© @ RADIO FREE EUROPE Pro COMMUNIST AREA This material was prepared forthe use of the cediors and policy taf of Radio Free Europe, issu Ideology @YUGOSLAVIA: Party 6 February 1974 YUGOSLAVIA: IDEOLOGICAL FERMENT AT MANY LEVELS The current ideological struggle reflected particularly in the conflict surrounding the Belgrade and Zagreb con- tributors to the Zagreb philosophical bimonthly Praxis, is only one aspect of the ferment prevailing at various levels in the country, The conflict indicates that even the insistence on a full-fledged imple- mentation of the workers' self-management system has provoked reaction by certain groups in the Party -- which in turn believes that conditions for such a development have not yet matured, The case of the eight Belgrade professors whose removal from their teaching posts has been postponed for the second time has lately attracted public interest throughout the world. The case, however, is only one -- and in some respects not even a very important one -- reflecting what has been going on in the country since December 1971 when the first of large-scale purges were carried out. Suffice it to say that all party congresses in the six constituent republics of Yugoslavia, originally scheduled to convene in January or at the latest in February of this year, have been postponed (the Serbian party congress, twice) until the end of March and April. Although no reasons were given for the postponement, it seems fairly certain that an internal struggle behind the political scene is the chief reason. far as the main congress is concerned,ive.y the 10th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugo- Slavia, scheduled to take place "sometime’in May" of “this” year -- it would not be surprising if it too/were postponed until June or July in view of the postponement of the republican party congresses. Why all these changes? Judging from the daily reports of the Yugoslav information media, the ideological struggle between the two chief factions in the LCY has so intensified that new purges at all levels are expected before the individual republican congresses are convened. Because of these struggles, however, one should not assume that any strong pro-Soviet faction exists qy in the top party echelons, In fact, ruling personalities in the Party Presidium and the Executive Bureau have been annoyed when gy accused of harboring pro-Russian sentiments. They have repeatedly stated that it is ridiculous to reproach them in that way, especially in view of the fact that most of them (not to mention Marshal Tito) were in the vanguard of the opposition to Moscow's attempts at imposing Soviet domination over Yugoslavia. What then is the struggle about? Professor Stipe Suvar [shu-var], one of Croatia's leading ideologists, several months ago stated the dilemma of the Yugoslav Communists when he said that "the ideological struggle in the League of Communists is now particularly acute because one notes that meny Communists advocate solutions which are not truly socialist; this is why they have found themselves torn between their intimate convictions and the official party line." (1) This is why, in his opinion, "“{deological confusion" has arisen. It has been created by so- called "leftist deviations" which demand solutions far ahead of their time, to situations in which "social conditions have not @ yet matured," as well as "rightist tendencies" trying "to revive a capitalist society." Between these two trends, said Suvar, lies “Tito's specific orientation," on which he did not elaborate apart from saying that without Tito's line, "the unity and independence of the country could not be preserved." Stalinism - A Special Sort of Mentality Suvar's claim that the workers! self-management system "should not be idealized as the final goal, but only as a stage in the development of society" indicates the extent of ideological confusion in Yugoslavia. For it is the self-management system which is considered the basis of Yugoslav society, an idea, on which -- for instance -- the contributors of Praxis in Zagreb and Belgrade have particularly insisted, accusing Yugoslav party and state leaders of not being willing to implement it fully. For this reason, Suvar, generally speaking a liberal party leader. calls them far ahead of their time and not willing to wait until the "social conditions mature." This seems to imply that onecan "deviate" from the official party line even if one insists on a full-fledged implementation of this very line. Professor Svetozar Stojanovic explained this paradox in his article in the Zagreb philosophical bimonthly Praxis when he said: The leaders of a Stalinized party can at one and the same time make essentially opposite accusations. For instance: the enemy is helped by a party member when he shows an exaggerated zeal'to implement the leaders! decisions or if he sabotages their implementation. (2) In the case of the eight Belgrade professors, one can see precisely this type of development: they are guilty of insisting on already agreed upon measures which have been mentioned hundreds of times in party resolutions and whose implementation has been strongly recommended. Because of this, Professor Stojanovic and his friends around Praxis consider the present ruling personalities in Yugoslavia "Stalinized communists" despite their defense that they have no desire whatsoever to become supporters of Moscow, But Professor Stojanovic and his friends see the way in which the country's internal policy is conducted as a kind of "Stalinist de-Stalinization." Milovan Djilas said several years ago that "there is no Communism which in one forn or another, to this or that degree, is not also Stalinism, neither can there be a true de-Stalinization if it does not reach to the very foundations of the Communist system." (3) Of course, Praxis people ~- although accused also of Djilasism -- have never agreed with Djilas on this issue. Specifically, they believe in communism "with a human face" which for them is the’so-called self-managing socialism in Yugoslavia. Contrary to Djilas who wrote that communist ideology "is intrin- sically incapable of developing into a democracy," (4) Belgrade and Zagreb Marxists firmly believe that the only way to achieve communism "with a human face" is first to implement the Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, adopted at the 7th Party Congress in April 1958 and to fully implement the idea of the workers' self-management. In their recent appeal published in a West German daily, they voiced their credo in the following way: ‘The idea of a multi-party system in Yugoslavia is practically unrealistic and theoretically conservative... The Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia should also remain the basic trend toward a realistic development of Yugoslavia in the future. It is not a, matter of changing this program but rather implementing it in a more rapid and consequential way. It is not a matter of creating, along with the LCY, yet another party, but rather to democratize the LCY in a moreiM profound way; in this way as much room as possible for free expression of various convictions would be created, more conflicts of opinion and dialogues, more public criticism - i.e. when one could polemicize with facts rather than with legal citations. Democratic socialism does not necessarily need parties but rather democratic public opinion. (5) Conflict to- Continue It is precisely this demand for "democratic public opinion" @ and “free expression of various convictions" within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’which has brought top Yugoslav o Marxists into conflict with the official party line which insists on "great discipline," "democratic centralism" and a strict "hierarchical order." This Leainist way of thinking in the highest party echelons in Yugoslavia leads one to suspect that the latter would like to come closer to the Soviet party line despite their repeated denials of any influence coming from Moscow. Professor Suvar, whose anti-Sovietiem and anti-dogmatism, thus far at least, could not be doubted, seems to be close to the truth when he said in October 1973: "Our ideals are now pegged higher, but our capability in practical terms has not increased correspondingly, and a possible discrepancy between ideals and social actuality could confront us with new social crises." (6) Such a crisis prevails in Yugoslavia today and the "new heretics" embodied in the Belgrade and Zagreb professors could help contribute to its solution, to quote Djilas again, "provided ww they do more than merely lament the betrayal of dogma and do, in fact, point toward the exit from the vicious circle." e Unfortunately, the persecuted professors in Yugoslavia do not consider themselves "heretics" but rather "true believers" -- the "heretics" being the ruling personalities. The latter are totally of the opposite opinion, Thus, the present conflict in the Yugoslav Party seems to be slowly but surely leading to a definite break between the two factions. Slobodan Stankovic (1) Politika, Belgrade, 27 Septemer 1973. (2) Praxis, Zagreb, No. 5-6, September-December 1973, p. 688. (3) Kultura (in Polish), Paris, No. 3/282, 1971. (4) Freedom At Issue, New York, May-June 1971. (5) su \tsche Zeitung, Munich, 26-27 January 1974. (6) Oko, Zagreb, 3 October 1973.