Peikovian Doctrine of The Arbitrary Campbell

The Peikovian Doctrine of the Arbitrary Assertion
Author(s): Robert L. Campbell

Source: The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Fall 2008), pp. 85-170
Published by: Penn State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41560376
Accessed: 05-01-2016 18:11 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Penn State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Ayn Rand
Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 173.52.120.124 on Tue, 05 Jan 2016 18:11:06 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Epistemologa
The
Peikovian
of the
Arbitrary
Robert
Doctrine
Assertion
L. Campbell
Thoughstillbarelyknownoutsideof Randiancircles,thedoctrine
of the arbitrary
assertionhas come to occupya prominentplace in
Objectivistepistemology.Ayn Rand's disciple Leonard Peikoffis
in print.1
responsibleforitsonlydetailedpresentation
The doctrineraises severalphilosophicalquestions. Does an
firmly
epistemology
groundedin factsabouthumanmentalfunctionas
Rand's
claims
to be, requirea notion of the arbitrary?Is
ing,
PeikofPsnotion of an arbitrary
assertionclear? Does the concept
have thescope of applicationthatPeikoffstakesout forit? Should
assertionsall be handled as Peikoffprescribes? Are the
arbitrary
argumentsfor the doctrinesound? These questionsbear on the
natureand qualityof PeikofPswork as a philosopher,and on the
of Objectivismconstruedas a closed system.2
viability
Arbitrariness in OPAR
The doctrineof thearbitrary
assertiongetsitsfirst(and,so far,its
: The
only) full explicationin printin PeikofPs opus Objectivism
OPAR).3 In thechapteron Reason
Philosophy
ofAynRand(hereinafter
(Peikoff 1993, 152-86), one of the five sections is titled"The
as NeitherTrueNor False" (163-71); thereis some further
Arbitrary
materialon arbitrary
assertionsin the followingsectionon "Contex4
tualCertainty"
with"emotion(171-82). Peikoffcontrastsrationality
alism"(162): willthinking
thatrespectsfactsand evidenceprevail,or
willit be feelingsto whichfactsand evidencemustconform? It is
against this backdrop that "the arbitrary"makes its appearance:
"Claimsbased on emotionare widespreadtodayand are possiblein
of logic,such claimsare 'arbitrary,'
i.e.,
anyage. In the terminology
devoidof evidence"(163).
TheJournal
ofAynRandStudies10, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 85-170.
86
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
claimor
Peikoffhas yetto presentan exampleof an arbitrary
But
the
reader
how
to
one.
as
to
instructions
identify
supplyany
are
or
irrational
claims
emotionalistic
(which,
alreadyknowsthatsuch
areone and thesame). In otherwords,thereaderalready
forPeikoff,
knowsthattheyare supposedto be reallybad.5 How, then,shoulda
claims?
rationalpersonrespondto arbitrary
declarationdoes not qualifyas knowlGrantedthatan arbitrary
stillbe true? If so, shouldone suspend
edge,mightit nevertheless
allow
thatitis unprovedbutpossible? Is one
Should
one
judgment?
idea
it? In short,whatis
an
to justify
refute
such
to
rejecting
obliged
and
shouldclaimsof
of
the
how
tem
status
theepis
arbitrary,
logical
thiskindbe dealtwithbyan exponentof reason?(163).
thatitwillbe upside-the-head
Peikoffbegins,then,bypresuming
obvious whichassertionshave no evidencegoing forthem. More
from
is a coherentclassification
deeply,he presumesthat"arbitrary"
- thatallof theassertionshe deemsarbitrary
an epistemicstandpoint
share distinctivepropertiesthat justifyspecial handling. Now he
providesexamples:
An arbitrary
claim is one for which thereis no evidence,
eitherperceptualor conceptual. It is a brazen assertion,
based neitheron directobservationnor on any attempted
logicalinferencetherefrom.For example,a man tellsyou
thatthesoul survivesthedeathof thebody;or thatyourfate
willbe determinedby yourbirthon thecusp of Capricorn
and Aquarius;or thathe has a sixthsense whichsurpasses
is studying
Hegel's
yourfive;or thata conventionofgremlins
If
him
Venus.
ask
on
the
you
"Why?"he offers
planet
Logic
he
no argument."I can't prove anyof thesestatements,"
- "butyoucan'tdisprovethemeither."(164)
admits
is less clearthanPeikoffmighthave hoped.
The characterization
fourassertionsthat
And notjustbecausehe has pickedas illustrations
assertionone
he is convincedthereadermustreject. Is an arbitrary
- or is it
forwhichthereis infactno evidenceor rationalargument
thereis no evidenceor rationalarguone whose proponentbelieves
assertion
ment? Peikoffassumesthattheproponentof an arbitrary
thatthereis no evidence:"brazen"meansthattheassertionhas
knows
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 87
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
been unleashedon purpose.6
is alwaysintentionalor not, thereis not
Whetherarbitrariness
supposedto be anydoubtabout therationalperson'sresponse:
The answerto all suchstatements,
accordingto Objectivism,
claim is automaticallyinvalidated. The
is: an arbitrary
rationalresponseto such a claim is to dismissit,without
or argument.(164)
discussion,consideration,
"Automaticallyinvalidated"appearsto mean that wheneverone
withoutfurther
one is entitled,
as arbitrary,
identifies
a statement
ado,
to concludethatit is false, consequentlyrulingit out of any further
consideration.
The Arbitrary as Impossible to Process Cognitively
Exceptthatfalsehoodis notwhatPeikoffhas in mind. For him,
froma falsestatement;
different
is qualitatively
an arbitrary
statement
it is on a different
plane of badness. AlthoughPeikoffneveruses
assertionsin waysthat
thesewords in OPAR , he describesarbitrary
or
implymeaninglessness unintelligibility:
toman'smeansofknowlhas norelation
An arbitrary
statement
fromthe realmof
is
detached
Since
the
statement
edge.
in a
itis affirmed
it.
Since
can
assess
no
evidence, process
oflogic
to therestof
void,cut offfromanycontext,no integration
to
is irrelevant
man's knowledgeis applicable;previous
knowledge
no reductionis
it. Since it has no place in a hierarchy,
are relevant.An arbitrary
possible, and thus no observations
cannot
becognitively
statement
byitsnature,itis detached
processed'
Such a
human
consciousness.
or
content
method
rational
of
fromany
If
idea
an
well.
as
detached
is necessarily
statement
fromreality
is cut loose fromanymeansof cognition,thereis nowayof
withreality.
itintorelationship
(164; italicsadded)
bringing
are so strongas to pose a metalogicalproblem.
Such statements
For if what Peikoffsays is true,what is the statusof a correct
judgmentthata claimis arbitraci How does one arriveat thatjudgment? How could one rationally
judge an assertionto be arbitrary,
88
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
by engagingin correctcognitionin relationto reality?If "the

except
soul survivesthe death of the body" is trulyincapable of being
processed,how can a rationalpersonjudgewhatevidence
cognitively
or argumentswould be requiredto supportit? For if the rational
how can he or she go on
personhas no idea whatwouldbe required,
havenotbeenpresented,
thattheevidenceor arguments
to determine
must
be
dismissed?
the
assertion
consequently
at cognitiveprocessingfails.
It isn't,afterall,becauseeveryeffort
well-formed
and
The statementis not gibberish;it is linguistically
the
have
a
Unless
of
immortal
souls
to
proponent
meaning.
appears
admitsto havingno evidenceand confessesto makingthe
helpfully
forno otherreasonbesideswantingitto be true,theperson
statement
to be arbitrary
willneed to subjectit to
who judgessuch a statement
a lot of cognitiveprocessing,merelyinorderto concludethatitmeets
PeikofPscriteria.7
statementsare completely
outof
Peikoffmaintainsthatarbitrary
context
, to thepointthatno previousknowledgecould be broughtto
bear on them. Contextis a key notion in Objectivism,and the
injunctionto keep contextis one of its keyprinciples(Rand 1990;
assertionsare totally
Peikoff1993; Sciabarra1995). Now ifarbitrary
one
each
of
would expect
PeikofPsfourcarefully
out of context,
or
chosen examples of arbitraryassertionsto be unintelligible,
impossibleto evaluate. None of themare. What'smore,as we shall
Peikoffoffersa redemptionpolicyforsome arbitrary
see eventually,
intotheproper
assertions,
wherebytheycan somehowbe reintegrated
context.Whatneverhad a contextoughtto resistbeingsuppliedwith
one.
claimsthatarbitrary
havenoplacein a
Peikofffurther
statements
cannot
be
even
to
so
, they
related,
hierarchy
indirectly, anyobservations
or empiricalevidence.
Rand on Invalid Concepts
To evaluatewhatPeikoffis sayingabouthierarchy,
we needto dig
further
into Objectivistepistemology.Accordingto Rand (1990) in
hermonographon thesubject,conceptformation
proceedshierarchiwith
that
can
be
formed
cally,beginning
directlyfrom
concepts
A
perceptualdata (e.g., dog). conceptat the nexthigherlevelin the
), is formedby integrating
hierarchy(e.g., animai
previouslyformed
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 89
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
; and so on). A
' tiger
conceptsat the firstlevel (e.g.,dog,cat, squirrel
next
level
above
that
at
the
), is formedby
(e.g., organism
concept
at
the
second
level (animal
'
previouslyformedconcepts
integrating
,
plant, etc.). Meanwhile,more finelyspecifiedconcepts (e.g., collie
first-level
, poodle
, etc.) are formedby differentiating
concepts
beagle
in
On
all
Peikoff
is
this
of
these
matters,
case).
following
simply
(/g,
in Chapters3 and 4 of his
Rand's exposition,whichhe recapitulates
own book (Peikoff1993,73-151).
StillfollowingRand, Peikoffclaims thatany valid conceptwill
permitbackwardtracingof the stepsby whichit was formed,right
down to theoriginalfirst-level
conceptsand theperceptualdata on
whichtheydepend. Peikoff(thoughnot necessarily
Rand) envisions
thisbackwardtracingas movingdown througha chainof definitions
towardperceptualdata; Peikoffcallsit "reduction"(136-37), a word
that Rand never used, althoughshe did say that all conceptual
knowledgehas to be able to be "reduced"to the perceptible(1990,
185,220). "The testof anyinvalidconcept,"Peikoffgoes on to say,
"is the factthatit cannotbe reducedto the perceptuallevel. This
meansthatnothingin reality
givesriseto theconcept"(137).
A critiqueof whatPeikoffis puttingforthherecould proceedon
several levels. A foundationalist
conception of knowledgewill
some mannerof derivingmore
require,as a conditionof objectivity,
knownperceptually,
abstractknowledgefrominformation
thoughthe
mannerprescribedas correctmay not much resemblePeikovian
reduction. But a constructivist
conceptionof knowledgecannot
handle objectivitythis way.8 If knowledgeis constructedby the
knower,insteadof being importedfromthe environment
through
willneed to
some specialprocessinvolvedin perception,objectivity
and
aregenerated,
dependon themannerin whichnewconstructions
are
to
constructionsboth new and old
subjected testingagainst
byargument.A successfulargumentfor
empiricaldata or refutation
lead to the rejectionof the Peikovian
willnecessarily
constructivism
doctrineof thearbitrary
assertion;however,itwillalso have to cover
a greatdeal moregroundthanI propose to do in thisarticle.
But,as I willargue,thePeikoviandoctrineis in deep troubleeven
if some typeof foundationalism
is correct. So, forthepurposesof
this article,I will proceed on the assumption,not merelythat
is correct,butthatthestandardObjectivistaccounts
foundationalism
90
Vol. 10,No. 1
Thejournalof RandStudies
of perceptionarebasicallysound,and thatRand's theoryof concepts

of theObjectivisttheories
is likewise.9For evenwhenthecorrectness
the
or
of a conceptturnsout
is granted,evaluating validity invalidity
to be quite a complicatedtask a good deal like evaluatingthe
of an assertion.
arbitrariness
or nonarbitrariness
As Rand (1990,49) stated:
There are such thingsas invalidconcepts,i.e., words that
to integrate
or false
errors,
contradictions,
attempts
represent
- or
in
such
as
conceptsoriginating mysticism
propositions,
withoutreferents,
which
wordswithoutspecificdefinitions,
can mean anythingto anyone,such as modern"anti-coneveryproposition
cepts."[. . .] An invalidconceptinvalidates
or process of thoughtin which it is used as a cognitive
assertion.
Quotingthissamepassage,Peikoff(1993,137) tackson theglossthat
"any such termis detachedfromreality,"but he nevercalls invalid
does he declarethattheir
Nor, moresignificantly,
conceptsarbitrary.
inclusionin a propositionthatpresupposestheirvaliditymakesthe
arbitrary.It is intensely
puzzlingwhyhe doesn't takethe
proposition
opportunityto draw this conclusion. Afterall, Peikoffconsiders
an invalidconcept(137) and regardsassertionsthatpresuppose
gremlin
10
theexistenceof gremlinsas arbitrary
(164).
Now ifincorporating
anysortof erroror falsepropositionmakes
not be obvious what has gone
a concept invalid,it will frequently
a
that
is
concept invalidhas on manyoccasions
wrong. Realizing
been a genuinediscovery.Phlogiston
(thestuffthat,in mid-eighteenth
made
somematerials
and
combustible,
century
chemistry,
supposedly
was used up whentheyburned)is an invalidconcept,in Rand'ssense.
tookmajorprogressin thediscipline:nothing
Exposingitsinvalidity
lesswas requiredthana wholenewtheoryof combustionincorporating the radicalnotionthatairis not an elementor even a singlegas
of severaldifferent
butrathera mixture
gases (e.g.,Kuhn 1970;Harr
1970). Could chemistsin the 1770s and 1780s have discoveredwhat
was wrongwiththephlogistonconceptby diligently
its
undertaking
thatitdidn'tgo through?
Peikovianreductionand discovering
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 9 1
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
What'smore,arbitrariness
is a property
of statements
or assertions
,
to
the
so
has to be shownto
according Peikoff,
principleof hierarchy
applyto themand not justto concepts.
Peikovian Proof
To understandhow all of this is meant to work,we need to
consult another segmentof Objectivistepistemology: PeikofPs
treatmentof proof. Peikoffconsidersproof to be a species of
validation.TheAynRandLexiconquotes himas follows:
"Validation"in the broad sense includes any process of
relatingmental contents to the facts of reality. Direct
perception,the methodof validatingaxioms,is one such
process. "Proof* designatesanother type of validation.
Proofis theprocessof derivinga conclusionlogicallyfrom
antecedentknowledge.11
(in Binswanger1988,520)
In elaboratinghis conceptionof proof,Peikoffapplieshierarchy
and reductionto propositions.But thesum totalof thiselaboration
is a scantthreeparagraphsof OPAR. Since PeikofPsaccountof the
in termsof hierarchy
is stated
and reduction,
thescantinessis
arbitrary
In
is
he
readers
of
his
book to accept
deeplytroubling. effect,
asking
an entireepistemologicaltheorythathe has neitherdeveloped nor
arguedfor.
is thatRand (1990) neverworkedout
The underlying
deficiency
an account of propositions.Neitherdid Peikoff,in thisbook or in
17 yearsafter
anypublicationpriorto it. Indeed,as of thiswriting,
thepublicationof OPAR , Peikoffhas yetto deliverone in print.
becauseso littlehas been done,thereis room fordebate
Precisely
over what an Objectivistaccount of proof for propositionsor
assertionswould need to be like. Would the requisitetheorybe
in nature(accountingforthewaysentencesare builtout of
linguistic
ofconcepts)?
and
forpropositionsas corresponding
structures
words,
Or would thetheoryof propositionsbe logical?Would assertionsbe
treatedas a kindof speechact (a different
sortof linguistic
account)
in logicalterms? (I've assumedthat
or would theybe characterized
whenone makesan assertion,whatone is assertingis a proposition,
but even thisis not actuallyspelledout anywherein the Objectivist
92
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
ofAyn RandStudies
betweenpsychologyand both
corpus.) And whilethe relationship
often
been
to
has
and
contested,Rand in Introduction
linguistics
logic
to
claims
be
(hereinafter
ITOE) frequently
Epistemologa
Objectivist
truths
abouthumancognitive
(Campbell1999).
psychology
presenting
So an Objectivistexplicationof propositionsor assertionswouldalso
need to be a psychologicaltheory.Whateverthedegreesof freedom
remainsincompleteso
mightbe, then,the Objectivistepistemology
it
lacks
an
account
of
as
propositions,or of the activityto
long
in
Yet
lectures
on logic,Peikoff(1974) has been
them.
his
asserting
structure
for
contentto stickwiththesame subject-copula-predicate
thas
been
around
for
over
2000
and
and
conclusions
years
premises
of propositions.
stillfailsto addressthefinestructure
account
of proof for
Here is just about PeikofPsentire
published
propositions:
Propositionstoo (if nonaxiomatic)mustbe broughtback
step by step to theperceptuallevel. They too are based on
- on thechainof evidencethatled to
antecedentcognitions
to directobservation. To a
them- going back ultimately
mindthatdoes not graspthischain,a higher-level
propositionis arbitrary,
noncontextual,nonobjective;it is detached
and fromtherequirements
fromreality
of humancognition.
of an idea is necessary.
[. . .] thisis whyproof
Proofis a formof reduction.The conclusionto be proved
is a higher-level
cognition,whose linkto realitylies in the
in
these
turnultimately
lead back to theperceptual
premises;
thehierarchical
level. Proofis thusa formof retracing
steps
of the learningprocess. [. . .] Proof is not a process of
premisesor even from
derivinga conclusionfromarbitrary
true
selected
Proof
is the process of
arbitrarily
premises.
theproper
hierarchy
establishinga conclusionby identifying
of
. In provinga conclusionone tracesbackwardthe
premises
withtheperceptuorderof logicaldependence,terminating
thatlogicis
allygiven. It is onlybecauseof thisrequirement
a conclusionobjectively.
themeansofvalidating
(Peikoff1993,
137-38)
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 93
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
Are Arbitrary Assertions Meaningless?
Peikoffhas been less thanforthcoming,
then,about therequirementsforproof. Thereis no reasonto believethathe knowswhat
theyare,in mostcases. Yet he is farfromhesitantto judgefailureto
assertionsreadily
meet those requirements.Not onlyare arbitrary
Peikoff
insinuates
thattheyare
"devoid
of
as
evidence,"
recognized
entirely
meaningless:
In the absence of evidence,thereis no wayto considerany
idea, on any subject. There is no way to reacha cognitive
verdict,favorableor otherwise,about a statementto which
Thereis nothing
are irrelevant.
logic,knowledge,and reality
the mind can do to or with such a phenomenonexcept
sweepitaside. (164)
Well,les considerwhathappenswhen someone actuallyclaims
thatthe soul survivesthe deathof the body. Let's further
suppose
that,whenaskedto describea soul,theclaimantprovidesnothingthat
it fromthevariousmentalcapabilities
would successfully
distinguish
thatare not knownto survivethedeathof theorganism.Les even
dataconsistent
withthe
further
supposethatwhenaskedforempirical
continuedexistenceof disembodied souls and inconsistentwith
permanentcessation of mental functioningon the death of an
organism,he providesnone. Plentyof cognitiveverdictscan be
infavoroftheclaim.
is no evidence
rendered. For instance,thatthere
theclaimuntiland unless
Which may,in turn,lead to entirely
rejecting
is nopointintesting
Or concludingthatthere
isprovided.
evidence
adequate
about disembodiedsouls or otherwiseinquiringinto the
hypotheses
to makethehypothesis
is provided
notion,untilsomething
plausible
further
in
is
about
mental
into.
what
known
to
Or,
capabilities
enough inquire
human beingsis fullyconsistentwith the theorythattheyemerge
fromthe functioning
of partsof thehumanbody,and inconsistent
as
toberejected
withthedoctrineof separablesouls,so theclaimsought
and
on.
And
on
current
contradict
because
knowledge.
they
false
Everyone of these lookslike a cognitiveverdict. They are all
fallible(maybe the claimant provided some evidence that was
in theface
or got overlooked).Theyareall reversible
misunderstood,
of future
evidence(maybetheclaimantwillcome backwithsome,or
94
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
nor reversibility
should
someone else will). But neitherfallibility
thecognitiveverdict
them;famously,
accordingto Peikoff,
disqualify
is fallibleand reversible
of certainty
(1993, 179-81).
But Peikoffisn't finished.Arbitrary
assertionsare unspeakable
,
whenrationalpersonsare present:
An arbitrary
idea mustbe giventheexacttreatment
itsnature
demands.One musttreatitas thoughnothinghas beensaid.
The reasonis that,cognitively
has beensaid.
speaking,nothing
One cannotallowintotherealmof cognitionsomething
that
repudiateseveryruleof thatrealm. (164-65)
It's hardto knowwhatall of thisis supposedto mean. Thereis
one thingthatit doesn'tmean. Peikoffisn'treallyurginganyoneto
move rightalong as thoughtheoffending
assertionhad neverbeen
reaction
to
forward.
Peikoffs
assertions
thathe deems arbitrary
put
is to denouncethem,at length,as arbitrary.
Except,thatis,whenhe
is endeavoringto showthatthenotionof immortalsoulsis mistaken,
or that neitherevidence nor argumentconferany credibility
on
horoscopes,or thatbeliefin theexistenceof gremlinsis fantastical.
Which is odd, because those are responsesthathe would have us
believean arbitrary
assertionneitherneeds nordeserves.
Peikoffstillisn'tdone. He insiststhat"thearbitrary"
is outside
all
.
epistemo
logical
categories
None of the conceptsused to describehumanknowledge
can be appliedto thearbitrary;
none of theclassifications
of
in
can
be
its
behalf.
Since
it
has
no
epistemology
usurped
relation to evidence, an arbitrarystatementcannot be
subsumedunderconceptsthatidentify
different
amountsof
evidence: it cannotbe describedas "possible,""probable,"
or "certain."[. . .] Similarly,
such a statementcannot be
subsumed under concepts that identify
different
relations
betweenan idea and reality.An arbitrary
statement
is neither
"true"
nor"false."(165)
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 95
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
Whathe has said hereis even harderto fathomthantheinjuncassertionwithnothing
tion to equate theproductionof an arbitrary
beingsaid.
Peikovian Paralysis?
In his 1997lectureson "ObjectivismthroughInduction,"Peikoff
compoundsour puzzlement. He contendsthatno sooner have we
inan unthinking
thanwe aretrapped
recognizedan assertionas arbitrary
:
condition
then you
[I]f and when you see that a claim is arbitrary,
cannotthinkaboutitscognitivestatusat all. You can'tthink
about its validityas a claim. You can't weighit, assess it,
itsinvalidity,
itstruth,
itspossibility,
determine
itsprobability,
its falsehood,anything.It is non-process-able.A rational
mindstopsin itstracks,in thefaceof anyattemptto process
sucha claim.
Now, I want to introducea word thatwe'regoingto make
big hayout of subsequently.A rationalmindis functionally
paralysedin this context. It's paralyzed,if it triesto do
anything
cognitive,to weigh,to judge,to process,to classify.
Thereis nothingitcan do to move one cognitivestepin any
setsthetask. So, ifyoutryto do
once thearbitrary
direction,
it,you justsitthere.[. . .] When I writemybook, I'm going
but
to havea wholechapteron paralysis.This isn'tinfantile,
adult paralysis.And it's all over [mytreatment
of] induction[,]as one of themosthelpfultechniques.Unfortunately,
that'snotwritten
down,so I can'tdiscussit. (Lecture11)
This is harderyet to fathom. None of the responsesthatI
previouslysuggestedcould be made to assertionsabout the soul
outlivingthe body are productsof any such cognitiveparalysis.
Neither are denunciationsof such assertionsas arbitrary.One
wouldfeellike,and whetherone
wonderswhatthesupposedparalysis
in orderto experienceit. Butjustas the
mightneedextensivetraining
has been aroused,Peikoff,
listener'scuriosity
pleadingan unfinished
declinesto providedetails.
book project,12
96
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
assertionswould seem to have a

Besides, purportedly
arbitrary
the
of
the
has one. In Peikovian
notion
because
context,
arbitrary
on
theevidentialcontinit
to
have
a
location
epistemology, appears
willapplyto anything
uum. And at leastone epistemologica!
category
continuum.
thatgetsa place on theevidentiary
Arbitrariness and the Evidentiary Continuum
statement
an arbitrary
as one forwhichthere
Peikoffhas defined
on thesame
#/be
evidence.
is nofavorable
How, then,could"arbitrary"
continuumas "possible," "probable,"and "certain"? For Peikoff,
each of those segmentsof the continuumis demarcatedby the
amountof evidencein its favor. Indeed, he explicatesthemin the
verynextsectionof OPAR.
So far,I have consideredonlytwo mentalstates,knowledge
verdictsto definean
and ignorance,and two corresponding
idea's status: "validated"or "unknown." Inherentin the
mind'sneed of logic,however,is a third,intermediate
status,
which applies for a while to certaincomplex higher-level
conclusions. In these cases, the validationof an idea is
gradual;one accumulatesevidencestepbystep,movingfrom
ignoranceto knowledgethrougha continuumof transitional
states. The maindivisionsof thiscontinuum(includingits
terminus)are identifiedby three concepts: "possible,"
"probable,"and "certain."(175-76)
Peikoffinsists,in turn,thatthereis no wayto judgewhatconstitutes
oneknows
evidenceforan assertionunless
whatwould
proveit.
"Evidence," accordingto the OxfordEnglishDictionary
, is
or
facts
to
or
conclu"testimony
tending prove disproveany
whethera factis "evidence,"therefore,
sion." To determine
one must firstdefinewhat proof of a givenclaim would
consist of. Then one must demonstratethat the fact,
although inconclusive,contributesto such proof, i.e.,
the claim logicallyand thus moves the matter
strengthens
closerto a cognitiveresolution.Ifonehasnoideawhattheproof
wouldconsist
of- or ifone holds thata proofof
ofa conclusion
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 91
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
- onehasnomeansofdeciding
a given
whether
itis impossible
piece
"tends
If
of
a
to
it.
the
terminus
journeyis
prove"
ofinformation
undefinedor unknowable,thereis no way to judgewhether
one is movingtowardit. (176; emphasisadded)
worksagainst
Peikoffappearsnotto recognizehow thisargument
For ifone does not knowwhat
his own conceptionof thearbitrary.
evidenceforan assertion,one also does not knowwhen
constitutes
means"devoid of
no evidence has been provided. But arbitrary
evidence." In otherwords,one lacksan objectivebasis forjudging
thattheassertionis arbitrary.
Consequently,the Peikovian account of proof transmitsits
shakinessdirectlyto Peikovianjudgmentsof arbitrariness.Peikoff
assertions(the
triesto stabilizethembydeclaringthatsome arbitrary
be
there
could never
are
necessarily
arbitrary;
variety)
supernaturalistic
in
favor.
their
evidence
any
This is whytherecan be no such thingas "some evidence"
natureand logic. The term
in favorof an entity
transcending
"evidence"in thiscontextwould be a stolenconcept. Since
there
nothingcan everqualifyas a "proof' of suchan entity,
is no way to identify
anydata as beinga "partproof' of it,
either. Thereis no wayto validatesuch a notionas: "that
which bringsmen closer to knowingthe unknowableor
provingtheunprovable."(176-77)
To makegood on thisclaim,Peikoffmustshow thatassertions
and ESP "transcendnatureand logic"- inother
aboutGod, gremlins,
he
is
words,
counterargument
obligedto providea general-purpose
dismissthemwithoutdiscussion.To
He cannotmerely
them.
against
of natureand logicwithoutproviding
pronouncethemtranscendent
evidenceor argumentforthatassertionwouldbe, well,arbitrary.
What's more, if and when Peikoffdoes produce a sound
shouldn't one promptlyconclude that these
counterargument,
assertionsare false,and that the purportedexistenceof God or
gremlinsor ESP powersis impossible?13
98
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
not. ClaimsaboutGod or gremlins

or immortal
souls
Apparently
controlof one's fate,Peikoffsays,are not contradicted
or planetary
byanyfacts.
The firstrangeof theevidentialcontinuumis coveredbythe
concept "possible." A conclusionis "possible" if thereis
some, but not much, evidencein favorof it,and nothing
known thatcontradictsit. This last conditionis obviously
- a conclusionthatcontradicts
knownfactsis false
required
- but it is not sufficient
to supporta verdictof "possible."
There are countlessgratuitousclaimsin regardto which
one
cannotcitea singlecontradictory
factibecausetheyare inherently
detached
fromfacts'thisdoes not conferon such claimsany
cognitivestatus. For an idea to qualifyas "possible,"there
mustbea certain
amount
thatactually
it. If there
ofevidence
supports
is no suchevidence,theidea fallsundera different
concept:
not "possible,"but "arbitrary"
(176; emphasisadded).
The argumentmoves in a tightcircle. An arbitrary
assertion
cannot be ruledout by known factsthatcontradictit. Why not?
Because by virtueof being arbitrary,
it is "detachedfromreality,"
therefore
no factscouldcontradict
it.
How do we breakout of the circleand determinewhetheran
assertionis arbitrary?
to findfactsthatcouldruleitout,and
By trying
If
we're
to
to findfactsthatruleitout,instead
so,
try
failing?
obliged
of subjectingit to instantdismissal.By constructing
a counterargumentagainstthiskindof assertion?Again,we'renot dismissing
itas
we
for
have
to
commit
the
resources
to
prescribed,
necessary
or
a
And
if
we're
successful,
developing citing counterargument.
we've demonstrated
thattheassertionis falseand thatwhatit claims
is impossible.14
By notingthatthe proponentof theassertionrefusesto accept
counterevidence
or counterargument?
But then,actual
anyproffered
- enoughto establishthat
dialoguewiththe proponentis necessary
the proponentis indeedimperviousto counterevidence
or counterargument.Which,in turn,willlead us, not to instantdismissal,or to
cognitiveparalysisaftera briefincubationperiod,but to rejection
aftersome roundsof dialogue. Or bydiscerning
in some otherway
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 99
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
thatthe assertionis arbitrary,
preemptingany searchforfactsthat
thereneed
But
own statedcriteria,
contradict
it?
Peikoffs
by
might
that
an
assertion
to be specificproceduresforobjectively
concluding
is arbitrary.Whatarethey?
One of thethingsthatPeikoffseems to be doingin thispassage
is touchingon an importantissue in philosophyof science: some
because theyaren'trelevantenough
hypothesesaren'tworthtesting,
of a
or plausibleenough. But he refersneitherto the plausibility
be
met
a
nor
to
the
criteria
that
have
to
for
hypothesisto
hypothesis
be plausible.
So let's consideran example. It is a factthatRand retainedan
withevolutionary
ideasof anysort. As she
relationship
arm's-length
statedin her essay "The MissingLink,"whose main theme,rather
oddly,was her speculativehypothesisthatsome humanbeingshave
undergoneincompletecognitiveevolution:"I am nota studentof the
I am neitheritssupporternor its
theoryof evolutionand, therefore,
opponent"(1982,54).
of evolutionis incongrutreatment
Becausesucha noncommittal
it
entwithRand's thoroughgoing
naturalism, has elicitedthecuriosity
of morethana fewcommentators.Parille(2004) has proposedthat
Rand neverendorsedanytheoryof biologicalevolutionbecause she
withits possible implicationsfor some of her
was uncomfortable
claims about human beings. Rand maintainedthathuman beings
and possess
have no innateknowledge,are born withno instincts,
freewill;butas she was presumably
aware,evolutionary
groundshave
or another,to argueforinnateknowledge,
been cited,byone thinker
and fordeterminism.15
forinstincts,
Let's now attemptto apply Peikoffs dictum,"To determine
one must firstdefinewhat
whethera factis 'evidence,'therefore,
would
consist
of."
What would constitute
of
a
claim
proof
given
proof that Rand arrived at no "cognitiveverdict" concerning
withits implications?
biologicalevolutionbecause of herdiscomfort
If she saidthatshe was endorsingno theoryof evolutionbecauseany
such theorywould implyinnateknowledge,human instincts,and
thatwouldbe strongprimafacieevidence
determinism,
psychological
would not constitute
forthecontention. (Even thenit presumably
reason
to
further
without
some
accept her statementas
proof,
accurate.)
100
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
What she actuallysaid, however,is that she had not studied

sufficient
to ruleout discomfort
evolutionenough. Is thatstatement
with the subject? Not necessarily. Rand could have distrusted
evolutionarytheorieseither for reasons that she was not fully
consciouslyawareof,or forreasonsthatshe was consciouslyaware
of but chose not to state. Either of these motivescould have
studyof thesubject- even led to it.
accompaniedinsufficient
Furtherevidence of discomfortcomes fromone of her last
essays. Indignantly
rejectingdemandsby Christiansocial conservativesthat"creationism"be taughtin publicschools,Rand (1981, 6)
or inventions,or
says, "To claim that the mystics'mythology,
and
valid
as
scientific
are
as
theories, to offerthisclaim
superstitions
to the unformedminds of children,is a moral crime." But she
promptlyfollowswith:
thatI am not a studentof biology
I muststate,incidentally,
neitheran advocatenor an opponentof
and am, therefore,
the theoryof evolution. But I have read a lot of valid
evidenceto supportit,and it is theonlyscientific
theoryin
thefield.The issue,however,is not thetheoryof evolution:
excuse for
this theoryserves merelyas a rabble-rousing
for
attackingman's
attackingscience,forattackingreason,
mind. (6)
Here Rand signalsher awarenessof evidenceforevolutionary
of inadequatestudyand
herprotestation
theories,whichundermines
makesherreluctanceto takea positionall themorepuzzling.16Her
stillgivesno otherreasonforwithholding
laterstatement
judgment.
for unstated
thinkthat Rand was uncomfortable,
we
Why might
reasons,withevolutionary
theoryas appliedto humanbeings? First
for
of all,becauseitis humanlypossibleto distrusta lineof thinking
reasonsof whichone is consciouslyunaware. Second, because it is
humanlypossibleto lie about one's motives.
But as Peikoffargueselsewherein his discussionof possibility,
and certainty,
justbecauseitis possiblefor.humanbeing
probability,
itdoesn'tfollowthatitis possiblethatthisparticular
to do something,
humanbeingdid thisparticular
thing(1993, 177).
ideas
True,butwhatwouldhaveexemptedRand fromdistrusting
- ThePekovian
Doctrine
Assertion 10 1
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
for reasons of which she was not consciouslyaware? Did Rand
possess conscious knowledgeof everyreason she had for doing
she did? Contemporary
theoryand researchin psychology
everything
(e.g., Piaget 1976; Campbell and Bickhard 1986; Wilson 2002)
generallyagree thatit is impossiblefora human being to become
consciouslyawareof his or herreasonsfortakingeveryaction.
would Rand have been exemptfromlying
Why,forthatmatter,
about her motives? Of the 1958 revisionsto her firstnovel Wethe
, Rand (1959, viii) declared,"I have not added or eliminated
Living
to or fromthe contentof the novel. I have cut out some
anything
sentencesand a fewparagraphsthatwererepetitious
or so confusing
in theirimplicationsthat to clarifythemwould have necessitated
additions.In brief,all thechangesareeditorialline-changes."
lengthy
In fact,Rand removeda passagein whichherheroineKira calledfor
themanyforthebenefitof thefew,and scornedtheideal
sacrificing
of "justiceforall" (Branden1986,114; Merrill1991,37-40). Wouldn't Rand have had to repudiateboth sentiments,
insteadof adding
materialto clarifythem? Surelyshe knew that she was makinga
changein thecontentof thenovel. And ifshe was lying
significant
about thismatter,
could she not lie about others?17
Now ifitis allowedthatRand could havebeen unawareof some
of her motivesfornot acceptingevolutionary
theories,or thatshe
could have liedabout herreasons,thereis stilla seriousquestion,in
the absence of documentedadmissionsfromher,as to whatwould
thenconstitute
proofof either.Inferencesfromwhatshe did sayand
what she did writecould supportsuch conclusions,but would not
proveeitherof themconclusively.
Figuringout whatconstitutesproofin such a case is a complex
task. Yet, as we shallsee in our finalsection,one discipleof Peikoff
has categorically
declaredthatanyassertionto the effectthatRand
or emotionallyuncomfortablewith evolutionary
was intellectually
forproving
whileprovidingno specification
ideas mustbe arbitrary,
anysuchconclusions.
On what basis, then, could Peikovians be makingobjective
assessmentsof arbitrariness?
Accordingto Peikoff,ifone does not
one does notknow
knowwhatwouldconstitute
proofofan assertion,
whatwouldconstitute
evidenceforit. Anyjudgmentthatan assertion
is arbitrary
presumes,in itsturn,thatonedoesknowwhatwouldconstitute
102
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
discernthatitis altogether
evidence
, and can therefore
lacking.
In theabsenceof a worked-out
conceptionof inductiveproofin
as per
Peikoff,
general,and of a philosophyof sciencein particular,18
extremecautionin
hisown declaredstandards,
oughtto be exercising
assertionsas arbitrary. Instead, he makes sweeping
identifying
declamationsabout whichassertionsare arbitrary,
accompaniedby
no effort
to specify
whatkindof evidencewouldbe required
virtually
beforeanyof themcould be deemed possible. PeikofPsfailureto
follow his own advice rendersmost of his animadversionsabout
ifnot entirely
arbitrariness
premature,
wrongheaded.
Is Arbitrariness a Kind of Error?
As we have seen, PeikofPs attemptto segregatearbitrary
assertionsfromthosedeservinga placeon theevidentiary
continuum
has been less thana resoundingsuccess. Of course,iftheassertions
weretrulymeaningless,therewould be no
thathe deemedarbitrary
wayto knowwhatevidencecould eitherfavorthemor workagainst
them. But such specimensas "Ayn Rand was uncomfortable
with
somethingabout theoriesof biologicalevolution"hardlyqualifyas
meaningless.Furthermilitating
againstPeikofPsinsinuationsis his
of suchexamplesas:
overalltreatment
a) The soul survivesthedeathof thebody;
b) Your fateis determined
by yourbirthon thecusp of Capricornand Aquarius;
c) Some people have a sixthsense thatsurpasseseveryoneelse's
perceptualcapabilities;and
d) Gremlinsare conveningon the planet Venus to discuss
Hegel's Logic.
Peikoffobviouslyrejectspropositionsa throughd. But wouldn'the
ifhe believedthemto be false?Is he
rejectthem,justas emphatically,
the
reallytreating propositionsthathe alleges to be arbitrary
any
frompropositionsthathe is convincedare false?
differently
of
Indeed,our perplexity
growswhenwe comparehis treatment
certainassertionsin the 1987 article,or in OPAR, or in his 1997
lectureson "ObjectivismthroughInduction,"withthe accounthe
givesof the verysame assertionsin a widelycirculatedarticlefrom
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 103
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
1989.
Let's considerin particular
theclaimsmadeby"channelers,"
who
saytheycan getin touchwithvariousof their"pastlives." In his first
published discussion, Peikoffclassifiedchannelers'assertionsas
arbitrary:
The agnostictreatsarbitrary
claimsas mattersproperly
open
to consideration,
discussion,evaluation.He allowsthatit is
"possible" that these claims are "true," therebyapplying
cognitivedescriptionsto verbiagethatis at war withcognition. He demandsproofof a negative: is up to you,he
declares,to show thatthereare no demons,or thatyoursex
lifeis nota resultof yourpreviousincarnation
as a Pharaoh
of ancientEgypt. (1987b,6)
Less thantwoyearslater,Peikoffpublished"Fact and Value." In
thisarticle,Peikoffmaintainsthateach of a wide varietyof belief
dishonest
systemsat odds withObjectivismis based on "inherently
ideas."
Now we mustnotethatfalsehooddoes notnecessarily
imply
vice; honest errorsof knowledgeare possible. But such
errorsare not nearlyso common as some people wish to
think,especiallyin the fieldof philosophy. In our century,
therehave been countless mass movementsdedicatedto
- e.g., Nazism, Communism,nondishonest
ideas
inherently
non-Aristotelian
nihilism,
logic,egalitarianism,
objectiveart,
the pragmatistcult of compromise,the ShirleyMacLaine
types,who "channel"withghostsand recounttheirprevious
lives;etc. In all such cases,theideas are not merelyfalse;in
one formor another,theyrepresentan explicitrebellion
. . . (1989a)
againstreasonand reality
dishonestideas, Peikoffcontends,are all false- and
Inherently
are all knownby theirproponentsto be false. Peikoffhasn'twholly
he dulybringsitup in "Fact and Value,"but
"thearbitrary";
forgotten
shrinksits territory
down to cases in which"a man acceptsan idea
on faithfromothersor simplybyhis own whim,withoutthe
blindly,
104
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
it" (1989a).
or integrating
effortof understanding
Two and a halfyearsafterthat,Peikoffpublishedhis book on
inwhichclaimsaboutpastliveshavequitbeingfalseand
Objectivism,
revertedto the arbitrary
category.The 1987 passage thatI quoted
on page 170 of OPAR. Then in
above appearsnearlyword-for-word
the arbitrariness
of such
his 1997 lectureseries,Peikoffreaffirms
claims:
Now, les say,in contrastto [an ideawitha basis,aboutyour
past choices influencingyour currentactions], Shirley
and herclaimis thatherpast lives
MacLaine [is]channeling,
influenceher daily choices. Now, I'm making up the
example,but, forinstance,she says she hates her brother,
becausehe looks justlikea slavethatshe hatedwhenshe was
the pharaohof ancientEgypt. [Audiencelaughs.] You've
got to have some reason to hate him, so why not that?
(Lecture11)
Peikofftakeshis audiencethroughan imaginary
dialoguewith
in
which
she
tells
her
ShirleyMacLaine,
questionerthat the only
evidenceon behalfof herassertionswillcome in thefuture,
afterthe
has
died
and
seen
He
God.
concludes:
questioner
It's a lot of talk;it's not justtheopen "I sayso," "I sayso."
This is now trickedup to sound likeargument,
discussion,
and evidence. But it's talk which consists of arbitrary
hypotheses,and whywe can't have evidencetoday,butwill
somehow,someday. (Lecture11)
In lightof this checkeredhistory,we are entidedto wonder
whetherPeikoffis genuinelyable to differentiate
betweena false
assertionand an arbitrary
one.19
Yet if we take him at his word, an arbitrary
claim, idea, or
statement
cannot
even
as aform
itcannot
befalse.This
; because
qualify
oferror
raises anotherquestionof deep importance.Whatis theObjectivist
accountof error?Ifwe acceptPeikofPssketchof proofas a formof
reductionthat applies to propositionsor assertionsinstead of
concepts,it seems to followthatan assertionthathas successfully
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 105
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
. (Otherwisetherewould
undergonereductionhas been proventrue
reduction
of a nonaxiomatic
kind
of
successful
have to be some
as proofthatdoes /qualify
propositionto perceptualinformation
and Peikoffalludesto none.) A falsepropositionwould have to be
at some pointalong
successfulreduction,
able to undergopartly
failing
the way when it is found to contradictpreviousknowledge. An
toreduction
, for,
altogether
arbitrary
propositionwouldhaveto be resistant
as Peikoffhas alreadytold us, it has no contextand no hierarchical
location.
If errorconsistsin acceptingfalsebeliefsor actingon them,then
assertionis notan error.Not thatthis
puttingforwardan arbitrary
assertionis qualitatively
bringsanyreprieve forPeikoff,an arbitrary
thanan error.
worse
The readerof OPAR maybe temptedto wonder,at thispoint,
whetherPeikoffcan even makesenseof error.If proofis a chainof
andwhatever
ofperceptualobservation,
fromtruths
logicalinferences
isn't
alternative
the
can
be
to
proven, underlying
corresponds reality
truthversusfalsehood. Is correspondenceto reality(truth)versus
detachmentfrom reality(arbitrariness).Elsewhere in the book,
Peikoff(1993) declares:
To derive a conclusion from arbitrarypremises,which
representsubjectivewhims,is not a process of logic. If I
declare,"Applesarerazorsand orangesareblades;therefore,
one can shave with fruitsalad," this is not a process of
of theformof logic
cognitionat all. It is merelyan imitation
whiledroppingits essence. If logic is to be the means of
a logicalconclusionmustbe derivedfromreality;
objectivity,
it must be warrantedby antecedentknowledge
, which itself
one reaches
until
and
so
back,
mayreston earlierknowledge,
thedata of sense. (119-20)
theself-evident,
In otherwords,logic is of no positivevalueexceptinsofaras it
abstraction
to thePeikovianproofprocess. Thevery
contributes
oflogical
even
or
false
with
would
because
is
permitarguments
form suspect,
is
Formal
valid.
to
be
necessarily
logic
judged
arbitrary
premises
decontextualized.The abstractionof logical formisolateswhat is
of contexts;itisolateswhatremainsthe
invariant
acrossa widevariety
106
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
sameabouttherelationship
betweenthepremisesof an argument
and
its conclusion,whetherthe premisesare trueor false. It doesn't
follow that formallogic can't be used to judge the adequacy of
in context. If it did follow,formallogicwould
particular
arguments
be largelyuseless.
Would itbe improper,
then,to inferanyof theconsequencesthat
would followif a speculativehypothesiswere true? Afterall, the
hypothesishas not alreadyundergonethe Peikovianproofprocess.
If it hadfullyundergonethe proof process,it would be known
to be
so
no
"what-iP'
would
true,
remain;any consequences
questions
would havetoobtain,precisely
becausethehypothesis
was true.
In KarlPopper'sphilosophyof science,thereis no requirement
for
positiveevidencefora testableuniversalhypothesis.Indeed,Popper
would obviouslyhave to rejectthe Peikoviancriteria(176, 178, 179)
wherebya hypothesisthatis supportedby some positiveevidenceis
possible,one supportedby a lot of positiveevidenceis probable,and
one supportedbyall of theavailablepositiveevidenceis certain.
[T]he probabilityof a statement(or a set of statements)is
alwaysthegreatertheless thestatementsays: it is inverseto
thecontentor thedeductivepowerof thestatement,
and thus
to its explanatory
and
power. Accordingly
everyinteresting
musthavea low probability;
and viceversa
:
powerfulstatement
a statementwith a high probabilitywill be scientifically
because it says littleand has no explanatory
uninteresting,
power. Althoughwe seek theorieswith a high degreeof
as scientists
wedonotseekhighly
theories
but
corroboration,
probable
that
is
to
and
theories.
;
explanations
say,powerful improbable
(Popper
1965,58)
A verylow probability
hypothesishardlyteeterson the brinkof
on thecontrary,
it willhave "empiricalcontent"(in
meaninglessness;
Popper'sterms)so longas ithas testableconsequences.The adequacy
of Popper's accountis a topic foranotherdiscussion;indeed,many
otherphilosophersof sciencewould arguethatto be worthtestinga
hypothesisneeds to have somethinggoingforit. But Popper'swork
constitutesa prima facie challengeto PeikofPsclaims about "the
arbitrary."And Popper, unlikePeikoff,went to greatlengthsto
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 107
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
elaboratea philosophyof science.
The Wind and the Parrot
fromthe realmof error,
In his quest to exclude"the arbitrary"
his
around
to
Peikofffinally
making chargeof meaninglessness
gets
explicit:
A relationship
betweena conceptualcontentand realityis a
betweenman's consciousnessand reality.There
relationship
can be no "correspondence"or "recognition"withoutthe
mind that correspondsor recognizes. If a wind blows the
sand on a desertislandintoconfigurations
spellingout "A is
a
the
wind
not
make
that
does
A,"
superiormetaphysician.
itdid not
to reality;
The winddid not achieveanyconformity
if
in
the
sand.
truth
but
Similarly,
merelyshapes
produceany
=
+
make
2
does
not
a parrotis trainedto squawk"2
4," this
The parrot'sconsciousnessdid notattain
it a mathematician.
or anyrelationto it,positive
therebyanycontactwithreality
or negative;the parrotdid not recognizeor contradictany
fact;what it createdwas not merelyfalsehood,but merely
sounds. Sounds that are not the vehicle of conceptual
awarenesshave no cognitivestatus. (Peikoff1993,165)
issue. But it is
Peikoffis talkingabout a genuineepistemological
a
attention
one thatshouldhavegotten
a fundamental
good deal earlier
in his book. What'sat stakeis theverynatureof knowledge.Peikoff
has recognizedthat knowledgecannot, at root, be a structureof
out in
symbolsin themindthatcorrespondsto some otherstructure
theenvironment.It can'tbe, because symbolshave to be interpreted;
. Human beings are
agent
theyhave to be symbolsforsomecognitive
in
made
statements
of
language. The wind
interpreting
capable
the
sand
cannot
across
symbols;ifithappensto blow
interpret
blowing
thedunesintoshapes readablebyyou and me as "A is A," thatdoes
letalone thatit
evidencethatthewindknowsanything,
not constitute
a
If
a
the
laws
of
understands
competentagent
parrot, fairly
logic.
and using
whose abilitiesnonethelessfallwellshortof understanding
=
4learnsto mimic"2 2 4" in English,it doesn't follow
language,20
that the parrot knows what English speakerswith even minimal
108
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
mathematical
competenceknow. Peikoffspendsno timeexploringthe
consequencesof the factthatknowledgecannotmerelybe a structure
of symbolsin correspondencewith aspects of the environment.21
Instead,he declares:
claimemittedby a humanmindis analogousto
An arbitrary
the shapes made by thewindor to thesoundsof theparrot.
Such a claimhas no cognitiverelationship
to reality,
positive
reference
to a bodyof
or negative.The trueis identified
by
evidence;itis pronounced"true"becauseit can be integrated
withoutcontradictioninto a total context. The false is
identified
bythesamemeans;itis pronounced"false"because
it contradictsthe evidenceand/orsome aspectof thewider
context.The arbitrary,
however,has no relationto evidence
- "true"or "false"- can be
or context;neitherterm,therefore
appliedto it. (165-66)
So a humanbeing,a highlycompetentcognitiveagent,who puts
forward
anyassertionthatPeikoffdeemsarbitrary,
dropsrightthrough
an ontologicaltrapdoor,and ceases to be a cognitiveagentat all. All
you have to do is endorsea propositionabout the soul outlivingthe
body, and your cognitiveabilitieswill be downgradedto parrot
level- ifnot forfeited
entirely!
Even ifwe accept Peikoffscontentionthatputtingforwardany
assertionthathe deemsarbitrary
is ipsofactoan irrational
act,itdoes not
followthattheassertionis theproductof a suddencompleteinterruptionto one's functioning
as a cognitiveagent- evenifitis an interruptionfromwhichone can somehowquicklyrecover.
In thispassage,Peikoffis no longertalkingabout trueassertions
or falsepropositions;he has lapsed intogenericdiscourseabout "the
true,""the false"- and "the arbitrary."Like theethicalgenericsthat
show up elsewherein OPAR ("the good" and "the evil"), these
epistemologicalgenericsare unmistakablesignalsof rationalismand
reifying.
WhenPeikoffspeaksof "thetrue,""thefalse,"and "thearbitrary,"
he is givingexpressionto his Parmenideanside: thebodyof evidence
thatan assertionmust fitis thetotalbodyof evidence;thecontextof
a staticwhole. "Nothing
knowledgeincludesall knowledge,forming
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 109
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
is a completely
isolatedfact,withoutcausesor effects;
no aspectof the
total.
totalcan existultimately
apartfromthe
Knowledge,therefore,
whichseeksto graspreality,
mustalso be a total;itselementsmustbe
interconnected
to forma unifiedwhole reflecting
thewhole whichis
the universe"(123). "Admittingto a tendencytowardrationalism,
Peikoffnevertiresof quotingHegel's dictumthatThe True is the
Whole"' (Sciabarra1995,121).
Such staticholismis inconsistent
withPeikoffsown recognition
thateach individual'sknowledgedevelopsovertime,as does therange
of knowledgeavailableto humanbeingsin general. In ITOH , Rand
indulgedextensivelyin speculativedevelopmentalpsychology(for
more about this, see Campbell 1999). Peikoffsoldierson in this
traditionin OPAR (1993, 1, 4-5, 12-15, 17-18, 52-54, 74-79, 83-85,
91-93, 96-99, 103, 130, 134-35, 157, 192,et seq.). Besides,ifPeikoff
wereentirely
no assertionaboutgods or gremlins
rightin histotalizing,
or immortalsouls would be able to stand completelyoutside the
no assertion
interconnected
web of humanknowledge;consequently,
out of relationwiththeuniverse.
could everbe completely
while
Unless. . . somehow. . . arbitrariness
directly
affirms
nothingness
there
is
reality.For PeikofftheParmenidean,
justeverything
rejecting
to "embrace
thereis; to affirm
else is to affirm
nothingness,
anything
a zero" (248). Whysuch fiercecondemnationof whatdoesn'triseto
thestatusof falsehood?An arbitrary
assertionsomehowjumpsall the
without
down
to
blameworthy
way
ultimately
passingthroughanyunstable
intermediate
stateof erroneousness.
Peikoffnever provides an explicitanswer. But some other
thathe makesin OPAR supportan argumentby analogy.
statements
Perhapswrongnesswithoutfalsehoodis possiblein thesamewaythat
a basic choice not to livemakesconceptsof good and evilinapplicable- yet rendersthe agent who has made that choice worthyof
relegationto thelowestrungof hell.
In one of the most widelyquoted passages in his book, Peikoff
on thepriorchoice to
insiststhatmoralvaluesare entirely
contingent
live. Only in thecontextof thischoice can any standardof value be
established;only once this choice has actuallybeen made can any
actionbe recognizedas good or bad, rightor wrong(244-45). If one
of one's actionscan
has chosento live,thenthegoodnessor rightness
be assessedaccordingto theirconducivenessto "man's lifequa man."
110
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
If one has chosen not to live,moralcategoriescannotapplyto one's

choice. Yet the choice not to live, which Peikoffdenies can be
meaningfully
regardedas evil,mustbe singledout forsuperblameand
Somehowit is worsethanevil.
hypercondemnation.
A primarychoice [to live or not to live] does not mean an
"whimsical,"or "groundless"choice. There are
"arbitrary,"
for
choice,and thosegroundsare
grounds a (certain)primary
The
all
of
it.
choice
to
live,as we have seen, is the
reality
choice to accepttherealmof reality.This choice is not only
notarbitrary.
It is theprecondition
of criticizing
thearbitrary;
itis thebase of reason.
A man who would throwawayhis lifewithoutcause, who
would rejecttheuniverseon principleand embracea zero for
its own sake- such a man,accordingto Objectivism,would
belongon thelowestrungof hell. His actionwould indicate
- of himself,of values,of reality
- that
so profounda hatred
he would have to be condemnedby any humanbeing as a
monster. The moment he would announce his decision
seriouslyhe would be disqualifiedas an objectof intellectual
debate. One cannotarguewithor about a walkingcorpse,
who has justconsignedhimselfto thevoid- thevoid of the
nonconscious,thenonethical,thenon-anything.
(248)
an arbitrary
assertioncannotbe meaningfully
understood
Similarly,
as false,yetis worsethana falsehood:
the arbitrary
is worse
thanthefalse. The false
Philosophically,
has a relation,albeitnegative,to the factsof reality;it has
reachedthe fieldof humancognitionand invokedits methin theprocess.
ods, eventhoughan errorhas beencommitted
This is radically
different
fromthecapricious.The falsedoes
not destroya man's abilityto know; it does not nullify
his
it leaves him the means of discovering
grasp of objectivity;
and correctinghis error. The arbitrary,
however,if a man
in
assaults
his
it,
indulges
cognitivefaculty;it wipes out or
makesimpossiblein his mindtheconceptof rationalcogni-
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 111
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
tionand thusentrencheshis innerchaos forlife. As to the
whom would you
practicalconsequencesof thisdifference,
preferto workwith,talkto, or buygroceriesfrom: a man
who miscountsthepeopleinhislivingroom(an error)or who
declaresthattheroom is fullof demons (thearbitrary)?
(166;
emphasisadded)
loaded alternative.Every
PeikofPsfinalsentenceposes a blatantly
much
make
mistakes
with
human
higherimpactthanmost
day,
beings
have.
fail
will
ever
miscounts
People
collegecourses,runcars
simple
off roads, alienatefriends,mismanagebusinessesinto bankruptcy,
crash airplanes. Conversely,from PeikofPs point of view, if a
partnerbelievesthathis
prospectiveseller,coworker,or conversational
died is now in heaven,walkingon streetsof gold,
friendwho recently
in thegripof "thearbitrary,"
and shouldbe as assiduously
he is as fully
that
his
the
man
who
believes
as
shunned,
livingroom is swarming
withdemons.
assertion"capricious,"Peikoff
What'smore,in callingan arbitrary
on whim,forthehellof it.
that
it
forward
was
deliberately,
implies
put
From PeikofPs
of
such
motives?
Can Peikoffsupply evidence
who acceptsanypropositionthatpresupposesthe
everyone
standpoint,
existenceof a god or gods has endorsed one or more arbitrary
who acceptssuchpropositions
assertions.Does itfollowthateveryone
is guiltyof whim,caprice, or assertingfor the hell of it? Peikoff
thinksso; when he questionsthe entiremissionof formal
apparently
he
premises,which
logic
rejectslogical reasoning from "arbitrary
with the
the
whims"
arbitrary
(119). Equating
representsubjective
Rand's
well
as
with
is
consistent
everydayusage (as
capricious
will
which
word
of the
nontechnical
"arbitrary,"
getmore
employment
attentionbelow). But is it consistentwith PeikofPs purportedly
technical exposition of an extremelybroad varietyof arbitrary
assertions?
If Peikoffcannotsupplyanyevidencethatan assertionhe deems
was put forwardon purpose,his judgmentabout motives
arbitrary
becomes,well,arbitrary.
The Peikovian Redemption Policy
From whatPeikoffhas said so far,thereadermustbe pardoned
112
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
willneverescape that
thatwhateverqualifiesas arbitrary
forthinking
how can it
status. If it has no relationshipwhatsoeverwithreality,
a
Peikoff
has
Buddhist
Unless
quietlyadopted
concepacquireone?
tionof hell,how can anyoneor anythingeverleave thelowestrung?
Nor is "innerchaos" a whole lot morereversible:Peikoffassuresus
itforlife.Most remarkably,
in thearbitrary
willentrench
thatindulging
claimsmustremainso. Some can
then,itturnsout thatnotall arbitrary
be redeemed.22
Here is theredemptionpolicy:
claims(butbyno means
Now letus note thatsome arbitrary
toa cognitive
context
and convertedthereby
all) can be transferred
whichdemonstrably
intotrueor falsestatements,
correspond
to or contradictestablishedfact. It is not merewords that
establishepistemologica!
status,buttheirrelationto evidence.
A savage's memorizedrecitalof an arithmeticsum, for
by
example,wouldbe liketheparrot's,butthesameutterance
thereasonsbehinditwouldconstitute
a manwho understands
a truth.(166)
Peikoffhas revertedto equatingarbitrary
assertionswithempty
to ask how manyof theassertions
symbols.So itbecomesimperative
are in factput forwardby people who
thatPeikoffdeems arbitrary
understand
fail
to
any of the concepts in them,or any
genuinely
them?
rationale
for
possible
In this connection,PeikofPsinvocationof the "savage" brings
littleassurance. Mainly,it servesto remindthe readerhow littlehe
as the1940s,theOksapminof
knowsof thehumanpast. As recently
theNew Guineahighlandswerepreliterate.
Theirtraditional
counting
in
which
worked
bypointing sequenceto variouspartsof the
system,
upperbody,stoppedat 29. Whiletheold Oksapmincountingsystem
of seven-digit
numbers,
evidentlyfailedto supportthe multiplication
it stillprovidedadequategrounds forasserting"Two plus two make
of itstruth(Saxe 1982).
four,"in fullunderstanding
Let us rathersuppose,forthesakeof argument,
thatPeikoffdoes
not fullyunderstandKurtGdel's incompleteness
theorem. Does it
followthatifPeikoffwereto repeatan accurateone or twoparagraph
of thetheoremafterreadingitin a reference
book,he would
summary
- ThePeikovan
Doctrine
Assertion 113
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
be assertingthis descriptionarbitrarily?blow much would Peikoff
need to know of the reasons forthe theorem,beforehis assertions
Would he
concerningit were cleansedof the taintof arbitrariness?
have to be able to reproduceGdePs actualproof,withappropriate
or come up witha sound derivationof his own, before
commentary,
we could concludethathe had providedenoughevidenceto liberate
his assertionfromthe realmof the arbitrary?What would it take
of thetheoremcouldbe
madein criticism
beforeanyof his statements
as trueor false?23
deemedworthyof consideration
assertionscan be
unclearas to howoften
Peikoffis utterly
arbitrary
or rationalthantheirinitial
redeemedbya personmoreknowledgeable
assertions
proponent.Nor does he establishwhatmakessome arbitrary
insteadof doomingthemforever.24
nonarbitrary,
potentially
From observinghow oftenhe has singledthemout, one might
thinkthatforPeikofftheologicalassertionsareirredeemably
arbitrary.
to refute
The problemis thatthiswould makehash out of anyefforts
them.
. . . considerthe claimthatthereis an infinite,
omnipotent
creatorof theuniverse.If theclaimis viewedas a productof
faithor fantasy,
apartfromanyrelationto evidence,ithas no
cognitivestanding.If one wishes,however,one can relatethis
thatthe
claimto an establishedcontext;one can demonstrate
of a rational
idea of God contradictsall the fundamentals
what
philosophy. Thanks to such a processof integration,
in
as
this
status
attains
was initially
case,
arbitrary
cognitive
a falsehood. (Peikoff1993,166)
Even if Peikoffwere whollycorrectin his analysisof assertions
thereare plentyof theistshangingaround.
about God as arbitrary,
Consequently,an atheistwould be well advised to put in the work
necessaryto redeemtheirpropositionsby relatingthemto an establishedcontext.Otherwise,Peikoffwouldhaveto rejectRand's critique
ifnot irresponsible,
wasteof effort(and,as
of theismas a lamentable,
does not). His own critique
we willsee below,he most emphatically
would, at best,become a seriesof wildgoose chases afterassertions
of refutation.
And whatwouldhe be compelledto sayabout
unworthy
God
an entirebook in thesame vein,such as Atheism:TheCaseagainst
114
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
(Smith1974)? Or a book likeBoyer's(2001) thatseeksto explain,in

terms,whyhumanbeingsareso proneto believeingods?
evolutionary
If assertionsabouta god or gods can be givena rationalinterpretationthataccordsthema contextand putstheirpropositionalcontents
one is temptedto wonderwhetherevery
back in thehierarchy,
supposbe
handled
the
same
last
can
assertion
way.
Maybe
every
edlyarbitrary
one of theseassertionsis reallytrueor false- is justthatsome of the
or out to lunch(well,
ignorant,
people makingthemare so thoughtless,
"detachedfromreality")as to be in no positionto know.
If so, however, most that is distinctiveabout the Peikovian
a
neitherconstitutes
doctrinegoes out thewindow. "The arbitrary"
of condemnathirdtruthvalue,nora specialconditionmoredeserving
tionthantheworstkindof error.
of arbitrary
assertionsdoes
Peikoffmaintainsthattheredemption
or
them
back a truth
their
awfulness
undercut
to
unique
give
nothing
is
an
act
of
extended
such
because
value,
charity
by
any
redemption
rationalpeople to irrational
people:
is
Even whenit is possible,however,thiskindof integration
claims into relation
. To bringunwarranted
never obligatory
.
withhuman knowledgeis nota requirement
ofhumancognition
Knowledge does not advance by a man's seizing on the
or lettingit dictatethesubjectmatterof histhought;
arbitrary
no truthotherwiseunknowncan be uncoveredthereby.What
seekto achievebysuchintegration
is not
one can legitimately
theidentification
theproofor disproofof a claim,butmerely
ofthe
in
and
even
an
error
as
the
God
this
nature
,
example
of
precise
is of valueonlyto thosewhose mindit is an error(as against
arbitrary). (167; italics on "is" are
being the deliberately
the
rest
are
PeikofPs,
mine)
thepuzzlement.
This paragraphjustintensifies
tomakesense of an
First,Peikoffnow says thatit is notobligatory
assertionso thatitcan be understood(and perhapsrefuted).
arbitrary
nottotryto
But justthreepages ago he was sayingthatitwas obligatory
make sense of an arbitrary
assertion!"The rationalresponseto such
or argument"
a claimis to dismissit,withoutdiscussion,consideration,
was
that
to
is
the
He
onlyconceivable
(164).
insisting
refusing respond
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 115
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
: "There is nothingthe mind can do to or withsuch a
rational
policy
phenomenonexceptsweepitaside" (164).
Second,Peikoffclaimsthathumanknowledgeneveradvancesby
thenatureof an error.So, forinstance,psycholpreciselyidentifying
were
errorsof behaviorism
ogydid notprogresswhenthefundamental
did not advance when the basic errorsof
and chemistry
identified,
phlogistontheorywereexposed,and astronomersmade no progress
the orbitof
when theyrealizedthattherewas no Vulcan perturbing
one
a
of
identifies
one
When
type error, is thereby
correctly
Mercury.25
in thefuture.Whatmakes
relatives
it
its
close
and
to
avoid
empowered
in
that?
no
benefit
there
is
sure
Peikoffso
Why,in his firstbook The
OminousParallels
, did he seek to refutevariousof ImmanuelKant's
doctrinesand expose their erroneous presuppositions,unless he
believedtherewas some epistemicbenefitto theexercise?Whydoes
theentryon "Kant" in TheAjnRandLexiconrunto 9 pagesof passages
all harshlycriticalof thephilosopherin question
by Rand and Peikoff,
(in Binswanger1988, 235-43)? Indeed, the "Kant" section is far
longerthanthe sectionson "Intelligence"and "Learning"combined.
MarkBickhard(2001; 2002; Bickhardand Campbell1996) has put
of
refinement
as theprogressive
a generaltheoryof rationality
forward
to
do
how
of
erroravoidance. "Rationalactivity
requiresknowledge
thingsin ways thatavoid or overcomeerror"(2002, 1). Bickhard's
principlesof variationand
theoryseeksto applythebasicevolutionary
selectionto questionsabout rationalcognition.A carefulcomparison
withPeikofPswould requireus
of Bickhard'sconceptionof rationality
to visita numberof issuesoutsidethepurviewof thisarticle.The very
likeBickhard'ssufficesto show, however,
existenceof a framework
thatPeikofPsjudgmentof the nonvalueof exposingerrorsis a long
wayfromobvious.
- whethertheyare
When he disparageslearningfrommistakes
is
one's own or other people's Peikoff
again revealing his
Parmenideanism.Eitheran assertionhas been put throughPeikovian
proof- so it is true,and it relatesto reality.Or it has not been put
the
nonexistence,
throughPeikovianproof- so itpertainsto unreality,
Such an implieddichotomy
is arbitrary.
zero,is detachedfromreality,
would makeerrorworse than
between"the true"and "the arbitrary"
become
It
would
impossiincomprehensible,
profitless.
epistemically
ble to accountfor.Therewouldbe no wronganswersanymore- just
116
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
assertions.
rightanswersand arbitrary
when
Peikoff
of varietiesof
Third,
complainsthattheelimination
errorwillnot advanceknowledge,he is concedingthat"the arbitrary"
is a speciesof error!Now thepersonwho makesan allegedly
arbitrary
assertionhasmade an error,unlesshe or she unleashediton purpose.
Peikoffpreviouslyused such epithetsas "brazen" and "capricious,"
thateverylastarbitrary
assertionis indulgedin forthehellof
implying
it. Now he allows thata person can makean arbitrary
assertionby
neither
true
nor
mistake.So muchfor"the arbitrary"
false,or
being
not countingas errorbecauseit reallyis something
worse.
On two keyissues- whetherarbitrariness
is a formof error,and
whattherationalresponseto arbitrariness
oughtto be- thePeikovian
incoherent.
positionturnsout to be flatly
Protective Belts and Apostles of the Arbitrary
himselfon theerrorissueand the
Peikoffhas alreadycontradicted
issue, so a cognitiveverdicton his doctrinecan be
redeemability
renderedwithoutfurther
delay. However,he does offerone more
to be beyonderror.
purportedbasis forconsidering"the arbitrary"
Peikoffarguesthatpeople who are committed
to an arbitrary
assertion
and willrejectall evidenceor argument
are imperviousto refutation
thattheirassertionis erroneous.
Butdoes thismeanthatthereis something
particularly
wrongwith
theirinitialassertion
P Or merelywiththeirsubsequentcommitment
to it?
or contraryevidence is
Closing one's mind to counterargument
irrational.But this pointcan readilybe made withoutcarvingout a
assertionsand ascribing
to thema specialform
specialclassof arbitrary
of awfulness.
No identification
of errorwillaffectthedetermined
exponent
If he hearshisclaimbeingrelatedto counterof thearbitrary.
evidence,he will act promptlyto insulateit fromlogic. For
example, he will answer objections as theologianshave
throughthecenturies."The meaningof 'God' is beyondthe
powerof languageto specify,"theysay. "God in thissense
does not involveanycontradictions
of man's knowledge,as
we would see clearlyifonlywe could knowHim- whichwe
cannot,not in thislife. Prove thatthisGod does not exist."
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 117
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
(Peikoff1993,167)
Here Peikoff,
thatarbitrariness
stilladmitting
is a speciesof error,
is complainingabout a policyof purposelyinsulating
one's hypotheses
fromanysortof empiricaltestor rationalcounterargument.
But such
a strategy
is ratherwidelyunderstoodto be irrational.Popper would
have regardedPeikovianproofas impossible;as a constructivist,
he
would have explicitlyrejectedthe Peikoviandemand for positive
evidenceforeveryhypothesis.
Yet afterbeingimpressedbytheminhisyouth,Popperconcluded
thatneitherFreudianpsychoanalysis
nor Adlerianindividualpsycholtheorybecause
ogywas a genuinescientific
I could not thinkof anyhumanbehaviourwhichcouldnotbe
in termsof eithertheory. It was preciselythis
interpreted
- that theyalways fitted,that theywere alreadyconfact
- whichin the eyes of theiradmirersconstitutedthe
firmed
strongestargumentin favourof thesetheories. It began to
dawn on me that this apparentstrengthwas in facttheir
weakness. (Popper 1965,35)
Besides,thehypothesesthathave ended up beingso insulatedoften
had some initialplausibility;
theydid not startout meetingPeikoffs
If what is arbitrary
stated criterionfor arbitrariness.
trulyhas no
contextor place in the hierarchy
or relationto evidence,a rational
personwon't understandit well enoughto be able to get startedon
it. But SigmundFreud'stheoryof psychicenergy
testingitor refuting
circa
as
of
1895, a plausiblespeculationabout the functioning
began,
thehumanbrainand centralnervoussystem.The problemwas that
Freudwould not publiclyadmitits initialexplanatoryshortcomings,
nor would he respondto subsequentdevelopmentsin neuroscience
thatcontradicted
some of theassumptionsof thetheory.Worseyet,
he failedto encouragehis studentsand colleaguesto testthe claims
made byhis theory(Kitcher1992; Sulloway1992).
as initially
Similarly,
put forwardin the early1800s,
phrenology,
with
a
claim;
distinctly
nonarbitrary
namely,that functionis
began
localizedin thehumanbrain. Today,in fact,we knowthatthisclaim
is generally
correct. It was the techniquesused forlocalizing(which
118
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
reliedon the outwardshape of the skull),and the lack of interestin

betweenbumpsor dips
testingspecifichypothesesabout correlations
traits
as
such "locality"or "amativeness,"that
on the craniumand
turned phrenology first into bad science and eventuallyinto
pseudoscience(Boring1950,50-60; Kitcher1992).
thistimefrom
A muchmorecontemporary
exampleof insulation,
is
the
of
"nonmoral"
domains
proliferation
developmental
psychology,
in orderto
of socialknowledgein ElliotTuriePs(1983) domaintheory,
accountforjudgmentsthatare moral fromthe pointof viewof the
of
person makingthem,but do not fitthetheory'snarrowdefinition
harm
to
other
and
a moralissue as alwaysinvolving
people (Campbell
of a narrowly
1996a; 1996b). Again,theinitialhypothesis
Christopher
definedmoraldomainwas not arbitrary;
indeed,in theearliestdaysof
TuriePs researchprogram,therewas some empiricalevidence to
support it. Defensive modificationsbegan when evidence was
providedthatsome people outsideof NorthAmerica(e.g.,orthodox
Hindus in some partsof India) regardviolationsof dietarylaws or
to murderand
mourningcustomsas comparablein theirimmorality
theft(Shweder,Mahapatra,and Miller1987). Insteadofconcedingthat
noteveryonedefinesthemoraldomainas theirtheoryrequires,
Turiel,
newdomainsto account
Killen,and Helwig(1987) startedintroducing
for the contraryevidence,such as an "unearthlybeliefmediated"
domainto explainthejudgmentsmade byorthodoxHindus.
As Popper (1965,37) notes:
some genuinelytestabletheories,when foundto be false,are
- forexamplebyintroducing
stillupheldbytheiradmirers
ad
hocsome auxiliary
or
the
assumption, byre-interpreting theory
ad hocin such a waythatit escapes refutation.Such a procedureis alwayspossible,but it rescuesthetheoryfromrefutation onlyat the price of destroying,
or at least lowering,its
scientific
status.
What'smore,the"protectivebelts" thatpeople sometimeswrap
aroundtheirpettheories(Lakatos1978),whileepistemically
objectionthatPeikoff
able, normallyfallwell shortof the grandmystification
cites in his complaintabout theologians.26When the grand-scale
declaresthatGod is incapableof beingcomprehendedwith
mystifier
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 119
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
is stillable
anyhumanmeansof knowing,yetsomehowthemystifier
what
human
to know that nothingabout God contradicts
beings
is beingself-referentially
inconsistent.As
alreadyknow,the mystifier
he has demonstratedin his coverage of philosophicalaxioms and
axiomaticconcepts (e.g., 1993, 4-12), Peikoffknowswhat is wrong
with self-referential
inconsistency.Recourseto the doctrineof the
in thiscontext.
is
arbitrary entirely
superfluous
The Burden of Proof
refutation
The reference
to God and attempts
bytheiststo forestall
another
Peikoff
to
still
however,
prods
bring
throughmystification,
In the
of
arbitrariness.
in
under
the
umbrella
issue
epistemological
and
rhetoric
of
he
reverts
to
his
meaninglessness wrongfulness
process,
beyonderror.
This bringsus back to the arbitrary
i.e., to the
qua arbitrary,
kind of claim that cannot by its naturebe relatedto any
establishedfact or context. In order to concretizethe
Objectivistprinciplethatsuch claimscannot be cognitively
processed,I want to elaboratehere on a venerableruleof
logic: therulethattheonus of proofis on himwho assertsa
positive,and thatone mustnot attemptto provea negative.
(Peikoff1993,167)
There is indeed a venerableruleof logicat workhere. But againitis
in no need of proppingwithdoctrinesabout "the arbitrary."If,for
claimsthatsomehumanbeingscan rapidlyand
instance,a psychologist
enumeratemorethan100 itemswithoutcountingthem,the
accurately
burden is on the person makingthe claim to provide a reliable
observationof at leastone personrapidlyand accurately
enumerating
more than 100 itemswithoutcountingthem. That is because it is
- i.e.,show thatitis truebycollecting
thehypothesis
possibleto verify
sucha hypothesis:
evidencethatsupportsit. It is notpossibleto falsify
morethan
can
enumerate
who
find
a
human
failures
to
being
repeated
rule
out the
to
will
not
suffice
claimed
100 items in the manner
existenceof at leastone such personamong those not yetobserved.
If thehypothesis
is true,itis possibleto provethatitis true,butifitis
false,itis not possibleto provethatitis false.
120
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
So thereis an onus of proof,all right.Butwhatdoes ithave to do

withPeikovianarbitrariness?
The onus of proof rule statesthe following. If a person
assertsthata certainentityexists(such as God, gremlins,a
disembodiedsoul),he is requiredto adduceevidencesupporting his claim. If he does so, one must citheraccept his
his evidenceby showingthathe has
conclusion,or disqualify
But if he offersno supporting
certain
data.
misinterpreted
dismiss
one
must
his claim without
evidence,
,
argumentation
because in this situationargumentwould be futile. It is
impossibleto "provea negative,"meaningbytheterm:prove
the nonexistenceof an entity
forwhichthereis no evidence.
(167)
Makingan assertionthatsomethingexists,or thatsome thingsbehave
in a certainway, providingno evidence for the assertion,then
demandingthatone's opponentdisprovetheassertion,is a good oldfashionedlogical fallacy,just like the fallacyof division,or the
ad baculum.The properresponseto a fallaciousargument
argumentum
- not to dismissit withoutargumentation.
out
the fallacy
is to point
The doctrineof the arbitrary
is, again, utterlysuperfluousin this
context.
Therewas nevera need to assimilatetheonus of proofprinciple
to the Peikoviandoctrineof arbitrariness.But in tryingto build a
Peikoffcompoundshisconfusions:
rationalefortheassimilation,
The reasonis thefactthatexistenceexists,and onlyexistence
exists. A thingthatexistsis something;it is an entityin the
world; as such, it has effectsby whichmen can grasp and
byperceptualmeans,or indirectly,
proveit- eitherdirectly,
by
of atoms). Buta nonexislogicalinference
(e.g.,thediscovery
tentis nothing;it is not a constituent
of reality,
and it has no
effects.If gremlins,forinstance,do not exist,thentheyare
nothingand have no consequences. In such a case, to say:
"Prove thatthereare no gremlins,"is to say: "Point out the
factsof reality
thatfollowfromthenonexistence
ofgremlins."
But thereare no such facts. Nothingfollowsfromnothing.
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 12 1
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
(167-68)
ifgremlinsexisted,therewould be some detectable
Now presumably
- and some good reasons for
activity
consequencesof gremlinistic
explanationsforthoseparticular
acceptinggremlinological
phenomena.
Therefore,if the predicteddata patternsdid not obtain- or theydid,
but the gremlinological
explanationsfor them were shown to be
there
would
of gremlins.
be
faulty
consequencesof thenonexistence
There would indeed be factsthat followfromthe nonexistenceof
gremlins.27
An examplefromthehistoryof astronomyis thehypothesis,
put
forwardin themid-nineteenth
thattheorbitof Mercurywas
century,
fromits predictedcoursebecause of a smallplanet
departingslightly
locatedbetweenitand thesun. But Vulcan,as thehypothetical
planet
was dubbed,was neverreliably
observed. Vulcan'sfailureto existdid
have consequences:"Telescopesweredirectedto whereitwouldhave
been, had it existed,and nothingwhateverwas seen in thatregion.
Compare thediscoveryof theplanetNeptune,wherea telescopedid
to somethingin theplace indicatedbythetheory"
lockon, ostensively,
(Harr1970,79).
Peikoffthe Parmenideaninsiststhatgremlinsare nothing,and
"nothingfollowsfromnothing";a god or gods are nothing,and
"nothingfollowsfromnothing";byimplication,
phlogistonis nothing,
Vulcan was
and "nothingfollowsfromnothing";and, apparently,
in danger,
and
follows
from
He
is
now
nothing, "nothing
nothing."
once again,of denyingthe existenceof logicallyvalid but unsound
It getworse;ifthereareno validbutunsoundarguments,
arguments.28
isn't modustollens
going to be next in line fora one-waytripto the
landfill?If gremlinsare nothing,and nothingfollowsfromnothing,
how can one attemptto assess thetruthor falsity
of "If therereallyare
gremlins,thenX willhappen"? Is one trulyprohibitedfromarguing
back that"X isn'thappening.Therefore,thereare no gremlins"?
Peikoffmomentarily
retreatsfromtheParmenideanism:
I mustadd thefollowing.One can
For thesakeof fullclarity,
For
inferfromanytruththefalsehoodof itscontradictories.
the
Dallas
in
York
from
"X
was
New
during
example,
shootingof Y" one can inferthe falsehoodof "X shot Y."
122
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
Thus one can disprovea claimor "prove a negative"("X is
- but only by demonstratingthat the claim
not guilty")
contradictsestablishedknowledge;i.e., only by relatingthe
claim to a positivecognitivecontext,when thisis available.
What one cannotdo is prove a negativeapart fromsuch a
whatone cannotdo is establishthefalsehoodof
relationship;
One establishesthe falseby
claimqua arbitrary.
an arbitrary
to nothing.(168)
to thetrue,not byreference
reference
tollens
stillsitting
on thecurbafterthegarbage
It's a reliefto spymodus
truckhas passedby. Butnow Peikoffhas establishedthatevena pretty
assertioncan be shownto be false,usingevidence
grosslyunmotivated
and logical reasoning. How, then,can anyclaim be "arbitrary
qua
arbitrary":shorn of any relationto evidence,any connectionwith
establishedknowledge,any possible context? Does any theologian
reallyclaimthatthereare absolutelyno detectableconsequencesof a
- thattherestof theuniverseis, so faras we humans
god's existence
could everknow,exactlythe same witha god aroundas it would be
withoutone?
tollens
was justan interlude.He
PeikofPsdecisionto sparemodus
to Rand as though
now veersback intoParmenideanizing.
Referring
about the issue gives the passage an oracular
she were stillthinking
quality:
of theism,to takeanotherexample,
Objectivism'srefutation
is nota case of "provinga negative"in thesensevetoedbythe
onus-of-proof
principle.AynRand does notstartwitha zero
and seek to discoverevidenceof God's nonexistence.She
knownfact,then
startswithreality,
i.e.,with(philosophically)
deniesa claimthatclasheswithit. Nor, as I have madeclear,
to be acceptedbyapostles
does sheexpectanysuchrefutation
willmerelyreformulate
of thearbitrary.
These individuals
the
claim so as to protectit fromevidence,then insistagain,
"Prove thatitis notso." (168)
As I noted above, protectivebeltingis hardlylimitedto theists,
or believersin immortal
astrologers,sixth-sensers,
gremlinologists,
souls. What's more, Peikoffhas declaredthat "the arbitrary
qua
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 123
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
cannot be refuted,because it allegedlyhas no relationto
arbitrary"
itis notarbitrary
evidenceor reasonsof anykind. Ifa claimcanberefuted,
;
to conclude
thatit isfalse.The
oneought
refuted,
if it has beensuccessfully
a refutation
or a
maybe guiltyof rejecting
"apostlesof thearbitrary"
thattheyought to accept;if trulydevotedto their
counterargument
leftand right.
Their
unholymission,theymaystartdodgingrefutations
fromputtingforwardan assertion
offense,however,is quitedifferent
thatcannotbe refutedin the firstplace, because it cannotbe trueor
false.
as
Whatdoes a personhave to do, exactly,to meritclassification
street
The designationis great
an "apostleof thearbitrary"?
preacher
language,but is there anythingmore to it? Besides, the street
capturedby his fireand brimpreacher'sattentionhas been entirely
all about his promisesof redemption.
stone. He has forgotten
To thisdemand,thereis onlyone validresponse. An assertionoutsidethe realmof cognitioncan impose no cognitive
on a rationalmind,neitherof proof nor of
responsibility
The
is notopen to either;itsimplycannot
arbitrary
disproof.
of such an
be cognitively
processed. The propertreatment
aberrationis to refrainfromsanctioningit by argumentor
discussion. (168-69)
Only onevalidresponse? Peikoffhas shortenedhis cycletime;he
is now whippingback and forth,withina singleparagraph,between
to disprovean arbitrary
needn'tand mustn't.Is thereno responsibility
not to tryto disprove
assertion?Needn't. Or is therea responsibility
one? Mustn't.Needn't. Mustn't.
Of course,when Peikoffsaysthatone mustrefrainfrom"sancassertionby discussingit, that's a reallyloud
tioning"an arbitrary
Mustn't. In Objectivism,"sanction"is a moralterm(e.g.,Rand 1957;
Binswanger1988, 432-33). Sanctioningthe wrong things,or the
wrongpeople,is itselfmorallywrong. Sanctioningan aberrationis a
gravemoralwrong.
Peikoffnow turnsto theissueof agnostiSomewhatsurprisingly,
cism. One would thinkthatscarcelyanythingneeds sayingon the
matter.Up to now,Peikoffhas blownhot and cold about thecorrect
assertion,but his oscillationshave
responseto an allegedlyarbitrary
124
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
been betweentwo alternatives:redeemit and refuteit, or leave it

unredeemedand denounceit.
To dismissa claim as "arbitrary"is not the equivalentof
pleadingignoranceor confessingindecisionor suspending
judgment.It is not the same as saying"I don't know"or "I
haven'tmade up mymind"or "I have no opinion." These
responsespresupposethatan issuehas a connectionto human
cognition; they presuppose that there is some evidence
to the issue and, therefore,
thatit is legitimate
to
pertaining
even
one
be
unable
for
various
reasons
consider,
may
though
to untangleit. For example,ifthefieldis specialized,a given
individualmaynot have thetimeto studytheevidence,even
thoughitis clearand abundant.Or thedatamaybe so evenly
- forinstance,in
and ambiguous
balanced,or so fragmentary
- that one
regard to judginga certainperson's character
cannot
decide
what
conclusion
is
warranted.
In such
simply
"I
an
don't
know"
is
honest
and
statement.
cases,
appropriate
If someone asks a manwhethertherearegremlinson Venus,
forthereply"I don'tknow."
however,thereis no justification
Whatdoesn'the know? Whatevidencehas he failedto study
or been unable to clarify?What is the basis to believethat
thereis anything
to learnon thissubject?If thegremlinclaim
is arbitrary,
thereis no suchbasis. In thissituation,
theproper
"I
I
know.
know
that
do
such
claim
is to be
any
responseis,
thrownout as inadmissible."(169)
Isn't theappropriateresponseto "Are theregremlinson Venus"
morealongthelinesof,"Whyon earthdo youthinkso?" or "I don't
knowof anyreasonto thinkthattherearegremlins.Do youknowof
anythatI'm notawareof?"? "I don'tknow"is ruledout in eithercase.
The reasonthatObjectivismrejectsagnosticism
shouldnow be
clear. The termappliesnot onlyto thequestionof God, but
also to many otherissues, such as ESP, reincarnation,
demonic possession, astrology,the Arab claim of an internationalZionistconspiracy,
and theMarxistclaimthatthestate
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 125
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
willwitheraway. In regardto all such issues and claims,of
numbertoday,theagnosticis the
whichtherearean unlimited
manwho says: "We can'tprovethattheclaimis true.Butwe
can'tprovethatitis false,either.So theonlyproperconclusion is: we don't know; no one knows;perhapsno one can
everknow?" (169)
Again, Peikoffcould have made an Objectivist case against
readersof theaxiom of consciousagnosticismsimplyby reminding
human
and
ness,
beings' abilityto know the world. That
affirming
would makemuchswifter
workof "perhapsno one can everknow."
As for the assertionsabout which Peikoff complains, isn't the
appropriateresponse to evaluate the relevantevidence and the
Whatneedcould
purportedreasonsforthem,and decideaccordingly?
therebe fora thirdtruthvaluecalled"the arbitrary"?
Surelyclaimsof
Zionistconspiracycan be adequatelyaddressedusing
an international
just"the true"and "the false." Whyshould a rationalperson faced
withthe reprintof "Protocolsof theEldersof Zion" have to get
between Needn't and Mustn't?
snaggedin a Peikoviantug-of-war
Can't he or she justevaluatetheassertions(nearlyalwaysas false,in the
cases thatPeikoffcites)and move on?
Agnosticismis not simplythepleadingof ignorance.It is the
of ignorance.It is thephilosophicalviewpoint
enshrinement
thatdemandssuch pleading- in regardto effusionsthatare
disconnectedfromevidence. The viewpointposes as being
fair,balanced,impartial.As shouldnow be obvious,however,
itis rifewithfallaciesand withprejudice.(169-70)
Peikoffcould haveanalyzedtheerrorsof agnosticism
byreviewing
kindsof assertions.He could
fordifferent
theevidentialrequirements
havegone afteriton accountof thefallaciesand prejudiceswithwhich
he believesit to be rife. He could have chewedthe agnosticout for
to concludethatcertainassertionsarefalse.Instead,he chooses
failing
to "thearbitrary,"
to indictagnosticismforcapitulating
glossedforthe
momentas "effusionsthatare disconnectedfromevidence."
claimsas mattersproperlyopen
The agnostictreatsarbitrary
126
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
to consideration,
discussion,and evaluation.He allowsthatit
is "possible" thatthese claims are "true,"therebyapplying
to verbiagethatis atwarwithcognition.
cognitivedescriptions
He demandsproofof a negative:it'sup to you,he declares,
to show thatthereare no demons,or thatyoursex lifeis not
a resultof yourpreviousincarnation
as a pharaohof ancient
Egypt. (170)
Others mightsuppose thatthe agnostichas failedto applythe

onus of proof principle,or has quit withoutrenderinga cognitive
verdictwhen availableevidenceand reasoningwould supportone, or
in tunewithevidentialrequirements
is insufficiently
moregenerally.
But no. Accordingto Peikoff,the agnostic'sfaultconsistsin
failingto recognizethat"the arbitrary"
getsa thirdtruthvalue all to
itself.The agnostic'sweaknessconsistsin not beingruthlessenough
to singleassertionsout for hypercondemnation
as arbitrary.The
in
fatal
flaw
consists
agnostic's
"applyingcognitivedescriptionsto
that
is
at
war
with
therecan be no
verbiage
cognition." Apparently
the
antidoteto agnosticism,
Peikovian
doctrine
of thearbitrary
except
assertion.
The agnosticmiscalculates.Typically,
he believesthathe has
avoidedtakinganycontroversial
positionandis thussafefrom
attack. In fact,he is takinga profoundly
irrational
position.
In struggling
to elevatethearbitrary
to a positionof cognitive
with the
respect,he is attemptingto equate the arbitrary
This
is
not
an
affirmation
of
merely
logicallysupported.
it
an
is
intent
on
ignorance;
epistemological
egalitarianism
obliteratingan essentialdistinction. Such an attitudeis
moredestructive
thananyerrorcommittedby
incomparably
a man devotedto reasonwho takesdefinitestandsbased on
mistakenarguments.(170)
consistsin "obliterating"
the
Agnosticism,forPeikoff,ultimately
"essentialdistinction"
betweenthearbitrary
and thenon-arbitrary.
Is itessential?
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 127
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
The "Essential Distinction"
My examinationof PeikofPs manifoldclaims concerning"the
has revealedhow theylumptogether:
arbitrary"
a propositionthat
1) Assertingwithoutadequateunderstanding
may,in fact,be true;
2) Assertinga propositionforwhich thereis no evidence and
thereare no good reasons- i.e., a propositionthatcan and should
quicklybe rejectedas false;
3) Assertinga propositionthat has alreadybeen conclusively
- i.e.,a propositionalreadyknownto be false;
refuted
4) Assertingthetruthof a propositionthatis subjectto theonus
whiletrying
to shifttheonus of proofto thosewho
of proofprinciple,
and
or
its
question deny truth;
5) Hangingonto a propositionthatwas initially
plausibleand
it or tackingon ad hoc assumptionsor
continuallyreformulating
or
to mystification,
so as to shieldit fromcounterevidence
resorting
counterargument.
In Rand's language,thePeikovianconceptionof "thearbitrary"
is
a "package deal," a scheme forshovingtogetherwhat does not go
vocabulary(e.g.,2007), his conceptogether.In PeikofPspresent-day
tionof "the arbitrary"
is a "misintegration."
Peikoffmakesclaimsaboutthe"thearbitrary"
that,takentogether,
are incoherent:
is contextless,
withouta place in theepistemic
1) "The arbitrary"
with
of
relation
out
any
hierarchy,
reality,and in distinctdangerof
a
but
rational
person can redeem an arbitrarily
meaninglessness
and
assertedproposition,givingit a context,a place in thehierarchy,
it
from
withreality,
a relationship
therebyrescuing
meaninglessness.
cannot be "cognitivelyprocessed"- butit
2) "The arbitrary"
to thecognitiveprocessingrequiredto identify
presentsno impediment
it as arbitrary,
or (wheneverredemptionis possible) to the cognitive
processingneededto redeemit.
has a thirdtruthvalue,foritcan be neithertrue
3) "The arbitrary"
nor false- butnearlyeverypropositionthatPeikoff(1993) cites as
he appearsto believeis false,and ifit is a propositionabout
arbitrary
128
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
he claimsto knowthatitis false(31-33).

thesupernatural,
"The
4)
arbitrary,"
beingneithertruenor false,is nota speciesof
need
one
not
whatkind
error but
put forwardtheeffortto identify
whatkindof erroritinvolvesnever
of erroritinvolves ^/identifying
- butitconstitutes
to humanknowledge
makesa positivecontribution
an "aberration"thatis worsethanan error,justas a "pre-moral"choice
not to liveis neithermoralnorimmoral,butworsethanimmoral.
5) "The arbitrary"neednot be dignifiedwith discussion or
that mightserve to redeem it- but it mustnotbe
argumentation
whichwould amountto
with
discussion
or argumentation,
dignified
it.
"sanctioning"
and theincoherencies
The misintegration
aresufficient
to sinkthe
Peikoviandoctrine. Neitherobviouslymisintegrated
nor obviously
butstilltroubling,
is a standthatPeikofftakesin thecourse
incoherent,
of defendingit. Accordingto Peikoff,
onlytruthsderivedfromother
truthsareof epistemicvalue. Identifying
theprecisenatureof an error
never advances human knowledge(167); at best, it rectifiesthe
benightedstateof the individualwho has avoidablycommittedone
particularerror. Nothing,in otherwords,is ever added to human
knowledgeas a whole by showing falsehoods to be false. The
Peikovianstricture
and
appliesto falsehoodsthatwereonce arbitrary
have undergoneredemption,but if valid it obviouslyapplies more
broadly. A fullexplorationis beyondthe scope of thisarticle,but
Peikoffsinsistenceon the non-valueof learningfromour mistakes
certainlyopens up Objectivism to sharp critique from other
epistem logicalpointsof view.
On account of its package dealingand its incoherencies,"the
an invalidconcept.Therefore,
the
is,byRand'sown criteria,
arbitrary"
distinctionbetween the arbitrary
and the nonarbitrary
cannot be
essentialto a rationalepistemology.And a critiqueof agnosticism
that
centerson itspurportedfailure
to distinguish
betweenthearbitrary
and
thenonarbitrary
cannotbe sound.
What is essential,rather,is the distinctionbetween truthand
that
falsehood,along withthe distinctionbetweenways of thinking
the
of
true
conclusions
versus
those
that
promote production
promote
the adoptionof falseconclusions. There is no need foran allegedly
betweenarbitrary
and nonarbitrary.
deeperdistinction
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 129
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
A Passion for the Arbitrary?
to say about the substanceof Peikoffs
There is nothingfurther
doctrine.But his mannerremainsof interest.His assertionthatthe
on "the arbitrary"
centralfailingof agnosticismis itssquishy-softness
rhetoric:
vent
a
of
superheated
opens
does not derivefromconcernfor
A passion forthearbitrary
logic. Its rootis a feelingthathas beengivenprecedenceover
logic. In some agnostics,the feelingis cowardice,the simple
fearthata standon contentiousissueswillantagonizepeople.
In otheragnostics,thefeelingis moreconvoluted.It is akin
all ideas and thusof
to glee,themaliciousglee of subverting
have
the
men
who
the
requiredto hold
integrity
baiting
themind-hater,
the
the
of
is
This
convictions.
destroyer,
glee
thenihilist.
Of all the variantsof emotionalism,nihilismis the ugliest.
Don't letitsexponentsinfectyourmindor yourmethodology.
(170)
Is hardto findanyepistemology
goingon here. But thereis no
to objectivity.
of
moral
judgmentpretending
shortage
itsposter
If thereweresuch a thingas a passionforthearbitrary,
be
would
childrenwould not be agnostics. Rather,they
religious
or crankswho professunshakableconfidencein theiroff-thefanatics,
wall theories. But such ill conceived and poorly directedmoral
significance.
judgmentsnonethelesshave motivational
to defendanypropositionthatPeikoffhas
If youhavethetemerity
you are an emotionalist;i.e., an irrationalist.
pronouncedarbitrary,
kind of irrationalist
worst
are
the
Indeed, you
(if the badness of
admitsof degrees),foryou are indulginga "passion for
irrationalism
the arbitrary."If you failto dismissout of hand any assertionthat
Peikoffdeemsarbitrary,
youare a miserablecoward,or a mind-hating
that
ordefend
toadvance
besure
nihilist.You'dbetter
, never
, then
anyproposition
.
hasbranded
L.eonard
arbitrary
Peikoff
To pursue truthimplies that one wants to find it. The
of a cognitivequest is to achieve
purpose and responsibility
130
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
theverythingtheagnosticdreadsmost:cognition.(170-71)
in makingclaimsabout the
Peikoffhas exhibitedlittlerestraint
motivesof anyone who puts forwardan assertionthat he deems
If theimputationswere beingmade byanyonebuthimself
arbitrary.
or his disciples,he would excoriate the claimant for shameless
"psychologizing."He mighteven deem theassertionsabout motives
arbitrary...
Let me concludethepresentdiscussionbystatingitsbroader
significance.Logic is man's methodof knowledge,and it
as theemotionalists
cannotbe defaultedon withimpunity,
of
all varietiesseek to do. Any such defaultexactsa fearsome
theworstthereis: itejectsthemental
toll- epistemologically,
in
therealmof cognition.(171)
from
process question
That lastsentenceseemsto be in needof a completion.Unfortunately,PeikofPs atheism,and his denial of an afterlife,
preclude
references
to theFirethatis preparedfortheunbelievers.
But Peikoffdoes turnout in theend to have something
epistemologica!to say:
- not in the fieldof
One cannotget somethingfornothing
materialwealth,and not in the fieldof knowledge,either.
One cannot reach truth,any more than knowledge,by
accident.One can reachitonlybya processof reason. (171)
in humancognition.
Here,Peikoffis rulingout anyroleforchance
he
rule
out
all
must
risk
Consequently,
cognitive taking.Peikoffcannot
variation
and
selection
forreasons
acceptany
conceptionof rationality,
thatrunmuchdeeperthanhisproclaimedexclusionof evolutionfrom
philosophy.29 The evolutionarystartingpoint for variationand
selectionconceptionsis blind,unguidedtrialand error(D. T. Campbell
variationsblindlygeneratedare
1987). Whereas,accordingto Peikoff,
hence everylast one of themis "ejectedfromtherealmof
arbitrary,
cognition." Nor, as we noted above, is Peikoffcomfortablewith
fromfalsepremises,letalone premisesthathe deems
logicalinferences
for
such
inferencespose the dangerof leadingone from
arbitrary
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 13 1
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
falseor even arbitrary
premisesto a trueconclusion. It's hard to
imagine,then,how Peikoffcould accept hypothesistestingas an
whetherconfinedto scienceor understood
procedure,
epistemologica!
theleast
thatmoved
as a moregeneralpractice.Wouldanyhypothesis
beyond
condemnation
as
the
available
data
adventuresome
arbitrary?
escape
of
description
What would be the fateof a new theoryor researchdirectionthat
deviatedfromthe previouslyacceptedontologyin any
significantly
itprovokePeikovianparalysis?
Wouldn't
discipline?
The Pedigree
assertionis
As presentedby Peikoff,thedoctrineof thearbitrary
embarrassment.Questionsof its ultimateauthoran epistemological
ship are of secondaryinterest,forthedoctrineneeds majorrepairor
no matterwho came up withit.
replacement
outright
: ThePhilosophy
Still,PeikofPsmodusoperandi,in Objectivism
ofAyn
Rand, is to attribute
everyidea and argumentto thepersonnamedin
its subtitle. "Since some of Ayn Rand's most importantideas are
expressedonly brieflyor not at all in her books, the absence of a
notein mytextdoes notimplythatthepointis myown. On
reference
is given,thematerialin all likelihood
thecontrary,
whereno reference
is takenfromthelengthy
philosophicdiscussionsthatI had withMiss
Rand across a periodof decades" (1993, xiv). l ie deniesmakingany
creativecontributionwhatsoever: "Our discussions were not a
collaboration:I askedquestions,she answeredthem"(xv).
Yet on theevidenceof an articleand a book publishedsome years
of
afterherdeath,we cannotbe surewhetherRand was theoriginator
thisdoctrine,or whethershe would have approvedits finalrendition
as deliveredbyPeikoff.Whilefreely
(xv) thatshe mightnot
admitting
insists
hersanctionon thefinaldoctrine,Peikofffirmly
haveconferred
thatshe was thesourceforit.
of thedoctrine
The problemis thatRand publishedno statement
ratheroften,but
whileshe was alive. She used theword "arbitrary"
never in a way that signals the technicalmeaningsthat Peikoff
is an epistemological
expoundsin OPAR. Since forRand "arbitrary"
notion,and the metaphysicsand epistemologyof Objectivismwere
workedout in largepartduringthe1950s,one wouldexpectpublished
uses of the word witha philosophicalmeaningto beginwithAtlas
As indeedtheydo. The earliersectionsof thenovel,before
Shrugged.
132
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
ofAyn RandStudies
Gait's speech, referto "arbitrary... violence" (Rand 1957, 742),

mercy"(744,858),and an "arbitrary
"arbitrary
power"(385),"arbitrary
wish" (686). Becauseof theovertly
philosophicalnatureof thespeech,
one would expect the uses to pick up speed, as in facttheydo:
choice" (956), "arbitrary
whim" (953), "arbitrary
"arbitrary
power of
wishes"(958), "arbitrary
orders"(960- 61),
theirwill"(958), "arbitrary
"the arbitrary"
whims"(978), and, finally,
"arbitrary
plainand simple
But
an
assertion."
none
of theuses of
Indeed,
nary "arbitrary
(982).
in AtlasShrugged
seem anymoretechnicalthan Rand's
"the arbitrary"
toObjectivist
uses of theworda decadelater,in herIntroduction
Epistemologa.
Arbitrariness
is once again targetedas theWesternphilosophers
pop up and get shot down in "For the New Intellectual.""[T]he
philosopherswereunableto refutetheWitchDoctor's claimthattheir
as hiswhims"(Rand 1961,30). She further
conceptswereas arbitrary
refersto "the view of man's conceptualfacultyas a mechanismfor
'constructs'not derivedfromexperienceor facts"
producingarbitrary
the
notion
that"anyonewho holds anyfirmconvictions
and
to
(32),
is an arbitrary,
and
mysticdogmatist,since realityis indeterminate
actual
nature"
Of
determine
its
the
Positivists
she
(34).
Logical
people
declares:
Knowledge,theysaid, consists,not of facts,but of wordsy
words unrelatedto objects,words of [sic]an arbitrary
social
convention,as an irreducibleprimary;thus knowledgeis
merelya matterof manipulating
language.The job of scienthe
of
is
not
but thecreationof
tists,theysaid,
study reality,
constructs
means
of
sounds, and any
arbitrary
by
arbitrary
constructis as validas another,sincethecriterion
of validity
of scienceis "that
is only"convenience"and the definition
whichthescientists
do." (35)
Rand's onlyextendedworkon knowledge,theIntroduction
toObjectivist
, was firstpublishedin installments
Epistemologa
during1966 and 1967.
- and once again
The monographonce againspeaksillof arbitrariness
nevermentionsarbitrary
or assertions.
Not even when she
propositions
that
an
invalid
the
of
invalidates
says
concept
anyproposition
presence
in whichitis used as a "cognitiveassertion"(1990,49; see also above).
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 133
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
Instead,Rand employsthe term as she had in "For the New
Intellectual.""Do [concepts]referto somethingreal,somethingthat
exists- or are they merelyinventionsof man's mind, arbitrary
constructsor loose approximationsthatcannot claim to represent
knowledge?"(1990, 1). Being contextual"does not mean that
conceptualizationis a subjectiveprocess or that the content of
choice"
conceptsdependson an individual'ssubjective(i.e.,arbitrary)
and
the
"The
nominalist
schools
(43).
conceptualist
regardconcepts
as subjective
, i.e.,as productsof man's consciousness,unrelatedto the
facts of reality,as mere 'names' or notions arbitrarily
assigned to
arbitrary
groupingsof concreteson thegroundof vague,inexplicable
and
resemblances"(53). "[AJxiomatic
conceptsreferto factsof reality
choice . .
are not a matterof 'faith'or of man's arbitrary
(59).
-centuryphilosophersteach that "a concept
Unspecifiedtwentieth
which represents
denotes nothing but its definingcharacteristic,
.
.
."
an
social
convention
but
(69). "The requirearbitrary
nothing
both in
of
mentsof cognitionforbidthearbitrary
grouping existents,
to
isolation
and
to
(70).
regard
integration"
of Ordinary
In the last chapterof ITOE , we findan indictment
Language Analysis: "LinguisticAnalysisholds that words are an
socialproductimmunefromanyprinciplesor standards. . ."
arbitrary
the
and that"we can 'dissolve'allphilosophicalproblemsby'clarifying'
use of these arbitrary,
causeless, meaninglesssounds which hold
. . ." (77). Rand proclaimsthat"To grasp
ultimatepowerover reality
and reclaimthepowerof philosophy,one mustbeginbygraspingwhy
(78). Finally,thereis
maynot be arbitrary"
conceptsand definitions
thepassagethatwas laterexcerptedin TheAynRandLexicon
, as Rand's
the
on
"the
"there
is
no
room
for
arbitraiy
arbitrary":
onlycontribution
in anyactivity
of man,leastof all inhis methodof cognition- and just
as he has learned to be guided by objectivecriteriain makinghis
in forming
his
physicaltools,so he mustbe guidedbyobjectivecriteria
tools of cognition:his concepts"(82).
Rand never explicatesor definesthe word "arbitrary"in the
in anyotherworkthatshe
originaltextof ITOE , nor,forthatmatter,
saw throughto publication.The best one can do is inferitsmeaning
as a close synonym
fromthecontextsin whichshe usesit. It functions
for"nonobjective"or "irrational."In some settings(e.g.,thequotations from pages 53 and 77), "subjective"will do just as well.30
134
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
oj RandStudies
Allowances duly made for the fact that her monographis about
concepts,there'sstillno wayto extractthePeikoviandoctrineout of
in it.
anything
If one looks up "Arbitrary"
in the RandLexicon
, one willfind
a long entryfromPeikofffollowedby the aforementionedmuch
shorterone fromRand. The long entryon arbitrariness
is an edited
1976
from
PeikofPs
lectures
on
transcript
Objectivismthat,as we shall
in
and
comes
close
tone
content
to
what
he ended up publishing
see,
in OPR.
There are just three other indicationsin printof what Rand
The onlystatement
of herown was not
thoughtabout"thearbitrary."
publishedduringher lifetime;theothertwo were theworkof other
authorswritingforherperiodicals.In some editedmaterialfromthe
epistemology
workshopsthatshe conductedbetween1969 and 1971,
latermade availableas an appendixto the second editionof ITOE ,
Rand warned against"the idea thatit is legitimate
to formarbitrary
Never
to
or
to
tie
to
try justify
hypotheses.
reality or to negatefor
- some hypothesisor some 'What if?' propositionfor
that matter
whichthereis no basis at all" (1990,306). It givesdirectevidencethat
by 1969 Rand equated arbitrary
propositionswith those that are
groundless,and recommendedagainsttryingto prove or disprove
them. But it stopswellshortof thepanoplyof ascriptionsabout"the
thatwe findin Objectivism:
ThePhilosophy
arbitrary"
of Rand.
Rand, however,had endorsedsomecomponentsof the doctrine
severalyearsearlier.This can be reliablyinferred
froma shortarticle
under
her
in
The
Newsletter.
published
b/ectivist
supervision
In thepursuitof knowledge,
thereis no place forwhims.
Every
or
claim,statement, propositionhas to be based on thefacts
of reality;nothingcan be claimedcauselessly,groundlessly,
arbitrarily.
Even a hypothesishas to have some factualbasis, some
factualevidenceindicating
thatitmightbe true.A hypothesis
based on nothingbut a blind guess is not admissibleinto
rationalconsideration. Reason deals only with thatwhich
exists; any hypothesisor suppositionthat some hitherto
unknownfactmayexist,has to be based on theevidenceof
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 135
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
factsknown
to exist.
an appeal to facts,is necessaryto
Rationaldemonstration,
. It is a breachof
supporteventheclaimthata thingispossible
to
assert
that
that
which
has
not
been
proven to be
logic
An
absence
does not
impossible is, therefore,possible.
.
of
constitute
[. .].
proof anything
When a person makes an assertionfor which no rational
- without
is- epistemologically
groundsaregiven,his statement
has beensaid. This is
nothing
cognitivecontent. It is as though
equallytrueif the assertionis made by two billion people.
(Branden1963,15,all italicshis)
the
In theabsenceof anycomparableexpositionbyRand herself,
articleshouldhave been excerptedin TheAynRandLexicon.It should
thosewho know the
also have been citedin OPAR. Unfortunately,
will
understand
internal
of
the
movement
precisely
politics
Objectivist
and LeonardPeikoff
whyHarryBinswangerkeptitout of theformer31
The motiveshavenothingto do
refrained
fromcitingitin thelatter.32
to do withtheidentity
withthecontentof thearticle,and everything
of itsauthor: NathanielBranden.33
As Branden'stitleindicates,his articleis not about arbitrariness.
and whywhat's wrongwith
It's about what's wrongwith theism,34
theismmeritsnothingshortof its outrightrejection. He givesevery
indicationof believingthattheists'assertionsaboutGod are false.Well
- a notionthatmakesits entrance
beforehe introducesarbitrariness
about two thirdsof thewaythroughthe essay- Brandenestablishes
thecontext:
[I]tis necessaryto rememberthatno theisthas everbeen able
to adduceevidencein supportof his beliefin God; thatall of
thetheissallegedproofs,such as the"argumentfroma first
cause," the "argumentfromdesign,"the "ontologicalargument,"etc.,have been refutedby philosophersmanytimes;
that no theisthas ever succeeded even in providingan
definition
of whathe means
and non-contradictory
intelligible
in
can
believe
God
and
that
one
onlyas an act of
by "God";
136
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
faith. Faith is the acceptance of ideas withoutsensory
evidenceor rationalproof. (15)
Despite its lead role in the Randian lexicon,the word "faith"

appears just once in Peikoffs entirepublished account of "the
Faithis also mentionedjustonce in his 1997lectureon the
arbitrary."
Could
thisbe becausePeikoffwould not be able to convince
subject.
readersthatpropositionsacceptedon faithareso strangeandegregious
as to deservea thirdtruthvalueall to themselves?
Brandensaw arbitrariness
as beingat one end of an evidentiary
continuum: he emphasized the need forevidenceor reasons as a
to be possible.
preconditionforrationally
considering
anything
He was indulgingin hyperbole(at best) when he equated an
assertion with nothinghaving been said. But Branden
arbitrary
restrained
himselffromconcludingthat"arbitrary"
is a truthvalue,or
a wayof beingwrongerthanwrong,and he triedto qualifyhis claim
thatarbitrary
assertionsare "withoutcognitivecontent." He neither
declaredthatarbitrary
assertions"cannot be cognitively
processed,"
nor offeredcomparisonswithdunes shiftedby the wind or speech
sounds mimickedby a parrot. Branden indictedagnostics for
nihilism. The focus of his
cowardice,but not for zero-embracing
article'frason theirrationality
of demandingevidenceor argumentin
violationof theonus of proofprinciple.
The mainfaultof thepiece was itsimpliedrejectionof blindtrial
and errorat anylevel. Branden'santagonismtowardtrialand error
appears to flow out of the underlyingRandian commitmentto
foundationalism;indeed, the reader can alreadysniffout a few
Parmenideantendencies.In arguingforthe onus of proofprinciple
(whichtakesup themiddlethirdof thearticle),Brandendeclares:
of
"Provinga negative"means: provingthe non-existence
thatforwhichnoevidence
.
ofanykindexists
Proof,logic,reason,thinking,
knowledgepertainto and deal
onlywiththatwhichexists. They cannotbe appliedto that
whichdoes notexist.Nothingcan be relevant
or applicableto
thenon-existent.The non-existent
is nothing.
(15, his italics)
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 137
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
are of highimportance,but as
The issues raisedby foundationalism
the
alreadynotedtheylie largelyoutside rangeof thisarticle.
Most importantforour purposesis what Brandendid not tryto
into a basic epistemological
do. He did not turn"the arbitrary"
category,or give it a new truthvalue all its own. He regardedthe
not thedistincdistinctionbetweenfaithand reasonas fundamental,
He did notassimilate
and thenon-arbitrary.
tionbetweenthearbitrary
arbitrariness
to theproductionof symbolsthattheproducerlacksthe
to
competence interpret.
The 1963 articleis brief. But its broadercontextis easilyrecovered, because the articlereworks,with minimalalteration,material
fromthe lecturecourse thatBrandenhad been givingon Thebasic
of
This was the firstsystematic
presentation
ofObjectivism.
Principles
it
is
the
oldest
Whas
more,
documentary
anywhere.
Objectivism
source,unless unpublishednotes or draftsstilllurkin theAynRand
and epistemolArchives,forthosepartsof theObjectivistmetaphysics
Rand's
Gait's
find
their
into
that
did
not
published
way
speech,
ogy
essays,theposthumousappendixto JTOE,or thepublishedportions
of herjournals.35
lectures.In
in twoof Branden'stwenty
assertionsfigure
Arbitrary
the thirdlecture,titled"Logic and Mysticism,"the onus of proof
principleis central:
Beforeconcludingour discussionof logic,thereis one final
issueto whichI shouldliketo turn.I wantyouto understand
a veryimportantmethodologicalprinciple;namely,thatit is
to attemptit.
impossibleto provea negative,and irrational
By a negative,in thiscontext,I meana negativeforwhichno
positiveexists,such as the attemptto prove thatone is not
guiltywhenno positiveproofof one's guilthas been offered,
or the attemptto negatesomethingforwhich thereis no
positive evidence. In colloquial terms,this fallacywould
consistof some arbitrary
assertion,followedbythechallenge,
"Prove thatitisn'tso." (Branden1967,Lecture3)
The metaphysicalbasis for the onus of proof principleis
Parmenidean,drawing on the distinctionbetween existenceand
138
Vol. 10,No. 1
Thejournaloj RandStudies
nonexistencethatBrandenlaidout in his Lecture1:

Proof,logic,reason,thinking,
knowledgepertainto and deal
withonlythatwhichexists. They cannotbe appliedto that
whichdoes not exist. Nothingcan be relevantto or applied
is nothing. [. . .] Any
to the nonexistent.The nonexistent
human statementand anyclaimto knowledgemustreferto
somethingthatexistsor derivefromsomethingthatexistsor
be based on somethingthatexists.(Lecture3)
Partof thispassagecan be spottednearlyverbatimin the1963 article.
The lecturesshows us exactlyhow farBrandenwentin questionassertions:
ingthemeaningof arbitrary
assertionabout nothingcan be said to exist
But an arbitrary
in
thatis a seriesof soundsutteredbya human
the
sense
only
far
as its content is concerned, it refers,
As
being.
speaking,to nothing.(Lecture3)
epistemologically
Assertionsabout witchesor goblins referto nothing,so faras
Brandenis concerned. It does not followsthat theyfailto existas
7 notesof "KingPorterStomp,"I have
assertions
. If I scat-singthefirst
uttereda seriesof sounds. But unlessyou have just asked me which
JellyRoll Mortoncompositionbecame a hitforBennyGoodman, or
or
somethingalong those lines,I have made no assertion,arbitrary
otherwise.If,on theotherhand,I saythatwitchesmakepeople illby
shootingthemwithinvisibledarts,thenI havemadean assertion,even
thoughit is about witches,and can thereforebe takento referto
nothing.
assertionscannot
Indeed,Brandendoes not declarethatarbitrary
be cognitively
processed:
A positivestatementderivedfromsome erroneousevidence
can be refutedby meansof provingtheerrorsof thealleged
evidence. Such a refutation
would be the disprovingof a
This
is
not
the
same
positive.
thingas provinga negative;that
an
error
or
the
falsehood
of a statement
forwhich
is,proving
no evidenceof anykindexists. For instance,ifI said thatthe
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 139
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
side of the moon whichwe see consistsof mountainsand
dead volcanic craters,I would have to offeryou scientific
evidenceto proveit. But ifI said thattheotherside consists
of rose gardensand Coca-Cola factoriesand you asked for
proof and I answered,"My proofis the factthatyou can't
it," no one could blame you if you decided not to
disprove
the
conversationany further,
not to
and, thereafter,
pursue
hold anyseriousconversations
withme at all. (Lecture3)
A rationaldecisionnot to continuea conversation,
or to pursue
seriousconversationsin the future,does not requirea judgmentof
or an inability
to cognitively
meaninglessness,
processwhattheother
onsetofPeikovianparalysis.
And,
partyhas said,letalone a fulminating
in fact,thereis no difficulty
an assertionabout rose
understanding
gardensand Coca-Cola factorieson thedarkside of themoon. What
is lackingis anyreasonto believethatit mightbe true.
Branden'sLecture3 is premisedon a tightcouplingbetweenfaith
Of theclaimabout thedarkside of
or mysticism36
and arbitrariness.
the moon, followedby a peremptory
demand fordisproof,Branden
drawsthelesson:
But muchas mymethodof thinking
would be reprehensible
in such a case, thereis a mentalattitudemore reprehensible
still. This is the attitudeof some thirdperson,who, after
wouldshrugand drawthefollowing
hearingourconversation,
conclusion: "Well, maybethe otherside of the moon does
and maybeit
consistof rosegardensand Coca-Cola factories,
doesn't. Who am I to know?"
If I, in this example,acted likea mysticopenlyat war with
thenhe,theneutralobserver,did something
worse:He
reality,
grantedequal status to mysticismand reality,refusingto
differentiate
or takesidesbetweenthem.(Lecture3)
In Lecture4, Brandengoes on to developthiscritiqueof agnosticism, in termsalreadyfamiliarto readersof his 1963 article:"An
atheist'srefusalto believethatforwhichno evidenceexistsis classified
by theagnosticas an act of faith.Whattheagnosticdemands of the
140
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
- proofof the nonexistenceof God."

atheistis proof of a negative
assertions
of
was, forBranden,one and thesame
Acceptance arbitrary
as acceptanceof ideas on faith:
But if one introducesan arbitrary
elementinto one's consciousness, if one introducesinto one's knowledgeand
convictionsan idea thatone holds withoutrationaljustification- an idea whichis not derivedfromreality
and whichis
- thatis,an idea accepted
not subjectto rationalexamination
- why,then,no further
on faith
is possible. Such
integration
an idea cannotbe placedwithina logicalhierarchy
or structure
It
acts
to
the
of concepts.
paralyze thinking
processbysetting
conflicts.(Lecture4)
up irreconcilable
Here,obviously,is whereseveralof PeikofPsclaimsoriginated.37
Brandenis sayingthat"thearbitrary"
is notlocatablewithina hierarchy
of concepts;thatarbitrary
assertionsresistwhatPeikoff
wouldlatercall
"reduction"(because theyare not derivedfromrealityand are offlimitsto rationalexamination);even that "the arbitrary"induces
"paralysis."
But arethesePeikofPsclaims? Not exactly.
For Brandengoes righton to linkarbitrariness
withbelievingon
assertionswithgenerating
in
contradictions
, and acceptingarbitrary
faith
one's thinking.
Faithis theacceptanceof an idea withoutevidenceor proof
- without sensory evidence or logical demonstration.
Becauseno idea takenon faithcan be rationally
but
integrated,
can onlyleave the totalof one's premisesin a stateof unresolved contradiction,
the introduction
of any idea takenon
faithresultsin the total undercutting
of man's knowledge.
Because man'spowerof integration
has been sabotaged,man,
in effect,
loses thecapacityto be certainof anything.
(Lecture
4)
Peikoff(1993) wouldhastento remindus,are the
Contradictions,
- not of a thirdtruthstatuscalled"arbitrary."For
markof falsehood
assertions
Branden,the negativeconsequencesof acceptingarbitrary
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 14 1
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
are one and thesame as thenegativeconsequencesof supposingthat
faithis a shortcutto knowledge.
man is forcedto feelthatreasonand thinking
And, further,
aresuperfluous.If reasonis not theonlymeansof perceiving
ifone can gainknowledgebysomeothermethod,then
reality,
manhas no cause to maintaintherigorous,
exactingdiscipline
of rationalthought,since some othermeans of information
and negatetheseresultsat anytimeand in any
maycontradict
issue. This is whatGait meantwhenhe said that"The alleged
short-cutto knowledge,whichis faith,is onlya shortcircuit
themind."(Branden1967,Lecture4)
destroying
Finally,Brandenmakesclearthatboth trueand falseideascan be
acceptedon faith.He carvesout no space fora thirdtruthvalue.
Now theseconsiderations
applyto anyactof a faithregardless
of the contentof the idea thata man decides to accept on
faith. The efficacy
of his consciousnesswould be impaired
evenifitwerea trueidea thata man acceptedon faith;thatis,
withoutthenecessarychain
acceptedwithoutunderstanding,
of proof,withoutfirst-hand
knowledgeor logicalconviction.
But the damage to his consciousnessbecomes multiplied
reality
manytimeswhenhe acceptsideason faiththatcontradict
and therefore
contradictand undercutthe restof his knowledge. (Lecture4)
For Branden,acceptinga false propositionon faithis more
harmfulthan acceptinga true one, whereas,for Peikoff,any one
as any
is just as totallymind-destroying
indulgencein the arbitrary
other.
In his presentations
overthepast40 years,Peikoffhas used nearly
all of thesamelanguagethatBrandenonce did. Buthisinterpretations
of thatlanguagehave changed,sometimessharply. Do any of his
improvements?
changesconstitute
became apparentratherquickly. In 1965,
One reinterpretation
From
Peikoffgave a set of lectureson Objectivism's
Theory
ofKnowledge.
1966 to 1968,tapesof theselecturesweremadeavailableto subscribers
142
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
by the NathanielBrandenInstitute.Lecture9 coveredthe familiar

assertions. It was in these
conjunctionof agnosticismand arbitrary
the
truthvalue: "An arbitrary
that
Peikoff
introduced
third
lectures
is neithertruenor false. It is
assertion,so long as it remainsarbitrary,
to be dismissedout of hand." Peikoffalso introducedthe wind
blowingthedunesintotheshapeof "A is A" and theparrotsquawking
"Two plus two equal four."38
contextis a reviewbyRobertEfron,published
Providingfurther
in 1967. Efron'stopicwas a book byC. E. M. Hansel
in TheObjectivist
. Since Brandenhad enunciatedan
Evaluation
titledESP : A Scientific
the
of
the
doctrine
of
version
assertion,and Peikoffhad
early
arbitrary
alreadybegunto extendit,one mightexpectthedoctrineto show up
in thiskindof article.It almostdoes:
Provethatpinkelephantsdo notexist.Provethatyoudidnot
assassinateJ.F. Kennedy.Provethatextrasensory
perception
(ESP) does not exist.
To accept such a challengeis to invitean epistemologica!
disaster.Anyattemptto disprovean assertionforwhichno
of the
positiveevidenceis provided,sanctionsthelegitimacy
unsupportedassertionand the use which may be made of
yourfailureto disprovethatassertion.(Efron1967,8)
in his review. He refersto
Efron neveruses the word "arbitrary"
assertions.
his
invocation
of sanction,he does
Despite
"unsupported"
not urge the reader,as Branden(1963; 1967) had, to dismiss such
assertionsas thoughnothinghas been said. Nor does he claim that
suchassertionsareneithertruenorfalse,as Peikoff(1966) was bythen
urging.He merelyappliestheonus of proofprinciple:Efronpraises
Hansel for askingwhat evidence is taken to supportalleged ESP
powers,forexaminingthatevidence,and forshowingthatnone of it
actuallysupportstheexistenceof ESP.39
It was over the next decade that Peikofffirmlyconsolidated
and automatically
invalidatedassertionsintoa
arbitrary,
unsupported,
singlecategory.40
In the sixthof his 1976 lectureson The Principles
of Objectivism
), Peikoff
(quotedhereas edited forinclusionin The RandLexicon
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 143
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
makes most of the declarationsthat have become familiar. He
assertion"has no relationto realityor to
proclaimsthatan arbitrary
humancognition"(in Binswanger1988,30). It is consignedto a third
truthvalue: "such a claimis not to be regardedas trueor as false;ifit
assessmentat all" (31).
it is entitledto no epistemological
is arbitrary,
in
OPAR
than
he
would
farther
, Peikoffwritesoff
Actuallygoing
"The
senseless:
as
assertions
[. . .] has no
arbitrary
utterly
arbitrary
relationto evidence,facts,or context. It is the humanequivalentof
[noisesproducedby] a parrot. . . sounds withoutany tie to reality,
withoutcontentor significance"(31; the bracketedpassage about
noisesis Peikoffs).
Peikoffhints,forthefirsttime,at a redemption
policy:"thewords
claimmayperhapsbe judgedas trueor falsein
expressingan arbitrary
some othercognitivecontext(if and when theyare no longer put
as arbitrary)"41
forward
(inBinswanger1988,31). The samestatement,
whenputforward
he says,is assertedarbitrarily
bysomeonewho does
not knowwhatitmeansor whatthereasonsforassertingitmightbe;
"when thespeakerdoes knowthemeaningand thereasons"(31), the
same wordscan be used to asserta propositionthatis trueor false.
And Peikoffs lecturealreadyoscillates between Needn't and
in
as the treatment
or painfully
Mustn't,thoughnot so protractedly
OPAR. The excerptconcludes:
to tryto refutesomeone'sarbitrary
It is notyourresponsibility
- to tryto findor imaginearguments
thatwillshow
assertion
erroron your
thathis assertionis false. It is a fundamental
rational
The
to
do
this.
even
to
procedurein regard
try
part
assertionis to dismissit out of hand,merely
to an arbitrary
and as such inadmissibleand
it as arbitrary,
identifying
undiscussable.(31-32)
of agnosticismto his
The same lectureyokesPeikoffstreatment
accountof thearbitrary,
justas Brandenhad done beforehim.
As excerptedin Binswanger's
entryon "Agnosticism"(1988,3- 4),
theagnosticforviolatingtheonus of proofprinciple.
Peikoffcriticizes
He goes beyondBrandenin concludingthattheagnosticis not merely
as an "epistemological
a coward,but is functioning
(4).
destroyer"
144
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
ojAyn RandStudies
See how manyfallaciesyou can findin [agnosticism].Here
area fewobviousones. The agnosticallowsthearbitrary
into
the realmof humancognition. He treatsarbitrary
claimsas
- and thenhe regretfully
properto consider,discuss,evaluate
thearbitrary
out of
says,"I don'tknow,"insteadof dismissing
hand. Second,theonus-of-proof
issue: theagnosticdemands
proofof a negativein a contextwherethereis no evidencefor
thepositive.It's up to you,he says,"to provethatthefourth
did not cause yoursex life[. . .]." Third,the
moon ofJupiter
agnosticsays,"Maybe thesethingswillone day be proved."
In otherwords,he assertspossibilities
or hypotheseswithno
jot of evidentialbasis. (4)
readerwillnote thatbecause"arbitrary"
The discerning
is defined
as "devoid of evidence,"the thirdfallacyis identicalto the first.
of agnosticismin PeikofPs1976 lecturesis
Otherwise,the treatment
identical
to
what
we
have encounteredin OPAR.
virtually
So by 1976 thedoctrineof thearbitrary
assertionhad pushedout
most of its tendrilsand excrescences.Justthreesproutedlater. One
is therelianceon reifying
generics;nowherein his lecturesdid Peikoff
with"the true"and "the false." These excontrast"the arbitrary"
pressionsmake theirdebutin the 1987 article,thentakean encorein
"Fact and Value." The second is the overtdenial of any positive
epistemicvalue to be gained fromredeemingand refuting
arbitrary
stands
that
Peikoff
took
claims;thoughthiswas strongly
impliedby
earlier,it is in the 1987 article,and subsequentlyin OPAR, thatthe
conclusionis explicitly
drawn.The thirdis thedoctrinethatcognitive
that
paralysis
purportedinabilityto make a rationalmove in any
- is broughton byexposureto an arbitrary
direction
assertion.
In hisprefaceto theAynRandLexicon
states(1988,ix)
, Binswanger
thathe had completedtheletter"A" before1980 and thatRand read
throughthatportionof the manuscript.So we maysafelyconclude
thatRand approved,not just of PeikofPslectureseries,but also of
these two publishedexcerpts. What she would have thoughtabout
"the true,""the false,"and "the arbitrary,"
or thedenialthatanything
is ever gained by learningfrom mistakes,or full-blownPeikovian
we of coursedo not know.
paralysis,
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 145
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
odd claimabout Rand's
Still,Peikoff(1997) makesa revealingly
She
on
the
would
not,he says,haveneeded
subject.
thoughtprocesses
to encounteror considerPeikovianparalysisin orderto endorsehis
latter-day
conceptionof thearbitrary:
It is theoretically
possible for someone, at this point, to
natureof the arbitrary,
the
deduce, fromthe anti-cognitive
are neithertrue
ultimateconclusionthatarbitrary
statements
nor false. But I hastento add, I do not believethatanyone,
apartfromAynRand,would actuallybe able to makesuch a
as againstrationalistically,unlesshe
deductionmeaningfully,
firstperformedone more induction,a second induction.
(Lecture11)
That second inductionallegedlyconsistsof notingthatwhenever
one promptlysuccumbsto
one recognizesan assertionas arbitrary,
to think
of
the
rational
faculty absoluteinability
completeparalysis
about theassertion'smeaningor implications.
Peikoffs declarationraises a lot more questions than it was
intendedto. Rand,afterall,wouldnothaveneededto generalizeabout
Peikovianparalysisifshe had neverheardor thoughtof such a thing.
Nor wouldshe haveneededto performthatbitof inductivereasoning,
ifshe was not in factthefirstto drawtheconclusionthatan arbitrary
assertionis neithertruenor false.Why,in anyevent,is Peikofftalking
assertions?
about the way Rand wouldhave reasoned about arbitrary
to OPAR, witha fully
Didn't Randpresenthim,as pertheintroduction
receivedand communicatedto the
formeddoctrinethathe gratefully
rest of the world? And didn't she patientlyexplicateto him the
as he insisted
thoughtprocessesbehindeverylastone of herteachings,
Rand"
she had in "My ThirtyYears withAyn
(Peikoff1989b)? Was
assertion?The
authorof thedoctrineof thearbitrary
Rand theprimary
historicalrecordgives us groundsfor doubt, which Peikoffs 1997
statements
do nothingto relieve.
The Sociological Function of the Peikovian Doctrine
is itsproclamation
Among thePeikoviandoctrine'smanyfailings
framework
thatfailsto specify
withinan uncompletedepistemological
clear rulesof evidence. Withoutsuch rules,it becomes extremely
146
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
and which are not.

difficult
to judge which assertionsare arbitrary
recommendations
foraction.
Anotherkeyfailingis its contradictory
that
no
rational
could
refute
the
doctrine
Is theupshotof
truly
person
"the arbitrary"?Or is it ratherthat everyrationalperson mustbe
fromtrying
discouraged
strongly
of thedoctrinebyPeikoffs colleaguesand
The actualemployment
it
that
is
not reallydesigned to deter fallacious
disciples suggests
discussion. Those objectives
or
unproductive
reasoning intellectually
can be accomplishedwithoutdraggingin themassiveconfusionsand
thatitentails.
exaggerations
mighty
of thearbitrary
assertionreallyencouragesis the
the
doctrine
What
replacementof carefulassessmentsof evidenceand argumentwith
moralcondemnation.It may,on occasion,be used to
indiscriminate
press Objectiviststo shun criticsof theirphilosophyinstead of
the
respondingto the criticisms.But its primaryimpactfallswithin
Randiancommunity.
First,theuse againstnon-Randians:Objectivistsmayemploythe
assertionagainstreligiousor supernatural
doctrineof the arbitrary
a
which
have
been
beliefs,
primetargeteversinceBranden'soriginal
Over
time,as became clear above, therehas been a
presentation.
furtherapplicationto Karl Popper's philosophyof science,which
overtlyand emphaticallyrejectsPeikovianproof. Thus, PeikofPs
protg David Harriman(2008) repeatedlycontraststhe methods
employed by Isaac Newton (which he takes to be instancesof
Peikovianproof)witharbitrary
or arbitrary
But
hypotheses
speculation.
no examplesof physicists
Harrimangivesvirtually
actuallyproceeding
nordoes he attemptto applythedoctrinein
witharbitrary
hypotheses;
its fullPeikoviansplendorto anyof theallegedcases.
Who outsideof Objectivistcircleswould reallybe fazed by an
The doctrineinitsfinalform,afterPeikoff
accusationof arbitrariness?
ranwildwithit,is so confusedthatnon-Objectivists
willmostlikely
findit incomprehensible.If theydo understandit,theywillalmost
certainly
rejectit. The kernelof thedoctrine,beforePeikoffranwild,
to epistemological
foundationalism
alreadypresupposesa commitment
thatfollowersof Peirce,Popper,and Piagetwillnot share.
be upsetifhisor herstatements
arejudged
Who, then,willactually
who
subscribes
the
someone
to
another
doctrine;
i.e.,
arbitrary?
Only
Objectivist.
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 147
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
withintheObjectivistcommunity
of
Duringinternecine
struggles
the1960s,theaccusationof arbitrariness
was nota standardrhetorical
and "whim-worshipping"
weapon. Chargesof evasion,subjectivism,
were the common currency.In the 1970s,indictments
for"psychoIn
were
added.42
the
and
1980s,
"emotionalism,"
rationalism,
logizing"
to
moral
would
them
on
the
bill
of
opposition
judgment
join
particulars.
PeikofPs"Fact and Value" (1989a) is the singlemost important
blastatanyonein Rand-landwho mightbe temptedto dissentfromthe
author's brand of orthodoxy. "Fact and Value" alleges the gross
of tolerating
dishonestideas"
immorality
anyproponentof "inherently
(i.e., of virtuallyany point of view that disagreeswith Peikovian
dishonest"is their
Objectivism).Butwhatmakestheideas"inherently
falsehood,not theirarbitrariness.Today everyweapon, fromthe
imputationof subjectivismto the insinuationof rejectingmoral
in Rand-land than the
judgment,is brandishedmore frequently
accusationof arbitrariness.This lattermakes its appearanceonlyin
connectionwithonesortof objectionableopinion.
In Objectivistcircles,chargesof arbitrariness
are typically
brought
Rand as a personor assertthathercharacter
againstthosewho criticize
fellshortof perfection,
or morally. PeikofPs disciple
epistemically
PeterSchwartzwas the firstto levelsucha charge. The occasion was
theappearanceof a biography
of Rand thatwas strongly
positiveabout
her literaryachievementand her ideas, but presentedsome of her
charactertraitsand actionsin a negativelight.On an extrapage tucked
TheIntellectual
insidehisnewsletter,
SchwartzblastedThePassion
Activist^
which
he
called
of Ayn Randy
"pseudo-Freudian,"and its author,
BarbaraBranden(1986),whom he consideredworthyof nothingbut
moralcondemnation.
It is onlyin this contextthatthe questioncan be raisedof
whetherto believeanyof theconcretefactualallegationsMrs.
Brandenmakesabout AynRand's behavior.When thetruth
of such allegationsrestsentirelyupon the testimony
of the
author(and of unnamed"friends"she regularly
cites),one
mustask whyshe is to be believedwhenshe has thoroughly
It is veryeasyto accusethe
destroyedherclaimto credibility.
dead of almostanything.I could readilyassertthatAynRand
148
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
ofAyn RandStudies
metwithme at dawnon thefirst
Thursdayof everymonthto
- and who could
join me in secretprayerat a Buddhisttemple
disproveitifI maintainedthatno one else knewabout it?
conclusionsreachedbya categorically
nonEpistem logically,
have
method
the
status
of
the
are
objective
arbitrary.
They not
trueand not false,butare,rather,
outside
thecognitive
entirely
realm- because theyare not genuineattempts
at cognition.
Admirersof Ayn Rand need not- and should not- feel
compelled to tryto rebuteach and everyconcretecharge
madebyBarbaraBranden(andotherswho aresureto follow).
Let the authors of any such charges firstestablishtheir
as honest,objectivereporters
credentials
intenton presenting
thetruth,
noton trying
to salvagetheirown sadlywastedlives.
Encompassedin thesweepof Schwartz'sdismissalwerethemost

in thebiography:thatRand begana love affair
sensationalrevelations
withNathanielBrandenin 1954,whichwas keptsecretfromeveryone
of thataffair,
in
excepttheirspouses,and thatthe finaldisintegration
1968,led direcdyto Nathanieland Barbara'sexpulsionfromRand's
circleand thedissolutionof theNathanielBrandenInstitute.
Peikoffwas stillskirting
aroundtheaffairin his essay"My Thirty
Years with Ayn Rand" (1989b). He was promptlycompelled to
from
acknowledgethattheaffairhad takenplace.43Butcorroboration
Rand's own correspondence
wouldnot necessarily
cleansethetaintof
arbitrariness
fromtheassertionthatsheand Brandenhadhad an affair.
Afterall,froma strictPeikovianstandpoint,
thevery
sameproposition
aboutAynRandcanbetruly
asserted
Leonard
and
asserted
by
Peikoff arbitrarily
Barbara
.44
Branden
by
In a 2005 book titledThePassionofAynRand*sCritics
, PeikofPs
discipleJames Valliant followsSchwartzin aimingthe charge of
at BarbaraBranden'sbook and NathanielBranden'slater
arbitrariness
memoirs.45
Again and again,the Brandensproducesuspiciousevidence
from"privateconversations"thatcontradicts
theentirebody
of verifiable
but
which
information,
conveniently
helpsthem
their
axes.
grind
particular
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 149
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
We have seen thatthe restof theirevidenceagainstRand
consists of purelyemotional assertion devoid of factpreciselywhat Rand's philosophy terms an "arbitrary"
claims are
assertion. Accordingto Objectivism,arbitrary
neithertruenor false. They are,in thissense,"worse" than
- even a negativeone.
norelation
toreality
whatever
false,bearing
It is erroreven to attemptto refutethem.
On thesurface,theBrandens'biographicalefforts
consistof
factualclaimsmade by people who knewtheirsubjectwell.
of theirworksas beingarbitrary
Therefore,theidentification
can onlybe made after(at leastsome) carefulanalysis.As we
thata sweeping
have seen,such analysisreadilydemonstrates
dismissalis,indeed,warranted.
Even ifone daysome of theBrandens'assertionsare verified
by morecrediblesourcesand evidence,theBrandenswillnot
havehelpedto establishtheirtruth.Considerableindependent
researchwillbe necessaryto accomplishthis.And itdoes not
matterwhetherthesediscoveriescast Rand in a positiveor
negativelight.
If one day, forexample,it is somehow established,to the
drove
surpriseof theauthor,thatRand's callousindifference
will
thecurrent
herhusbandto excessivedrinking,
analysis still
have been
will
not
and
the
Brandens'
stand,
credibility
willbe no
enhancedin anyway. The basis of theirinferences
less credibleand no less arbitrary.
But the historicalrecord can become clouded with the
assumptionsof a traditionthatis largelylegendary.It would
be tragicif Rand's biographysufferedthe same fateat the
hand of the Brandens'viciouslycraftedlegend. (2005, 17374)
One mightaskhow helpfulthedoctrinereallyis,whenVallianthas

had to expend 173 pages on his endeavorto show that nearlyany
statementthatNathanielor BarbaraBrandenhas made concerning
150
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
Rand's characteror actionsis arbitrary.

After173 pagesof impugning
sources'credibility
andpurportedly
theirclaims,readersexpect
refuting
an authorto issue an honest-to-goodness
"cognitiveverdict":in this
arefalse.Some ofValliant'sown
case,that"theBrandens'"statements
phrases,such as "viciouslycraftedlegend"(above) and "writersand
books rifewith lies and distortions"(175), are consistentwiththat
verdict.
It is also unfortunate
thatValliant,who is familiar
withSchwartz's
notice(393 n.50),doesn'trevisitthescope of theoriginalcharge.Less
thana yearafterSchwartzdismissedtheallegationas arbitrary,
Peikoff
and his followersquit denyingthe affairbetweenRand and Branden
(justas wellforValliant,sincemorethanhalfof his book is about the
affair).Yet Valliantcould have said,in perfectconsonancewiththe
Peikoviandoctrine,that Nathanieland Barbara Brandenwere still
arbitrarily
assertingthattherehad been an affair.
Afterall,a propositionconcerning
Rand'scharacter
or conductcan
be arbitrary,when put forward by persons who function
"nonobjectively"toward Rand (applyingSchwartz and Valliant's
thiscategory
includes"theBrandens"and all otherswho make
criteria,
in
negativejudgments publicconcerningRand's character).The exact
same propositioncould be true,when put forwardby personswho
function"objectively"(these,accordingto the same criteria,
are the
ones who expressnothingbut adulationof Rand's character,
thereby
Schwartz,and Valliant).
gainingtheapprovalof Peikoff,
But claimingthat"theBrandens"had assertedtheexistenceof the
affairarbitrarily,
whilepersonsacceptableto theauthorhad assertedit
would
have
been so blatantlyprejudicialas to exhaust any
truly,
reader'scredulity.
It is not as thoughValliantadhereswithanyconsistencyto the
Peikovianstrictures
thathe has described.Some of hisown claimsare
so poorlydocumentedthattheywillinducemostreaders'jawsto drop.
Here's what he has to say about FrankO'Connor's reactionto his
wife'saffairwithBranden:
O'Connor almost certainlybelieved that his wife was an
exceptionalgeniusand a woman exceptionally
loyal to her
values. He may well have appreciatedhis wife'scomplex
- and intellectual
- needs. Possessing such a
emotional
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 15 1
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
sensitiveand daringsoul maywellhavegivenhimthecapacity
to embracehis wife's quest forjoy,a capacityobviouslynot
sharedby theBrandens. (And he surelycould have leftRand
withoutmuch fear,had he trulyobjected to the situation.)
(167)
of two
Vallians evidenceforall of thisconsists,in its entirety,
since
items. First,FrankO'Connor consentedto theaffair(ironically,
Rand kepttheaffairsecretfromtherestof theworld,and thereis no
to thewayit began,all Valliantcan
documentattesting
contemporary
offerin support of O'Connor's verbal consent is the putatively
emotionalisticeffusionsof . . . Barbara and Nathaniel Branden).
Second, O'Connor neverleftRand; theywere stillmarriedwhen he
died.
O'Connor leftno writtenrecordof his feelingsabout the affair.
neverspoke to anyoneabout it exceptRand,Nathaniel
He apparently
Branden- and whateverhe said to hiswifedied
and
Barbara
Branden,
else in thisparagraphis whatValliantbelieves
withher. Everything
that
hadtheattitudes
wouldbe true,ifFrank 'Connor
JamesValliantwould
hehad. By Peikovianstandards,whatpreponderanceof
liketo believe
Whatsmaller
evidencecan Valliantpresentforhis "almostcertainly"?
each
he
for
evidence
can
of
favorable
"may well"?
present
quantity
Whereis thedecisivecase, encompassingall of theavailableevidence,
to back his "surely"?Valliantsuppliesthereaderwithnone.
? Whenhas he done hispublic
So whereis Valliansloudmeaculpa
assertions?
for
spreadingarbitrary
penance
Perhaps Valliantis too caughtup in his own passion for the
to abjectlyconfess his aberrationand administerhis own
arbitrary
chastisement. Where, then, are the Peikovian furieschorusing:
Detachmentfromreality!Instantejectionfromthe cognitiverealm!
Nullifiedgrasp of objectivity!Inner chaos forlife! Wrongerthan
wrongand worsethanbad!
There is no chorus. Valliansbook was publishedwithPeikoffs
blessing.
Randianblogosphereprovidesa finalillustration
The present-day
use. Again,the
are put to strategic
of thewaychargesof arbitrariness
characterand
Rand's
is
target unacceptablesuggestionsconcerning
about
evolution.
her
ambivalence
account
of
this
time
on
motives,
152
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
Peikoffhas proclaimed,on the one hand, that afterreligious

believers embrace Objectivism,their opposition to theories of
cited
biologicalevolutionwillfallaway(1993, 126). He has favorably
a book thataccountsforteleologicalconceptsusingan evolutionary
framework
excludedevolution(468,Ch. 6 n.9). He has also pointedly
fromthescope of Objectivistphilosophy(476,Ch.
aryconsiderations
11 n.19), and derided"the intellectuals'
fad of the period,Darwin's
evolution"
of
(405).
theory
In allof this,Peikoffis faithfully
Rand's attitude
toward
replicating
evolution.As NathanielBranden(1984) recollects:
I rememberbeingastonishedto hearher sayone day,"After
all,thetheoryof evolutionis onlya hypothesis."I askedher,
"You mean you seriouslydoubt that more complex life
- includinghumans- evolved fromless complex life
forms
forms?" She shruggedand responded, "I'm reallynot
preparedto say,"or words to thateffect.I do not mean to
forthetheoryof evolution
implythatshewantedto substitute
the religiousbeliefthatwe are all God's creation;but there
was definitely
somethingabout theconceptof evolutionthat
made heruncomfortable.
Neil Parille(2004) has suggestedsome possible reasons forthe
discomfort.
and
First, evolution is generallyseen as a deterministic
free
.
hostile
to
will.
ultimately
[. .]
Second, if biologicalevolutionis true,then manyareas of
philosophymightneed to be reexamined.For example,how
can man have a qualitatively
different
value fromanimalsif
[he] is everybit [as much]a partof natureas animals?[. . .]
The relationshipbetween the brain and thoughtbecomes
more problematicin a Darwinianuniverse.[. . .] In what
sense can humannaturebe takenas fundamental
to morality
ifman is exclusively
partof thematerialwor[ld]?[. . .]
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 153
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
of creatinga biologicalor
Third,Rand mayhave been fearful
secular equivalentto originalsin. Rand's opposition to
originalsin is well known,but heroppositionto originalsin
would apply to any argumentthat proposes a biological
weaknessin man'swill. A fullrecognition
of man's biological
and psychologicaldrivesmightlead to a pessimisticview of
human nature. Indeed, manyscholarshave see[n] parallels
between originalsin and Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic
doctrines.[. . .]
Fourth,it is also possible thatRand mayhave believedthat
biological evolution did not present any problems for
in
buthoped thatfollowersmoreknowledgeable
Objectivism,
biologywould resolvewhatevertensionsexist.
PeikofPsfollowershave littlepatiencewithanyeffortto explain
Rand's ambivalence. In an online essay,Don Watkins46dismissed
Parille's argumentthat Rand mighthave suspected a connection
betweenevolutionary
theories,Freud'sconceptionof darkinstinctual
and thedoctrineof originalsin: "This
impulsesto sex and aggression,
is just a joke. I'm sureof it." Watkinsindignantly
rejectedParille's
general thesis that Rand found evolutionaryideas worrisome,on
account of theirpotentialrelationswith instincts,determinism,
or
with
sin.
Watkins
"was
not
'concerned'
"Rand,"
thundered,
original
butreality,
withthefactsas shewas able to identify
them.To
anything
claimotherwiseis to labelRanddishonestand herphilosophya fraud."
Watkinsdenounced"theunstated(and unjustified)
premisethatRand
was irrational."47
- merelythat
Parillewas not suggesting
thatRand was irrational
she could have been workingfromassumptionsabout evolutionthat
led herto believethatevolutionary
withkey
ideascould be inconsistent
Watkins,on theotherhand,appearsto have
partsof herphilosophy.48
- which,to him,meantthat
rational
presumedthatRandwas perfectly
she neverworked fromassumptions,and would underno circumstanceshave stuckwithan erroneousassumption.
Watkinsat least creditedParille'sargumentswithneedingsome
kindof rebuttal.A second Peikovian,Diana Hsieh,thensteppedin,
calledfor,becausewhatWatkins
contendingthatnone was genuinely
154
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
a seriesof arbitrary
assertions.
had been doingwas redeeming
of an arbitrary
A "charityrefutation"
is a refutation
claim,
offeredin generouskindnessto thepoor souls possiblytaken
in byepistem logicalhucksters.(The termis not myinvention;I've heardthatit tracesback to AynRand.49)
Consider,forexample,theObjectivistarguments
againstGod
as thecreatorof theuniverse.Because thetheistcan citeno
So theatheist
genuineevidenceforit,the claim is arbitrary.
has no obligationto refuteit. Rather,the epistemologica!
withthetheist.[. . .]
burdenrestsentirely
Don Watkinsoffersmorethana fewcharity
Unsurprisingly,
in hisdissectionof Neil Parille'sarticle"AynRand
refutations
I'm quiteblownaway
and Evolution." In readingthatarticle,
that
the
fact
Neil
never
[Parille]
by
actuallyconsidersAyn
Rand'sown perfectly
reasonableexplanationforherhesitancy
about the theoryof evolution,namelyinadequate study.
Instead,he engagesin baseless speculationsabout the supposed implicationsof evolutionshe wished to avoid, e.g.,
and originalsin. The
instinctualknowledge,determinism,
premiseof thewholediscussionis thatAynRand
underlying
was not an honest intellectual.Thas why we need not
consider the possibilitythat she accuratelyreportedthe
reasonsforherhesitancy
or thatshegroundedherphilosophic
views in observed fact ratherthan desired conclusions.
as appliedtoAyn Rand,that'sa disturbingly
false
Particularly
premise. (2005,myitalics)
thosewho invokethedoctrineagainstcriticsof Randdo
Typically,
not takeits detailsseriously.Valliantat leastgiveslip serviceto the
Peikoviandifferentiation
betweena falseassertion,whichcontradicts
knownfacts,and an arbitrary
no known
assertion,whichcontradicts
factsbecause it has no relationto any possible evidence. But even
Valliant,as we saw, does not consistentlymaintainthat the same
propositioncan be assertedarbitrarily
by one person and trulyby
another. Nor does he act as though"the arbitrary"
is impossibleto
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 155
Docirne
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
it would be remarkably
sillyto claim that "the
process cognitively;
statements
Brandens'"objectionable
regardingRand's characterand
or that
actionswere contextlessand bereftof positionin a hierarchy,
theycould bringnothingbut Peikovianparalysisupon any rational
that
mind.Hsieh opinesthatParille'sclaimsdidn'tneedtherefutations
Watkinsprovided,but attachesnone of the supposed distinguishing
to them. Far frombrandingParille'sstatements
marksof thearbitrary
she
thattheyareallmeaningless,
witha thirdtruthvalue,or insinuating
Rand.
about
a
false
him
with
premise
merelycharges
accepting
which
failsto notethat,alongsidecharity
Hsieh further
refutations,
one Needn't provide, there are what we mightcall sanctioning
whichone Mustn't. If he was genuinely
refutations,
contendingwith
which of these moral imperativeswas bindingon
the arbitrary,
- and how would anyonedecide? What's more,ifWatkins
Watkins
aboutFreud,
of Parille'sstatements
refutation
a charity
was performing
were
statements
the
same
it
that
follows
and
evolution,
originalsin,
endowed
Watkins
false
when
but
when
asserted
by Parille,
arbitrary
holds
them.And thisasymmetry
themwitha contextand thenrefuted
even thoughParillehad done some scholarshipon Freud,evolution,
to
and originalsin,whileWatkinshad done absolutelynone,preferring
deridewithoutargumentthescholarshipof others!
of PeikofPs
Finally,one is leftin thedarkabout the applicability
found
Rand
that
Parille's
Does
suggestion
remainingjudgments.
his graspof objectivity?Does it
evolutionvaguelyworrisomenullify
entrenchinnerchaos in himforlife? Is itbrazen? Is iton a par with
believingthathis livingroom teemswithimps and succubi? Has he
dumberthana grayparrot?
made himselfsubstantially
instantly
assertionare
The deficienciesof the doctrineof the arbitrary
into
Its
enlistment
apparentfromPeikofPspresentation.
excruciatingly
Rand
of Ayn
merely
apologeticsforthemoraland epistemicperfection
can'tproperlybe calledan
The enlistment
itsnonobjectivity.
confirms
abuse; thereis no wayto ascertainthecorrectuse fora doctrineso illinconsistent.Had thedoctrinebeen suitedto
definedand internally
even-handedapplication,thosewho insiston themoraland epistemic
perfectionof Rand, regardlessof the availableevidence,would long
sincehave been enteredon therollof "apostlesof thearbitrary."
156
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
Conclusion
We are in a positionnow to addressthe questions raisedat the
beginningof thisarticle.
Does an epistemologythatrespectsthe factsof human mental
No. Such fallaciousor
requirea notionof thearbitrary?
functioning
selfreferential
activities
as
irrational
inconsistency,
protectivebelting,
and grandor pettymystificaviolationsof theonus of proofprinciple,
tion,are alreadycoveredbyotherepistem logicalnorms. Thereis no
to shun"thearbitrary."
Some criteria
need fora generalizedinjunction
- not to haul it
of a hypothesis
are needed forthe initialplausibility
in
but to aid investigators
bodilyout of the chasm of arbitrariness,
it
is
worth
whether
testing.
deciding
assertionclear? No. Peikoff
Is Peikoffsnotionof an arbitrary
can be straightforwardly
writesas thougharbitrariness
judgedby any
rationalperson,but he is expectingjudgmentsof lackof evidenceto
be made in theabsenceof clearrulesof evidence. Indeed,becausethe
whenput forthbyone personand
same propositioncan be arbitrary
will
trueor falsewhenput forthbyanother,judgmentsof arbitrariness
the
available
to
the
of
elaborate
assessments
person
knowledge
require
responsibility,
makingtheassertion,hisor hersenseof epistemologica!
etc. Peikoffcan't even decide whetherputtingforwardan arbitrary
assertionis an error.
Does theconcepthave thescope of applicationthatPeikoffstakes
out forit? No. He makesclaimsforits fundamentalitythatare hard
to square with the restof Objectivistepistemology.He repeatedly
in places where others would find implausible
spies arbitrariness
or just plain false
hypotheses,fallaciousarguments,mystification,
conclusions.As we saw fromhis own variablereactionsto assertions
about "past lives," sometimeshe spies arbitrariness
(1987b; 1993;
he
has
on
other
falsehood
occasions,
where,
(1989a).
1997)
spied
Peikoffmanagesto spy
When it comes to theology,or gremlinology,
of metaphysical
axioms(1993,Ch. 1) and arbitraribothcontradictions
.
ness (Ch. 5) inthesamebook
assertionsall be handledas Peikoffprescribes?
Should arbitrary
Peikoffcan't makeup his own mindhow theyshouldbe handled. Is
no one obliged to respond to an arbitrary
assertion,or is everyone
to redeeman arbitrary
assertion,or
obligednot to? Is it worthwhile
- or notpossible,becausegenuinearbitrariness
notworthwhile
induces
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 157
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
paralysisin everyrationalmind?
Are the argumentsforthe doctrinesound? Some of the most
assertion
claims,e.g.,equatinga personwho makesan arbitrary
striking
witha parrotmimicking
thesounds of humanlanguage,areadvanced
withoutargumentof anykindand have no apparentfunctionexcept
to vilify.The thesisthat"arbitrary"
is a thirdtruthvalueis backedby
claimsto theeffectthatarbitrary
assertionslackcontextor a place in
the hierarchy. But Peikoffcomes up with no further
supportfor
the
that
of
the
contextlessness,
except
allegation
promoters
arbitrary
- and his own mystifying
will resortto mystification
invocationof
Peikovianparalysis.Meanwhile,Peikoffhasn'tdevelopedhis notion
of hierarchy
forpropositionsnearlywellenoughto justify
theweight
he pileson it. Finally,theallegationthatarbitrary
assertionsarealways
in theknowledgethattheyarearbitrary
putforward
apparently
requires
no specific evidence about motives. Far too often in Peikoffs
presentation,
moralizinginvectivesimplytakestheplace of objective
assessment.The same tendencyis on displaywhenPeikovianslaythe
chargeof arbitrariness
againstthose who question some aspect of
Rand's characteror one of herstatedreasonsfora decision.
The implicationsfor Peikoffs standingas a philosopherare
distinctly
negative. If Peikoffliftedthe core idea withoutattribution
fromBranden's(1967) lectures,
as he appearsto havedone,he is guilty
of intellectual
dishonesty.His refusalto creditBranden's(1963) prior
publicationon the subject is, in any event,unscholarly. He has
elaboratedthedoctrinesignificantly;
however,thebestthatcan be said
about Peikoffsown contributions
is thathe has performed
betteron
other
occasions.
many
Because Rand acceptedPeikoffsstatementsabout arbitrariness
when she endorsed his 1976 lectures,a further
implicationis that
in
everything his account (except the reifying
generics,the overt
dismissalof learningfrommistakes,and the invocationof Peikovian
paralysis)has to be counted as part of closed-systemObjectivism,
Objectivismsimplyequatedwith"thephilosophyof AynRand."
This isn'tgoingto do theclosed-system
Objectivistanyfavors.He
or she is foreversaddledwitha badlyargued,internally
inconsistent
doctrinethatis impossibleto applybecause it embracescontradictory
to corrector
advocatesare not permitted
imperatives.Closed-system
improveObjectivistepistemology. Consequently,theymust either
158
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
accept everyjot and tittleof the Peikoviandoctrineof the arbitrary

assertion(1976 edition),or hittheroad out of Rand-land.
Some, thoughnot all, of the doctrine'stroublesstem fromthe
of Rand's epistemology.The closed-system
advocate
incompleteness
notes foran Objectivisttheoryof
willhave to hold on to promissory
propositions,an accountof inductiveproofforpropositions,and an
entirephilosophyof science. Never paid offduringRand's lifetime,
byanyoneelse.
theycan neverbe fulfilled
on
the
other
hand, Objectivismis understoodas an open
If,
of
need a replacesystemcapable revision,itsadvocateswillurgently
mentforthe doctrine. At the veryleast,thiswillmean trainingthe
on a shadowycornerof theObjectivistcorpusand clearing
floodlights
out thejunkthathas been allowedto accumulatethere.If thedoctrine
assertionjust misappliesthe deeper principlesof
of the arbitrary
Objectivistepistemologyin the serviceof ill-conceivedmoral judgments,only local correctionswill be needed. If the doctrineis
of underlying
Parmenideantendenciesin the
genuinelysymptomatic
in
or
its
foundationalism
moregenerally,
the
philosophy, inadequacies
will
have
to
become
work
repair
global.
Acknowledgments
ThankstoDouglasRasmussen,
William
Roderick
Bissell,
Dwyer,
Roger
Long,
Stuart
andChris
Matthew
Sciabarra
Michael
forcomments
draft
ona previous
Kelly,
Notes
1. Theevolution
willbeaddressed
ofthedoctrine
inthesecond-to-last
section
ofthisarticle.
2. Peikoff
maintain
thatObjectivism
is "the
(1989;1993)andhisfollowers
ofAynRand,"
whosecontents
consist
ofwhat
Randpublished
exclusively
philosophy
herlifetime,
under
hersupervision.
pluswhatothers
published
during
Consequently
toordeletion
from
thisclosedsystem
ofideasconstitutes
a wholesale
anyaddition
- oritsreplacement
ofObjectivism
different
byanentirely
rejection
philosophy.
aretotheMeridian
3. Allpagereferences
in1993.
edition,
paperback
published
4. Mostofthematerial
inOPAR,including
thediscussion
ofarbitrary
assertions,
derived
isproximately
from
a series
of12lectures
that
Peikoff
the
gavein1976,under
tide"ThePhilosophy
ofObjectivism."
these
lectures
havebeeneither
for
Although
rent
orforsaleinsomeaudiorecording
medium
sincethey
werefirst
andcan
given,
beobtained
onCDs today,
havenever
beentranscribed
andpublished
as a set.
they
ItisOPAR,andnotthelecture
thatPeikoff
intended
forgeneral
distribution.
series,
I willrespect
andtakethebookastheprimary
hispriorities
for
source
Consequendy,
The1976lectures
willgetsomeattention,
hisaccount.
whenwetrace
the
however,
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 159
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
s chapter
on
A preliminary
version
oftwosections
ofPeikoff
ofthedoctrine.
history
from
thearticle
intheObjectivist
Reason
waspublished
Forum;
(1987a;1987b)differs
A post-OPAR
details.
ofOPAR(159-71)onlyinminor
thecorresponding
sections
about"the
Induction
lecture
series,
1997),goesintodetail
(Peikoff
Objectivism
through
I
relevant
material
Lecture
11.
will
some
the
sole
of
which
is
quote
arbitrary,"
topic
work.
must
thislecture,
butagain,
from
priority
gotopublished
a substanInduction
5. In Objectivism
, Lecture
11,Peikoff
(1997)employs
through
it
ofcondemning
Instead
"thearbitrary."
forintroducing
tially
procedure
improved
hestarts
of"emotionalism,"
inadvance
ofdescribing
it,asanunfiltered
by
expression
hasbeenprovided,
withthoseforwhich
someproof
assertions
arbitrary
contrasting
three
thenotion
thendevelops
byworking
examples.
through
lineofresponse
theasserter
s first
wasinitially
6. Whenthispassage
published,
I sayso- period"
to"Why?"
was"Because
1987b,
1).
(Peikoff
not"selfadmits
thatarbitrariness
Peikoff
7. Inhis1997lecture,
is,ingeneral,
infact,
become
outthelackofevidence
evident."
quitechallenging.
may,
Ferreting
insciences,
allPh.D.s,youknow,
"On a strictly
basis,becausethey're
quantitative
to appearlogical,
of thebaseless
there's
rational,
byproponents
[a]majoreffort
On thefaceofit,itmayseem,'God,thisguynotonly
andunanswerable.
scientific,
he'sgotitproved!'Andinthesecases,a greatdealof
hasa basisforhisclaim,
mental
onyourpart,
I repeat,
dealofthought
a great
work,
occasionally
thought,
that
a claim
isbaseless.
It'snotself-evident
that
theclaim
tograsp
isneeded
elaborate,
theguyconveniently
unless
thata claimisbaseless,
isbaseless.Itisnotself-evident
I sayit,'or,'Because
Godtoldme.'Butthey
because
Thisistrue,
stands
upandsays,
of an
thatthearbitrariness
Yetin acknowledging
don'tdo thatin universities."
theneedfora specific
Peikoff
never
assertion
is rarely
obvious,
goeson toadmit
true.
assertion
toprovethat
that
wouldberequired
oftheevidence
understanding
theworth
of
broadtendency;
isanextremely
constructivism
8. Epistemological
tobe,how
ittakes
onwhat
ofknowledge
a constructivist
knowledge
theory
depends
is
andhowwhathasbeenconstructed
tobe constructed,
itconsiders
knowledge
that
embrace
varieties
of
constructivism
there
are
function.
So
to
supposed
orKenneth
Derrida's
deconstructionism,
Gergen's
Jacques
subjectivity
outright
(e.g.,
to
their
fail
to
deliver
on
Others
rather
socialconstructionism).
aspirations
patendy
ofthe
Kant'sdoctrine
is thecasewithImmanuel
(as,itcanbe argued,
objectivity
ButI takesuchviews
oftheunderstanding").
andthe"categories
"forms
ofintuition"
- whenthey
with.It
hadonetobegin
mission
intheir
tohavefailed
epistemological
such
toobjectivity,
commitment
that
make
a credible
ofconstructivism
isthevarieties
orJean
ofpragmatism,
Peirce's
asCharles
(1976)genetic
epistemology,
variety
Piaget's
that
ofscience,
rationalist
orKarlPopper's
something
bring
philosophy
(1965)critical
ofarbitrariness.
valuable
tobearonthequestion
whatHayek
with
havea wholelotincommon
Noneofthese
views,
bytheway,
orpolitical
is as moreofanethical
constructivism
calledconstructivism.
Hayekian
thanan epistemological
1980). Itsunderlying
pointofview(Diamond
tendency
andsocialsystems;
ofmoral
human
istotheconscious
commitment
principles
design
andsocialengineering
tomoral
theepistemological
toHayek,
counterpart
according
So byHayek's
stated
from
deduction
is rationalistic
criterion,
premises.
explicitly
as a sortof
was a constructivist;
Descartes
Popperwas not. Yet Descartes,
outofanything
thatknowledge
anda denier
foundationalist
else,wasnota
emerges
160
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
ofAyn RandStudies
was.
inthesenseemployed
constructivist
here;Popper
inhis1976
ofperception
wassketched
9. TheObjectivist
byPeikoff
theory
inmuchgreater
anddeveloped
lectures
depthbyKelley(1986). The Objectivist
insomedepth
waspresented
neither
ofconcepts
byRand(1990);subsequently
theory
toit.
haveaddedanything
norhisfollowers
Peikoff
in herown
10. Couldit be becauseRanddidn'tuse theword"arbitrary"
thedoctrine's
I willreturn
tothisissuewhenI address
pedigree.
presentation?
istaken
from
Peikoff
s 1976series
11.Theentry
on"Validation
oflectures
on
andanswer
A statement
ThePhilosophy
about
,Lecture
3,question
period.
ofObjectivism,
thatI haven't
"Proof"
1988,387)- so similar
quotedit- comesfrom
(Binswanger
1 ofPeikoff
onlogic.To avoidconfusion,
itshould
benoted
Lecture
s 1974series
thelate1960s,ifnotlater,
made
no
thatupthrough
distinction
Objectivist
writings
axioms
weremerely
andvalidation:
saidnottoneedproof
because
between
proof
in
at
effort
Rand
are
1990,
55).
they presupposedany
proof
(e.g.,
hadinmind
isnotclear.A decadeafter
12.Which
bookPeikoff
these
lectures,
hisassociate
DavidHarriman
hehasproduced
no bookon induction,
is
although
atworkonone.Harriman
topublish
from
(e.g.,2008)hasbegun
chapters
presently
theopusinquestion;
noneso farhastaken
upthetopicofPeikovian
paralysis.
13. In thefirst
of OPAR,Peikoff
forthe
chapter
appearsto be pressing
inYahweh-God-Allah,
thatpropositions
belief
thestandard
conclusion
expressing
are false. "Theideaof the'supernatural'
monotheistic
is an assaulton
deity,
It is a contradiction
manknowsaboutreality.
ofevery
essential
ofa
everything
Itrepresents
a rejection
ofthebasicaxioms
rational
ofphilosophy
..
metaphysics.
suchdivine
attributes
as world
(1993,31). After
reviewing
creating,
omnipotence,
Peikoff
andmiracle
concludes:
offered
infinity,
"Every
commonly
working,
argument
of theaxiomatic
forthenotionof God leadsto a contradiction
of
concepts
thenotion
withthefacts
Atevery
clashes
ofreality
andwiththe
point,
philosophy.
ofthought"
todefine
the
ordefend
(32).Morebroadly,
"Any
attempt
preconditions
infallacies"
must
words:Godisnot
necessarily
(32). Inother
collapse
supernatural
thesortofbeingthatcouldexist;
God'sattributes
arenotattributes
thatanyentity
soaffirmative
claims
aboutGodareallfalse.
couldpossess;
of Objectivism
Two recent
2007;Toner2007)
bytheists
(Parrish
critiques
theviewthat
attribute
toPeikoff
claims
aboutGodareincoherent
Reed(2008)has
countered
with
a casethat
treats
claims
about
Godasarbitrary
rather
than
Objectivism
with
incoherent.
Reed'scaseisperfectly
consistent
whatPeikoff
5 of
saysinChapter
1.
withChapter
tosquare
OPAR- buttough
14.Constructing
a counterargument
isprecisely
what
Peikoff
seems
tobedoing
inthefirst
ofOPAR,where
hecontends
that
theexistence
ofanysupernatural
chapter
wouldcontradict
oneormoreofthemetaphysical
axioms
ofObjectivism
(see
being
"doesnotaccept
Godoranyvariant
note13above).Objectivism
ofthesupernatural.
Wearea-theist,
as wellas a-devilist,
a-demonist,
(1993,32). In their
a-gremlinist"
andTonerhavepointed
rebuttals
toReed(2008),bothParrish
tostatements
that
inChapter
1asevidence
Peikoff
makes
that
Peikoff
doesnotconsistently
treat
"Godtalk"asarbitrary..
15. Ina book-length
ofRandpublished
after
herdeath,
critique
GregNyquist
thatrecent
militate
(2001)hasindeed
byevolutionary
argued
findings
psychologists
ofinnate
fortheexistence
ofsomeforms
andsomekinds
in
ofinstincts
knowledge
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 16 1
Doctrine
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
human
bothRand's
ofhuman
Therefore,
Nyquist
conception
thinking
beings.
argues,
alsocites
andherarguments
forherethicsdependon falsepremises.
Nyquist
inopposition
toRand'sviewoffree
asheconstrues
it,
will,
evolutionary
psychology
ofrejecting
free
willentirely.
hestopsshort
though
andcertainty
16.Adhering
s criteria
forpossibility,
toPeikoff
(1993,
probability,
somevariety
ofevolutionary
to be
theory
176-79),Randshouldhaveconsidered
ofspecies,
and"a
there
isnootherscientific
oftheorigin
because
theory
probable,
thetruth
of
lot"ofreliable
evidence
it. (Sheshould
nothaveconsidered
supports
thatallof the
to be certain,
becauseshewasnotconvinced
evolutionary
theory
herfailure
tojudgeevolutionavailable
evidence
standards
it.)ByPeikovian
supports
- andis
trueis aninstance
ofagnosticism
as probably
(1993,169-71)
arytheory
arecowards
or
Peikoff
informs
us thatallagnostics
therefore
irrational.
Further,
thedcision
that
nihilists.
Coulditbetheapparent
prompted
lapseintoagnosticism
theessayafter
Ransdeath?
nottoanthologize
herrevisions
tohaveanyphilosophi17.Unless
Randgenuinely
didnotconsider
couldneverhaveundergone
cal import,
becauseherphilosophy
anyalternation,
Inthat
ithadchanged.
that
oftheevidence
case,shewouldnot
regardless
indicating
havebeenlying;
shewouldhavebeeninthegripofa delusional
system.
toa question
about
18. Inoneofherepistemology
Randresponded
workshops,
and
to ruleoutallalternatives
theamount
andnature
oftheevidence
necessary
induction.
"Yes.
That's
the
of
a
scientific
question
conclusively
hypothesis:
big
prove
- because(a) I haven't
on thatsubject
worked
WhichI couldn't
beginto discuss
scientist
toevenbegin
toformulate
it,and(b)itwouldtakeanaccomplished
enough
inthatfield"
ina givenfieldtoillustrate
thewholeprocess
(1990,303-04;editor's
italics).
In
within
on Objectivism.
himself
histreatise
19. Peikoff
further
contradicts
thatassertions
aboutthesuper1 ofOPAR,on "Reality,"
Peikoff
claims
Chapter
contradict
theaxiomsof
claimsaboutGod and gremlins,
natural,
including
arefalse.ButinChapter
that
suchassertions
which
wouldimply
5,on
Objectivism,
of
become
aboutGodandgremlins
thesameassertions
"Reason,"
examples
prime
in their
"thearbitrary."
Parrish
(2008)andToner(2008)notethiscontradiction
toReed(2008).
responses
s studies
IrenePepperberg
20. However,
gray
(e.g.,2001)ofAlex,anAtncan
with
ina human
andphrases
cansaywords
that
someparrots
language
parrot,
suggest
that
Peikoff
exceedanything
Ifso,their
abilities
massively
understanding.
cognitive
ofthem.
haveexpected
might
Peikoff
aboutempty
werepursued,
s worries
21. Iftheir
symbols
implications
of
At least,a number
to foundationalism.
hiscommitment
undermine
might
andpsychologists
1993;Harnad
1990)havesuggested
(suchasBickhard
philosophers
thatthey
would.
Peikoff
assertions
22.Theredemption
forformerly
arbitrary
distinguishes
policy
another
inthepositivist
tradition
from
1952)whorailagainst
Ayer
(e.g.,
philosophers
Some
that
areworsethanfalse:"themetaphysical."
domain
ofassertions
purported
tothrow
outas arbitrary
thatPeikoff
wishes
ofthepropositions
(e.g.,propositions
areequally
thelogical
aboutGod,orother
eagerto
positiviste
supernatural
beings)
Forthe
differences.
twoimportant
Thereare,however,
dismiss
as metaphysical.
that
cannot
be
are
those
verified,
empirically
positivists,
metaphysical
propositions
162
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
ofAyn RandStudies
arethoseforwhich
assertions
no evidence
hasbeen
whereas
forPeikoff,
arbitrary
a claimaboutlifeon otherplanets
hasno
provided.Hence,forthepositivists,
if
but
it
could
be
verified
human
or
for
travelers
automated
evidence
it,
currently
going
outside
oursolarsystem,
so itisnotmetaphysical.
weretoreachplanets
spaceships
evidence
there
is no current
fororagainst
theclaim,
so itis arbitrary
ForPeikoff,
becausethelogical
positivists
equatethe
(Long2000,118n. 11). Butprecisely
withthat
which
cannot
beverified,
there
isnoescapefrom
thatstatus.
metaphysical
willeverliberate
Oncemetaphysical
a
always
theybelieve,
metaphysical;
nothing,
andnonsense.
from
that
realm
ofbogosity
Contrariwise
thePeikovians
proposition
- perhaps
thatfuture
evidence
evenevidence
available
believe
toanother
presently
can
a
from
therealm
ofthearbitrary.
person springproposition
23. Peikoff
hasrepeatedly
denounced
GdePs
theorem.
Inhis
incompleteness
hepronounces
lecture
ontheDIM Hypothesis,
thetheorem
mostrecent
an
series,
In
his
The
instance
ofD2 (orhopeless
book
Ominous
Parallels,
cognitive
disintegration).
hedeclared:"Eventheprofessional
theonetime
ofthe
mathematicians,
guardians
andoflogical
citadel
ofcertainty
thehangofthemodern
consistency,
caught
spirit
In 1931,they
wereapprised
ofthelatest
Viennese
inthefield,
Kurt
development
to whichlogicalconsistency
GdePsincompleteness
theorem,
according
(and
theattribute
that
therefore
isprecisely
nosystems
ofmathematics
canever
certainty)
claim
Godeiconcluded
that
topossess"
a system
offormal
(1982,
215).Infact,
logic
toinclude
withenough
finite
methods
ofproof,
arithmetic,
elementary
power
using
beincomplete
musteither
truth
that
(i.e.,unabletoproveatleastonemathematical
itsscope)orinconsistent
lieswithin
has
(NagelandNewman
1958).SincePeikoff
with
rendered
suchsheer
areweentided
GdePsconclusion
toinfer
that
inaccuracy,
whenever
herefers
totheincompleteness
theorem
heisdoing
sowithout
understandaboutitarearbitrary?
ing,hencehisassertions
24. In his 1997lectures,
Peikoff
between
thecaseinwhicha
distinguishes
inpastlivesrespects
believer
defensible
of"life"
definitions
and"mind"
and
rationally
thecaseinwhich
shedoesnot "IfShirley
"soul"andso on,versus
MacLaine
[. . .]
hadsaidthefollowing
itwouldhavebeenOK. Ifshehadsaid
aboutherpastlives,
'Allavailable
a speech
tothis
effect*
rational
evidence
isadmissible,
itcounts.
I mean
I
define
it
as
scientists
as
mean
"soul"
what
by"life"
exacdy
today.
by
AynRand
just
a wholecurrent
context
ofknowledge,
weknow
says.I accept
including
everything
abouttheconsciousness'
onthebrain.AndI still
dependence
saythatmypastlives
influence
behavior.'
Thenherstatement
wouldnotbe detached
from
mycurrent
available
eventhough
shehasstated
Inthatcase,wecould,
noneherself.
evidence,
ifwewanted,
relate
herstatement
ourselves
towhat
wealready
that
know,
easily
grasp
isa contradiction,
andpronounce
herstatement
false.Thatiscompletely
different
from
theepistemological
situation
thatI gaveyou[. . .],whenShirley
MacLaine's
statement
amounted
andthrow
outsomeorallofourcurrent
rational
to,Itranscend
andcontext'"
definitions
iftheclaimant
resorts
to
(Lecture
11). In otherwords,
when
herclaims
aboutpastlivesarearbitrary;
ifshedoesnot
mystification
challenged,
resort
tomystification,
thevery
sameclaims
arefalse.
Wouldn't
itthenfollow
that
a
rational
redeems
claims
aboutpastlivesandconverts
them
intofalse
person
arbitrary
andrejecting
ones,simply
bycatching
anymystification?
25. Nor,presumably,
couldepistemology
benefit
from
what's
exposing
wrong
withthedoctrine
ofthearbitrary
assertion.
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 163
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
26. Mystification
asa tactic
ofargument
isdifferent
asa supposed
from
mystism
basedon
is often
usedtoprotect
claims
mystification
pathto knowledge,
though
which
either
or
faith.
We
further
contrast
mysticism
may
mystification, alleges
grand
theinadequacy
of merehumaninstruments
of knowing
to comprehend
some
withpetty
Peikoff
s
orobscurum
mystification,
perobscurius.
"special"
phenomenon,
notionof cognitive
(see above)
(1997)ownappealto an unexplicated
paralysis
Itshoresup theobscure
claims
aboutthe
as petty
(various
mystification:
qualifies
withthemoreobscure
abouta
of"thearbitrary'')
(claims
extraordinary
properties
kind
ofcognitive
that
descends
ontheknower
assoonasarbitrariness
special
paralysis
is
is recognized).
noexplication
ofitsown,thepurported
paralysis
Though
given
are
to lendsupport
declarations
thatarbitrary
assertions
to Peikoffs
expected
orcontradicted
ofbeing
unbeatable,
contexdess,
hierarchically
incapable
supported
andineligible
forany"cognitive
verdict"
byevidence,
then
27.I exclude
thecaseinwhich
thegremlinologist
that
asserts
exist,
gremlins
istheslightest
on
that
elseintheuniverse
bitdifferent
ontodeny
goesright
anything
neither
detectable
account
ofgremlins
around.Ifthegremlinologist
provides
being
norreasons
forpreferring
ofgremlins
explanagremlinological
signs
beingaround,
hisassertion
tionsof known
overnon-gremlinological
explanations,
phenomena
in sucha caseis notthat
Butrational
conclusion
shouldnotbe takenseriously.
"Gremlins
exist"
isarbitrary;
it'sthattheassertion
isfalse.
inwhere
Peikort
draws
back.
28. bomeinRand-land
havestepped
eventually
Forinstance:
ofanyarguments
withfalse
Theyflatly
denythevalidity
premises.
I. .,"real."
inaccord
with
"True"means
reality,
toreality,
i..,"unreal."
"False"means
[.. .]
contrary
from
doesone"derive"
How,pray,
unreality?
anything
don'tariseina vacuum,
|T]helawsoflogic,
reasoning,
including
syllogistic
offacts.
universe
ofPlatonic
norinhabit
someabstract
Forms,
independent
that
havebeendrawn
from
areinferences
Eventhelawsoflogicthemselves
inferences
Thusthe"truth"
oflogical
observations
[i.e.,validity]
ofreality.
their
direct
butfrom
their
internal
formalistic
arises
notfrom
"coherence,"
facts
toobservable
ofreality.
"correspondence"
is to arguethatthe"true"and the"real"are
To suggest
otherwise,
unrelated.
completely
had
with
the"syllogism."
what's
Yet. . . that's
[Theexample
exactly
wrong
Allbirds
are
Allfrogs
arebirds;
anda trueconclusion:
twofalsepremises
Itsmajorandminor
Allfrogs
areamphibians.]
Therefore,
amphibians;
- amount
- "Allfrogs
and"Allbirds
areamphibians"
arebirds,"
premises
in
unconnected
to
tonothing
morethanmeaningless
anything
gibberish,
mean
do
not
are
not
intelligible
they
anything
reality.
They
"premises";
atall.
which
means:they
do notmeananything
164
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
So [...]
*Howcananyconclusion
bedrawn
from
ofmeaningless
strings
gibberish?
* Ifnot,howcansucha conclusion
bevalidated
as"true"?
* Iflogicitself
infactual
is nottobe rooted
howcanoneeven
reality,
a "true"
orconclusion
from
a "false"
one?(Bidinotto
premise
distinguish
2005)
To takethesefurther
assertions
steps,onemustopenly
pronounce
arbitrary
thenassimilate
falsepropositions
to arbitrary
ones. Theverdict
of
meaningless,
follows
from
several
ofPeikoff
sclaims
about
"thearbitrary."
already
meaninglessness
Peikoffs
as notedabove,hastrouble
false
Meanwhile,
Parmenideanism,
handling
because
ofitsstark
between
towhatexists
binary
propositions,
opposition
referring
andtruly)
andreferring
tononexistence
andnon-truly).
(meaningfully
(meaninglessly
Itishardtobelieve,
that
Randwould
everhaveratified
therejection
ofvalid
however,
from
falsepremises.
Shehadtoomuchregard
forlogic,
nottomention
arguments
toomuchfondness
forreductio
adabsurdum.
29. '"Darwin's
to a specialscience,
notto
theory,
AynRandheld,pertains
assuch,therefore,
takes
noposition
inregard
toit"(Peikoff
philosophy.
Philosophy
is notfully
inhisexclusion,
consistent
1993,476,Ch.11n. 19). Peikoff
however;
inOPARhefavorably
elsewhere
a bookbyhis
quotes(191;468,Ch.6 n.4) from
associate
TheBiological
Basis
Harry
Binswangen
Binswangens
monograph,
ofTeleological
within
anexplicidy
neo-Darwinian
framework.
, operates
Concepts
evolutionary
30. In twobooksontheObjectivist
in2000and2006,Tara
ethics,
published
Smith
muchas Randdid- nontechnically.
uses"arbitrary"
familiar
surely
Though
withthePeikovian
Smith
never
citesitoralludes
toitineither
book.She
doctrine,
Peikoffs
definition
of"arbitrary"
infavor
ofonetaken
from
bypasses
Oxford
English
ofclaims
about
intrinsic
shemisses
2000,108).Ina discussion
Dictionary
(Smith
value,
a cueforpronouncing
them
couldexist
without
our
arbitrary.
"Obviously,
something
current
awareness
ofanyevidence
forit.Butwhatadvocates
ofintrinsic
valueclaim
isnotthat
intrinsic
valuemight
claim
that
itdoes"(2000,
would
exist;
they
69).Peikoff
notaccept
Smith's
formulation
because
onhisviewpositive
evidence
must
be
here,
forthemere
thatthere
areintrinsic
values.
on Peikoffs
Indeed,
presented
possibility
an assertion
terms
aboutintrinsic
valuemadebya philosopher
whoprovided
no
evidence
foritwouldremain
even
existence
positive
arbitrary
ifevidence
forthe
ofintrinsic
value
waseventually
byothers.
produced
31. Thosenotinstructed
inthefeuds
andschisms
that
haveperiodically
roiled
Rand-land
wouldneversuspectthatanything
was missing
fromtheLexicon.
other
than
MissRandisincluded
says:"Material
Binswanger
byauthors
misleadingly
onlyifshehadgivenitanexplicit
[. . .] orifitwasoriginally
publicendorsement
under
hereditorship
inTheObjectivist
TheObjectivism
orTheAyn
Newsletter^
published
Letter"
Rand
wassomematerial
inTheObjectivist
(1988,
ix-x).Alsoincluded
published
Forum
while
Randwasstill
alive.In fact,
theonlyother
contributors
whosematerial
wasactually
wereAlanGreenspan,
Edwin
A.Locke,
SusanLudel,
excerpted
George
andHarryBinswanger
Reisman,
Peikoff,
MaryAnnSures,Leonard
(Lockeand
whoneverwroteforRand'sownperiodicals,
wereincluded
on the
Binswanger,
of theirparticipation
in TheObjectivist
The muchlonger
listof
strength
Forum).
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 165
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
contributors
whosematerial
wasnotexcerpted
included
AllanBlumenthal,
Joan
Mitchell
EdithEfron,
Robert
Beatrice
Robert
Blumenthal,
Efron,
Hessen,
Hessen,
Barbara
andNathaniel
Branden.
Those
Walsh,
Branden,
KayNolteSmith,
George
inthelatter
hadfallen
outwithRandafter
their
werepublished;
articles
subcategory
intheformer
those
hadnot.
subcategory
32. PeikofPs
entire
of thearbitrary
discussion
carries
published
justtwo
footnotes
istoRand's
definition
oftruth,
from
468,Ch.5,nn.8-9). Thefirst
(1993,
Galsspeech(943inthepaperback
ofAtlasShrugged,
1017inthehardcover).The
attached
toPeikofPs
assertion
that
"thearbitrary
. . . assaults
a man's
second,
cognitive
toa passage
atthevery
endofthesamespeech
faculty"
(1993,166)points
(983inthe
ofAtlasShrugged',
or1069inthehardback).
Itisnotclearwhatpassage
he
paperback
hasinmind.Theonlyuseof"arbitrary"
inthespeech's
final
comes
when
Gait
pages
invokes
"thefearyouacquired
inyour
encounters
withtheincomprehensible,
early
theunpredictable,
thecontradictory,
thearbitrary,
thehidden,
thefaked,
the
irrational
inmen"(982or1068).Asisthecasethroughout
Atlas
notechnical
Shrugged,
meaning
seemsintended.
Does"thearbitrary"
assault
human
faculties
inwaysthat
cognitive
thefaked
ortheincomprehensible
orthecontradictory
do not?
33. Nathaniel
Branden
27July
hasstated
communication,
(personal
2007)that
heactually
introduced
thenotion
ofthearbitrary
assertion
toObjectivism.
34. According
27July
toNathaniel
Branden
communication,
2007),
(personal
theoriginal
forhisconception
ofarbitrary
assertions
washisboyhood
inspiration
with
adults'
statements
aboutGod.
unclear,
experience
contradictory
35. ThebasicPrinciples
that
iscommercially
available
isa retoday
ofObjectivism
lectures
weregiven
in1967.However,
ofBranden's
as they
thecopyright
recording
dateonthelectures
is1960,andI know
ofnoevidence
that
between
these
twodates
Branden
madeanysignificant
3 and4 that
totheportions
ofLectures
changes
pertain
toarbitrary
assertions.
36. Instandard
faith
andmysticism
areequated.Inpoint
Objectivist
parlance,
of fact,manypeoplebelievereligious
on faitheventhough
they
propositions
innomystical
andmayheartily
ofthose
who
personally
practices,
engage
disapprove
do. Forthesakeofargument,
I willstay
with
thefamiliar
Randian
however,
usage.
37. Infact,
somewhowerepresent
atthetime
recall
that
in1966theliveseries
of lectures
on BasicPrinciples
featured
a guestappearance
byPcikoff
ofObjectivism
Lecture
4 on"TheConcept
inanysignificant
ofGod."Didhedepart
way
presenting
from
Nathaniel
Branden's
text?
existing
38.Theselectures
havebeenoutofcirculation
formany
toBill
Mythanks
years.
whotookthecourse
atthetime,
forchecking
hisnotesonLecture
9,which
Dwyer,
abouttruth
values
wordforword.
quotethepassage
39.A familiar
when
noteissounded
Efron
ridicules
thecounterargument
(made
areinhibited
inthepresence
that
ESP powers
ofa skeptical
bysomeESP advocates)
- evenofa computer
human
A fewgoso farasto
observer
thematerials.
presenting
maintain
thatinhibition
under
these
circumstances
isa keyproperty
ofESP. "Such
anargument
tomaintaining
thatanimportant
ofgremlins
is
is equivalent
property
their
thepink
to avoiddetection"
to BillDwyer,
(1967,11). According
capacity
wasalsousedinPeikofPs
lectures
on "Objectivism's
of
Theory
elephant
example
Knowledge."
40. Nathaniel
Branden
14September
communication,
2007)saysthat
(personal
166
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
in hislectures,
andin histhinking
aboutthesubject,
he neverwentbeyond
his
that
anarbitrary
assertion
should
betreated
asifnothing
formulation
hasbeensaid.
41. Thiswayofputting
cannot
be quiteright,
forPeikoff
hasalready
things
declared
that
assertions
havenocognitive
context
InOPAR,he
whatsoever.
arbitrary
willsaythatredemption
assertion
a cognitive
context
arbitrary
givestheformerly
where
itpreviously
lacked
one.
42. I amindebted
toEllenStuttle
forthisobservation.
43. Extremely
toa witness
Bidinotto,
(Robert
promptly.
According
personal
15September
first
admitted
thatthere
had
communication,
2007),Peikoff
publicly
beenan affair
attheFordHallForum
on26April1987,during
thequestions
and
answers
hisfirst
of"MyThirty
Yearswith
AynRand"(Peikoff
following
presentation
canbehadfrom
Valliant
407n.42).Peikoff
saidtohis
1989b).Corroboration
(2005,
hadindeed
audience
thatthere
beenanaffair,
andthathiswifeCynthia
hadfound
inwhich
letters
andjournal
entries
Randconfirmed
it.
44. In hisObjectivism
Induction
Peikoff
ofa
lecture,
through
givestheexample
without
thatHarry
evidence,
person
upanypositive
claiming,
anteing
Binswangens
seminar
bachelor
consisted
ofa 3-hour
onHegel'sLogic,
at4 inthe
party
beginning
theoriginal
claimaint
noevidence,
has
morning.
Although
presented
byothers
inquiry
turned
affidavits
several
from
that
werepresent
upsigned
Objectivists
they
declaring
attheevent,
a bunchofthemtrooping
videoshowing
intoBinswangens
security
the
wee
and
so
on.
Does
this
mean
thattheinitial
hours,
apartment
building
during
claimwasn'treally
No. Does itmeanthattheinquiry
thatendedup
arbitrary?
itshould
havetaken
not!"So,what
causestheideathat
place?Absolutely
supporting
anarbitrary
claim?Itisthefailure
inprinciple,
tothink
youcanobjectively
process
thefailure
to insiston inductive
Is thewillingness
to discuss,
generalization.
listen
anexample,
ora chart,
ora sentence,
consider,
to,orallowintoyourthought
Inother
a principle.
thecauseofourdilemma
isanunprincipled
words,
apartfrom
evenif onlyaccepted
of,or indulgence
in,someone's
acceptance
irrationality,
to follow
forfiveminutes
hismental
hypothetically
process.Andofcourse,
you
ifyouuphold
oneinstance
ofunreason,
reason
acrosstheboard
know,
youdestroy
inevery
branch
ofphilosophy"
1997,Lecture
(Peikoff
11).
45.Nathaniel
Branden
wereinitially
'smemoirs
in1989,under
thetitle
published
revised
in1999asMyYears
version
with
Day.A substantially
Judgment
appeared
Rand.Valliant
andmisleadingly
Barbara
Branden's
booktogether
frequendy
lumps
with
weretwomanifestations
as though
ofa single
Nathaniel's,
they
project.
46. The essayappeared
in 2005 on Watkins'
blog<http://www.anger
Theblogis presently
inactive
andtheentries
inaccessible.
managementmu.nu>.
Watkins
isnowanemployee
oftheAynRandInstitute.
47. Ironically,
a strict
ofPeikovian
criteria
toRand's1981statement
application
on evolution
wouldmandate
a judgment
thatRandwas irrational,
becauseshe
herawareness
of"valid
infavor
evidence"
ofevolutionsuspended
judgment
despite
Parille
wasnotawareof the1981statement
at thetime;
arytheory.However,
wasn't
either.
Watkins
apparendy
48. No doubta secondindictment
forarbitrariness
is beingprepared
against
Cox. Coxrecendy
commented:
we
aboutherindicates
Stephen
"Everythingknow
that[Rand]
hadthekind
ofintellectual
that
scorns
integrity
anyconscious
temptation
toevadea central
intellectual
Yetshedidobfuscate
certain
inwhat
issues,
problem.
- ThePeikovian
Doctrine
Assertion 167
Campbell
oftheArbitrary
I wouldcallnota conscious
oranunconscious
buta preconscious
manner.
Another
thiswouldbe thatshehadexcellent
vision.Shecouldsee
wayofsaying
peripheral
infrom
theside,andshetookinstinctive
toavoid
philosophical
dangers
coming
steps
areeasytofind.Oneis herviewof
anyshedidnotwantto runinto.Examples
evolution.
Becauseshedidnotbelieve
inGod,shemust
haveaccounted
biological
ina purely
fortheexistence
oftheworld
way.Orso onewouldthink.
evolutionary
ina bunch
Yetbecause
shedidnotwanttopicture
man'sheroic
raceasoriginating
of
shediverted
aboutherviewofthe
Branden,
interview),
apes(Nathaniel
questions
matter
thatshehadnever
evolution
andwas'therefore
. . . neither
studied
bysaying
itssupporter
noritsopponent"'
Cox hasnot
(2007,255-56).Strictly
speaking,
Randmight
coveredeverypossibility:
haverejected
bothevolution
anddivine
andoptedfora strict
creation
Aristotelian
viewoftheworld
asindefinitely
oldand
Homo
intheRandian
as equally
so. Butthere
isnoevidence
thatshe
sapiens
corpus
ourspecies
hasbeenaround
forbillions
ofyears.
thought
49. Randmayhaveusedthephrase
inconversation,
refutation"
butI've
"charity
found
noconfirmation
oftheusageinprint.
inOPAR. Hsieh
Nordoesitappear
thatRandmadeactiveuseof thefull,
seemsto imply
doctrine
of the
latter-day
thiscannot
that
aspreviously
beconfirmed
from
assertion;
noted,
arbitrary
anything
Randwrote
forpublication.
References
Alfred
andLogic.Secondedition.NewYork:
Truth,
Ayer,
Jules.1952.Language,
in1946.
Dover.Original
workpublished
Mark
H. 1993.Representational
inhumans
andmachines.
content
Bickhard,
Journal
andTheoretical
5: 285-333.
ofExperimental
Intelligence
Artifial
anderror
. 2001.Error
Thedynamic
oferror
avoidance
dynamics:
emergence
andTheoretical
13: 199-209.
vicariants.
ofExperimental
Journal
Artifial
Intelligence
. 2002. Critical
On thenegative
NewIdeasin
sideofrationality.
principles:
20: 1-34.
Psychology
andRobert
L. Campbell.
1996.Developmental
ofexpertise:
Rationality
aspects
andgeneralization.
andTheoretical
8,nos.
Journal
Artifial
Intelligence
ofExperimental
3-4: 399-417.
Enemies
of
Bidin
theSaddamites
#2- Rockwellians:
otto,Robert
J. 2005.Sicking
Post 37. 2 February.Onlineat: <http://solohq.org/Forum/
liberty,
1009_1
.shtml>.
ArticleDiscussions/
inswanger,
toZ. New
ed. 1988.TheAynRand
Lexicon:
Harry,
Objectivism
from
York:Meridian.
. 1990.Thebiological
delRey,
California:
Basis
Marina
Ayn
ofTeleological
Concepts.
RandInstitute
Press.
Secondedition.
New
EdwinG. 1950.A History
Psychology.
Boring,
ofExperimental
York:Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Pascal.2001.Religion
TheEvolutionary
Boyer,
ofReligious
Thought.
Origins
Explained:
NewYork:BasicBooks.
Barbara.1986. ThePassion
Branden,
ofAynRand.GardenCity,New York:
Doubleday.
ammunition
Whatis the
Nathaniel.1963. Intellectual
Branden,
department:
168
TheJournal
Vol. 10,No. 1
of RandStudies
viewofagnosticism?
TheObjectivist
Newsletter
Objectivist
2,no.4: 15.
. 1967.Basic
20lectures.
NewYork:Nathaniel
Branden
Principles
ofObjectivism.
Institute.
Available
onCD from
TheAtlasSociety.
. 1984.Thebenefits
andhazards
ofthephilosophy
ofAynRand:A personal
statement
Humanistic
24:
39-64.
Online
at <http://www.
Journal
of
Psychology
articles.
nathanielbranden.com/
catalog/
php?tPath=:2#>.
. 1989.Judgment
with
Mifflin.
Day:MyYears
Rand.Boston:Houghton
. 1999.MyYears
with
Rand.SanFrancisco:
Jossey-Bass.
DonaldT. 1987.Evolutionary
InEvolutionary
Campbell,
epistemology.
Epistemologa,
andthe
and
,edited
Theofy
ofRationality,
Sociology
byGerard
ofKnowledge
Radnitzky
III. La Salle,Illinois:
W.W.Bartley
47-89.
OpenCourt,
Robert
L. 1999.AynRandandthecognitive
inpsychology.
revolution
Campbell,
The
Studies
1,no.1 (Fall):107-34.
Journal
ofRand
andMark
H. Bickhard.
1986.Knowing
Levels
andDevelopmental
Basel:
Stages.
Karger.
andJohn
Chambers
1996a.Moral
A critique
Christopher.
theory:
development
ofitsKantian
Review
16: 1-47.
presuppositions.
Developmental
andJohn
Chambers
1996b.Beyond
formalism
andaltruism:
The
Christopher.
formoral
Review
16: 108-23.
prospects
personality.
Developmental
andthe
Cox,Stephen.2007. Merely
metaphorical?
AynRand,IsabelPaterson,
oftheory.
The
Studies
237-60.
8,no.2 (Spring):
language
Journal
ofRand
Arthur
onconstructivism
andethics.
Diamond,
M.,Jr.1980.F. A. Hayek
Journal
of
Libertarian
Studies
4,no.4: 353-365.
Robert.
1967.Review
ofESP: A Sdentific
Evaluation
Efron,
byC. E. M.Hansel.The
no.3: 8-11.
6,
Objectivist
Steven.1990. The symbol
D: Nonlinear
Harnad,
grounding
problem.Physica
42: 335-46.
Phenomena
Rom.1970.ThePrinciples
ofChicago
Harr,
ofScientfic
Thinking.
University
Chicago:
Press.
David.2008.IsaacNewton:Discoverer
ofuniversal
laws.TheObjective
Harriman,
Standard
3,no.1.
Hsieh,Diana Mertz. 2005. Poisoningthe well. 24 July.Onlineat:
/www.dianahsieh.com/blog/
<http:/
2005/07/poisoning-well.html>.
David. 1986. TheEvidence
Realist
Baton
Kelley,
oftheSenses:
Theory
ofPerception.
StateUniversity
Press.
Rouge:Louisiana
Patricia.
1992.Freud's
Dream:
Complete
Science
Kitcher,
Interdisciplinaiy
ofMind
Massachusetts:
MITPress.
Cambridge,
Thomas.1970.TheStructure
Revolutions.
Secondedition.
Kuhn,
ofScientific
Chicago:
ofChicago
Press.
University
Imre. 1978. Falsification
andthemethodology
of scientific
research
Lakatos,
InPhilosophical
l/olume
1: TheMethodology
Research
programmes.
Papers
ofScientific
Worrall
andGregory
Currie.
,edited
Programmes
byJohn
Cambridge:
Cambridge
8-101.Original
work
in1970.
Press,
University
published
T. 2000.Reason
andValue:
Aristotle
versus
Rand.Poughkeepsie,
New
Long,Roderick
York:TheObjectivist
Center.
Ronald
E. 1991.TheIdeas
Merrill,
ofAynRand.La Salle,Illinois:
OpenCourt.
- ThePeikovian
Assertion 169
Doctrine
oftheArbitrary
Campbell
andJames
R.Newman.1958.Gdel's
NewYork:NewYork
Proof.
Nagel,Ernest
Press.
University
Writers
contra
Human
Nature.
SanJose,
California:
Nyquist,
GregS. 2001.AynRand
ClubPress.
Onlineat: < http:
10July.
Neil. 2004.AynRandandevolution.
//rebirth
Parille,
freason.com/Articles
/Parle/
Ayn_Rand_and_E>olution.shtml>.
A critique
ofObjectivist
E..2007.GodandObjectivism:
Parrish,
philosophy
Stephen
ofreligion.
Studies
8,no.2: 169-210.
Journal
ofAynRand
matters.
Studies
. 2008.What's
Journal
ofAynRand
goodforthegooseandrelated
9,no.2: 395-415.
12lectures.
NewYork:
Leonard.1965.Objectivism's
Peikoff,
Theory
ofKnowledge.
Branden
Institute.
Nathaniel
Lectures
on
California:
toLogic.10lectures.
. 1974.Introduction
Oceanside,
Objectivism.
Lectures
12lectures.
California:
. 1976.ThePhilosophy
Oceanside,
ofObjectivism.
onObjectivism.
and
inAmerica.
NewYork:Stein
Parallels:
TheEndofFreedom
. 1982.TheOminous
Day.
TheObjectivist
Forum
andthearbitrary.
. 1987a. Reason,
8, no. 5
emotion,
1-5.
(October):
Torum
andthearbitrary,
. 1987b.Reason,
8,no.
emotion,
partII. TheObjectivist
1-7.
6 (December):
Activist
. 1989a.Factandvalue.TheIntellectual
5,no.1 (18May).Onlineat:
fact_value.htm>.
essays/
<http:/
/www.peikoff.com/
InTheVoice
memoir.
with
. 1989b.Mythirty
of
years
AynRand:Anintellectual
inObjectivist
Reason:
, byAynRand.NewYork:NewAmerican
Essays
Thought
in1987.
work
334-53.Original
Library,
published
ThePhilosophy
. 1993.Objectivism:
Original
ofAynRand.NewYork:Meridian.
in1991.
work
published
on
California:
Lectures
12lectures.
induction.
. 1997.Objectivism
Oceanside,
through
Objectivism.
Lectures
on
California:
6 lectures.
. 2007. TheDIM Hypothesis.
Oceanside,
Objectivism.
models
for
Animal
IreneM. 2001. Lessonsfrom
ethology:
cognitive
Pepperberg,
Robotics
onEpigenetic
In Proceedings
,
Conference
oftheFirst
computing.
ethological
editedby Christian
Balkenius,
JordanZlatev,HidekiKozima,Kerstin
andC. Breazeal.Lund,Sweden:LundUniversity
Dautenhahn,
Cognitive
at: <http://www.lucs.lu.se/Abstracts/LUCS_Studies/
Science
Series.Online
LUCS85.html>.
Translated
bySusanWedgwood.
ofConsciousness.
Jean. 1976. TheGrasp
Piaget,
work
Press.Original
Harvard
Massachusetts:
published
University
Cambridge,
in1974.
InConjectures
and
andrefutations.
1965.Science:
KarlRaimund.
Conjectures
Popper,
& Row,33-65.
NewYork:Harper
TheGrowth
Knowledge.
ofSentific
Refutations:
edition.
House.Paperback
NewYork:Random
Rand,
Ayn.1957.AtlasShrugged.
House.Hardcoveredition.
NewYork:Random
. 1957.AtlasShrugged.
House.
NewYork:Random
Secondedition.
. 1959.Wethe
Living.
170
Vol. 10,No. 1
TheJournal
of RandStudies
InForthe
ThePhilosophy
NewIntellectual:
. 1961.Forthenewintellectual.
of
9-57.
Rand
,byAynRand.NewYork:NewAmerican
Library,
TheObjectivist
Forum
1-11.
. 1981.Theageofmediocrity.
2,no.3 (June):
Who
link.InPhilosophy:
Needs
Peikoff.
. 1982.Themissing
It?,edited
byLeonard
42-55.
in
1973.
work
Bobbs-,
published
Original
Indianapolis:
toObjectivist
Edited
Secondedition.
. 1990.Introduction
byLeonard
Epistemologi.
New
Mentor.
andHarry
York:
Peikoff
Binswangen
Acommentary
onParrish
andToner.
Adam.
2008.Notevenfalse:
Reed,
Journal
of
Rand
Studies
9,no.2: 361-94.
B. 1982. Developing
forms
ofarithmetical
Saxe,Geoffrey
thought
amongthe
ofPapuaNewGuinea.Developmental
18,no.4: 583-94.
Psychology
Oksapmin
letter.
TheIntellectual
Activist
20August.
Peter.1986. Untided
Schwartz,
1995.Rand:TheRussian
Radical.
ChrisMatthew.
Park,
Sciabarra,
University
StateUniversity
Press.
Pennsylvania:
Pennsylvania
andJohn
G.Miller.
1987.Culture
Richard
and
A.,Manamohan
Shweder,
Mahapatra,
In TheEmergence
inYoung
Children
moraldevelopment.
, editedby
ofMorality
Lamb.Chicago:University
ofChicago
1-83.
Press,
Jerome
KaganandSharon
TheCaseagainst
God.LosAngeles:
H. 1974.Atheism:
Nash.
Smith,
George
Values:
A Study
andReward
Tara.2000.Viable
Smith,
ofUfeastheRoot
ofMorality.
Rowman
& Litde
field.
Lanham,
Maryland:
TheVirtuous
Ethics:
. 2006.AynRand's
Normative
Egoist.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
Press.
University
thePsychoanalytic
Frank
Sulloway,
J. 1992.Freud,
biologist
oftheMind'Beyond
hegend.
Harvard
Massachusetts:
Press.Original
work
University
Cambridge,
published
in1979.
Patrick.
2007.Objectivist
Stues
8,no.2:
Toner,
Journal
atheology.
ofAynRund
211-35.
. 2008.God-talk
andthearbitrary.
Studies
9,no.2:417-21.
Journal
ofAynRand
Elliot.1983.TheDevelopment
andConvention.
Turiel,
Morality
ofSodaiKnowledge:
Press.
University
Cambridge:
Cambridge
andCharles
C. Helwig.1987.Morality:
Itsstructure,
,Melanie
Killen,
functions,
In TheEmergence
inYoung
andvagaries.
Children
, edited
byJerome
ofMorality
Lamb.Chicago:University
ofChicago
155-243.
Press,
KaganandSharon
TheCaseagainst
S. 2005.ThePassion
Critics:
the
Brandens.
Valliant,
James
ofAynRand's
House.
Dallas,Texas:Durban
toOurselves:
D. 2002.Strangers
theAdaptive
Unconscious.
Wilson,
Timothy
Discovering
Harvard
Press.
Massachusetts:
University
Cambridge,

Peikovian Doctrine of The Arbitrary Campbell

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Peikovian Doctrine of The Arbitrary Campbell

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

The Peikovian Doctrine of the Arbitrary Assertion

Author(s): Robert L. Campbell

by engagingin correctcognitionin relationto reality?If "the

of perceptionarebasicallysound,and thatRand's theoryof concepts

assertionswould seem to have a

not. ClaimsaboutGod or gremlins

What she actuallysaid, however,is that she had not studied

If one has chosen not to live,moralcategoriescannotapplyto one's

(Smith1974)? Or a book likeBoyer's(2001) thatseeksto explain,in

reliedon the outwardshape of the skull),and the lack of interestin

So thereis an onus of proof,all right.Butwhatdoes ithave to do

been betweentwo alternatives:redeemit and refuteit, or leave it

Others mightsuppose thatthe agnostichas failedto applythe

he claimsto knowthatitis false(31-33).

Gait's speech, referto "arbitrary... violence" (Rand 1957, 742),

Despite its lead role in the Randian lexicon,the word "faith"

nonexistencethatBrandenlaidout in his Lecture1:

- proofof the nonexistenceof God."

by the NathanielBrandenInstitute.Lecture9 coveredthe familiar

and which are not.

Encompassedin thesweepof Schwartz'sdismissalwerethemost

One mightaskhow helpfulthedoctrinereallyis,whenVallianthas

Rand's characteror actionsis arbitrary.

Peikoffhas proclaimed,on the one hand, that afterreligious

accept everyjot and tittleof the Peikoviandoctrineof the arbitrary

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen