G.R. Nos.

L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy
Reyes alias "Taba,"respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion

which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and
punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or
remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
Act, 1

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge
Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against
Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended
information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and
domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University,
the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said
Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public
authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.

(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the
respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an
information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated
by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac,
pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S.
Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE,
ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER
MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation
of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law,
committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the
Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in
the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act
No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto,
knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a member and
became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist
Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such officers
and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly,
willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting,
instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take
up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots
to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence,
deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted
meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating
and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal
means; and toward this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of
the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed
purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or
seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to
discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to
established in the Philippines a Communist regime.

2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with
FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above
subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the
New People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and
unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means,
and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft,
fraud, or disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1)
it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title
thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970,
declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and
overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall
be enacted." 2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is
the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History in perspective,
bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against
this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of
a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder
because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security
of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the
judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the
forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be
determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of
attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused
can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it
does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional

purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any
other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but
on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and
therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar
governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than
as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor
organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist
Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members.
Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a
member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States
pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly
possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep
from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions
to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the
authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally
applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or possesses
certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them
likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts and
juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or
possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms
the persons who possess the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union
office without incurring criminal liability members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81
S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an
order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a
"Communist-action organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of

1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communistaction organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed,
dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling
the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates
primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat
989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder,
reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the
deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general
definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was
a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be
so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its
conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now
engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to
abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act
provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But
the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to
prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that
they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and
place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the
requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature
of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as
punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the
Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific
intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that
membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The
former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter
requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not
enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities
underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts

deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a
statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a
member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of
the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to
file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the
Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it
become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken
part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding
office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to
individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or
which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor
union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be
"judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed
fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring every
secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person
who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the
Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the
claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound
organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court
relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached
the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two
classes of associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in
a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its
purpose and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and
public welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other
class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the
principal association in the included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that
this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and
gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and
later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known,
many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oathbound and secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the
peace or interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a
matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator

is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation

of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;"
and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose.
The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already
received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the
legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third
court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing
that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated,"
meaning in that state, said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college
fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism,
have on the whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily
available including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the
House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes
and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised putting aside controverted
evidence that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with
additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other
periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites;
that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for
all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of
its member an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another
declared any person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in
the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and
Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for
political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local,
state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the
punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by
this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In
1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by
armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of
Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30we noted the growth of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations
such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After
meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of
a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus
been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit
of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and
reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative
adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly
objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two
mischiefs in one

clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill
of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that
establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter
of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in
the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either
elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this
section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes
effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association,
organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period
of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of
the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner
therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as
it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We
assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the
extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its
adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the
Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions
operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal
service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the
United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were
removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively
operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by
its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background,
the statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy,
them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct
and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect
to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct
which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few
organizationswill come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb
behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is
found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of

legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, bethey
many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present
activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof
expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this
Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any
subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party or
of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity
of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the
Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from
penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of
the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to
provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are
sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a
substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted careful
investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in
fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other
illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime
subject to alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines
constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in
scope but international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines
and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis
continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these findings
in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed
to takeproper account of the distinction between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul
Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:

... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol
would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the
sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require
supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e.,
whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the
limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean
by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and
oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those facts which are relevant to
the legislative judgment will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is
a rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts those which tie
the legislative enactment to the litigant are to be demonstrated and found
according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that
'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government
controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives
of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress
over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530.
We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we
accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the
threatwhich Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the
United States, but to the United States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we
must recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of
thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the AntiSubversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to
require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes
every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no
subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United
States: 41

Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to

rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure
of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of
governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle,
carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it
isnot within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the
government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof),
Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement
of knowing membership,as distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis
for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization;
and when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is
engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such
knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of
"overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives
the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a
legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts
prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the
Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first
"whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand
violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in
section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means. Only
in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law
does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow"
in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the
"overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the
Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a
prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported
anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious
sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been
intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the
whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument
designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which
the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression

As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force,
violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is
infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is
so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding
considerationsof national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership
provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any
such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith,
any such society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or
both, and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or
agencythereof, for the five years next following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to
promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty,
is not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no
reason why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a
group engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree
of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of
self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in
the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the
legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of
personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first
instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom tohire or
freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual
freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands
one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section 4
which reads:

And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its
political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the
purpose of placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and
domination of any lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccionalto prision
mayor with allthe accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party of
the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the
national or any local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian
regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an
aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United States or England or
Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title.
Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally indicates
that the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the
substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the details of
the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of
the proposed lawand its operation.52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute
will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the AntiSubversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize
the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive
area of freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be
observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such
circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the
Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that
thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to
establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the
objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign

power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert
acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the
Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to
future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases
are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of my brethren in the decision reached
upholding thevalidity of the Anti-Subversion Act. 1 It is to be admittedthat the learned and scholarly
opinbion of Justice Castro hasthe impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe constitutional
issues raised. What is more, the stressin the concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill assure
in the trial of those prosecuted under suchAct respect for their constitutional rights is to be
commended.Nonetheless, my own reading of the decisionscited, interpreting the bill of attainder
clause 2 coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a too-latitudinarian constructionof the guarantees of
freedom of belief and expression 3 as well as freedom of association 4 as to impermissible inroadsto which
they may be exposed, compels a differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.
1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally pressing concern of state safety and
security shouldbe ignored. The political branches of the governmentwould lay themselves oepn to a
justifiable indictment fornegligence had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the nation
against its sworn enemies. In a simplerera, where the overthrow of the government wasusually
through the rising up in arms, with weapons farless sophisticated than those now in existence, there
wasno constitutional issue of the magnitude that now confrontsus. Force has to be met with force. It
was as clearcutas that. Advances in science as well as more subtlemethods of inducing disloyalty
and weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced complexities in coping withsuch problems.
There must be then, and I am the firstto recognize it, a greater understanding for the

governmentalresponde to situations of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the AntiSubversion Act isto be appraised. From ny standpoint, and I am not presumptuousenough to claim
that it is the only perspectiveor that is the most realistic, I feel that there was an
insufficientappreciation of the compulsion of the constitutionalcommands against bills of attainder
and abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the thought that evenhad my view prevailed, all
that it would mean is that anew legislation, more in comformity to my way of thinkingto what is
ordained by the fundamental law, wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be entertained
thenthat a setback would be occasioned to legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of subversive
activities, in whateverform manifested.
2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof the bill of attainder clause is the meaning
attachedto it by the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the people who adopted it. As was
explained by the then Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on November19, 1934 as
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court: "A billof attainder
is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4Wall.
277, 18 L ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was
tried, convictedand sentenced to death without a jury, without ahearing in court, without hearing the
witnesses againsthim and without regard to the rules of evidence. His bloodwas attainted or
corrupted, rendering him devoid of allheritable quality of acquiring and disposing property
bydescent. (Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less than death,
the act wasknown as a 'bill of pains and penalties.' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto laws, were
favorite methods of Stuartoppression. Once, the name of Thomas Jefferson was includedin a bill of
attainder presented to Parliament becauseof his reform activities." 5Two American SupremeCourt
decision were thus in the minds of the framers.They are Cummings v. Missouri 6 and Ex
parteGarland. 7 They speak unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form, that apply either to
named individuals or easilyascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflicton them
punishment amounting to a deprivation ofany right, civil or political, without judicial trial are billsof
attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 8
Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa Catholic priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath
requiredby the state Constitution of Missouri of 1865. Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors, ministers,
and otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever, "by act orword," manifested a "desire" for the
success of the nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the AmericanCivil War. If they swore
falsely, they were guilty of perjury.If they engaged in their professions without theoath, they were
criminally liable. The United States Supreme Court condemned the provision as a bill of
attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting punishment withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any
right, civil orpolitical, previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment.Why such a conclusion was
unavoidable was explained inthe opinion of Justice Field thus: "A bill of attainder isa legislative act, which
inflicts punishment without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than death, the actis termed a bill of
pains and penalties. Within the meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills ofpains and
penalties. In these cases the legislative body, inaddition to its legitimate functions, exercises the
powersand office of judge; it assumes, in the language of thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it pronounces
upon theguilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of
the proofs produced,whether conformable to the rules of evidence orotherwise; and it fixes the degree of
punishment in accordancewith its own notions of the enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d
article of the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we have referred, had in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings
was guilty, or should be heldguilty, of having been in armed hostility to the UnitedStates, or of having

entered that state to avoid beingenrolled or drafted into the military service of the UnitedStates, and,
therefore, should be deprived of the right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to teach inany
institution of learning, there could be no question thatthe clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within
themeaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, insteadof mentioning his name, had declared
that all priestsand clergymen within the state of Missouri were guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty
of them, and hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would beequally open to objection. And
further, it these clauseshad declared that all such priests and clergymen shouldbe so held guilty, and be
thus deprived, provided they didnot, by a day designated, do certain specified acts, theywould be no less
within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution.In all these cases there would be the legislativeenactment
creating the deprivation, without any of theordinary forms and guards provided for the security ofthe
citizen in the administration of justice by the establishedtribunales." 10

On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings washanded down, Ex parte Garland 11 was also
decided. Thatwas a motion for leave to practrice as an attorney beforethe American Supreme Court.
Petitioner Garland wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of 1860. Underthe previous rules of
such Court, all that was necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice in the statecourts to
which he belonged. In March 1865, the rule waschanged by the addition of a clause requiring that an
oathbe taken under the Congressional acts of 1862 and 1865to the effect that such candidate for
admission to the barhad never voluntarily borne arms against the UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could
not in conscience subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a presidentialpardon extended on
July 15, 1865. With such actof clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue inpractice contending
that the test oath requirement wasunconstitutional as a bill of attainder and that at any rate,he was
pardoned. The same ruling was announced by theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus: "In the
exclusionwhich the statute adjudges, it imposes a punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were
not punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other of the actsit adds a new punishment to that
before prescribed, andit is thus brought within the further inhibition of the Consitutionagainst the passage
of an ex post facto law. Inthe case of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, ... wehave had occasion to
consider at length the meaning of abill of attainder and of an ex post factolaw in the clauseof the
Constitution forbidding their passage by the states,and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there
said.A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution againstenactments of this kind by Congress; and the
argumentpresented in that case against certain clauses of the Constitutionof Missouri is equally
applicable to the act ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12
There was a reiteration of the Cummings and Garlanddoctrine in United States v. Lovett, 13 decided in
1946.There it was shown that in 1943 the respondents, Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for
several yearsworking for the government. The government agencies,which had lawfully employed them,
were fully satisfiedwith the quality of their work and wished to keep thememployed on their jobs. Over
their protest, Congress providedin Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency AppropriationAct of 1943, by way
of an amendment attached to theHouse Bill, that after November 15, 1943, no salary orcompensation
should be paid respondent out of any moneythen or thereafter appropriated except for services as
jurorsor members of the armed forces, unless they wereprior to November 15, 1943, again appointed to
jobs bythe President with the advide and consent of the Senate.Notwithstanding such Congressional
enactment, and thefailure of the President to reappoint the respondents, theagencies, kept all the
respondents at work on their jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943, but their compensationwas
discontinued after that date. Respondentsbrought this action in the Court of Claims for the salariesto
which they felt entitled. The Ameican Supreme Courtstated that its inquiry was thus confined to whether
theaction in the light of proper construction of the Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so,
whether Section304 is a bill of attainder insofar as the respondents wereconcerned.

After holding that there was a juditiciable, view theAmerican Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section 304 fallsprecisely within the category of
Congressional actionswhich the Constitution barred by providing that 'No Billof Attainder or ex post
Law shall be passed.' InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If the punishment be lessthan death,
the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of
attainderinclude bills of pains and penalties.' ... On the sameday the Cummings case was decided,
the Court, in Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same grounds anAct of Congress which
required attorneys practicing beforethis Court to take a similar oath. Neither of thesecases has ever
been overruled. They stand for the propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their form,that
apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to
inflictpunishment on them without a judicial trial are billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution.
Adherenceto this principle requires invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere to it." 14
United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase to review a conviction under the LaborManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, making it a crimefor a member of the Communist
Party to serve as anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions, anemployee of a labor union.
Respondent Brown, a longshoremanon the San Francisco docks, and an open andavowed Communist,
for more than a quarter of a centurywas elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of theInternational
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961.On
May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a one-countindictment returned in a district court of California
withservicing as a member of an executive board of a labororganization while a member of the
Communist Party, inwillful violation of the above provision. The question ofits validity under the bill of
attainder clause was thusproperly raised for adjudication. While convicted in thelower court, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted in the
opinion by Chief Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form, purpose and effect of ante-Constitutionbills of
attainder indicates that the properscope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance tocontemporary
problems, must ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the reasons for its inclusion in
theConstitution, and the evils it was desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the writings of the
architectsof our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill ofAttainder Clause was inteded not as a
narrow, technical(and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but ratheras an implementation of the
separation of powers, ageneral safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicialfunction, or more
simply trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings, Garland, and Lovett,Chief Justice
Warren continued: "Under the line of casesjust outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor Management
Reportingand Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses
power under theCommerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting interstate
commerce persons whomay use such positions to bring about political strikes. In Sec. 504, however,
Congress has exceeded the authoritygranted it by the Constitution. The statute does not setforth a
generally applicable rule decreeing that any personwho commits certain acts or possesses certain
characteristics (acts and characteristics whhich, in Congress'view, make them likely to initiate political
strikes) shallnot hold union office, and leave to courts and juries thejob of deciding what persons have
committed the specifiedacts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead,it designates in no
uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec characteristics and therefore cannothold union office
without incurring criminal liability members of the Communist Party." 17
Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities ControlBoard, 18 where the provision of the Subversive
ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the Communist Party ofthe United States to register was sustained,
the opinionof Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a five-manmajority, did indicate adherence to

the Cummingsprinciple. Had the American Communist Party been outlawed,the outcome certainly would
have been different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches notto specified organizations but to
described activities inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The singlingout of an individual for
legislatively prescribed punishmentconstitutes an attainder whether the individualis called by name or
described in terms of conduct which,because it is past conduct, operates only as a designationof
particular persons. ... The Subversive Activities ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the
registrationonly of organizations which, after the date of the Act,are found to be under the direction,
domination, or controlof certain foreign powers and to operate primarily toadvance certain objectives. This
finding must be madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial reviewwhich opens the record for
the reviewing court'sdetermination whether the administrative findings as tofact are supported by the
preponderance of the evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element to whichthe statute
attaches legal consequences, not merely a pointof reference for the ascertainment of particularly
personsineluctably designated by the legislature." 19

The teaching of the above cases, which I find highlypersuasive considering what appeared to be in
the mindsof the framers of the 1934 Constitutional Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the
Anti-SubversionAct falls within the ban of the bill of attainder clause. Itshould be noted that three
subsequent cases upholding theCummings and Garland doctrine were likewise cited in theopinion of
the Court. The interpretation accorded to themby my brethren is, of course, different but I am unable
togo along with them especially in the light of the categoricallanguage appearing in Lovett. This is
not to lose sightof the qualification that for them could deprive such aholding of its explicit character
as shown by this excerptfrom the opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the Anti-SubversionAct a bill of
attainder it would be totally unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law alone,without
more, would suffice to secure their conviction andpunishment. But the fact is that their guilt still has
to bejudicially estblished. The Government has yet to proveat the trial that the accused joined the
Party knowingly,willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Partyknowing its subversive
character and with specific intentto further its objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Governmentby
force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the control and domination of a foreign
power. 20While not implausible, I find difficulty in yielding acceptance.In Cummings, there was a
criminal prosecution ofthe Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again in Brown, there
was an indictment of the laborleader who, judging by his membership in the CommunistParty, did
transgress the statutory provision subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill attainder clause. If the
constructionI would place on theoff-repeated pronouncementof the American Supreme Court is
correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have to be instituted wouldnot save the statute.
It does seem clear to me that fromthe very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to outlaw the Communist
Party of the Philippines and similar associations,"not to mention other specific provisions, the taintof
invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concurin the judgment reached as the statute not
suffering fromany fatal infirmity in view of the Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.
3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancyof the Anti-Subversion Act to the
intellectual libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in terms of the free speechand free assocition
guarantees. 21 It is to be admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1700,the threat
that Communism, the Russian brand then, didpose was a painful reality for Congressional leaders andthe
then President. Its shadow fell squarely across thelives of all. Subversion then could neither be denied
notdisparaged. There was, in the expert opinion of those conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out
national existenceof no mean character. Nonetheless, the remedies toward off such menace must not be
repugnant to our Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in anyother way. The apprehension

justly felt is no warrant forthrowing to the discard fundamental guarantees. Vigilantwe had to be, but not at
the expense of constitutional ideals.

One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost significance,is the right to dissent. One can differ,
evenobject; one can express dissatisfaction with things as theyare. There are timew when one not
only can but must.Such dissent can take the form of the most critical andthe most disparaging
remarks. They may give offense tothose in authority, to those who wield powe and
influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional protection.Insofar as the content of such
dissent is concerned, thelimits are hardly discernible. It cannot be confined totrivial matters or to
such as are devoid of too much significance.It can reach the heart of things. Such dissentmay, for
those not so adventurous in the realm of ideas,possess a subversive tinge. Even those who oppose
a democraticform of government cannot be silenced. This is trueespecially in centers of learning
where scholars competentin their line may, as a result of their studies, assert thata future is bleak for
the system of government now favoredby Western democracies. There may be doubts entertainedby
some as to the lawfulness of their exercisingthis right to dissent to the point of advocary of such
adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear thatthereby he incurs the risk of a penal
sanction. That ismerely to affirm the truth of this ringing declaration fromJefferson: "If there be any
among us who would wish todissolve this union or to change its republican form, letthem stand
undisturbed as monuments of the safety withwhich error of opinion may be tolerated where reason
isleft free to combat it." 22 As was so well put by the philosopher,Sidney Hook: "Without holding the right
to theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be absolute for even the right to non-heretical
speech cannot beabsolute it still seems wise to tolerate the expression evenof Communist, fascist and
other heresies, lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of heresies, and deprive ourselvesof the
opportunity to acquite possibly sounder ideasthan our own." 23
The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount to an incitement to commit the crime of
seditionor rebellion. The state has been reached, to follow theformulation of Cardozo, where thought
merges into action.Thus is loyalty shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the
Constitution. It does not bar the expressionof views affecting the very life of the state, even
ifopposed to its fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not require as a matter of fact, that
unorthodoxideas be freely ventilated and fully heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.
Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutionalprinciple "that even though the
governmental purposesbe legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursuedby means that broadly
stifle fundamental personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.For precision of
regulation is the touchstone in an areaso closely related to our most precious freedoms." 24 This is so
for "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
notbe achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadlyand thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." 25 It isindispensable then that "an over breadth" in the applicabilityof the statute be avoided. If
such be the case, then theline dividing the valid from the constitutionally infirm hasbeen crossed. That for
me is the conclusion to be drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.
There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe dissent of Justice Black in the Communist
Party casediscussed above. What is to be kept in view is that a legislativemeasure certainly less
drastic in its treatment ofthe admittedly serious Communist problem was found inthe opinion of this
noted jurist offensive to the FirstAmendment of the American Constitution safeguardingfree speech.
Thus: "If there is one thing certain aboutthe First Amendment it is that this Amendment was

designedto guarantee the freest interchange of ideas aboutall public matters and that, of course,
means the interchangeof all ideas, however such ideas may be viewed inother countries and
whatever change in the existing structureof government it may be hoped that these ideas willbring
about. Now, when this country is trying to spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world
ideals that are revolutionary in many countries seems to be aparticularly inappropriate time to
stifle First Amendmentfreedoms in this country. The same arguments that areused to justify the
outlawry of Communist ideas here couldbe used to justify an outlawry of the ideas of democracyin
other countries." 26 Further he stated: "I believe with theFramers of the First Amendment that the internal
securityof a nation like ours does not and cannot be made todepend upon the use of force by
Government to make allthe beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a commonmold on any single
subject. Such enforced conformity ofthought would tend only to deprive our people of the boldspirit of
adventure and progress which has brought thisNation to its present greatness. The creation of
publicopinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs, and partieshas been and is a necessary part of
our democraticsociety. Such groups, like the Sons of Liberty and theAmerican Corresponding Societies,
played a large part increating sentiment in this country that led the people ofthe Colonies to want a nation
of their own. The Father ofthe Constitution James Madison said, in speakingof the Sedition Act
aimed at crushing the Jefferson Party,that had that law been in effect during the period beforethe
Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto be 'miserable colonies, groaning under a
foreign yoke.'In my judgment, this country's internal security can betterbe served by depending upon the
affection of the peoplethan by attempting to instill them with fear and dreadof the power of Government.
The Communist Party hasnever been more than a small group in this country. Andits numbers had been
dwindling even before the Governmentbegan its campaign to destroy the Party by force oflaw. This was
because a vast majority of the Americanpeople were against the Party's policies and
overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year after year. That is the trueAmerican way of securing this
Nation against dangerousideas. Of course that is not the way to protect the Nationagainst actions of
violence and treason. The Foundersdrew a distinction in our Constitution which we would bewise to
follow. They gave the Government the fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in violation of valid lawsbut
withheld any power to punish people for nothing morethan advocacy of their views." 27
With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind and congenial to my way of thinking, I
cannot sharethe conclusion reached by my breathren as to the Anti-Subversion Act successfully
meeting the test of validity onfree speech and freedom of association grounds.
4. It could be that this approach to the constitutionalquestions involved arises from an appraisal of
the challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an interpretationthat it does represent a
defeatist attitude on thepart of those of us, who are devotees at the shrine of aliberal-democratic
state. That certainly could not havebeen the thought of its framers; nonetheless, such an
assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis extreme measure susceptible as it is to
what apparentlyare not unfounded attacks on constitutional grounds?Is this not to ignore what
previously was accepted as anobvious truth, namely that the light of liberalism sendsits shafts in
many directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and minds of men. It if difficult forme to
accept the view then that a resort to outlawry isindispensable, that suppression is the only answer to
whatis an admitted evil. There could have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the
communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack of fealty to reason,its inculcation of
disloyalty, and its subservience tocentralized dictation that brooks no opposition. It is thus,in a
realistic sense, a manifestation of the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For better, of
course,is the propaganda of the deed. What the communists promise,this government can fulfill. It is

up to it then to takeremedial measures to alleviate the condition of our countrymenwhose lives are in
a condition of destitution andmisery. It may not be able to change matters radically.At least, it should
take earnest steps in that direction.What is important for those at the bottom of the economicpyramid
is that they are not denied the opportunity for abetter life. If they, or at least their children, cannot
evenlook forward to that, then a constitutional regime is nothingbut a mockery and a tragic illusion.
Such a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit of thinning,if not completely
eliminating, the embattled ranksand outposts of ignorance, fanaticism and error. That forme would
be more in accordance with the basic propositionof our polity. This is not therefore to preach a
doctrine of object surrender to the forces apparently bent on the adoption of a way of life so totally
opposed to the deeply felt traditions of our people. This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the
vitality of the democratic creed, with an expression of regret that it could not have been more
impressively set forth in language worthy of the subject.
It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the
ably-written opinion of Justice Castro for the Court sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of my brethren in the decision reached
upholding thevalidity of the Anti-Subversion Act. 1 It is to be admittedthat the learned and scholarly
opinbion of Justice Castro hasthe impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe constitutional
issues raised. What is more, the stressin the concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill assure
in the trial of those prosecuted under suchAct respect for their constitutional rights is to be
commended.Nonetheless, my own reading of the decisionscited, interpreting the bill of attainder
clause 2 coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a too-latitudinarian constructionof the guarantees of
freedom of belief and expression 3 as well as freedom of association 4 as to impermissible inroadsto which
they may be exposed, compels a differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.
1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally pressing concern of state safety and
security shouldbe ignored. The political branches of the governmentwould lay themselves oepn to a
justifiable indictment fornegligence had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the nation
against its sworn enemies. In a simplerera, where the overthrow of the government wasusually
through the rising up in arms, with weapons farless sophisticated than those now in existence, there
wasno constitutional issue of the magnitude that now confrontsus. Force has to be met with force. It
was as clearcutas that. Advances in science as well as more subtlemethods of inducing disloyalty
and weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced complexities in coping withsuch problems.
There must be then, and I am the firstto recognize it, a greater understanding for the
governmentalresponde to situations of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the AntiSubversion Act isto be appraised. From ny standpoint, and I am not presumptuousenough to claim
that it is the only perspectiveor that is the most realistic, I feel that there was an
insufficientappreciation of the compulsion of the constitutionalcommands against bills of attainder

and abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the thought that evenhad my view prevailed, all
that it would mean is that anew legislation, more in comformity to my way of thinkingto what is
ordained by the fundamental law, wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be entertained
thenthat a setback would be occasioned to legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of subversive
activities, in whateverform manifested.
2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof the bill of attainder clause is the meaning
attachedto it by the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and by the people who adopted it. As was
explained by the then Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on November19, 1934 as
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the Court: "A billof attainder
is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4Wall.
277, 18 L ed 356). In England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was
tried, convictedand sentenced to death without a jury, without ahearing in court, without hearing the
witnesses againsthim and without regard to the rules of evidence. His bloodwas attainted or
corrupted, rendering him devoid of allheritable quality of acquiring and disposing property
bydescent. (Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less than death,
the act wasknown as a 'bill of pains and penalties.' Bills of attainder, like ex post facto laws, were
favorite methods of Stuartoppression. Once, the name of Thomas Jefferson was includedin a bill of
attainder presented to Parliament becauseof his reform activities." 5Two American SupremeCourt
decision were thus in the minds of the framers.They are Cummings v. Missouri 6 and Ex
parteGarland. 7 They speak unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form, that apply either to
named individuals or easilyascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflicton them
punishment amounting to a deprivation ofany right, civil or political, without judicial trial are billsof
attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 8
Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa Catholic priest for refusing to take the loyalty oath
requiredby the state Constitution of Missouri of 1865. Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors, ministers,
and otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever, "by act orword," manifested a "desire" for the
success of the nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the AmericanCivil War. If they swore
falsely, they were guilty of perjury.If they engaged in their professions without theoath, they were
criminally liable. The United States Supreme Court condemned the provision as a bill of
attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting punishment withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any
right, civil orpolitical, previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment.Why such a conclusion was
unavoidable was explained inthe opinion of Justice Field thus: "A bill of attainder isa legislative act, which
inflicts punishment without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than death, the actis termed a bill of
pains and penalties. Within the meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills ofpains and
penalties. In these cases the legislative body, inaddition to its legitimate functions, exercises the
powersand office of judge; it assumes, in the language of thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it pronounces
upon theguilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of
the proofs produced,whether conformable to the rules of evidence orotherwise; and it fixes the degree of
punishment in accordancewith its own notions of the enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d
article of the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we have referred, had in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings
was guilty, or should be heldguilty, of having been in armed hostility to the UnitedStates, or of having
entered that state to avoid beingenrolled or drafted into the military service of the UnitedStates, and,
therefore, should be deprived of the right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to teach inany
institution of learning, there could be no question thatthe clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within
themeaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, insteadof mentioning his name, had declared
that all priestsand clergymen within the state of Missouri were guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty

of them, and hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would beequally open to objection. And
further, it these clauseshad declared that all such priests and clergymen shouldbe so held guilty, and be
thus deprived, provided they didnot, by a day designated, do certain specified acts, theywould be no less
within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution.In all these cases there would be the legislativeenactment
creating the deprivation, without any of theordinary forms and guards provided for the security ofthe
citizen in the administration of justice by the establishedtribunales." 10

On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings washanded down, Ex parte Garland 11 was also
decided. Thatwas a motion for leave to practrice as an attorney beforethe American Supreme Court.
Petitioner Garland wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of 1860. Underthe previous rules of
such Court, all that was necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice in the statecourts to
which he belonged. In March 1865, the rule waschanged by the addition of a clause requiring that an
oathbe taken under the Congressional acts of 1862 and 1865to the effect that such candidate for
admission to the barhad never voluntarily borne arms against the UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could
not in conscience subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a presidentialpardon extended on
July 15, 1865. With such actof clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue inpractice contending
that the test oath requirement wasunconstitutional as a bill of attainder and that at any rate,he was
pardoned. The same ruling was announced by theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus: "In the
exclusionwhich the statute adjudges, it imposes a punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were
not punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other of the actsit adds a new punishment to that
before prescribed, andit is thus brought within the further inhibition of the Consitutionagainst the passage
of an ex post facto law. Inthe case of Cummings v. Missouri, just decided, ... wehave had occasion to
consider at length the meaning of abill of attainder and of an ex post factolaw in the clauseof the
Constitution forbidding their passage by the states,and it is unnecessary to repeat here what we there
said.A like prohibition is contained in the Constitution againstenactments of this kind by Congress; and the
argumentpresented in that case against certain clauses of the Constitutionof Missouri is equally
applicable to the act ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12
There was a reiteration of the Cummings and Garlanddoctrine in United States v. Lovett, 13 decided in
1946.There it was shown that in 1943 the respondents, Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for
several yearsworking for the government. The government agencies,which had lawfully employed them,
were fully satisfiedwith the quality of their work and wished to keep thememployed on their jobs. Over
their protest, Congress providedin Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency AppropriationAct of 1943, by way
of an amendment attached to theHouse Bill, that after November 15, 1943, no salary orcompensation
should be paid respondent out of any moneythen or thereafter appropriated except for services as
jurorsor members of the armed forces, unless they wereprior to November 15, 1943, again appointed to
jobs bythe President with the advide and consent of the Senate.Notwithstanding such Congressional
enactment, and thefailure of the President to reappoint the respondents, theagencies, kept all the
respondents at work on their jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943, but their compensationwas
discontinued after that date. Respondentsbrought this action in the Court of Claims for the salariesto
which they felt entitled. The Ameican Supreme Courtstated that its inquiry was thus confined to whether
theaction in the light of proper construction of the Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so,
whether Section304 is a bill of attainder insofar as the respondents wereconcerned.
After holding that there was a juditiciable, view theAmerican Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section 304 fallsprecisely within the category of
Congressional actionswhich the Constitution barred by providing that 'No Billof Attainder or ex post
Law shall be passed.' InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of attainder is a

legislative act which inflicts punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If the punishment be lessthan death,
the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of
attainderinclude bills of pains and penalties.' ... On the sameday the Cummings case was decided,
the Court, in Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same grounds anAct of Congress which
required attorneys practicing beforethis Court to take a similar oath. Neither of thesecases has ever
been overruled. They stand for the propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their form,that
apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to
inflictpunishment on them without a judicial trial are billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution.
Adherenceto this principle requires invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere to it." 14
United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase to review a conviction under the LaborManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, making it a crimefor a member of the Communist
Party to serve as anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions, anemployee of a labor union.
Respondent Brown, a longshoremanon the San Francisco docks, and an open andavowed Communist,
for more than a quarter of a centurywas elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of theInternational
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959, 1960, and 1961.On
May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a one-countindictment returned in a district court of California
withservicing as a member of an executive board of a labororganization while a member of the
Communist Party, inwillful violation of the above provision. The question ofits validity under the bill of
attainder clause was thusproperly raised for adjudication. While convicted in thelower court, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted in the
opinion by Chief Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form, purpose and effect of ante-Constitutionbills of
attainder indicates that the properscope of the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance tocontemporary
problems, must ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the reasons for its inclusion in
theConstitution, and the evils it was desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the writings of the
architectsof our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill ofAttainder Clause was inteded not as a
narrow, technical(and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but ratheras an implementation of the
separation of powers, ageneral safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicialfunction, or more
simply trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings, Garland, and Lovett,Chief Justice
Warren continued: "Under the line of casesjust outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor Management
Reportingand Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses
power under theCommerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting interstate
commerce persons whomay use such positions to bring about political strikes. In Sec. 504, however,
Congress has exceeded the authoritygranted it by the Constitution. The statute does not setforth a
generally applicable rule decreeing that any personwho commits certain acts or possesses certain
characteristics (acts and characteristics whhich, in Congress'view, make them likely to initiate political
strikes) shallnot hold union office, and leave to courts and juries thejob of deciding what persons have
committed the specifiedacts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead,it designates in no
uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec characteristics and therefore cannothold union office
without incurring criminal liability members of the Communist Party." 17
Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities ControlBoard, 18 where the provision of the Subversive
ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the Communist Party ofthe United States to register was sustained,
the opinionof Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a five-manmajority, did indicate adherence to
the Cummingsprinciple. Had the American Communist Party been outlawed,the outcome certainly would
have been different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It attaches notto specified organizations but to
described activities inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The singlingout of an individual for
legislatively prescribed punishmentconstitutes an attainder whether the individualis called by name or

described in terms of conduct which,because it is past conduct, operates only as a designationof

particular persons. ... The Subversive Activities ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the
registrationonly of organizations which, after the date of the Act,are found to be under the direction,
domination, or controlof certain foreign powers and to operate primarily toadvance certain objectives. This
finding must be madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial reviewwhich opens the record for
the reviewing court'sdetermination whether the administrative findings as tofact are supported by the
preponderance of the evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element to whichthe statute
attaches legal consequences, not merely a pointof reference for the ascertainment of particularly
personsineluctably designated by the legislature." 19

The teaching of the above cases, which I find highlypersuasive considering what appeared to be in
the mindsof the framers of the 1934 Constitutional Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the
Anti-SubversionAct falls within the ban of the bill of attainder clause. Itshould be noted that three
subsequent cases upholding theCummings and Garland doctrine were likewise cited in theopinion of
the Court. The interpretation accorded to themby my brethren is, of course, different but I am unable
togo along with them especially in the light of the categoricallanguage appearing in Lovett. This is
not to lose sightof the qualification that for them could deprive such aholding of its explicit character
as shown by this excerptfrom the opinion of the Court: "Indeed, were the Anti-SubversionAct a bill of
attainder it would be totally unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law alone,without
more, would suffice to secure their conviction andpunishment. But the fact is that their guilt still has
to bejudicially estblished. The Government has yet to proveat the trial that the accused joined the
Party knowingly,willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Partyknowing its subversive
character and with specific intentto further its objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Governmentby
force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the control and domination of a foreign
power. 20While not implausible, I find difficulty in yielding acceptance.In Cummings, there was a
criminal prosecution ofthe Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again in Brown, there
was an indictment of the laborleader who, judging by his membership in the CommunistParty, did
transgress the statutory provision subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill attainder clause. If the
constructionI would place on theoff-repeated pronouncementof the American Supreme Court is
correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have to be instituted wouldnot save the statute.
It does seem clear to me that fromthe very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to outlaw the Communist
Party of the Philippines and similar associations,"not to mention other specific provisions, the taintof
invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concurin the judgment reached as the statute not
suffering fromany fatal infirmity in view of the Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.
3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancyof the Anti-Subversion Act to the
intellectual libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in terms of the free speechand free assocition
guarantees. 21 It is to be admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1700,the threat
that Communism, the Russian brand then, didpose was a painful reality for Congressional leaders andthe
then President. Its shadow fell squarely across thelives of all. Subversion then could neither be denied
notdisparaged. There was, in the expert opinion of those conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out
national existenceof no mean character. Nonetheless, the remedies toward off such menace must not be
repugnant to our Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in anyother way. The apprehension
justly felt is no warrant forthrowing to the discard fundamental guarantees. Vigilantwe had to be, but not at
the expense of constitutional ideals.

One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost significance,is the right to dissent. One can differ,
evenobject; one can express dissatisfaction with things as theyare. There are timew when one not
only can but must.Such dissent can take the form of the most critical andthe most disparaging
remarks. They may give offense tothose in authority, to those who wield powe and
influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional protection.Insofar as the content of such
dissent is concerned, thelimits are hardly discernible. It cannot be confined totrivial matters or to
such as are devoid of too much significance.It can reach the heart of things. Such dissentmay, for
those not so adventurous in the realm of ideas,possess a subversive tinge. Even those who oppose
a democraticform of government cannot be silenced. This is trueespecially in centers of learning
where scholars competentin their line may, as a result of their studies, assert thata future is bleak for
the system of government now favoredby Western democracies. There may be doubts entertainedby
some as to the lawfulness of their exercisingthis right to dissent to the point of advocary of such
adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear thatthereby he incurs the risk of a penal
sanction. That ismerely to affirm the truth of this ringing declaration fromJefferson: "If there be any
among us who would wish todissolve this union or to change its republican form, letthem stand
undisturbed as monuments of the safety withwhich error of opinion may be tolerated where reason
isleft free to combat it." 22 As was so well put by the philosopher,Sidney Hook: "Without holding the right
to theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be absolute for even the right to non-heretical
speech cannot beabsolute it still seems wise to tolerate the expression evenof Communist, fascist and
other heresies, lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of heresies, and deprive ourselvesof the
opportunity to acquite possibly sounder ideasthan our own." 23
The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount to an incitement to commit the crime of
seditionor rebellion. The state has been reached, to follow theformulation of Cardozo, where thought
merges into action.Thus is loyalty shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the
Constitution. It does not bar the expressionof views affecting the very life of the state, even
ifopposed to its fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not require as a matter of fact, that
unorthodoxideas be freely ventilated and fully heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.
Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutionalprinciple "that even though the
governmental purposesbe legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursuedby means that broadly
stifle fundamental personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.For precision of
regulation is the touchstone in an areaso closely related to our most precious freedoms." 24 This is so
for "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
notbe achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadlyand thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." 25 It isindispensable then that "an over breadth" in the applicabilityof the statute be avoided. If
such be the case, then theline dividing the valid from the constitutionally infirm hasbeen crossed. That for
me is the conclusion to be drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.
There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe dissent of Justice Black in the Communist
Party casediscussed above. What is to be kept in view is that a legislativemeasure certainly less
drastic in its treatment ofthe admittedly serious Communist problem was found inthe opinion of this
noted jurist offensive to the FirstAmendment of the American Constitution safeguardingfree speech.
Thus: "If there is one thing certain aboutthe First Amendment it is that this Amendment was
designedto guarantee the freest interchange of ideas aboutall public matters and that, of course,
means the interchangeof all ideas, however such ideas may be viewed inother countries and
whatever change in the existing structureof government it may be hoped that these ideas willbring

about. Now, when this country is trying to spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world
ideals that are revolutionary in many countries seems to be aparticularly inappropriate time to
stifle First Amendmentfreedoms in this country. The same arguments that areused to justify the
outlawry of Communist ideas here couldbe used to justify an outlawry of the ideas of democracyin
other countries." 26 Further he stated: "I believe with theFramers of the First Amendment that the internal
securityof a nation like ours does not and cannot be made todepend upon the use of force by
Government to make allthe beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a commonmold on any single
subject. Such enforced conformity ofthought would tend only to deprive our people of the boldspirit of
adventure and progress which has brought thisNation to its present greatness. The creation of
publicopinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs, and partieshas been and is a necessary part of
our democraticsociety. Such groups, like the Sons of Liberty and theAmerican Corresponding Societies,
played a large part increating sentiment in this country that led the people ofthe Colonies to want a nation
of their own. The Father ofthe Constitution James Madison said, in speakingof the Sedition Act
aimed at crushing the Jefferson Party,that had that law been in effect during the period beforethe
Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto be 'miserable colonies, groaning under a
foreign yoke.'In my judgment, this country's internal security can betterbe served by depending upon the
affection of the peoplethan by attempting to instill them with fear and dreadof the power of Government.
The Communist Party hasnever been more than a small group in this country. Andits numbers had been
dwindling even before the Governmentbegan its campaign to destroy the Party by force oflaw. This was
because a vast majority of the Americanpeople were against the Party's policies and
overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year after year. That is the trueAmerican way of securing this
Nation against dangerousideas. Of course that is not the way to protect the Nationagainst actions of
violence and treason. The Foundersdrew a distinction in our Constitution which we would bewise to
follow. They gave the Government the fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in violation of valid lawsbut
withheld any power to punish people for nothing morethan advocacy of their views." 27
With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind and congenial to my way of thinking, I
cannot sharethe conclusion reached by my breathren as to the Anti-Subversion Act successfully
meeting the test of validity onfree speech and freedom of association grounds.
4. It could be that this approach to the constitutionalquestions involved arises from an appraisal of
the challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an interpretationthat it does represent a
defeatist attitude on thepart of those of us, who are devotees at the shrine of aliberal-democratic
state. That certainly could not havebeen the thought of its framers; nonetheless, such an
assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis extreme measure susceptible as it is to
what apparentlyare not unfounded attacks on constitutional grounds?Is this not to ignore what
previously was accepted as anobvious truth, namely that the light of liberalism sendsits shafts in
many directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and minds of men. It if difficult forme to
accept the view then that a resort to outlawry isindispensable, that suppression is the only answer to
whatis an admitted evil. There could have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the
communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack of fealty to reason,its inculcation of
disloyalty, and its subservience tocentralized dictation that brooks no opposition. It is thus,in a
realistic sense, a manifestation of the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For better, of
course,is the propaganda of the deed. What the communists promise,this government can fulfill. It is
up to it then to takeremedial measures to alleviate the condition of our countrymenwhose lives are in
a condition of destitution andmisery. It may not be able to change matters radically.At least, it should
take earnest steps in that direction.What is important for those at the bottom of the economicpyramid

is that they are not denied the opportunity for abetter life. If they, or at least their children, cannot
evenlook forward to that, then a constitutional regime is nothingbut a mockery and a tragic illusion.
Such a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit of thinning,if not completely
eliminating, the embattled ranksand outposts of ignorance, fanaticism and error. That forme would
be more in accordance with the basic propositionof our polity. This is not therefore to preach a
doctrine of object surrender to the forces apparently bent on the adoption of a way of life so totally
opposed to the deeply felt traditions of our people. This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the
vitality of the democratic creed, with an expression of regret that it could not have been more
impressively set forth in language worthy of the subject.
It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the
ably-written opinion of Justice Castro for the Court sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.

G.R. No. L-19328 December 22, 1989

ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, EPIFANIO VILLEGAS, ARTURO XAVIER, PONCIANO FERNANDO,
ROSENDO DOMINGO and LEONARDO LUCENA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19329 December 22, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK defendants-appellants.
Augusto Kalaw for plaintiffs-appellants.

NARVASA, J.:
These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on appeal, 1 since the
central issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in
Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor. 2As posed by the referral resolution, 3 the question
is whether or not said statute.
...en cuanto autoriza la confiscacion en favor del Estado de las propiedades
ilegalmente adquiridas por un funcionario o empleado del Gobierno antes de la
aprobacion de la ley ... es nula y anti-constitutional porque:
(a) es una Ley ex-post facto que autoriza la confiscacion de una
propiedad privada adquirida antes de la aprobacion de la ley y obliga
el funcionario o empleado publico a explicar como adquirio sus

propiedades privadas, compeliendo de esta forma a incriminarse a si

mismo, y en cierto modo autoriza la confiscacion de dicha propiedad
sin debido proceso de la ley; y
(b) porque autoriza la confiscacion de inmuebles previamente
hipotecados de buena fe a una persona.
The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes
Katigbak. In their complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a
complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2) said
statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before
its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint filed against Alejandro
Katigbak by NBI officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out
of the government service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers and the
Investigating Prosecutor (Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.
The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition 4 filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture
in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance
with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak was holding various positions
in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of Customs; and title to some of the
properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his wife and/or son.
The cases were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter rendered 5 (1) dismissed the complaint and the
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No. 31080, ordered
"that from the properties (of Katigbak) enumerated in this decision as acquired in 1953,1954 and 1955,
shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00. 6 The judgment also
declared that the "impatience of the Investigating Prosecutor" during the preliminary inquiry into the
charges filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No. 1379 did not amount to such arbitrariness as would
justify annulment of the proceedings since, after all, Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his side of the
case in the trial court; 7 that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement
of a penal liability but the recovery of property held under an implied trust; 8 that with respect to things
acquired through delicts, prescription does not run in favor of the offender; 9 that Alejandro Katigbak may
not be deemed to have been compelled to testify against his will since he took the witness stand
voluntarily. 10 The Katigbaks moved for reconsideration and/or new trial. The Trial Court refused to grant a
new trial but modified its decision by reducing the amount of "P 100,000.00 in the dispositive portion ... to
P80,000.00." 11
Appeal was taken from this verdict of the Court of Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal, as earlier
stated, was certified to this Court.
No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo. 12 They concern
mainly the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the penalty

of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No.
1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted. 13

Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial
Judge in 1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and
categorically pronounced by this Court inCabal v. Kapunan, Jr. 14 Citing voluminous authorities, the
Court in that case declared that "forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such ... and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property ... has been held ... to partake of the nature of a penalty"; and that
"proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically civil in form are deemed criminal or penal, and,
hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witnesses against,
themselves is applicable thereto. 15The doctrine was reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971 in republic v.
Agoncillo. 16 And germane is the 1977 ruling of the Court inde la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc. 17 involving
among others the issue of the validity and enforceability of a written agreement alleged to be in violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices-Act to the effect that
"the provisions of said law cannot be given retro active effect."
The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and
it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No.
1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the
Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. 18 But this is precisely what
has been done in the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953,
1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the enactment of the law, and
imposed a lien thereon "in favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is,
quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.
As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be made
answerable for damages because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080,
resulted from a preliminary investigation which was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an
arbitrary and highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any intention
to persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The trial court
further found that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena on September 13, 19, 24, 25
and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao
A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere fact that the preliminary investigation was
terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily signify that he was
denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the Trial Court's factual conclusion that no
malice or bad faith attended the acts of public respondents complained of, and consequently no
award of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by this Court absent any
showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.
The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the determination of the other issues.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so far as it pronounces the acquisitions of
property by the appellants illegal in accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien

thereon in favor of the Government in the sum of P80,000.00 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, but is AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI,
M.M. and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.
Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any individual
for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. This principle arises from the reality of
extradition as a derogation of sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the
host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory. 1 The act of
extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person accused or convicted of a crime, to another
State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it was committed and which asks for his
surrender with a view to execute justice." 2 As it is an act of "surrender" of an individual found in a
sovereign State to another State which demands his surrender 3, an act of extradition, even with a treaty
rendered executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not imposed an obligation to
extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of the validity of the
requesting State's demand, in accordance with the requested State's own interests.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from
treaty. 4 Pursuant to these principles, States enter into treaties of extradition principally for the purpose of
bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit of their laws, under conventions recognizing the right of
nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals within their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose
of enforcing their respective municipal laws. Since punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly
on the willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert them to the State where their offenses
were committed, 5 jurisdiction over such fugitives and subsequent enforcement of penal laws can be
effectively accomplished only by agreement between States through treaties of extradition.
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government of the
Philippines in the suppression of crime, 6 the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the

7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became
effective thirty (30) days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements
for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. 7

The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of
extraditable offenses between the two countries and (which) embraces crimes punishable by
imprisonment for at least one (1) year. Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition for crimes
committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books
of the requesting State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons
. . . wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State
for an extraditable offense." 8 A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense,
the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of
the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be
extradited. 9
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable under the Laws of
both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least one (1) year, or by a more severe
penalty." 10 For the purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the
Contracting States place the offense within the same category or denominate the
offense by the same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition
is requested shall be taken into account in determining the constituent elements of
the offense. 11
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his
country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered
a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of
Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of
deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the
extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence
adduced in the court below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country.
Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner before this Court strike at the validity of
the extradition proceedings instituted by the government against him.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,

12

are undisputed:

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of

Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93
dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of
Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal

request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the
following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to
Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by
Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of
attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly committed in the following manner:
The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to
Section 81 (1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wright's and co-offender, Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonesty in obtaining
$315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors (MM7R),
secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned
by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and
a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal
documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and
Janine Mitchell.
The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary
to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wright's and co-offender Mr. John Carson Craker's receiving a total of
approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus
commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., depending on the volume of
business written, by submitting two hundred fifteen (215) life
insurance proposals, and paying premiums thereon (to the
acceptance of the policies and payment of commissions) to the
Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) Society through the Office of
Melbourne Mutual Insurance, of which respondent is an insurance
agent, out of which life proposals none are in existence and
approximately 200 of which are alleged to have been false, in one or
more of the following ways:
( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told the
policies were free (usually for 2 years) and no payments were
required.
(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or $100)
to sign and had to supply a bank account no longer used (at which a
direct debit request for payment of premiums would apply). These
policy-holders were also told no payments by them were required.

(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily

Personnel Agency", and again were told the policies were free for 2
years as long as an unused bank account was applied.
(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.
The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception
contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's attempting to cause the
payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the name of
Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting one proposal for Life Insurance
to the AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not exist with the
end in view of paying the premiums thereon to insure acceptance of
the policy and commission payments.
The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes
Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's signing and
swearing before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate
pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory
Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life
Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing three (3) false
statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded
between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990,
extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the
Department of Justice before the respondent court.
In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to
appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In the same
order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest
of the petitioner.
The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed
by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was
arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at
the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a
Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in Australia;
that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against
him; that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on
March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the Philippines
again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24, 1990,

again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to
the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on, has not left the Philippines;
and that his tourist visa has been extended but he could not produce the same in
court as it was misplaced, has neither produced any certification thereof, nor any
temporary working visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by
the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian
Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for
which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said
Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could
be granted irrespective of when the offense in relation to the extradition was committed,
provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or
omissions constituting the same were committed. 13
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning
the following errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT
THE ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE
EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO
EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING
RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX
POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE
EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED DO NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR PROSECUTION
IN AUSTRALIA.
IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN MISINTERPRETING THE
EXTENDED STAY OF PETITIONER AS EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO
HIDE AND EVADE PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE
EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER OR
DECISION THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO STAND
TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14, 1993 and denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14 Reiterating substantially the same
assignments of error which he interposed in the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenges in this petition the
validity of the extradition order issued by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the
Treaty. Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court order violates the Constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be valid, the Australian government
should show that he "has a criminal case pending before a competent court" in that country "which can
legally pass judgement or acquittal or conviction upon him."
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are relevant to our
determination of the validity of the extradition order, reveals that the trial court committed no error in
ordering the petitioner's extradition. Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the
crimes for which the petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in
Australia were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have
been committed. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner, the trial court correctly
determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the
Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively. 15
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for extradition are
sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy
thereof, a statement of each and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which
were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is
wanted for prosecution under the said article. All of these documentary requirements were dully
submitted to the trial court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the
provisions of the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were
sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions,
including the statement itself. 16 In conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the
appropriate documents and annexes were signed by "an officer in or of the Requesting State" 17 "sealed
with . . . (a) public seal of the Requesting State or of a Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of
the Government of the Requesting State," 18 and "certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the
Requesting State accredited to the Requested State." 19 The last requirement was accomplished by the
certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.
The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a "criminal case
pending before a competent court in the Requesting State which can legally pass judgement of
acquittal or conviction" 20 stretches the meaning of the phrase "wanted for prosecution" beyond the
intended by the treaty provisions because the relevant provisions merely require "a warrant for the arrest
or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited." 21Furthermore, the 'Charge
and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has,
in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the
Treaty is required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent
court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is
not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As
the Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged with
an information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the
purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. 22

This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals. May the extradition of the petitioner who is wanted for prosecution by the government of
Australia be granted in spite of the fact that the offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his
country were allegedly committed prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty.
Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement cannot be given
retroactive effect. Article 18 states:
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the
Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their respective
requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.
Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and
it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on
which notice is given.
We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive enforcement from this
provision. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity; the second
paragraph pertains to its termination. Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates to, much less,
prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of
when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed,
provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions
constituting the offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the
Requested State at the time of the making of the request for extradition, have
constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.
Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under
Article 2 of the Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were committed,
and, irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the Extradition
Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article 2 paragraph 4, quoted above.
Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective
application, whether civil or criminal.23 However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The
Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions inCalder vs. Bull 24 concluded that the concept was
limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1)

statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2)
laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which
prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence
so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. 25 "Applying the constitutional principle, the
(Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights
of the accused." 26 This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of
the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to
the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a
criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an
offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty
was ratified." 27

In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its interests to
enter into agreement with the government of Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted
for criminal offenses in either country. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a
Resolution dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of the
1987 Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requirements for entry into force were
complied with by both governments.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, we hereby
AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition

and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are
as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident
was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the
Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by
the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
informations 5before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together
with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction

of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one
or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent
of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299 10 and No. 1094 11 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales),
were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the
said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved
it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson,

and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has
been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4
with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases
were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating
his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to
suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that
the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post factolegislation and
a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation
and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng
case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of
the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the
Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of
the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the
petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible
period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject
amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed
the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in
Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and
R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,

Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders
Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate,
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals
and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A,
issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal
accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from
the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused"
appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to
this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the

People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is
a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is
not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The
phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The
offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the
criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions
of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed
into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness. 34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form
of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision
in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law
is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived
as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in
the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by
23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the
committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid
law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to
procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull, 42 an ex post factolaw is one

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense on order to convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage. 44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide dor their punishment.48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in
the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. 52Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the
power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion
in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement,
since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its
power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and
the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall
now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner
and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to
their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed
in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v.
Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such
a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and
second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is
presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations
for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of
the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2

VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.

CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO,
SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public
and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and
committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with
intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR.,
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP.
GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office
as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as
accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among
others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during
the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the
crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.

Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as
among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein
that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of
the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information
that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the
accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him
with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . .
at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control
where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as
such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense
and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims
and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely
allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of
P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their
common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to
public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
said cases.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.