IAN

KESARCODI-WATSON

ARE THERE
BORROWINGS

REAL

THINGS?

FROM N;iGARJUNA

I. INTRODUCTION

If things are said to be unique, self-existing (sva-b/r&u), entities @h&as),

dependent for their being not on relations, but on what they intrinsically are,
distinct from what other, different things (as I will call them) intrinsically
are - and most of us, I think, believe most objects to be thus, and theologians
certainly believe that souls and God are, quite as did the AbhidhSmikas of
ancient Buddhism and Plato of ancient Greece believe certain aspects of our
Cosmos to be - then the following arguments from the M&lhyamika philosopher
N@pijunu would seem to be destructively trenchant and perhaps compelling.
The following arguments, coming presumably from N&@junu, are, however presented here as my interpretation of the crucial first chapter of his
Miilamadhyamak.
The problems connected with interpretation of this
work are notorious. Thus, what I at most may claim here is a cluster of
arguments based on one persons reading of the K&-ik&. If it is disputed as
a reading, I offer it as arguments in their own right. I am not solely interested in
the niceties of hermeneutics, and would be less worried by an error in
reading N&ir&nu than an error in presenting a philosophical position as
viable. N@@juna may well be wrong. And I do not want to claim to say
what he says, but rather use what appears to me to be what he is
saying.
N#@iuna Sattack appears to be upon one specific doctrine about
things, the doctrine that says that things are unique and self-existing, i.e.,
the Abhidh&mika doctrine of dharmas. According to this, there are several
specific kinds of thing or dhmma which might arise, or come into being, and
beings of these kinds comprise our Cosmos. But clearly these arguments hold
good, if they do at all, against any doctrine positing such things, no matter
how varied or extensive be their number. And I will speak only of things:
tacitly understanding by this, unique, selfexisting entities, as they are understood, in whatever form or number, by any teaching or belief adhering to
their ultimate or irreducible realness. There are certainly oddities about the
Journal oflndian Philosophy 5 (1978) 371-383. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 0 1978 by D. Reidel Acblishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland.

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Abhidharmikas doctrine - indeed, there are different kinds of Abhidharmika

tradition. But these do not seemto be oddities, or differences,which redound
upon whether there really are things, which is all I am presently takingA@@junas argument to be addressing.
I have indicated throughout the versesof this first chapter in brackets.
I take the ensuingargumentsto be in someway reflected in theseverses.
I havenot included the text. In the following arguments,a considerable
portion will be my own construction of N@irjknas text. StiIl, to compromisewith thosewho may careto checkon this fidelity or openly confessed
dependence,I include the slokunumbersalongwith the sectionalheadings.
II. THE ARGUMENTS:
1. An assessmentof the argument reflected in Verse I

Existing things @h&as), asdharmas or unique, self-existingentities, cannot

comeinto being by arising (utp&fa) out of themselves.For that would mean
the double nonsenseof(i) two really different things being in fact the same;
and (ii) of somethingexisting before it existed.
But nor can they come into existenceout of other things, for that would
involve somethingwhich didnt exist, but starts to exist by coming out of
somedifferent thing (or things). And, for two reasons,this provesimpossible.Firstly, asunique, self-existingentities, they cant arise out of
something (or things) which is (or, are) different from them. For that
would involve someintrinsically unique thing emergingfrom something
different; and what is intrinsically unique cannot come from something, or
combination of things, which differ from it. The intrinsically unique can
only come from somethingwhich in somesenseis (i.e. identical with) it, or
which somehowcontains it.
The secondreasonfor this impossibility can be put asfollows. Things,
we have seen,cannot arise,either out of themselves,or out of other things
whose self-naturediffers from that of these arising (utp#da) things. But
what of the seemingpossibility mentioned above?Could there be things
which at present are other, but which nonethelesssomehowcontain the selfnature of things yet to arise (utpiida)? No, because(i) this would mean a
changein the self-natureout of which the new thing, or things, arise,
having once existed in it asa part; and self-naturescannot change,being

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irreducible ultimates. And (ii), if new things already exist in someother

thing or things, their arising or coming out of them could not be their
coming-into-existence.
Hence, things, asunique, self-existingentities, cannot come into existence out of themselves,or out of other things; that is to say, they cannot
be self-madeor other -made.This meansthat their arising asapparent
things cannot be a matter of unique, self-existing entities coming-intoexistence,or arising; or if things are not merely apparent,but truly unique
entities having self-nature@a-M&Q), then there canbe no sensein which
they can arise at all.
But assumingfor the moment that what at least appearto be things do
arise - for whilst they cannot arise from themselves,nor from others, nor
from somemixture of self and other, there undoubtedly appearsboth to be
arising, and antecedentconditions essentialfor it - our question must now
be, how they arise, or, more generally, what this means.What are these
things we appearto acknowledgein speakingof their arising (utp@du), and
in what consiststhis arising or coming-to-be?
2. An assessmentof the argument rejlected in Verse 2

Well, a sound beginning will be a graspof the kinds of situation in which

things in someway not there before, are believed to arise or come-to-be.
And in listing four such situations, N@&juna embarksupon an exposition of
the very central Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising @rati?ya-samutpada),
or the arising of things in situations suchthat all aspectsof, or elementsin,
these situations in somesensestrictly dependon one another. Perhapsthere
is no teaching more crucial to an adequategraspof the centralities of Buddhism
than that of pratsya-samutptia. But again,I am concernedlesswith this fact
about the doctrine, than with its veracity per se, or at least, the veracity of
what I take it to be.
So then, Nagrfrjuna lists four kinds of dependencysituations in which
things, or putative things, arise.
(i) HETU, or the causation-situation; By causewe mean here that X, out
of which Y can spring, in virtue of what X is on its own. Clearly X neednot
be one thing, asan irreducibly disparateindividual, but could be a cluster of
conditions which together might be thought of as one thing. So this situation
is that in which Ys uprising means,Y is causedby X.

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(ii) ALAMBANA, or the support of senseoperations giving rise to sen&ions-situation: The referencehere is to the five objectsof sense- form
(riipa), taste (MSYI),touch (sp~u@r~ya),sound (&zb&.z),smell (gundha) - us
sensations;for these five, as sensations,dependfor their arising upon the
operation of sense.This situation is that in which Y exists,becauseit is the
dependent object of X (operation of sense).
(iii) ANANTARA, or sequentialcontiguity -situation; It is that situation
in which Y (and only Y) comesafter the advent of X (and onZy X), after
which X ceasesto be. For instance,to usethe exampleoften connectedwith
Humesunderstandingof causation,the movementof billiard ball B (Y)
comesafter the striking and transferenceof movementof ball A (X), after
which ball A stops.
(iv) ADHIFATI, or operation of sovereigninfluence-situation. I take it
what is here meant is the caseof a number of factors working in a situation,
none of which is alone a sufficient occasionfor change,but which together
give rise to change,largely (but not only) due to a certain single factor,
namely, the sovereigninfluence. So, Y is largely due to the influence of X.
The exampleis the eye-organin the arisingof eye-consciousness.
Let us look at what we havegot here.We havehere four situations in
which two supposedlydistinct things are linked.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

a causeand its effect (he&);

a subject and its objects@Zambunu);
an event contiguous with another event in a series(ununturu);
an influence and its product (adhiputi).

Now, in eachcase,we have a linkage between someostensibly preexisting

thing, and somechange, or newly arising (ufptiu) thing, linked intrinsically
with the preexisting thing, or its operation. In (i), (ii) and (iv), it is some
operation of the pre-existing thing that the newly arising (tltpffdu) thing is
linked with, and not necessarilythe pre-existing thing itself; in (iii), there
may be no suggestionof an operation apart from the presenceof the preexisting thing itself. In eachcase,however,there is somesensein which, had
the first not arisenor beenthere, the secondwould not have arisen.What we
have,then, in eachcaseis a change-conveyinglinkage (prutyuyu), in which
the senseof conveying is asgeneralas possible: from initiating or making,
aswith causation,to merely expressing,indicating, or pointing to, as
with sequentiallinkage. To talk of a link betweentwo contiguous events

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in a seriesmay be no more than to saythat one comesafter the other, such

that, had the first not arisen,the secondwould not have.
Accordingly, for pratyu~~ Ive chosento avoid translations like causality
(Stcherbatsky), conditioning causes(Streng), or - which is perhapsthe best
of these - relational conditions (Inada).l I will usethe phrasechangeconveying linkage, meaningto cover whatever is involved, or at least, whateverwe normally think is involved, when two things are intrinsically linked
in the abovefour ways.I will occasionallyshortenthis to linkage and,where
appropriate, sometimesalsoconveythe samenotion by the word operation.
Perhapswe should note, in caseit is not clear, that the model supposedly
here is of three distinct entities involved in four situations:
(i) X, the self-natured thing, supposedprecondition of arising;
(ii) the linkage or operation (if appropriate) conveying the arising and
which must be distinguished from X, as self-natured;
(iii) Y, the resultant arising change,also a self-natured thing.
It will prove most crucial to keep thesethree apart in our thinking, at least
initially, for the situation we are addressingis a threefold one, supposedly
involving three distinct elementsof the abovekind.
Finally, the question whether these four kinds of situation exhaust the
rangeof dependentarising is one I do not wish to discussnow. Whilst I
think it probably doesexhaust the range,there is not much doubt that the
argumentsagainstthis group of four are argumentsalso againstany other.
The argumentsaregeneral,and they are applied to the four in detail only
later (verses7-10).
3. Assessment of the argument reflected in Verse 3

Now let us consider the linkage on its own; and rather than call it a thing,
let us merely think of it, more neutrally, as an independent realness.For, in
the admirable distinction of S.S.Barlingay,3there is little doubt that though
this linkage is clearly distinguishable from the other two aspects(I have
called them entities) of the arising-situation, it is in no way clearly separabZe
from them; in quite the sameway asthe colour of a thing is distinguishable
from its shape,but in no way separable from it. I cannot isolate one from the
other as I am able to do with different things. Accordingly, it is well to bear
in mind that, in considering linkage on its own, we are not considering

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somethingwhich evenmight be thought to be an isolatable thing, though

certainly it is somethingwhich is distinct and independent, in the senseof
having properties all its own. Ontologically speaking,it is non-separable
from things. You cannot everfmd it on its own in our world. But, speaking
logically, it clearly can be treated on its own in virtue, of course,of having
its own properties.
So then, the first thing to note about this linkage is that the self-being,
or self-nature(SW&~&Z),of the things supposedlylinked by it cannot be present
aspart of it. For self-naturecan only exist when things areon their own.
It is unique and self-existing, so it cannot be found to exist except in the
entities, as self-sufficiently independent individuals. To put this another way,
the sva-bhrivanatureof a thing is that which marks off that thing from
others. So it cannot be that which links that thing to others. And we might,
for completenessfurther note that, sincebeing linked meansbeing related,
the sva-bhiiva-natureof things cannot be related to other things either.
Thus, if there everis real relationship, it cannot be between the self-nature
of things.

This is a point we must return to. For now, let us note the secondpoint:
if there is no self-natureof linked things in the linkage, there can be no
other-nature in it, either. For any other-nature, would be the self-natureof
someother thing, that is to say,the nature of something other than those
linked. And this would not be in the linkage, becausethe self-natureof any
thing, other than the independent realnessit is, cannot be in it.
Thus, the linkage or operation hasnothing of either linked thing in it.
If anything of X (or, Y) is in it, it can be no aspectof Xs (or, of Ys) selfnature. But if there is no aspectof its self-nature,then (i) either it doesnt
belong to X (or, I), or (ii) if it does, then it merely is linked to X (or, Y).
This leadsto the very sameproblem - the nature of this linkage.
And anyway, it is Xper se which, if anything, must be held to do the
operation or be linked, not someother thing merely linked to X.
4. An assessmentof the argument reflected in Verse 4

But not only is there nothing of X (or Y) in the linkage, but this linkage is
not in X either. So the puzzle about the real nature of this linkage is not to
be solvedin this way. To explain this in more detail.
This linkage, or operation, is not in X, asthe pre-condition supposedly

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empowered to produce it, or, if the linkage is merely sequential, to be its

contingent sine qua 32011,~
for X could not, then, either be its pre-condition
(if it is thought to be that), or in any way distinguished from it - as it must
be, to be that which is linked by it to Y.
And yet, for another reason, the linkage cannot fail to be in X. Briefly,
what is in X is its self-nature; and the self-nature of this X entails the property
of being linked to Y. That is, X could not be X - i.e., the precondition
empowered to produce, or which factually is the sine qua non of, this arising
linkage or change-initiating operation - without some element of whatever
is meant by this linkage, or operation, in it. For instance, part of the selfnature of X as hetu is defined as being the cause of Y; this is predicated as a
property of X.
On the other hand, and for reasons already given above, X is not in this
linkage, or operation, either. For the self-nature of something cannot be
part of the self-nature of some other thing, distinguished from it. And if
this contradicts the above propertys being part of Xs self-nature, this does
not show either are false -both are plainly true, one necessarily so of a
contingently existing X (that there be an X of this kind is contingent; though
if there is, that it have this property is necessary), and the other, necessarily
so of all Xs (and Ys) whatever. Rather it does show, or hint at, the intrinsic
impossibility of change-conveying linkages as real things at all, indeed, as
independent realnesses of any kind. Logic, it seemswill not allow us to
live with contradictions. Yet the only way to be rid of this one is to abandon
the linkage as anything real. How logic can enable one sensibly to do this
may well, of course, be another puzzle; for it may well prove to be condemning itself on its own grounds. And whilst it may in good faith bear
witness to its own limitations, it can, it may be thought, scarcely exercise
itself to its own destruction. But this is another very thorny issue best left
aside for now. Suffice to say that demonstrating the limits of logic is part
of Ndgrirjuna s exercise. Though whether its self-demolition can also be part
of this task is, perhaps, another question.
Now yet again, the converse of this -- that X is not in the change-conveying linkage - can also be affirmed ; namely, that X cannot fail to be in it.
For this linkage is defined as having some aspect of X in it; i.e., is defined
in terms of X. Causation, for instance, is defined as, an operation of X
Accordingly, the causation operation must have X in it, at least to the
extent of having X, operating in it.

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Again, any contradiction this may presentreboundsonly upon the viability

of change-conveyinglinkages asreferablerealnessesin their own right. But
if they are not, the things they are saidto link cannot be either. All three X-linkage-Y - stand, or fall, at once.
And so we may conclude that the realness of the linkage cannot be
found in X, asthe preexisting producer, or sine qua non, of dependent
arising situations. Nor canX, whose realnesswas not in doubt, be found in
the linkage in question.
5. Use of Verse 5

There are two further problems,or at least two, about the change-conveying
linkage being in X, and hencean intrinsic property of its self-nature.We
might illustrate theseby taking hetu asexample,and speakingof the intrinsic
property, is the causeof Y.
Firstly, being the causeof Y meanscausingY. There are no potential
causesbecausethere are no potential things. Things have self-nature,and
self-naturecannot, logically, be saidto exist potentially; for this would mean
existing in or in virtue of, somethingelse.And self-naturehaving entities can
never exist in, or in virtue of somethingelse.They are unique and self-existing;
or nothing at all.
Hence,Xs being the causeof Y meansit is causingY. That is, Xs having
this property meanshaving the linkage or operation in question as part of
its self-nature.But, and this is the fust problem - or rather, the first reductio
ad absurdurn here - this property, sinceit must include the linkage or
operation, is a relational one, henceone which intrinsically involves things
other than X. So it cannot be an aspectof any self-nature,so not of that of X.
Secondly, clearly the linkage can be in X only when it is so linked; hence,
only when that to which it is saidto be linked (Y) hasactually arken
(utpcida) - i.e. only when there is a Y.
Now this needsexplaining, for it may seemthat making somethingneed
not entail that the thing be made;only that there are other things there,
operating together, to soon give rise to that something.
But the point here is in fact about self-nature- about what is possible,
and what is not, of entities of this kind. And the point is madeby noting
that you cannot assert non-linkage (apratyaya; Inadas non-relational
conditions) of somethingnot yet existing, so cannot assertlinkage of it

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either; sothe only things you canassertlinkage of arealreadyexisting ones.

The only attributes you can assert- indeed, even conceiveof - before
somethingnot yet existing comes-into-being,are those intrinsically involved
in, or related to (were this possible),the self-natureof what does exist - here,
X. And the attributes of Y, being those of its self-nature,can neither be
intrinsically involved in, nor related to, those of any other thing - so, not
of X. In other words, there is not here a mere fault in conceivability, which
would be a matter of mere psychology, but rather the point that the selfnature of one thing can never exist, so never preexist, in the self-nature of any
other thing. Hence,only after somethingwhich has a unique self-naturedoes
exist can you, logically, assertlinkages with other things in its regard.
This leavesus with two paradoxical puzzlesin conclusion. Firstly, that
things cannot come-into-being,for that would meanthey once existed,
potentially - which they cannot. Secondly,that X canonly possessthe
linkage or operation asan attribute when linked to an already existing Y;
hence, can only be (e.g.) the causeof Y after Y exists. Yet X, as Ys precondition, must preexist it. Again, any contradiction can only reflect some
error in our thinking about the nature of this linkage, the status of its
realness,and henceabout X and Y.
6. Use of Verse 6

Now, the linkage can neither be in, nor qualify, real things (like X; sat), or
non-real ones (like potential-Y;asat). It is not in X, becauseit can be no part
of Xs self-nature (verse4). It is not in potential-Y, becausethere can be none
such (verse5). It cannot qualify - that is to say,be about - real things,
becausethey are self-existing. It cannot qualify, or be about, non-real ones,
becausethere are in fact no non-real things.
From this we may conclude that the realnessof the linkage can neither
be in, qualify, or be about, either real or non-real things. And clearly there
are no other kinds of thing. In other words, the linkage per se cannot be a
real thing, for its self-naturemust involve linking real things, henceat least
be about them. But, if the linkage is not real, no more then can the things
supposedly linked be so. This is to say, the dependent arising of whatever
appears- the fact of which is not here in question - cannot be the appearing
of things linked to other things already existing. Its correct analysis,and so
that of these,indeed, all supposedthings, must be otherwise.

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7. Use of Verse 7

Now, armedwith this reductio ad absurdurn, and the resultant conclusions,

we can more conclusively dismissthe viability of eachof these linkagesin
turn. Firstly, hetu.
If the realnessof somethingis neither in real or non-real things, nor
about them, it cannot be said to be an efficient cause,which, assumingthere
were such, must be about real things, or perhaps,about bringing real things
into being where there were only non-real ones(were these possible)before.
But sincethe aboveconditions, which cannot apply to efficient causation,
havebeen found to apply to all four linkages, and so to causation(hetu), it
follows that the linkage of hetu cannot apply, at all, to anything, sinceit is
bound by conditions which make it impossible.
8. (Verse 8)

Nor can the secondlinkage (&mbana) apply betweenreal things either.

For this would meanthat an aspectof Ys self-naturewere the property,
belongsto, or, is a dependentobject of, X. But this is impossible.For Y
is a unique, selfexisting entity, so it cannot contain aspart of its self-nature
somethinglinking it intrinsically to someother thing - namely, X.
9. (Verse 9)

The fate of sequentialcontiguity (anantam) is no better. For, if Y does

not exist, it hasno self-nature, so it cannot yet be said to be contiguous
with X. It cannot yet be said to be anything, for it isnt. And if X no longer
exists, it cannot be saidto be contiguous either, sincethere is no longer
anxtobeso.
Hence,there can be no real linkage of sequentialcontiguity between
real things; so, once again,the things supposedlythereby linked cannot,
as things, be real either.
IO. (Verse 10)

The fourth linkage (adhipati) is but a variant of the first (hetu) so falls to
the samecritique. The collection of factors, of which adhipati is the major,
could together be called X ashetu.

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To put it generally, though, becausethere can be no potential-Y, or Y with

no self-nature,no sensecanbe given to the statement,From the existenceof
X, Y arises.For this would entail a prior linkage betweenX asan existing
thing, and the possibility of Y, that is to say, potential-Y. But this, aswe
have seen,is impossible.
11. (Verse 11)
And, should we now turn our attention to Y, and away from X asits supposid
precondition, our conclusionsmust be the same.In the first place, Y, asthe
thing (supposedly)arisen,as,that is, the dependent change,has self-nature,
so cannot be intrinsically involved in someother thing, or distinguishable
realness;henceit is not involved in any linkage as such. But if it cannot be
intrinsically involved in any linkage, it cannot be in it ; and if not in it, how
could it havearisenfrom it?
12. (Verse 12)
But, sincereal things cannot, then, arise from an objectifiable operation of
changeinitiation, the only things which could arise - for certainly there is
arising (utptfdz) - would be non-real ones,that is to say, non-self-naturehaving ones. Or better, arising realness,sinceit must be non-self-naturehaving (for self-naturecannot arise) can only apparently be things, that is,
seemto us to be things, having boundaries,a seemingwhich must be the
product of our grossestmisconception (avtiya).
To put this another way, and banish any lingering ambiguity here, since
things cannot arise from this operation or linkage, it is at once true that
nothing can arise from such,and that, if there are things, they havenot
arisen. This means,thirdly, that if there is arising, it is not of things. And
sincethe furniture of our Cosmosclearly hasarisen- all acceptableknowingtechniquesestablishthis most clearly - what we call things are only apparently so, being rather what truly has arisen.
Accordingly, what we correctly call dependent changeor arisings,or
realness,coming-to-be,or what NSgZrjunacalls the phala (fruit or product),
must cometo pass,through a transition which itself is other than a real thing
(linkage, shorn of all relation), through a vehicle (X, shorn of its selfnature) which also must be other than a real thing. Change-conveying,in

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other words, must be other than a tripartite relation-entailing time-defined

happening.
13. (Verse 13)
What is more, this real product, which cannot be a thing, does arise in
someway from what went before aschange-conveying.This change-conveying, however,hasbeen shown to have no self-nature.Accordingly, the
real product which does arise can, we might once more note, haveno selfnature either.
14. (Verse 14)
Finally, this real product is neither identical with the change-conveying,nor
doesit consist of somethingother than this. It is not the former, not because
it hasself-nature,for this hasbeen denied, but becauseit is a real product.
And it is not the latter, because(a) it hasno self-nature(so is no thing
whatever), and (b) it is a real product of this change-conveyingand henceit
must in someway be intrinsically involved in it.
1.5.
Under the circumstances,we might now generally conclude, not only
can there be no real things, for there can be no entities having self-naturein
a world where all phenomenaare the singular real product of change-conveying,
but there can be no real relations either. For relation can only be between
things with real boundaries,and hence,with self-nature.This possibility is
incoherent, not only becausethere canbe no things having self-nature,but
also because,were there such,they couldnt be related - a final, and perhaps
most telling, argumentad absurdurnagainstthere being such.
La Trobe University.

NOTES
1I have in mind, of course, the Sarv2stivtiins and their various outgrowths, such as the
Vaibhzisikas and the Sauthtrikas. In their excellent translation of K6nchok-jik-mayWang-posPrecious Curlund of Tenefs, Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins render:
The definition of a Vaibhzisika is: a person propounding Hhay&a tenets who does not

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accept self-consciousness(svusur;nvedunu)and who asserts external objects as being truly

existing. ... The definition of a Sautantrika is: a person propounding Hinayana tenets
who asserts the true existence of both external objects and self-consciousness. (Practice
and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism; Grove Press,New York; 1976; pp. 70 and 92).
aSee, Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist NirvGnu; F. Streng, Emptiness: u
study in religious meaning; K. Inada, NZgtirjunu: u Translation of his Mtiumdhyumakak%ikZ with an Introductory

Essay.

3See his Distinguishables and Separables, Indian Philosophical Quarterly (Jan. 1975).
Compare also the strikingly similar remarks of Kalidas Bhattacharya in Philosophy and
Language Allied Publishers; New Delhi; 1965.
*The word I am translating by all of pre-condition, supposedly empowered to produce,
or which is the contingent sine qua non of, either the change-conveying linkage, or the
change (Y) thereby arising, is kriy5 This has been variously rendered energy
(Stcherbatsky), efficient cause (Streng), and functional force (Inada). Obviously,
efficient cause would not do, for this notion is independently introduced in verse 7
as a virtual synonym for hetu. For various reasons, the other renderings seem to me
inadequate also. I take the senseto relate to the literal meaning of kriyrf, namely,
doing or action. But I have tried to render this notion in such a way that all prutyuyus
are accommodated. For it seemsto me that the word is meant to apply to them all.
Accordingly, I have adopted the above, somewhat convoluted, certainly wordy, rendering.
See, Richard Robinson, Did Nag5rjuna really refute all philosophical views?, Phifosophy
East and West (July 1972). Also, K. Puhakka and R. Pulingandla, Professor Richard
Robinson on Nagdrjuna, The Middle Way (May, 1974) and Nagtijuna and Maya,
TheMiddle Way (Aug. 1974). And finally, Prank J. Hoffman, On Nagirjuna: Common
Sense,Nonsense, and Sense, The Middle Way (Nov. 1976).