A syllogism (Greek: syllogismos "conclusion," "inference") is a kind of

logical argument that applies deductive reasoning to arrive at a conclusion based on two or
more propositions that are asserted or assumed to be true.
In its earliest form, defined by Aristotle, from the combination of a general statement (the
major premise) and a specific statement (the minor premise), a conclusion is deduced. For
example, knowing that all men are mortal (major premise) and that Socrates is a man (minor
premise), we may validly conclude that Socrates is mortal. Syllogistic arguments are usually
represented in a three-line form (without sentence-terminating periods):
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal
The word "therefore" is usually either omitted or replaced by the symbol ""

Contents

1 Early history
o 1.1 Aristotle
o 1.2 Medieval Scholarship

2 Basic structure

3 Types of syllogism
o 3.1 Examples

3.1.1 Barbara (AAA-1)

3.1.2 Celarent (EAE-1)

3.1.3 Darii (AII-1)

3.1.4 Ferio (EIO-1)

3.1.5 Baroco (AOO-2)

3.1.6 Bocardo (OAO-3)

3.1.7 Barbari (AAI-1)

3.1.8 Celaront (EAO-1)

3.1.9 Camestros (AEO-2)

3.1.10 Felapton (EAO-3)

3.1.11 Darapti (AAI-3)

o 3.2 Table of all syllogisms

4 Terms in syllogism

5 Existential import

6 Syllogism in the history of logic

o 6.1 Boole's Acceptance of Aristotle

7 Syllogistic fallacies

8 See also

9 Notes

10 References

11 External links

Early history
In antiquity, two rival theories of the syllogism existed: Aristotelian syllogistic and Stoic
syllogistic.[1] Aristotle defines the syllogism as, "...a discourse in which certain (specific)
things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of
necessity because these things are so." [2] Despite this very general definition, in Aristotle's
work Prior Analytics, he limits himself to categorical syllogisms that consist of three
categorical propositions.[3] These include categorical modal syllogisms.[4]
From the Middle Ages onwards, categorical syllogism and syllogism were usually used
interchangeably. This article is concerned only with this traditional use. The syllogism was at
the core of traditional deductive reasoning, where facts are determined by combining existing
statements, in contrast to inductive reasoning where facts are determined by repeated
observations.
Within academic contexts, the syllogism was superseded by first-order predicate logic
following the work of Gottlob Frege, in particular his Begriffsschrift (Concept Script) (1879),
but syllogisms remain useful in some circumstances, and for general-audience introductions
to logic.[5][6]

Aristotle

The use of syllogisms as a tool for understanding can be dated back to the logical reasoning
discussions of Aristotle. Prior to the mid-twelfth century, medieval logicians were only
familiar with a portion of Aristotle's works, including titles such as Categories and On
Interpretation - works that contributed heavily to the prevailing Old Logic, or "logica vetus".
The onset of a New Logic, or "logica nova", arose alongside the reappearance of Prior
Analytics - the work in which Aristotle develops his theory of the syllogism.
Prior Analytics, upon re-discovery, was instantly regarded by logicians as "a closed and
complete body of doctrine", leaving very little for thinkers of the day to debate and reorganize. Aristotles' theories on the syllogism for assertoric sentences was considered
especially remarkable, with only small systematic changes occurring to the concept over
time. This theory of the syllogism would not enter the context of the more comprehensive
logic of consequence until logic began to be reworked in general in the mid-fourteenth
century by the likes of John Buridan.
Aristotle's Prior Analytics did not, however, incorporate such a comprehensive theory on the
"modal syllogism" - a syllogism that has at least one modalized premise (that is, a premise
containing the modal words 'necessarily', 'possibly', or 'contingently'). Aristotle's terminology
in this aspect of his theory was deemed vague and in many cases unclear, even contradicting
some of his statements from On Interpretation. His original assertions on this specific
component of the theory were left up to a considerable amount of conversation, resulting in a
wide array of solutions put forth by commentators of the day. The system for modal
syllogisms laid forth by Aristotle would ultimately be deemed unfit for practical use, and
would be replaced by new distinctions and new theories altogether.

Medieval Scholarship
Boethius
Boethius (c. 475-526) contributed an effort to make the ancient Aristotelian logic more
accessible. While his Latin translation of Prior Analytics went primarily unused before the
twelfth century, his textbooks on the categorical syllogism were central to expanding the
syllogistic discussion. Boethius' logical legacy lay not in any addition he personally made to
the field, but rather in his effective transmission of prior theories to later logicians, as well as
his clear and primarily accurate presentations of Aristotle's contributions.
Peter Abelard
Another of medieval logic's first contributors from the Latin West, Peter Abelard (1079-1142)
gave his own thorough evaluation of the syllogism concept and accompanying theory in the
Dialectica - a discussion of logic based on Boethius' commentaries and monographs. His
perspective on syllogisms can be found in other works as well, such as Logica Ingredientibus.
With the help of Abelard's distinction between de dicto modal sentences and de re modal
sentences, medieval logicians began to shape a more coherent concept of Aristotle's modal
syllogism model.
John Buridan
Considered by some to be the foremost logician of the later Middle Ages, John Buridan (c.
1300-1361) contributed two significant works - Treatise on Consequence and Summulae de

Dialectica, in which he discussed the concept of the syllogism, its components and
distinctions, and ways to make use of the tool to expand its logical capability. For the next
two hundred years after Buridan's discussions, little would be said about syllogistic logic. It
has been assessed by historians of logic that the primary changes that occurred in the postMiddle Age era were changes in respect to the public's awareness of original sources, a
lessening of appreciation for the logic's sophistication and complexity, and an increase in
logical ignorance - an ignorance that would be heavily ridiculed by logicians of the early
twentieth century.[7]

Basic structure
A categorical syllogism consists of three parts:

Major premise

Minor premise

Conclusion

Each part is a categorical proposition, and each categorical proposition contains two
categorical terms.[8] In Aristotle, each of the premises is in the form "All A are B," "Some A
are B", "No A are B" or "Some A are not B", where "A" is one term and "B" is another. "All A
are B," and "No A are B" are termed universal propositions; "Some A are B" and "Some A are
not B" are termed particular propositions. More modern logicians allow some variation. Each
of the premises has one term in common with the conclusion: in a major premise, this is the
major term (i.e., the predicate of the conclusion); in a minor premise, it is the minor term (the
subject) of the conclusion. For example:
Major premise: All humans are mortal.
Minor premise: All Greeks are humans.
Conclusion: All Greeks are mortal.
Each of the three distinct terms represents a category. In the above example, humans, mortal,
and Greeks. Mortal is the major term, Greeks the minor term. The premises also have one
term in common with each other, which is known as the middle term; in this example,
humans. Both of the premises are universal, as is the conclusion.
Major premise: All mortals die.
Minor premise: All men are mortals.
Conclusion: All men die.
Here, the major term is die, the minor term is men, and the middle term is mortals. Again,
both premises are universal, hence so is the conclusion.
A sorites is a form of argument in which a series of incomplete syllogisms is so arranged that
the predicate of each premise forms the subject of the next until the subject of the first is
joined with the predicate of the last in the conclusion. For example, if one argues that a given
number of grains of sand does not make a heap and that an additional grain does not either,

then to conclude that no additional amount of sand would make a heap is to construct a
sorites argument.

Types of syllogism

Relationships between the four types of propositions in the square of opposition

(Black areas are empty,
red areas are nonempty.)
There are infinitely many possible syllogisms, but only 256 logically distinct types and only
24 valid types (enumerated below). A syllogism takes the form:
Major premise: All M are P.
Minor premise: All S are M.
Conclusion: All S are P.
(Note: M Middle, S subject, P predicate. See below for more detailed explanation.)
The premises and conclusion of a syllogism can be any of four types, which are labeled by
letters[9] as follows. The meaning of the letters is given by the table:
code
a
e
i
o

quantifie subjec
copula predicate type
r
t
universal
All
S
are
P
affirmatives
No
S
are
P
universal negatives
particular
Some
S
are
P
affirmatives
Some

are not P

particular negatives

example
All humans are mortal.
No humans are perfect.
Some humans are healthy.
Some humans are not
clever.

In Analytics, Aristotle mostly uses the letters A, B and C (actually, the Greek letters alpha,
beta and gamma) as term place holders, rather than giving concrete examples, an innovation
at the time. It is traditional to use is rather than are as the copula, hence All A is B rather than
All As are Bs. It is traditional and convenient practice to use a, e, i, o as infix operators so the
categorical statements can be written succinctly:
Form

Shorthand

All A is B
No A is B
Some A is B
Some A is not B

AaB
AeB
AiB
AoB

The letter S is the subject of the conclusion, P is the predicate of the conclusion, and M is the
middle term. The major premise links M with P and the minor premise links M with S.
However, the middle term can be either the subject or the predicate of each premise where it
appears. The differing positions of the major, minor, and middle terms gives rise to another
classification of syllogisms known as the figure. Given that in each case the conclusion is S-P,
the four figures are:

Major premise:
Minor premise:

Figure 1
MP
SM

Figure 2
PM
SM

Figure 3
MP
MS

Figure 4
PM
MS

(Note, however, that, following Aristotle's treatment of the figures, some logicianse.g.,
Peter Abelard and John Buridanreject the fourth figure as a figure distinct from the first.
See entry on the Prior Analytics.)
Putting it all together, there are 256 possible types of syllogisms (or 512 if the order of the
major and minor premises is changed, though this makes no difference logically). Each
premise and the conclusion can be of type A, E, I or O, and the syllogism can be any of the
four figures. A syllogism can be described briefly by giving the letters for the premises and
conclusion followed by the number for the figure. For example, the syllogism BARBARA
below is AAA-1, or "A-A-A in the first figure".
The vast majority of the 256 possible forms of syllogism are invalid (the conclusion does not
follow logically from the premises). The table below shows the valid forms. Even some of
these are sometimes considered to commit the existential fallacy, meaning they are invalid if
they mention an empty category. These controversial patterns are marked in italics.
Figure 1
Barbara
Celarent
Darii
Ferio
Barbari
Celaront

Figure 2
Cesare
Camestres
Festino
Baroco
Cesaro
Camestros

Figure 3
Datisi
Disamis
Ferison
Bocardo
Felapton
Darapti

Figure 4
Calemes
Dimatis
Fresison
Calemos
Fesapo
Bamalip

The letters A, E, I, O have been used since the medieval Schools to form mnemonic names
for the forms as follows: 'Barbara' stands for AAA, 'Celarent' for EAE, etc.
Next to each premise and conclusion is a shorthand description of the sentence. So in AAI-3,
the premise "All squares are rectangles" becomes "MaP"; the symbols mean that the first
term ("square") is the middle term, the second term ("rectangle") is the predicate of the
conclusion, and the relationship between the two terms is labeled "a" (All M are P).
The following table shows all syllogisms that are essentially different. The similar syllogisms
share actually the same premises, just written in a different way. For example "Some pets are
kittens" (SiM in Darii) could also be written as "Some kittens are pets" (MiS in Datisi).
In the Venn diagrams, the black areas indicate no elements, and the red areas indicate at least
one element.