Lost in the Politics of Produce:

The American Agricultural Dilemma and the Dehumanization of the Bracero

History 4839
May 5, 2016

The Bracero Program promised Mexican migrant workers good pay, transportation,
suitable living conditions, and decent meals while working the fields for growers across the
United States. On the surface the program sounded solid; however, the inadequate housing, poor
quality food, and low pay provided by the growers fell extremely short of what the braceros were
promised. In 1961, Dr. Ernesto Galarza, a Mexican migrant himself, visited bracero camps in
California and noted the housing provided to the laborers consisted mostly of storage sheds,
chick hatcheries, dairy barns, and tents.1 In an interview with a Mexican laborer, Dr. Galarza
learned the laborer and his fellow braceros were sleeping in a cow barn that smelled so badly
they had to use Flint (a strong chemical) to cover up the cow smell.2 The worker told Dr. Galarza
that when the Father came to hear their confessions and say the Rosary that they were ashamed
for him on account of the smell of the cows and the stink of the Flint.3 This is just one of many
examples describing the living and working conditions of bracero workers in the United States in
Truman Moores book The Slaves We Rent.
The American farm growers considered themselves different from traditional farmers.
Growers were the big business of agriculture and were not small farmers that used the labor of
farm children on vacation.4 American commercial growers had a large migrant workforce and
grew most of the food for the United States. California farm growers in the mid-1900s depended
on Mexican guest workers to harvest their crops in a timely manner and provide American
families with produce at an affordable price. Without the braceros, the growers argued that they
would not be able to keep up with production costs and American families would pay the price in

Truman E. Moore, The Slaves We Rent (New York: Random House, 1965), 43.
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 43.
3
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 43.
4
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, x.
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increased food costs. This assertion by the growers became a hotly debated issue that divided
members of Congress, domestic agricultural workers, and the growers themselves. At the center
of the debate were the bracero workers, who were reduced to a basic commodity and
dehumanized in this argument over the future of American produce. The Bracero Program may
have started as a solution to war-time labor shortages, but it evolved into a crutch
agricultural growers were reluctant to let go of and caused the United States government to
rethink the morality of the guest worker program.
Historians N. Ray Gilmore and Gladys W. Gilmore argued that the domestic agricultural
worker was the victim in this labor dispute as they could not afford to support their families on
the low harvesting wages and did not have the benefit of paid transportation, food, and housing
that was afforded to the bracero.5 In response to the claim that braceros are the agricultural
industrys answer for cheap labor, the Gilmores have made the argument that considering the
other expenses incident to hiring the bracero, he can hardly be regarded as cheap labor.6
However, as historian Michael Snodgrass has noted, the Braceros were bribed by venal officials
at home, shipped north in cattle cars, cheated by racist growers, and then sent back with little
more than some new boots or a radio to show for their labor.7 While the domestic agricultural
worker had protection in the form of unions and were familiar with their rights as laborers, the
braceros did not have the ability to demand the rights promised to them through the agreements
made between the United States and Mexico.

N. Ray Gilmore and Gladys W. Gilmore, The Bracero in California, Pacific Historical Review 32 (1963): 275.
Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 275.
7
Michael Snodgrass, The Bracero Program, 1942-1964, Beyond La Frontera: The History of Mexico-U.S. Migration,
ed. Mark Overmyer-Velazquez (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 80.
6

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The Inception of the Guest Worker Program

With the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and the 1885 Alien Contract
Labor Law, which made it a federal crime to import contract labor, Californians, who had
historically relied on foreign labor, were placed in a difficult position in regards to their
agricultural industry.8 Prior to World War I, Mexican workers had made their way into the
United States while working on the railroads, providing maintenance work, and were loaned out
to local farmers whose crops would be transported by the railroads.9 Due to the war and the
increasing restrictions the United States placed on European immigrants, resulting in a shortage
of labor, Southwest employers were able to convince Congress to grant Mexican laborers
temporary permission to work in the United States through The Immigration Act of 1917 once
the United States officially entered the war.10 Allowing Mexican laborers to enter in to the
United States during the war ensured the continued growth the California agricultural industry,
which resulted in a significant increase in Mexican immigrants during the 1920s particularly in
that state until the Depression.11
The United States governments acceptance of temporary labor from Mexico continued
until 1922; however, Mexican immigration continued to increase until the 1930s. The Okies,
English speaking migrant workers who came from Oklahoma, streamed into California during
the dust storms and the Depression in the 1930s.12 The Okies arrival in California provided a
surplus of laborers, which was a first for American growers.13 As a result of the surplus of

Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 267-268.

Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 268.
10
Barbara Schmitter Heisler, The Bracero Program and Mexican Migration to the United States, Journal of the
West 47, no. 3 (2008): 66.
11
Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 269.
12
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 83.
13
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 83.
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laborers, many Mexican workers repatriated or were forcibly deported to Mexico, but there were
some who continued to illegally cross over the border in search of work.14 Mexican laborers
continued to supply California with farm labor throughout the course of the Depression.
Following the United States entrance into World War II, shipyards and aircraft industries made
use of the surplus Okie labor.15 With the countrys economic recovery, agricultural employers
began to complain about a labor shortage in the early 1940s and requested to start using Mexican
migrant workers again.16 The braceros were a better option over the Okies for growers, as the
braceros were single males, were willing to work for less in poorer conditions, did not speak
English, did not know their rights, and were not in a position to defend themselves if their rights
were violated.17
Despite protests from unions, growers were able to successfully lobby Congress to allow
them to resume the use of Mexican labor. However, in order for an American grower to be
eligible to receive Bracero labor they had to prove an existing shortage of available laborers.18
The Mexican government was hesitant to resume the temporary labor program with America due
to forced deportation of Mexicans during the depression, the poor treatment of its citizens during
their tenure in the fields, and Mexicos concerns over its own economic development.19 In July
of 1942, the United States federal government and the Mexican government came to a bilateral
agreement on labor migration and labeled it as a means that provided strategic farm crops for

14

Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 269.

Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 83.
16
Heisler, The Bracero Program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 66.
17
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 94.
18
Heisler, The Bracero Program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 67.
19
Heisler, The Bracero Program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 67.
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the democratic cause.20 The Bracero Program had officially begun and brought millions of
Mexican laborers to the Southwest agricultural industry throughout the duration of the program.
What made this program different from previous arrangements between growers and
Mexican laborers was that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), in conjunction
with the Farm Security Administration (FSA), was responsible for recruiting, transporting,
contracting, housing, and feeding Braceros.21 In 1943, the War Food Administration (WFA) took
over for the FSA and worked through the University of California Agricultural Extension
Service to place workers, which meant that farm placement and county extension men
determined what constituted fair wages and they did so without consulting the Mexican
government or domestic agricultural workers.22 By executive order in 1948, the Department of
Labor took over all responsibilities and duties related to the Bracero Program.23
In 1951, Public Law 78, which was an amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1949, was
enacted. The act authorized the Secretary of Labor to do the following:
(1) to recruit such workers ; (2) to establish and operate reception centers ; (3) to
provide transportation from recruitment centers outside of the united States to such
reception centers; (4) to provide subsistence, emergency medical care, and burial
expenses during transportation and at reception centers; (5) to assist workers
and employers in negotiating contracts [each having the free choice of acceptance or
rejection]; (6) to guarantee the performance of employers of provisions of such contracts
relating to the payment of wages or the furnishing of transportation.24
With the temporary guest worker program in place between the United States and
Mexico, as well as American laws in place to protect the braceros, the number of Mexican
migrants coming into the United States drastically increased. In the peak year of 1957, there
were 192,438 Bracero workers in California.25 By the end of the program in 1964, more than 4.5

20

Heisler, The Bracero Program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 67.
Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 269-270.
22
Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 270.
23
Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 270.
24
Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 271.
25
Gilmore, The Bracero in California, 272.
21

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million Mexican workers had entered America legally and, although these laborers worked in 24
different states, California had the largest number of these workers.26 This number does not
include the estimated 3.6 million undocumented Mexican laborers, a third of whom were
deported in 1954 during Operation Wetback.27 Clearly the farm growers concern was with
cheap exploitable labor to maximize profits; otherwise, growers would be looking to domestic
agricultural laborers for the harvesting of their crops and there would not have been a consistent
stream of undocumented workers coming from Mexico illegally who were able to find work.

The Bracero Experience

One subject matter that appears to be missing from the numerous debates over the fate of
the Bracero Program is the consideration of the braceros themselves. American employers were
to provide adequate housing, living expenses comparable to domestic farmworkers in the area,
pay prevailing area wages, provide transportation, and guarantee a minimum number of work
days.28 Also, due to past mistreatment, the employers were responsible for protecting the workers
against discrimination. Although these safeguards were put in place for the Braceros wellbeing
by the United States government to appease the Mexican governments concerns over the
treatment of the citizens, inspection and enforcement of these conditions were practically
nonexistent. Instead of paying prevailing wages, the growers convened at the beginning of each
season to decide what they were willing to pay, which was below the thirty cent minimum
requirement.29 This short changing of wages exploited the Mexican worker and kept domestic

26

Heisler, The Bracero Program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 70.
Heisler, The Bracero Program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 70.
28
Heisler, The Bracero program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 68.
29
Heisler, The Bracero program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 68.
27

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workers from seeking employment with growers, which allowed the growers to continue to
prove the continuance of a labor shortage.
The process the braceros faced when they entered and exited the United States was not an
easy one. There were reception stations along the U.S. and Mexico border where buses and
trucks would transport the workers to different company farms. Henry Anderson, of the
Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, had spoken to employees at the Reception Center
in El Centro, California, who stated physical and verbal abuse occurred regularly. The Center
employees saw braceros physical abused by some workers, heard obesities yelled at the braceros,
and in one reported case there was a bracero who was beaten-up and forced into a truck, which
later returned with blood covering the seat.30
The braceros situation did not improve once they were in the United States. Most of the
housing in the camps provided to the braceros were often substandard and fell short of the
minimum requirements. The camps where braceros would reside lacked heating and fire
protection, poor or nonexistent health services, and poor food quality.31 Not only were the basic
human needs of substandard quality, but there were men in the area who profited from selling
meals to the bracero. Fred Van Dyke, a San Joaquin grower in the 1960s, stated he personally
knew of men who grew wealthy charging the braceros a dollar seventy-five per day for meals.32
Van Dyke noted that some camps had a thousand men and that meant a big pay day for those
selling meals to the braceros, a practice which Van Dyke called nothing but a racket.33

30

Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 91-92. The Reception Center employee, who told the story of the bracero being
beaten and forced into a truck, later found out the bracero had been injured on the job and was awarded $500.00.
A transportation assistant, Arnold Edge, wanted the bracero to sign a statement stating he had received $200.00
and that the rest would be mailed to him in Mexico. The bracero refused to sign the paper and wanted to wait
until he received the full $500.00. This refusal lead to his brutal beating.
31
Heisler, The Bracero program and Mexican Migration to the United States, 68.
32
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 93.
33
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 93.

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On top of paying for poor quality food, the braceros were often cheated out of their
wages by the growers. Anderson spoke to some braceros who complained that they had been
forced to accept contracts they did not want. One bracero Anderson spoke to told him that out of
seven men he had made the most money, forty-one cents, for three days work.34 Another bracero
stated that it was pointless to go to work, because the growers cheat them at weight in where
instead of deducting four pounds for the sack [that holds what the braceros gathered for the
day], they deduct ten.35 During the 1960s, a family of four who earned $5,000.00 per year was
considered deprived, a family who earned less than $3,000.00 per year was in abject
poverty, but the Mexican migrant worker never earned more than $1,000.00 per year from farm
labor.36 Moore stated quite succinctly in his book that the poverty the Mexican migrant faced
was the old-fashioned kind. It is to be without food, without clothes, without shelter, and
without hope in this world.
In September of 1963, a crew of fifty-six braceros were traveling in a flatbed produce
truck that had been converted into a bus to their camp in Salinas, California, from the town of
Chualar, where they picked lettuce; a chain had been tied to the outside doors of the bus to keep
the workers in.37 While approaching an unmarked railroad crossing, the driver/foremen,
Francisco Espinosa, and the co-foreman, Arturo Galindo, went slowly over the tracks, but then
gunned the bus over the tracks when they heard a train whistle.38 Unfortunately, Espinosa was
not fast enough and a Southern Pacific Railroad freight train rammed into the bus, cutting it in

34

Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 92.

Moore, The Slaves We Rent, 93.
3636
Moore, The Slaves We Rent, xi.
37
Lori A. Flores, A Town Full of Dead Mexicans: The Salinas Valley Bracero Tragedy of 1963, The End of the
Bracero Program, and the Evolution of Californias Chicano Movement, Western Historical Quarterly 44, (2013):
126.
38
Flores, A Town Full of Dead Mexicans, 126.
35

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half, and threw the bodies of the braceros out of the bus, some landing three hundred feet away.39
Twenty-three braceros died instantly and nine men died later from their injuries.
Due to the tragic accident in Chualar, the safety of the braceros became a mainstream
concern for the budding Chicano movement and other workers rights groups. The California
Department of Industrial Relations reported 125 farm workers died and 2,754 sustained injuries
in transportation related accidents from 1952 through 1962.40 Union leaders joined Mexican
American political activists and religious representatives in their call to Congress to end the
Bracero Program, which they jointly viewed as a program that simultaneously exploited
Mexican laborers and displaced U.S. workers.41 The Council of California Growers, who were
in favor of extending the Bracero Program past its end date in December of 1964, appallingly
argued that some opponents of the Bracero Program stooped to a new low in shameful tactics
by seeking to exploit this tragedy to defeat the proposed bracero law extension now before
Congress.42

Arguing the Fate of the Bracero Program

After a previous one year extension in 1963, the Bracero Program was set to end on
December 31, 1964, as the program was only meant to be a temporary. The arguments for and
against extending the program past 1964 were hotly debated amongst state representatives in
Congress and various farm labor and grower associations, dividing members within their own
associations and political groups. House Rule Committee members who were in favor of the

39

Flores, A Town Full of Dead Mexicans, 126.

Flores, A Town Full of Dead Mexicans, 133. To get a clear understanding of how Mexican migrant workers
were viewed by the U.S., it is important to note that in 1963 farm workers were still classified as types of loads
for vehicles by the U.S. government.
41
Flores, A Town Full of Dead Mexicans, 127.
42
Growers reply to unfair charge on ill-fated bus, Redlands Daily Facts, October 9, 1963.
40

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extension argued that letting the program lapse would not only hurt the agricultural growers
financially, but also the American consumer. Democratic Arkansas representative E.C. Gathings
claimed American housewives will pay more for their canned produce if growers are deprived
of their access to Mexican labor for harvesting and other farm chores.43 Some California
farmers agreed with Gathings as tomato, lettuce, strawberry, and lemon growers relied on
Mexicans for sixty percent of their labor.44 A few of these farmers voiced their concerns and
stated without the bracero workers food prices would go up, as tomato farmers predicted harvest
reductions from thirty to ninety percent. Jack Miller of the Farmers Harvest Association of
Southern California stated that he could visualize about sixty percent of the lemon crop not
being taken off the trees.45 With California being one of the largest domestic agricultural
contributors in the country it is possible to see why some farmers had anxiety over losing access
to a readily available work force.
With the approaching end of the Bracero Program, some farmers and likeminded state
representatives agreed with Gathings that American farm workers would not perform the tasks
required of harvesting.46 Gathings argued the wages offered to farm workers were good, but
American workers in the Southwest would rather collect relief than perform the stoop labor
required to pick major crops.47 Democratic Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield agreed that
the Mexican workers provided a solid labor supply in a field that American citizens are reluctant
to work in and was hopeful Congress would renew the contract with Mexico.48 Robert Mills, the
superintendent of the Berlywood Investment Company, stated that even without the bracero

43

House to vote again on Braceros, Redlands Daily Facts, October 9, 1963.

No magic solution to California farm labor problem, The Oxnard Press-Courier, September 4, 1964.
45
The Oxnard Press-Courier, September 4, 1964.
46
Redlands Daily Facts, October 9, 1963.
47
Redlands Daily Facts, October 9, 1963.
48
Mansfield sees reopening of bracero agreement, Redlands Daily Facts, December 4, 1964.
44

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workers, education had provided Americans with better job opportunities which kept them from
returning to the fields and that as long as the tax dollar and educational facilities are what they
are, we will continue to need supplemental farm labor.49 The proponents of the extension of the
Bracero Program were occupied with the fear of the damaging effects the end of the program
would have on the success of Californias agricultural future.
Proponents of the continued use of Mexican guest workers believed if the program came
to an end it would not take long for Congress to reinstate the program once they saw the effects
of the loss of the workers and realized the need for bracero labor. Robert Holt, secretary manager
of the California Tomato Growers Association, warned that the end of the program would be
disastrous for the domestic tomato industry and could possibly be the beginning of the end for
this processing crop.50 Holt stated the loss of bracero labor and heavy slashes in tomato tariffs
could cause the industry to severely cut back after 1694, and with Italy and Mexico being the
largest exporters of tomatoes to American, a can of tomato paste would be less expensive being
shipped to New York from Italy than it would be for that same can to be shipped and processed
from California.51 With mechanization still a few years off, it would be near impossible for
California tomato growers to keep up with production costs.
According to some growers, not only would the ability to partially harvest crops, or
harvest them at all, be a potential problem with the sudden shortage of labor the Bracero
Program supplied, but it would also affect local merchants as well. John Vevers, the manager of
the Corona Growers, Inc., claimed the loss of Mexican workers would seriously reduce jobs in

49

The Oxnard Press-Courier, September 4, 1964.

Tomato industry threatened by bracero loss, tariff cut, The Bakersfield Californian, January 11, 1964.
51
The Bakersfield Californian, January 11, 1964.
50

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packing houses, canneries and industries allied with farming.52 Vevers stated bracero labor was
used to harvest sixty seven percent of the lemon crops, which provided a large source of income
to the area.53 Braceros working and living in the area would have been spending their money at
local merchants shops, which meant the loss of the braceros to the farm growers would have
also impacted the income of the merchants.
Those in favor of ending the Bracero Program saw the continuation of the program not
only as a detriment to the American farm worker but also to the Mexican guest worker as well.
Democratic Texas representative Henry Gonzales was of the opinion that American workers did
not want harvesting jobs because of low pay and the denial of fringe benefits afford to the
Mexican workers, such as housing, transportation, and food.54 Additional House Rule Committee
members accused the program of aiding to deprive American migrants of jobs and to exploit the
Mexicans.55 Those opposed to the program were of the mindset that with livable wages and
domestic incentives, harvesting work would become more appealing to American workers and
those workers would have alleviated any shortage of labor left by the exiting braceros.
There were some representatives of the California agricultural community that were also
of the opinion that domestic recruitment of farm labor would be a better option than extending
the Bracero Program. John Newman, spokesman of the Council of California Growers,
acknowledged the serious unemployment issue that was affecting California at the time and
stated the growers were committed to recruiting qualified unemployed agricultural workers and
requested the State Board of Agriculture provide assistance in problem solving studies.56

52

Growers ask Corona merchants aid in bracero extension fight, The Corona Daily Independent, September 19,
1963.
53
The Corona Daily Independent, September 19, 1963.
54
Redlands Daily Facts, October 9, 1963.
55
Redlands Daily Facts, October 9, 1963.
56
Growers OK End of Bracero Program, The San Mateo Times, February 17, 1964.

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Newman wanted assistance in determining the number of workers that would be needed, the
projected rate of mechanization to determine the duration of time the workers would be needed,
as well as the amount of wages, fringe benefits, schools, and health facilities these new workers
would need.57 At the time, California was providing a quarter of the countrys table foods and
about half of the nuts, fruits, and vegetables, giving the growers confidence the State Board of
Agriculture would assist them in the transition from bracero labor to domestic labor.58
Opponents of the Bracero Program also argued that not only did the program take jobs
away from American farm workers, but that the benefit of the program was also questionable in
regards to whether or not it helped Mexico. California Democratic representative Edward Roybal
disputed the value of the program to Mexico, claiming it creates other problems and charges
some U.S. employers manage to avoid adhering to standards required for use of bracero labor.59
California Democratic representative B.F. Sisk declared the abuses of the program would be why
its extension would be defeated on the House or Senate floor and claimed that the manner of
operating the program in the Southwest and even in Californias Imperial Valley is such that
unless the abuses are eliminated I will not support further extension.60 Representative Gonzales
argued that the program had caused senseless suffering to the American workers and had
provided little to no benefit to Mexican workers.61 With marginal benefit to the Mexican workers
and with unemployed domestic agricultural laborers in need of work it did not make sense to
renew the guest worker program between the United States and Mexico.

Conclusion

57

The San Mateo Times, February 17, 1964.

The San Mateo Times, February 17, 1964.
59
California delegation split on Bracero issue, Redlands Daily Facts, February 14, 1963.
60
Redlands Daily Facts, February 14, 1963.
61
Redland Daily Facts, February 14, 1964.
58

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The ending of the Bracero Program shed light on the issue that the United States was
unsure of their agricultural future and was divided on whether or not farm growers could sustain
American demand for produce at a reasonable cost without the exploitation of foreign labor.
Even after the programs end, whether it was out of fear of an unknown agricultural future or
greed, California farm growers were able to use a loophole in the Immigration and Nationalities
Act (Public law 414), which stated foreign labor could be used if U.S. citizens were unavailable
to work at a fair wage.62 The growers were allowed to bring in tens of thousands of Mexican
migrant workers from 1965 through 1967, which left Mexican American farm workers underpaid
and unemployed.63 Unfortunately, during this time, produce took precedence over people.

62
63

Flores, A Town Full of Dead Mexicans, 143.

Flores, A Town Full of Dead Mexicans, 143.

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Bibliography
Primary Sources
Growers ask Corona merchants aid in bracero extension fight. The Corona Daily
Independent, September 19, 1963.
This article discusses how the loss of Mexican workers impact both the grower and the
local merchant. I used this article to support the pro-Bracero argument that the loss of the
Mexican worker also affected the local merchants.
Growers OK End of Bracero Program. The San Mateo Times, February 17, 1964.
This article discusses the growers support of ending the Bracero Program. It shows
California growers were amenable to other labor sources after the end of the Bracero
Program.
The Oxnard Press-Courier, August 1963-September 1964.
These articles discuss different farm growers arguments for and against the continuation
of the Bracero Program. It shows the division between the growers.
Redlands Daily Facts, February 1963-December 1964
These articles discuss the differing opinions of the Republican and Democrat government
representatives in regards to whether or not to extend the Bracero Program past 1964. It
shows the divisions within each party.
Tomato industry threatened by bracero loss, tariff cut. The Bakersfield Californian,
January 11, 1964.
This article discusses the hardships tomato growers would face with the end of the
Bracero program. I used this to support the arguments against ending the program.
Secondary Sources
Flores, Lori A. A Town Full of Dead Mexicans: The Salinas Valley Bracero Tragedy of 1963,
The End of the Bracero Program, and the Evolution of Californias Chicano Movement.
Western Historical Quarterly 44, (2013): 125-143.
This article discusses the details of the Chualar bus accident and the aftermath. I used
this article to shows the unsafe and sometimes fatal positions the braceros found
themselves while guest workers in the United States.

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Gilmore, N. Ray, and Gladys W. Gilmore. The Bracero in California. Pacific

Historical Review 32 (1963): 265-282.
This article discusses how the Bracero Program came to be and the specifics of the
program. I used this to gather information on the program to present the history and the
complexities of the program.
Moore, Truman. The Slaves We Rent. New York: Random House, 1965.
This book explores the life of migrant workers across the United States. I used this book
to gather information on the living conditions and the treatment of the Bracero laborers in
California.
Schmitter Heisler, Barbara. The Bracero program and Mexican Migration to the United
States. Journal of the West 47 (2008): 65-72.
This article discuss the migration of Mexican laborers to the United States. I used this
article to gather information on the creation of the Bracero Program and the hardships
faced by the Bracero while working in United States.
Snodgrass, Michael. The Bracero Program, 1942-1964. Beyond La Frontera:
The History of Mexico-U.S. Migration, edited by Mark Overmyer-Velazquez, 79-102.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
This book documents the migration of Mexican workers to the United States. I used
Snodgrasss article gather information on the Braceros experiences working in the United
States.

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