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Contents
Our Mindset in Investigations
Facilitation Skills
Generous Listening
Interviewing
Choices of Question Style
Investigation Steps
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Scope Setting
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Step 5 ICAM
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Step 7 Reporting
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This booklet is designed to assist the ICAM facilitator, together with the ICAM
leader and ICAM team, in delivering a high quality output. It is intended for use
by those who have done an ICAM Facilitators Course with Raeda and supports the
conversations that were held in that forum.
Facilitation Skills
A critical skill for the facilitator is to be able to facilitate. This may sound obvious but it
is so basic that it is often overlooked. Below are some of the core skills of facilitators:
Know the ICAM model inside out and be able to explain it
Listen generously and listen to understand
The ability of always maintaining the interaction as a conversation
The control to not express your views unless asked
Remembering that the ICAM is all about the team, not about you as the
facilitator
Asking questions in different ways
Involving everybody in the conversation.
GENEROUS LISTENING
So, what is Generous Listening and why is it important in facilitation (and also in
interviewing)?
Generous Listening (or Listening Powerfully) is one of those things that can
change the way you are seen by others and can directly affect your leadership
style. It is also one of the essential skills if you wish to be an effective facilitator.
Generous Listening is all about listening in order to understand. It is about
focusing on the person talking with you. It is about listening with your body and
more importantly, with your mind. If, however, you are just waiting for the words
to stop so that you can say what you want to say, it is not generous to the other
person. We call this stingy listening. If you are wondering where you are going to
go out for dinner later, or you 'know' what they are going to say next, or you are
also trying to listen in on another conversation, this stingy listening will be noticed.
Not directly maybe, but you will be seen as not listening. To listen generously or to
listen powerfully and to listen with your whole self. To listen with the desire, a wish
if you like, to understand what is being said.
All of this sounds really easy, but to get really good at generous listening you
will need to practice. Even then, it is easy to slip into stingy listening. One great
way of keeping in check is to be aware of when you are listening well and when
you are not. Myles Downey in his brilliant book 'Effective Coaching' advises us that
"awareness is curative". This is a really neat little trick that you can do to yourself.
Simply being aware of how generous or stingy your listening is at the time will
improve your listening skills.
Interviewing
What is the best way to interview someone after a safety event? The simple answer
to this one is 'as soon as possible'. Actually, there is a very simple approach to
interviewing that anyone can learn and apply with ease and confidence.
Once again, it all depends on what is going on in your mind and how generously
or powerfully you are listening (see the section on Generous Listening). The best
state of mind to have when interviewing someone after a safety event is one of
curiosity and seeking to understand. Also remember that you are trying to determine
what is responsible, not who is responsible. We start by looking into how to do a
good interview.The three question styles below are enough to get all the information
that you need. The most powerful one, especially at the start of an interview, is 'free
recall'. Here, you simply allow the interviewee to talk while you listen generously.
When interviewing, allow the interviewee to speak their mind. Never interrupt
if you have a question, jot it down and ask your question later. You have two ears
and one mouth. Use them in that ratio or even less. After asking them to go through
(in as much detail as they want) what happens normally, and what happenned that
day, just close your mouth and listen. Listen generously. Listen with your eyes, with
your body and with your mind. Have a partner with you to take down the notes so
that you can focus on the body language and show support and active listening to
the interview. If you go in with a mindset of listening to understand, you will do fine.
As opportunities arise, you will have the chance to explore more information
using open questions. Leave as many of the closed questions as you can to the end.
Open-ended questions
Allow for an unlimited and general response from the witness in his/her own
words. Such questions tend to result in unrestricted, broad ranging responses.
Investigation Steps
The steps of an Investigation:
Step 1 Immediate Actions Early Interview and Scene Security
Step 2 Investigation Planning and Investigation Scope Setting
Step 3 Data Collection Information Gathering
Step 4 Data Organisation Timelines and 5 Hows & Whys
Step 5 ICAM
Step 6 Creating SMART Actions
Step 7 Reporting
STEP 1
STEP 2
INVESTIGATION PLANNING
AND INVESTIGATION SCOPE SETTING
The best ICAM teams contain diversity and an element of independence. Having a
manager level person as the ICAM team leader is also critical to ensure control and
the identification of good quality Organisational Factors.
The personal accountable for the incident identifies the ICAM Team leader,
from another area, department or function and together they nominate a suitable,
also independent, ICAM facilitator. They also discuss and set the scope of the
investigation.
Investigation team members would then consist of the ICAM leader, the
facilitator, a peer (from another shift usually, maybe a safety rep) of the person
involved in the incident, a technical subject matter expert, and maybe a safety
advisor from the area also.
STEP 3
STEP 4
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Resilience
Resilience is often described as the ability to bounce back, to accommodate
'unexpected' change and to absorb uncertainties without falling apart.
Resilience is best described by looking at four elements:
Knowing what to do, i.e. how to respond to disruptions and disturbances by
making adjustments to normal work.
Knowing what to look for, i.e. how to monitor that which is, or could become,
a threat in the near term.
Knowing what to expect, i.e. how to anticipate developments and threats
further into the future, such as potential disruptions, pressures, and their
consequences.
Knowing what has happened, i.e. how to learn from experience, in particular
to learn the right lessons from the right experience.
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Drift
Drift explores whether the way we do the task today has changed slowly over a
longer period of time.
Holding people accountable is a fine notion, as long as the people you are
holding accountable have the authority to make decisions about their work and
have the capability and authority to carry out the work the way you believe it
should be done.
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Leadership
The key element in relation to both simple and detailed incidents is the role
leadership played in setting up the individual or system that failed and the
conversations leaders have both before and after an incident.
Inductions and core competency training are very different things and we tend to
lump them together when carrying out investigations. Inductions are about raising
awareness in people so that they have cause to stop and think about something
before barging off in a direction they may later regret. Inductions are there to make
sure people know what a confined space is and not to go into one, for any reason,
without being formally trained, etc.
Design of Work
System Interrelationships
This topic covers the idea that people take action when doing a task that is based
on their view of the world at that point in time and space.
This is the fact that when some or many of the forces described here interact that
makes the difference, not just one on its own.
This topic brings in all of those systems that we build into safe work. Things like:
Change Management, Communication, Compliance and Verification Management,
Contractor Management, Document Management, Equipment Maintenance,
Fitness for Work, Area Design, Leadership, Risk Management, Task Planning and
Preparation, Training and Competence, etc.
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STEP 5
ICAM
As a facilitator, you need to be able to explain the ICAM model to others. You
also need to be able to answer questions about it especially at the start of an
investigation so that the ICAM team have context of what it is you are trying to
achieve together in the investigation.
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This slice of cheese represents the actions that either individuals or teams took just
prior to the event. Although the term human error is a fabrication or a label that is
placed on an action after an event has occurred, it is unfortunately still in common
use as though it is some human condition. It is not. It is better to think of Individual/
Team Actions as actions that people did that did not result in the outcome that was
expected. It could be an action that goes against what is required in a procedure,
or a rule. It could also be the omission of a step in a task that is required to be done
in order to complete a task. The word "action" here is important. In order to qualify
as an Individual/Team Action, an action must be observable. A great way of think
about that it must be possible to take a photo, or a video of the action. It cannot be
a thought or a decision. It must be something someone did (or did not do).
As we know we all make mistakes every day of our lives, this is also true at
work. To ensure that people are not hurt at work as a result of a mistake or slip
or a lapse that they may make at work, we need to provide Defences to protect
them. Examples could be ABS or Traction Control in a vehicle to help avoid an
accident. Seat belts, airbags and roll over protection are other examples. As you
can see, Defences can either be designed to prevent an event from occurring or
for minimizing the consequence of an event after it has happened. After all, a seat
belt cannot stop you having a car accident.
Our job in an ICAM is to establish which defences were missing or did not work.
These are called Absent/Failed Defences. We ask questions such as:
What could (or should) have been in place to prevent this event from
happening but was not in place?
What was in place to prevent this event from happening but did not work?
What could (or should) have been in place to minimise the consequences of
this event but was not in place?
What was in place to minimise the consequences of this event but did not
work?
These are the Absent/Failed Defences.
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James Reason also helps us understand that there are factors that contribute to us
making 'errors'. There are many things at work that encourage (or promote) errors
of violations of procedures and in the ICAM, they are described in a group called
Task/Environmental Conditions. These can range from giving people procedures
that are too complex and cause confusion or simply are not able to be followed,
through to poor communication or less than adequate task allocation to planning,
and things like the weather and what PPE we are provided with, etc. These are
things that are setting our people up to fail in their tasks. Giving them the wrong
tools, telling them to hurry up, giving mixed messages about what to do; these all
increase the likelihood that they will make mistakes and not follow the procedures.
Often they simply cant.
So we simply ask things like "What is it about the task or the environment in which
we asked people to work that has promoted or encouraged this error to occur?"
We need to understand where the Task/Environmental Conditions came from.
Who created those Task/Environmental Conditions that encouraged people to
make 'poor' decisions and 'erroneous actions'? Where did they come from? The
answer of course is "The Organisation". The Organisation could be a department,
an operation or the business itself. The Organisation created the rules that tell
us how to write the (complex) procedures. It tells us how we purchase things
and how we supply tools and equipment et cetera. It also tells us how to do risk
assessments and assess the impact of changes in the workplace. It is these systems
that are working quite as well as we expected them to if they have produced Task/
Environmental Conditions that have encouraged people to take Actions (that we
used call errors or violations) in the absence of good defences that could have
resulted in a severe injury.
In order to identify these Organisational Factors we ask ourselves:
Where did we go wrong as an organisation?
Where did our systems fail?
How did we manage to set up a work environment or task that encouraged
or promoted errors or violations?
It is often at this point that we really need to ensure we have the right people in the
ICAM team. Organisational Factors are often strategic, high level, General Manager
level or above issues and so we need to ensure the right level people are involved
in the discussions around Organisational Factors at the time.
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STEP 6
STEP 7
Actions must address all Absent or Failed Defences and Organisational Factors.
Sometimes, you will also have an action for a Task/Environmental Condition also.
For example, when you have a poorly written procedure as a TEC and the OF is all
about your procedure writing process, you will not only fix the process but ensure
also that the poor procedure is fixed as well.
Each operation and company will have its own reporting requirement. The biggest
learning I can share with you in this space is to challenge what you have and make
it as simple as you can, but not too simple.
So, what should be in a report? The first way to start this conversation is to ask
your leaders about the purpose of the report. Is it to share findings, help senior
leaders understand the incident, simply capture the outcome of the investigation,
or some mixture of these?
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REPORTING
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Do the 5 Hows & Whys come from the gaps identified between WAD,
WAN, and WAI?
ICAM chart do the contributing factors listed in the ICAM chart (or list)
align with the headings?
Absent/Failed Defences last minute defences that were missing or did not
work as planned.
Individual/Team Actions describes actions that someone did or did not do
that led to the incident.
Task/Environmental Conditions describes what promoted or encouraged
the Individual/Team Actions.
Organisational Factors describes a system-wide issue that created the
Task/Environmental Conditions.
Look at each of the Individual/Team Actions and see if there is at least one
Task/Environmental Condition that would encourage or promote it as an
action.
Does the Incident Pathway Statement (Or ICAM Chart/list) clearly tell
the story through from the Organisational Factors that produced Task/
Environmental Conditions that encouraged or promoted the Individual/
Team Actions, which in the absence or failure of a Defence led to the event?
Do the Key Learnings come from the investigation and do they summarize
what would be useful to others?
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Are the actions sustainable and still going to be in place and effective in 12
months?
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Facilitating ICAM
STEPPING INTO THEIR SHOES
This booklet is designed to assist the ICAM facilitator, together
with the ICAM leader and ICAM team, in delivering a high
quality output. It is intended for use by those who have done
an ICAM Facilitators Course with Raeda and supports the
conversations that were held in that forum.