G.R.No.159889.June5,2008.

WALTERVILLANUEVAANDAURORAVILLANUEVA,
petitioners, vs. FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA
CHIONG,respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Conjugal Partnership; The separation in
fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not
affect the conjugal partnership.Petitionerscontentionthatthelot
belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact
from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property
relations,isbereftofmerit.Respondentsseparationinfactneither
affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Eliseras
interestoverit.UnderArticle178oftheCivilCode,theseparation
in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall
not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature.
Same; Same; Same; Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all
property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.Under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses
during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnershipofgains,unlessitisprovedthatitpertainsexclusively
tothehusbandortothewife.Petitionersmereinsistenceastothe
lots supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such
presumptionwhentakenagainstalltheevidenceforrespondents.
Same; Same; Same; Without the wifes consent, the husbands
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998 is not void, but
merely voidable.The sale by Florentino without Eliseras consent
is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani,
471 SCRA 306 (2005), citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, 423 SCRA
571(2004),weheldthatwithoutthewifesconsent,thehusbands
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but
merelyvoidable.
_______________
*SECONDDIVISION.

198

198

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Villanueva vs. Chiong

Same; Same; Same; In a case involving the annulment of sale

executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held
that the alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only
insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is
concerned.Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo
thepropertyisstillconjugal,thetransactionshouldnotbeentirely
voided as Florentino had onehalf share over the lot. Petitioners
stancelacksmerit.InHeirs of Ignacia AguilarReyes v. Mijares,410
SCRA 97 (2003), citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., 23 SCRA 248
(1968), a case involving the annulment of sale executed by the
husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the
alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as
the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
Althoughthetransactioninthesaidcasewasdeclaredvoidandnot
merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole
transactionisthesame.
Same; Same; Same; If a voidable contract is annulled, the
restoration of what has been given is proper.Ifavoidablecontract
isannulled,therestorationofwhathasbeengivenisproper.xxx
Theeffectofannulmentofthecontractistowipeitoutofexistence,
andtorestoretheparties,insofar as legally and equitably possible,
totheiroriginalsituationbeforethecontractwasenteredinto.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Feliciano M. Maraon forpetitioners.
Mejorada, Mejorada & Mejorada Law Firm for
respondentEliseraChiong.
QUISUMBING,J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the
modificationoftheDecision1datedDecember17,2002ofthe
CourtofAp
_______________
1Rollo, pp.2131.PennedbyAssociateJusticeRemediosA.Salazar
Fernando, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of
thisCourt)andEdgardoF.Sundiamconcurring.
199

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199

Villanueva vs. Chiong

peals in CAG.R. CV. No. 68383, which had affirmed the
Joint Decision2 dated July 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No.
4460. The RTC annulled the sale made by respondent
FlorentinoChionginfavorofpetitionersWalterandAurora
Villanueva conveying a portion of a parcel of land which
respondentsacquiredduringtheirmarriage.
Thepertinentfactsareasfollows:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were
married sometime in January 1960 but have been
separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they
acquired Lot No. 997D1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog

CityandcoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitle(TCT)No.
(T19393)2325,3 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold
the onehalf western portion of the lot to petitioners for
P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino
allowed petitioners to occupy4 the lot and build a store, a
shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last
installment payment on December 13, 1986,5 petitioners
demandedfromrespondentstheexecutionofadeedofsale
in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of
sale.
OnJuly5,1991,EliserafiledwiththeRTCaComplaint6
forQuietingofTitlewithDamages,docketedasCivilCase
No. 4383. On February 12, 1992, petitioners filed with the
RTCaComplaint7forSpecificPerformancewithDamages,
_______________
2 Records, pp. 123130 (Civil Case No. 4460). Penned by Judge
PrimitivoS.Abarquez,Jr.
3 Exhibit A (Civil Case No. 4383) and Exhibit 1 (Civil Case No.
4460),folderofexhibits,p.1.
4 TSN, October 11, 1996, p. 10. As admitted by Elisera, petitioners
werealreadyoccupyingthesubjectparceloflandsince1976.
5Exhibits1to1WWW(CivilCaseNo.4460),folderofexhibits,p.
1.
6Records(CivilCaseNo.4383),pp.16.
7Records(CivilCaseNo.4460),pp.14.
200

200

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Villanueva vs. Chiong

docketed as Civil Case No. 4460. Upon proper motion, the

RTCconsolidatedthesetwocases.8
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned
DeedofAbsoluteSale9infavorofpetitioners.
On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision,
annulledthedeedofabsolutesaledatedMay13,1992,and
ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all
improvements therein. The RTC likewise dismissed Civil
Case No. 4460, but ordered Florentino to return to
petitioners the consideration of the sale with interest from
May13,1992.10Thefallo ofthedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is
herebyrenderedasfollows:
ForCivilCaseNo.4383,(a)annullingtheDeedofSaleexecuted
byFlorentinoChionginfavorofWalterVillanueva,datedMay13,
1992(Exhibit2);orderingdefendantWalterVillanuevatovacate
the entire land in question and to remove all buildings therein,
subjectto[i]ndemnityofwhateverdamageshemayincurbyvirtue
oftheremovalofsuchbuildings,withinaperiodof60daysfromthe
finalityofthisdecision;awardofdamagesisherebydeniedforlack
ofproof.
In Civil Case No. 4460, complaint is hereby dismissed, but
defendant Florentino Chiong, having received the amount of

P8,000.00 as consideration of the sale of the land subject of the

controversy, the sale being annulled by this Court, is ordered to
returnthesaidamountto[the]spousesVillanueva,withinterestto
be computed from the date of the annulled deed of sale, until the
sameisfullypaid,withintheperiodof60daysfromfinalityofthis
judgment. Until such amount is returned, together with the
interest, [the] spouses Villanueva may continue to occupy the
premisesinquestion.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
ITISSOORDERED.11
_______________
8Id.,atp.29.
9Exhibit2(CivilCaseNo.4460),folderofexhibits,p.2.
10Rollo,p.16.
11Id.,atpp.1617.
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Villanueva vs. Chiong

TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedtheRTCsdecision:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theappealeddecisiondated
July19,2000oftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch6,DipologCityis
herebyAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.12

Petitioners sought reconsideration, but to no avail.

Hence,thispetition.
Petitioners assign the following errors as issues for our
resolution:
I.
THAT THE COURT A QUO AS WELL AS THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ... GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LAND IN
QUESTION BELONGED SOLELY TO RESPONDENT
FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ULTIMATELY TO THE
HEREINPETITIONERS.
II.
THAT THE LOWER COURT AS WELL AS THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE
ERRED IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE
DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT
FLORENTINO CHIONG IN FAVOR OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONERS.13
Simplyput,thebasicissuesare:(1)Isthesubjectlotan
exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of
respondents?(2)WasitssalebyFlorentinowithoutEliseras
consentvalid?
PetitionerscontendthattheCourtofAppealserredwhen
itheldthatthelotisconjugalproperty.Theyclaimthatthe
lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because respondents
werealreadyseparatedinfactatthetimeofsaleandthat
the share of Elisera, which pertains to the eastern part of

LotNo.
_______________
12Id.,atp.31.
13Id.,atp.76.
202

202

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Villanueva vs. Chiong

997D1, had previously been sold to Spouses Jesus Y.

Castro and Aida Cuenca. They also aver that while there
was no formal liquidation of respondents properties, their
separationinfactresultedinitsactualliquidation.Further,
assuming arguendo that the lot is still conjugal, the
transactionshouldnotbeentirelyvoidedasFlorentinohad
onehalfshareoverit.
Elisera, for her part, counters that the sale of the lot to
petitioners without her knowledge, consent or authority,
wasvoidbecausethelotisconjugalproperty.Sheaddsthat
thesalewasneitherauthorizedbyanycompetentcourtnor
diditredoundtoherortheirchildrensbenefit.Asproofof
thelotsconjugalnature,shepresentedatransfercertificate
oftitle,arealpropertytaxdeclaration,andaMemorandum
ofAgreement14datedNovember19,1979whichsheandher
husband had executed for the administration of their
conjugalproperties.15
Anentthefirstissue,petitionerscontentionthatthelot
belongsexclusivelytoFlorentinobecauseofhisseparation
in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved
their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents
separationinfactneitheraffectedtheconjugalnatureofthe
lot nor prejudiced Eliseras interest over it. Under Article
17816 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between
husbandandwifewithoutjudicialapprovalshallnotaffect
the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature.
_______________
14 Exhibit D (Civil Case No. 4383) and Exhibit 3 (Civil Case No.
4460),folderofexhibits,pp.45.
15Rollo, pp.6165.RespondentFlorentinofailedtofilehiscomment
on the petition for review, it appearing that he left his place of
residence.Thus,thecourtresolvedtoconsiderthefilingofcommentby
respondentFlorentinoaswaived.
16 ART. 178.The separation in fact between husband and wife
withoutjudicialapproval,shallnotaffecttheconjugalpartnership.
203

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203

Villanueva vs. Chiong

Likewise, under Article 16017 of the Civil Code, all

property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is

presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains,
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husbandortothewife.Petitionersmereinsistenceastothe
lots supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome
such presumption when taken against all the evidence for
respondents.
Onthebasisaloneofthecertificateoftitle,itcannotbe
presumed that the lot was acquired during the marriage
and that it is conjugal property since it was registered in
the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age,
marriedtoEliseraChiong.18ButEliseraalsopresented
a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and
Florentinoasownersofthelot.Inaddition,Florentinoand
Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of
Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal
property.19Moreover,thecon
_______________
17ART.160.Allpropertyofthemarriageispresumedtobelongto
theconjugalpartnership,unlessitbeprovedthatitpertainsexclusively
tothehusbandortothewife.
18 Exhibit A (Civil Case No. 4383) and Exhibit 1 (Civil Case No.
4460),folderofexhibits,p.1.
xxxx
is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act in the name of FLORENTINO CHIONG, Filipino, of
legalage,marriedtoEliseraChiong.
xxxx
See Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003, 401
SCRA410,419.
Underprevailingjurisprudence,thefactthatthetitleisinthename
of the husband alone is determinative of its nature as belonging
exclusively to said spouse and the only import of the title is that
Florentino is the owner of said property, the same having been
registeredinhisnamealone,andthatheismarriedtoEliseraChiong.
19 Exhibit D (Civil Case No. 4383) and Exhibit 3 (Civil Case No.
4460),folderofexhibits,p.4.
204

204

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Villanueva vs. Chiong

jugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the

Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he
declaredhiscapacitytosellasacoownerofthesubjectlot.20
Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without
Eliserasconsentisnot,however,voidab initio.InVda. de
Ramones v. Agbayani,21 citing Villaranda v. Villaranda,22
we held that without the wifes consent, the husbands
alienationorencumbranceofconjugalpropertypriortothe
effectivityoftheFamilyCodeonAugust3,1988isnotvoid,
but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil
Code23provide:
ART.166.Unless the wife has been declared a non compos

mentisoraspendthrift,orisundercivilinterdictionorisconfinedin
aleprosarium,the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes
consent
_______________
KNOWALLMENBYTHESEPRESENTS:
This agreement entered into by and between ELISERA CARBONEL
CHIONGhereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY, and FLORENTINO
CHIONG,astheSECONDPARTY
xxxx
That the FIRST and SECOND PARTIES have the following conjugal
properties:
xxxx
d.ResidentiallotsituatedatPoblacionDipologCityatKatipunanStreet,
with an area of 207 square meters, more or less titled in the name of the
spouses;
xxxx
20Exhibit2(CivilCaseNo.4460),folderofexhibits,p.2.
21G.R.No.137808,September30,2005,471SCRA306.
22G.R.No.153447,February23,2004,423SCRA571.
23 Since all the relevant events and transactions took place before the
effectivityoftheFamilyCodeonAugust3,1988,thepertinentlawistheCivil
CodeofthePhilippineswhichtookeffectonAugust30,1950.
205

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Villanueva vs. Chiong

Thisarticleshallnotapplytopropertyacquiredbytheconjugal
partnershipbeforetheeffectivedateofthisCode.
ART.173.The wife may, during the marriage, and
within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property.Shouldthewifefailtoexercisethisright,sheorherheirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and

Florentinoisnecessaryforthesaleofaconjugalpropertyto
be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was
notobtainedwhenFlorentinoverballysoldthelotin1985
and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992.
Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is
annullable at Eliseras instance, during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned,
conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely
questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on
July5,1991,perfectlywithintenyearsfromthedateofsale
andexecutionofthedeed.
Petitionersfinallycontendthat,assumingarguendothe
property is still conjugal, the transaction should not be
entirely voided as Florentino had onehalf share over the

lot. Petitioners stance lacks merit. In Heirs of Ignacia

AguilarReyes v. Mijares24 citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al.,25a
case involving the annulment of sale executed by the
husbandwithouttheconsentofthewife,itwasheldthatthe
alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only
insofarastheshareofthewifeintheconjugalpropertyis
concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was
declaredvoidandnotmerelyvoidable,therationaleforthe
annulmentofthewholetransactionisthesame.Thus:
_______________
24G.R.No.143826,August28,2003,410SCRA97.
25131Phil.790;23SCRA248(1968).
206

206

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Villanueva vs. Chiong

Theplainmeaningattachedtotheplainlanguageofthelawis
that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without
the wifes consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress
intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall
prejudicethewife,suchlimitationshouldhavebeenspelledoutin
the statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast
the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge
Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated,
[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs.
Villanueva,54Phil.213andCoque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430,
inwhichcasesannulmentwasheldtoreferonlytotheextentofthe
onehalfinterestofthewife.26

Now,ifavoidablecontractisannulled,therestorationof
what has been given is proper.27 Article 1398 of the Civil
Codeprovides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties
shall restore to each other the things which have been the subject
matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its
interest,exceptincasesprovidedbylaw.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the
basisfordamages.

Theeffectofannulmentofthecontractistowipeitoutof
existence,andtorestoretheparties,insofar as legally and
equitably possible, to their original situation before the
contractwasenteredinto.28
Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case,
petitioners should return to respondents the land with its
fruits29 and respondent Florentino should return to
petitionersthesumofP8,000,whichhereceivedastheprice
oftheland,togetherwithinterestthereon.
_______________
26Supranote24,atpp.106107.
27Id.,atp.109.
28Tolentino,Civil Code,Vol.IV,p.608.

29Dumasug v. Modelo,34Phil.252(1916).
207

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Villanueva vs. Chiong

On the matter of fruits and interests, we take into
considerationthatpetitionershavebeenusingthelandand
have derived benefit from it just as respondent Florentino
hasusedthepriceofthelandinthesumofP8,000.Hence,
if, as ordered by the lower court, Florentino is to pay a
reasonableamountorlegalinterestfortheuseofthemoney
thenpetitionersshouldalsoberequiredtopayareasonable
amount for the use of the land.30 Under the particular
circumstancesofthiscase,however,itwouldbeequitableto
consider the two amounts as offsetting each other. Hence,
the award of the trial court for the payment of interest
shouldbedeleted.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIEDforlackofmerit.
TheassailedDecisiondatedDecember17,2002oftheCourt
of Appeals in CAG.R. CV. No. 68383 affirming the Joint
DecisiondatedJuly19,2000oftheRegionalTrialCourtof
Dipolog City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 4460 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The order for the
paymentofinterestisDELETED.
SOORDERED.
Tinga, Velasco, Jr., LeonardoDe Castro** and Brion,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied,
modification.

assailed

decision

affirmed

with

Note.Under the Family Code, if the properties are

acquiredduringthemarriage,thepresumptionisthatthey
are conjugal. (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 427 SCRA
439[2004])
o0o
_______________
30Guido v. De Borja,12Phil.718(1909).
** Additional member in place of Justice Conchita CarpioMorales
whowasonleaveofabsence.

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