Concepcion v.

Ca
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005

FACTS:

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private

respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named
Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a
petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife
married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom
according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial
court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was
awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa
argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of
the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the
surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden
name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the
requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be
not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child
of Theresa and Mario.

Issue:
whether the illigitimate father can contest the legitimacy of his illigitimate
child
HELD:

Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the
latter never became the formers husband and never acquired any right to
impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to have his son
be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate
child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child
because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to
question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the
child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having
the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was
upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to
bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of

Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used
by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any
way.
_________
Salientes vs. Abanilla
Facts
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail
C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They
lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and
Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested
to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused.
So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented
from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative
of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody
Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the
trial court's order
2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available
to the father
Ruling:
1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari Salientes: o the
order is contrary to the Family Code which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise o even assuming that there were
compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an
action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas
corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of
custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint
of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother toshow
cause and explain the custody of her very own child. Abanilla: o the writ of
habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right
to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely
filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the
court in accordance with the new rules on custody of minors o under the law,
he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental
authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie
Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an international flight
stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the

maternal grandparents. The CA was correct in holding that the order of the
trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are
restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was
still pending before it. an interlocutory order is not appealable but the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The
aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the order.

2. Habeas corpus is available to the father

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority
over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the
court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case,
private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Petitioners
can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents petition for
custody. Moreover. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from
seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age. . Article 213 of the
Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the court.

____
Dept. of Education v. Tuliao
Facts:
On October 8, 2002, Mariano Tuliao (Tuliao) filed an action for recovery of
possession and removal of structure with damages against the Department of
Education (DepEd) with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Tuguegarao City
(MTCCJ. He alleged that he was the registered owner of the subject parcel of
land and that a portion of the said property was allowed by his predecessorsin-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary School (AES) as an access
road for the schoolchildren in going to and from the school. In March 2000,

upon discovering that a structure was being constructed on the land, he

demanded that the DepED cease and desist and vacate the property. The
respondent, however, refused. Tuliao likewise demanded payment for
reasonable rent, but his demand was also ign

Issue:
whether Tuliao had a right of action against the holder and possessor of the
said property
Ruling:
Here, Tuliao, as the registered owner, filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and removal of structure.1wphi1 To support his claim, he
presented not only tax declarations and tax receipts, but also a certificate of
title. The Court agrees with the CA that the said pieces of evidence were
sufficient to resolve the issue of who had the better right of possession. That
being the case, the burden was shifted to the DepEd to prove otherwise.
Unfortunately, the DepEd only presented testimonial evidence and nothing
more to prove its defense and refute Tuliaos claim. Its lone witness was all
that the DepEd had to prove its right of possession. As between a certificate
of title, which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership,19 accompanied with
a tax declaration and a tax receipt on one hand, and a testimony of a lone
witness who is a retired teacher on the other, the former prevails in
establishing who has a better right of possession over the property, following
the rule that testimonial evidence cannot prevail over documentary
evidence.20
The Court once ruled that mere material possession of the land was not
adverse as against the owner and W8S insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession was accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.21
Accordingly, the DepEd 's possession can only be considered as adverse from
the time the gymnasium was being constructed in 1999 on the subject
portion of Tuliao's property. In March 2000, Tuliao discovered the construction
and demanded that the DepEd cease and desist from continuing the same.
When DepEd refused, Tuliao filed a complaint for recovery of possession of
the subject lot in 2002. Thus, only two (2) years had elapsed from the time
the DepEd resisted Tuliao's claims. Clearly, he did not sleep on his rights.
There was no prolonged inaction that barred him from prosecuting his claims.
At any rate, the MTCC was fair when it stated that it could not order the
immediately removal of the structures and directed Tuliao to exercise his
option under Article 448.
If that would not be feasible or practical for DepEd, its remedy is to file an
action for expropriation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

_____
Manaquil, et. al. vs. Moico
Facts:
FACTS:

Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously

expropriated by the National Housing Authority (NHA). Lots 18 and 19 were
awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil under a Conditional
Contract to Sell.

After the death of the spouses in 1991, it turned out that Prescilla had a child
by a previous marriagenamely Eulogio Francisco Maypa (Eulogio). Iluminardos
supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) his brothers and sisters and herein
petitioners Dionisio and Estanislao Mananquil (Estanislao), Laudencia
Mananquil-Villamor (Laudencia), and Dianita Mananquil-Rabino (Dianita)
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and adjudicated ownership
over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession of Lots 18 and
19 and leased them out to third parties.

Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and two
others, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla,
had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and
Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico (Moico). Moico
began evicting the Mananquils tenants. Thus, the Mananquils filed a case for
quieting of title.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Mananquils. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC.

The Mananquils argue that since they are the legal heirs of Iluminardo
Mananquil, then they possess the requisite legal or equitable title or interest
in Lots 18 and 19, which thus permits them to file an action to quiet title; and
whatever rights Iluminardo had over the lots were transmitted to them from
the moment of his death, per Article 777 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title should prosper?

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: quieting of title

An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded

on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of
the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper
place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right
would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use,
and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But for an action to quiet
title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.

From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have failed
to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under
the NHA program/project. They failed to present any title, award, grant,
document or certification from the NHA or proper government agency which
would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the registered
owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are
qualified successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan
program/project, taking over Iluminardos rights after his death.

Petitioners should have shown, to the satisfaction of the courts that under the
NHA program project governing the grant of Lots 18 and 19, they are entitled
and qualified to succeed or substitute for Iluminardo in his rights upon his
death.

DENIED.