G.R. No.

78239 February 9, 1989

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,
vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer,
who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed
the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending,
she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon
which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that
she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of
the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of
treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated
March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the
amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor
of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied. 1
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17,
1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the
date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension
which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50. 2
The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President
for further review and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:
We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne out
by the records, petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she was accused. In line

with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office
adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985,
that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits
and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before
he can reassume his former position. ...
Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that "a
pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence." (Sec. 36, par. 2).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled
to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must
secure an appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute
pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. 3
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition in her behalf We gave due course on October 13, 1987.
Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by
reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was
still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of conviction, the
accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment
remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon was issued before the final
verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect,
the President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly
dismissed the same. 4
It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa
thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two
months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of
prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. 5 Temporary
absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment, such
disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. 6 Even if the offender be
pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same
have been expressly remitted by the pardon. 7 The penalty of prision correccional
carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from public office. 8
The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of
the nature of pardon and its legal consequences. This is not totally unexpected
considering that the authorities on the subject have not been wholly consistent
particularly in describing the effects of pardon.

The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the
King's wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by
American case law.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official
act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the
validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."
8-a
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was
governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The
pertinent provision reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.
9
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended
only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before
conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was
pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the
former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that
in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon,
petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by
the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and
absolute pardon in relation to the decisive question of whether or not the plenary pardon
had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
In Pelobello v. Palatino, 10 We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the
courts on the various consequences of pardon: "... we adopt the broad view expressed in
Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. ... (W)e are of the opinion that the
better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to
unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after an inquiry
into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the
extent of relieving completely the party ... concerned from the accessory and resultant
disabilities of criminal conviction.
The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases, 11 and several others 12 show
the unmistakable application of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland, 13 whose
sweeping generalizations to this day continue to hold sway in our jurisprudence despite
the fact that much of its relevance has been downplayed by later American decisions.

Consider the following broad statements:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights;
it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. 14
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. 15 The
modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case
(reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been made on the effects
of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has
generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of
guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and
the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and
not forgetfulness. 16
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's
innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act,
including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. 17 But it
relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and
"as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference
between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a
convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left
unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never
found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction."
18
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. 19 It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon
the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the
offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." 20 This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive
declared her not guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v.
Hazzard, 21 we find this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major number
of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our
judicial system, but requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The very
act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established
by the most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may relieve from
the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase
the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed. 22

In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to
concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if
only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should
not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that
pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past,
we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a
pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the
mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which,
despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary,
prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." 23
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. 24 This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of
the true character and purpose of the privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are
in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore
a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction 25 although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment
to that office. 26
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to
favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from
refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or
who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her
offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately
whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the
pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant
city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or

for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the
debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. 27
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result but on grounds different from those relied upon by the majority
opinion.
Petitioner Salvacion A Monsanto was Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City. Together with
three (3) other accused, she was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the complex
crime of Estafa through falsification of public documents. After trial, the accused were
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P 3,500.00. They were also ordered to
jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P 4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to this Court which affirmed the same.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos extended to her on 17 December 1984 an absolute pardon
which she accepted on 21 December 1984.
By reason of said absolute pardon, petitioner in representations before the City Treasurer
of Calbayog, the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the President, asked that she be
allowed to re-assume her former office, as of 1 August 1982 (the date of her preventive
suspension), that she be paid her back salaries for the entire period of her suspension,
and that she be not required to pay her proportionate share of the amount of P 4,892.50.
Respondent Assistant Executive Secretary denied petitioner's request for automatic
reinstatement as well as her other claims, because of which denial, this petition for
review on certiorari was filed before the Court seeking the setting aside and reversal of
the decision of the respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, on the main contention
that, as a public officer who has been granted an absolute pardon by the President, she
is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment,
and to the other reliefs prayed for.

There can be no dispute that the pardon extinguished petitioner's criminal liability. At the
same time, Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code categorically covers the effects of a pardon
on the pardoned's right to hold office, suffrage and on his civil liability. It states:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code to the case at bar, it is, to my mind, clear that
the pardon extended by the President to the petitioner did not per se entitle her to again
hold public office (including therefore the office of Assistant Treasurer, Calbayog City) or
to suffrage; nor did such pardon extinguish her civil liability for the criminal conviction,
subject matter of the pardon.
An examination of the presidential pardon in question shows that, while petitioner was
granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to full civil and political
rights", yet, nothing therein expressly provides that the right to hold public office was
thereby restored to the petitioner. In view of the express exclusion by Art. 36, RPC of the
right to hold public office, notwithstanding a pardon unless the right is expressly restored
by the pardon, it is my considered opinion that, to the extent that the pardon granted to
the petitioner did not expressly restore the right to hold public office as an effect of such
pardon, that right must be kept away from the petitioner.
It is a recognized principle in public law hopefully to be honored more in its
compliance rather than in its breach that a "public office is a public trust." The
restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason of
conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no
matter how intensely arguable, but must be stated in express, explicit, positive and
specific language. To require this would not be asking too much.
I am aware that there are broad statement in Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 341 and
Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 which may be understood to mean that an absolute
pardon, without qualification, restores full civil rights which have been construed, in turn,
to include the right to hold public office (Versoza vs. Fernandez, 55 Phil. 323).
If such be the message of said cases, then I submit that a modification is in order, so that
an absolute pardon to work a restoration of the right to hold public office must expressly
so state, in order to give substance and meaning to the sound provisions of Article 36 of
the Revised Penal Code, particularly in the light of our times and experience.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in the important and eloquent opinion of the Chief Justice. I
also join in the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla. At the same time, I

would add a few brief statements, basically for my own clarification. Article 36 of the
Revised Penal Code states:
Article 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the registration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
It is worthy of note that the rule embodied in Article 36 is reiterated four (4) times by the
Revised Penal Code in its following provisions:
Article 40. Death-Its accessory penalties. - The death penalty, when it is not executed by
reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute
disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date of
sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. - Their accessory penalties. - The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
Article 42. Prision mayor - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision mayor shall
carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted
in the pardon.
Article 43. Prision correccional - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Chief Justice points out that the penalty imposed upon petitioner for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, included the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification from public office or employment and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The 17 December 1984
pardon extended to petitioner in the instant case was written on a standard printed form
which states in printed words that it was "an absolute and unconditional pardon [which]
restored [petitioner] to full civil and political rights." 1 While the right of suffrage and the
right to hold public office or employment are commonly regarded as "political rights," 2 it
must be noted that there are other "political rights" 3 and that the pardon given to
petitioner did not expressly and in printer's ink restore to petitioner the particular right to
hold public office and the specific right to vote at elections and plebiscites.

I join in the basic point of Mr. Justice Padilla that because of the nature of a public office
as a public trust, Articles 36 and 40-43 appropriately require a very high degree of
explicitness if a pardon is to work the restoration of such right to petitioner. Exactly the
same point may, of course, be made in respect of the restoration of the right to vote.
Articles 36 and 40-43 of the Revised Penal Code, quoted above, have been in our statute
books since 1930. I believe that they have been left intact by the constitutional
provisions on pardon, whether one refers to the 1935 Constitution or to the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. I do not believe that Articles 36, et al. collided with any provision or
principle embodied in either of our prior constitutions. The Chief Justice appears to agree
with this position when he referred to Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code (Opinion, p.
5). He goes on, however, to say (in page 13) that: "the pardon granted to petitioner has
resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot
go beyond that."
It is submitted, with respect, that Articles 36, et al. of the Revised Penal Code have not
been shown to be an unconstitutional restriction on the pardoning power of the
President. The limitation on the President's pardoning power, if limitation it be, does not
appear to be an unreasonably onerous one. Articles 36, et al. merely require the
President to become completely explicit if the pardon he extends is intended to wipe out
not merely the principal but also the accessory penalty of disqualification from holding
public office and from voting and to restore the recipient of the pardon to the exercise of
such fundamental political rights. Such requirement of explicitness seems entirely in line
with the fundamental point made by the Chief Justice that a pardon does not blot out the
factual guilt of the recipient of the pardon. In other words, the mere grant of a pardon to
a public officer or employee who has been unfaithful to the public trust and sentenced to
disqualification from voting and from holding such office, does not create the
presumption that the recipient of the pardon has thereby suddenly become morally
eligible once more to exercise the right to vote and to hold public office.
In my view, the pardon extended to petitioner was ineffective to restore to her the right
to hold public office and on this ground, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review and to
AFFIRM the assailed Resolution of the then Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result but on grounds different from those relied upon by the majority
opinion.
Petitioner Salvacion A Monsanto was Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City. Together with
three (3) other accused, she was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the complex
crime of Estafa through falsification of public documents. After trial, the accused were
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P 3,500.00. They were also ordered to

jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P 4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to this Court which affirmed the same.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos extended to her on 17 December 1984 an absolute pardon
which she accepted on 21 December 1984.
By reason of said absolute pardon, petitioner in representations before the City Treasurer
of Calbayog, the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the President, asked that she be
allowed to re-assume her former office, as of 1 August 1982 (the date of her preventive
suspension), that she be paid her back salaries for the entire period of her suspension,
and that she be not required to pay her proportionate share of the amount of P 4,892.50.
Respondent Assistant Executive Secretary denied petitioner's request for automatic
reinstatement as well as her other claims, because of which denial, this petition for
review on certiorari was filed before the Court seeking the setting aside and reversal of
the decision of the respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, on the main contention
that, as a public officer who has been granted an absolute pardon by the President, she
is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment,
and to the other reliefs prayed for.
There can be no dispute that the pardon extinguished petitioner's criminal liability. At the
same time, Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code categorically covers the effects of a pardon
on the pardoned's right to hold office, suffrage and on his civil liability. It states:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code to the case at bar, it is, to my mind, clear that
the pardon extended by the President to the petitioner did not per se entitle her to again
hold public office (including therefore the office of Assistant Treasurer, Calbayog City) or
to suffrage; nor did such pardon extinguish her civil liability for the criminal conviction,
subject matter of the pardon.
An examination of the presidential pardon in question shows that, while petitioner was
granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to full civil and political
rights", yet, nothing therein expressly provides that the right to hold public office was
thereby restored to the petitioner. In view of the express exclusion by Art. 36, RPC of the
right to hold public office, notwithstanding a pardon unless the right is expressly restored
by the pardon, it is my considered opinion that, to the extent that the pardon granted to
the petitioner did not expressly restore the right to hold public office as an effect of such
pardon, that right must be kept away from the petitioner.
It is a recognized principle in public law-hopefully to be honored more in its compliance
rather than in its breach that a "public office is a public trust." The restoration of the right
to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason of conviction in a criminal

case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter how intensely
arguable, but must be stated in express, explicit, positive and specific language. To
require this would not be asking too much.
I am aware that there are broad statement in Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 341 and
Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 which may be understood to mean that an absolute
pardon, without qualification, restores full civil rights which have been construed, in turn,
to include the right to hold public office (Versoza vs. Fernandez, 55 Phil. 323).
If such be the message of said cases, then I submit that a modification is in order, so that
an absolute pardon to work a restoration of the right to hold public office must expressly
so state, in order to give substance and meaning to the sound provisions of Article 36 of
the Revised Penal Code, particularly in the light of our times and experience.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached in the important and eloquent opinion of the Chief Justice. I
also join in the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla. At the same time, I
would add a few brief statements, basically for my own clarification. Article 36 of the
Revised Penal Code states:
Article 36. Pardon; its effects. - A pardon shall not work the registration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
It is worthy of note that the rule embodied in Article 36 is reiterated four (4) times by the
Revised Penal Code in its following provisions:
Article 40. Death-Its accessory penalties. - The death penalty, when it is not executed by
reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute
disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date of
sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. - Their accessory penalties. - The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
Article 42. Prision mayor - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision mayor shall
carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although

pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted
in the pardon.
Article 43. Prision correccional - Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Chief Justice points out that the penalty imposed upon petitioner for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, included the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification from public office or employment and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The 17 December 1984
pardon extended to petitioner in the instant case was written on a standard printed form
which states in printed words that it was "an absolute and unconditional pardon [which]
restored [petitioner] to full civil and political rights." 1 While the right of suffrage and the
right to hold public office or employment are commonly regarded as "political rights," 2 it
must be noted that there are other "political rights" 3 and that the pardon given to
petitioner did not expressly and in printer's ink restore to petitioner the particular right to
hold public office and the specific right to vote at elections and plebiscites.
I join in the basic point of Mr. Justice Padilla that because of the nature of a public office
as a public trust, Articles 36 and 40-43 appropriately require a very high degree of
explicitness if a pardon is to work the restoration of such right to petitioner. Exactly the
same point may, of course, be made in respect of the restoration of the right to vote.
Articles 36 and 40-43 of the Revised Penal Code, quoted above, have been in our statute
books since 1930. I believe that they have been left intact by the constitutional
provisions on pardon, whether one refers to the 1935 Constitution or to the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. I do not believe that Articles 36, et al. collided with any provision or
principle embodied in either of our prior constitutions. The Chief Justice appears to agree
with this position when he referred to Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code (Opinion, p.
5). He goes on, however, to say (in page 13) that: "the pardon granted to petitioner has
resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot
go beyond that."
It is submitted, with respect, that Articles 36, et al. of the Revised Penal Code have not
been shown to be an unconstitutional restriction on the pardoning power of the
President. The limitation on the President's pardoning power, if limitation it be, does not
appear to be an unreasonably onerous one. Articles 36, et al. merely require the
President to become completely explicit if the pardon he extends is intended to wipe out
not merely the principal but also the accessory penalty of disqualification from holding
public office and from voting and to restore the recipient of the pardon to the exercise of
such fundamental political rights. Such requirement of explicitness seems entirely in line
with the fundamental point made by the Chief Justice that a pardon does not blot out the
factual guilt of the recipient of the pardon. In other words, the mere grant of a pardon to
a public officer or employee who has been unfaithful to the public trust and sentenced to
disqualification from voting and from holding such office, does not create the

presumption that the recipient of the pardon has thereby suddenly become morally
eligible once more to exercise the right to vote and to hold public office.
In my view, the pardon extended to petitioner was ineffective to restore to her the right
to hold public office and on this ground, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review and to
AFFIRM the assailed Resolution of the then Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.

PEOPLE VS. GAFFUD, GR 168050

PUNO, C.J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March
31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 finding the
accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. guilty of the complex crime of double murder
and sentencing him to death, affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) dated August 28, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1125.
The facts of this case were aptly summarized by the CA as follows:
Records show that accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., along with two John Does
were indicted for Double Murder for the killing of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador,
under the following Information:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. and
two (2) JOHN DOES of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening of May 10, 1994 at Sitio Biton, Barangay
Wasid, Municipality of Nagtipunan, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and
motivated by long standing grudge, after conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, by means of fire, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
shot and burn Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador which caused their instantaneous
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Records)
It appears that Manuel Salvador and his daughter Analyn Salvador were killed when the
house they were staying in located at Sitio Biton, Barangay Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino
was burned down while they were inside. An eyewitness pointed to accused-appellant
Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. as one of the arsonists.
Upon preliminary investigation, where appellant Gaffud, Jr. failed to appear despite being
subpoenaed to submit his counter-affidavit, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ferdinand
Orias resolved that charges for double murder by means of fire be filed against herein
appellant and two John Does, (p.14, Records).

When arraigned on June 6, 1995, accused-appellant Gaffud, Jr. entered a plea of Not
Guilty, (p. 48, Records), paving the way for his trial.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses against appellant Gaffud, Jr., namely
Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador,
Orly Salvador, nephew of Manuel Salvador, Potado Ballang, Barangay Captain of Wasid,
Nagtipunan, Quirino, Dan Dangpal, a neighbor of the deceased, SPO2 Dominador Tabal,
the investigating police, and Dr. Teodomiro Hufana who conducted the autopsy on the
deceased Manuel Salvador.
Evidence for the prosecution tended to prove that on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly
Salvador was on his way to the house of his uncle Manuel Salvador to fetch the latter as
they were going to attend a wedding at the nearby barangay hall. He suddenly heard
two gunshots. Thereafter, he saw the house of his uncle burning. Because of the glow
emanating therefrom, he saw three persons within the vicinity of the burning house. He
saw them hurriedly leaving the place towards the direction of the Cagayan river. One of
the three was holding a flashlight, whom he identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr. He could
not identify the two other persons. After the house was burned, Orly went towards the
barangay hall to see if his uncle Manuel Salvador was there, but he met Brangay Captain
Potado Ballang who informed him that his uncle was not at the barangay hall. They then
proceeded to the burned house, and found the charred remains of Manuel Salvador and
Analyn Salvador. (TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 3-8)
Barangay Captain Potado Ballang testified that he saw appellant Gaffud, Jr. on the fateful
day at around 6:30 PM, along the riverbank, a few meters away from the house of
Manuel Salvador. When Potado asked what he was doing there, Gaffud, Jr. said he was
looking for his boat. However, Potado knew that the appellant did not own a boat. After a
few minutes, Potado left to attend the wedding party being held at the barangay hall.
(TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 2-5)
Dan Dangpals testimony was dispensed with, but the defense agreed to the nature of the
testimony he would have given, which tended to show that sometime at about 8:00 PM
on the fateful evening, while inside his house, he heard successive gunshots, and when
he went out of his house, he saw the deceaseds house burning about 200 meters away.
He heard persons laughing and saw the light of a flashlight and persons moving away
from the burning house. He could not recognize any of them. (TSN, February 24, 1997;
Exhibit D, p. 8, Records)
Dominga Salvadors testimony tended to show that the appellant Gaffud, Jr. was their
neighbor. In the morning of May 10, 1994, she went to the house of the appellant to see
him about her husbands share in the construction of the barangay hall, which was
contracted to the appellant. Gaffud, Jr. told her that he would go to her house that
afternoon to introduce his in-law Balbino Bravo to her husband. Thereafter, she went
home, and left again at around 11:00 AM, leaving behind her husband Manuel Salvador
and their daughter Analyn. Later that night, she was at Natipunan, Quirino attending a
seminar for hilot, (TSN, July 4, 1995, pp. 3-15). In her sinumpaang salaysay, offered in
evidence as Exhibit A, Dominga also related that she had earlier filed a complaint in the
barangay against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.
SPO2 Dominador Tabal was a police investigator who investigated the killing of Manuel
and Analyn Salvador. Thereat, he saw two dead bodies hanging from a Melina tree. They

were put there so that they would not be reached by the dogs. He saw that one of the
victims had a fractured head, while the other had a wound on the side. Pictures of the
victims including the scene of the incident were taken by them. Among those
interviewed the appellant Gaffud, Jr. and his brother, (TSN, June 5, 1997, pp. 2-7).
Dr. Teodomiro Hufanas testimony was also dispensed with, (p. 127, Records) in view of
the defense counsels admission of the contents of his Autopsy Report on Manuel
Salvador, (Exhibit C), which reads in pertinent part:
FINDINGS
-Cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and intestine (Large) protruding from
the abdomen.
-Presence of semi-burned rattan about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in diameter on the burned
hand.
-Presence of a peculiar hole from the thoracic cavity directed downward to the body,
probably gunshot wound.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
-CREMATION (Burned)
REMARKS: Cannot be identified if male or female
For the appellants defense, the defense presented the appellant himself. His defense of
alibi was corroborated by his wife Juanita Gaffud and in-law Balbino Bravo.
Appellant denied the accusation leveled against him, and testified that the approximate
time of the burning of the victims house, he was at home, entertaining his in-laws,
Balbino Bravo and Rufina Bravo, who was there for a visit. After eating dinner, he and
Balbino Bravo talked. At around 7:00 to 8:00 PM, he and Balbino Bravo saw a blaze
coming from the other side of the Cagayan River, about 50 to 80 meters away from the
house of the Bravos. They did not mind the blaze, and instead went to sleep. The next
morning, they heard news about somebody being burned, and because of this, he and
Balbino Bravo hiked to the place of the incident. Thats where he found that his pare
Manuel Salvador and his daughter were burned in their house. After seeing the dead
bodies, appellant went home. He went back later, and was even designated by the
Barangay Captain to guard the bodies of the deceased. Thereafter, he was forced to
evacuate his family from Nagtipunan, because the Ilongot tribe was forcing him to testify
against someone but he didnt want to. He was told that something might happen to his
family if he didnt leave, (TSN, June 3, 2002).
The appellants defense was corroborated on its material points by the testimony of his
wife, Juanita Gaffud, and his in-law, Balbino Bravo, both of whom testified that on May
10, 1994, the accused was at his residence entertaining visiting Bravo spouses and
stayed there the whole night, (TSN January 31, 2002 and March 18, 2002).

Juanita Gaffud also testified that during the pendency of the trial, she talked to Dominga
Salvador about the settlement of the case and even offered a certain amount for the said
purpose, (TSN, March 10, 2002, p. 12).[3]
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two (2)
counts of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. GUILTY for
two (2) counts of murder and hereby sentences him as follows, to wit:
a)

Death penalty - for the death of Manuel Salvador;

b)

Another death penalty - for the death of Analyn Salvador;

c)

To pay the legal heirs of the victims:

c-1) SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) for each count or a total of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00) as death indemnities;
c-2) FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for each count or a total of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages;
c-3) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) for each count or a total of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages;
c-4) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as nominal damages;
and
c-5) Costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[4]
As the death penalty was imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review. In his Appellants Brief,[5] accused-appellant argued that the RTC erred in: (i)
failing to rule and resolve whether or not conspiracy existed, as the information charged
him with conspiracy with two others in the commission of the crime; and (ii) convicting
him despite the fact that conspiracy was not proven, and also despite the fact that there
was no proof whatsoever as to what overt act he committed which would constitute the
crime of murder.
The case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition per
Resolution[6] of this Court dated August 24, 2004, in accordance with the ruling in
People v. Mateo.[7] In disposing of the assigned errors, the CA held that the lack of
discussion of conspiracy among accused-appellant and his anonymous co-accused in the
decision of the RTC was not antithetic to his conviction for the crime of murder, since the
charge that he was a principal performer in the killing of the victims was spelled out in
the Information[8] filed against him.[9] Moreover, in the absence of conspiracy, each of
the malefactors is liable only for the act committed by him.[10] As to the sufficiency of

the evidence presented by the prosecution, the CA held that the circumstantial evidence
in this case established accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11]
Accordingly, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty of
the complex crime of double murder, with the following modifications:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED, although the
decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED, in that: The accused Bernardino Gaffud,
Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of the complex crime of double murder, and is hereby
sentenced to the supreme penalty of Death. He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs of
the victims: (1) P100,000.00 or P50,000.00 for each victim, as civil indemnity for the
death of the victims; (2) P100,000.00 or P50,000.00 for each victim, as moral damages;
and (3) P10,000.00 as nominal damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03SC dated September 28, 2004, the case was elevated to this Court for review.
On the first assigned error, we concur with the CA that the failure to prove conspiracy in
this case is not fatal.
The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the
accused in the commission of the crime, conspiracy must be established by clear and
convincing evidence in order to convict the accused.[13] In the case at bar, however, we
hold that the direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of the victims, Manuel
Salvador and Analyn Salvador, was established beyond doubt by the evidence of the
prosecution. Hence, a finding of conspiracy in this instance is not essential for the
conviction of accused-appellant.
On the second assigned error, we uphold the finding of both courts a quo that the
evidence proffered by the prosecution, although circumstantial in nature, leads to the
conclusion that accused-appellant is the perpetrator of the act resulting in the death of
the victims.
It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i)
there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived
are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[14]
In this case, the following facts or circumstances were proven:
(i)
Accused-appellant was near the place of the incident just a few minutes
before the crime was committed. Captain Potado Bollang testified that he saw the
accused-appellant at the riverbank, about 100 meters from the house of the victims,
coming to and fro, allegedly looking for his boat, when in fact, Captain Bollang knew that
accused-appellant did not own one.[15]
(ii)
Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified persons, was near the
house of the victims at the time it was on fire. Accused-appellant was identified by Orly
Salvador as one of the three men he saw about 5 meters from the house of his uncle,
Manuel Salvador, while it was burning. Previously, he heard two gunshots as he was on
his way towards the said house. He also saw appellant fleeing with the other
malefactors, while holding a flashlight.[16] His testimony was corroborated by the
admitted testimony of Dan Dangpal who said that he heard two gunshots while he was at

his home, which was near that of the victims. When he went out, he also heard men
laughing, and saw them fleeing from the burning house, illumined by a flashlight.[17]
(iii)
Accused-appellant was in a hurry to leave the place of the incident without
giving any help to his kumpare Manuel Salvador and the latters daughter, Analyn. Orly
Salvador testified that he saw accused-appellant holding a flashlight, in a hurry to leave
the burning house of the victim, going towards the direction of the river.[18]
(iv)
Accused-appellant had a motive to kill the victims because of the complaint
filed by Manuel Salvadors wife, Dominga Salvador, and the fact that he owed Manuel
Salvador some money. Dominga Salvador testified that she had filed a complaint against
accused-appellant and his brother in their barangay for their act of slaughtering her pig.
Aside from this, in the morning of the same fateful day, she went to the house of
accused-appellant aiming to collect her husbands share in the profits for the construction
of the barangay hall they had built, but the accused-appellant only told her that he and
his in-law would see her husband later that day.[19]
These circumstances, when taken together, are enough to produce the conclusion that
accused-appellant was responsible for the killing of the victims by means of burning
them inside their house.
Moreover, we sustain the following observation of the CA that against the convincing
evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants defense of denial and alibi must fail:
The Court finds incredible appellants story that after seeing the blaze across his house,
he merely slept with his in-laws without investigating. The Court finds it against human
nature for one to sleep soundly during a fire occurring just 50-80 metes from ones house,
even though the blaze is occurring across a river. Also, appellant muse know, after
seeing the location of the blaze, that the house of his pare, or close friend, was in
danger, and his natural reaction at least was to verify the object of the conflagration.
Appellants story that he only slept soundly after seeing the blaze is therefore
unbelievable, and taints the credibility of his alibi.
Another telling factor on the appellants defense is his flight. Appellant admitted that in
his testimony that he fled Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino after he was investigated at the
Municipal Hall, (TSN, June 3, 2002, p. 19). Appellant said he fled because of threats from
the Ilongots. However, appellant said it never entered his mind to report the threats on
him. Appellants explanation fails to convince. It bears stressing that appellant fled right
after being investigated and questioned by police authorities, and during the time that
the preliminary investigation of the case was ongoing. This is highly suspicious, as such
time is the best time for him to defend his innocence, if he is indeed innocent. As it is,
appellant was arrested in San Vicente, Jones, Isabela, a remote barangay by the
elements of the NBI, (Id., at 23; reverse of p. 19, Records). Flight is consistently held as
and indication of guilt, (People v. Magaro, 291 SCRA 601 [1998]). There is no showing
why such conclusion should not be made in this case.[20]
We now go to whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2)
separate counts of murder or for the complex crime of double murder.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, reads:

ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period.
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute
only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence,
there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime.[21]
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as
complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.[22]
The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two
or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a
number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.[23]
In the landmark case People v. Guillen,[24] the Court held that the single act of throwing
a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the death of another person and injuring four
others produced the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murders. Under
Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed when a person is killed by means of
explosion. Applying Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the crime committed is death,
the maximum penalty for murder, which is the graver offense.
More recently, in People v. Carpo et al.,[25] we held that the single act of hurling a
grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three persons and injuries
to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and attempted murder.
Also, in People v. Comadre,[26] we held:
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows
the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty
irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits
two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the
crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a
cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses
should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed
because the offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser
degree of perversity.
In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of accused-appellant burning the
house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter,
Analyn Salvador, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double
murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed by means of fire. Since the
maximum penalty imposed for murder was death, when the case was pending in the CA,
the CA correctly imposed the penalty of death for the complex crime of double murder
instead of the two death penalties imposed by the RTC for two counts of murder. In view,
however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 (otherwise known as An Act Prohibiting

the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines), we reduce the penalty of death to
reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.[27]
Anent the award of damages, we increase the award of civil indemnity by the CA for the
death of the victims from P100,000 or P50,000 for each victim, to P150,000 or P75,000
for each victim in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[28]
As to the deletion of exemplary damages by the CA, we reinstate the award by the RTC
of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each victim.
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating
only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by
him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity
from capture.[29] In this case, the RTC correctly appreciated nighttime as aggravating
considering that nighttime was especially sought by accused-appellant to carry out his
evil plan. Evidence shows that accused-appellant waited for nighttime to consummate
his plan. It should be noted that accused-appellant was seen lurking near the house of
the victims earlier in the evening. The fact that he brought with him a flashlight clearly
shows that he intended to commit the crime in darkness.
We sustain the award by the CA of moral damages in the amount of P100,000, or
P50,000 for each victim, in view of the grief and sorrow suffered by the heirs of the
victims. We likewise affirm the award of nominal damages in the amount of P10,000 for
the value of the burned house as sufficiently explained by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM the March 31, 2005 decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00060 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1)
the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is REDUCED to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2)
the civil indemnity for the death of the victims is increased to P150,000, or
P75,000 for each victim; and
(3)
accused-appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000,
or P25,000 for each victim.

G.R. No. 118570

October 12, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA alias "Bennie", accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC-Br. 78, Quezon City, in Crim. Case
No. Q-94-58036 finding accused-appellant BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA guilty of two (2)
separate heinous crimes kidnapping for ransom and murder and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in each case and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for funeral expenses. 1
On 13 July 1994, at about six-thirty in the morning, an American pastor named Malcolm
Bradshaw was driving his car along EDSA to take his daughter Michelle to school. At the
bus stop between Corinthian Gardens and the corner to White Plains Avenue, Quezon
City, he saw a woman, later identified as the victim Alicia Abanilla, struggling to break
away from the arms of a man known later to be accused-appellant Benedicto Ramos y
Binuya alias "Bennie." The woman hailed a passenger bus and then a white car to no
avail. Perhaps no one comprehended the situation she was in. Realizing that the woman
was in deep trouble, Bradshaw stopped his car and blew his horn repeatedly to attract
the woman's attention. She was hysterical and Bradshaw was to her heaven-sent. She
grabbed the opportunity and ran towards Bradshaw's car and hopped in at the back seat.
Unfortunately for her, Ramos caught up with her and squeezed himself into the same
car.
From EDSA Bradshaw turned right towards White Plains Avenue where he was flagged
down by a traffic policeman. As Bradshaw slowed down Ramos pulled out his gun and
ordered him to go straight ahead, which the latter obeyed. As they cruised along White
Plains Avenue, Alicia handed her wallet to Michelle and asked the latter to look in there
for some medicine herself. Later she took back her wallet and tried to look for her
medicine herself. As she went through the contents of her wallet a receipt fell off and
landed on the left side of Michelle. Alicia then asked the accsused, "Bennie, has Cecil had
her baby?" "No," replied Ramos. "Is she having it by caesarian?" Ramos did not answer.
"Does Cecil know that you are doing this to me . . . . that you are holding me hostage?"
Again Ramos did not answer. 2
Upon reaching Katipunan Avenue in front of Blue Ridge Subdivision, Ramos told
Bradshaw to stop at Rajah Matanda Street, Project 4, Quezon City, where he got off and
pulled Alicia out of the car. She clung to the shoulders of Michelle muttering, "God bless
you. Pray for me and notify my family." Then she placed her arm around Bradshaw's neck
and softly whispered to him, "I will probably not get out of this with my life. Tell my family
my situation." At about ten of seven, Ramos finally succeeded in pulling Alicia out of the
vehicle.
Soon after, Bradshaw discovered the receipt dropped by Alicia Abanilla which contained
her name and residence telephone number. Thus after taking his daughter to school, he
proceeded to his office, called the number in the receipt and inquired about Mrs.
Abanilla. The maid informed him that Mr. and Mrs. Abanilla had already left for work at
Meralco. Later that morning, at the instance of Bradshaw, one of his employees called up
a friend at Meralco to inquire about Mrs. Abanilla, and the former was told that Mrs.
Abanilla was at that time apparently being held hostage by a man who was demanding
ransom for her release.
Meanwhile, at around seven-fifteen, Alicia called up her boss, Atty. Pastor del Rosario, for
whom she worked as a confidential secretary at Meralco. Atty. del Rosario was still in

bed. She begged him not to ask any question but said that she needed P200,000.00 in
cash immediately, otherwise, she might not be able to go home anymore. She assured
him that she had enough funds in the bank to repay him. She then requested him to give
the money to Inday, a lady messenger at Meralco, with instruction to deliver the money
to her at Glori Supermart at Sikatuna Village. Atty. del Rosario suggested that the money
be delivered instead by a Meralco security personnel but she refused, saying, "Please not
security, I do not want them to know what happened to me." Towards the end of their
conversation, Alicia entreated, "Sir, you are the only one who can help me now, I cannot
turn to anyone else. Please help me. " 3
Del Rosario hurriedly gathered P200,000.00 in cash, placed the money in a white
envelope and tucked it in a plastic bag. He then ordered his driver, Serrano Padua, to
fetch Inday from Meralco. When Inday arrived, Del Rosario gave her the money and told
his driver to take her to Mrs. Abanilla at Glori Supermart with specific instruction to give
the money to no one else but Mrs. Abanilla. 4
At around seven-thirty, a taxi cab driven by Antonio Pineda passed by. Ramos and Mrs.
Abanilla boarded the cab and took the back seat. They proceeded towards Anonas
Extension in Sikatuna Village near Glori Supermart. Ramos instructed Pineda to park his
taxi in front of the supermarket as they had to wait for someone. For P700.00 Pineda
agreed to wait for them so he could take them later to Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Driver Serrano Padua and Inday finally arrived at their rendezvous. Pineda, who was
requested by Alicia to receive the money, approached them and asked about the
package for Mrs. Abanilla. However, Inday refused to give the money saying that she was
instructed to deliver it only to Mrs. Abanilla. Pineda went back to the taxi and informed
his passengers of Inday's refusal. Mrs. Abanilla gave her identification card to Pineda and
told him to ask Inday to face the taxi and show herself through the window. Pineda went
back to Inday, gave Mrs. Abanilla's ID and asked her to approach the taxi to see Mrs.
Abanilla. Inday recognized Alicia so the former handed the money to Pineda. Thereupon,
Ramos told Pineda, "Tara, deretso tayo sa Norzagaray."
On the way to Norzagaray travelling along Commonwealth Avenue, Ramos suddenly
changed his mind and decided to head for Bocaue, Bulacan, instead. During the entire
trip, Pineda noticed Alicia looking very pale, fidgety and apparently perturbed.
Upon arriving in Bocaue, they went straight to the St. Paul Hospital compound where
they parked. Pineda and Ramos got off to relieve themselves by a fence. Pineda noticed
a revolver tucked in Ramos' waist. Afterwards, Ramos told Pineda to leave the taxi for a
while as he was going to discuss something with his companion. Obviously, he was
interested in counting the money in the plastic bag. As Pineda waited for his passengers
to call him, he observed that his woman passenger kept opening and closing the rear
door of his taxi as if trying to get out.
Pineda became uneasy. He slowly inched himself towards his taxi. There he saw Ramos
strangling his woman companion. So he told Ramos, "Boss, iba na yata iyang ginagawa
mo ah, baka mapadamay ako diyan!" He boarded his taxi and asked his passengers to
transfer to another vehicle as he did not want to get involved in what was going on. But
Mrs. Abanilla pleaded, "Mama, huwag mo akong iiwanan dito dahil papatayin ako ng
lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na babae." Ramos retorted, "Hoy! pati iyong isip ng

driver nililito mo." Then he ordered Pineda to take them back to MacArthur Highway
where they would take another ride.
As Pineda drove out cf the hospital compound, Mrs. Abanilla panicked and held him by
the shoulder pleading, "Huwag mo akong iiwanan dito." When Pineda reached MacArthur
Highway near Sto.
Nio Academy in Bocaue he saw a traffic aide, Gil Domanais, who was directing traffic.
He, had a gun on his waist. Upon seeing the armed traffic aide, Pineda stopped his cab,
got of: and told Domanais that his male passenger had been strangling his female
companion. He also narrated that his passengers, who had been with him since morning,
refused to get off his cab and he had not yet been paid by them. Domanais suggested to
him to bring his passengers to the police station.
Domanais peeped through the window of the taxi and saw Ramos with his left arm
around the shoulders of Alicia. She was crying. She told Domanais that Ramos was
armed with a revolver and was hurting her. At that moment Ramos pulled out his gun
prompting Domanais and Pineda to run away and take cover. Ramos then transferred to
the driver's seat and drove the cab away. In a desperate effort to free herself, Alicia
opened the left rear door and jumped out of the cab; unfortunately, her blouse was
caught in the process. As a consequence, she was dragged by the vehicle. Ramos
suddenly stopped the taxi, and as Alicia attempted to rise, he aimed his gun at the back
of his hapless victim, fired at her twice, hitting her just above her nape. Domanais, who
was armed with a .38 caliber pistol and witnessing the shooting, fired at Ramos; but he
missed him. Then he called for police assistance as Ramos fled on foot.
On the same day, responding elements of the Bocaue Police Station apprehended Ramos
in a grassy area at the Violeta Metroville Subdivision. The police connfiscated his .22
caliber Smith and Wesson Magnum with four (4) live ammunitions and two (2) spent
shells, and recovered a bag containing P138,630.00 consisting of P1,000.00 and P500.00
bills.
Mrs. Abanilla's body was left at the scene of the shooting, lying face down parallel to the
taxi. Dr. Benito B. Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of the Province of Bulacan, conducted
the autopsy and testified that the cause of death was "shock due to massive external. . .
intracranial. . . . hemorrhage due to gunshot wound in the head penetrating the skull and
the brain tissues." 5
Thereafter an Information was filed against Benedicto Ramos y Binuya alias "Benni"
charging him with the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder, to which he
pleaded not guilty. To expedite the proceedings, the prosecution and the defense agreed
during the pre-trial that the testimony of their witnesses would be in the form of
affidavits which would be the bases for the cross-examination. Trial on the merits than
ensued.
For his part, Ramos denied having kidnapped and killed the victim. In his Sinumpaang
Salaysay 6 he narrated his versio of the incident.
3.
Na, ang bintang sa akin na "kidnapping for ransom with murder' ay walang
katotohanan sapagkat ang totoo ay ang mga sumusunod: a. Ang yumaong si Alicia
Abanilla ay aking ninang sa kasal noong ikinasal kami ng aking asawang si Cecillia

Pascual noong 17 October 1993 sa Sta. Rita Parish Church, Quezon City. Bago ako at ang
aking asawa ikasal sa nabanggkit na simbahan ay kasal na kami sa isang civil marriage
noong June 30, 1993 sa City Hall ng Maynila . . . d. Na, dahilan sa wala akong
hanapbuhay mula ng ako'y tanggalin sa Meralco, ako'y nagsabi sa aking ninang Alice na
ako ay paluwagan ng kaunting halaga ng pera dahil sa ang aking asawa ay
manganganak at wala akong panggastos. Ang una kong sabi sa kanya ay noong unang
linggo ng Hulyo, 1994 sa pamamagitan ng telepono sa Meralco. Ang sabi niya sa akin
huwag akong mag-alala pagkat tutulong siya sa akin kapag manganganak na ang aking
asawa. Ngunit pinagbawalan niya akong magpunta sa kanilang bahay o kaya sa kanyang
opisina, kaya sa telepono lamang kami nag-uusap . . . g. Sapagkat ako'y ayaw
papuntahin ng aking ninang Alice sa kanyang at sa kanyang opisina, at ang sabi niya ay
abangan mo na lamang siya sa EDSA kanto ng White Plains, ang ginawa ko siya sa
kanyang rota patungo sa kanyang opisina. Ng kami ay magkita sa EDSA sa may kantong
patungong White Plains, sinabi ko agad sa kanya na kailangan ko na 'yong ipinangako
niyang tulong para sa aking asawa. Ang sabi niya sa akin bukas na raw niya ibibigay at
doon din sa lugar na iyon kami magkita. Hindi ako pumayag at doon kami nagtalo,
pagkat sabi ko sa kanya pupunta ng ospital ang asawa ko at ngayon din kailangan ko ng
pera. Habang kami nagtatalo, may dumating na sasakyang Toyota Corolla Station Wagon
na ang driver ay Amerikano at pinara ng ninang Alice ko at hinintuan kami ng kano na
napag-alaman ko nitong bandang huli na si Malcolm Bradshaw, at isinakay si ninang
Alice at sumakay na rin ako . . . . j. Ng kami ay dumating sa St. Paul Hospital Bocaue,
napag-alaman kong wala doon ang asawa ko, kaya't sabi ko kay ninang Alice tutuloy
kami sa Norzagaray, sa bahay ng aking biyenan at baka nandoon pa si Cecil. Ayaw ng
sumama ni ninang Alice sa Norzagaray dahil nahihiya daw siya sa biyenan ko, kaya't
kami nagtalo. Gusto kong makumbinsi si ninang Alice na sumama sa Norzagaray kaya
pinakiusapan ko ang driver ng taxi na lumayo muna sandali pagkat may pag-uusapan
kami ng ninang Alice at sumunod naman ang driver na lumayo sa taxi . . . . k. Sinabi ko
kay ninang Alice na kailangan sumama siya sa akin sa Norzagaray at siya ang magbigay
ng pera kay Cecil upang malaman ni Cecil na ang pera ay galing sa kanya. Ito sa dahilan
na kung ako ang magbibigay ng pera sa asawa ko, baka itong si Cecil ay magduda na
masama ang pinanggalingan ng pera at matakot, at magkaroon ng shock at duguin. Ang
aking pangamba na baka magduda si Cecil na ang pera ay galing sa masamang paraan
ay dahil sa ako nga ay napagbintangan na nagpalsifica ng tseke ni Atty. del Rosario at
yun din ang dahilan ng aking pagkakatanggal sa trabaho ko sa Meralco . . . . 1. Hindi
kami nagkasundo ng ninang ko at maya-maya dumating na ang driver at nagyaya na
dahil gutom na raw siya. Pumayag ako na lumakad na ang taxi at ang plano ko ay ituturo
ko sa driver ang daan patungo sa Norzagaray, ngunit pagdating sa MacArthur Highway,
hininto ng driver ang taxi sa kanang parte ng Highway patungong Maynila at bumaba
ang driver at kinausap yung traffic aide na may baril at nakatayo sa tabi ng highway.
Hindi ko narinig kung ano ang sinabi ng driver sa traffic aide ngunit ng makapagusap na
sila, ang traffic aide ay lumapit sa taxi na para bagang magiimbestiga. Ng sumilip ang
traffic aide sa bintana ng taxi sa tapat ng driver na noon ay nakabukas, sinabi ng ninang
Alice na may baril ang kasama ko. Ang traffic aide ay natakot at biglang lumayo at
kumuber sa tabi ng pader at ang driver naman ay tumakbong palayo. Ang ginawa ko ay
lumipat ako sa lugar ng driver at ang plano ko ay ako na ang magmamaneho patungong
Norzagaray pagkat ang driver tumakbo na at nangagamba ako na baka kung ano na ang
nangyayari kay Cecil at wala sa ospital . . . . m. Ng lumakad na ang taxi, si ninang Alice
na noon ay nakaupo pa rin sa likuran ng driver seat, biglang tumayo at dinampot ang
baril na dala ko na noon ay nasa tabi ko sa upuan ng driver at biglang binuksan ang
kaliwang pinto sa hulihan at bababa ngunit nahawakan ko ang damit niya ng aking
kaliwang kamay pagkat nakahawak sa manibela ang kanang kamay ko at siya ay hindi

nakababa agad. Sa aming pagbubuno pagkat hinihila ko siya na mapaupo muli at siya
naman ay pilit na bumababa, pumutok ang hawak niyang baril ng dalawang beses.
Maya-maya may pumutok na isa at biglang tumumba si ninang Alice at bumagsak sa
kalsada na ang ulo ay patungo din sa direksyon ng taxi . . . . n. Ng makita ko si ninang
Alice na bumagsak sa kalsada, bigla akong bumaba at dinampot ko yung baril na noon
ay nabitiwan na ni ninang Alice at dinampot ko rin ang bag ng ninang ko at tumakbo
akong papalayo pagkat naalala ko yung traffic aide na nakakuber sa tabi ng pader na
noon ay malapit pa sa taxi.
After trial, the court a quo convicted Ramos of two (2) separate crimes kidnapping for
ransom and murder instead of the complex crime charged in the Information. It held
that there was no proof that the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of killing her so as
to make the offense a complex crime. Thus, the killing of the victim was found to be
merely an afterthought making accused-appellant liable for two (2) separate offenses.
In this petition, accused-appellant imputes to the trial court the following errors: First, the
lower court erred in concluding that his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt;
Second, the lower court erred in disregarding vital pieces of evidence in his favor; and,
Third, the lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crimes of kidnapping for ransom
and murder.
Specifically, accused-appellant argues that kidnapping was never sufficiently
established. He maintains that all throughout the incident the victim was not under
detention at any moment nor was she deprived in any manner of her liberty; that if there
was some kind of pressure or force employed upon the victim, such pressure or force did
not amount to a deprivation of liberty but was merely a matter of persuasion that moved
the victim to go with him voluntarily.
We resolve. The essence of the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Art.
267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659, 7 is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with an indubitable proof of intent on the part
of the malefactor to effect such restraint on the offended party' liberty. The term "actual
deprivation of liberty" consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure but also of
detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 8
In the instant case, actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident from the moment
she was forcibly prevented by accused-appellant from going to work at Meralco and
taken instead against her will to Bulacan. Her freedom of movement was effectively
restricted by her abductor who, armed with a .22 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver
which instilled fear in her, compelled her to go with him to Bulacan. This is clear from the
testimonies of witnesses Bradshaw and Pineda, thus
Bradshaw:
4.
On 13 July 1994, at around 6:30 a.m., I was driving from my home in Wilson St. to
the Marcos Highway, to bring my seventeen (17) year old daughter, Michelle, to school. I
was driving a 1981 Toyota Corolla station wagon, with plate no. PAZ 395. Between the
gate of Corinthian Village and the right turn towards White Plains Avenue, at the bus
stop, I saw a lady, struggling and breaking away from an unidentified male (the "male").
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25. The male got down and started to pull out the lady from the car. The lady held on
to my daughter and in a quiet voice, whispered to her, "God bless you, please tell my
family my situation." The male kept trying to pull her out. As she was about to be pulled
out of the car, she then held on to me with her right arm and in a quiet voice, whispered
to me, I will probably not get out of this with my life. Tell my family my situation." I asked
her, "How can we? We don't even know your name." 9
Pineda:
Q54: Habang nasa biyahe kayo ay wala ka bang nakitang takot o tanda ng pangamba sa
panig ng babae?
S:
Meron po. Pag tumitingin ako sa rear view mirror ko ay napapansin kong
maputlang-maputla yung babae na parang takot na takot.
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Q56: Pag nagsasalita ba yung babae ay may napapansin ka bang nerbiyos so boses
niya?
S:

Meron ho.

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Q71: Pagkatapos ay ano ang sumunod na pangyayari?

S:
Noong naiinip na ako bumalik na ako sa dalawa at nagtanog ako ng ganito "ano ba
boos?" ang sagot sa akin ng lalaki ay bigyan ko uli sila ng fifteen minute na pag-uusap.
Ang ginawa ko ay lumayo uli at nakipagkuwentuhan sa isang driver na gumagawa ng
pintuan ng kaniyang kotse. Pagkatapos tinanong ko ang kakuwentuhan ko kung anong
oras na at ang sabi ay 12:45 p.m. na raw kaya inip na inip na ako. Paglingon ko sa taxi ay
napansin kong bukas-sara iyong pintuan sa side ng babae at sa wari ko ay parang
gustong bumaba ng taxi, maya-maya ay napansin kong sakal-sakal na noong lalake
iyong babae.
Q72: Ano ang ginawa mo pagkatapos mong makita na sinasakal iyong babae?
S:
Lumapit po ako at sinabi ko sa lalake na "Boss, iba na yata iyang ginagawa mo ah,
baka mapadamay ako diyan." Pagkasabi ko ay binitiwan noong lalake iyong babate na
parang gustong palabasin parang walang nangyari. Pumasok ako sa taxi ko at sinabi ko
sa lalake na "lumipat na lang kayo ng sasakyan baka mapadamay pa ako diyan." Ang
sabi sa akin ng babae "Mama, mo akong iiwanan dito, dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito.
May kapatid ka din na babae. " . . . At habang inilalabas ko ang taxi ay nagpapanic na
ang babae at kumakapit na sa kaliwang balikat ko at umiiyak na nagsasabing "huwag mo
akong iiwan dito" . . . 10
From the narration of facts by the prosecution witnesses we note that on at least three
(3) occasions the victim tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to get away from appellant: the first
attempt was at EDSA when she struggled to free herself from his clutches and hailed a
bus and a white car but without success, and later, when she jumped into the car of

Bradshaw to escape; the second was at St. Paul Hospital, Bocaue, when witness Pineda
noticed from a distance the rear door of his taxi being repeatedly opened and closed by
his woman passenger as if trying to get out; and, finally, at MacArthur Highway when the
victim jumped out of the taxicab but her blouse was caught at the rear door (although
appellant claims he grabbed her blouse and forced her back into the cab 11). It was
during this final attempt to free herself that she was gunned down from behind by
accused-appellant in cold blood. If there really was no restraint on her person, as
appellant insists, there would have been no reason for her to attempt to escape.
Furthermore, from her statements to witnesses Bradshaw, Del Rosario and Pineda, the
victim clearly hinted at her abduction and the imminent threat on her life. She whispered
to Bradshaw, "I will probably not get out of this with my life. Tell my family my situation."
To Atty. Del Rosario she said, "I need P200,000.00 in cash immediately, otherwise I might
not be able to go home anymore; Sir, you are the only one who can help me now, I
cannot turn to anyone else. Please help me." And, to witness Pineda, "Mama, huwag mo
akong iiwanan dito dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na babae."
It may be observed at this juncture that the victim kept on repeating she was going to
die. She even exclaimed to Pineda that she would be killed by accused-appellant. One
thing is certain from those statements of the victim, i.e., that she was virtually at the
mercy of her tormentor who at that moment was already in complete and effective
control of her.
The claim of the defense that the force or pressure employed against the victim was in
fact merely a matter of persuasion and not constitutive of restraint on the victim's
liberty, taxes credulity. Definitely, the acts of forcibly pulling the victim out of the car of
witness Bradshaw, strangling her while inside the taxi of Pineda, pulling her back into the
cab when she attempted to flee, and eventually shooting the victim twice in the head
and hitting her, can hardly be considered as "merely a matter of persuasion." On the
contrary, these circumstances are positive indications of the victim's detention by
appellant against her will.
The victim might have carried occasional conversations with the accused, but this fact
did not negate the existence of kidnapping. Evidently, that was just the victim's way of
mentally and emotionally coping with the harrowing and dangerous situation she was in.
After all, appellant was not a total stranger to her, she being a principal sponsor at his
wedding. She had to start a conversation not only to calm herself down but also to
appease her captor.
For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an
enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. It is enough that, as in the instant case,
she was in any manner deprived of her liberty, unable to move and get out as she
pleased. 12
Accused-appellant next contends that there was no proof he demanded or received
money from anybody, since it was the victim herself who asked money from Atty. Del
Rosario, and her statement that "she needed P200,000.00 immediately, otherwise, she
might not be able to go home anymore," does not suggest that someone was demanding
money from her or that she was being kidnapped; that if his intention was to kidnap the
victim for the purpose of extorting ransom, then he could have just left the victim and
brought the money with him; that, in fact, when the victim gave the money to him after

it was delivered to her by Pineda who received it in turn from Inday, he (appellant) just
dropped the money on the floor of the taxi and it was the victim who picked it up and
placed it in her bag.
The arguments are as puerile as they are untenable. The statement of the victim that
"she needed P200,000.00 immediately otherwise she might not be able to go home
anymore," should not be interpreted in isolation. Rather, its true meaning should be
ascertained in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. When the victim called up
Atty. Del Rosario, she was already being held hostage against her will by the accused
who; armed and violent, had no qualms in maltreating his Ninang and subsequently
shooting her twice and killing her.
By his own admission, accused-appellant really did ask for money from the victim
although he tried to impress upon the trial court that it was merely a loan. Consider the
following statement of accused-appellant
. . . sinabi ko agad sa kanya na kailangnn ko na 'yong pinangako niyang tulong para sa
aking asawa. Ang sabi niya sa akin bukas na raw niya ibibigay at doon din sa lugar na
iyon kami magkita. Hindi ako pumayag at doon kami nagtalo, pagkat sabi ko so kanya
pupunta ng ospital ang asawa ko at ngayon din kailangan ko ng pera. 13
The tenor of the foregoing statement unmistakably shows that accused-appellant was
not merely borrowing but was actually demanding money from the victim, reminding her
of her supposed promise to lend him money for his wife's delivery. Common experience
tells us that when borrowing money, persuasion is used, for debt implies a favor, a
request. Thus, the words of accused-appellant "hindi ako pumayang," "doon kami
nagtalo," and "ngayon din kailangan ko ng pera," are inconsistent with his excuse that he
was just borrowing money from the victim.
Moreover, while the records do not disclose that accused-appellant specified the exact
amount he needed, the victim was nevertheless explicit in her plea to Atty. Del Rosario to
procure for her P200,000.00 in cash immediately. The nagging questions are: Why
P200,000.00? Why not just, say, P50,000.00 or even P100,000.00, which was more than
enough to cover the hospitalization expenses of appellant's wife? Why "loan" a hefty sum
to a person who had been out of work for quite sometime due to a previous misconduct
likewise involving money, and whose capacity to pay was doubtful?
Nonetheless, the explanation of the accused that what happened was just a simple case
of borrowing money coupled with a request that the victim accompany him to Bulacan so
his wife would believe the money was really borrowed and did not come from an illegal
source, was too lame and anemic, and disproved by subsequent events. Indeed, it hardly
conforms to human nature that after appellant was loaned a considerable amount he
would suddenly turn vicious toward his own benefactress, strangle her and shoot her to
death for no sane reason than that she refused to go with him to Bulacan.
From all indications, therefore, no other logical meaning can be ascribed to the victim's
statement to Atty. Del Rosario than that the money was intended as ransom, i.e., as
consideration for her release from captivity.
While it may be true that it was the victim, not accused-appellant, who made the call and
asked for the money, it must be stressed nonetheless that actual demand for ransom by

the accused from the relatives or friends of the victim is not necessary, much less
essential, as the demand may be made directly on the victim herself. This convenient
method commonly resorted to by kidnappers, more often, proves to be very effective not
only in compelling the relatives and friends of victims to pay ransom but also in
concealing the identities of the malefactors.
The fact also that the money was delivered to and received by the victim personally did
not make it any less a ransom prize. After it was handed to the victim, she gave it to
accused-appellant, who was seated beside her at the back seat of the taxi. Clearly,
accused-appellant, who was in total control of the situation, obtained actual and
constructive possession of the ransom money when it was delivered to the victim. 14
On his conviction for murder, accused-appellant points out contradictions in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Antonio Pineda and Gil Domanais concerning their
positive identification of appellant as the one who shot the victim. According to accusedappellant, Antonio Pineda testified on direct examination thus
Q:
Sinabi mo kanina na nakita mong binaril ng dalawang beses sa ulo yung sakay
mong babae noong kasama niyang lalaki, nakita mo ba ito?
A:

Oo, po. 15

And on cross-examination Pineda testified

Q:

But you did not see the person who fired the shots?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

And you ran away, is that correct?

A:

Yes, sir. 16

The same witness also gave two (2) places of his birth, namely, tubo sa Baclaran and
tubong Bisaya (taga Antique ang ama at Bicol ang ina)
T:
Ano ang iyong tunay na pangalan, edad, tirahan at ibang bagay hinggil sa iyong
pagkatao?
S:
Antonio Pineda Jr. y, Lirio, 22 taong gulang, binata, tubo sa Baclaran, Paranaque,
Metro Manila at nakatira/stay-in taxi driver sa No. 65 Matahimik St., Teacher's Village,
Quezon City, at ang aking mga magulang ay may permanent address sa Block F-28, Lot
9, CDC 12 Area D, Barangay San Nicolas, Dasmarias, Cavite. 17
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Q:
Pakisabi ang iyong buong pangalan at iba pang mga bagay-bagay na maaaring
mapagkakilalan sa iyo?
S:
Ako po si Antonio Pineda Jr. y Lirio, 22 taong gulang, binata, tubong Bisaya (taga
Antique ang ama at Bicol ang ina) at stay-in taxi driver sa No. 65 Matahimik St.,

Teacher's Village, Quezon City, at ang aking mga magulang ay may permanent address
sa Block F-28, Lot 9, CDC 12 Area D, Barangay San Nicolas, Dasmarias,
Cavite. 18
Moreover, according to appellant, Pineda gave two (2) different versions as to who
caused the taxi to stop at MacArthur Highway
S:
. . . Tuloy-tuloy po ako ng pagtakbo ko at pagdating ko sa kanto ng MacArthur
Highway na malapit sa Petron station at Sto. Nio Academy ay may nakita akong traffic
aide na nakauniporme ng khaki at may sukbit na baril. Ang ginawa ko ay bigla akong
nagpreno sa tabi sabay labas ng taxi at nilapitan ko iyong traffic aide. 19
T:

Ano ang ginawa ninyo sa Highway kung mayroon?

A:

Pinatigil po ni Bennie yung taksi at nagtalo silang dalawa ng biktima. 20

On the part of witness Gil Domanais, appellant draws our attention to the witness'
statement to the police that appellant shot the victim twice in the head, while on crossexamination the same witness declared
Q:
But since you are (sic) at the back, your position was at the back of the taxi, you
did not know who fired the gun, is that right?
A:

I know, sir.

Q:

Why do you say you know?

A:

Because the shots came from inside the taxi, sir.

Q:

But you did not know who actually fired the shots?

A:

I'm very sure that it was the suspect who fired the gun, sir.

Court:
A:

Did you see the suspect fire the gun?

I saw it sir.

Q:
But you did not hit him because actually you cannot (sic) see him when you fired
your gun, is that correct?
A:

I saw him and it was the upper shoulder that was showing, sir. 21

Accused-appellant stresses that witness Domanais was merely presuming it was

accused-appellant who fired at the victim. Thus, insofar as the murder is concerned, the
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt.
We disagree. The shooting of the victim took place in the presence of and within the
auditory perception of witness Pineda who was just ten (10) meters away from the scene.
He heard the shots from the taxi whose lone occupant at that time was accusedappellant. In addition, witness Pineda explained that he earlier saw appellant attempting

to kill the victim by strangulation; thus, he concluded, and rightly so, that it was
appellant who shot the victim to death.
With respect to Pineda's supposed inconsistent statements on where he was born, this
was sufficiently explained by him during his cross-examination
Q:
Mr. Pineda, you gave your statement to the police on July 13, at about 11:40 in the
evening, and you were asked about your name and other personal circumstances. Your
answer is (sic) You are Antonio Pineda, tubo sa Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Now
in your second statement given to Atty. Abad on the 26th of July, you were asked the
same question and you answered you are (sic) Antonio Pineda, tubong Bisaya. Now will
you explain to us why in your first statement you said that you are (sic) tubong
Paraaque and then in your second statement, you are (sic) tubong Bisaya, which is
correct?
A:
sir.

My father is a Visayan and my mother is a Bicolana and I was born here in Manila,

Q:

In other words, you were not born in the Visayas?

A:

No sir. 22

By saying therefore that he was "tubong Bisaya" despite the fact that he was born in
Manila, Pineda was merely disclosing his Visayan origin on his father's side.
The other alleged inconsistencies in Pineda's sworn statements as to who caused the
cab to stop along the highway refer to minor details which cannot impair his
credibility. On the contrary, such consistencies even guarantee that his testimony was
not a product of perjury. 23 As succinctly observed by the trial court
. . . although the testimonies of the two (2) prosecution witnesses, namely, Antonio
Pineda, driver of the taxi cab wherein accused and the victim rode from Quezon City up
to Bocaue, Bulacan, and Gil Domanais, the traffic aide, contained minor inconsistencies,
the same even bolstered their credibility showing that their testimonies were
unrehearsed. So, also, prosecution witnesses testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner. 24
As for the allegation that Domanais was merely presuming it was accused-appellant who
fired at the victim, suffice it to state that Domanais categorically testified that it was
accused-appellant who shot the victim in the head. On cross-examination, he gave a
detailed account of how the shooting took place
Q:
But since you are (sic) at the back, your position was at the back of the taxi, you
did not know who fired the gun, is that right?
A:

I know, sir.

Q:

Why do you say you know?

A:

Because the shots came from inside the taxi cab, sir.

Q:

But you did not actually saw (sic) who fired the shots?

A:

I'm very sure that it was the suspect who fired the gun, sir.

Court:
A:

I saw it, sir.

Court:
A:

Did you see the suspect fire the gun?

Where were you?

I was on the side of the taxi, sir.

Court:

I thought you ran and took cover on the wall.

A:
The wall where I hid was only low, sir, that is why when I stood up, I could easily
see, sir. 25
As can be seen from the foregoing dialogue, the trial court clarified the matter with
witness Domanais who positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant. Moreover,
in his sworn statement Domanais categorically stated
. . . . Sakay po siya ng isang taxi at siya po ay tumalon ngunit nakawit po sa pinto ang
damit niya kaya po siya nakaladkad ng taxi ng kaunti at ng ihinto po ng suspect ang taxi
dahilan po sa bago nangyari ito ay tumakbo po ang driver ng taxi ay dinukwang na lang
po ng suspect ang biktima at binaril nga po ng dalawang beses sa ulo. 26
The suggestion that it was witness Domanais' shot which hit the victim is belied by the
evidence. The medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim testified that the entry
wound at the back of the victim's head measured 0.75 centimeters and that based on
the character of the wound the bullet causing it was fired from a .22 caliber gun similar
to that confiscated from accused-appellant. Therefore, the fatal shot could not have
come from witness Domanais' .38 caliber pistol. 27 Moreover, witness Domanais affirmed
that it was only after he saw accused-appellant shot the victim twice in the head that he
opened fire at accused-appellant.
The rule in this jurisdiction on the matter of credibility of witnesses is well-settled. Unless
there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the
case, the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court, which
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and was
in a better position to gauge their credibility and appreciate properly the relative weight
of the often conflicting evidence for both parties. 28
In the present case, we find no cogent reason to overrule the judgment of the trial court
giving credence to the declarations of prosecution witnesses Pineda and Domanais who
positively identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, the
accused anchored his defense on bare denial. Certainly, this negative assertion cannot
prevail over the unimpeached testimony of the prosecution witnesses describing in
sufficient detail how accused-appellant shot the victim. In the face of the clear and
positive declaration of witnesses, the defense of denial hardly assumes probative value

and goes even farther down the drain in the absence of any evidence of ill motives on
the part of the witnesses to impute so grave a wrong against accused-appellant. 29
Thus when accused-appellant suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning, shot the
victim from behind twice after the latter failed in her attempt to escape but was dragged
instead by the cab where she was held captive, and while in a pitiable state of utter
helplessness, the crime committed cannot be any less than murder qualified by
treachery.
Considering the evidence extant on record, we agree with the trial court that victim Alicia
Abanilla was indeed kidnapped for ransom and then murdered by accused-appellant. But
the kidnapping for ransom and murder should not be treated as separate crimes for
which two (2) death penalties must as a consequence be imposed. Instead, under Art.
267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, accused-appellant should
be convicted of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER
and impose upon him the maximum penalty of DEATH.
Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that
where the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his abductor, the crime
committed would either be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of
The Revised Penal Code, 30 or two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus,
where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact
killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a
necessary means of committing the murder. 31 On the other hand, where the victim was
kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as an
afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were
committed. 32
However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a
last paragraph which provides
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of "special complex
crime" of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction
drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was
purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is:
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of
whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
Obviously, the instant case falls within the purview of the aforequoted provision of Art.
267, as amended. Although the crime of kidnapping for ransom was already
consummated with the mere demand by the accused for ransom even before the
ransom was delivered the deprivation of liberty of the victim persisted and continued
to persist until such time that she was killed by accused-appellant while trying to escape.

Hence, the death of the victim may be considered "a consequence of the kidnapping for
ransom."
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray 33 that RA No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes
the penalty of DEATH is unconstitutional, nevertheless, accede to the ruling of the Court,
by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should
accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA alias "BENNIE" is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
No. 7659, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of victim Alicia Abanilla in the
amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for burial expenses.
Conformably with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of the case be forwarded forthwith
to the President of the Philippines for the exercise at his discretion of his power to pardon
the accused-appellant.

G.R. Nos. L-8922-24

February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENTINO ENGUERO, JOSE TARIMAN, NAZARIO NARVARTE and DIONISIO
BUENO, defendant-appellants.
Manuel Bilog for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for
appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno were charged
with the crime of robbery in band in three separate informations and after a joint trial the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur found them guilty as charged and sentenced
them as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 2714, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty which shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor nor more than
14 years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte
and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than
4 years and 2 months of prison correccional nor more than 8 years and 21 days of prison
mayor; and all of them to indemnify Florentina Ogarte de Binaday in the amount of
P36.75 and to pay the costs;

(b) In Criminal Case No. 2715, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty which shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prisons mayor nor more than
14 years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte
and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than
4 years and 2 months of prison correccional or more than 8 years and 21 days of prison
mayor; and all of them to indemnity Creseciano Magistrado and Juan Margarte in the
amount of P38.88 and P17.80 respectively, and to pay the cost; and
(c) In Criminal Case No. 2716, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty which shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor nor more than
14 years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte
and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than
4 years and 2 months of prison correccional nor more than 8 years and 21 days of prison
mayor; and all of them to indemnify Anatolia Bragais in the amount of P3 and to pay the
cost. In the three cases, they shall not suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency on account of the nature of the principal penalty.
The one bottle of Siutong wine, Exh. B, shall be returned to Cresenciano Magistrado; the
pair of red leather shoes; Exh. H; the Jacket, Exh. G; the blue pant, Exh. H; and the
hammer, Exh. I to Anatolia Bragais; and the birthstone ring, Exh. E, to Juan Margarte. The
balisong, Exh. M, and the bolo, Exh. C, and its scabbard Exh. C-1, are confiscated. The
Pistol, Cal. 45, W/SM-394701, by decision of this court in Criminal Case No. 2729, is
already confiscated. The gray skin suit marked Exhs. K and K-1; the pair of tennis shoes
Exh. D; the raincoat, Exh. L; and the flashlight, Exh. N, shall be refused to Florentino
Enguero. The towel, Exh. O; the skin pant Exh. P; and the pair of shoes, black and white,
Exh. Q, shall be returned to Nazario Narvarte.
They appealed. Jose Tariman withdrew his appeal. As no question of fact is raised, the
only error assigned to have been committed by the trial court being the conviction and
sentence of the defendants for three robberies in band instead of only one, the Court of
Appeals certified the appeal to this Court.
The trial court found the following:
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 9, 1952 the four defendants met at Yabo
River, Lupi, Camarines Sur, after Florentino Enguero had previously provided himself with
a pistol. From the river they went to the house of Enguero where they took their supper.
After eating Enguero issued to Nazario Narvarte a bolo, to Jose Tariman a balisong and to
Dionisio Bueno, a piece of hardwood, while he himself had the pistol. Thus armed sagan,
Lupi, but before reaching the barrio itself, they passed at the house of Teodulo Banta
where Enguero ordered him and his brother-in-law, Francisco Bugagao, at the point of his
pistol to guide them to the barrio. At the instance of Eugenio, their hands were tied
behind their backs. With the two as guides, the group proceeded towards the barrio, and
on the way they met Pedro Bragais by the stairs of his house. Pointing his pistol at him,
Enguero had his hands tied behind his back and ordered him to go with them. They
continued on their way and later they met again one Ernesto Belgado whose hands they
also tied behind his back. They took him along with them too. They arrived in the barrio
at about 8:00 in the evening and went directly to the store of Cresenciano Magistrado
which adjoins his house. They made the four tied men sit on the ground in front of the
store guarded by Narvarte who had the bolo in his hand, while Enguero entered the
store. Pointing his pistol at Magistrado, Enguero demanded money from him. Fearing for

his life, Magistrado ordered his wife who was in the house to give their money to them.
Enguero, Bueno and Tariman then went up the house and took P4.80 from Magistrado's
wife. And upon finding Juan Margarte, the barrio school teacher who was lodging with the
Magistrados, in one of the rooms of the house, Bueno, who had the open balisong in his
hand brought him down to the ground and there tied his hands behind his back. Upon
seeing a birthstone ring in Margarte's finger, Bueno forcibly took it away from him. After
a while Enguero and Tariman went down to the store and told Magistrado to give them
wine which they drank. After drinking Enguero took the goods displayed in the store and
passed them on to Bueno and Tariman who piled them on the ground in front of the
store. The goods consisted of one dozen bottles of Coca-Cola worth P1,20; one dozen
cans of Sardines worth P7.20; one dozen bottles of wine, Hoctung, worth P3; one dozen
Sardine at P4.80; one dozen bottles Pomade worth P4.80; two pairs of gold ear-rings
worth P10; one dozen cartons Purico, valued at P3; and one package of Matches worth
P0.33. The total value of these articles together with the sum of P4.80 taken from the
wife of Magistrado amounts to P39.13. The defendants also carried away the following
articles belonging to Juan Margate; one birthstone ring worth P70; one pair of tennis
shoes worth P5.50; one pair of sock worth P2; one cake of soap worth P.30; a medal and
a crucifix worth P10, all with total value of P87.80.
After having committed the acts narrated above and when it was about 10:00 in the
evening, the four defendants, together with Magistrado, Margate whose hands were still
tied behind his back and the four other tied individuals, all of whom they forced to go
with them, went to the nearby house of Victorino Togno about 14 meters from the house
of Magistrado (See Exh. R). Upon arriving Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman and
Clementino Carulla (this last one was originally accused with the four defendants, but the
case against him was later dismissed upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal) went up the
house. while their abovenamed companions remained on the ground guarded by Bueno
and Narvarte. Anatolia Bragais, wife of Victorino Togno, and her son were in the house.
Pointing at the neck of Anatolia a sharp instrument, Enguero demanded money from her.
Carulla opened a trunk and took P3 from it. Enguero asked Anatolia where she kept the
rest of her money, and to make her reveal it, he threatened to cut her throat with the
sharp instrument. She told him that she had no other money. However, Enguero took and
carried away from her house a pair of shoes worth P18, a jacket worth P12, a blue pant
worth P12 and a hammer. These articles including the P3 in cash have a total value of
P45. Then they left the house.
After committing the acts mentioned in the next proceeding paragraph, the four accused
and Carulla, together with Magistrado, Margate and the four tied men whom they again
forced to go with them, proceeded to the house of Florentina Ogarte, wife of Ireneo
Binday, located about 54 meters from the house of Cresenciano Magistrado (See sketch,
Exh. R). The time was about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Upon arriving Enguero and
Carulla went up the house while, Tariman, Narvate and Bueno again stood as guard on
the ground. Enguero pointed his pistol at Florentina and ordered her to produce her
money and jewels. She replied that she had none; but Enguero nonetheless searched her
waistline. Not having found anything, he began to hold her private parts, but she begged
for pity and said they could get instead the goods in her store. Enguero left her and took
from the store 2 dozen cans of Sardine worth P8.20; 15 tins of Salmon worth P11.15; 14
tins of tinapa worth P4.20; 2 dozen bottles of Hoctung wine worth P8.40 besides money
amounting to P4.80. He threw the goods to his co-defendants on the ground through the
door. The value of the goods and money taken makes a total of P36.75. Enguero and
Carulla then asked Florentina to provide them with empty sacks which she did. Bueno,

Tariman and Narvarte gathered the goods and put them inside the sacks. They then left
the house after cautioning Florentina not to report them to the authorities.
From this last house the four defendants, together with those whom they forced to follow
them, returned to the store of Magistrado. Upon arriving they gathered the other stolen
goods and put them inside the sacks. Then they looked for some one who could carry
goods for them. They found Glicerio Buensalida and Absalon Medrano, after which they
untied the hands of Margate, Bragais, Belgado, Banta and Bugagao. After warning them
out to report to the authorities, the four defendants left and went away with the stolen
goods carried by Buensalida and Medrano.
After a few days the defendants were apprehended pursuant to a warrant of arrest
issued by the Justice of the Peace Court of Lupi on July 16, 1952. After their arrest
Enguero and Tariman were investigated by Capt. Dominador M. Gutierrez of the 1st
Camarines Sur PC Company, and Narvarte and Bueno by First Lieut. Jaope Nobleza of the
same company. The investigation was made in question and answer from and reduced to
writing which later was subscribed and sworn to by the defendants before Mamerto M.
Bonot, Justice of the Peace of Lupi. Exhibit S is the sworn statement of Enguero, Exhibit T
of Bueno, Exhibit U of Narvarte and Exhibit V of Tariman. In there exhibits the four
accused have admitted and confessed among other statements, their respective
participation in the three different robberies, pointing to the investigators the
whereabouts of some of the stolen articles.
Following the lead in the written confessions Sgt. Fernando Narvaes took the defendants
to their respective houses on July 22, 1952 and recovered from them some of the goods
and arms used during the robberies. From Florentino Enguero the following were
recovered:
1 suit, skin, gray, Exhibits K and K-1
1 bottle of Siu Tung wine, Exhibit B
1 pair of Tennis shoes (Elpo), Exhibit D
1 raincoat, rubber, used during the robbery, Exhibit L
1 Knife (balisong) used during the robbery, Exhibit M
1 flashlight used during the robbery, Exhibit N
1 Pistol, Cal. 45 W/SN-394701 with one magazine and one ammunition used during the
robbery.
From Nazario Narvarte, the following were recovered:
1
1
1
1

towel (white), Exhibit O

pant skin (Ceniza), Exhibit T
pair shoes, black and white, Exhibit Q
hammer (Steel) Exhibit I.

From Dionisio Bueno, the following were recovered:

1 ring, birthstone, Exhibit E.
1 pant skin (blue), Exhibit H
1 jacket, skin, light green, Exhibit G.
One pair of leather shoes (Red), Exhibit F, was recovered from Jose Tariman.

The above articles are listed in an inventory, Exhibit J, prepared by Sgt. Narvaez, in which
all the four defendants certified that the goods were taken from their custody. As
evidence of this fact, each and everyone of them signed Exhibit J below the articles
recovered respectively from them (Exhibits J-1, J-2, J-3 and J-4).
Counsel de oficio argues that the appellants are guilty of one crime only citing in support
of his contention the case of People vs. de Leon, 49 Phil., 437. The contention is without
merit. In the case cited by counsel the defendant entered the yard of a house where he
found two fighting this case, after committing the first crime of robbery in band the
appellants went to another house where they committed the second and after
committing it they proceeded to another house where they committed the third.
Obviously, the rule in the case cited cannot be invoked and applied to the present.
The crime committed is robbery in band punished in articles 294, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, in connection with article 295
of the same Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 373, with prison correccional in its
maximum period to prison mayor in its medium period. As the robbery was committed in
band, the penalty to be imposed is the maximum period of the proper penalty, which is
prison mayor in its medium period, or from 3 years and 1 day to 10 years. The second
paragraph of article 295 of the Revised Penal Code which impose the penalty next higher
in degree upon the leader of the band has been left out by Republic Act No. 373,
amending further article 295 of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed upon each of
the appellants is the next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense, or 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, and 8 years and 1 day of
prison mayor, as maximum, in each of the three crimes committed, and the accessories
of the law.
Modified as to the penalty to be imposed upon each of the three appellants, the rest of
the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with proportionate costs in each case against
the appellants.