USN Fleetdoctrine

The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S.
Navy, 1922-1941
Author(s): Trent Hone
Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 1107-1148
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The Evolution of Fleet Tactical

Doctrine in the U.S. Navy,
1922-1941
Trent Hone*
Abstract
Inthe Japanese attack on Pearl Harborin 1941, the U.S. Navy battle line was destroyed. Althougha great deal has been published
concerning the constructionand operationalhistories of these battleships, relativelylittleis knownabout how these ships would have
been employed in battle. This articleseeks to rectifythis shortcoming by examiningthe Navy's tactical doctrinewith specific focus on
the employment of the battle line and illustratingthe salient principles of the Navy's battle doctrine in the interwarperiod, as well as
AdmiralHusband E. Kimmel'splan for a fleet battle in the Central
Pacific in the fall of 1941.
ON
7 December 1941, the United States Navy's battle line was

destroyed in a surprise attack on the fleet base at Pearl Harbor.
Although many of the battleships were eventually repaired and returned
to service, future fleet engagements would be decided by air power and
aircraft carriers, not by battleships. Consequently, a great deal has been
published concerning the construction and operational histories of the
battleships at Pearl Harbor, but relatively little is known about how these
ships were to have been employed in battle as a cohesive unit.
This article seeks to rectify this shortcoming through an examination of the Navy's tactical doctrine with specific focus on the employment of the battle line. The Navy's own records, particularly the Navy's
tactical publications and records of the Navy's Fleet Problems, form the
foundation of this investigation.
* I would like to thank Mr.Frank
Uhlig and the anonymous readers of the Journal of Military History for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this manuscript.
Trent Hone is a member of the professional staff of TracerNET Corporation and
a graduate of Carleton College.
The Journal of Military History 67 (October 2003): 1107-48
Society for Military History
1107
TRENTHONE
Doctrinal
1922-30
Development,
In the years following the First World War, the Navy's doctrinal development was heavily influenced by serious attention devoted to the study
of the only major fleet action of that conflict, the Battle of Jutland. On
the afternoon of 31 May 1916, the main battle fleets of Britain's Royal
Navy and the German High Seas Fleet fought a large, but tactically indecisive, action off the coast of Denmark. Although ships on both sides
were sunk, the Royal Navy was unable to bring its superior firepower to
bear and decisively defeat the Germans. In the eyes of the U.S. Navy, this
failure was due primarily to the inadequate coordination and communication of the British forces.1
Consequently, one of the main lessons absorbed by the Navy through
its study of Jutland was the importance of concentrated battleship gunfire and the necessity of coordinated movement to achieve this concentration. Battleship
tactical doctrine therefore came to stress the
importance of fluid maneuver and flawless transition from one formation
to another. The Navy thought that if the battle line could be maneuvered
effectively under fire, then the chances of an indecisive outcome, or
defeat in detail, could be significantly reduced.
for Tactical Flexibility and Concentration

The Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922 set upper limits on
the number of battleships the major signatories could have and physical
limitations on new battleship construction.2 In the years following the
treaty, the Navy developed three specific types of formation-cruising,
approach, and battle. Each of these had a specific role, but they were all
designed to ensure the coordinated movement of battleships and other
fleet assets.
Formations
1. The U.S. Navy took note of the numerous navigational errors that occurred
among the British ships at the Battle of Jutland. These errors created difficulty when
attempts were made to deploy the Royal Navy's battle line in position ahead of the
German forces, and again later when effort was made to locate the German forces
after contact was lost. Report of Tactical Exercises 3-5 October, Commander-inChief, United States Fleet, 12 October 1933 (Roll 16, Target2, Fleet Problem XV,Correspondence Regarding Concept of the Problem, Record Group 38 [Records of the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations], National Archives and Records Administration [NARA],Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as RG 38, NARA]), p. 12.
2. Under the WashingtonTreaty, Great Britain was limited to twenty battleships,
while the United States was allowed eighteen; both had the same overall displacement
limit of 525,000 tons. Japan was restricted to ten battleships and an overall displacement of 315,000 tons. New battleships were to be limited to 35,000 tons standard displacement and possess guns no larger than sixteen-inch. For battleships retained
under the treaty, 3,000 tons could be added in order to improve their capacity to
1108
THE JOURNAL OF
Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-41
Cruising formations were designed for those situations when the

position of the enemy was unknown and the chances of contact were
slight; these formations were the most dispersed, employing a variety of
ships in concentric circles around the fleet guide. The battleships and
Figure 1: Typical Cruising Formation3

resist air and submarine attack. Ships' Data, U.S. Naval Vessels, January 1, 1938
(Washington: GPO, 1938), v-xvii, 277-83.
3. U.S.F. 10, Current Tactical Orders, United States Fleet, 1934 (WW2 CF, Box
270, Naval Historical Center [NHC]), Cruising Disposition 4L, Diagram Number One.
MILITARY HISTORY
1109
TRENTHONE
tf
FLEET
AXIS
I
tt C"CLCE
CAS CENTER
,45
75
900
210
ISO0\
1 CA FROM
RIGHT FLANK
1 CA FROM
LEFT FLANK
CIRCLE 10
Figure 2: Typical Approach Formation4

fleet train would be located closest to the center, with cruisers and
destroyers deployed on more distant arcs.5
4. U.S.F. 10, Current Tactical Orders, United States Fleet, 1938 (WW2 CF, Box
270, NHC), Cruising Disposition 6R, p. 13.
5. F.T.P 45, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1924, WorldWar
Two Command File (WW2 CF), Box 106, Cruising Disposition No. 2, p. 27, Classified
Operational Archives, NHC, WashingtonNavy Yard,Washington, D.C. I am grateful to
Navy archivist Kenneth Johnson, whose assistance in locating documents in the Naval
Historical Center's Operational Archives was invaluable. U.S.F. 10, Current Tactical
1110
THE
JOURNAL
OF
Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41
The use of concentric circles allowed the whole fleet to change direction very quickly without complex maneuvers. Earlier formations were
rectangular or linear and required more complex maneuvering, particularly when undergoing a change of course.6 By timing an attack to coincide with such a maneuver, the enemy could gain an advantage. In a
circular formation, each ship could simultaneously assume the new fleet
course, and the formation would remain unchanged.
When the general location of the enemy had been determined, the
ships would shift into an approach formation. Approach formations featured a more concentrated arrangement and were intended to ensure
that all elements of the fleet would be able to enjoy an acceptable level
of mutual support while still maintaining a formation broad enough to
permit contact with the enemy.7
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Figure 3: Typical Battle Formation8

Orders, United States Fleet, 1934 (WW2CF, Box 270, NHC), Cruising Disposition 4L,
Diagram Number One; MarkAllen Campbell, "The Influence of Air Power Upon the
Evolution of Battle Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941" (M.A.Thesis, University of
Massachusetts, December 1992), 83-88.
6. F.T.P 45, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1924 (WW2 CF,
Box 106, NHC), Cruising Disposition No. 1, p. 25.
7. Campbell, "The Influence of Air Power,"83-88.
8. U.S.F. 10, Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, United States Fleet, 1941
(WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC), DiagramNumber One, p. 33.
MILITARY HISTORY
1111
TRENTHONE
Once contact was made with the enemy and his location determined, the fleet would deploy into battle formation. Battle formations
represented the maximum concentration of force and were designed to
allow all elements of the fleet to focus on the destruction of the enemy
battle line.9 Light forces would concentrate at the head and rear of the
battle line. The exact ratio of this distribution would be determined by
the specific situation; placing two-thirds of the light forces in the van and
one-third toward the rear appears to have been the most common
arrangement.10
The Importance of a Steady Course

The importance of maneuver lay not only in the Navy's ability to
concentrate and coordinate its battleships, but also in its influence on
the ability of those battleships to hit their targets. The technological limitations of the 1920s and 1930s, coupled with the complexity of hitting
a moving ship with a battleship shell, made it extremely important that
the Navy's battleships steam a steady course in order to deliver accurate
fire on the enemy.
The fire control computers of the day were analog predictors, dependent on relatively slow maneuvering for the development of a successful
gunnery solution.1l Ensuring that one's own ships maneuvered deliberately was vital; otherwise, the fire control solution would be incorrect
and hitting would become a matter of pure chance.
Conversely, if the enemy battle line could be forced to maneuver, it
would be placed at a significant disadvantage and be incapable of firing
accurately. At close range, the enemy could be forced to maneuver by a
massed destroyer attack; the Germans had forced the Grand Fleet to
turn away with a large destroyer attack at Jutland. But the enemy would
be most vulnerable if forced to maneuver at longer range during the transition into battle formation. If the enemy's deployment could be disrupted, then the resulting confusion would have a significant impact on
the battle.12
In the 1920s such an attack at long range could be effectively performed only by battleship gunfire. Destroyer torpedoes did not have the
necessary range, and existing airframes were too light to reliably carry a
payload large enough for an effective attack. The Navy's battleships were
particularly well suited to employ concentrated gunfire at extreme range.
9. Campbell,"TheInfluenceof Air Power,"83-88.
10. Ibid.,89.
11. Norman Friedman, US Battleships: An Illustrated Design History (Annapo-
lis, Md.:NavalInstitutePress,1985), 173.

12. Campbell,"TheInfluenceof Air Power,"89.
1112 *
THE JOURNAL OF
U.S. Navy Advantages and the Pursuit of Long-Range Fire

Existing Battleship Designs
The numerous design studies published by Norman Friedman have
illustrated two significant advantages that the Navy's battleships possessed over their contemporaries:
* First, the Navy had three modern, well-protected battleships
armed with sixteen-inch guns in the ships of the Colorado
class.13 Sixteen-inch guns were the largest allowed under the
Washington Treaty, and as the Royal Navy and Japan's Imperial
Navy were each allowed only two battleships with sixteen-inch
guns, the Navy had a significant advantage at the longer ranges
these guns could reach.
* Second, beginning with the ships of the Nevada class, all the
Navy's battleships had used the "all-or-nothing" armor scheme.
Employing only the heaviest armor over the most vital portions
of the ship, "all or nothing" was the first battleship armor
scheme specifically intended to protect the ship in combat
beyond ten thousand yards.14 Twelve of the Navy's eighteen battleships were armored in this manner.
In contrast, the battleships of other navies had been designed with
"incremental" armor schemes, a patchwork of armor of varied thicknesses. These schemes did not employ substantial protection for the
decks, which were vulnerable to the steeper trajectory of plunging shells
fired from longer ranges.15
Experience in the First World War had shown that battleships could
and would engage each other at ranges of twenty thousand yards and
beyond. At these expected battle ranges, the Navy's battleships were well
protected. Combined with the possession of three modern ships armed
with sixteen-inch guns, the Navy's battle line possessed a distinct advantage, making the concept of engagement at long range particularly attractive. The problem then became one of how to ensure accurate fire at
these great distances.
13. Friedman, US Battleships, 183.

14. Ibid., 101-2; Norman Friedman, "USSNevada: The 'all or nothing' Scheme
of Protection," Warship 1, no. 2, 32.
15. The British battleships Nelson and Rodney, which did feature an "allor nothing" scheme, are not considered here because they were not completed until 1927,
well after the acceptance of the Washington Treaty. See Norman Friedman,Battleship
Design and Development, 1905-1945 (Greenwich, England:Conway Maritime Press,
1978), 54-66.
MILITARY HISTORY
1113
TRENT HONE
Aerial Spotting
Before the advent of radar-directed fire control in World War II, the
accuracy of gunfire was dependent on the ability to spot the fall of shot;
this in turn relied on the ability to see the impact of shells that missed
the target and the degree to which they had been short or long. The spotters needed to see not only the masts and superstructure of the target
ship, but more importantly, the ship's waterline, because unless the distance between the target ship's hull and the splashes of missing shells
could be gauged, the fire control solution could not be accurately
adjusted.
The maximum range of accurate gunfire therefore became limited by
the curvature of the Earth and the height of the position from which the
spotting was being performed. In practice, this limited the effective range
of battleship gunfire to between twenty-two thousand and twenty-six
thousand yards when spotting was confined to the masts of the firing
ship.l6 Obviously, the only way to increase this distance was to increase
the height of the spotting position. The use of aircraft was an ideal solution.
On 17 February 1919, the battleship Texas conducted a long-range
firing exercise using aerial spotting and radio to quickly relay the spotting data back to the Texas. Spotting from the plane was much more
effective than spotting from the ship. Lieutenant Commander Kenneth
Whiting, in his testimony before the Navy General Board, estimated the
increase in effectiveness to be as large as 200 percent.17
The significance of these increasing capabilities was not lost on the
Navy's leadership. As early as 1922, the Bureau of Aeronautics was advocating higher elevation for battleship guns because of the increased accuracy aerial spotting made possible at longer ranges.18 The design of the
South Dakota class battleships reflected this thinking; their guns were to
have been able to elevate to forty degrees, allowing accurate fire beyond
thirty-five thousand yards.19
16. Norman Friedman, US Naval Weapons (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1985), 37-38; Encyclopedia Britannica-http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=41960&tocid=0.
The range to the horizon in statute miles is equal to 1.224 multiplied by the
square root of the height of the spotter in feet. From a height of 120 feet, the height
of the spotting tops on the Navy's battleships, the horizon is approximately 23,500
yards distant.
17. Thomas Wildenberg, "In Support of the Battle Line: Gunnery's Influence on
the Development of CarrierAviation in the U.S. Navy,"Journal of Military History 65
(July 2001): 700.
19. The South Dakota class ships were cancelled under the terms of the Washington Treaty of 1922. The guns intended for these ships were eventually used as
coast defense weapons; in this role they were capable of firing to 45,100 yards with
1114 *
THE JOURNAL OF
Director Fire Control and Massed Fire

Increased accuracy at long range was also made possible by experience gained through interaction with the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet during 1917 and 1918. Exposure to the Royal Navy's system of director
control helped to shape the U.S. Navy's attitude towards fire control,
strengthening the supposition that accurate fire at long range had
become a possibility.20 Director control centralized the control of all the
battleship's guns, ensuring that they were all firing at the same target.
Combined with an analog fire control computer to predict the motion of
the enemy ship, director control made it possible to fire accurately at
ranges beyond twenty thousand yards.
The potential effect of the massed fire of battleship divisions was
another important lesson from the Royal Navy. According to Friedman,
"By 1917 British officers claimed that the massed fire of one or two battle divisions could break up an enemy line, as [Admiral Horatio] Nelson
had done" at Trafalgar.21External symbols of the effort to concentrate
the fire of battleship divisions, range clocks and turret-bearing indicators
soon began to appear on the Navy's battleships. Although the turret-bearing indicators disappeared relatively quickly, the range clocks remained
and were even featured in preliminary designs for new battleships in the
late 1930s.22
Ford Rangekeeper and Stable Vertical
Accurate long-range gunfire became even more effective with the
introduction of the Ford Rangekeeper, a sophisticated fire control computer that could solve the differential equation associated with the movement of two maneuvering ships.23 First ordered in 1916, the Ford
an elevation
of 46 degrees. John Campbell, Naval
Weapons of World War Two
(Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press, 1985), 116.

20. Friedman, US Battleships,
171.
21. Ibid., 173.

22. Ibid., 313, illustration of the preliminary design model for the Iowa class.
23. A differential equation is necessary to solve the problem of predicting the
location of two maneuvering ships because of the changes of course they can make;
only in an ideal situation will both of them be moving in a straight line.
Consider the following example: A firing ship is steaming course 000 (North) at
12 knots. Its target is steaming course 315 (Northwest) at 12 knots. Initially, the relative bearing to the target ship is 090 (East) and the range 10,000 yards, just shy of
5 nautical miles (4.937 nautical miles, to be more exact).
If neither ship turns, then their relative positions five minutes later may be calculated with trigonometry. The firing ship will have moved 1 nautical mile along
course 000 and the target will have moved 1 nautical mile along course 315. We know
that it has therefore moved 0.707 (sin(45)=0.707) nautical miles along course 270
(West) and 0.707 (cos(45)=0.707) nautical miles along course 000. Therefore, the distance between the firing ship's track and the target ship has decreased to 4.230 nauMILITARY HISTORY
1115
TRENT HONE
computers made possible the "very rapid postwar development of US

naval gunnery."24 Friedman notes the importance of the device: "The
success of the Ford Rangekeeper and its successors also convinced the
US Navy that it was possible to hit consistently at very long ranges, so
that aerial spotting was well worthwhile."25
The introduction of the stable vertical, an artificial horizon designed
for use at times when the actual horizon could not be clearly discerned,
further increased the accuracy of long-range fire, particularly in conditions of poor visibility.26 Over time, the capabilities of the stable vertical
were improved to such an extent that it became the primary indicator of
the ship's inclination for fire control purposes. Original equipment on
the Navy's Colorado-class battleships, the stable vertical was added to
older ships as they were modernized.
The Need for Decisive Firepower
As the interest in long-range fire increased, the Navy recognized that
even if fire at long range could be made accurate and effective, fewer hits
would be scored than at closer ranges. In 1919 and 1920 the Navy's
Bureau of Ordnance had begun to assume that future battleships would
fight at ranges around twenty thousand yards. The knowledge that hits
at such ranges would be relatively few and randomly distributed27 led to
an emphasis on ensuring that every hit scored would be decisive.
By 1928, the Navy was assuming that at 14,000 yards, each gun
would hit an average of 0.64 times per minute, and that at 24,500 yards
tical miles and it has fallen behind by 0.293 nautical miles. These distances form the
two sides of a right triangle, with the hypotenuse being the linear distance between
the two ships.
Trigonometry and the Pythagorean theorem again allow us to determine the
length of this hypotenuse and the angle of bearing of the target ship. This distance is
4.240 nautical miles ((0.293)2 + (4.230)2 = (4.240)2), and the angle is 86 degrees
(arctan(4.230/0.293)=86). As this is the angle between the firing ship's track and the
target, which is now slightly astern, the relative bearing becomes 094. The distance
converts to 8,588 yards.
This simplest of examples illustrates the basic principles involved in plotting the
movement of two ships. A significantly greater magnitude of complexity would be
introduced if the target ship were turning to come onto a parallel course to the firing
ship. An accurate calculation would then require a differential equation. Effectively
an infinite series of trigonometric calculations like the example above would have to
be calculated as the target ship traced through the arc of its turn. It was exactly those
sorts of integrations that the Ford Rangekeeper was designed to solve.
25. Ibid., 173.
26. The horizon is important to accurate gunfire because it is necessary to fire
the guns when the ship is at the midpoint of its roll, when the level of the deck is parallel to the horizon. Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War Two, 106.
1116
THE JOURNAL OF
the rate of hitting would decrease to 0.18 hits per gun per minute.28
These estimates reinforced the Navy's emphasis on the destructive effect
of each and every hit.
As a result the Navy focused on extremely powerful naval artillery,
seeing the sixteen-inch gun as the most effective battleship armament.
No lighter caliber could guarantee the same destructive effect, and heavier calibers-such as the eighteen-inch gun briefly considered as an
alternative-were seen to offer little in the way of improved effect.29
U.S. Navy Disadvantages

Gun Elevation
Unfortunately, the Navy's ability to engage in long-range combat was
significantly limited in the 1920s by the maximum range of its battleships' guns. Of the Navy's eighteen battleships, only the five ships of the
Colorado and Tennessee classes were able to fire to ranges beyond thirty
thousand yards. Of the remaining thirteen ships, six were unable to fire
beyond twenty-one thousand yards, and the rest could not fire beyond
twenty-four thousand yards because of the limited elevation of their
main armament.30 This was recognized as a serious limitation, and plans
were made to increase the elevation of the main batteries on the older
ships.
After finding no specific prohibition in the Washington Treaty against
increasing the elevation of battleship main batteries, the Navy's Bureau of
Ordnance planned to alter the turrets of the New York, Arkansas, and
Florida classes as these ships were modified, allowing their guns to reach
longer ranges.31 The Royal Navy charged that such modifications would
violate the treaty, and the First Lord of the Admiralty's objections prevented the alterations.32 The oldest of the Navy's battleships remained
incapable of combat beyond twenty-one thousand yards, a "grave defect,"
according to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.33
28. Ibid.,219.
29. Theeighteen-inch/48gundevelopedby the Navywasrejectedbecauseit was
too heavy and because its higher velocity reduced its effectivenessagainst deck
armor.By the late 1930s it was consideredinferiorto the sixteen-inch/50firingthe
2,700-poundshell. Friedman,USNaval Weapons,21.
30. Wildenberg,"InSupportof the BattleLine,"708.
31. "TheGun-Elevation
Question,"by CaptainFrankH. Schofield,USN,Annual
Reports of the Navy Departmentfor the Fiscal Year 1923 (Washington:GPO, 1924),
AppendixC, 114-17.
32. Friedman, US Battleships, 189, 190-91.

33. Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet for the
Period 1 July, 1928 to 21 May, 1929, San Pedro, California, 21 May 1929 (WW2 CF,
Box 256, NHC),p. 9.
MILITARY HISTORY
1117
TRENT HONE
By 1927, the situation had changed: the U.S. Congress was willing to
authorize the increase in gun elevation, and the Royal Navy no longer
objected to such modifications.34 As the Nevada, Pennsylvania, and
New Mexico classes were taken in hand for modernization, gun elevation
was increased to thirty degrees. By 1934, when the last of these ships
had been modernized, the Navy possessed a force of twelve battleships
capable of firing to ranges beyond thirty thousand yards.
Speed
Although the Navy's battleships all had similar maximum speeds,
they were all relatively slow. Their lack of speed was seen as a very serious disadvantage during the interwar years. The Navy's main competitors, the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), each had
several battle cruisers that could be employed as a fast wing in support
of their battle line.
The Navy feared that these battle cruisers would use their superior
speed to maneuver into an advantageous position, and force the Navy's
battle line to bend or suffer having its "T" crossed.35 This was a major
concern, and the Navy devoted considerable effort to the development of
a counter in its battle plans.
Doctrinal Development, 1930-41

The London Treaty of 1930 built upon the limitations set by the
Washington Treaty of 1922 and mandated the extension of the battleship
building holiday for another five years; no additional battleships would
be added to the fleet for over a decade.36 In the same year, the Navy
introduced the initial draft of a set of battle instructions designed with
35. Crossing the "T"places an opponent's ships at a serious disadvantage. The
traditional method involves steaming across the line of the enemy's heading. By doing
so, all the guns of one's own ships can bear on the enemy, but only the forwardguns
of the enemy can return fire. Battleships of this era could typically fire only half their
main guns forward, and sometimes less. As a result, when confronted with this situation, a battle line must turn to expose the rest of the main armament or risk being
overwhelmed.
36. The London Treaty of 1930 reduced the overall number of battleships for all
major signatories. Great Britain and the United States were allowed a total of fifteen
battleships or battle cruisers; Japan was permitted only nine. All three powers agreed
to forego battleship building until 1936 at the earliest. Japan did not sign the London
Treaty of 1936, which renewed the limitations on battleships and added an extra provision: battleship main batteries were to be restricted to guns no larger than fourteeninch. However, if Japan refused to agree to remain a participant in the treaty system,
the limit would be raised to sixteen-inch guns. Ships' Data, U.S. Naval Vessels,
v-xvii, 277-83.
1118 *
THE JOURNAL OF
the capabilities and limitations of its battleships in mind. "Tentative

Fleet Dispositions and Battle Plans, 1930" was the first in a series of publications detailing the Navy's tactical doctrine as it evolved in the 1930s;
during the next few years it was revised and tested.37
Eventually, the lessons learned from the testing of this document
and its revisions were codified in later publications: FT.P 143 War
Instructions, 1934; F.TP 142 General Tactical Instructions, United
States Navy, 1934; F.T.P 188 General Tactical Instructions, United
States Navy, 1940; and numerous versions of U.S.F. 10 Current Tactical
Orders. Additional foundations of battleship doctrine were published in
U.S.F. 16 Current Tactical Orders-Battleships
and U.S.F. 17 Current
Doctrine-Battleships.
Major Battle Plans-Normal and Reverse Action
The tactical publications covered two basic types of action, the normal action and the reverse action. The first is quite conventional, but the
second was seen as a radical solution to one of the battle line's greatest
problems, its lack of speed.
In a normal action, the opposing battle lines would steam on roughly
parallel courses in the same general direction. The Navy assumed that a
stronger force would seek this type of engagement, particularly if it possessed superior speed, "so that it can impose an enveloping flank attack
on the van flank of its opponent."38 This was a very traditional form of
battleship action, which had been seen at Tsushima (1905), at Jutland,
and in numerous engagements from the age of sail. The Navy appears to
have assumed the enemy would expect this form of engagement.39
The second basic type of action was the reverse action. In this form
of engagement, the battle lines would again steam on roughly parallel
courses, but in opposite directions.40 This unconventional approach was
37. The document "Tentative Fleet Dispositions and Battle Plans" was issued
and first tested during fiscal year 1930. Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Fleetfor the Period 1 July, 1929 to 30 June, 1930 (WW2CF,Box 256, NHC), p. 17.
Revisions of the document were further tested during the next two years. Annual
Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleetfor the Period 1 July, 1930 to
30 June, 1931 (WW2 CF, Box 256, NHC), p. 10; Annual Report of the Commanderin-Chief, United States Fleetfor the Period 1 July, 1931 to 30 June, 1932 (WW2 CF,
Box 256, NHC), p. 23.
38. F.T.P.143, War Instructions, United States Navy, 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 108,
NHC), p. 104.
39. The Japanese did indeed plan for a "normal" action on parallel courses.
David C. Evans and MarkR. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technologyin the
Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997),
282-86.
40. F.T.P 143, War Instructions, United States Navy, 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 108,
NHC), pp. 107-8.
MILITARY HISTORY
1119
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adopted in order to offset the slow speed of the Navy's battle line, and to
limit the effectiveness of the fast battle cruiser force the enemy was
likely to employ at the head of his battle line.
Reverse Action as a Counter to Slow Speed
The relatively low speed of the Navy's battle line worried the Navy in
the interwar years, particularly because the Imperial Japanese Navy had
four-reduced after the London Treaty of 1930 to three-battle cruisers
of the Kongo class it could employ as a detached wing. Such a detached
wing could use its high speed to maneuver into a position ahead of the
Navy's battle line and force it to buckle or cross its "T."
Throughout the interwar period, the Navy sought effective counters
to the IJN'sfast wing and saw the employment of one or more battleships
as a detached wing as a possible solution. This method would be dangerous, because any detached force would be slow, and dividing the battle line would expose it to defeat in detail.41 California was employed as
a detached wing in Fleet Problem XI (1930), and although she was effective in the role, she was "destroyed" by the concentrated fire of the
"enemy" battleships.42
Ultimately, the Navy viewed the reverse action as the most effective
solution to the problems offered by the enemy's detached wing. If the
enemy could be coerced to deploy first, and the Navy then deployed in
the opposite direction, the Navy could gain a distinct advantage:
This is because it would place the enemy's light forces opposite our
rear in a position from which they cannot make a successful attack,
and a reversalof course by the enemy fleet will not improve the situation for the enemy unless a redistributionof light forces could be
made.43
The enemy's detached wing of battle cruisers would similarly be out of

position: a reverse action "offers a certain method of forcing the enemy
to dispose his battle cruisers astern if he wishes to fight on a parallel
44
course.
If the Navy could initiate a reverse action, then the enemy advantage
in battle cruisers would be mitigated at the outset of the action. The
41. United States Fleet Problem XI, 1930, Report of the Commander in Chief
United States Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., 14 July 1930 (Roll 13, Target 7, Fleet
Problem XI, CINCUSReport, 14 July 1930, Record Group 80 [General Records of the
Department of the Navy], NARA [hereafter cited as RG 80, NARA]), pp. 61-62.
42. Ibid., 60.
NHC), p. 108; F.T.P 188, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1940
(WW2 CF, Box 108, NHC), pp. 14-10 through 14-15.
44. Report of Fleet Problem XV 1 June 1934 (Roll 16, Target 1, Fleet Problem
XV, CINCUSreport, June 1, 1934, RG 38, NARA),p. 57.
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enemy would be forced either to accept an action on opposite courses,

with his battle cruisers chasing the rear of the Navy's formation, or turn
around and have his battle cruisers positioned at the rear of his line.
Four Range Bands
The two basic types of action were further subdivided into four range
bands: extreme, long, moderate, and close. Extreme range was considered to be 27,000 yards or more, long range was 21,000 yards to 27,000
yards, moderate range was 17,000 yards to 21,000 yards, and close range
was anything under 17,000 yards.45 The boundaries of these bands corresponded almost exactly with the known capabilities of battleships then
in service. The outer limit of the moderate-range band represented the
effective limit of the guns on the Navy's older battleships, and the outer
limit of the long-range band corresponded with the maximum range of
the fourteen-inch guns on the majority of Japanese battleships and battle cruisers.46
The Navy enjoyed a marked superiority in the extreme range band.

The five battleships of the Colorado and Tennessee classes represented
the most powerful collection of battleships with extreme range capability in the world. As a result, combat in the extreme range band was considered very advantageous. Extreme range battle plans concentrated on
the use of long-range gunnery to defeat the enemy; light forces-destroyers and light cruisers-would be withheld unless a favorable opportunity
presented
itself.47 The enemy
was not expected
to be able to respond
effectively at these great distances.48

NHC), p. 86; F.T.R 142, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1934
(WW2 CF, Box 108, NHC), p. 235; F.T.P 188, General Tactical Instructions, United
States Navy, 1940 (WW2 CF, Box 108, NHC), p. 14-1.
46. At the time the range bands were devised, the U.S. Navy estimated the maximum range of the Japanese fourteen-inch guns on the Kongo, Fuso, and Ise classes
to be twenty-seven thousand yards. See Class of 1926, Joint Problem No. I, Blue
Statement of Problem and Staff Solution (Box 14, Strategic Plans Division Records,
RG 38, NARA), Numerical Comparison of Forces. By 1935, the U.S. Navy had
increased its estimate to twenty-nine thousand yards. See Operations Problem III1935-SR, Orange, Estimate of the Situation by Orange Commander-in-Chief, Solution by A Member of the Staff (Box 21, Strategic Plans Division Records, RG 38,
NARA),p. 10. Both of these estimates were too low. The Japanese had been increasing the effective range of their battleship main batteries and also intended to open fire
at extreme range. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 250-63.
47. F.T. 143, War Instructions, United States Navy, 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 108,
NHC), p. 106.
48. This assumption was incorrect. The Japanese planned to open fire at
extreme range and would have been able to respond at these great ranges. Evans and
Peattie, Kaigun, 250-63.
MILITARY HISTORY
1121
TRENTHONE
In contrast, the Navy was at a significant disadvantage in the longrange band. Before the modernization of the older battleships, only the
same five ships were able to fire effectively at these ranges. The longrange battle was therefore a delaying action, a period that should be limited, and maintained only so long as necessary until the range could be
opened to extreme distances, or closed to moderate ranges. Light forces
would be used to attack the enemy battle line, in the hope that the
resulting confusion would reduce the speed of the enemy battleships and
allow the Navy's battle line time to increase or decrease the range.49
According to the Navy's War Instructions,
Whenconditions permit,the battle line should close or open through
ranges that are unfavorableas rapidly as possible. When compelled
to engage at ranges that are unfavorable,an endeavor should be
made to present a target angle which would be unfavorable for
impacts againstthe side armorof our ships, havingdue regardfor the
loss of gunfirethat may result from insufficienttrain of turrets.50
Because the long-range band would be the most disadvantageous position for the Navy's battleships, the Navy expected that the enemy would
desire to fight within this band.51The essential goal of the long-range battle plans was to minimize the amount of time spent in this range band,
either by rapidly closing or opening the range.52
At moderate ranges, the Navy's battle line was considered superior
to any potential enemy. Within this range band, all the Navy's battleships
would be able to fire effectively and subject the enemy to their concentrated fire. Light force attacks could be supported by the primary and, if
the range were close enough, secondary guns of the battleships, but light
forces were to be withheld unless a favorable opportunity arose or the
battle progressed poorly.53 The destruction of the enemy at moderate
ranges was left primarily to the heavy guns of the battleships.
Close range was considered an all-out brawl because of the extreme
lethality of close-range battleship gunfire and the proximity of enemy
light forces.54 The firepower of the entire battle line could be brought to
NHC),p. 106.
50. Ibid.,p. 87.
51. F.T.R 188, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1940 (WW2
CF,Box 108, NHC),p. 14-3.

52. Ibid.,p. 14-4.
NHC),p. 106.
54. Thereis perhapsno betterillustrationof this thanthe furiousconfusednight
actionfoughtoff Guadalcanalon the nightof 14-15 November1942. The battleships
Washingtonand SouthDakota,alongwith destroyers,encountereda Japanesetask
forceincludingthe battleshipKirishimaand two heavycruisers.Kirishimawas mortally woundedin a rapidexchange,while South Dakota was disabledand forcedto
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bear on the enemy, but hostile cruisers and destroyers would be able to
make effective torpedo attacks on the battleships. In order to counter
these attacks, the Navy's light forces were instructed to attack immediately without additional orders in a close-range battle.55
Other Plans
In addition to the eight plans devoted to normal and reverse action
in each of the four range bands, the Navy developed a series of specialized battle plans for specific types of encounters.
Pursuit plans were developed for those situations where the enemy
refused battle or attempted to flee. These plans emphasized the use of
light forces and airplanes. Only they would have the necessary speed to
catch the enemy and force him to reduce speed sufficiently to allow the
Navy's battle line to catch up.56 Airplanes had a distinct advantage
because of their speed and invulnerability to underwater attack. The
Navy feared that in retreating, the enemy would seek to draw the fleet
over a minefield or into the teeth of a submarine line57; therefore, an
antisubmarine screen was an integral part of the pursuit plans.58 When
pursuing, the battle line was instructed to engage the enemy as soon as
possible.
Night combat was seen as uncertain, with significant potential for
confusion. Night battle plans focused on protecting the battle line from
surface torpedo attack. Cruisers would fend off enemy destroyers while
destroyers would attack the enemy battle line with torpedoes.59 This
simple division of responsibilities allowed battleships to assume that any
destroyers they encountered would be hostile, and similarly, destroyers
were to assume that any large ships they sighted were legitimate targets.60 It was believed that this primitive form of IFF (Identification,
Friend or Foe) would lessen the potential confusion and prevent friendly
fire incidents.
In the event that the battle progressed poorly, the Navy developed
plans for disengaging and withdrawing from the fight. Two withdrawal
retire due to the concentrated fire of the Japanese ships. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, 15 vols. (Boston, Mass.:
Little, Brown and Company, 1984), 5:270-87.
55. F.T.P 188, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1940 (WW2
CF, Box 108, NHC), pp. 14-6 through 14-15.
NHC), pp. 111-12.
57. Ibid., pp. 109-10.
58. Ibid., p. 110.
59. F.T.P.188, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1940 (WW2
CF, Box 108, NHC), p. 14-24.
60. F.T. 143, War Instructions, United States Navy, 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 108,
NHC), p. 120.
MILITARY HISTORY
1123
TRENTHONE
plans detailed in the tactical publications both used the light forces and
aircraft to screen the departure of the battle line and fleet train. The first
of these was designed to use the light forces in a defensive role with aircraft laying smoke screens.61 The second plan involved a concentrated
attack by both the light forces and aircraft against the enemy battle line,
enabling the fleet to withdraw in the resulting confusion.62
Testing the Tactical Instructions in the Fleet Problems
In order to ensure that the plans from the tactical publications would
be useful and effective, the Navy tested and refined them during its Fleet
Problems. Beginning with Fleet Problems X and XI of 1930, both the battle plans themselves and the methods of communicating them to the
fleet during a combat situation were extensively tested.
In Problems X and XI, the fleet was divided into two forces (Blue and
Black) of relatively equal battleship strength. Each "fleet" was to develop
its own battle plans, based on the prevailing situation. The emphasis on
developing specific plans for the current situation illustrates that the
plans in the tactical publications were not a rigid doctrine for the handling of the fleet in battle; they were examples. Commanders were to use
them as a guide in the development of their own plans.
For Problem XI, the Black Fleet developed a plan based on a reverse
action at extreme range. The general plan of the Black Fleet was:
To engage the enemy by moving on courses opposite to that of the
enemy, reversingaction if initial deploymenthas been a normalone,
in order to concentrate efforts on rear of enemy Battle Line and to
deny enemy Detached Wingand LightForces opportunityto attack
the van of our Battle Line.63
Another Black plan developed for Problem XI called for a normal action
at extreme range; this plan was similar to that in the tactical publications, but it had one significant difference: the battleship California was
to be placed ahead of the battle line and employed as a detached wing.
In this role she proved quite effective, but was eventually destroyed.64
In contrast to the extreme range plans prepared for Problem XI, the
Black Fleet developed a battle plan in Problem X based on closing
quickly to decisive ranges. In order to facilitate rapid closing of the range
and limit the effectiveness of enemy battleship gunfire while closing, air61. F.T.P 188, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy, 1940 (WW2
CF, Box 108, NHC), p. 14-22.
62. Ibid., p. 14-23.
United States Fleet, AdmiralW. V. Pratt, U.S.N., 14 July 1930 (Roll 13, Target 7, Fleet
Problem XI, CINCUSReport, July 14, 1930, RG 80, NARA),p. 9.
64. Ibid., 61-62.
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plane and destroyer attacks were to be focused on the enemy battleships

at the outset of an action. Once the range had closed sufficiently, concentrated fire would be opened on the van of the enemy battle line.65
The Blue Fleet made use of the same battle plans for both problems.
High speed was to be used in order to keep the battle ranges between
twenty-five thousand and twenty-nine thousand yards. From these
ranges, fire was to be concentrated on one flank of the enemy battleships, either the van or the rear. However, the rest of the enemy battle
line would not be ignored; all the enemy battleships were to be kept
under fire. Divided fire would be employed against the ships on the other
flank.66
If aerial spotting could not be employed, then Blue would seek an

engagement at ranges around twenty thousand yards so that spotting
from the battleship masts would be effective. Once the battle began to
progress favorably, the range would be closed to ensure decisive effect:
"In any event battleship ranges will be closed to maximum destructive
effect when superiority of hitting is gained."67
The experiences of both fleets in Problems X and XI indicated that
the new battle plans marked a significant improvement in the capability
of the fleet. Vice Admiral William C. Cole, commander of the Blue Fleet,
offered the following comment:
The tactics of the generalengagementas experienced in ProblemXI,
as in Problem X, offer the widest field for discussion....
The 'Tenta-
tive Fleet Disposition and Battle Plans, 1930' give to us the greatest
single advance in fleet tactics I have known in my years of service in
the fleet. It affordsto the O.T.C. [Officerin Tactical Command]an
extraordinaryincrease in the flexibility of control from the beginning of tactical scouting through the general engagement .... Our
greatest dangerlies in an inflexibleadherence to a conception of the

enemy's strength and disposition made even under the best conditions of visibility for tactical surfaceand air scouting, but made with
the fleets separate by forty to sixty thousand yards. We must have
the tactical forms to admit of quick change, and the flexibility of
mind to use them.68
Vice Admiral Lucius Allyn Bostwick, commander of the Black Fleet, had
similar positive comments:
65. Report of Fleet Problem Ten, 7 May 1930 (Roll 13, Target 1, Fleet Problem X,
CINCUSReport, May 7, 1930, RG 80, NARA),p. 22.
66. Divided fire involved splitting the main battery fire of one ship amongst two
or more targets.
United States Fleet, AdmiralW. V. Pratt, U.S.N., 14 July 1930 (Roll 13, Target 7, Fleet
MILITARY HISTORY
1125
TRENTHONE
The introductionof the TentativeFleet Dispositionsand BattlePlans,
U.S. Fleet, 1930, has opened possibilitiesfor advancementin the tactics of the Fleet. The new publication has been found simple to
understand and use in operations .... The eager acceptance of this
work by all that have used it brings out the need for a survey of all
our instructions and manuals and a careful revision of the War
Instructionsand GeneralTacticalInstructions,with the inclusion of
the TentativeFleet Dispositionsand Battle Plans therein.69
The battle plans were further refined in the next few years and later
codified by the publication of F.T.P 142 General Tactical Instructions,
United States Navy in 1934. Continued testing during the Fleet Problems throughout the 1930s did not reveal the need for any significant
changes, and the plans were published again in 1940 in the revised version, F.T. 188, General Tactical Instructions, United States Navy.
The lack of significant changes over this span is attributable to the
fact that the battle plans were not inflexible prescriptions for the conduct of battle, but were guidelines for the officers of the fleet, providing
an example format upon which they could base their own plans. This is
further supported by the fact that, in contrast to the more general publications pertaining to doctrine, the publication dealing specifically with
the tactical employment of battleships, U.S.F. 16, was frequently updated
as tactical exercises illustrated areas for improvement.70
As flexible and effective as the Navy's doctrine became, however, it
still had one major limitation: The Navy assumed that a single major fleet
action would ultimately decide any future naval war and planned for this
accordingly.
General Principles of U.S. Navy Doctrine

Use of a Definite Plan
In battle, the actions of the fleet were to be governed by a specific
plan, either one developed by the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC),
or one taken directly from the tactical publications. The plan, or plans,
would be distributed to all the fleet elements before the battle so that the
transmission of a brief signal could put a specific plan into action:
Battlewill be governedby a definite plan.... The battle plan may be
prescribedby appropriategeneralsignal, using the numeralsand letters designatinga typical battle plan from ChapterXIV,GeneralTac-
69. Ibid, pp. 65-66.

70. Four changes to U.S.F. 16 had been issued within a year of the initial publication of the document. Change No. 4 to U.S.F 16, 29 November 1935 (WW2CF, Box
272, NHC).
1126
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tical Instructions, a plan contained herein, or other plan prepared by
a responsible commander for a particular operation.71
It is necessary . . . that the commander's plans and orders which
must be transmitted to subordinates be full and complete and, furthermore, it is necessary that the plans and orders follow a standard
form.72
The standard form was provided by example plans in the tactical publications. Fleet and task force commanders were to follow the general layout provided in order to develop their own plan that would be easily
understood by their subordinates:
The Battle Disposition of forces present is wholly flexible and will be
prescribed by the Senior Officer Present (O.T.C.). It will be based on
his battle plan which, in turn, will depend on our Own and Enemy
forces present.73
Practice in the writing of such plans was gained during the Fleet
Problems. Before the commencement
of each problem, the commanders
of the respective fleets were required to produce operational plans and
orders.74 In so doing, the Navy encouraged the development of an officer
corps familiar both with the assessment of a situation and the production of plans designed to bring victory based on that assessment.
Leveraging Advantages and Enemy Disadvantages
As battle plans were designed for a specific set of existing tactical
and operational circumstances, effective plans were those that leveraged
the Navy's advantages while emphasizing enemy weaknesses:
Battle plans must utilize our own known or estimated factors of
superiority in methods, skill, and material to defeat the enemy by
taking advantage of his known or supposed weaknesses or by nullifying his elements of superiority.75
The prevailing circumstances
would therefore bear quite consideron
the
of
action.
The
ably
Navy's plan
ability to employ aerial spotting,
the range of battleship guns, and the relative protection of battleships
would be used to determine the ranges at which a gun engagement would
71. U.S.F. 10, Current Tactical Orders, United States Fleet, 1941 (WW2CF, Box
270, NHC), p. 32.
270, NHC), 3.
75. F.T.P 143, WarInstructions, United States Navy, 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 108,
NHC), p. 83.
MILITARY HISTORY
1127
TRENTHONE
be advantageous.76 Engagement at more favorable ranges would be

sought, while engagement at less favorable ranges would be discouraged,
hence the general preference for engagements at extreme and moderate
range. However, the plans did not focus entirely on battleship gunfire:
The battle will be governedby a well defined plan. This plan will be
based on the employment primarilyof the weapon in which we are
superiorto the enemy. Other weaponswill be employed in a manner
contributingto the employment of our superiorweapon.77
The Navy recognized that its battle line might not always be superior to
the enemy's. In such circumstances, other forces would have to be
employed to ensure victory.
The Fleet Problems illustrated the kinds of success that might follow
from an initial tactical advantage. For example, in Problem X, Black
gained complete control of the air by disabling the Blue carrier forces,
Saratoga and Langley. Blue was left without aerial spotting and was at a
severe disadvantage in the ensuing battle line engagement. The Chief
Observer, who was the head umpire and final arbiter regarding the rules,
concluded:
The suddennesswith which factors of strengthcan be destroyedand
the completeness of success which may be achieved if tactical
advantages are realized and seized in a modern action furnishes
ample materialfor thought and reflection.78
The Navy therefore sought to rapidly exploit existing factors of strength.
To encourage this behavior among its officer corps, it developed a decentralized command and control structure designed to ensure tactical flexibility.
Tactical Flexibility and Decentralized Command and Control
The ability and effectiveness of the Navy's officers were seen as two
distinct advantages, which the Navy sought to exploit by instilling tactical flexibility and encouraging individual initiative. In the summary of
Fleet Problem XII (1931), Admiral W. V. Pratt, the Chief of Naval Operations, made this quite clear:
I wish to impress on every officer here, particularlythe younger
ones, to never attempt to draw out of the plans a canned solution.
The purpose of this problemwas to teach you to act quickly and to
form a clear and concise decision. Fromthis decision evolves a clear
76. Ibid., p. 87.

270, NHC), p. 3.
78. Report of Fleet Problem Ten, 7 May, 1930 (Roll 13, Target 1, Fleet Problem
X, CINCUSReport, May 7, 1930, RG 80, NARA),p. 65.
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and definite plan .... You will get a number of valuable lessons but
do not accept them as gospel.79

Pratt's statements emphasize the flexibility desired at the tactical level.
The introduction of battle plans had created a framework within which
officers could develop concise procedures for an engagement, but they
also introduced the danger that officers would too rigidly accept set plans
and adhere to them despite changing circumstances.
Battle plans were to be tailored to meet the specific needs of the tactical situation; however, the Navy feared that a plan, once set in motion,
would be so rigidly accepted that officers would overlook potential
opportunities. To reinforce the need for tactical flexibility the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral David Foote Sellers, rejected battle plans entirely
for Fleet Problem XV (1934):
The second idea I have endeavoredto emphasize is that of flexibility.
As O.T.C.I commence a battle exercise with an entirely open mind.
I have no set plan.... The BattleLine and its attachedforces are handled in accordance with the situation that develops, whatever this
may be. By the use of generalsignalsit is possible to operatethe Fleet
in any way desired. Everysituation is judgedby its own merits. This
is the only principleof naval tactics that is alwaysapplicable.80
Sellers was particularly interested in presenting the officers of the fleet
with the challenge of evaluating a constantly changing situation. For
Fleet Problem XV (1934), his plan was "to present to opposing commanders of all ranks a rapidly changing situation over an extended period."81
The goal was to encourage officers to acknowledge and embrace the fluidity of a combat situation.82
However, Sellers's emphasis on flexibility for this exercise was not an
abandonment of plans in general. It was a learning tool, designed to
ensure officers were cognizant of the necessity of remaining flexible as a
campaign evolved.
Flexibility was further encouraged by decentralizing the Navy's command and control structure. Subordinate officers were given the latitude
to act on their own initiative in furtherance of the battle plan. The desire
to place such responsibility in the hands of subordinates was partly due
to the obvious problems of attempting to coordinate the efforts of the
79. United States Fleet Problem XII, 1931, Report of the Commander in Chief
United States Fleet, AdmiralJ. V. Chase, U.S.N., 1 April 1931, Remarks of AdmiralW.
V. Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations (Roll 13, Target 13, Fleet Problem XII, CINCUS
Report, April 1, 1931, RG 38, NARA),p. 50.
80. Report of Fleet Problem XV, 1 June 1934 (Roll 16, Target 1, Fleet Problem
XV, CINCUSreport, June 1, 1934, RG 38, NARA),p. 66.
81. Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet for the
Period 1 July, 1933 to 30 June, 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 256, NHC), 11.
82. Ibid.
MILITARY HISTORY
1129
TRENTHONE
whole fleet in battle, but also based on the recognition that a well-trained
and educated officer corps was a very effective weapon, and that by
encouraging an individual to act on his own initiative, he would be more
effective in battle:
Both the estimate and generalplan must be so clear that they can be
conveyed to subordinate commanders without fear of misunderstandingor doubt in order to ensure freedomfrom confusion in execution. We must differentiate between the general plan and its
contributorydetails which are the tasks assigned to task groupcommanders.83
The Navy recognized that in battle, effective communication with

subordinates might prove to be impossible.84 By working from a plan,
officers would understand their general role in the battle and could act
upon it without further orders. The need for such communication was
thereby reduced. The Fleet Problems illustrated the possibilities. By
Fleet Problem XV, major elements of the fleet were operating without
specific instructions:
It will be noted that the Commander-in-Chiefgave no important
orders to any of the detached forces, i.e., the Air Force, the Submarine Force, and the Scouting Force. These forces conducted their
operationsentirely by means of the current Battle Instructions,thus
proving the great progress made in the indoctrinationof the Fleet.
After the exercise the Commander-in-Chiefcould think of nothing
more to add to the Battle Instructions.In fact, these are now becoming so well known, that they are requiredmostly for new units joining the Fleet.85
Individual initiative was also stressed in Problem XV:
The third idea emphasized duringthe last year is that commanders
and captainsof every grademust act on their own initiative, using as
very general guides our Battle Instructions and Cruising Instructions. Each commander,as well as the O.T.C.,shouldjudge each situation on its own merits and as he visualizes it, and not in
accordance with mandatory instructions or even suggestions contained in printedbooks. I cannot emphasize this point too strongly.86
83. United States Fleet Problem XIII, 1932, Report of the Commander-in-Chief
United States Fleet, Admiral Frank H. Schofield, 23 May 1932 (Roll 14, Target 1, Fleet
Problem XIII, CINCUSReport, May 23, 1932, RG 38, NARA),Remarks of Admiral A.
L. Willard, p. 19.
84. Ibid., p. 19.
XV, CINCUSReport, June 1, 1934, RG 38, NARA),p. 57.
86. Ibid., p. 66. See also the Blue battle instructions, Fleet Problem XV May
1934 (Roll 16, Target2, Fleet Problem XV, Correspondence RegardingConcept of the
Problem, RG 38, NARA),p. 13.
1130
THE
JOURNAL
OF
The Commander-in-Chief explained the reasoning behind this emphasis

in summations contained in the report on Fleet Problem XV:
The Commander-in-Chiefconsiders that our officer corps is the
most intelligentand best educatedof any in the world.It is our greatest naval asset today. He desires that it be used to maximumadvantage in battle. Therefore,he expects that every battle situation shall
be judged strictly on its own merits, and not upon instructions
printedlong before. Decisive, positive, aggressiveaction suited to the
actual situation, must be the guiding idea of every flag and commandingofficer.87
The role of the O.T.C. was that of a coordinator. He was the head of
a collection of independent formations, isolated by distance and the limitations of effective communication. In battle, subordinate commanders,
familiar with the general plan, were to use their own initiative to fight
towards a successful conclusion. As the battle evolved, they would be
able to rapidly exploit advantageous circumstances without waiting for
orders:
The O.T.C.will limit to a minimum all orders to the Fleet duringthe
action. These will be stated in very general terms and usually will
apply to the Fleet as a whole, such as a reversal of Fleet course, a
retirementor an order for the Fleet to attack or pursue.88
Success would depend on the ability of individual commanders to interpret these orders in light of the overall plan and act upon them according to the current tactical situation.89 Every officer was instructed to be
aware of the current situation and alert to potential opportunities as they
presented themselves.90
Through this emphasis on tactical flexibility, individual initiative,
and decentralized command and control, the Navy sought to leverage
one of its most valuable assets, the training and education of its officer
corps. The formulation of a general plan encouraged this by ensuring
that all officers were familiar with the desired plan of action and their
roles in it.
87. Fleet Problem XV May 1934 (Roll 16, Target 2, Fleet Problem XV, Correspondence RegardingConcept of the Problem, RG 38, NARA),p. 13.
88. U.S. Fleet Battle Instructions No. 3-34, Effective 9 April 1934, 27 March
1934 (Roll 16, Target 3, Fleet Problem XV, Correspondence Regarding Preparations
for and Conduct of the Problem, RG 38, NARA),pp. 7-8.
89. Ibid., p. 7.
NHC), p. 108.
MILITARY HISTORY
1131
TRENT HONE
Seizing the Tactical Initiative

The reliance on a decentralized command and control was designed
to ensure that the Navy would take advantage of tactical opportunities as
they arose. Seizing the tactical initiative was very important, particularly
because of the fear that an enemy would be able to dictate the course of
an action through superior speed.
The Navy saw timely and unexpected maneuver as an effective way
to counter superior speed. The reverse action detailed in the tactical
publications is the most striking example:
The Commander-in-Chiefhas devoted considerable attention to
developing the technique of a fleet action on opposite courses. He
considers that this type of action offersgreat opportunitiesto a welldrilled Fleet for gaining a decisive victory. Furthermore,it offers a
certain method of forcing the enemy to dispose his battlecruisers
astern if he wishes to fighton a parallelcourse. It also offersan excellent opportunityto avoid quickly the initial disadvantagesdue to the
weather position and sun glare.... It is true that if we elect to fight
on a reverse course the enemy can do to us all the things we can do
to him, providedhe instantly detects our intentions and has a fleet
perfectly drilled in the rapid execution of a new and complicated
plan of action. Even in this case we will gain the advantageof the initiative and have a start of at least 5 minutes before the enemy can
imitate our movements.91
The use of an unconventional maneuver in order to seek an advantage over the enemy was not without precedent:
History teaches that it was Nelson's way to initiate a new and
unusual maneuverin the hope that the enemy would fail to take the
necessary counter-measuresin time. In every case his hope was fully
justified.92
Just as Nelson had used unconventional maneuver at Trafalgar and the
Nile to force the enemy to fight a battle on his terms, the Navy sought to
impose its will on an enemy from the very beginning of an action.
In concert with the reverse action, the Navy developed deceptive
maneuvers to confuse the enemy deployment at the outset of an action.
Confusion in the Blue battle line during Problem XV resulted in movements very similar to these deceptive maneuvers.93 Unfortunately, these
movements took place within range of the enemy's guns, but the reverse
action was successfully initiated before undue loss had been incurred.
Blue's battle instructions made plans for these deceptive maneuvers:
XV, CINCUSReport, June 1, 1934, RG 38, NARA),p. 57.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., p. 56.
1132 *
THE JOURNAL OF

As the two fleets approach close to gunfire ranges this position of his
battle cruisers [at the forefront of the battle line] is a considerable
embarrassment to Gray, as he must avoid their being overwhelmed
by the Blue Battle Line before the Gray Battle Line can enter the
action. This compels Gray to commence the movement of his battle
cruisers toward one battle flank some time before the deployment of
the Battle Line. It is probable that he will commence this movement
as soon as he gets the first indications of the direction of Blue deployment. It follows that Gray is very susceptible to deception on this
point by Blue.94
The deceptive maneuver envisioned was a "change of course of the
Battle Line by division column movement away from the intended direction of the fleet deployment."95 Blue had little opportunity to employ
these deceptive measures once the fleet action had started, but the
intent to use maneuver in order to mitigate an enemy advantage and
seize the initiative is obvious.
In concert with the emphasis on seizing the initiative, the Navy
focused on aggressive offensive action leading to an engagement on its
terms. In their joint comments on Fleet Problem XIII, Admiral R. H.
Leigh and Rear Admiral J. K. Taussig stated, "I am of the opinion that we
are stronger, quicker, and more effective when acting on the offensive
than on the defensive."96 Even when on the strategic defensive, the tactical offensive would be taken. The initiative would never be ceded to the
enemy; rather it would be constantly denied him.97
Long-Range Fire with Aerial Spotting
The tactical publications emphasized
these great distances:
the benefits of opening fire at
Fire should be opened, normally, at the maximum range at which an

effective fire can delivered under the conditions which exist at the
time. The advantage of an initial superiority is so great that every
effort should be made to establish early hitting.98
94. U.S. Fleet Battle Instructions No. 3-34, Effective 9 April 1934, 27 March
for and Conduct of the Problem, RG 38, NARA),p. 6.
95. Ibid.
United States Fleet, AdmiralFrank H. Schofield, 23 May, 1932 (Roll 14, Target 1, Fleet
Problem XIII, CINCUSReport, May 23, 1932, RG 38, NARA), Remarks of Admiral R.
H. Leigh and Rear Admiral J. K. Taussig, p. 30.
NHC), p. 87.
MILITARY HISTORY
1133
TRENTHONE
Experiments had shown that early hitting would be possible at these

extreme ranges. During gunnery exercises in 1927, the Maryland was
able to deliver accurate fire with her sixteen-inch guns at ranges beyond
thirty-thousand yards.99 The Fleet Problems illustrate that the Navy
embraced the concept of extreme range fire.
In Fleet Problem X (1930), New Mexico opened fire at the extreme
range of thirty-five thousand yards.100The Black Fleet's battle plan 1E-1
in Fleet Problem XI stipulated that the enemy battle line was to be
engaged at extreme ranges, beyond twenty-seven thousand yards.101In
the mock combat that followed, the opposing fleets opened fire at thirtytwo thousand yards.'02 Fleet Problem XIII (1932) witnessed Nevada firing at thirty thousand yards.103 During Fleet Problem XVII (1936),
maximum gun range was considered to be thirty-five thousand yards.104
Lesser opening ranges, such as thirty thousand yards, and even as low as
twenty-seven thousand yards were recorded, but the emphasis on opening fire at extreme range is consistent throughout the Fleet Problems.l05
In order to fire accurately at these extreme ranges, aerial spotting
was essential. Without aerial spotting, the maximum effective range of
battleship guns was considered to be twenty-eight thousand yards. However, in the simulated combat of the Fleet Problems, the effectiveness of
99. Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet (Roll 6, Microfilm
M971, NARA),p. 30.
100. Report of Fleet Problem Ten, 7 May 1930 (Roll 13, Target 1, Fleet Problem
X, CINCUSReport, May 7, 1930, RG 80, NARA),p. 49.
United States Fleet, Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N., 14 July 1930 (Roll 13, Target 7, Fleet
102. Ibid. The ranges at which the battle was fought are illustrated in the track
of the engagement provided between 58 and 59.
103. Chronological Record of Events, Fleet Problem Thirteen, Senior Umpire
Blue (Roll 14, Target 4, Fleet Problem XIII, Senior Umpire, BLUE, Chronological
Record of Events, RG 38, NARA),p. 8.
104. Annex Cast, Green Battle Fleet Order No. 1-36, Fleet Problem XVII, 14 May
1936 (Roll 21, Target 6, Fleet Problem XVII, US Fleet, BLUE, WHITE, GRAY,and
GREEN Statements of the Problem with Estimates of the Situation, Plans, Orders,
Instructions, and Organization, RG 80, NARA).
105. Umpire Notes, USS New York,Fleet Problem XX, 28 February 1939 (Roll
28, Target 1, Fleet Problem XX, Black Ship Umpire Reports, Record Group 313
[Records of Naval Operating Forces], NARA[hereafter cited as RG 313, NARA]),p. 1;
Commanding Officer Report, USS Tennessee, Narratives of Fleet Problem XX, 2
March 1939 (Roll 28, Target5, Fleet Problem XX, White Task Force, Task Group, Division, Squadron, and Ship Commanders' Narratives of Events and Track Charts, RG
313, NARA); Umpire Report and Narrative, USS Wyoming, Fleet Problem XX, 28
February 1939 (Roll 27, Target 1, Fleet Problem XX, Black Ships Operating Independently, Narratives and Track Charts, RG 313, NARA),p. 51; Narrative of Fleet Problem XX, USS New York, 1 March 1939 (Roll 27, Target 1, Fleet Problem XX, Black
Ships Operating Independently, Narratives and Track Charts, RG 313, NARA),p. 13.
1134
THE JOURNAL OF
Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S. Navy, 1922-41
battleship gunfire was halved at ranges over twenty-two thousand yards

without aerial spotting.106
According to the Umpire Rules in use during the 1930s, at thirty-four
thousand yards a battleship would inflict 0.5 percent damage on an
enemy battleship each minute. This would increase to 1.0 percent per
minute at twenty-six thousand yards, and 2 percent per minute at eighteen thousand yards. Without aerial spotting the damage at longer ranges
would decrease dramatically. At thirty-four thousand yards the damage
would be reduced to 0 percent, and at twenty-six thousand yards, the
damage would be halved to 0.5 percent.107
Estimates by the Naval War College predicted an even greater
increase in effectiveness with aerial spotting; in 1935 the assumption
was that at twenty-nine thousand yards air spotting would deliver six
times as many hits as observation from spotters aloft.108Aerial spotting
was therefore essential for extreme range gunfire and was extensively
practiced in the Fleet Problems and tactical exercises.
The experience gained was used as the foundation of an additional
chapter to U.S.F. 16. Completed in early 1935, chapter seven provided
in precise detail the communication methods to be employed by spotting
aircraft and firing ships. Diagrams illustrated the relative positions the
spotting aircraft were to assume, and a new section added in November
1935 gave details on spotting procedures for indirect fire.109
Procedures for indirect fire were detailed in U.S.F 17 from 1938.
Under these conditions, spotting relied entirely on observers in aircraft.
Some measure of the Navy's confidence in the effectiveness of aerial
spotting is reflected in the assumption that it would be possible to engage
the enemy effectively using aerial spotting alone.110
Unfortunately, the desire for practice with aerial spotting led to the
use of constructive spotting aircraft instead of actual planes during Fleet
Problem XVI and this led to some confusion."' Admiral Harris Laning,
106. Change No. 3 to U.S.F. 10, 5 October 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC), p.
16; Change No. 10 to U.S.F. 10, 9 May 1936 (WW2CF, Box 270, NHC), p. 62; Change
No. 12 to U.S.F. 10, 24 January 1938 (WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC), p. 12.
107. Change No. 3 to U.S.F. 10, 5 October 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC), pp.
16-17; Change No. 12 to U.S.F. 10, 24 January 1938 (WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC), pp.
12-13.
108. W. J. Jurens, "The Evolution of Battleship Gunnery in the US Navy,
1920-1945," Warship International 28, no. 3 (1991): 246.
109. Change No. 1 to U.S.F. 16, 7 February 1935 (WW2 CF, Box 272, NHC);
Change No. 4 to U.S.F. 16, 29 November 1935 (WW2 CF, Box 272, NHC).
110. Change No. 4 to U.S.F. 16, 29 November 1935 (WW2 CF, Box 272, NHC),
p. 7-6a; U.S.F. 17, Current Doctrine-Battleships, October 1938 (WW2CF, Box 272,
NHC), pp. 4-5.
111. In the Fleet Problems, it was occasionally necessary to simulate ships or
planes that did not actually exist. During Fleet Problem XVI a seaplane was lost the
MILITARY HISTORY
1135
TRENTHONE
U.S. FLEET
4t-V0-1
BATDIV-4 0
yda.
0
CALIF.
0
BATDIV-1
<
BAtDIV-2
Spotting altitude will

be the maxinm attain0 able with satisfactory
O uandling performnce
0 of the aircraft, or
as dictated by ceiling.
0
0O
0
PEMN.
0
0
BATDIV-3
0
0
T-2
1)
LieTVO-2
V'*
Figure 4: Typical Spotting Procedure112

night before the climactic surface engagement, and all available aerial assets were
withdrawn from the problem in order to search for the crew of the lost aircraft.
For details of the constructive aerial spotting in Fleet Problem XVI, see Critique
of Fleet Problem Sixteen, 15 June 1935, Comments of Rear Admiral Kempff, Commander BatDiv One (Fleet Problem XVI, CINCUSReport, September 15, 1935 [Enclosures A-I], RG 38, NARA), p. 2; Fleet Problem Sixteen, Report of Commanderin-Chief, United States Fleet, USS Pennsylvania, Flagship, 15 September 1935, Admiral J. M. Reeves (Fleet Problem XVI,CINCUSReport, September 15, 1935 [Enclosures
A-I], RG 38, NARA),p. 26.
112. Change No. 4 to U.S.F. 16, 29 November 1935 (WW2 CF, Box 272, NHC),
p. 7-4.
1136
THE JOURNAL OF
the commander of the White Fleet, was not aware that the constructive
air spot was in effect, and did not return fire when Black opened up at
extreme range. The Black ships had a speed advantage and successfully
prevented the White Fleet from closing. In his comments on the action,
Admiral Laning suggested that the Black ships were wasting their ammunition because at such ranges their fire would not be effective without
aerial spotting. Unfortunately he was unaware that constructive aerial
spotting was in effect, and as a result his forces were soundly defeated in
the main engagement.113
While the tactical exercises served to test the effectiveness of
extreme range fire in mock combat situations, the Navy honed its gunnery skills with Long-Range Battle Practice. The detailed investigation of
W. J. Jurens has illustrated the importance the Navy assigned to these
gunnery practices in the 1930s, particularly the necessity of engaging
targets at "maximum effective range" and scoring hits early.114
Jurens has shown that from 1927 until the beginning of World War
Two, the Navy's gunnery in Long-Range Battle Practice showed steady
improvement. The average performance gradually increased, and the
spread of extreme performances decreased. The Navy's long-range gunnery was improving in accuracy and consistency throughout the
1930s.115
The assumption that the Navy would be able to shoot accurately at
extreme ranges was not without foundation. The opening ranges battleships employed in the Fleet Problems and tactical exercises mirrored the
ranges at which the Navy practiced opening fire in its gunnery exercises.
Accurate extreme range gunfire was not an artificiality of the mock combat of the Fleet Problems, but a goal the Navy worked hard to achieve.
113. Admiral Laning's specific comments were as follows: "Should our battleships in war waste ammunition as they indicate they waste it in peacetime exercises,
it is quite evident that by the time we place our battleships within effective range of
an enemy in war they will have little or no ammunition left with which to destroy
him." Critique of Fleet Problem Sixteen, 15 June 1935 (Fleet Problem XVI, CINCUS
Report, September 15, 1935 [Enclosures A-I], RG 38, NARA), Comments of Admiral
Laning, p. 8.
It should be noted that Admiral Laning'sconcern about the waste of ammunition
through ineffective fire at extreme range is an important one. These comments illustrate that the Navy was aware of this possible problem, but the potential advantage of
gaining the upper hand at the beginning of an action by opening fire at the maximum
effective range outweighed these concerns.
114. Jurens, "The Evolution of Battleship Gunnery in the US Navy, 1920-1945,"
246.
115. Ibid., 261.
MILITARY HISTORY
1137
TRENTHONE
Concentration on the Enemy Battle Line

The advantage that could be gained by focusing decisive firepower
on the enemy battle line at the outset of an action could be decisive. The
effectiveness of battleship gunfire had long been established; the Fleet
Problems reflected this capability.
In Fleet Problem XVI, the Idaho was knocked out of action in six
short minutes by the concentrated fire of six enemy battleships and battle cruisers. Idaho had been damaged earlier in the problem by torpedo
hits, but the speed with which she was dispatched by enemy gunfire was
quite notable.116 The other two ships of Battleship Division Three were
also overwhelmed by the concentration of enemy fire. The report stated:
It is considered that the damageadjudgedagainst BatdivThree was
properly awarded by the Assistance Umpires, this division being
under concentrated fire from enemy battleships and battle cruisers
...
for about 30 minutes.117
The destruction of an entire battleship division so early in the action

hindered the ability of the White Fleet to deploy effectively; half an hour
was required for deployment of the White battle line.l18
The Navy's gunnery exercises provided further support for the idea
that the concentrated fire of a battleship division could rapidly inflict
crippling losses. During an exercise in fiscal year 1935, the battle line
achieved 60 hits for 1,179 shots on a target raft at a mean range of
27,450 yards. Had the target been battleship-sized, there would have
been roughly 3.33 hits per minute per ship. With about 20 hits necessary
to sink a battleship, the concentrated fire of a three-ship division could
destroy an enemy battleship in approximately two minutes.119
New Mexico suffered the effects of a double concentration in the
opening stages of Fleet Problem X. She was leading the battleships of
the Blue Fleet into battle; Black's initial fire distribution called for a
double concentration on the ship in the enemy van. For twenty-four
minutes New Mexico suffered under this fire, initially from extreme,
116. Critique of Fleet Problem Sixteen, 15 June 1935 (Fleet Problem XVI, CINCUS Report, September 15, 1935 (Enclosures A-I), RG 38, NARA), Comments of
Admiral Laning, p. 8.
117. Fleet Problem Sixteen, Report of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, Flagship, 15 September 1935, AdmiralJ. M. Reeves (Fleet Problem
XVI, CINCUSReport, September 15, 1935 [Enclosures A-I], RG 38, NARA),p. 27.
118. Critique of Fleet Problem Sixteen, 15 June 1935 (Fleet Problem XVI, CINCUS Report, September 15, 1935 [Enclosures A-I], RG 38, NARA), Comments of
Admiral Laning, p. 8.
119. Jurens, "The Evolution of Battleship Gunnery in the US Navy, 1920-1945,"
247n.18, 268.
1138 *
THE JOURNAL OF
and later from long range.120New Mexico was for all practical purposes
destroyed.121
There were limitations to the effectiveness of concentrated fire. The
concentration of more than three battleships against a single target was
considered wasteful.122By 1938, the complexity of the Umpire Rules had
increased and the effectiveness of concentrated gunfire was now specifically stated: "If two or more ships concentrate fire on a single ship the
damage effect will be increased 50 percent."123 Earlier versions of the
rules make no specific indication of the amount of damage resulting from
concentration; it may be that in earlier exercises the concentrated fire
of multiple ships was applied without penalty, so that if two ships fired
at a single target, the resulting damage would be double that resulting
from a single firing ship.124
Other methods of concentrating firepower upon the enemy battle
line were tested. These attacks were coordinated to coincide with the
commencement of the fleet action, so that battleship shells, aerial
bombs, and destroyer torpedoes would be swarming around the enemy
at the same time. It was expected that this coordination would increase
the effectiveness of each method of attack.
During Fleet Problem X, the commander of the Blue force developed
a battle plan featuring a destroyer attack coordinated with the beginning
of the action. Its object was to place torpedoes in the midst of the enemy
battle line at the same time as the battleships opened fire.125The Green
Fleet developed a plan in which destroyer torpedo attacks would coincide with the attack of torpedo planes in Fleet Problem XVII (1936).126
In Fleet Problem XV, the attack of carrier planes was well timed to
coincide with the opening of the battleship engagement. The battle
X, CINCUSReport, May 7, 1930, RG 80, NARA),pp. 53-55.
121. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
122. F.T.P 143, WarInstructions, United States Navy, 1934 (WW2CF, Box 108,
NHC), pp. 96-97; U.S.F.17, Current Doctrine-Battleships, 1938 (WW2CF, Box 272,
NHC), p. 4.
123. Change No. 12 to U.S.F.10, 24 January 1938 (WW2CF,Box 270, NHC),p. 12.
124. Change No. 3 to U.S.F. 10, 5 October 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC);
Change No. 10 to U.S.F. 10, 9 May 1936 (WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC).
X, CINCUSReport, May 7, 1930, RG 80, NARA),p. 8; Brief of Estimate of the Situation and Plans and Orders of Commander Blue Fleet, US Fleet Problem X, 1 January 1930 (Roll 13, Target 4, Fleet Problem X, BLUE Estimate of the Situation, with
Plans and Orders, RG 80, NARA),p. 8.
126. Annex Cast, Green Battle Fleet Order No. 1-36, Fleet Problem XVII, 14 May
1936 (Roll 21, Target 6, Fleet Problem XVII, US Fleet, BLUE, WHITE, GRAY,and
GREEN Statements of the Problem with Estimates of the Situation, Plans, Orders,
Instructions, and Organization, RG 80, NARA).
MILITARY HISTORY
1139
TRENTHONE
cruiser action commenced at 1335; the battleships engaged at 1418; and

the carrier planes attacked at 1345. The report "noted that the engagement of our Battle Line had been coordinated by the O.T.C. quite effectively with our air attacks."127The coordination of these assets required
timing and planning, but it was assumed that the benefits of a concentrated effort would make it well worthwhile.
During Fleet Problem XX, attacks on battleships during the fleet
action were very effective. The New York was wrecked by a combination
of battleship gunfire and aerial attacks. Dive bombers and torpedo
bombers inflicted a total of 33 percent damage, the majority of it early
in the action. Battleship gunfire finished her off; she suffered 50 percent
damage from gunfire overall.128
Much of the incentive for attacking the enemy battle line with aircraft during the fleet engagement resulted from the perceived vulnerability of attacking aircraft. Rear Admiral J. R. P. Pringle stated:
I doubt the advisabilityof a carrierplane attack against a battleship
division in close formationunless the conditions are most favorable
or unless executed in supportof some other operation.I believe that
such an attack would result in very heavy damage to the attacking
planes and doubt if the resultingbattleshipdamagewouldjustify the
operation.129
The fleet action was a distraction that would allow airplanes to attack an
enemy relatively unopposed. Without such distraction, air attacks
against alerted ships were considered dangerous and potentially ineffective.130By contrast, unopposed aerial attacks offered far greater potential.
The Umpire Rules specified that torpedo bombing, dive bombing,
and level bombing attacks would score twice as many hits if they were
unopposed by antiaircraft fire and if the target ship was unable to
maneuver. The effectiveness of attacks would be increased to a lesser
XV,CINCUSReport, June 1, 1934, RG 38, NARA),p. 57; Fleet Problem XV May 1934
(Roll 16, Target2, Fleet Problem XV,Correspondence RegardingConcept of the Problem, RG 38, NARA),p. 12.
128. Narrative of Fleet Problem XX, USS New York, 1 March 1939 (Roll 27, Target 1, Fleet Problem XX, Black Ships Operating Independently, Narratives and Track
Charts, RG 313, NARA),p. 14.
United States Fleet, Admiral Frank H. Schofield, 23 May 1932 (Roll 14, Target 1, Fleet
Problem XIII, CINCUS Report, May 23, 1932, RG 38, NARA), Comments of Rear
Admiral J. R. P. Pringle, p. 28.
130. Critique of Fleet Problem Sixteen, 15 June 1935 (Fleet Problem XVI, CINCUS Report, September 15, 1935 [Enclosures A-I], RG 38, NARA), Comments of
Lieutenant Commander F. B. Stump, Senior Squadron Commander, USS Saratoga, p.
2.
1140
THE JOURNAL OF
extent if one of these conditions prevailed.131 By timing aerial attacks

with the outset of a fleet engagement, the enemy would be forced to
choose between maneuvering and reducing the effectiveness of its gunfire, or maintaining a steady course and offering an easier target to aerial attacks.
The Navy also assumed that an aerial attack would assist the battleships by decreasing the effectiveness of the enemy fire:
It is hoped that the ... air attacks will inflict serious injuries on the
fire control equipment,the secondarybatteries and the communication facilities of the Gray battleships immediately prior to or soon
afterthe commencement of the action. It is also possible that certain
Grayvessels will be reducedin speed and compelledto leave the battle line.132
Coordination of all these assets simultaneously against the enemy battle
line reflects the Navy's emphasis on aggressive offensive action and
desire to seize the tactical initiative. Long-range gunfire was only one
facet of the Navy's plan; it would be supplemented by the attacks of other
arms.133
The New Battleships-North Carolina and South Dakota

The development of the Navy's first battleships constructed under
the restrictions of the Washington and London naval treaties, the ships
of the North Carolina and South Dakota classes, was influenced by the
doctrinal principles the Navy had developed during the preceding years:
these ships were designed to be able to fight effectively at extreme range,
their armor schemes were based on a well-developed concept of the
immune zone, and technological advances allowed them to enjoy much
higher speeds than their predecessors. Although treaty limitations
forced the consideration of fourteen-inch guns for these ships, they
eventually came to be armed with very powerful sixteen-inch guns, the
Navy's preferred battleship weapon.
131. Change No. 3 to U.S.F. 10, 5 October 1934 (WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC), pp.
21-22; Change No. 12 to U.S.F. 10, 24 January 1938 (WW2 CF, Box 270, NHC), pp.
21-22.
132. U.S. Fleet Battle Instructions
No. 3-34, Effective 9 April 1934, 27 March
for and Conduct of the Problem, RG 38, NARA),p. 5.
133. This kind of coordination was employed in actual combat in the defensive
action fought off Samar on 25 October 1944. The escorts of the third of three task
units (each with several escort carriers screened by destroyers and destroyer escorts)
in Task Group 77.4, "Taffy3," attacked the Japanese simultaneously with aircraft
from the escort carriers. Morison, History of the United States Naval Operations,
12:242-88.
MILITARY HISTORY
1141
TRENT HONE
Well-detailed design histories of the North Carolina and South

Dakota classes have been written by Norman Friedman, who indicates
that the Navy emphasized several factors in the design of these battleships:
* The sixteen-inch gun was considered the most effective battleship weapon. In terms of hitting power and accuracy the sixteeninch weapon was superior to all lesser calibers.134 The
development of a super-heavy shell maximized the performance
of the sixteen-inch gun. Deck penetration was extremely important at long range and this was enhanced by increasing the mass
of the shell fired; with a 2,700-pound shell, the sixteen-inch gun
was considered superior to an eighteen-inch gun firing a more
conventional projectile.135
* A protective scheme featuring an immune zone designed to coincide with the long range band. Requirements from 1933 for a
new battleship specified an immune zone of 21,000 yards to
28,000 yards against sixteen-inch guns.136 Later design studies
for the North Carolina-class feature immune zones that begin at
19,000 to 22,000 yards and end at 27,000 to 30,000 yards.137
The Navy was designing new battleships that would be least vulnerable at those ranges at which the enemy was expected to
fight, reflecting the Navy's emphasis on maximizing its advantages and countering those of the enemy.
* High speed would enable them to act as a fast wing. By 1933,
there was a requirement for battleships with speeds of at least
twenty-nine knots. Ships of this speed would be able to counter
the battle cruisers other navies were employing as a detached
wing such as the Japanese battle cruisers of the Kongo class.
Additionally, ships with such a high speed would be able to operate with aircraft carriers.138
134. For the superior accuracy of the Navy's sixteen-inch gun, see Jurens, "The
Evolution of Battleship Gunnery in the US Navy, 1920-1945," 271 n. 66.
135. Friedman, US Battleships, 211-13.
136. Ibid., 229.
137. Ibid., 246-48, 254-55. Note that because the North Carolina designs at this
stage featured fourteen-inch guns, the majority of the immune zones were calculated
against a fourteen-inch shell. It was typical for the Navy's battleship designs to have
protective schemes intended to defeat their own main battery.
138. Friedman, US Battleships, 230-31.
1142 *
THE JOURNAL OF
The design of the Navy's new battleships of the North Carolina and
South Dakota classes reflected the strong influence of the Navy's doctrine and the perceived limitations of the existing battle line.
Conclusion-A Pacific Jutland

In mid-1941, on the eve of war in the Pacific, Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Pacific
Fleet, and his staff composed a plan designed to entice the Imperial
Japanese Navy into a major fleet action in the central Pacific. Edward S.
Miller's War Plan Orange describes the plan in detail.139However, Miller
notes that specific information regarding the tactical employment of the
Navy's battleships is lacking: "The supreme riddle of the 1941 fleet plans
concerns deployment of the battle line."'40 He goes on to wonder, "If a
battle plan existed, why has it never come to light?"141
Kimmel and his staff did develop a plan for a medium-range engagement, but apparently did not have a specific plan for battle at any other
ranges. This could be due to several factors. Kimmel may have intended
to use one of the basic plans provided in the tactical instructions for
longer ranges. Possibly Kimmel, cognizant of the benefits that could be
gained from leveraging a specific advantage, planned to wait until the ini-
139. Kimmel's operational plan was relatively simple. A raiding force centered
on the Pacific Fleet's three carriers would sortie into the MarshallIslands and reconnoiter Japanese positions. Distant support for this raid would be provided by a second task force containing a single battleship division; a third task force, with the
remaining six battleships of the Pacific Fleet, would rendezvous with the others in the
open ocean at a point south of Midway and east of Wake Island.
The planners hoped that the Japanese, baited by the three carriers, would be
drawn out by the initial raid. While the IJNwas on its way to the area, the carrier task
force would depart for a second sortie into the Marshalls. This time aggressive action
would be taken to destroy enemy targets identified in the initial reconnaissance.
There is no doubt that this raid was intended to destroy the eyes of the Japanese fleet.
Deprived of the use of patrol planes based in the Marshalls, the Japanese would be
forced to use ship-based aircraft for reconnaissance.
Patrol planes would harass and shadow the Japanese fleet from the moment it
came into range, while the carriers would most likely have been kept with Kimmel
and the battle line.
As soon as the Japanese were within range, the three U.S. Navy carriers would
launch a massed strike aimed at the enemy carriers. This attack would destroy Japanese air power. With aerial superiority assured, the U.S. Navy would close on the
Japanese, preparing for the climactic surface gunnery battle. See Edward S. Miller,
War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1991), 286-312, chapter 25.
140. Miller,WarPlan Orange, 302.
141. Ibid., 308.
MILITARY HISTORY
1143
TRENT HONE
tial phase of his operation was complete before designing a specific plan;
this would allow time to estimate the enemy strengths and assess his
weaknesses. The possibility also exists that an emphasis was placed on
medium-range action because that range was certain to offer the potential for decisive action. If outfought early in an engagement, the Japanese could use their speed advantage to retire; at medium range, they
would have to fight their way out.
Kimmel's Plan 2M1, issued in November 1941, was specifically
intended for combat at medium range. It was a deceptive plan, designed
to seize the tactical initiative once the battle had closed to decisive
range. The plan assumed the presence of strong forces in the enemy van,
the Japanese battle cruisers and attendant light forces, and sought to isolate them.
Upon the execution signal for Plan 2M1, the battle line would begin
a simultaneous turn to the rear, initiating a reverse action. The general
plan was:
To initiate a reverse action, accepting the temporary reduction in
gun power efficiency of the battleline duringthe maneuverin anticipation of gaining the tactical advantagesof surprise, more effective
orientation of the battleline, and relatively superior light force distributionand disposition.142
The object of the plan illustrates Kimmel's intent to control the pace of
battle by gaining the initiative:
Continuance of engagement under more favorable conditions by
seizing the tactical initiative, and by initiating a reverse action to
obtain the tactical advantage of surprise.143
Like the great "battle turn away" of the Germans at Jutland, Plan
2M1 would have seen the Navy's battleships slowly and deliberately turn
to an opposite course. The planners hoped that the Japanese, like the
British in 1916, would be left for a moment wondering where the enemy
had gone. But, unlike the Germans, the U.S. Navy battleships would not
withdraw; they would move to threaten the rear of the Japanese line.
The Navy knew that the Japanese would deploy their battle cruisers
as a detached wing at the head of their battle line. By waiting until the
battle was joined to initiate a reverse action, Kimmel planned to isolate
this battle cruiser force and achieve local superiority at the decisive
point, the rear of the enemy line. If the battle cruisers turned to rejoin
the fight, light forces would attack them immediately.144 This attack
would prevent them from quickly coming to the aid of the other Japan142. Battle Plan 2M1, Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletin No. 3-41, 21 November
1941 (WW2 CF, Box 250, NHC).
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
1144
THE JOURNAL OF
ese ships and allow the battle line to focus on the destruction of the
enemy battleships.
It is difficult to judge how effective Kimmel's plan would have been.
Even if the Japanese allowed themselves to be lured into such a battle,
the Navy remained ignorant of Japanese plans to outrange them in every
respect. Provided they could find them, Japanese carrier planes would
have attacked the U.S. Navy carriers from ranges up to 150 miles away
in an effort to gain air superiority.145If conditions were right, the Japanese battleships would have opened fire at around thirty-seven thousand
yards.146 Although their accuracy at extreme range would have been
poor, these capabilities would have come as a rude surprise.147The most
shocking weapon the IJN possessed was undoubtedly the Type 93 torpedo.148
However, Japanese plans for the use of their powerful torpedoes
relied on launching them at long ranges into an area well ahead of the
enemy line. At these distances, Japanese torpedoes achieved a very poor
hit rate.149At closer ranges, Kimmel's Plan 2M1 would have reduced the
odds even more.
By waiting until closing to decisive ranges before turning to initiate
a reverse action, Kimmel was attempting to lull the Japanese commander into a false sense of security. At the head of their line, the Japanese
planned to employ a powerful concentration of force, including their battle cruisers and heavy cruisers armed with the Type 93 torpedoes.150
Kimmel remained ignorant of the range and power of these weapons, but
he knew the danger that enemy light forces could present to the van of
his force. Plan 2M1 was designed to counter exactly the kind of plan the
Japanese envisioned.
In the years before World War II, the Navy developed a doctrine well
suited to its existing battleships and the anticipated fleet engagement
that would decide a future war. Far from being antiquated, battle line tactics were continuously evolving to reflect the Navy's growing capabilities,
145. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 283.
146. Ibid., 262.
147. The poor accuracy of Japanese gunfire at long range is suggested by the
inability of the Japanese ships to score hits off Samar at anything but relatively close
range. Morison, History of the United States Naval Operations,
12:242-88.
148. The Type 93 torpedo had a 1,080-pound warhead and a maximum range of
43,700 yards at thirty-six knots. Faster settings gave ranges of 35,000 and 21,900
yards at forty and forty-eight knots respectively. Campbell, Naval Weapons of World
War Two, 207.
149. At the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942 the Japanese launched
forty-three torpedoes at the Allied ships. All of them missed. Morison, History of the
United States Naval Operations,
3: 346.
150. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 283.

MILITARY HISTORY
1145
TRENTHONE
the anticipated action of the enemy, and the introduction of new technologies.
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 left the United States Navy
with a diverse collection of eighteen battleships and no prospect for new
construction for a decade. The battleships that made up the Navy's
battle line could operate as a single unit because of their similar maximum speeds, but their capabilities spanned a broad spectrum.
The most modern among them, the three battleships of the Colorado
class, represented the state of the art in battleship design; they had eight
sixteen-inch guns and the most modern armor scheme then in existence.
The four oldest, the battleships of the Florida and Wyoming classes,
were approaching obsolescence; they had been designed over a decade
earlier, and their guns and armor layouts belonged to an earlier generation.
The Navy initially planned to replace these older ships after the expiration of the ten-year building holiday. As a result, the Navy's battle
plans from the first decade of the interwar period did not reflect the specific capabilities of existing ships. The Navy's battle doctrine of this initial period, from the signing of the Washington Treaty to that of the First
London Treaty of 1930, emphasized maneuver and was designed to
ensure that the Navy's ships would operate as a cohesive unit in battle.
After the signing of the First London Treaty in 1930, the battleship
building holiday was extended for another five years. The Navy gave up
three of its oldest battleships, and, deprived of the authority to build
modern battleships for several more years, the Navy developed battle
plans and a tactical doctrine reflecting the specific capabilities and limitations of its existing ships. These doctrinal considerations influenced
the design of the Navy's fast battleships built under the auspices of the
Second London Treaty of 1936, the ships of the North Carolina and
South Dakota classes.
The tactical doctrine developed in the 1930s was refined and tested
during the Navy's Fleet Problems; codified elements were published and
distributed in the Navy's Fleet Tactical Publications. Further doctrinal
clues are provided in the annual reports of the Commander-in-Chief of
the United States Fleet. These primary sources illustrate that during the
last decade of the interwar period, between the London Treaty of 1930
and the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. Navy's tactical doctrine
became quite sophisticated, extending beyond the battle line to encompass all aspects of a potential fleet engagement. It was designed to leverage U.S. Navy strengths while focusing on enemy weaknesses; it
emphasized the coordination of all arms; it focused on tactical flexibility; and it was based on a decentralized command structure, relying
heavily on individual initiative.
1146
THE JOURNAL OF
U.S. Navy Battleships

Actual Capabilities of United States Shipsl51
Class and Ship
Main
Maximum
Service
Dates
Armament Range (yards)
Florida Class
Florida
1911-1930
10-12745
21,000
Utah
1912-1930
10-127/45
21,000
Wyoming Class
Arkansas
1912-1946
12-12750
23,000
1912-1930
12-12750
23,000
Wyoming
New York Class
New York
1914-1946
10-147/45
22,000
Texas
1914-1948
10-14745
22,000
Nevada Class
Nevada
1916-1927
10-14745
22,000
1929-1946
33,000
Oklahoma
1916-1927
10-14745
22,000
1929-1941
33,000
Pennsylvania Class
1916-1929
12-14745
22,000
Pennsylvania
1931-1946
33,000
Arizona
1916-1929
12-14745
22,000
1931-1941
33,000
New Mexico Class
New Mexico
1918-1931
12-14750
23,000
1933-1946
35,000
Idaho
1919-1933
12-14750
23,000
1934-1946
35,000
1917-1931
12-14750
23,000
Mississippi
1932-1946
35,000
California Class
12-14/50
1921-1947
35,000
California
Tennessee
1920-1947
12-14750
35,000
Colorado Class
Colorado
1923-1947
8-16745
33,000
1921-1947
8-16745
33,000
Maryland
West Virginia
1922-1947
8-16745
33,000
Speed
(knots)
21
21
21
21
21
21
20.5
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
151. Class of 1926, Joint Problem No. I, Blue Statement of Problem and Staff
Solution (Box 14, Strategic Plans Division Records, RG 38, NARA),Numerical Comparison of Forces; Operations Problem III-1935-SR, Orange, Estimate of the Situation by Orange Commander-in-Chief, Solution by A Member of the Staff (Box 21,
Strategic Plans Division Records, RG 38, NARA), p. 10; Siegfried Breyer, Battleships
and Battle Cruisers: 1905-1970 (New York:Doubleday and Company, 1973), 209,
213, 217-18.
MILITARY HISTORY
1147
TRENT HONE
Orange Capital Ships-Estimated

Ship Class
Type
Kongo Class
CB
Fuso Class
BB
Ise Class
BB
Nagato Class
BB
Date of
Estimate
1926
1935
1926
1935
1926
1935
1926
1935
Capabilities of Japanese Ships152

Main
Armament
8-14745
12-14745
12-14745
8-16745
..
Maximum
Range (yards)
27,000
29,000
27,000
29,000
27,000
29,000
34,000
32,000
Speed
(knots)
27.5
26
22.5
23
23
..
152. Class of 1926, Joint Problem No. I, Blue Statement of Problem and Staff
Solution (Box 14, Strategic Plans Division Records, RG 38, NARA),Numerical Comparison of Forces; Operations Problem III-1935-SR, Orange, Estimate of the Situation by Orange Commander-in-Chief, Solution by A Member of the Staff (Box 21,
Strategic Plans Division Records, RG 38, NARA),p. 10.
1148
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The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S.

The Evolution of Fleet Tactical

7 December 1941, the United States Navy's battle line was

Society for Military History

for Tactical Flexibility and Concentration

Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-41

Cruising formations were designed for those situations when the

Figure 1: Typical Cruising Formation3

Figure 2: Typical Approach Formation4

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

CLs' '1 VI()

Figure 3: Typical Battle Formation8

The Importance of a Steady Course

lis, Md.:NavalInstitutePress,1985), 173.

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

U.S. Navy Advantages and the Pursuit of Long-Range Fire

13. Friedman, US Battleships, 183.

Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-41

Director Fire Control and Massed Fire

of 46 degrees. John Campbell, Naval

Weapons of World War Two

(Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press, 1985), 116.

21. Ibid., 173.

computers made possible the "very rapid postwar development of US

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

U.S. Navy Disadvantages

32. Friedman, US Battleships, 189, 190-91.

Box 256, NHC),p. 9.

Doctrinal Development, 1930-41

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

the capabilities and limitations of its battleships in mind. "Tentative

The enemy's detached wing of battle cruisers would similarly be out of

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

enemy would be forced either to accept an action on opposite courses,

The Navy enjoyed a marked superiority in the extreme range band.

itself.47 The enemy

was not expected

effectively at these great distances.48

CF,Box 108, NHC),p. 14-3.

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-41

plane and destroyer attacks were to be focused on the enemy battleships

If aerial spotting could not be employed, then Blue would seek an

greatest dangerlies in an inflexibleadherence to a conception of the

General Principles of U.S. Navy Doctrine

69. Ibid, pp. 65-66.

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

be advantageous.76 Engagement at more favorable ranges would be

76. Ibid., p. 87.

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

do not accept them as gospel.79

The Navy recognized that in battle, effective communication with

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

The Commander-in-Chief explained the reasoning behind this emphasis

Seizing the Tactical Initiative

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S.Navy, 1922-41

the benefits of opening fire at

Fire should be opened, normally, at the maximum range at which an

Experiments had shown that early hitting would be possible at these

Evolutionof Fleet TacticalDoctrinein the U.S. Navy, 1922-41

battleship gunfire was halved at ranges over twenty-two thousand yards

Spotting altitude will

Figure 4: Typical Spotting Procedure112

Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-41