect and preserve.
What Next?
What will happen next? In Britain, a referendum has no clear constitutional status. It seems
that activating article 50 of the EU Treaty will require a vote in Parliament. Most MPs oppose
Brexit, though most have also said that they respect the referendum result at the moment,
anyway. One plausible scenario is that, if article 50 is invoked, and once the terms of any
negotiated exit become clearer, a new referendum could be held to decide whether to
approve these or to stick with EU membership. Serious negotiations may well be impossible
until the autumn of 2017, after the French and German elections. At this stage, nothing is
clear.
Brexit is likely to lead to the break-up of Britain. In September 2014, Scottish voters
rejected independence by 55 to 45 percent. Since then, the SNP has triumphed in elections,
and is likely to press for a new independence referendum which it would probably win, with

the aim of remaining in the EU. Whether broader EU politics will permit this is rather
uncertain. But Scottish independence will certainly make it enormously difficult to achieve a
progressive majority in elections in the rest of Britain.
The implications for Northern Ireland are also serious. After decades of bloody civil
war, the conflict was ended by the Good Friday agreement of 1998. As part of the process,
the border with the Republic was virtually eliminated. Brexit, which implies reinstating a
hard border between North and South, may cause economic disruption and result in
intensified demands for a united Ireland.
Whether Brexit will cause long-term economic damage is unpredictable, but the
auguries are not favourable. A new Conservative government, even further to the right than
Cameron and Osborne, could well react with intensified austerity. And at least one of its
leadership candidates has called for the removal of worker protections derived from EU law.
Many of the leaders of the Leave campaign who perhaps never expected to win the
referendum have backtracked on the claims and promises made just weeks ago. No, there
will not be an extra 350 million a week to spend on the NHS. No, immigration cannot be
stopped merely by leaving the EU. The alienated working-class losers from the structural
changes of recent decades will find that they are also the main losers from Brexit. For many,
their anger is likely to result in a lurch further to the right. UKIP will doubtless be ready to
harness this anger.
What is certain is that Britain has now become a nastier and more insecure offshore
island. The debate on the alternatives to EU membership has, as yet, barely begun.