Property Case Digests on Landmark Rulings

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. HELI TOLENTINO

001 - ANDAMO VS. IAC
Facts:
Spouses Andamo (Petitioners) are the
owners of a parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite. The property is adjacent to that of
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette,
Inc. (private respondent), a religious
corporation.
Private
respondent
constructed
waterpaths
and
contrivances
including an artificial lake in their
property.
This allegedly:
o inundated
and
eroded
petitioners land
o caused a young man to drown
o damaged petitioners crops and
plants
o washed away costly fences
o endangered
the
lives
of
petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy
seasons,
o and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction
Petitioners filed a criminal action of
destruction by means of inundation
under Art. 324 RPC before RTC Cavite
against respondents.
Petitioners filed a civil action against
respondent for damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
RTC issued an order suspending the civil
case until there is judgment in the
criminal case.
Petitioners appeal to IAC.
IAC affirmed trial courts ruling.
Petitioners contend that the trial court
and the Appellate Court erred in
dismissing the civil case since it is
predicated on a quasi delict.
Issue: W/N spouses Andamo can proceed with
the civil case, thus be able to claim damages from
the improvements made by private respondents.
Ruling: YES
A careful examination of the aforequoted
complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant,
or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the

plaintiff.
Shown in the petitioners complaint, the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the
land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act
of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the
basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of ones property
is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not
to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Owners have the right over their property but
such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces
of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage
to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or
damage suffered.
Decision of IAC reversed. SC directed RTC to her
the civil case for damages against private
respondent.
002 - BUAYAN CATTLE CO., V HON.
JUDGE QUINTILLAN AND ADAN DE LAS
MARIAS
FACTS:
Petitioner Buayan Cattle Co., is the
holder of Pasture Agreement No. 8.
Said agreement covers 1,000 hectares of
parcel land in Southern Cotabato, the
same has been surrounded with fences.
Subsequently, Pasture Lease Agreement
No. 2510 was issued in favor of Private
Respondent, Adan De Las Marias. It
covered 930 hectares of land adjacent to
the land of the petitioner.
Adan De las Marias asked for a relocation
survey of the said pasture area by a
Forest Guard of the District Forester to
determine the extent of his land.
The survey showed that the boundaries
of private respondents land extended

580 hectares into the Pasture land of the

Petitioner.
Thereafter, he removed the petitioners
fence and started to set up his own
boundary fence 580 hectares into the
petitioners pasture area.
Petitioner reported to the District
Forester the said construction and the
latter sent a forest guard to investigate
the report.
The Director of Forestry ordered to stop
private respondent from fencing the area
leased to the petitioner.
PR filed a complaint for injunction with
the CFI, seeking to enjoin petitioner
Buayan Cattle, district forester, director
of forestry, sec of agriculture and natural
resources, etc., from restricting him in
the exercise of his lease rights. Thus, it
was granted.
P filed a motion to dissolve said writ. But
it was denied.
ISSUE: W/N PR is the lawful possessor of the

subject land in question
RULING: NO, The SC ruled that the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the lower court
is improper and without basis. It is clear from the
complaint that the first and older possessor of the
disputed area is the petitioner herein. Thus,
private respondent is sanctioned due to his
usurpation.
It was PR who unilaterally removed the fence of
the P and set his own boundary fence 580
hectares into the petitioners pasture land,
violating petitioners superior right thereto.
Hence, the purpose of writ of injunction is to
restrain the wrongdoer not to protect him
(private respondent).
The act of PR in unilaterally entering the Ps land
is unlawful and unjust. The Ps act of repelling the
PRs entry into the formers land is sanctioned by
law, thus:
Article 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose,
he may sue such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
The petition is hereby granted.
*Respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary
injunction. That injunction had the effect of
restraining, not the wrongdoer, but the person in
the vigilant protection of his rights. SC ruled that

the issuance of the said writ to restrain any
interference with the illegal operation was in
grave abuse of discretion.
003 - CARLOS SUPERDRUG vs DSWD
FACTS
Petitioners are domestic corporations and
proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines. Policies and Guidelines to Impleme
nt the Relevant Provisions of Republic Act 9257
otherwise known as Expanded Senior Citizens
Act of 2003 which was issued by DOH
providing a grant of 20% discount in the
purchase of unbranded generic medicines from
all establishments dispensing medicines for
senior citizens.
DOH issued Administrative Order No 177
amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the
twenty percent discount shall not be limited to
the purchase unbranded medicines only, but
shall extend to both prescription and nonprescription medicines whether branded or
generic.
Petitioners assert that Sec 4 (a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation of private property. Compelling
drugs to owners and establishments to grant
discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5%
to 10% on branded medicines and the law failed
to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be
justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE:
Is the law unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The permanent reduction in their
total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding
to the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for
which petitioners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation.
The law grants a twenty percent
discount to senior citizens for medical and
dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory
fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert
halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar
places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares
for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization
of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers; and purchases of medicines for the

exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As
a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the
discount as a tax deduction.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand

as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.
In the absence of evidence demonstrating the

alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in
view of the presumption of validity which every
law has in its favor. Given these, it is incorrect
for petitioners to insist that the grant of the
senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to
their business, because petitioners have not
taken time to calculate correctly and come up
with a financial report, so that they have not
been able to show properly whether or not the
tax deduction scheme really works greatly to
their disadvantage.
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive
pricing component of the business. While the
Constitution protects property rights, petitioners
must accept the realities of business and the
State, in the exercise of police power, can
intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights
in the process.
004 - CITY OF MANILA V CHINESE
COMMUNITY OF MANILA
Facts:
The City of Manila, plaintiff herein,
prayed for the expropriation of a portion
private cemetery for the conversion into
an extension of Rizal Avenue.
Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that
such public improvement be made in the
said portion of the private cemetery and
that the said lands are within their
jurisdiction.
Defendants alleged
a.) That no necessity existed for said
expropriation
b.) That the land in question was a
cemetery, which had been used for many
years, and
c.) that the same should not be converted
into a street for public purposes
They further claimed that the

expropriation of the cemetery would
create irreparable loss and injury to
them and to all those persons owing and
interested in the graves and monuments
that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said
public improvement was not necessary
on the particular-strip of land in
question.
Plaintiff herein assailed that they have
the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain and that the courts
have no right to inquire and determine
the necessity of the expropriation
because the only function of the courts
in such proceeding is to ascertain the
value of the land in question; that
neither the court nor the owners of the
land can inquire into the advisable
purpose of the expropriation. Thus, the
same filed an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and
hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.
Held:
YES, The courts have the power of restricting
the exercise of eminent domain. The taking of
private property for any use which is not
required by the necessities or convenience of the
inhabitants of the state is an unreasonable
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and
beyond the power of the legislature to delegate.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be
public or private. The former is a cemetery used
by the general community, or neighborhood, or
church, while the latter is used only by a family,
or a small portion of the community or
neighborhood.
Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public
use and no part of the ground can be taken for
other public uses under a general authority. And
this immunity extends to the unimproved and
unoccupied parts which are held in good faith
for future use.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded
that the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
005 - CUA LAI CHU VS LAQUI

Cua Lai Chu (Petitioner) obtained a loan

of 3.2 M and to secure such they
executed a deal of Real Estate Mortgage
in favor of Laqui (Respondent)
Upon failure to pay Laqui applied for
extra judicial foreclosure and in turn
Cua Lai Chu filed to annul said
foreclosure and TRO.
RTC Ruled in favor of petitioner granting
annulment of foreclosure and TRO then
subsequently reversed its own decision.
Respondent emerged as the highest bidder and
sale was executed in favor of respondent with 1
year redemption period.
After 1 year redemption period
respondent filed for consolidation and
an issuance for the writ of possession
while petitioners filed for opposition
which was denied and granted
respondents motion for declaration of
general default and allowed him to
present evidence ex parte.
CA Dismissed on both procedural and
substantive grounds since petitioners failed to
indicate PTR number.
ISSUE: W/N Writ of Possession was issued
properly despite the pending case questioning
the validity of sale on said property
RULING: Yes. The right to possession of a
purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is
not affected by a pending case questioning the
validity of the foreclosure proceeding.
Furthermore, since the foreclosed property was
not redeemed within the mentioned period
respondent acquired an absolute right as a
purchaser.
DOCTRINE: Art. 433 Actual possessions under
claim of ownership raise disputable presumption
of ownership. The true owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of property.
006 - DISTILLERIA WASHINGTON V LA
TONDENA DISTILLERS
La Todena (LT) filed before RTC for
recovery of possession, (claiming
ownership) against Distilleria
Washington (DW) if 18,517 empty "350
c.c white flint bottles" bearing the
blown-in marks of "La Tondena Inc" and
"Ginebra San Miguel"
LT argues that DW was using LTs

bottles for DWs own product named
"Gin Seven" without their written

consent, violating RA 623
RTC dismissed and held that a
purchaser of liquor pays for the liquor
and bottle. Hence, DW having
ownership over them and is not required
to return the bottle.
Ca reversed, under RA 623, use of
marked bottles by any person other than
the manufacturer without the written
consent is unlawful. Saying that the
marks by La Toneda stamped/blown-in
to the bottles are sufficient notice to the
public that the bottles are LT's property
(having ownership over it)
In a decision of the SC in 1996 it held
that that there was a valid transfer of
bottles to Distilleria Washing, except
that its possession without the written
consent of La Tondena gives rise to a
presumption of illegal use.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the SCs 1996
Decision raising the issue that:
a. In the 1996 decision, SC said DW acquired
ownership of the bottles. Since there is a right of
ownership over the bottles it is absurd to hold
the petitioners liable for the possession and use
of its own bottles w/out consent of LT who is no
longer the owner thereof
Who owns the white flint bottles? Distilleria
Washington
HELD:
La Tonedena not only sold its gin
products but also the marked bottles as
well. These products were transferred by
way of sale. Hence, ownership over the
bottles and all its attributes, namely:
A. jus utendi - right to receive
from the thing what it
produces
B. jus abutendi - right to
consume the thing by its
use
C. jus disponendi - power to
alienate, encumber,
transform & destroy the
thing owners
D. jus vindicandi - right to
exclude, from possession of
the thing owned, any other
person to whom the owner
has not transmitted the
thing
-- passed on to the buyer. Hence, the transferee
has the right to possess the bottles. What is

forbidden is the use of the bottles in
infringement of another's trademark or
incorporeal rights.
General rule on ownership must
apply and petitioner be allowed to enjoy
all the rights of an owner with regard the
bottles in question.
Hence, La Tondena has relinquished all
its propriety rights over the bottles in
favor of Distilliera Washington. It
transferred its ownership over the
marked bottles when it sold its gin
products to the public.
Now, Distilliera Washington as an
owner, can exercise all the
attributes of ownership (stated
above, iyong mga jus) over the bottles.
007 - GERMAN MANAGEMENT
SERVICES INC., v. CA
FACTS
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and
Manuel Rene Jose, residents of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 50023
of the Register of Deeds of the province
of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980
which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560.
The land was originally registered on
August 5, 1948 in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No.
19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent
granted by the President of the
Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act
No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose
executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German
Management Services to develop their
property into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on
February 9,1983 obtained Development
Permit No. 00424 from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission for
said development.
Finding that part of the property was
occupied by private respondents and
twenty other persons, petitioner advised
the occupants to vacate the premises but
the latter refused. Nevertheless,
petitioner proceeded with the
development of the subject property
which included the portions occupied

and cultivated by private respondents.
MTC OF ANTIPOLO - Private
respondents filed an action for forcible
entry against petitioner alleging that
they are mountainside farmers of Sitio
Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal
and members of the Concerned Citizens
of Farmer's Association; that they have
occupied and tilled their farmholdings
some twelve to fifteen years prior to the
promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during
the first week of August 1983, petitioner,
under a permit from the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Rizal, was
allowed to improve the Barangay Road
at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal at its expense, subject to the
condition that it shag secure the needed
right of way from the owners of the lot to
be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and
thereafter, petitioner deprived private
respondents of their property without
due process of law by: (1) forcibly
removing and destroying the barbed
wire fence enclosing their farmholdings
without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice,
corn fruit bearing trees and other crops
of private respondents by means of
force, violence and intimidation, in
violation of P.D. 1038 and (3)
trespassing, coercing and threatening to
harass, remove and eject private
respondents from their respective
farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos.
316, 583, 815, and 1028.
MTC dismissed private respondents
complaint of Forcible Entry
RTC OF ANTIPOLO On appeal
before this court, RTC sustained MTCs
dismissal.
COURT OF APPEALS - Private
respondents then filed a petition for
review before this court. On July
24,1986, said court gave due course to
their petition and reversed the decisions
of the Municipal Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court.
The Appellate Court (CA) held that since
private respondents were in actual
possession of the property at the time
they were forcibly ejected by petitioner,
private respondents have a right to
commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession.

Petitioner moved to reconsider but the

same was denied by the CA in its
resolution dated September 26, 1986.
HENCE, THIS RECOURSE.
ISSUE: WON private respondents are

entitled to file a forcible entry case
against petitioner.
HELD
SC resolved to DENY the instant
petition. The decision of the CA dated
July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that
it was duly authorized by the owners to
develop the subject property, private
respondents, as actual possessors, can
commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in
issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and never determines the actual
title to an estate. Title is not involved.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that
at the time petitioner entered the
property, private respondents were
already in possession thereof. There is
no evidence that the spouses Jose were
ever in possession of the subject
property. On the contrary, private
respondents' peaceable possession was
manifested by the fact that they even
planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees
twelve to fifteen years prior to
petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may
validly claim ownership based on the
muniments of title it presented, such
evidence does not responsively address
the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be
stated that regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the
party in peaceable quiet possession shall
not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can
prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character
of his prior possession, if he has in his
favor priority in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Both the MTC and the RTC have
rationalized petitioner's drastic action of
bulldozing and destroying the crops of

private respondents on the basis of the
doctrine of self-help enunciated in
Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such
justification is unavailing because the
doctrine of self-help can only be
exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is
absent in the case at bar. When
possession has already been lost, the
owner must resort to judicial process for
the recovery of property. This is clear
from Article 536 of the Civil Code which
states, "(I)n no case may possession be
acquired through force or intimidation
as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he
has an action or right to deprive another
of the holding of a thing, must invoke
the aid of the competent court, if the
holder should refuse to deliver the
thing."
008 - J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS VS. CA.
Facts:
1.
National Investment and Development
Corporation, government corporation (NIDC)
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
with Kawasaki Heavy Industries., Ltd. of Kobe
Japan (Kawasaki) for the construction,
operation and management of Subic National
Shipyard Inc. (SNS) which became Philippine
Shipyard and Engineering Corporation
(PHILSECO).
2.
Under the JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki is
to contribute P330 mil. In the proportion of 6040% ratio respectively. It also provided to the
parties right of first refusal.
3.
Subsequently, NIDC transferred all its
rights to PNB which in turn was transferred to
the National Government. Pres. C. Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 50 for the
establishment of Committee on Privatization
(COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to
take title to, and possession of, conserve,
manage and dispose of non-performing assets of
the National Government. Because of quasireorganization, the governments share became
97.41% and Kawasakis to 2.59%. Thereafter, a
trust agreement was made between ATP and the
National Government and the former was
named a trustee in the latters share in
PHILSECO.
4.
In the interest of national economy and
government, the ATP and COP deemed it best to
sell the shares of the government in PHILSECO
to private entities. KAWASAKI was given the

right to top by 5% the highest bidder. Kawasaki
was also entitled to name a corporation in which
it was a stockholder, who could exercise the right
to top, Kawasaki named Philyards Holdings, Inc.
(Philyards).
5.
At the pre-bidding, the Asset Specific
Bidding Rules (ASBR) which was explained to
the bidders, including the rights given to
Philyards. The right to top may be exercised by
Philyards when it would surpass the highest
bidder.
6.
In the Bidding, the highest was
petitioner, JG Summit (petitioner) with the
knowledge of Kawasaki/Philyards right to top.
Subsequently, petitioner informed ATP of its
protest against the right to top of Kawasaki.
7.
Then, petitioner was notified that
Philyards had exercised its right to top, which it
paid the price, and that the ATP had executed a
Stock Purchase Agreement.
8.
Petitioner filed before the SC for petition
of mandamus, it was referred to CA. The CA
denied the petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner
then files for a petition for Certiorari. The
Certiorari was granted, the SC ruled in favor of
petitioner. Respondents then filed separate
Motion for Reconsideration, which the SC
reversed its own decision, ruling in favor of the
respondent. On October 20, 2003, the petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 and a
Motion to Elevate This Case to the Court En
Banc.
Issue: WoN the right of first refusal/to top
constitutes a violation of the constitution? No
the right is valid.
Ruling:
The right of first refusal was a property
right that was given to the shareholders of
PHILSECO under their JVA. It is given to them
as shareholders before it is offered to others. It
does not by itself constitute a violation of the
Constitution or the Anti-Dummy law, which
limits land ownership to Filipinos. The foreign
corporation who holds shares in a landowning
corporation, the ownership of the shares which
is adversely affected but the capacity of the
corporation to own landthat is, the corporation
becomes disqualified to own land. No law
disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a
landholding corporation even if the latter will
exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law
disqualifies is the corporation from owning
lands.
009 - MACASIANO V. DIOKNO

FACTS:
Municipality of Paranaque passed
Ordinance No. 86. It authorized the
closure of Gabrielle, Cruz, Bayanihan,
Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
Located at Baclaran for the
establishment of a flea market.
It was done in pursuance of MCC
Ordinance No. 2 which authorized use of
city/municipal streets within
Metropolitan Manila as vending area
subject to the ff. conditions by
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA):
1. The said streets are not used for
vehicular traffic and majority of
residents do not oppose the
establishment of the flea
market.
2. The 2m middle road to be used
as flea market shall be marked
distinctly.
3. The time for use of vending area
shall be designated.
4. The use of vending areas is
temporary and will be closed
once reclaimed areas are
developed and donated by the
Public Estate Authority.
Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter
into contract with any service
cooperative for management of flea
markets. Municipality entered into an
agreement with Palanyag.
Macasiano ordered the distruction of
stalls along Cruz and Gabrielle put up by
Palanyag. The former wrote a letter
giving the latter 10 days to discontinue
the flea market. Otherwise, the market
stalls will be dismantled.
RTC: Upheld validity of Ordinance No.
86 and enjoined Macasiano from
enforcing his order.
ISSUE: W/N ordinance issued by municipal
council of Paranaque authorizing lease and use
of public streets for flea markets is valid
HELD: No
RATIO:
Gabrielle, Cruz, Bayanihan, Garcia Ext
and Opena streets are local roads used
for public service and are therefore
considered public properties of

Paranaque. Properties of the local

government which are devoted to public
service are under the absolute control of
the Congress.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337: Local
Government Code was in force during
the enactment of the ordinance. Section
10 providing for the power given to local
governments to close roads must be
interpreted with the Civil Code. The
closure should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the property from public
use or service. Once withdrawn, it
becomes patrimonial property and it
may be conveyed.
Property for public use is outside the
commerce of man. As such, it may not
be the subject of lease or other contracts.
Even assuming Paranaque has the
authority to pass the ordinance, it did
not comply with the conditions by
MMA. Baclaran is a congested area.
The general public has a legal right to
demand the demolition of illegally
constructed stalls in public streets and
Paranaque officials have the duty to
clear the city streets and restore them to
their specific public purpose.
010 - MACTAN-CEBU INTL AIRPORT

AUTHORITY V. LOZADA, SR.
FACTS:
Deiparine owned Lot no. 88. It was
subjected to expropriation proceedings
for the expansion and improvement of
Lahug Airport. During the pendency of
said proceedings, Lozada acquired the
lot.
RTC: Judgment in favor of Republic;
Pay Lazada fair market value with
consequential damages by way of legal
interest computed from Nov. 1947 (lot
was first occupied by airport)
Affected landowners withdrew their
appeals in consideration of a
commitment by the Air Transportation
Office (ATO, former CAA) that the lots
would be resold at same price they were
expropriated (3/sqm) if ATO abandons
Lahug Airport.
Lot was transferred to the Republic but
the expansion of the old Lahug airport
was not pursued.
Lozada, with other landowners,
contacted CAA, requesting to repurchase
the lots. Latter claimed Lahug Airport

could still be used as an emergency DC3 airport. Also assured that they will
prioritize owners subject to the approval
of the president.
Nov. 1989: Pres. Cory Aquino issued a
Memorandum to the Dept. of
Transportation directing transfer of
aviation operations of Lahug Airport to
Mactan International Airport.
From time of expropriation, public
purpose for said expropriation was
never realized. Old airport converted
into the Ayala I.T. Park while the rest of
the lot was occupied by squatters and
also a jail site.
June 1996: Lozada and landowners
initiated a complaint for recovery of
possession and reconveyance of
ownership of lot.
Oct 1999: RTC in favor of Lozada.
CA: Affirmed the RTC. Mactans MR
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lozada and the

landowners are entitled to the restitution of the
expropriated property which was not used for
the said public purpose
HELD: Yes. Expropriation was subject to the
condition that Lahug Airport would continue its
operation. Since the condition did not
materialize and the airport was abandoned, the
former owners should then be allowed to
reacquire the expropriated property.
RATIO:
Requirements for taking of private
property: (1) it is for a particular public
purpose; (2) just compensation must be
paid;
Expropriated property must be used
pursuant to the purpose stated in
petition for expropriation. It should also
fine another petitioner for the new
purpose. Otherwise, it would lack the
indispensable element of a particular
public use and the owner would be
denied due process of law.
If the intent or purpose is not initiated
or not at all pursued, former owners
may seek the reversion of the property if
they so desire. They must also return the
amount of just compensation received.

DOCTRINE: The taking of private property is
always subject to the condition that the property
be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken.
011 - REPUBLIC (BUREAU OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT) V IAC & RAMA
Logronio (officer of Bohol

Reforestration Project of Bureau of
Forest Develipment) bulldozed portions
of 2 parcels of land believed to be forest
lands at Talibon, Bohol. He occupied it
and planted trees.
Rama then filed an action of RTC Bohol
for recovery of possession, ownership &
damages againt Logroni saying that he is
the absolute owner & possessor of those
2 parcels of land. Showed a title in his
name:
a) original torrens title in Rama's name
(May 4, 1967) from Register of Deeds
b) Before that, he applied for issuance of
title based on patent and was granted
Jan 13, 1967 (So his, issuance of title is
based on a patent title)
Republics allegations - filed a motion to
intervene and said that Logronio's acts were
authorized by the government through the
Bureau of Forest Development in connection w/
the reforestation program of the government.
Also said that the gov. never released the lands
as alienable and disposable lands. Hence, not
susceptible of private ownership.
Ramas contention - Republic is guilty of
estoppel for having caused the issuance of the
certificate of title covering the forest land. If the
title is to be cancelled, he would be deprived of
ownership over the land and he should be paid
by the Republic for all existing improvement he
incurred over the lands.
RTC - parcels of land are forest land; alienable ;
ordered Republic to pay petitioner for necessary
expenses it incurred over the lands
Republic appealed regarding the
payment of expenses to Rama
CA - affirmed; modified and said that Rama has
right of retention until necessary expenses are
awarded to him by Republic.
Republic appealed to SC regarding that
modified judgment by CA
ISSUE: Who owns the land? Republic/State
HELD:
Rama's title is covered by original
torrents title and before that he applied
for the issuance of the title based on a

patent granted to him.
The fact that he applied for a patent
title shows recognition on his part
that the land is part of public
domain.
Although the government officials
issued those patent tiles and OCT in his
name, the State cannot be in estoppel by
mistakes of its officials or agents.
It is a forest land, the title in his name
did not confer any validity to his
possession or claim of ownership.
The titles are void ab initio. In
effect, Rama's possession of the land
from the beginning was fraudulent and
illegal. Merely a squatter on the parcel.
He is not in good faith.
Trivia:
2 parcels of lands are located within the
timberland in Talibon Bohol that is why it is a
forest land.
Patent - grant of government property
012 - SPS. PASCUAL VS SPS. CORONEL
Respondents, spouses Reynaldo and Asuncion
Coronel, are the registered owners of two parcels
of land which they resided on the said property
until sometime in 1969 when they decided to
transfer to a new residence close to their
business operations. They entrusted the
property and the owners copy of TCT to
Asuncions parents who moved into the property
and resided therein. However they moved to
another house and entrusted the whole property
to their son, Dr. Fermin Pascual, Jr. The latter
had a son, petitioner Richard Pascual, who
subsequently occupied the premises together
with his wife. Respondents formally demanded
from the petitioners the immediate surrender of
the premises but the latter failed and refused to
vacate the same. They filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tarlac City a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages[5] against the petitioners on the ground
that the latter are occupying the property
without their consent.
The petitioners contended that the respondents
are no longer the lawful owners of the subject
house and lot because they already sold the same
to Alberta in turn, sold the property to Dr. MeluJean Pascual, petitioner Richards older sister,
through the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Estate. According to the petitioners,

after Alberta sold the property to Melu-Jean, she
surrendered the actual possession of the
property to the latter; hence, Melu-Jean is the
lawful owner and possessor of the property. The
petitioners claimed that they are occupying the
property on behalf and with the consent of
Melu-Jean, and therefore, she is the real partyin-interest and the complaint should be filed
against her.
Respondents also filed a case for annulment of
deed of sale with the RTC. After the petitioners
filed their answer in the case for unlawful
detainer, the respondents amended[10] their
complaint in the case for annulment to include
Melu-Jean as defendant, and to pray for the
nullification of the 1989 Deed in favor of MeluJean. The respondents alleged that Albertas
signature in the said deed of sale is a forgery and
that it was not signed by Emilio, who was still
very much alive then, contrary to what was
written above his name as deceased.
MTCC dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer. The respondents appealed to the RTC
The RTC found that the petitioners possession
was by the tolerance of the respondents, thus,
lawful until the latter sent the petitioners a
demand to vacate.
The petitioners filed an appeal with the
CA. argued that they have a superior right
because they are in actual physical possession of
the property by authority of the real owner,
Melu-Jean, who should have been impleaded as
defendant. They contended that the action for
unlawful detainer is not proper since the issue of
ownership is raised; the proper action is to file
an accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria cognizable by the RTC. CA
affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents are still the rightful
owners of the property?
HELD:
The respondents have the better right to possess
the subject property. As opposed to the
unregistered deeds of sale, the certificate of title
certainly deserves more probative value. Indeed,
a Torrens Certificate is evidence of indefeasible
title of property in favor of the person in whose
name appears there in such holder is entitled to
the possession of the property until his title is
nullified.
The petitioners, however, insist that the deeds of
sale deserve more credence because they are
valid contracts that legally transferred

ownership of the property to Melu-Jean.
However, it should be noted that the CA merely
affirmed the power of the trial court to
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership,
which consequently includes the power to
determine the validity of the deeds of sale. As
previously stated, such determination is not
conclusive, and the issue of ownership and the
validity of the deeds of sale would ultimately be
resolved in the case for annulment of the deeds
of sale.
Even if we sustain the petitioners arguments and
rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it
would still not bolster the petitioners case.
013 - TAMIN VS. CA
Facts:
1. Petitioner municipality, represented by
Mayor Domiciano Real filed before the
RTC of Zamboanga del Sur, Molave,
which was presided by petitioner judge.
The complaint was for the ejectment
with preliminary injunction and
damages against respondents, Vicente
Medina and Fortunata Rosellon.
2. The complaint alleged that petitioner
municipality is the owner of the parcel
of residential land (located in Poblacion,
Zamboanga del Sur). The said lot was
alleged to be reserved for public plaza,
under Presidential Proclamation No.
365. During the late Mayor Real, the
municipality leased the disputed land to
respondents, with the condition that the
latter should vacate in case it is needed
for public purposes.
3. Petitioners also alleged respondent paid
rentals diligently until 1967, and that the
mayor then found out that respondents
filed a cadastral case over the disputed
property, and that the latter refused to
vacate the premises.
4. Instead of filing an answer, respondent
moved for a motion to dismiss alleging
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC, which the
complaint was for illegal detainer.
Petitioner judge denied the motion to
dismiss and also granted the petitioner
municipalitys motion for a writ of
possession with the ancillary writ of
demolition to the properties of
respondents situated in the disputed lot.
Petitioner municipality implemented the
order of the court, and demolished the

structures and buildings owned by
respondents.
5. Respondent filed an answer, alleging
that Medina owned, occupied and
possessed the subjected lot, and that
Rosellon leased portion of the land from
Medina. Private respondent denied
having leased the land to petitioner
municipality.
6. Before the petitioner judge could further
act, the respondents filed a petitioner for
certiorari before the CA, assailing the
decision of the RTC.
CA ruling: The appellate court gave due to the
petition, a temporary restraining order was
issued, enjoining the petitioner judge from
proceeding with the hearing. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but it was denied.
Hence this appeal.
Issue: WoN the petitioner municipality is
entitled to a writ of possession and a writ of
demolition even before the trial start?
Ruling:
The court ruled on the premise that, if
the land forms part of a public plaza, then it is
outside the commerce of man. Consequently,
private respondents then has no right to occupy
the disputed parcel of land and cannot insist in
remaining there. Construction of anything in
property allotted for a public plaza can be abated
summarily as a public nuisance by the
municipality. However, it is to be noted that
even before the proclamation (PP No. 365) the
parcel of land was the subject of cadastral
proceeding before the RTC. At that time, the
cadastral proceeding was to settle the ownership
of the property over the questioned
proclamation, which is still pending. Although
technically, this is not a prejudicial question,
since the latter comprises of a criminal and civil
action, in which the present case, involves civil
and administrative in character. Regardless, the
two cases are intimately correlated to which
solving the cadastral case will determine
petitioners right to eject private respondent.
Faced with this circumstances, the trial court
should have hold the ejectment case in abeyance
until determination of the administrative case.
In the interest of justice, the court decided that
the municipality must put up a bond to be
determined by the trial court to answer for just
compensation to private respondents in case the
latter is entitled to it. Wherefore, the instant
petition is dismissed, the questioned resolution
of CA is affirmed.
014 - UNSON VS LACSON
Cipriano Unson (Petitioner) was the

owner of a lot and a narrow strip of land
named Callejon del Carmen that the City
of Manila considered as patrimonial
property wherein sizeable buildings
under Genato Commercial Corporation
stood. Another lot of his was leased to
the government for several years for the
use of Mapa High School.
Municipal Board of Manila then passed
Ordinance No. 3470 declaring a part of
Cellejon del Carmen as patrimonial
property and is subject to lease to
Genato. Petitioner appealed that said
ordinance is illegal and that the contract
of lease must be considered void.
Petitioner appealed that Respondents
are unable to cite legal provision
allowing such act as under the power of
the City of Manila except RA 409 Sec 18
authorizing the Municipal Board of
Manila under the provisions of existing
laws to provide for laying out,
construction and improvement of
streets, avenues and alleys which was
contradicted by Art. 2246 that talks of
withdrawal of public streets from use
under the City of Manila.
ISSUE: W/N City Ordinance 3470 is a legal

provision for taking Unsons property
RULING:
No. Municipal Corporations may not acquire the
same patrimonial property without grant from
the National Government. Since the primary
proprietor of taking such property was Genato
and not specifically the City of Manila, they are
not entitled to the same right Municipalities and
the state has unless approved by the National
Urban Planning Commission.
DOCTRINE: Art. 428 The owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.
PROPERTIES INVOLVED:
Lot 10 Northbound by R. Hidalgo St. (Genatos
Building aka Commerce Building) ; Lot 12
Eastbound; Lot 11 (Narrow strip of Land); Lot 9
Southbound (undeclared private owner) used by
Mapa High School
015 - ADILLE VS. CA
The property in dispute was originally owned by
Felisa Alzul who got married twice. First with

Bernabe Adille, with whom she begot a son,
Rustico Adille. Second with Procopio Asejo, with
whom she begot Emeteria, Teodorica, Domingo,
Josefa, and Santiago.
Sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property
in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period
of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942
without being able to redeem and after her
death, but during the redemption period,
Rustico Adille repurchased the property by
himself alone at his own expense, and after that,
he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition
representing himself to be the only heir and
child of his mother Felisa. Consequently, he was
able to secure title in his name alone.
His half-siblings, herein respondents, filed a
case for partition and accounting claiming that
Rustico was only a trustee on an implied trust
when he redeemed the property, and thus, he
cannot claim exclusive ownership of the entire
property.
Trial Judge sustained defendant in his position
that he was and became absolute owner, he was
not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and
also condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to
vacate.
Court of appeals reversed the trial Court, and
ruled for the plaintiffs-appellants, the private
respondents herein. The petitioner now appeals,
by way of certiorari, from the Court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner may acquire
exclusive ownership over the property held in
common. NO
Held:
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a
co-owner with aspect to his share alone. While
the records show that the petitioner redeemed
the property in its entirety, shouldering the
expenses therefore, that did not make him the
owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
end the existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one coowner, subject to his right to collect
reimbursement from the remaining coowners. There is no doubt that redemption of
property entails a necessary expense. Under the
Civil Code:
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to
compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right

owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of
the latter may exempt himself from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his
share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver
shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had
succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his
name terminate the existing co-ownership.
While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we
said, liable to him for reimbursement as and for
their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot
claim exclusive right to the property owned in
common. Registration of property is not a means
of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere
notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
Petition Denied.
016 - AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS:
The land subject matter of the case was
originally covered by Free Patent 23263 issued
in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon. Pursuant
to the said patent, the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo Agpoon
OCT 2370. Presentacion Agpoon Gascon
inherited the said parcel of land upon the death
of her father, Herminigildo, and was issued TCT
32209. Presentacion declared the said land for
taxation purposes in her name taxes were paid
thereon in her name. Spouses Joaquin and
Presentacion Gascon filed Civil Case U-2286 in
the then CFI Pangasinan for recovery of
possession and damages against Marcelino Agne
stating that they are the registered owners of the
parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog,
Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the
possession of Agne, that during the Japanese
occupation, the latter, taking advantage of the
abnormal conditions then obtaining, took
possession of said land by means of fraud,
stealth, strategy and intimidation; that Gascon
repeatedly demanded the surrender of the
physical possession of said property but the
latter refused.
Agne alleged that the land in question was
formerly a part of the river bed of the AgnoChico River; that in the year 1920, a big flood
occurred which caused the said river to change
its course and abandon its original bed; that by
virtue of the provisions of Article 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code which was then the law in
force, Agne by operation of law, became the
owners by accession or accretion of the

respective aliquot parts of said river bed
bordering their properties; that since 1920, they
and their predecessors in interest occupied and
exercised dominion openly and adversely over
said portion of the abandoned river bed in
question abutting their respective riparian lands
continuously up to the present to the exclusion
of all other persons, particularly Herminigildo
Agpoon; that they have introduced
improvements thereon by constructing irrigation
canals and planting trees and agricultural crops
thereon and converted the land into a productive
area.
While the above case was still pending, Agne
filed a complaint against Director of Lands and
spouses Agpoon with the former CFI Pangasinan
for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or
action to clear title to a parcel of land, which
action was docketed as Civil Case U-2649. Agne
alleged in their said complaint that the land in
question, which was formerly a portion of the
bed of Agno-Chico river which was abandoned
as a result of the big flood in 1920, belongs to
them pursuant to the provision of Article 370 of
the old Civil Code; that it was only on 13 April
1971, when spouses filed a complaint against
them, that they found out that the said land was
granted by the Government to Herminigildo
Agpoon under Free Patent 23263, pursuant to
which OCT 2370 was issued in the latter's name;
and that the said patent and subsequent titles
issued pursuant thereto are null and void since
the said land, an abandoned river bed, is of
private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the
subject of a public land grant.
Issue: Who owns the land?
Held:
Agne owns the land. The old Civil Code, once the
river bed has been abandoned, the riparian
owners become the owners of the abandoned
bed to the extent provided by this article. The
acquisition of ownership is automatic. There
need be no act on the part of the riparian owners
to subject the accession to their ownership, as it
is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the
mode of acquisition becomes evident, without
the need of any formal act of acquisition. Such
abandoned river bed had fallen to the private
ownership of the owner of the riparian land even
without any formal act of his will and any
unauthorized occupant thereof will be
considered as a trespasser. The right in re to the
principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory,
as it is a mode of acquisition provided by law, as
the result of the right of accretion. Since the
accessory follows the nature of the principal,

there need not be any tendency to the thing or
manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our
ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from
the moment the mode of acquisition becomes
evident. In the present case, Agne became
owners of aliquot portions of said abandoned
river bed as early as 1920, when the Agno River
changed its course, without the necessity of any
action or exercise of possession on their part, it
being an admitted fact that the land in dispute,
prior to its registration, was an abandoned bed
of the Agno River and that Agne, et. al. are the
riparian owners of the lands adjoining the said
bed.
017 - AGUILAR V CA
FACTS:
P Virgilio and R Senen are brothers
The two brothers purchased a house and
lot in Paranaque where their father
could spend and enjoy his remaining
years in a peaceful neighborhood
Initially, the brothers agreed that
virhilios share in the co-ownership was
2/3 while Senen was 1/3
By virtue of a written memorandum,
virgilio and senen agreed that their
interests in the house and lot should be
equal, with senen assuming the
remaining mortgage obligation of the
original owners with the SSS (social
security system) in exchange for his
possession and enjoyment of the house
together with their father
Virgilio was then disqualified from
obtaining a loan from SS, the brothers
agreed that the title be registered in the
name of senen in the meantime
After Maximiano Aguilar died, P
demanded from private R that the latter
vacate the house and that the property
be sold and proceeds thereof be divided
among them
R failed to vacate, P then filed an action
to compel the sale of the house and lot
The case was then set for pre-trial
TRIAL COURT: upheld the right of the
plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition. The
trial court held that the property should be sold
to a third person and the proceeds be divided
equally between the parties
Defendant sought relief to the CA
CA: set aside the order of the TC
P went to the SC

ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court was correct with
regard to the sale and rent
RULING:
YES, We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor
of petitioner, except as to the effectively of the
payment of monthly rentals by respondent as coowner which we here declare to commence only
after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate
in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no
co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership, and that each co-owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code
states that whenever the thing is essentially,
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
it be, allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds accordingly distributed.
This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition
the property is invoked by any of the co-owners
but because of the nature of the property it
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b)
the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the
entire property upon proper reimbursement of
the co-owners.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the
right to use the house and lot without paying any
compensation to petitioner, as he may use the
property owned in common long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in a manner not injurious to the
interest of the other co-owners. 9
Each co-owner of property held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with
no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his co-owners, the reason being
that until a division is made, the respective share
of each cannot be determined and every coowner exercises, together with his coparticipants joint ownership over the pro
indivisoproperty, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the

sale of the property and the trial court granted
the petition and ordered the ejectment of
respondent, the co-ownership was deemed
terminated and the right to enjoy the possession
jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued
stay of respondent and his family in the house
prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the
property should have been sold and the proceeds
divided equally between them. To this extent
and from then on, respondent should be held
liable for monthly rentals until he and his family
vacate.
The petition is GRANTED. Decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the trial court is REINSTATED,
respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate
the premises in question and to pay petitioner
Virgilio B. Aguilar a monthly rental of P1,200.00
with interest at the legal rate.
018 - BENITEZ vs. CA
FACTS:
On January 22, 1986, petitioners Rafael and
Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-square-meter
parcel of land with improvement from the Cavite
Development Bank, covered by TCT No. 41961
(now, TCT No. 55864).
Subsequently, private respondents Renato and
Elizabeth Macapagal bought a 361-square-meter
lot covered by TCT No. 40155. On September 18,
1986, they filed with the RTC of Pasig, Branch
against petitioners for the recovery of possession
of an encroached portion of the lot they
purchased. The parties were able to reach a
compromise in which private respondents sold
the encroached portion to petitioners at the
acquisition cost of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) per square meter.
Private respondents purchased still another
property, a 285.70 square-meter-lot covered by
TCT No. 3249-R, adjacent to that of petitioners.
After a relocation survey was conducted, private
respondents discovered that some 46.50 square
meters of their property was occupied by
petitioners' house. Despite verbal and written
demands, petitioners refused to vacate. A last
notice to vacate was sent to petitioners on
October 26, 1989.
Private respondents filed with the MeTC of San
Juan, for ejectment against petitioners which
granted them and ordered the petitioners and all

persons claiming rights under them to vacate
and surrender possession of the subject
premises to the respondents as well as to pay the
following amount of P930.00 a month starting
July 17, 1989 until they finally vacate the
premises and pay attorneys fees and suit.
RTC affirmed the decision on appeal stating that
The controversy in this case is not an
encroachment or overlapping of two (2) adjacent
properties owned by the parties. It is a case
where a part of the house of the
defendants(herein petitioners) is constructed on
a portion of the property of the
plaintiffs(respondents).
CA- affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not an action for ejectment
is the proper remedy to recover
possession of the encroached portion
(2) Whether or not Sps. Benitez can be
made to pay rent
(3) Whether or not the option to sell
exclusively belongs to the owner.
HELD:
1. YES. The jurisdictional requirements for
ejectment, are: after conducting a
relocation survey, private respondents
discovered that a portion of their land
was encroached by petitioners' house;
notices to vacate were sent to
petitioners, and private respondents
filed the ejectment suit against
petitioners on January 18, 1990 or
within one (1) year from the last
demand.
Under Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of
Court allows any person unlawfully
deprived of possession by FISTS or after
expiration of right to hold possession
within 1 year from unlawful deprivation
to bring an action to recover possession.
Forcible entry requires prior physical
possession but unlawful detainer does
not require prior physical possession.
Actual or physical possession is not
always necessary. And possession is not
only acquired through material
occupation but also when a thing is
subject to the action of ones will or by the
proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right,
through execution of deed of sale.
Private respondents are unlawfully deprived of
possession of the encroached land and that the
action for the recovery of possession thereof was

made within the one- year reglementary period,
ejectment is the proper remedy.
2. YES. Technically, such award is not
rental, but damages. Damages are
recoverable in ejectment cases
under Section 8, Rule 70 of the
ROC. These damages arise from
the loss of the use and occupation
of the property, and not the
damages which private
respondents may have suffered
but which have no direct relation
to their loss of material
possession. Damages in the
context of Section 8, Rule 70 is
limited to "rent" or "fair rental
value" for the use and occupation
of the property.
Petitioners benefited from their occupation of a
portion of private respondents' property. Such
benefit justifies the award of the damages of this
kind. Nemocum alterius, detrimenti locupletari
potest. No one shall enrich himself at the
expense of another.
3. YES.
Article 448 of the Civil Code states that
the option to sell the land on which
another in good faith builds, plants or
sows on, belongs to the landowner.
The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the
landowner's choice. Not even a declaration of the
builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this
option to him per Article 450 of the Civil Code.
This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the
landowner because "his right is older, and
because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing. There can be no pre-emptive right to buy
even as a compromise, as this prerogative
belongs solely to the landowner. No compulsion
can be legally forced on him, contrary to what
petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order
would certainly be invalid and illegal.
The MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals were
all in agreement in sustaining private
respondents' rights.
Petition is DENIED.
019 - GABOYA vs. CUI
Facts:
Don Mariano Cui owned 3 commercial
lots situated in Cebu with a total area of
2658 sqm. There were no improvements

because the same was destroyed during

the Pacific War (world war 2).
He sold the said lots to his 3 children
named Rosario, Mercedes and Antonio
for 64k. The sale to Rosario was
cancelled because she could not pay.
Her share was returned to Don Mariano.
In the deed of sale, the latter retained
the usufruct of the property.
A building was erected on the portion
facing Calderon street. It was occupied
by a Chinese businessman and he paid a
600 monthly rental.
Mercedes and Antonio obtained a loan
for 130k from the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation (RFC). The amount
would be used to construct a 12-door
commercial building on their share of
the property. Don Mariano executed an
authority to mortgage his share. It was
agreed that 1/3 of the property, the mass
facing Calderon, would be assigned to
Don Mariano but he did not join the
construction of the building.
The 12-door commercial building was
constructed and Mercedes and Antonio
received rents (4800) used for payment
to RFC.
Victorino filed an action to collect
rentals from the three lots, including
rentals collected from the commercial
building. He claims that the
usufructuary right of Don Mariano
extends to the rentals of the commercial
building constructed on the land. The
building constructed is considered an
accession to the land and by law, thru
Art 571, there is a right to enjoy any
increase which the thing in usufruct may
acquire through accession.
Mercedes and Antonio claim that Don
Mariano waived and renounced the
usufruct and they gave him 400 monthly
by way of aid.
020 - JAGUALING V CA & EDUAVE
ISSUE: W/N the usufruct reserved by Don

Mariano gave him the right to receive the rentals
of the commercial building
HELD: No, it did not include the rentals of the
commercial building.
RATIO:
The usufruct was not intended to
include the rentals of the building
subsequently constructed on the vacant
lots but it entitled him to receive a

reasonable rental for the portion of the
land occupied by the building.
Civil Code limits industrial accession to
those involving land and materials
belonging to different owners.
Otherwise, no need for accession where
the ownership of the land and materials
are concentrated on the same party. No
accession considering Antonio and
Mercedes own that particular share of
the land where the commercial building
is built and it was constructed using
money loaned exclusively to Antonio
and Mercedes.
There shouldve been an express
provision to include rents of buildings to
be erected considering deed of sale and
mortgage mentioned the possibility of
construction.
No adequate proof that Don Mariano
renounced his usufruct. A gratuitous
renunciation of real right over
immovable property created by a public
document should be in writing in the
regular course of business.
The parties to this case dispute the

ownership of a certain parcel of land
located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental with an area of 16,452 square
meters, more or less, forming part of an
island in a non-navigable river, and
more particularly described by its
boundaries as follows:
Northby the Tagoloan River, South
by the Tagoloan River, Eastby the
Tagoloan River and Westby the
portion belonging to Vicente Neri.
Janita Eduave and Rudygondo Eduave
filed an action to quiet title/remove a
cloud over the property saying that
Juanita inherited the land from her
father together with her co-heirs by
virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial
Parttion and the land was declared for
tax purposes. Since the death of her
father they had been in possession of the
property but the tax declaration remains
in the name of her deceased father.
She also said that in the deed of
extrajudicial partition, the area in there
is 16,452 sq.m. but in the tax declaration
it was only 4,937sq.m she said that she

included the land that was under water.

But the land eroded due to typhoon
Ineng (1964) which destroyed the bigger
portion and the improvement leaving
only a coconut tree.
In 1966 due to the movement of the
river deposits on the land that was not
eroded, the area increased to almost half
a hectare and in 1970 Eduave started to
plant banana trees.
In 1973, Maximo and Anuncita
Jagualing asked her permission to plant
corn and bananas provided that they
prevent squatters to come to the area.
Eduave engaged the services of a
surveyor who conducted a survey and
placed concrete monuments over the
land. Eduave also paid taxes on the land
in litigation, and mortgaged the land to
the Luzon Surety and Co., for a
consideration of P6,000.00.
The land was the subject of a
reconveyance case in another civil case,
between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of
Antonio Factura, which was the subject
of judgment by compromise in view of
the amicable settlement of the parties,
dated 31 May 1979.
The heirs of Antonio Factura had ceded
a portion of the land with an area of
1,289 sq. m., to Janita Eduave in a
notarial document of conveyance,
pursuant to the decision of the CFI, after
a subdivision of the lot 62 Pls-799, and
containing 1,289 sq. m. was designated
as Lot 62-A, and the subdivision plan
was approved as Pls-799-Psd-10001782.
Eduave also applied for concession with
the Bureau of Mines to extract 200 m3
of grave, and after an ocular inspection
the permit was granted and then entered
into an agreement with Tagoloan
Aggregates to extract sand and gravel,
which agreement was registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds.
Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing assert
that they are the real owners of the land
in litigation containing an area of
18,000 sq. m. During the typhoon Ineng
in 1964 the river control was washed
away causing the formation of an island.
Jagualing started occupying the land in
1969, paid land taxes as evidenced by
tax declaration 26380 and tax receipts,
and tax clearances. Actual occupation of
the land by Jagualing included

improvements and the house.
Rudygondo and Janita Eduave filed with
the RTC Misamis Oriental an action to
quiet title and/or remove a cloud over
the property in question against
Jagualing.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure of Eduave to establish by
preponderance of evidence their claim of
ownership over the land in litigation.
The court found that the island is a delta
forming part of the river bed which the
government may use to reroute, redirect
or control the course of the Tagoloan
River. Accordingly, it held that it was
outside the commerce of man and part
of the public domain, citing Article 420
of the Civil Code. As such it cannot be
registered under the land registration
law or be acquired by prescription. The
trial court, however, recognized the
validity of Jagualing's possession and
gave them preferential rights to use and
enjoy the property. The trial court added
that should the State allow the island to
be the subject of private ownership, the
Jagualings have rights better than that
of Eduave.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the court found that the island was
formed by the branching off of the
Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto
the accumulation of alluvial deposits.
Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465
of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court,
declared Eduave as the lawful and true
owners of the land subject of the case
and ordered Jagualing to vacate the
premises and deliver possession of the
land to Eduave.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right to an island
that forms in a non-navigable and nonfloatable water, is it the one who has
actual possession or the owner of the
land along the margin nearest the
island? Latter
HELD:
The parcel of land in question is part of
an island that formed in a nonnavigable and non-flotable river;

from a small mass of eroded or

segregated outcrop of land, it increased
to its present size due to the gradual and
successive accumulation of alluvial
deposits.
Art 465 should be applied, under
that provision, the island belongs to
the owner of the land along the
nearer margin as sole owner
thereof. This is the preferential right
because the owners of the land located
in the margin nearest the formed island
are in the best position to cultivate and
attend to the exploitation. No need of act
of possession over the accretion is
required.
And in this case, because the island is
longer than the property of private
respondents, they are deemed ipso jure
to be the owners of that portion which
corresponds to the length of their
property along the margin of the river.
BUT if the riparian owner failed to

assert his claim, the same may yield to
the adverse possession of third parties.
However, in this case, Jagualing's

possession was not in good faith. And
under the doctrine of acquisitive
prescription, those who are in the
possession of the land in bad faith could
only acquire it through acquisitive
prescription through an uninterrupted
adverse possession for a period of 30
years.
And in this case, the petitioners

admitted that they have been in
possession of the land for 15 years.
Hence, they could not have acquired the
property through acquisitive
prescription.
Note/trivia:
With regard the issue of the RTC that
the State owns it, the SC said that they
were unprepared to rule on this, unlike
the trial court because there was no
documents showing that it belongs to
the State. The State should be the one to
present evidence.
The action is a quasi-in rem (which is an

action in personam concerning real
property) because the action was to
quiet title against petitioners. Hence, the

proceedings is conclusive between P and
PR and does not bind the State or other
riparian owners who may have an
interest over the island involved therein.
021 - LUCASAN v. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC)
Lucasan and his wife owned two lots in
Bacolod City.
Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC)
granted a 5k loan to Lucasan and
Benares. They failed to pay and PC filed
a collection case.
1979: RTC ordered them to jointly and
severally pay 7,199.99 w/ 14% per
annum interest. Lucasan couldnt pay so
RTC issued a writ of execution to effect a
levy on his properties.
1981: The sheriff issued a Notice of
Embargo annotated on the two lots. Also
annotated as prior encumbrances were
mortgages in favor of Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and Republic
Planters Bank (RPB).
1981: Lots were sold at public auction
and awarded to PBC. Certificate of sale
was executed and registered.
Neither Lucasan, PNB nor RPB assailed
the sale or redeemed the properties
within the redemption period. PBC did
not file a petition for consolidation of
ownership either.
1997: Lucasan wrote a letter to PDIC
(PBCs receiver and liquidator) for the
cancellation of the certificate of sale and
offered to pay. Lucasan also paid his
loans with PNB and RPB, so the
mortgages were cancelled.
2001: PDIC denied and informed
Lucasan that there can only be
reacquisition through sale via public
bidding with 2,900,300 as the minimum
bid.
Lucasan filed petition for declaratory
relief with RTC. He pleaded for the
lifting of the notice of embargo and
certificate of sale. He claims that the
properties were still in his possession
and PBC/PDIC did not institute and
action for consolidation of ownership.
He also asserts that the policy of
disposing the property through public
bidding at such a value is unjust.

RTC 2003: Granted PDICs Motion to

Dismiss. It is an action to quiet title.
Clouds contemplated by Art. 476 is one
where the instrument is apparently valid
on its face but is in reality null and void.
The annotations on the titles were valid.
The Notice of Embargo was issued by
virtue of a valid judgment. Certificate of
sale was executed as a result of a public
bidding.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of his complaint to
quiet title was proper
HELD: Yes. RTC rightfully dismissed his
complaint.
RATIO:
Quieting of a title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud of
doubt with respect to real property. It
has two requisites: (1) Complainant has
a legal right/title/interest in the real
property; (2) The deed claimed to
becloud the same must be shown to be
in fact invalid despite appearance of
validity;
Lucasan does not possess equitable
title/interest over the parcels of land. He
also failed to demonstrate that the
notice of embargo and certificate of sale
are invalid.
Lucasan lost whatever right he had over
the lots when we failed to redeem the
properties. (1964 RoC: 12 months from
registration of certificate of sale. He was
15 yrs late.)
Payment of loands to PNB and RPB did
not restore his rights either. It merely
extinguished his loans.
022 - METROPOLITAN BANK AND
TRUST CO. VS. PASCUAL
Facts:
Nicholson Pascual (Respondent) and
Florencia Nevalga were married.
During the union, Florencia bought
from spouses Sering a 250-square
meter lot with a three-door
apartment located in Makati City. The
TCT was issued in the name of Florencia
married to Nelson Pascual aka
Nicholson.
Florencia filed a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage invoking Art. 36 and
the dissolution and liquidation of their
conjugal partnership of gains before
RTC QC. This was granted but their

properties were never liquidated.
Florencia, with spouses Oliveros,
obtained P58 million loan from
Metrobank. A real estate mortgage was
made on several properties including the
disputed property.
To procure the loan, Florencia
submitted documents such as the RTC
decision and the waiver of Nicholson of
the properties, but did not include
the property in question.
Florencia failed to pay the obligation so
the property was foreclosed. Metrobank
was the highest bidder.
Nicholson filed before RTC Makati City
praying for the cancellation of the
foreclosure on the disputed property. He
contends that the property is conjugal
and was mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank alleged that the property was
paraphernal.
RTC ruled in favor of Nicholson. It
declared the real estate mortgage null
and void.
CA affirmed with RTCs ruling.
Issues:
(1) W/N the property is conjugal - YES
(2) W/N the dissolution terminated the
conjugal partnership of gains - NO
(3) W/N Metrobank is an innocent
purchaser for value - NO
The property is conjugal in nature as it was
bought in the duration of their marriage. It being
named Florencia Nevalga, married to Nicholson
Pascual does not mean that it is a paraphernal
property of Florencia but merely describes her
marital status.
There were no liquidation proceedings between
the properties of the spouses. Therefore, the
property is still conjugal in nature.
Metrobanks right to the property is only 1/2
(the portion of Florencia only). The bank failed
to observe due diligence.
Petition denied.
023 - PARILLA VS PILAR
Facts:
1. Petitioners spouses and co-petitioner
son, namely; Samuel, Chinita and
Deodato, all surnamed Parilla, as
dealers of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Pilipinas Shell), are in
possession of a parcel of a land located
at the poblacion of Bantay, Ilocos Sur.

The parcel of land was leased to
Pilipinas Shell by respondent.
2. After the expiration of the lease
agreement, petitioners remained in
possession of the parcel of land, which
they build improvements, consisting of a
billiard hall, a restaurant, sari-sari store
and a parking lot. After repeated
demands, petitioners refuse to vacate
the property.
3. Respondent, Deodato Pilar, who was
residing in the United States, filed an
ejectment complaint, through his
attorney-in-fact, Marivic Paz Padre.
4. After the trial, the MTC ordered the
petitioners to vacate the property and to
pay the respondent the amount of
P50,000 for compensation, and
P10,000 for attorneys fees. In turn, the
respondent shall pay the petitioners 2
million for the improvements made in
the property.
5. Respondent appealed to the RTC the
order of reimbursement, however the
court affirmed the MTCs decision.
6. The respondent filed a petition for
review before the CA, which set aside the
questioned order for reimbursement.
Hence, the present petition, assailing
the decision of the CA.
Issue: WoN the CA erred in not ruling that
petitioners are builders of good faith and is
entitled for reimbursement?
Ruling: Petitioner denied. The decision of the CA
is affirmed.
Petitioners contention is that since they
were not prevented by respondent, or his agents
from building improvements upon the property,
then Article 453 renders them as builders in
good faith. Thus, Article 448 (the case should
be under Article 449-450) in relation to
Article 546, gives them entitlement for
reimbursement for the improvements made in
the property. The Court does not agree.
There was a lease agreement between
Pilipinas Shell and respondent. As petitioners
were dealers of Pilipinas shell, they are
considered its agents. Article 1678 on lease
contract, of the Civil Code is thus the applicable
law and not Article 448 and 546. Petitioner is
wrong to urge the court to apply Art. 448 on the
present case. Jurisprudence declares that Art.
448 is only applicable to builders,
planters or sowers, who believing
themselves to be owners, or at least have
a claim to the parcel of land. It does not
apply to when the interest is a mere holder. A
tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good

faith as he has no pretension to be owner.
Petition is denied. The decision of the CA is
affirmed.
(Note: This case was listed under Article 449450 and not under 448.)
Also Note.A lessee is undoubtedly a builder
in bad faith if despite the absence of a perfected
contract of lease and in utter disregard of the
lessors numerous protests, he continued his
construction activities upon the latters land.
024 - PASCUAL VS SARMIENTO
Damaso Pascual (petitioner) filed for

recovery of possession against Luis
Sarmiento, Narciso Perez, and Petra
dela Cruz(respondent) claiming that he
was the absolute owner of the land in a
place called Bangat alleging that it was
sold to him by the widow and heirs of
Domingo Pascual after he died.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents but was
reopened
Respondent brought a suit for
usurpation and unlawful detainment of
said land claiming that three parcels of
land were adjoined to Domingos
property due to the change of course of
the river.
In record, by 1910 petitioners land is
bounded on the North by the
Norzagaray River which serves as the
boundary line between Angat (where
lands of respondents reside) and
Norzagaray. The said parcels of land in
Angat where the ones included in
petitioners land due to the change of
course of the river which destroyed a
portion of respondents land.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is the rightful owner of
said incorporated land
HELD:
No. Respondents are the rightful owners of the
parcels of land incorporated in petitioners land.
However, petitioner relied on Article 370 of the
Civil Code stating that the beds of rivers which
remain abandoned because the course of the
water has naturally changed belong to the
owners of the riparian lands throughout their
respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided
estates belonging to different owners, the new

dividing line shall run at equal distance there
from. Court explained that riparian owners
simply have the right to one-half of the
abandoned bed through the changing of the
rivers course, however, it does not grant any
property right to the owner of the riparian land
when a new course is opened. Hence,
respondents retain ownership.
DOCTRINE:
Article 370 of the Civil Code - the beds of rivers
which remain abandoned because the course of
the water has naturally changed belong to the
owners of the riparian lands throughout their
respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided
estates belonging to different owners, the new
dividing line shall run at equal distance there
from.
025 PECSON VS. CA
Pecson owned a commercial lot (256.3
sq. m) in Kamias St, QC wherein he built
a 4-door 2-story apartment building.
Due to his failure to pay realty taxes
amounting to 12k, the lot was sold at a
public auction to Nepomuceno who then
sold it to private respondents, spouses
Nuguid for 103k.
Petitioner questions the validity of the
sale while the spouses were claiming
that the apartment building should be
included.
RTC and CA held that the apartment
building was not included in the sale of
the commercial lot.
After an entry of judgment was made,
the Sps. Nuguid filed a motion with the
RTC for a motion for delivery of
possession of the lot and the apartment
building
RTC for the motion for the delivery of the
possession of lot and apartment building:
Pecson to pay the rent to the spouses
from the date of the entry of judgment
(June 23, 1993 to Sep 23, 1993)
Spouses should pay Pecson for the
construction cost of the apartment
before a writ of possession would be
issued to them.
Pecson moved for reconsideration but the Trial
court did not act on it, instead it issued a writ of
possession
The CA affirmed in part the decision of

the RTC
declaring the cost of construction can be
offset from the amount of rents to be
collected
since Sps. Nuguid opted to appropriate
the improvement, Pecson is entitled to
be reimbursed the cost of construction
at the time it was built in 1965 which is
at P53k and the right the retain the
improvement until full indemnity is
paid.
Both parties appealed to SC:
Both parties agree that Pecson was a
builder in good faith of the apartment
building because he constructed it at the
time when he was still the owner of the
lot. Hence, the issue is on the
application of Articles 448 and 546 of
the CC.
ISSUE:
W/N Art 448 and Art 546 applies to this case?
Refer below
W/N Pecson should retain ownership and
possession of the apartment building until the
spouse makes proper indemnity? YES.
What is the basis for the reimbursement or
indemnity, should it be at the time it was built in
1965 amounting to 53k or the current market
value? Latter
HELD:
Art 448 does not apply to a case where
the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale/donation.
The issue on good faith/bad faith is
irrelevant if the true owner himself is
the builder of the works on his own land
Hence, Art 448 does not apply to this
case. BUT the provision regarding the
indemnity may be applied because the
intent of this article is to avoid a state of
forced co-ownership.
Art 546 was formulated in trying to
adjust the rights of the owner and
possessor in good faith of a piece of
land, to administer complete justice to
both of them in such a way as neither
one nor the other may enrich himself of
that which does not belong to him.
Hence, the current market value of the
improvements, which should be made
the basis of reimbursement.

Since the spouses chose to appropriate

the apartment building, Pecson is
entitled to possession and enjoyment o
the building UNTIL he is paid the
proper indemnity because the right to
retain the improvements while the
indemnity is not paid implies tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it
is built, planted or sown.
In this case, the spouse haven't paid
Pecson the proper indemnity. Hence,
Pecson has the right to retain ownership
of the building as well as the rents from
the lease.
The case was remanded to the trial court to
determine the current market value of the
apartment building and the lot. Until payment of
the requirement indemnity is made, Pecson shall
be restored of the possession of the apartment
building
026 - PNB VS. DE JESUS
Facts:
De Jesus filed a complaint against
petitioner before RTC of Occidental
Mindoro for recovery of ownership and
possession of parcel of land in
Occidental Mindoro (1,144 square
meters).
De Jesus alleged that he acquired said
land, had a verification survey, and
discovered that the northern portion of
the lot was being encroached upon
by a building of PNB to the extent of
124 square meters. PNB refused to
vacate the property despite demands.
PNB answered that they acquired the
property from Mayor Ignacio (owner
before) and that the encroachment
already existed. They offered to pay
P100 per square meter of the
encroachment, yet the sale did not
happen since Mayor Ignacio mortgaged
the land to DBP.
RTC ruled in favor of De Jesus
declaring him the rightful owner of the
124 meters encroached.
CA affirmed.
PNB claims that they were a builder in
good faith. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N PNB is a builder in good faith.
Ruling: No.
A builder in good faith is one who, not being the
owner of the land, builds on that land believing
himself to be its owner and unaware of any
defect in his title or mode of acquisition.
A builder in good faith can (Art. 448-450)

compel the landowner to make a choice
between: (1) appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity or (2) obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a
rule that accords with the principle of accession,
i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and
not the other way around. Even as the option lies
with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one.
He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the
building to instead remove it from the land.
In this case, PNB was aware of such
encroachment prior to acquiring the land so
good faith cannot be invoked.
CA affirmed. Petition denied.
027 - BALLATAN VS. COURT OF
APPEALS (EDITED FROM THE EARLIER
DIGEST FACTS SAME SAME, ISSUE AND
RULING DIFFERENT)
Facts:
Ballatan is in the middle of constructing
her house when she noticed that the
concrete fence and side pathway of the
adjoining house, belonging to Go
encroached the entire length of the
eastern side of her property. Her
surveyor informed her that the lots
measurement is less than what is in the
deed.
Ballatan informed Go but Go insisted
that he had the right measurements as
measured by Engr. Quedding, the
authorized surveyor of the AIA
(developer of subdivision).
Ballatan then called the attention of
AIA. Engr. Quedding found that
Ballatans land was less by a few meters
and Li Ching Yaos (respondent) lot,
whose lot was next to Gos, was
increased by 2 meters. He allegedly
found the lots in proper position.
Ballatan, Go, and Li Ching Yao was not
able to reach an amicable settlement.
Ballatan filed a petition for recovery of
possession before RTC. Go filed an
Answer with Third Party Complaint
impleading as third party Li Ching Yao,
AIA, and Engr. Quedding.
RTC ruled in favor of Ballatan. It
ordered Go to demolish the
improvements on the land and
dismissed the third party complaints.

Go appealed before CA. It modified

RTCs decision:
o Affirmed the dismissal of third
party complaint against AIA
o Ordered Go to pay Ballatan
o Li Ching Yao to pay Go a
reasonable amount for the
portion they encroached.
o Engr. Quedding to pay
attorneys fees for his erroneous
survey.
Issue: WON respondents Go and Yao are
builders in good faith
Ruling: Yes.
Respondent Go built his house in the
belief that it was entirely within the
parameters of his fathers land.
Respondent Go had no knowledge that
they encroached on petitioner Ballatans
lot. Respondent Go is deemed builder in
good faith until the time Ballatan
informed him of their encroachmenton
her property.
Respondent Yao built his house on his
lot before any of the other parties did.
He constructed his house in 1982,
respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners
in 1985. There is no evidence, much less,
any allegation that respondent Yao was
aware that when he built his house he
knew that a portion thereof encroached
on respondents Gos adjoining land.
Good faith is always prsumed, and upon
him who alleges bad faith on the part of
a possessor rests the burden of proof.
All the parties are presumed to have
acted in good faith. Their rights must,
therefor, be determinedin accordance
with the appropriate provisions of the
Civil Code on property.
ART. 448 (Refer to the code)
NOTE: A builder in good faith is one
who is unaware of any flaw in his title to
the land at the time he builds on it.
CA affirmed.
028 - SPOUSES CARANDANG v. HEIRS

OF DE GUZMAN
FACTS: Spouses Carandang and the

decedent Quirino de Guzman were
stockholders and corporate officers of
Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS).
The Carandangs have equities at 54 %
while Quirino has 46%.
When the capital stock of MBS was

increased on November 26, 1983, the
Carandangs subscribed P345,000 from
it, P293,250 from the said amount was
loaned by Quirino to the Carandangs. In
the subsequent increase in MBS capital
stock on March 3, 1989, the Carandangs
subscribed again to the increase in the
amount of P93,750. But, P43,125 out of
the mentioned amount was again loaned
by Quirino.
When Quirino sent a demand letter to
the Carandangs for the payment of the
loan, the Carandangs refused to pay.
They contend that a pre-incorporation
agreement was executed between
Arcadio Carandang and Quirino,
whereby Quirino promised to pay for the
stock subscriptions of the Arcadio
without cost, in consideration for
Arcadios technical expertise, his newly
purchased equipment, and his skill in
repairing and upgrading
radio/communication equipment
therefore, there is no indebtedness on
the part of the Carandangs.
Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint
seeking to recover the P336,375 total
amount of the loan together with
damages. The RTC ruled in favor of
Quirino and ordered the Carandangs to
pay the loan plus interest, attorneys
fees, and costs of suit. The Carandangs
appealed the trial courts decision to the
CA, but the CA affirmed the same. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the Carandangs were also
denied. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
SPOUSES CARANDANG: Three of the
four checks used to pay their stock
subscriptions were issued in the name of
Milagros de Guzman, the decedents
wife. Thus, Milagros should be
considered as an indispensable party in
the complaint. Being such, the failure to
join Milagros as a party in the case
should cause the dismissal of the action
by reason of a jurisprudence stating
that: (i)f a suit is not brought in the
name of or against the real party in
interest, a motion to dismiss may be
filed on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should
have dismissed the case for failure to

state a cause of action, considering that
Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an
indispensable party, was not included as
a party-plaintiff.
HELD: No. Although the spouses

Carandang were correct in invoking the
aforementioned doctrine, the ground set
forth entails an examination of whether
the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the
litigation, and not whether all persons
interested in such outcome are actually
pleaded. The first query seeks to
answer the question of whether Milagros
is a real party in interest, while the latter
query is asking if she is an indispensable
party. Since the issue of this case calls
for the definition of an indispensable
party, invoking the abovementioned
doctrine is irrelevant to the case because
the doctrine talks about a real party in
interest and not an indispensable
party. Although it is important to take
note that an indispensable party is also a
real party in interest.
In sum, in suits to recover properties,
all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of
the Civil Code and relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may
bring an action, any kind of action, for
the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit
for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief
can be accorded in the suit even without
their participation, since the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.
Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not an
indispensable party in the action for the
recovery of the allegedly loaned money
to the spouses Carandang. As such, she
need not have been impleaded in said
suit, and dismissal of the suit is not
warranted by her not being a party
thereto. (The CivPro issue was not the
main issue in the case.)
029 - REPUBLIC VS HOLY TRINITY

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by

the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the
RTC a Consolidated Complaint for
Expropriation against landowners whose
properties would be affected by the construction,
rehabilitation, and expansion of the North Luzon
Expressway.
The Holy Trinity Reality and Development
Corporation was one of the affected landowners.
TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting
that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the
payment of 100% of the zonal value of the
affected properties (in the total amount of
28,406,700 pesos) with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, South Harbor Branch (LBPSouth
Harbor), an authorized government depository.
TRB maintained that since it had already
complied with the provisions of Sec. 4 of RA
8974 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC. RTC
issued an Order for the Issuance of the Writ of
Possession as well as the Writ of Possession
itself. Holy Trinity moved for reconsideration.
The Sheriff filed with the RTC a Report on Writ
of Possession stating that since none of the
landowners voluntarily vacated the properties
subject of the expropriation proceedings, the
assistance of the PNP would be necessary in
implementing the Writ of Possession.
Accordingly, TRB, through OSG, filed with the
RTC an Omnibus Motion praying for an Order
directing the PNP to assist the Sheriff in the
implementation of the Writ of Possession. The
Holy Trinity filed with the RTC a Motion to
Withdraw Deposit, praying that it be allowed to
withdraw 22,968,000 out of 28,406,700,
including the interest which accrued thereon.
RTC granted the motion (except as to the
interest) since Holy Trinity already proved its
absolute ownership over the properties and paid
the taxes due to the government. RTC conducted
a hearing on the accrued interest, after which it
directed the issuance of an Order of
Expropriation, and granted TRB a period of 30
days to inquire from LBP-South Harbor whether
the deposit made by DPWH with the bank
relative to the expropriation proceedings is
earning interest or not. TRB submitted a
Manifestation to which was attached the letter
by Atty. Osoteo stating that the DPWH
Expropriation Account was an interest bearing

current account. RTC resolved the issue by
ruling that the interest earnings from the deposit
of 22,968,000 (under the principle of accession)
are considered as fruits and should properly
pertain to the property owner (in this case, Holy
Trinity). Upon motion of TRB, it issued an Order
of Expropriation. But later on, it reversed itself
stating that the issue as to who is entitled to the
payment of interest should be ventilated before
the Board of Commissioners. The CA reversed.
ISSUE: WON Holy Trinity is only entitled to the
amount equivalent to the zonal value of the
expropriated property and not to the accrued
interest?
Held:
NO. Holy Trinity is also entitled to the accrued
interest. Note: TRB is contending that Holy
Trinity is only entitled to the exact amount as
defined in Sec. 4 of RA 8974 and Sec. 2 Rule 67.
TRB failed to distinguish between the
expropriation procedures under RA 8974 and
Rule 67. The former specifically governs
expropriation proceedings for national
government infrastructure projects.
In the case at bar, the proceedings deal with the
expropriation of properties intended for a
national government infrastructure project.
Thus, the RTC was correct in applying the
procedure laid out in RA 8974, by requiring the
deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the
zonal value of the properties sought to be
expropriated. The controversy though arises not
from the amount of the deposit but as to the
ownership of the interest that had since accrued
on the deposited amount.
The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA. The
intention of the TRB in depositing such amount
through DPWH was clearly to comply with the
requirement of immediate payment in RA 8974,
so that it could already secure a writ of
possession over the properties subject of the
expropriation and commence implementation of
the project. In fact, TRB did not object to Holy
Trinitys Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the
RTC, for as long as it shows (1) that the property
is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2)
that it is the absolute owner thereof. A close
scrutiny of TRB's arguments would further
reveal that it does not directly challenge the CAs
determinative pronouncement that the interest
earned by the amount deposited in the
expropriation account accrues to Holy Trinity by

virtue of accession.
TRB only asserts that Holy Trinity is entitled
only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value
of the expropriated property, nothing more and
nothing less. The SC agrees in TRB's statement
since it is exactly how the amount of the
immediate payment shall be determined in
accordance with Sec4 of RA 8974, i.e., an
amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of
the expropriated properties.
However, TRB already complied therewith by
depositing the required amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South
Harbor. By depositing the said amount, TRB is
already considered to have paid the same to
Holy Trinity, and Holy Trinity became the owner
thereof. The amount earned interest after the
deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the
owner of the principal who is already
determined as the Holy Trinity. The interest is
paid by LBP-South Harbor on the deposit, and
TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more
than what it is required to do so by law.
Nonetheless, the SC finds it necessary to
emphasize that Holy Trinity is determined to be
the owner of only a part of the amount deposited
in the expropriation account, in the sum of
P22,968,000.00. Hence, it is entitled by right of
accession to the interest that had accrued to the
said amount only.
030 - SUMULONG AND VIDANESBALAOING VS. HON. GUERRERO AND
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
(NHA)
Facts:
1. The NHA filed before the Court of First
Instance, a complaint for expropriation
of parcels of land covering 25 hectares
in Antipolo Rizal. This included the
lots of both petitioner (Sumulong and
Balaoing).
2. The lots were valued by NHA at P1.00
per square meter adopting as its market
value.
3. Together with the complaint was a
motion for immediate possession of the
properties, to which NHA deposited the
amount to Philippine National Bank
(amount is P158, 980). This amount
represents the total market
value pursuant of Presidential

Decree No. 1224, which provides
the policy on expropriation and
payment of just compensation.
4. Respondent judge, Hon. Guerrero gave
out the order, issuing the writ of
possession.
5. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the motion was
denied by the court. Hence this petition
directly to the SC.
6. Petitioner base their grounds on the
following:
a. Respondent judge acted in grave
abuse of discretion.
b. PD 1224 is unconstitutional for
violating due process.
c. Depriving the court of their
judicial discretion to determine
just compensation for
expropriation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the provisions of PD
1224 is unconstitutional for depriving
the court in determining just
compensation?
Ruling: Yes, the provisions found in PD 1224
about just compensation is unconstitutional.
Just compensation means the
value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and equivalent for
the loss sustained. The values provided by the
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very
wide areas covering several barrios or even an
entire town with the exception of the poblacion.
Individual differences are never taken into
account. Stating that the owners are estopped
from questioning the values made by the
assessors since they had the opportunity to
protest is illusory. The idea of expropriation
simply never occurs until a demand is made or a
case filed by an agency authorized to do so.
Therefore, the provisions of PD 1224 regarding
just compensation are unconstitutional for
encroachment on judicial prerogative.
The case is remanded for further proceedings.
031 - ARAMBULO VS NOLASCO
Raul Arambulo with his wife Teresita

and his mother Rosita with siblings
Primo, Maria Lorenza, Ana Maria,
Maximiano, and Julio (petitioner) and
Iraida Nolasco (respondent) are coowners of 2 parcels of land in Tondo,
Manila. Iraida was later on succeeded by
her husband. On January 8, 1999,

petitioners filed for relief under Article
491 alleging that all co-owners except
respondents are entitled to sell their
respective shares and respondents are
withholding their consent to sale their
shares. Respondents then alleged that
there were not aware of petitioners
intention to sell since they were not
called on to participate in the
negotiations.
RTC Ruled in favor of petitioners; RTC alleged
that respondents withholding of consent is prejudicial of the common interest of the co-owners
CA Reversed RTC decision; CA alleged that
respondents has full ownership of their
undivided interest and they cannot be compelled
to sell their portion of the property.
ISSUE:W/N Respondents can be compelled by
the court to give their consent to the sale of their
shares
HELD:
No. Court of Appeals upheld Art. 493 wherein
each co-owner shall have the fill ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
to the property except when personal right are
involved. In the case at bar, the sale that is to be
made by petitioners of their part will not affect
the full ownership of respondents of the part
that belongs to them. Court cited the case of
Bailon-Casilao vs CA: that even if the owner
sells the whole property as his, the sale will only
affect his own share but not that of his coowners.
032 - AVILA VS. BARABAT
Facts:
1. Anunciacion Bahena vda. De Nemeno
owned a parcel of land located at Toledo
City, Cebu. Upon her death, the parcel of
land was transferred to her 5 children,
namely; Narcisa Avila, Natividad
Macapaz, Francisca Adlawan, Leon
Nemeo and Jose Bahena. The heirs
built their respective houses on the
parcel of land.
2. Respondent, Benjamin Barabat leased a
portion of the house of Avila. Benjamin
subsequently married Jovita, which they
moved together in the said house.
3. Avila then relocated to Cagayan de Oro.
She offered her share of the lot to her
siblings, but the no one seems to be
interested in buying the share. Avila

then turned to respondents, which the
latter was willing to buy the said share.
4. Avila and respondents executed a
private document. Respondent then
stopped paying rentals to Avila and
started paying the realty taxes.
5. Sometime in 1982, petitioner, Januario
Adlawan confronted the respondents,
stating that they had until March to
vacate the house since he was buying the
property. Respondents then told
Januario that they already purchased
the property, showing him the private
document. Subsequently, respondent
received a letter from atty. Alo,
informing them that Avila has sold the
property to spouses Januario and
Nanette Adlawan.
6. Respondents filed a complaint for
quieting to title before the RTC. It was
subsequently amended to include
annulment of the deed of sale to the
spouses Adlawan.
RTC Ruling: Rendered a decision in favor of the
respondents. It nullified the subsequent sale in
favor of the Adlawan spouses.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto.
Issue:
1. WoN the subject property was already
partitioned by the siblings?
Ruling: Yes, the SC ruled in the affirmative
The regime of co-ownership would have existed
if the property was still undivided or not
partitioned. In the nature of co-ownership, a coowner cannot pin point the exact division of the
property because the share remains intangible
and ideal.
Every act of intending to end the
indivision is deemed to be a partition. It is clear
that the sibling owners already partitioned
among themselves the parcel of land, which they
already took possession. At the present case, the
siblings were no longer co-owners of the parcel
of land, and are owners of their respective
shares. The lot has already been physically
divided among themselves. Therefore, the right
was no longer pro indiviso. Since there was no
longer co-ownership, petitioners right to
redeem no longer exist. For this right to be
exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time
the conveyance is made by a co-owner and the
redemption is demanded by the other co-owner
or co-owner(s).
Petition denied.
033 - LEONOR B. CRUZ VS TEOFILA M.
CATAPANG
Facts:
Leonor Cruz and Norma Maligaya are
co-owners of a land located at Barangay
Mahabang Ludlod in Batangas. With
Maligayas consent, Teofila Catapang
built a house on a lot adjacent to the
parcel of land which intruded a portion
of the co-owned property.
Leonor visited the property and
discovered that a part of respondents
house intruding unto a portion of the coowned property. She demanded for
demolition and vacate the portion
encroaching the property but responded
disregarded.
Petitioner filed a suit for forcible entry
before the MTC.
MTC- Granted. Consent of only one of the coowners is not sufficient to justify the defendants
construction.
RTC-Affirmed.
CA-Reversed. Consent was given by Maligaya,
therefore cannot be characterized as one made
through strategy or stealth (a cause of action for
forcible entry).
Issue:
Is consent of the co-owner valid in the dismissal
of the forcible entry case?
Held:
No. Entry into the land affected clandestinely
without the knowledge of the other co-owners
could be categorized as possession by stealth.
Normas consent, allowing the respondent to
stay in the constructed house can be considered
as a strategy. Hence, these causes of action
constitute forcible entry. Moreover, an alteration
was made without a valid consent of the other
co-owner. Alterations may include any act of
strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held
implicitly an act of alteration. In this case, the
construction of a house on the co-owned
property is an act of dominion. There being no
consent from all co-owners, respondent had no
right to construct her house on the co-owned
property.

034 - DIVERSIFIED CREDIT
CORPORATION vs. FELIPE ROSADO and
LUZ JAYME ROSADO
FACTS:
This appeal from a decision of the CFI of
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental was
certified to us by the Court of Appeals because
the same involves no questions of fact.
The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of
Bacolod City, when the Diversified Credit
Corporation filed an action to compel the
spouses Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme Rosado
to vacate and restore possession of a parcel of
land in the City of Bacolod (Lot 62-B of
Subdivision plan LRC-Psd-33823) that forms
part of Lot No. 62 of the Bacolod Cadastre, and
is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
27083 in the name of plaintiff. After answer,
claiming that the lot was defendants' conjugal
property, the Municipal Court ordered
defendants to surrender and vacate the land in
litigation; to pay P100.00 a month from the
filing of the complaint up to the actual vacating
of the premises; to pay P500.00 attorneys' fees
and costs.
Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance, the
case was submitted on the following stipulation
of facts
1. Lot No. 62-B of Bacolod Cadastre
belong to the thirteen co-owners,
including the wife of the defendant
herein, who owns 1/13th part proindiviso
2. On May 11, 1964, Luz Jayme Rosado,
wife of the defendant Felipe Rosado,
signed a Deed of Sale together with the
co-owners of the property to the plaintiff
as shown by Exh. "A" for the plaintiff
3. On the lot in question the defendant
Felipe Rosado had built a house
sometime in 1957 without the whole
property having been previously
partitioned among the thirteen (13) coowners
4. The title of the property has already
been transferred to the plaintiff upon
registration of the Deed of Sale in June,
1964, with the Office of the Register of
Deeds;
5. Demand was made by the plaintiff
upon the defendant Felipe Rosado and
his wife Luz Jayme Rosado on October
19, 1964, but until now the defendant
Felipe Rosado has refused to vacate the

premises or to remove his house thereon
as shown by Exh. "B" for the plaintiff, on
the grounds as he alleged in his answer
that he had built on the lot in question a
conjugal house worth P8,000.00 which
necessarily makes the lot on which it
stands subject to Article 158 of the Civil
Code and on the point of view of equity
that the wife of the defendant Felipe
Rosado received an aliquot share of
P2,400.00 only from the share and if the
house were demolished the defendant
would suffer damage in the amount of
P8,000.00
6. The portion of the lot on which the
house stands, would earn a monthly
rental of P50.00
7. Felipe Rosado, husband of Luz Jayme,
did not give his conformity to the Deed
of Sale, Exh. "A".
8. On October 31, 1964, the defendant
Felipe Rosado requested the plaintiff in
the letter, Exh. "C" for the plaintiff, for a
period of six (6) months within which to
vacate the premises.
9. The letter was not answered by the
plaintiff and they did not accept the
offer, and on November 25, 1964, they
filed a complaint before the Municipal
Court which proves that plaintiff
neglected the offer.
CFI: rejected the claim of ownership
advanced by Rosado, based upon the
construction of a house on the disputed
lot by the conjugal partnership of the
Rosado spouses, which allegedly
converted the land into conjugal
property under Article 158, paragraph 2
of the Civil Code
ISSUE: Whether construction of a house on the

lot owned in common by the Jaymes, and sold
by them to the appellant corporation, the land in
question or a 1/13th part of it became conjugal
property.
HELD: Appellant's thesis legally untenable.
CFIs ruling was affirmed with costs against
Felipe Rosado
RATIONALE: (ART. 493/494 applies and
not Art. 158) Basic principle in the law of coownership, both under Civil Code that no
individual co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion of the land or thing owned in

common until the partition thereof. Prior to that
time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal, or
abstract, quota or proportionate share in the
entire thing owned in common by all the coowners.
Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no
time physically determined, it cannot be validly
claimed that the house constructed by her
husband was built on land belonging to her, and
Article 158 of the Civil Code cannot apply.
Certainly, on her 1/13 ideal or abstract undivided
share, no house could be erected. Necessarily,
the claim of conversion of the wife's share from
paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result
of the construction must be rejected for lack of
factual or legal basis.
It is the logical consequence of the foregoing
ruling that the lower court did not err in holding
that the appellant was bound to vacate the land
without reimbursement, since he knew that the
land occupied by the house did not belong
exclusively to his wife, but to the other owners as
well, and there is no proof on record that the
house occupied only 1/13 of the total area. The
construction was not done in good faith.
036 - HEIRS OF MARCELINO CABAL VS
SPS. CABAL
Marcelo Cabal owned a 4,234sqm parcel

of land in Zambales described as Lot G.
Upon his death he was survived by his
wife and children. 5 years before his
death (1949), he allowed his son
Marcelino (petitioner) to build his house
on a portion of lot G and since then he
resided on said portion and later on, his
son was able to build his house on said
property.
Sometime in 1964, the heirs settled
amongst themselves said lot into
undivided equal shares of 423.40 sqm.
The heirs further subdivided Lot G into
Lot G-1 in favor of Marcelino and G-2 in
favor of the other heirs (Daniel, Higinia,
Natividad, Juan, Cecilio, Margarita,
Lorenzo, Anacleto, and Lauro). While
Marcelino Mortgaged his share, the
other lot was again subdivided the
remaining portion of lot 1 with a certain
Oscar Merete and Carmelita Pagar as coowners.
The owners of Lot 1 then executed a
Deed of Partition amongst themselves.
This was followed by a land survey by

Eng. Dominador Santos who executed a
subdivision plan revealing Marcelino
and his son had built their houses 423
sqm in Lot G-1. Upon realizing Sps.
Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents)
confronted Marcelino which resulted to
an agreement of a resurvey and
swapping of lots that did not
materialize.
MTC Ruled in favor of Marcelino; MTC alleged
that there was no cause of action on the part of
the respondents since Marcelino has been in
possession in good faith since 1949.
RTC Reversed the MTC ruling; RTC alleged
that Marcelinos possession was in the concept
of co-ownership and that his possession was
merely tolerated by the owners
CA Sustained RTC decision; Marcelino may
have been in good faith when he started to
occupy the property by 1949 but his good faith
was diminished upon the knowledge of the
surveying of said lot.
ISSUE: W/N Lot owned by Marcelino is deemed
under co-ownership
HELD:
No. As a rule, there is no co-ownership where
the portion owned is concretely determined and
identifiable. In the case at bar, the dispute arose
from the house Marcelino built on the said
portion of Lot G wherein was subjected to the
partition of the other heirs. Court held that it is
undisputedly his property since 1949 with his
fathers consent and even before his fathers
death, his co-heirs were aware of such consent
given to him and have acknowledged the same.
When the partition was instituted by the heirs,
his inheritance was designated through physical
manifestation of him occupying the said portion
of the lot.
DOCTRINE:
Elementary is the rule that there is no coownership where the portion owned is
concretely determined and identifiable, though
not technically described, or that said portion is
still embraced in one and the same certificate of
title does make said portion less determinable
or identifiable or distinguishable, one from the
other, nor that dominion over each portion less
exclusive in their respective owners
037 - HEIRS OF REYES VS. REYES
Facts:

Antonio Reyes and his wife, Leoncia Mag-isa
Reyes (Leoncia), were owners of a parcel of
residential land with an area of 442 square
meters located in Pulilan, Bulacan. On that land
they constructed their dwelling.
The couple had four children, namely: Jose,
Teofilo , Jose and Potenciana Reyes-Valenzuela.
Antonio Reyes died intestate, and was survived
by Leoncia and their three sons, Potenciana
having predeceased her father. Potenciana also
died intestate, survived by her children, namely:
Gloria Reyes Valenzuela, Maria Reyes
Valenzuela, and Alfredo Reyes Valenzuela. Jose,
Jr., and his family resided in the house of the
parents, but Teofilo constructed on the property
his own house, where he and his family resided.
Leoncia and her three sons executed a deed
denominated Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling
Muli, whereby they sold the land and its existing
improvements to the Spouses Benedicto Francia
and Monica Ajoco (Spouses Francia)
for P500.00, subject to the vendors right to
repurchase for the same amount sa oras na
sila'y makinabang. Potencianas heirs did not
assent to that deed. Nonetheless, Teofilo and
Jose, Jr. and their respective families remained
in possession of the property and paid the realty
taxes thereon.
Leoncia and her children did not repay the
amount of P500.00.
The Spouses Francia both died intestate.
Alejandro Reyes, the son of Jose, Sr., first
partially paid to the Spouses Francia the amount
of P265.00 for the obligation of Leoncia, his
uncles and his father. Alejandro later paid the
balance of P235.00.
On August 11, 1970, the heirs of Spouses Francia
executed a deed entitled Pagsasa-ayos ng Pagaari at Pagsasalin,[5]whereby they transferred
and conveyed to Alejandro all their rights and
interests in the property for P500.00.
Alejandro executed a Kasulatan ng Pagmemeari, wherein he declared that he had acquired all
the rights and interests of the heirs of the
Spouses Francia, including the ownership of the
property, after the vendors had failed to
repurchase within the given period. From then
on, he had paid the realty taxes for the property.
Nevertheless, Alejandro, his grandmother
(Leoncia), and his father (Jose, Sr.) executed
a Magkakalakip na Salaysay, by which
Alejandro acknowledged the right of Leoncia,
Jose, Jr., and Jose, Sr. to repurchase the

property at any time for the same amount
of P500.00.
On October 22, 1970, Leoncia died intestate. She
was survived by Jose, Sr., Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and
the heirs of Potenciana. Even after Leonicas
death, Teofilo and Jose, Jr., with their respective
families, continued to reside in the property.
On September 2, 1993, Alejandro also died
intestate. Surviving him were his wife,
Amanda Reyes, and their children,
namely: Consolacion Reyes, Eugenia
Reyes-Elvambuena, Luciana ReyesMendoza, Pedrito S. Reyes, Merlinda
Reyes-Famodulan, Eduardo Reyes and
June S. Reyes (respondents herein).
In 1994, respondent Amanda Reyes asked the
heirs of Teofilo and Jose, Jr., to vacate the
property because she and her children already
needed it. After the petitioners refused to
comply, she filed a complaint against the
petitioners in the barangay, seeking their
eviction from the property. When no amicable
settlement was reached, the Barangay Lupon
issued a certification to file action to
the respondents.
In the interim, petitioner Nenita R. de la Cruz
and her brother Romeo Reyes also constructed
their respective houses on the property.
RTC Respondents initiated a suit for quieting
of title and reconveyance.
They alleged that their predecessor Alejandro
had acquired ownership of the property by virtue
of the deed Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at
Pagsasalin executed on August 11, 1970 by the
heirs of the Spouses Francia; that on the basis of
such deed of assignment, Alejandro had
consolidated his ownership of the
property via his Kasulatan ng Pagmemeari; and that under the Magkasanib na
Salaysay, Alejandro had granted to Leoncia, his
father Jose, Sr., and his uncles, Teofilo and Jose,
Jr. the right to repurchase the property, but they
had failed to do so.
In their answer, the petitioners averred that
the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an
equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale;
that the mortgagors had retained ownership of
the property; that the heirs of the Spouses
Francia could not have validly sold the property
to Alejandro through the Pagsasaayos ng Pagaari at Pagsasalin; that Alejandros right was

only to seek reimbursement of the P500.00 he
had paid from the co-owners, namely: Leoncia,
Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr. and the heirs of
Potenciana; and that Alejandro could not have
also validly consolidated ownership through
the Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari, because a
consolidation of ownership could only be
effected via a court order.
RTC - ruled in favor of the respondents,
declaring that Alejandro had acquired ownership
of the property in 1965 by operation of law upon
the failure of the petitioners predecessors to
repurchase the property; that the joint affidavit
executed by Alejandro, Leoncia and Jose, Jr. and
Jose, Sr., to extend the period of redemption was
inefficacious, because there was no more period
to extend due to the redemption period having
long lapsed by the time of its execution; and that
the action should be dismissed insofar as the
heirs of Potenciana were concerned, considering
that Potenciana, who had predeceased her
parents, had no successional rights in the
property.
CA Petitioners appealed.
CA: the transaction covered by the Kasulatan
ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was not a pacto de
retro sale but an equitable mortgage under
Article 1602 of the Civil Code; that even after the
deeds execution, Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and
their families had remained in possession of the
property and continued paying realty taxes for
the property; that the purported vendees had not
declared the property for taxation purposes
under their own names; and that such
circumstances proved that the parties envisaged
an equitable mortgage in the Kasulatan ng
Biling Mabibiling Muli. The CA agreed with the
RTC that theMagkakalakip na Salaysay did not
effectively extend the period for Leoncia and her
children to repurchase the property, considering
that the period to repurchase had long lapsed by
the time the agreement to extend it was executed
on October 17, 1970.
Issue:
The CA erred in finding that respondents (were)
already barred from claiming that the
transaction entered into by their predecessorsin-interest was an equitable mortgage and not
a pacto de retro sale;NO
Did Alejandro and his heirs (respondents
herein) acquire the mortgaged property through
prescription? NO
RATIO:
The CA correctly concluded that the true
agreement of the parties vis--vis the Kasulatan
ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable

mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale. There was
no dispute that the purported vendors had
continued in the possession of the property even
after the execution of the agreement.
When Alejandro redeemed the property
on August 11, 1970, he did not thereby become a
co-owner thereof, because his father Jose, Sr.
was then still alive. Alejandro merely became the
assignee of the mortgage, and the property
continued to be co-owned by Leoncia and her
sons Jose, Sr., Jose Jr., and Teofilo. As an
assignee of the mortgage and the mortgage
credit, Alejandro acquired only the rights of his
assignors, nothing more. He himself confirmed
so in the Magkasanib na Salaysay, whereby he
acknowledged the co-owners right to redeem the
property from him at any time (sa ano mang
oras) for the same redemption price of P500.00.
Thus, Alejandros acknowledgment of the
effectivity of the equitable mortgage agreement
precluded the respondents from claiming that
the property had been sold to him with right to
repurchase.
The respondents counter, however, that
the Magkasanib na Salaysay, which
acknowledged the other co-owners right to
redeem the property, was void; that the
petitioners could no longer claim to be coowners entitled to redeem the property, because
the co-ownership had come to an end by
Alejandro having openly repudiated the coownership; that Alejandros acts of repudiation
had consisted of: (a) redeeming the property
from the Spouses Francia; (b) acquiring the
property from the heirs of Spouses Francia by
virtue of a deed of assignment denominated
as Pag-aayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin; (c)
executing an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership over the property (Kasulatan ng
Pagmeme-ari); (d) applying for the cancellation
of the tax declaration of property in the name of
Leoncia, and the subsequent issuance of a new
tax declaration in his name; (e) his continuous
possession of the property from 1955, which
possession the respondents as his heirs had
continued up to the present time, or for a period
of almost 50 years already; and (f) the payment
of the taxes by Alejandro and the respondents
for more than 30 years without any contribution
from the petitioners; and that such repudiation
established that Alejandro and his successors-ininterest had already acquired sole title over the
property through acquisitive prescription.

The law allows a new period of redemption to be
agreed upon or granted even after the expiration
of the equitable mortgagors right to repurchase,
and treats such extension as one of the
indicators that the true agreement between the
parties is an equitable mortgage, not a sale with
right to repurchase. It was indubitable,
therefore, that theMagkasanib na
Salaysay effectively afforded to Leoncia, Teofilo,
Jose, Sr. and Jose, Jr. a fresh period within
which to pay to Alejandro the redemption price
of P500.00.
Alejandro became a co-owner of the property by
right of representation upon the death of his
father, Jose Sr. As a co-owner, however, his
possession was like that of a trustee and was not
regarded as adverse to his co-owners but in fact
beneficial to all of them.
Respondents asserting that Alejandro, having
earlier repudiated the co-ownership, acquired
ownership of the property through prescription.
SC: In order that a co-owners possession may be
deemed adverse to that of the cestui que trust or
the other co-owners, the following elements
must concur:
1. The co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the
co-ownership amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or the other
co-owners;
3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and
conclusive; and
4. His possession is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious.[33]
The concurrence of the foregoing elements was
not established herein. For one, Alejandro did
not have adverse and exclusive possession of the
property, as, in fact, the other co-owners had
continued to possess it, with Alejandro and his
heirs occupying only a portion of it. Neither did
the cancellation of the previous tax declarations
in the name of Leoncia, the previous co-owner,
and the issuance of a new one in Alejandros
name, and Alejandros payment of the realty
taxes constitute repudiation of the coownership. The sole fact of a co-owner declaring
the land in question in his name for taxation
purposes and paying the land taxes did not
constitute an unequivocal act of repudiation

amounting to an ouster of the other co-owner
and could not constitute adverse possession as
basis for title by prescription.
The respondents did not present proof
showing that Alejandro had effectively
repudiated the co-ownership. Their bare
claim that Alejandro had made oral
demands to vacate to his co-owners was
self-serving and insufficient. Alejandros
execution of the affidavit of consolidation of
ownership and his subsequent execution on the
joint affidavit were really equivocal and
ambivalent acts that did not manifest his desire
to repudiate the co-ownership.
The only unequivocal act of repudiation was
done by the respondents when they filed the
instant action for quieting of title on September
28, 1994, nearly a year after Alejandros death
on September 2, 1993. However, their
possession could not ripen into ownership
considering that their act of repudiation was not
coupled with their exclusive possession of the
property.
The respondents can only demand from
the petitioners the partition of the coowned property and the reimbursement
from their co-owners of the amount
advanced by Alejandro to repay the
obligation. They may also seek from their
co-owners the proportional
reimbursement of the realty taxes paid
for the property, pursuant to Article 488
of the Civil Code.
Grant the petition for review on certiorari.
038 - MERCADO V. LIWANAG
Ramon and Basilia Mercado filed a
complaint seeking to Annul a Deed of
Sale on the ground of fraud and on the
provisions of Art. 493 of the CC.
Ramon Mercado and Basilia Mercado
owns a parcel of land in Kangkong
Quezon City, covering 4,392 sq. m and it
is covered by a TCT issued their names
as co-owners pro-indivisio.
Out of the 4,392 sq.m; 391 sq.m was
expropriated by the National Power
Corporation around 1953
1956 - Ramon Mercado then executed a

Deed of Sale covering his portion/half of

that said land and sold 2,196 s.q at
P7.00/sq.m amounting to P15,372.
Pursuant to that Deed of Sale, a TCT was

issued in the name of Pio Liwanag and
Basilia Mercado.
Liwanag showed a receipt signed by

Ramon Mercado and a promissory note
for P10,000 but Ramon Mercado said
that there was no payment and the such
and promissory note was still uncashed
because it is still in possession of Atty.
Eugenio de Garcia.
RTC - Under Art. 493 of the CC: the sale in

question was valid and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: W/N the Deed of Sale should be
annulled under Art. 493 of the CC? NO.
HELD:
Sale of an undivided aliquot share; To
what portion the share is limited:
What a co-owner may dispose of under
Art 493 is only his undivided aliquot
share. Wherein it shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him
upon the termination of the coownership.
A co-owner has no right to divide the
property into parts then convey one part
by metes and bound.
In this case, the deed of sale stated that

Ramon is selling, transferring and
conveying his rights, title and interest on
his 1/2 portion of the said ownership
covering 2,196 sq/m
When the sale was registered the TCT in

the names of Ramon Mercado and
Basilia Mercada as co-owners were
cancelled. And a new TCT was issued,
now in the names of Pio Liwanag and
Basilia Mercado as co-owners proindivisio.
On the part of Basilia, she still retains

her part of ownership which he had even
before the sale, so she had no cause to
complain.
Hence, there is nothing invalid, irregular

nor inaccurate thereof.
The title in final and conclusive

repository of the rights of the new coowners (In this case, Liwanag and
Basilia Mercado) which Liwanag
acquired thru a sale and only acquired
an undivided half-share of the property
which Ramon Mercado had the right to
dispose of.
As for fraud, there was no proof showing

it existed in the record.
Art 493:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be alloted to him in
the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
039 - DONATO PAULMITAN, JULIANA
FANESA AND RODOLFO FANESA VS. CA,
ALICIO, ELENA, ABELINO, ADELINA,
ANITA, BAKING AND ANITO ALL
SURNAMED PAULMITAN.
Facts:
1. Agatona Paulmitan was married to
Ciriaco Paulmitan, who begotten 2
children, namely; Pascual and Donato.
Agatona died intestate, leaving 2 parcles
of land located in the province of Negros
Occidental (Lot No. 757 and Lot No.
1091). Shortly after the death of Agatona
(mother), Pascual also died, leaving his
heirs, namely; Alicio, Elena, Abelino,
Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito all
surnamed Paulmitan (respondents).
Donato, on the other hand, had only one
child, Juliana Fanesa who was married
to Rodolfo Fanesa (petitioners).
2. Donato, executed an Affidavit of
Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating
unto himself Lot No 757 on the ground
of being the sole heir of Agatona.
3. For Lot No. 1091, Donato sold it to
Juliana. Because of non-payment of
taxes, said lot was forfeited and sold in a
public auction. Subsequently, the same

property (Lot No. 1091) was redeemed
by Juliana.
4. Upon learning of these transactions,
respondents filed a complaint before the
Court of First Instance for the partition
of the properties and damages.
5. The trial court issued an ordered
dismissing the complaint as for Lot No.
757, thus making it final and executory
(not the disputed property). As regards
to Lot No. 1091, the trial proceeded, to
which the trial court ruled in favor of the
respondents.
6. The petitioners appeal before the CA.
The CA however affirmed the decision of
the CFI.
CFI ruling: For Lot No. 1091, it ruled in favor of
the respondents.
CA ruling: Affirmed the decision of the CFI.
Issue:
1. WoN a co-owner may acquire exclusive
ownership over the property held in
common?
Ruling: Petition is without merit.
The Petitioners are basing their claim on
two transactions, namely; when Donato sold the
parcel of land to Juliana, and when Juliana
redeemed the whole property.
Article 493 states that xxx But the effect
of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
At the present case, what Donato sold to
the Juliana is not the whole property, but only
his share, pro indiviso, which is merely of the
lot. Thus, Juliana is a co-owner together with
her cousins (respondents).
As for the transaction of Juliana,
redeeming the whole property. What Juliana
acquired is not the whole property, but her share
subject to reimbursement from the respondents.
It did not made her the sole owner of the subject
property. The redemption, no doubt is a
necessary expense.
Under Article 448: Each co-owner shall have a
right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the
thing or right owned in common and to the
taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself
from this obligation by renouncing so much of
his undivided interest as may be equivalent to
his share of the expenses and taxes. No such
waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
040 - REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF DIGNOSSORONO
FACTS:
Lots No. 2296 and 2316 located in Lapulapu City, Cebu were adjudicated in
favor of the following in 4 equal shares:
o to Francisca Dignos
o to Tito Dignos
o to Isabel, Donata, Segunda,
Gregoria, Domingo and Isabelo
Dignos
o to Silveria, Mario, Juan,
Brigilda and Pastor Amistuoso
The two lots were not actually
partitioned by the adjudicatees.
1957: The heirs of Tito Dignos sold the
entire two lots for Php 2565.59 to Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA). It
was embodied in a public instrument
entitled Extrajudicial Settlement and
Sale. This was done without the
knowledge of the other adjudicatees of
the portion or their heirs.
1996: CAAs successor-in-interest,
Mactan Cebu International Airport
(MCIAA) erected a security fence across
Lot. 2316. It also relocated families (who
built their dwellings within the airport
so theyre squatters) to a portion of the
same lot to enhance airport security. Tax
Declaration covering the lots were also
issued in the name of MCIAA.
Heirs of Francisca asked MCIAA agents
to cease giving 3rd persons permission to
occupy the lots. They filed a complaint
for Quieting of Title and Legal
Redemption. They allege that theyve
been in continuous peaceful possession
of the property, that the tax declarations
cast a cloud on their titles and that the
original certificate of titles could no
longer be found since they were lost
during world war 2. Neither they nor
their predecessors disposed of their
shares and they were not given notice of
the acquisition by CAA/MCIAA.
Republic/MCIAA contends that it has
been in open, continuous and notorious
possession since the sale. It acquired
valid title because it was a purchaser in
good faith. Even if it was not a just title,
it was already in possession for 30 yrs so

there is extraordinary prescription.

Heirs are already barred by laches.
RTC ruled in favor of the heirs: (this was
well-taken by SC)
o They were only disturbed of
their possession in 1996 when
the fence was erected.
o Their action did not prescribe
either as action for quieting of
title cannot prescribe.
o The registration of the
Extrajudicial Settlement and
Sale registered under Act. No
334 did not constitute
constructive notice to the whole
world because the said law does
not cover land not yet registered
under the Torrens system (Act.
No 496 is the applicable law).
o The questioned sale was valid
only with respect to Titos
share in the lots and it was
subject to the right of legal
redemption by the heirs.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the sale by Titos heirs is binding

upon the other adjudicatees or their heirs- NO.
RATIO:
Art 439 is applicable. Even if a co-owner
sells the whole property, the sale affects
only his share but not the shares of other
co-owners who did not consent to the
sale.
The sale itself is not null and void but
only the rights of the respective coowner is transferred. So, the buyer
becomes a co-onwer of the property.
It was validated by the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale that the two lots
were already registered and the original
transfer certificate of titles were lost.
Redemption price should be the actual
purchase price. Art. 1088 is applicable:
Co-heir may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the
time they were notified. (but they
werent notified)
Republic still has the right to seek
redress against Tito Dignos and his
heirs.
041 - ROSAURO TANINGCO VS.

REGISTER OF DEEDS
Facts:
Mediarito obtained a loan of P9,000
from Spouses Rosauro Taningco and
Simplicia Ramos.
Mediarito mortgaged all "rights,
interests, and participation" over 6
parcels of land in Laguna. These were
part of her conjugal properties with her
deceased husband. The properties were
under judicial administration and have
not been liquidated to the widow and
heirs.
The Register of Deeds Laguna denied
the registration:
o "Mortgagor Nieves Mediarito,
the surviving spouse of Salvador
Roxas, alienated her 1/2
conjugal share without previous
liquidation of the conjugal
properties." Was raised before
the Land Registration
Committee, but was denied as
Mediarito does not appear to be
the registered owner of the said
land.
o Register of Deeds Laguna said
there should be a settlement and
distribution of the conjugal
estate because before then the
interest of the wife therein is
merely inchoate.
ISSUE: W/N there should be a settlement and
distribution of the conjugal estate before it can
be mortgaged
RULING: No.
The interest of the wife is registered as the titles
to the lands are in the names of the spouses.
After the dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
as by death of the husband, this interest
ceases to be inchoate and becomes actual
and vested with respect to an undivided
one-half share of the said properties.
The partnership having been dissolved, if the
deceased husband leaves heirs other than the
wife, as in this case, the properties come under
the regime of co-ownership among them until
final liquidation and partition.
Art. 493 of the Civil Code provides: Each coowner shall have the full ownership of his part

and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgageit, although the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, the mortgage does not refer to
a specific portion to the land but the rights,
interests, and participation of the wife.
Petition granted. Register of Deeds is ordered
the mortgage.
042 - TUASON vs. TUASON and ARANETA
FACTS:
Sisters Angela Tuason and Nieves
Tuason de Barreto and their brother
Antonio Tuason held a parcel of land
with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered
by Certificate of Title in Manila, in
common, each owning an undivided 1/3
portion.
Nieves wanted and asked for a partition
of the common property, but failing in
this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion.
It was offered to her sister and her
brother but both declined to buy it.
It was later made to their mother but the
she also declined to buy
Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to
Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic
corporation, and a new Certificate of
Title was issued in lieu of the old title.
The three co-owners agreed to subdivide
the whole parcel into small lots and then
sold the proceeds of the sale, to be later
divided among them. This agreement is
entitled "Memorandum of Agreement"
Atty. Araneta, lawyer of the two coowners, Angela and her brother Antonio
At the same time he was a member of
the Board of Director of the third coowner, Araneta, Inc.
Terms of the contract
a. The three co-owners agreed to improve
the property by constructing roads and
curbs and then subdivide it into small
lots for sale.
b. Araneta Inc. was to finance the whole
development;
c. It was also to pay the real estate taxes
due on the property or of any portion
thereof that remained unsold
Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11

and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of
reference we are reproducing them below:
(9) This contract shall remain in full
force and effect during all the time that it may
be necessary to fully sell the said property in
small and subdivided lots
(11) Araneta Inc. is hereby given full
power and authority to sign for and in behalf of
all the said co-owners of said property all
contracts
of sale and deeds of sale of the
lots into which this property might be
subdivided;
(15) No co-owner of the property
subject-matter of this contract shall
sell,
alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or
participation
therein without first giving
preference to the other co-owners
In return for this entire obligation
assumed by Araneta Inc., it was to
receive 50% of the gross selling price of
the lots and any rents collected from the
property,
While in the process of sale, the
remaining 50% is divided equally among
the three co-owners so that each will
receive 16.33% of the gross receipts.
Angela notified Araneta that because of
alleged breach of the terms of the
"Memorandum of Agreement" she had
decided to rescind the contract and she
asked that the property (common) be
partitioned.
Later, Angela filed a complaint in the
CFI asking the court to order the
partition of the property and that she be
given 1/3 of the same including rents
ISSUE: Whether the contract should be declared
null and void because its terms which were
reproduced violate Art. 400 of the CC
RULING:
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to
remain a party to the community. Each may, at
any time, demand the partition of the thing held
in common.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
undivided for a specified length of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period
may be a new agreement.
We agree with the trial court that the provisions
of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable.

The obligation imposed in the contract to
preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall
have been sold, is a mere incident to the main
object of dissolving the co-owners.
By virtue of the document, the parties thereto
practically and substantially entered into a
contract of partnership as the best and most
expedient means of eventually dissolving the coownership, the life of said partnership to end
when the object of its creation shall have been
attained.
We find no valid ground for the partition
insisted upon the appellant. We find from the
evidence as was done by the trial court that of
the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the
parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5
per cent of the entire area remained unsold at
the time of the trial, while the great bulk of 97.5
per cent had already been sold.
As well observed by the court below, the
partnership is in the process of being dissolved
and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming
that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable,
under which the parties by agreement may agree
to keep the thing undivided, there should be no
fear that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be
disposed of within the four years left of the tenyears period fixed by Art. 400.
We are fully convinced that the trial court and
this Tribunal are carrying out in a practical and
expeditious way the intentions and the
agreement of the parties contained in the
contract, to dissolve the community and coownership, in a manner most profitable to the
said parties.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
043 - CARLOS BUENDIA VS CITY OF
ILIGAN
Facts:
1. Carlos Buendia (Buendia) filed with the
National Water Resources Board
(NWRB) an application for the
appropriation of water from the spring
within his property in Ditucalan, Iligan
City. No protest was timely filed, so
NWRB moved to the issuance of permits
nos. 13842 and 13827.
2. 5 months after the issuance of said
permits, respondent, Iligan City
(respondent) then files its
opposition/appeal. Said
opposition/appeal serves as both a

protest and appeal to the issuance of the
permit to Buendia.
3. The NWRB dismissed the
opposition/appeal since it was filed out
of time. NWRB reasoned that the
opposition part was filed out of time,
while in the appeal, no controversy
arose, and therefore, there is no appeal
to speak of.
4. Instead of filing for a motion for
reconsideration, respondent files a
petition for certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court. Respondent
prayed that decision of the NWRB be
annulled.
5. The RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent. It stated that the dismissal
of the opposition/appeal of the NWRB is
proper since it was filed out of time by
the respondents. However, the
appropriation by the Iligan City
Waterworks Sewerage System (ICWSS)
and its predecessor-in-interest of the
water source in Ditucalan spring was
from 1927 up to the present. Thus,
following the rule on acquisitive
prescription that the right to the use of
public water may be acquired through
prescription for twenty (20) years.
Therefore, ICWSS had acquired by
acquisitive prescription the right to
appropriate even before the application
of Buendia.
6. Buendia sought for a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
1. WoN the RTC correctly ruled that
respondent already acquired by
acquisitive prescription, the right to
appropriate water from the Ditucalan
Spring?
Ruling:
The Court cannot now accept hook, line,
and sinker the lower courts findings on the issue
based on two reasons:
a. The agency that exercised original
jurisdiction did not pass on the issue, to
which the lower court should have
declined to decide on the matter.
b. Such determination is contradicted by
the allegations made by the City of Iligan
in a previous case that has become final
involving the same parties.

In the previous case named Buendia vs. City of
Iligan, it was established that respondent
entered the property only in 1974 and
constructed an in-take dam thereon for purposes
of appropriating water from the spring only in
1978. In the same case, it was ruled that the
constructed in-take dam done in bad faith.
Therefore, based on the allegations of
the respondent, ICWSS cannot have been said to
have acquired the right by acquisitive
prescription, since it only entered the premises 2
years before the enactment of the Water Code of
the Philippines and only 18 years before the
petitioner (Buendia) applied for the permits.
Furthermore, respondents alleged exercise of its
right to appropriate the water source since 1927
is negated by its belated application with the
NWRB for water permits.
Petition is granted
044 - COMPANIA GENERAL DE
TABACOS DE FILIPINAS VS. ALHAMBRA
CIGAR & CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING
CO.
Facts:
Plaintiff claims to have appropriated
and to own the exclusive right to use the
word Isabela on cigarettes. Plaintiff
sold cigarettes with the name Alhambra
Isabelas on the package.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff. This prohibited defendant to
use the word Isabelas. Defendant
appealed.
Plaintiffs claim:
o Violation or infringement of the
trade name Isabela
o Unfair competition arising out
of the use by the defendant.
Trial court dismissed the count on
unfair competition (There was no actual
intention on the defendants part to
deceive the public and defraud a
competitor). Plaintiff did not offer
evidence on the issue of infringement or
violation of trademark. The court held in
favor of the plaintiff saying the case is
rather one of the violation of a
trademark under the first four sections
of Act No. 666.
Issue: W/N defendant should be guilty of
violation or infringement of the trade name
Isabela NO.
The Act is No. 666 of the Philippine Commission

and confers a right of action in three cases(1)
for the violation of a trade-mark, (2) a tradename, and (3) to restrain unfair competition.
The statute founds the cause of action in the first
two cases exclusively on the invasion of the right
of property which the statute gives in the trademark or trade-name. These actions are not based
on fraud nor is the right given on the theory of
unfair competition. It is founded solely in the
property which the statute creates in the trademark or trade-name.
Violation or infringement not based on fraud
Unfair competition exclusively based on fraud
From these observations it is a necessary
deduction that an action for the violation of a
trade-name cannot be carried on in conjunction
with an action of unfair competition based on a
similarity to the plaintiff's trade-name. If an
action on the trade-name will lie, then an action
of unfair competition based on similarity to the
trade-name is impossible; whereas, on the other
hand, if an action of unfair competition is the
proper action, then one for the violation of a
trade-name based on the same facts will not lie.
that the ownership of a trade-name does not
necessarily prevent the owner from bringing an
action of unfair competition founded on the
appearance of the goods of defendant as exposed
for sale, which appearance is not based on
similarity to the owner's tradename. Such an
action would have to be based on the general
appearance of the package, its form, color, style,
adornment, and matters of that character; and
would not lie on appearance arising from the
similarity of plaintiff's and defendant's tradenames.
Petition granted
Notes:
A trade-name is a name, device or mark by
which it is intended to distinguish from that of
others the business, profession, trade or
occupation in which one May be engaged and in
which goods are manufactured or sold to the
public, work is done for the public, or
professional services are rendered to the public.
Requisite: necessary that it be used with the
intent of appropriating it as a tradename.
045 - DERMALINE V. MYRA
PHARMACEUTICAL
Facts:

Dermaline filed before the Intellectual Property
Office (IPO) an application for the registration of
their trademark Dermaline. However, this was
opposed by the Myra pharmaceutical alleging
that the trademark Dermaline resembles their
trademark Dermalin.
Myra, alleged that this will cause confusion,
mistake and deception to the purchasing public.
They also alleged that Dermalines use and
registration of its applied trademark will
diminish the distinctiveness and dilute good will
of Myras Dermalin, registered to IPO was back
July 8, 1986.
They also alleged that Myra is protected
and has right when it comes to trademark under
R.A 8293. Despite Dermalines attempt to
differentiate the trademarks, the pronunciation
for both marks are still identical. Myra also
pointed out that Dermalines applied for the
same mark on June 3, 2003 and was already
denied.
Dermaline, Inc. in their answer
contends that the trademarks have entirely
different features and distinctiveness
presentation thus cannot result from confusion.
In determining if the trademark is confusing
similar, a comparison of words is not the only
determinant but their entirety must be
considered in relation to the goods to which they
are attached.
IPO Bureau of legal affairs: rejected the
application of Dermaline
Dermaline file for a MR but it was denied. They
then filed an appeal on the C.A.
C.A.: denied the appeal and affirmed the
decision of IPO
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the IPO should allow the
registration of the trademark Dermaline
Held: No
Ratio: Myra as a registered trademark owner, it
has the right under the Sec. 147 of R.A. 8293 to
prevent 3rd parties from using a trademark or
similar signs or containers without its consent,
identical or similar to its registered trademark,
which would result in a confusion.
There are 2 test in determining the
likelihood of confusion:
1.) Dominancy test- focuses on the
similarity of the prevalent features of the
competing trademark that might cause
confusion or deception. The important
issue is whether the use of the mark
would cause confusion or mistake in the
mind of the ordinary purchaser. It is

incorporated in Sec. 155.1 of R.A 8293.
2.) Holistic test- entail a consideration of
entirety of the marks applied to the
product, including labels and packaging,
in determining confusing similarity.
2 types of confusion:
a.) Product confusion- ordinary prudent
purchaser would be induced to purchase
one product in belief that he was
purchasing the other.
b.) Source or origin confusion- although
goods of the parties are different, the
mark applied for by the other party can
be assumed to originate with the
registrant of the earlier product. Thus
the public would think that there is
connection between the two parties.
IPO used the dominancy test and declared that
both type of confusion were apparent in both
trademarks.
When one applies for the registration of the
trademark which is almost the same or that very
closely resembles one already used and
registered by another, the application should be
rejected and dismissed outright. This is intended
not only to avoid confusion but also to protect an
already used and registered trademark and an
established good will.
046 - GENERAL GARMENTS VS.
DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
The General Garments Corporation, organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, is
the owner of the trademark "Puritan," for
assorted men's wear, such as sweaters, shirts,
jackets, undershirts and briefs.
The Puritan Sportswear Corporation, under the
laws of the state of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., filed a
petition with the Philippine Patent Office for the
cancellation of the trademark "Puritan"
registered in the name of General Garments
Corporation, alleging ownership and prior use in
the Philippines of the said trademark on the
same kinds of goods, which use it had not
abandoned; the registration by General
Garments Corporation had been obtained
fraudulently and in violation of Section 17(c) of
Republic Act No. 166, as amended, in relation to
Section 4(d) thereof.

General Garments Corporation moved to
dismiss the petition alleging that Puritan
Sportswear Corporation is a foreign corporation
not licensed to do business and not doing
business in the Philippines does not have a legal
capacity to maintain a suit in the Philippine
Patent Office for cancellation of a trademark
registered therein. The Director of Patents
denied the MD likewise the MR. General
Garments Corporation filed the instant petition
for review.
Petitioner contends that Puritan Sportswear
Corporation is not considered as a person under
Philippine laws and consequently is not
comprehended within the term "any person"
who may apply for cancellation of a mark or
trade-name under Section 17(c) of the
Trademark Law. That respondent is a juridical
person should be beyond serious dispute. The
fact that it may not transact business in the
Philippines unless it has obtained a license for
that purpose, nor maintain a suit in Philippine
courts for the recovery of any debt, claim or
demand without such license (Secs. 68 and 69,
Corporation Law) does not make respondent any
less a juridical person.
Issue:
Whether or not Puritan Sportswear Corporation,
which is a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business and not doing business in the
Philippines, has legal capacity to maintain a suit
in the Philippine Patent Office for cancellation of
a trademark registered therein?
The right to the use of the corporate or trade

name is a property right, a right in rem, which it
may assert and protect in any of the courts of the
world even in jurisdictions where it does not
transact business just the same as it may
protect its tangible property, real or personal
against trespass or conversion.
In any event, respondent in the present case is
not suing for infringement or unfair competition
under Section 21-A, but for cancellation under
Section 17, on one of the grounds enumerated in
Section 4. The first kind of action, it maybe
stated, is cognizable by the Courts of First
Instance (Sec. 27); the second partakes of an
administrative proceeding before the Patent
Office (Sec. 18, in relation to Sec. 8). And while a
suit under Section 21-A requires that the mark
or tradename alleged to have been infringed has
been "registered or assigned" to the suing
foreign corporation, a suit for cancellation of the
registration of a mark or tradename under
Section 17 has no such requirement. For such
mark or tradename should not have been
registered in the first place (and consequently
may be cancelled if so registered) if it "consists
of or comprises a mark or tradename which so
resembles a mark or tradename ... previously
used in the Philippines by another and not
abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to or
used in connection with goods, business or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive purchasers; ..."(Sec. 4d)
Petition dismissed.
Held:
Yes. Respondent is not suing in our courts "for
the recovery of any debt, claim or demand," for
which a license to transact business in the
Philippines is required by Section 69 of the
Corporation Law, subject only to the exception
already noted. Respondent went to the
Philippine Patent Office on a petition for
cancellation of a trademark registered by
petitioner, invoking Section 17(c) in relations to
Section 4(d) of the Trademark Law.
Take note:
Section 17 (c) and Section 4 (d) of the Trademark
Law provide respectively as follows:
SEC. 17. Grounds for cancellation. Any
person, who believes that he is or will be
damaged by the registration of a mark or tradename, may, upon the payment of the prescribed
fee, apply to cancel said registration upon any of
the following grounds:
(c) That the registration was obtained
fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of
section four, Chapter II thereof: ...
The purpose of such a suit is to protect its

reputation, corporate name and goodwill which
has been established, through the natural
development of its trade for a long period of
years, in the doing of which it does not seek to
enforce any legal or contract rights arising from,
or growing out of any business which it has
transacted in the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 4. Registration of trademarks, tradenames

and service-marks which shall be known as the
principal register. The owner of a trade-mark,
trade-name or service-mark used to distinguish
his goods, business or services from the goods,
business or services of others shall have the right
to register the same on the principal register,
unless it:

(d) Consists of or comprises a mark or tradename which so resembles a mark or trade-name
registered in the Philippines or a mark or
tradename previously used in the Philippines by
another and not abandoned, as to be likely,
when applied to or used in connection with
goods, business or services of the applicant, to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers
047 - THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. COLEGIO DE
SAN JOSE, ET AL., COLEGIO DE SAN
JOSE
FACTS
During the months of September, October and
November every year, the waters of Laguna de
Bay cover a long strip of land along the eastern
border of the two parcels of land in question, the
width of which strip varies from 50 to 70 meters
according to the evidence of the Colegio de San
Jose and up to the eastern border of the pass
claimed by the municipality of San Pedro
Tunasan, according to some witnesses for the
Insular Government; and, according to other
witnesses for the Insular Government, the
flooded strip includes the aforementioned pass
itself, which is usually completely covered with
water, so that the people can fish in said flooded
strip.
The claimant Colegio de San Jose contends, and
its evidence tends to prove, that the abovenamed parcels of land are a part of the Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to said
claimant, which has been in possession thereof
since time immemorial by means of its tenants
or lessees and farmers.
On the other hand, the Government of the
Philippine Islands contends that the said two
parcels of land belong to the public domain, and
its evidence tends to prove that they have always
been known as the shores of Laguna de Bay, and
they are situated alongside the highway running
parallel to said shore; that the water of the lake
has receded a great distance on that side; that
said parcels of land had been under water
formerly; that at present, during the rainy
season, the water of the lake reaches the
highway, and that when the water recedes the
people of the place occupy and cultivate said
lands during the dry season.
ISSUE
The only question to be decided in the present

appeal is whether the two aforesaid parcels of
land in controversy belong to the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan and are owned by the
claimant Colegio de San Jose, or whether they
belong to the public domain as a part of the bed
of Laguna de Bay.
HELD
The judgment appealed from is affirmed,
without special pronouncements as to costs.
The two parcels of land in litigation form no part
of the bed of Laguna de Bay, and consequently,
do not belong to the public domain, they must
belong to the claimant Colegio de San Jose as a
part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,
owned by it, the northeastern part of which
borders on said lake, and in accordance with the
legal provision just quoted, the fact that they are
inundated by its waters during extraordinary
risings, which take place during the months of
September, October and November, does not
deprive said claimant of the ownership thereof.
THE SUPREME COURT FINDS (1) That the
natural bed or basin of Laguna de Bay is the
ground covered by its waters at their highest
ordinary depth during the dry season, that is,
during the months of December, January,
February, March, April, May, June, July and
August; (2) that the highest depth reached by
said waters during the rainy season, or during
the months of September, October and
November, is extraordinary; (3) that the two
parcels of land in litigation form an integral part
of the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan belonging to the claimant Colegio de
San Jose; (4) that said two parcels of land, being
accidentally inundated by the waters of Laguna
de Bay continue to be the property of the
claimant Colegio de San Jose (art. 77, Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866); (5) that even
supposing that the said two parcels of land have
been formed by accession or deposits of
sediment by the waters of said Laguna de Bay,
they still belong to the said claimant Colegio de
San Jose, as owner of the land of theHacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan, bordering on said
Laguna de Bay (art. 84, Law of Waters of August
3, 18660; (6) that the provisions of the Law of
Waters regulating the ownership and use of the
waters of the sea are not applicable to the
ownership and use of lakes, which are governed
by special provisions.

DOCTRINE: REFER TO ARTICLE 502 OF
THE CIVIL CODE (OWNERSHIP OF
WATERS)
048 - NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS
It appears that in the early morning hours of
October 27, 1978, at the height of typhoon
"Kading", a massive flood covered the towns
near Angat Dam, particularly the town of
Norzagaray, causing several deaths and the loss
and destruction of houses, farms, plants,
working animals and other properties of the
people residing near the Angat River.
Private respondents recalled that on the said
day, they were awakened by the sound of
rampaging water all around them. The water
came swiftly and strongly that before they could
do anything to save their belongings, their
houses had submerged, some even swept away
by the strong current. A number of people were
able to save their lives only by climbing trees.
Private respondents blamed the sudden rush of
water to the reckless and imprudent opening of
all the three (3) floodgates of the Angat Dam
spillway, without prior warning to the people
living near or within the vicinity of the
dam.
Petitioners denied private respondents'
allegations and, by way of defense, contended
that they have maintained the water in the Angat
Dam at a safe level and that the opening of the
spillways was done gradually and after all
precautionary measures had been taken.
Petitioner NPC further contended that it had
always exercised the diligence of a good father in
the selection of its officials and employees and in
their supervision. It also claimed that written
warnings were earlier sent to the towns
concerned. At the time typhoon "Kading" hit
Bulacan with its torrential rain, a great volume
of flood water flowed into the dam's reservoir
necessitating the release of the water therein in
order to prevent the dam from collapsing and
causing the loss of lives and tremendous damage
to livestock and properties.
Petitioners further contended that there was no
direct causal relationship between the alleged
damages suffered by the respondents and the
acts and omissions attributed to the former.
That it was the respondents who assumed the
risk of residing near the Angat River, and even

assuming that respondents suffered damages,
the cause was due to a fortuitous event and such
damages are of the nature and character
of damnum absque injuria, hence, respondents
have no cause of action against them.
ISSUES
(a) IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING
IN JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS VS. COURT
OF APPEALS, 4 IS APPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE UNDER WHICH
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE EVEN
THOUGH THE COMING OF A TYPHOON
WAS FORCE MAJEURE;
(b) IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE GIVING OF
THE WRITTEN NOTICE OF WARNING BY
PETITIONERS ABSOLVED THEM FROM
LIABILITY;
(c) IN NOT HOLDING THAT ANY
DAMAGE SUFFERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WAS DAMNUM ABSQUE
INJURIA; and
(d) IN NOT AWARDING THE
COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONERS FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION
HELD
Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
The doctrine laid down in the said case is still
good law, as far as the concurrent liability of an
obligor in case of a force majeure, is concerned.
The case of National Power Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, as a matter of fact, reiterated the ruling
in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. In the former case,
this Court ruled that the obligor cannot escape
liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous
event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in
any manner of the tenor of the obligation as
provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which
results in loss or damage.
Neither can petitioners escape liability by
invoking force majeure. Act of God or force
majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events
not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are
inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must
be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. As a
general rule, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen or
which though foreseen, were inevitable.

Although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of
God, petitioners can not escape liability because
their negligence was the proximate cause of the
loss and damage.
It has been shown that the defendants failed to
take the necessary safeguards to prevent the
danger that the Angat Dam posed in a situation
of such nature as that of typhoon "Kading".
049 - LUNOD V MENESES
FACTS
Lunod, de la Vega, Rodriguez, Marcelo,
Villena, Litao, Hernandez, and
Pantanilla, residents of Bulacan, filed a
written complaint against Meneses,
alleging that
- they each owned and possessed
farm lands, situated in Maytunas
and Balot, near a small lake named
Calalaran;
- that the defendant is the owner of a
fish-pond and a strip of land
situated in Paraanan, adjoining the
said lake on one side, and the River
Taliptip on the other;
that from time immemorial (more than
20 years) there is a statutory easement
permitting the flow of water over the
land in Paraanan, which easement the
said plaintiffs enjoyed until the year
1901
Defendant converted the land in
Paraanan into a fishpond and by means
of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented
the free passage of the water through
said place into the Taliptip River
- That the lands of the plaintiff
became flooded, there being no
outlet except through the land in
Paraanan;
- That their plantation were
destroyed, preventing its passage
through said land and injuring the
rice plantations of the plaintiffs.
Apolinara de Leon (land surveyor)
denied that he had occupied or
converted any land in the barrio of
Bambang into a fishpond;
ISSUE W/ there is a violation of easement
RULING
Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and
ordered defendant to remove the dam
placed on the east of the Paraanan
passage on the side of the Taliptip River
opposite the old dam in the barrio of

Bambang, as well as to remove and
destroy the obstacles to the free passage
of the waters through the strip of land in
Paraanan;
It was clearly proven in this case that the
lands owned by the plaintiffs in the
barrio, as well as the small adjoining
lake, named Calalaran, are located in
places relatively higher than the sitio
called Paraanan where the land and fish
pond of the defendant are situated, and
which border on the Taliptip River;
that during the rainy season the
rain water which falls on the land of
the plaintiffs, and which flows
toward the small Calalaran Lake at
flood time, has no outlet to the
Taliptip River other than through
the low land of Paraanan:
- that the border line between
Calalaran and Paraanan there has
existed from time immemorial a
dam, constructed by the community
for the purpose of preventing the
salt waters from the Taliptip River,
at high tide, from flooding the land
in Calalaran, passing through the
lowlands of Paraanan; but the
defendant constructed another dam
along the boundary of this fishpond
in Paraanan, thereby impeding the
outlet of the waters that flood the
fields of Calalaran, to the serious
detriment of the growing crops.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating of
natural easements relating to waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to
receive the waters that flow naturally, without
the work of man, from the higher lands together
with the stone or earth which they carry with
them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands cannot erect
works that will impede or prevent such an
easement or charge, constituted and imposed by
the law upon his estate for the benefit of the
higher lands belonging to different owners;
neither can the latter do anything to increase or
extend the easement.
According to the provisions of law, the
defendant, Meneses, had no right to construct
the works, nor the dam which blocks the
passage, through his lands and the outlet to the

Taliptip River, of the waters which flood the
higher lands of the plaintiffs; and having done
so, to the detriment of the easement charged on
his estate, he has violated the law which protects
and guarantees the respective rights and
regulates the duties of the owners of the fields in
Calalaran and Paraanan.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, in so
far as it agrees with decision, and reversed in
other respects, with the costs of this instance
against the appellants. So ordered.
050 - MERCADO V. MUNICIPAL
PRESIDENT OF MACABEBE
Facts: Secretary of Commerce and
Communication ordered Romulo Mercado to
remove two dikes which he had constructed at
both ends of the Batasan- Limasan creek, which
traverses part of the hacienda which was
formerly, belongs to Romula. The said hacienda
is now owned by Eufemia Mercado. She
acquired the hacienda through a formal
donation mode to her by Romulo after the
institution of this action.
The court held that the said creek is a
property of public domain and this was opposed
by Eufemia. Eufemia contends that the said
creed was an artificial and not a natural creek.
This had been developed on the hacienda
through excavation on 2 different occasions;
before and during the revolution and after the
revolution.
However, the municipal president of
Macabebe and the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications contend that the said creek is a
natural navigable creek which already existed on
the hacienda long before the revolution but also
from the time immemorial.
Eufemia presented evidence, the plan of
the land and it showed that the portion of the
creek was a recess or an arm of Bugalun, of the
Nasi river, which arm was lost in the hacienda. It
extended close to a small creek called the
Batasan- Limasan.
Mariano Mercado, her grandfather was
the one who started the said excavation of the
creek in order to facilitate the transportation and
cutting of firewoods and other products
produced on the hacienda.
Through the said excavation, Mariano
with the help of almost 60 men, connected the 2
bodies of water and after having so connected
them, made another excavation at both ends
towards the rivers and the creek. Thus
constructing a sort of canal directly connecting
both bodies of water and which was later on

became known as the Batasan- Limasan creek.
The creek was opened from Nasi river to
the Limasan creek and it was used as a means of
transportation in attending the needs of the
residents of the barrios. It came to the point that
people passes to the said creek even without the
knowledge of the Mercado.
This is the reason why Romulo Mercado
decided to convert the creek into a fishpond and
with that he closed the opening towards the Nasi
river on one side and the Limasan creek on the
other side.
The respondents on the other hand,
presented some witnesses however these are
insufficient to overcome the pieces of evidence
presented by the petitioner on the ground that
one of their witnesses is relatively young and
admitted that he inly passes the said creek once
or twice a month while the others are not
residents of the place.
Lower court: invoke art. 339, art. 407 par. 1-3 &
8, art. 408
Although it is true that the creek passes
through the hacienda, it is none the less true that
it is not included in any of the kinds of private
property enumerated. The Mercado in closing
the two openings of the creek not appropriated
the channel of the creek but the creek itself.
A creek is not a brook. A brook is a short, almost
continuous stream of water while creek is an
arm or recess extending from a river, which
participates in the ebb or flow of the sea.
Issue: whether the creek is a property of public
ownership
Held: Yes
Ratio: The S.C reiterated the provision invoked
by the lower court
Art. 339, creek is obviously a similar
character of canals, rivers, and torrents, since it
is an arm extending to river.
Art. 407, creek may be considered as
belonging to the class of property enumerated in
par.8.
The use and enjoyment of a creek as any
other property susceptible of appropriation may
be acquired and lost through prescription. The
Mercado certainly lost that right through the
said cause and they cannot claim it exclusively
for themselves after the general public had been
openly using it from 1906-1928.
When two different interest are in
conflict, the private should yield the public.

051 - MONTEVERDE V GENEROSO
Tomas Monteverde owns a land in Santa
Ana, Davao. The Agdao River bound it
in the Northwest.
Tambongon Creek, which is navigable, is
a branch of the Agdao River runs thru
Monteverdes land.
He constructed 2 dams across the Agdao
river and 5 dams across the Tambongon
creek for fishpond purposes.
The district engineer of Davao destroyed

the 2 dams. While the provincial
governor threatened to destroy the other
dams in the creek saying it was due to
public health because the closure of the
branches of the river for fishpond
purposes is obstructing the flow of water
resulting to stagnant water, which may
be breeding places for mosquitos and
was done without authorization from
the competent authorities.
And the governor also said that by virtue
of the authority conferred by Sec 24 of
the Water Law1, he may destroy the
dams due to nuisance and public
health/safety.
Monteverde filed at the CFI for injunction

against the provincial governor, the district
engineer and the district health officer but this
was denied.
ISSUE: W/N the authorities (provincial
governor, district engineer or district
health officer) are authorized to destroy
private property summarily & without
judicial proceedings? NO.
HELD:
They cannot destroy it under the
pretense that such private property
constitutes a nuisance
The SC held that the use of Art 24 of
the Spanish Law of Waters should
have to conform to the principles of
existing public law/organic law.
Also, the Court identified 2 classes of nuisances:
Nuisances per se - it affects the
immediate safety of persons and
Any person may, upon his own private property,
construct artificial ponds of sea water, having
communication with the sea, for use as bathing places or
vivaries, or for any other commercial or recreative
purpose, notice thereof being given to the governor of
the province. During two months, the governor shall
1
propertyl the property may be

summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity.
Nuisances per accidens - the
municipal authorities do not have the
right to compel the abatement of a
thing/act without reasonable notice to
the owner regarding the time and place
of hearing before a court to decide if the
thing/property/act constitutes a
nuisance
In this case, the dam or fishery

constructed in a navigable stream is not
a nuisance per se. Although it may be a
nuisance if it engagers the health or
depreciates property by causing the
water to be stagnate and public health
may be conserved but it should
conserved in a LEGAL MANNER. Due
process of law must be observed before
the citizen's property or personal rights
or liberty can be interfered with.
The Court also cited a case (Lawton v

Steele) wherein the US SC recognized
the legislative power to regulate fishing
in public water and the right of
summary abatement of nuisances
without judicial process or proceeding
for the protection of health but the court
said that it should take into account the
VALUE (great value or trifling value) of
the property to determine if it may
summarily abated or judicial proceeding
should be conducted first.
US SC also said, that if the property is of
TRIFLING VALUE and its destruction is
necessary to effect the object of a
CERTAIN STATUTE then it is within
the power of the legislature to order its
summary abatement.
Applying that cited case, the Court said

in this case: (1) There is no law
authorizing the summary abatement of
nuisance by the provincial governor and
(2) The dams and fishponds are not of
trifling (small, minor) value
have power to order the suspension of the work if, after

consultation with the naval officer in command and the
provincial engineer, it appear that the work might be
substantially prejudicial to the public interests. In such
an event the interested party may appeal to the
Government."

052 - MUNICIPALITY OF MANGALDAN

VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MANAOAG
Facts:
On May 23, 1914, counsel for the municipality of
Mangaldan filed a complaint in the CFI of
Pangasinan against the municipality of Manaoag,
alleging that from time immemorial it has been
enjoying and using one-half of the water of the
Tagumising River
That all the volume of water carried by the socalled Tolon River, a continuation of the former,
which passes through the municipality of
Manaoag
That under as easement that for more than 30
years had existed in favor of the plaintiff, certain
residents of Mangaldan have been enjoying the
use of the water from the said Tagumising and
Tolon Rivers for the purpose of irrigating their
lands, but that, two years prior to the date abovementioned, they were deprived of the use and
enjoyment of the water of said rivers, by reason of
the defendant's having obstructed the channel by
means of a strong dam built at the confluence of
the two rivers at a place between the localities of
Tagumising and Tolon, thus obstructing the flow
of the water.
The plaintiff municipality prayed the court to
hold that is was entitled to use and enjoy the
water carried by the so-called Tolon River, and
further, that the court oblige the defendant to tear
down the dam that it had constructed at the
confluence of the Tagumising and the so-called
Tolon Rivers, and to pay the costs.
After the trial was held, court repaired to the
vicinity of said river for the purpose of making an
ocular inspection thereof and of the dam in the
sitio of Amorboran. Said inspection disclosed
that near and in front of the said dam there was a
piece of land covered with an overgrowth of
weeds which prevented the water of the river
from reaching it, and, on its being carefully
examined, some bamboo stakes were found
there; these had some plant growth in their lower
part, while their upper and front parts appeared

to be covered with earth and sand overlaid with
considerable under brush and a number of small
trees; that at a distance of about 50 steps from the
dam, there was a small pool of water and back of
it the bed of the river was completely dry and had
been filed with earth and sand; and that in the
part of the river between the dam and the water
there was a fill that was higher than the river bed.
During the inspection, counsel for the plaintiff
called attention to the fact that, as the bed of the
irrigation ditch named Canon was of the same
width as that of the Tagumising River, and that,
as there was a current in the ditch, this latter took
all the water of the river. It was also observed that
the bamboo stake was quite new, and had not
rotted notwithstanding that it had been under
water.
However, the counsel of the defendant noted that
the earth on the dam was a deposit left there by
the river current, as likewise the embankment
behind the dam, earth, sand and driftwood,
having accumulated there during a period of
about 30 years, and that the part of the
Tagumising River where there was a running
water was lower than the dry part of the same
river back of the dam, so that, even though the
earth and sand deposit on the dam had been
removed, it would have been difficult for the
water to rise up to the level of the dry bed of the
river.
CFI The municipality of Manaoag was ordered
to remove the dam and likewise the deposits of
earth and sand that were in front of and behind
said dam. Ordered also to construct in the same
place a new dam, with branches of trees only, so
that the surplus water might pass and be used by
the inhabitants of Mangaldan, as it had been used
by them for many years past.
Issue:
Whether the water that flows through the river
known by the names of Tagumising River and
Tolon, and whether this river itself having two
names, belong to the public domain, and whether
the people of the municipality of Mangaldan
have, by prescription, the right to use and enjoy

the water of that part of the said river known by
the name of Tagumising , when it passes through
the municipality of Manaoag, and of the part
thereof known by the name of Tolon, where it
crosses the municipality of Mangaldan.
Held: YES. It belongs to the public domain.
Article 409( now 504) of the same Code
provides:
these two municipalities has a right to

monopolize the water of said river, especially that
of Manaoag which is on a higher elevation, so that
the water runs from the boundary of the
municipality of Manaoag, eastward, toward the
town of Mangaldan situated, westward at a lower
altitude.
The present case concerns the use and enjoyment
of water of a river of the public domain, and also
the rights acquired by the plaintiff, which rights
must be respected by the defendant.
The use of public waters is acquired

1. By administrative concession.
2. By prescription of twenty years.
Article 411( I think 506 now) provides: The right
to make use of public waters is extinguished by
the forfeiture of the concession, and the nonuser for twenty years.
From these legal provisions it is concluded that
the Tagumising River, as well as the water that
flows through it and then passes through the
Tolon River, which is a continuation of the
Tagumising River, are of the public domain. This
is confirmed by article 33 of the Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, in force in these Islands.
Therefore, the inhabitants of both Manaoag and
Mangaldan have the same right to enjoy the use
of this water, and the defendant municipality may
not, to the prejudice of the inhabitants of
Mangaldan, alter, modify, or reduce the water
bed of the said river in the part thereof where it
passes through the town of Manaoag; neither
may the inhabitants of Manaoag impede the flow
of the water of the Tagumising section of the
river, so as to prevent its coming into the Tolon
section of the stream, thus absolutely depriving
the people of Mangaldan of said water.
The record does not contain even any
circumstantial evidence that the Tagumising
River had its source within the territory of the
town of Manaoag, and that the water of the
Tagumising River came from places outside of
Manaoag and from lands of higher altitude than
those where the town of Manaoag stands, so that
the people of Manaoag and those of Mangaldan
only have the right to use and enjoy the water of
the said river, which as well as the river itself, is
of the public domain, as already stated. Neither of
Although the record does not satisfactorily show

that the municipality of Manaoag filled in the bed
of the Tagumising River in the vicinity of the dam
constructed in said river, and although it is
probable that the accumulation of earth in the
river and in the dam was due to the force of the
current of the water of the river itself, yet this
would not relieve the defendant from its
obligation to remove all the obstacles that
obstruct the flow of the water, thus restoring the
dam to its original state so that it may allow the
water of the river to pass through its fissures and
small openings, to the end that the people of
Mangaldan may enjoy the use of this water, to
which they have a right by reason of the fact that
the Tagumising section of the river and the water
which flows over its bed belong to the public
domain, and no one has a right to monopolize
them for his exclusive benefit and to the prejudice
of others who have the same right. The existence
of the dam or dams in the Tagumising River
which benefit the inhabitants of the town of
Manaoag by their enjoyment of the water of
public use, implies the obligation to maintain and
preserve the said dam or dams in proper
condition so that any alteration or change may
not cause injury to the resident of other towns.
The errors assigned from the judgment appealed

have been refuted, and, said judgment is
affirmed. Cost against the appellants (Manaog).
053 - NAWASA VS SECRETARY OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS
A letter of complaint was issued asking

for representation from the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
(NAWASA) (Petitioner) to secure the

release of water from Ipo Dam to
address the crop failure in Bulacan.
A decision was made that recognized
Executive Proclamation Nos. 48 and 72
reserving 3,600 and 40,000 liters per
second from Angat River to
Metropolitan Water District but
declared that NAWASA was not entitled
and that it should apply for water rights
with the Bureau of Public Works.
Therefore, NAWASA has no right to use
the water.
CFI Ruled in favor of NAWASA alleging that it
had acquired right to use by means of
prescription.
ISSUE: W/N NAWASA has the right over the
water
HELD:
Yes. The court held under Art. 409 of the 1889
Civil Code that there are two modes to acquire
right to use public waters (1) By administrative
concession (2) 20 year prescription period.
Petitioners alleged the incontestable fact that
from 1913 1959 (46 years) that NAWASA and
its predecessors have openly, publicly and
exclusively appropriated water from Angat river
without protest from anyone.
The Irrigation Law contented by Respondents
with regard to making an application to the
Director of Public Works modifies things in so
far as administrative process and not with
regard to the modes of acquisition.
DOCTRINE:
Article 409 of the 1889 Civil Code: Two different
ways of acquiring the right to the use of public
waters: (1) By Administrative Concession (2)
Prescription for 20 years.
Irrigation Act 2152 Section 14 (claimed by
respondents) :
Any person hereafter desiring to appropriate
any public water shall previously make an
application to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications through the Director of Public
Works
054 - SANTOS V. MORENO

BACKGROUND:
Hacienda San Esteban was a track of
marshland owned by the Zobel family
and managed by the Ayala. It is located

in the municipality of Macabebe,
Pampanga. It was originally devoted for
cultivating nipa palms and a distillery
plant turned it into alcohol used to
manufacture liquor.
Ayala dug canals facilitate the gathering
of tuba and guarding of the hacienda.
The hacienda was converted into a web
of fishponds since it shifted its business
to bangus culture. It constructed dikes
and closed the canals.
Santos bought a portion of the Hacienda
and he closed Sapang Maragul, Silab,
Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Niqui and Nasi.
The mayor, policemen and residents
opened the closure dikes at Maragul,
Nigui and Silab. They claim it deprived
them of their means of transportation
and fishing grounds. Santos filed an
action to enjoin them from demolishing
the dikes while the municipal officials of
Macabebe also filed an action against
him. CFI rendered judgment against
Santos. So he elevated it to SC.
Sec. of Commerce and Communications
(Secretary) ordered Santos to demolish
the dikes across the six streams. This
was later revoked and the streams were
declared to be privately owned.
Secretary entered into a contract with
Santos recognizing the private
ownership of the six streams. Santos
turned over two canals for public use.
SC appeal withdrawn.
Officials of Macabebe filed an
administrative with the Bureau of Public
Works (BPW) regarding the portion still
owned by the Zobel. Panopio
(investigator of BPW) submitted a
report recommending the removal of the
dikes and dams.
Ayala and Director of Public Works
(Director) had a compromise and
another investigation was conducted. It
named which canals are public and
those that are private.
The Municipality of Macabebe and Zobel
executed an agreement wherein they
recognize the nature of the streams
mentioned in Panopio report as public
or private. It was approved by the
Secretary.
Secretary of Justice issued an opinion
stating the the agreement was invalid
because the streams lost their private

nature by prescription as the public used
them and the Secretary had no more
power to do so because it was revoked
by an amending law.
Administrative investigations were again
conducted.
Pres. Quezon reopened Sapang Maragul,
Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu.
FACTS OF CASE:
Santos acquired a larger portion of the
hacienda where 25 streams were closed
by Ayala.
RA 2056 was enacted.
Residents in the vicinity of the hacienda
petitioned with the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, pursuant
to RA 2056, to open the ff streams:
Balbaro, Balili, Banawa, Matua, Bato,
Bengco, Bunga, Butabuta, Caamastiles,
Cansusu, Cela, Don Timpo, Mabalanga,
Mabutol, Macabacle, Macanduling
Maragul, Malauli, Magasawa, Malate,
Masamaral, Maisac, Mariablus, Nigui,
Pita, Silab, Sapang Maragul, Sepung
Bato, Sinag and Tumbong.
The secretary ordered them reopened on
the ground of public domain except
Malauling Maragul, Silab, Nigui,
Pepangebonan, Nasi and Bulacus.
Santos filed a petition with CFI for an
injunction. Granted.
CFI/trial court declared all streams
under litigation as private.
Secretary filed appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the streams belong to Santos
HELD
Yes. The streams/canals in question may
be classified as creeks under the Spanish
Law of Waters and Spanish Civil Code.
Creeks belong to the owners of estate
over which they flow. Further, canals
constructed by private persons within
private lands and devoted exclusively for
private use must be of private
ownership.
EXCEPT Cansusu because it is a natural
stream and it is a continuation of
Cansusu River, a public stream.
RA 2056 applies to public navigable
rivers and communal fishing grounds.
The said streams are artificial as found
by the Panopio report.
o Witnesses positively stated that
Sapang Macanduli, Macabacle
and Balbaro were made by the
hacienda owners.
Cansusu is part of Cansusu

River, a public stream. It is of a
winding course. So it is NOT an
artificial stream.
o Witnesses testified that
Maragul, Mabalanga and Don
Timpo are canals made by
Ayala. They are more or less
straight, leading deep into the
interior of the hacienda.
o Sapang Bunga, Batu, Sepong
Batu, Banawa, Mabutol, Butabuta and Masamaral were made
by Ayala to gain access to the
interior of the hacienda.
o Sapang Mariablus and
Matalabang Malate were
formerly small and nonnavigable streams dug deeper by
Ayala.
o Matua, Camastiles, Magasawa
and Cela are original canals by
Ayala.
o Sinag, Balili, Pita, Tumbong and
Bengco were also by Ayala
although they have a winding
course because workers made
them according to the location
of nipa palms.
The earlier agreement between Ayala
and Macabebe did not bind the
government because the power of the
Secretary was suppressed by Act 4175
but this did not affect the findings of fact
in the Panopio report.
There could be no prescription because
the streams were used exclusively by
hacienda personnel. Prohibition against
public use was enforced by guards called
arundines.
The dikes/dams should be ordered
demolished.
o
055 - SIDECO VS. SARENAS

Facts:
Sideco and Leocadio & Rufino Sarenas
are both claiming exclusive right to the
use of the waters flowing through the
estero (estuary) in Bangad, Nueva Ecija.
Sidecos claim:
Goes back to 1895
Predecessor in interest of his father
constructed a dam in these waters (Use

of dam was interrupted by outside
causes such as imprisonment and war)
Sarenas claim:
Not quite clear SC doesn't know the
facts to their claim
They made an application to the
Secretary of Commerce and
Communications through the Director
of Public Works with opposition from
Sideco which granted the two Sarenas
rights to use the waters of the estero.
CFI Ruling Ruled in favor of Sarenas.
Dismissed Sidecos complaint. Sideco appealed
to SC.
appropriation is effected,
provided he prosecutes his
enterprise to success and with
reasonable diligence.
Explanation of Decision:
The plaintiff and defendant must show
evidence to prove their claim.
Respondent merely contented that
petitioners claim was not sufficient.
Petition granted.
056 - ALINO V HEIRS OF ANGELICA
LORENZO
Issue: Who has the rightful claim? Sideco

Explanation of Law:
Laws relating to claims of irrigation are

under the Spanish Law of Waters and
the Irrigation Act (Act 2152).
Irrigation Act provides explicitly
provides that it shall not work to the
detriment of rights acquired prior to its
passage (Doctrine of Beneficial Use).
Controversies must be submitted to the
Secretary of Commerce and
Communications through the Director
of Public Works. The "decision" of the
Secretary thereon is final "unless appeal
therefrom be taken to the proper court
within thirty days after the date of the
notification of the parties of said
decision. In case of such appeal the
court having jurisdiction shall try the
controversy de novo."
Priority of Appropriation
fundamental principle which must
primarily determine the vital industrial
question of what constitutes a valid
appropriation of waters for irrigation
purposes
o There must be in this
jurisdiction an intention to
use the waters for a
beneficial purpose.
o The precise point of time when
the right attempted to be
asserted began is regarded as
commencing when the claimant
started to construct his dam,
ditch, flume, or other appliance,
by means of which his
A 1,745 sq m. of land in Sinsuat Avenue,

Rosary Heights Cotabato City a TCT was
registered in the name of Lucia.
Angelica Lorenzo (Lucia's daughter)
bought the loat for P10,000 under a
Deed of Absolute Sale. The TCT in the
name of Lucia was cancelled and was
issued in Angelica's name. The lot was
declared for taxation purposes in
Angelica's name
Although the tax declaration was in
Angelica's name, Lucia continued to pay,
under her name the real estate taxes
from 1980-1987. Lucia then designated
Vivian as caretaker of the lot and Vivian
even built a house on the lot and
resided.
Angelica died leaving her husband and
children. They executed an ExtraJudicial Settlement of her estate and the
subject lot was adjudicated to Angelica's
minor children and a TCT was issued in
their name.
Lucia executed a document authorizing
Bautista to look for a buyer for her lots.
Lucia offered to Central Bank of the
Philippines including the lot which was
registered in Angelica's name. Lucia
wrote to the husband (Servillano, Sr) to
return the lot but he refused.
Angelica filed for the declaration of
nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale.
During the pendency of the case, Lucia
died and was substituted by her heirs
(petitioner's in this case
Petitioner's contend that the sale was
simulated and there was absence on the
part of Angelica or her husband to assert
dominical rights over the property,

Lucia remained in continuous
possession of the lot and even paid for
the real property taxed due.
Respondent heirs contend that the sale

was not simulated and Lucia did not
take any concrete steps to recover the
subject lot.
RTC & CA held that the sale was simulated

ISSUE: Is the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Lucia in favor of her daughter Angelica, valid
and binding upon the parties? NO
HELD:
The intention of the parties shall be
accorded primordial consideration,
which is determined from the express
terms of the agreement as well as their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
In this case, Angelica and her husband
did not attempt to exercise any act of
dominion over the lot from the sale was
made until the institution of the
complaint by Lucia. They did not enter
the subject property not occupy the
premises and even the respondent heirs
did not take possession of the lot.
Actual possession of land consists in

the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it in a way that a person would
naturally exercise over his own property.
It is not necessary that the owner of
a parcel of land should himself occupy
the property because someone in his
name may perform the act.
In this case, Lucia was in actual

possession of the property and she
designated Vivian as a caretaker of the
subject lot and Vivian even constructed
a house on the lot and has been residing
since then.
Notes connected to the topic:
In this case, Lucia religiously paid the

realty taxes on the lot from 1980-1987.
Although they are not incontrovertible
evidence, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of
owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least

constructive possession
An action for reconveyance prescribes in

10 years from the date of registration of
deed or issuance of certificate of title.
BUT if the person claiming to be the
owner is in actual possession, the right
to seek reconveyance does not prescribe.
Because one who is in actual possession
of the a piece of land claiming to be the
owner may wait until his possession is
disturbed before taking steps to
vindicate his right. In this case, Lucia
continuously possessed the subject lot,
her right to institute a suit to clear the
cloud over her title cannot be barred by
statute of limitations
WHEREFORE, The Deed of Absolute Sale is null

and void ab initio. And the respondents are
ordered to reconvey the subject lot to the
petitioners.
057 - ARRIOLA VS DELA SERNA
Facts:
1. Plaintiff, Fabian Arriola sues as
administratrix of her mothers estate,
Simona Cabrera for the ejectment and
recovery of a parcel of land situated in
Manila at the corner of Calles San Luis
and Nueva.
2. Plaintiff has no documentary title to
submit, only testimonies given by
witnesses, alleging that her mother was
in possession of the subject land until
about 1882, when she was ousted by a
court order and possession was taken by
one Jose Rubio.
3. On the other hand, defendant shows
title in herself and her children by
inheritance from her deceased husband,
Jose Rubio. It appears also upon the
defendant's showing that said Jose M.
Perez Rubio acquired title by a
conveyance executed by the Court of
Quiapo on Dec 21, 1881, and that,
immediately upon said conveyance, he
entered into possession of the property
and he and his heirs have continued in
possession thereof under the claim of
ownership, publicly, peacefully, and
without interruption, down to the time
of the commencement of this action.
4. Plaintiff alleged that bad faith in the
acquisition of the land by Jose Rubio.

That there was a prior reopening of a
case, and because of the inaction of both
parties (Rubio and his opponent),
nothing further was done, and therefore,
Rubio had no title thereto.
Issue:
1. WoN defendant acquired the subject
property through his husbands (Rubio)
bad faith?
Ruling: The Court finds it unnecessary to try the
issue of the case.
Article 1957 provides that ownership
and other rights prescribes at 10 years to the
persons present and 20 for those who are
absent. Article 1950 provides that good faith of
the possessor is when he doesnt know the defect
of the title and believes that the one who
acquired the title is the real owner. Article 434
provides that good faith is always presumed. At
the present case, it is clear that defendant have
been occupying and possessing in good faith the
subject land, unless bad faith can be impugn in
her husband. There being no proof of bad faith
on the part of her husband (Rubio), which is of
no consequence to the decision. It is also equally
clear that defendant, having taken possession of
the subject land from Feb. 1896 up to Oct. 17,
1908, defendant is the owner of the parcel of
land by prescription.
058 - DAVIS VS NEYRA
A certain Julian Palma sold the house in

question to petitioner Amos Davis for 1k
with the agreement that the vendor will
remain in actual possession after
February 18, 1909 as tenant vendee by
paying 15 php a month for 12 months.
Palma sold the house to Esteban who
transferred the house to one Jose
Colomneda and finally to defendant
Neyra who immediately went into actual
possession of the house.
Petitioner filed for recovery of
possession alleging absolute ownership.
RTC ruled in favor of defendant but petitioner

appealed that title and right of plaintiff could not
be defeated despite defendants purchase in
good faith.
ISSUE: W/N Davis has absolute right to possess
the property.
HELD:
Yes. There is specifically stated in the contract

that if Palma did not purchase the property in 2
years plaintiff would become the absolute owner.
According to Art. 1473 a real property belongs to
the person who first recorded it in registry and
should there be no entry the property shall
belong to the one who first took possession of it.
In the case at bar, on the day the plaintiff bought
the house he entered into possession and Palma
was a mere tenant. Davis having purchased the
property and having received from the vendee
the same could not be defeated by defendant
being a possessor in good faith.
059 - ESCRITOR VS. IAC
Facts:
1958 Escritor filed a claim of
ownership in the cadastral proceedings
before CFI over a lot in Atimonan,
Quezon. Notice of hearing was
conducted. No one contested the
ownership of Escritor.
The court declared Escritor as the owner
of the land. He immediately took
possession of the property. The decision
had become final.
Acua (private respondent) filed a
petition for review on the decision of
ownership of Escritor in CFI. He
contends it was obtained through fraud
and misrepresentation.
1960 The petition was granted and a
new hearing was set. While the
proceedings were going on, claimant
Escritor died. His heirs (petitioners in
this case) took possession of the
property.
1971 The Court adjudicated said land
to Acua. It ordered petitioners to
vacate the property.
1975 Acua filed before the same CFI
an action to claim damages against
petitioners for the fruits that were
allegedly possessed unlawfully for 13
years.
CFI RULING: Dismissed Acuas petition.
IAC RULING: Reversed the ruling of CFI, it
granted Acuas petition. It held that petitioners
were possessors in bad faith from 1958 up to
1971 and should be held accountable for
damages.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners (Escritors
heirs) are liable for damages - NO
SC said that the first decision of the cadastral
case was in favor of Escritor (1958). In this

decision, the said court found to its satisfaction
that claimant Escritor acquired the land by
inheritance from his father who in turn acquired
it by purchase and that his open, public,
continuous, adverse, exclusive and notorious
possession dated back to the Filipino-Spanish
Revolution.
The first decision (1958) had become final and it
did not suggest that the land was owned by any
person other that Escritor. On the basis of the
favorable judgment which was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, Escritor
honestly believed that he is the legal owner of
the land. With this well-grounded belief of
ownership, he continued in his possession of lot.
This cannot be categorized as possession in bad
faith.
As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is
one in possession of property knowing that his
title thereto is defective. Here, there is no
showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his
title. Nor was it proved that petitioners were
aware that the title of their predecessor had any
defect.
Assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor
in bad faith, this should not prejudice his
successorsin-interest, petitioners herein, as the
rule is that only personal knowledge of the flaw
in ones title or mode of acquisition can make
him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not
transmissible from one person to another, not
even to an heir as provided by Art. 534.
060 - FREDCO VS HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Manufacturing Corporation
(petitioner) filed for a cancellation of
registration no. 56561 in the IPO
against the president if Harvard
University with regard to the Harvard
Shield Symbol for decals, tote bags,
serving trays, sweat shirt, tshirt, and
hat. They alleges that petitioners started
using such in the Philippines in 1982 by
New York Garments.
Harvard then alleged that it is the
lawful owner in 50 countries including
the Philippines. Upon discovery of its
use in 2002 through a website they filed
a complaint against FREDCO for
infringement.
IPO ruled in favor of Harvard; one cannot

register the mark if you do not own it. Fredco
failed to explain how New York Garments was
able to come up with the idea of the trademark.
CA affirmed IPO decision

ISSUE: w/n CA erred in affirming the IPO
decision
HELD:
No. Fredcos registration should not have been
allowed in the first place because it falsely
suggest connections with persons and
institutions and their beliefs. Mentioned as well
is the protection of trademarks of those
signatories of the convention of Paris regardless
if it is registered or not in a country. Harvard
University being a well renowned institution is
entitled to such protection that may lead to the
damaging of its reputation.
DOCTRINE:
Section 4. Registration of trade-marks, tradenames and service- marks on the principal
register.There is hereby established a register
of trade-mark, trade-names and service-marks
which shall be known as the principal register.
The owner of a trade-mark, a trade-name or
service-mark used to distinguish his goods,
business or services from the goods, business or
services of others shall have the right to register
the same on the principal register, unless it:
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive
or scandalous manner, or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt
or disrepute;
061 - LEABRES vs CA
FACTS:
Clara Tambunting de Legarda died
testate in 1950. Among the properties
left is the Legarda da Tambunting
Subdivision located on Rizal Ave Ext,
Manila with an area of 80,238.90 sqm.
Claras husband, Vicente Legard, was a
special administrator along with two
others. He sold a portion of the
subdivision to Leabres for 1k. The
probate court supposedly authorized the
sale in 1951.
Legarda was relieved as an
administrator and Philippine Trust Co.
took over. It advertised the sale of the
subd. No adverse claim over the subd

was presented by any person. So, it was
sold to Manotok Realty for 840k. A
Deed of Absolute Sale was issued and
registered.
Leabres filed a complaint for the
quieting of title. He claims it was sold to
him as evidenced by a receipt dated
1950; That he already introduced
improvements and erected a house;
However, he has not registered his
interest nor did he present his claim for
probate in the testate proceedings. He
also claims that Manotok was in bad
faith since it had prior knowledge and
notice of Leabres physical possession of
the property.
RTC: Dismissed complaint. Reinstated
Manotoks counterclaim. Ordered
Leabres to surrender possession to
Manotok.
CA: Affirmed. Purchase of registered
lands for value and in good faith hold
the same free from all liens except those
noted on the titles. The purchaser of a
registered land has to rely on the
certificate of title.
ISSUE: W/N Leabres is a possessor in good faith
NO.
HELD:
The receipt is not a contract of sale nor a
promise to sell. It only acknowledged
the sum of 1k. A valid contract of sale
requires consent, a determinate subject
matter and a price certain in money.
Those elements are lacking.
Vicente entered into said sale in his own
personal capacity and without court
approval. It cannot bind the estate of
Clara.
Assuming receipt was sufficient proof,
Leabres should have submitted the
receipt of the alleged sale to the probate
court so that his right may be
recognized.
To consider Leabres in good faith would
be to put a premium on his own gross
negligence.
062 - MORALIDAD V. PERNES
Facts: Mercedes Moralidad own a parcel of land
located in Davao City. She taught in Davao, Q.C,
and Manila. While teaching in Manila, she had
the good futune of furthering her studies at the
University of Pennsylvania. While studying, she
was offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic

Archdiocese, which she did for 7 years.
Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health
Department of the said university for the next 17
years.
During those years, she would only come
home to the Philippines to spend her 2 months
vacations in Davao. Since she is single, she
usually stayed in the house of her niece, Arlene
Pernes.
Sometimes in 1986, M. Moralidad received
news from A. Pernes that Mandug Davao City
was infested by NPA rebels and many women
and children were victims of crossfire between
government troops and the rebels. She
immediately sent money to Arceli, Arlene
sister, with instructions to look for a lot in the
Davao City, where Arlene and her family could
transfer and settle down. The lot that was
bought was the lot in dispute.
M. Moralidad acquired the property for
the purpose of letting Arlenes family to move
from Mandug, but later she wanted the property
to be also available to any of her relatives
wishing to live and settle in Davao City. The
intention was made in a document.
Following her retirement in 1993, M.
Moralidad came back to the Philippines to stay
with the family of Arlene on the house they build
on the subject property. Later on, their
relationship turned sour because members of
the family of Pernes were impervious to her
suggestions and attempt to change certain
practices concerning matters of health and
sanitation within their compound.
M. Moralidad filed a complaint for
slander, harassment, threat and defamation
against the Pernes family before the Barangay
Lupon.
Barangay Lupon: order the Pernes family to
vacate Moralidads property after Moralidad
reimbursed for the value of the house.
Unfortunately, the parties could not agree
on the amount. Later on, other incidents with
violent confrontations happened. Their
relationship had gone to worse. Thus, prompting
M. Moralidad to file a complaint before the
Regional Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao, charging the spouses Pernes, who
were government employees, with conduct
unbecoming of public servant. However, this
administrative case did no prosper.
She then filed with the MTCC of Davao an
unlawful detainer suit against the spouses
Pernes. M. Moralidad alleged that she is the
registered owner of the land on which Pernes
built their house. Through her counsel, she sent

a letter to spouses Pernes demanding to vacate.
If they not they should pay rental however
spouses Pernes did not agree.
On the other hand, spouses Pernes alleged
that entering the said property, building a house
and maintaining it is with the full knowledge
and consent of M. Moralidad.
MTCC: ruled in favor of M. Moralidad
Spouses Pernes although builders in
good faith, they continued
possessions of the premise turned
unlawful upon their receipt of the
demand to vacate. Their possession
of property is by mere tolerance of
Moralidad.
M. Moralidad should reimburse the
necessary and useful expenses spent
by spouses Pernes.
Spouses Pernes then filed an appeal with
the RTC, while M. Moralidad filed a motion for
execution.
RTC: Granted the motion but it was later
on withdrawn and vacated on the ground that
the house constructed is more valuable than the
land site.
Thus the RTC reversed the MTCC
decision
The Perness possession of property
is by mere consent of Moralidad and
not by tolerance.
Art. 1678, for reimbursement is not
applicable because it contemplates
of a lessor-lessee arrangement.
Instead, it is Art. 448 and 546 that
should governed.
Spouses Pernes being builders in good faith,
have the right to retain possession of the
property until they have been reimbursed the
cost of the improvement they have introduced
on the property.
Moralidad went to CA.
CA: affirmed the RTC ruling
Ejectment suit initiated by

Moralidad was premature
Hence this petition

Issue: Whether the spouses Pernes right to
possess the land had been terminated
Held: Yes. MTCC decision was reinstated with
modification regarding the reimbursement. CA.
was reversed and set aside.
Ratio: The CA. is correct in saying that it was a

usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner
being the owner and respondents are the
usufructuaries. However, the court disagreed
that the action for unlawful detainer must be
dismissed on the ground of prematurity.
Usufruct is defined in Art. 562. It allows
one to enjoy anothers property. Also to enjoy
the property of another temporarily including
jus utendi and jus fruendi but the owner retains
the jus disposidendi or the power to alienate.
The term of period of the usufruct was
considered terminated in the modes enumerated
in Art. 603, and Par 2 states that by the
fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided
in the title creating the usufruct. In the
document executed by the petitioner it was
stated that her relatives may enjoy the use of the
property however they should maintain a
peaceful and harmonious relationship. Anyone
who cannot conform to it may exercise the
freedom to look for his own.
Thus, the non-maintenance of peaceful
and harmonious relationship between them
extinguishes the usufruct. In the case at bat,
there is no doubt that what prompts Moralidad
to file a complaint is because she cannot live
peacefully and harmoniously with the Pernes
family. Hence the usufruct extinguished.
With regard to improvements, Art. 579 and 580
shall govern. Thus petitioner had no right for
reimbursement. He may remove the
improvements without damaging the property
063 - MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN
V DIRECTOR OF LANDS (1910)
Facts:
June 19, 1908, the municipal president of the
pueblo of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, file an
application with the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of a parcel of land of which
the municipality was the absolute owner.
The application states that the said land has an
area of 666.60 square meters and its details are
given in the map attached to the application,
which sets forth that the property described was
appraised at the last assessment levied for
1. the purpose of the payment of the land
tax
2. there is no encumbrance on it
3. no one other than the applicant, to the
latter's best knowledge and belief, has
any right or interest therein;

4.
the said land was acquired by

possession and material occupation for a
large number of years and is at present
occupied by the applicant as a municipal
corporation duly organized;
5. and that, in the unlikely event of the
denial of the said application, the
applicant invokes the benefits of chapter
6 of Act No. 926, since the said
corporation has been in possession of
the land mentioned, which is entirely
surrounded by a fence, and has been
cultivating it for a great many years.
Respondents (Director of Lands)
arguments:
The Attorney-General, in representation of the
Director of Lands, opposed the registration
solicited and alleged that the land in question
belonged to the United States and was under the
control of the Government of the Philippines
Islands. He prayed that it would be denied in
case the said property should be declared to
belong to the Insular Government, the same be
awarded to it.
Court ruled in favor of the Municipality of
Catbalogan
The motion was denied and exception was taken
thereto by the Attorney-General, who forwarded
to this court.
Issue/s:
Whether the lot occupied by the court-house of
the municipality of Catbalogan, of the Islands
and Province of Samar, belongs to the said
municipality or is state land under the control of
the Insular Government? Municipality of
Catbalogan
Held/Ratio:
The parcel of land belongs to Catbalogan
because it is part of its patrimonial property.
Short History
1. During the beginning of the Spanish
occupation, the policy was to seek out a
nucleus of inhabitants and establish
pueblos, and later barrios, with the
nucleus of inhabitants at the center.
2. The administrative authority of a
province, representing the Governorgeneral, had the authority to designate
the territory of new pueblos.
3. The Spanish officials tasked to colonize

the Philippines observed the Laws of the
Indies in layouting new towns:
a. Law 6, Title 5, Book 4: within
the boundaries of a town, there
must be at least 30 residents,
and each resident must have a
house
b. Law 7, Title 5, Book 4: whoever
wishes to establish a new town
of only 10-30 residents shall be
granted the time and territory
necessary for the purpose and
under the same conditions
c. Law 7, Title 7, book 4: manner
of allotment of territory by the
provincial government
i. Allotment of territory
for the entire pueblo
itself
ii. Allotment of territory
for public lands,
pastures, common areas
within the pueblo
iii. The remaining area will
be divided into 4 parts,
1 for the principal
financier of the pueblo,
and 3 for the rest of the
settlers
d. Law 8, Title 7, Book 4: casas
reales (municipal buildings), the
cabildo, the concejo, customs
buildings, and the like shall be
constructed between the main
square and the church
e. Law 14, Title 7, Book 4: viceroys
have the authority to designate
common lands, pastures, and
public lands for those pueblos
which have none (BUT THEY
CANNOT DESIGNATE AREAS
MEANT FOR CHURCHES OR
COURTHOUSES BECAUSE
THAT AUTHORITY ONLY LIES
WITH THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT)
f. Law 1, Title 13, Book 4: viceroys
have the authority to designate
to each villa and lugar
additional lands and lots which
they may need, but the territory
must not be detrimental to a
third party and they must send
statements of the designations
to the government

4. The municipality of Catbalogan is the
provincial seat of Samar. It is possibly
the first and oldest pueblo in the
province.
5. The inhabitants of a pueblo, being
required to build decent and habitable
municipal buildings by paragraph 92 of
the royal ordinances of February 26,
1768, may be assumed to have built it on
their own ground AFTER the provincial
government had designated territory for
it according to the Laws of the Indies.
6. The land designated for a church and
the land designated for a courthouse is
considered property of the municipality
because no pueblo can exist
administratively without having a
church and a courthouse which
represents the seat of its local authority
and municipal government. The area
meant for a church or a courthouse is
granted by the provincial government,
following the Laws of the Indies. Thus in
this case, the parcel of land in question
is patrimonial property of Catbalogan.
7. The courthouse and the church of a
pueblo were always built on opposite
sides of the plaza mayor (the main
square). The plaza mayor was always
within the inhabited area of the pueblo
while the common areas or pastures
were not. In this case, the parcel of land
in question is well within the plaza
mayor of Catbalogan and cannot be
considered a common area or a pasture.
The parcel of land is part of the
municipal assets of Catbalogan. It is
patrimonial property.
1. That Catbalogan has possession and
ownership of the parcel further weakens
the Director of Lands position.
2. According to pertinent laws, a municipal
corporation such as Catbalogan may
validly own land:
a. Article 343, Civil Code: property
of provinces or towns is divided
into property for public use and
patrimonial property
b. Article 344, Civil Code: property
for public use in provinces and
towns comprises provincial and
town roads, squares, streets,
fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works
of general services supported by
said towns or provinces. All

other property is patrimonial
c. Section 2 of the Municipal Code:
(a) Pueblos incorporated under this Act shall be
designated as municipalities (municipios), and
shall be known respectively by the names
heretofore adopted. Under such names they may
sue and be sued, contract and be contracted
with, acquire and hold real and personal
property for the general interest of the
municipality, and exercise all the powers
hereinafter conferred upon them.
(b) All property and property rights vested in
any pueblo under its former organization shall
continue to be vested in the same municipality
after its incorporation under this Act.
3. Thus, based on these laws,
municipalities like Catbalogan have the
right to acquire real and personal
property.
4. Catbalogan should be considered the
owner of the parcel because
a. upon its founding, it was given
the land by the provincial
government. It acquired
exclusive ownership of the
parcel for the purposes of
erecting a courthouse. The
records of the case show no
contrary proof.
b. It had been occupying the
property far longer than the
period required for
extraordinary prescription
based on article 1959 of the Civil
Code (occupation period: 40-45
years)
c. The presumption that it had
been holding the land as an
owner had not been rebutted
064 - NATIONAL COCONUT
CORPORATION VS FRANCISO &
SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES
DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO DE FILIPINA
A Japanese corporation bought a

property from Sagrada
The Japanese corporation then
transferred the property to the
Philippine Alien Property Custodian,
which in turn, transferred it to
petitioner National Coconut
Corporation.

Wherein National Coconut Corporation

is in possession the property.
In a previous civil case (Civil Case No.

5007) filed by Sagrada Orden de
Predicadores for illegal detainer against
National Coconut Corporation, the CFI
rendered a judgment declaring null and
void the sale of a property by Sagrada to
the Japanese Corporation which the
PAPC and petitioner obtained the
property.
The National Coconut Corporation

alleged that it was a possessor in good
faith and is entitled to the fruits over the
property.
ISSUE: W/N National Coconut Corporation is a

possessor in good faith and entitled to the fruits
before the rendition of the judgment? YES
HELD:
Art 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith
who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flawwhich invalidates it.
Art 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits received before the possession is
legally interrupted.
In this case, the possession in good

faith by NCC and its predecessor in
interest (Philippine Alien Property
Custodian) was not interrupted by the
filing of the complaint and service of
summons against PAPC.
It is because PAPC was not the

purchaser of the property and was
not supposed to be aware of any vice
or defects of the sale between Sagrada
and the Japanese Corporation.
National Coconut Corporation's

possession in good faith ceased to
be such when there was a rendition of
judgment against the Philippine Alien
Property Custodian. And the PAPC and
his successor in interest (NCC) is liable
from the time of the rendition of the
judgment until the possession of the
property has been delivered to Sagrada.
The possession of the property
became illegal only from the time
NCC was notified or demanded by
Sagrada to return the possession of

the property to it but it failed to do
so.
BUT before said notice or demand,
the possession of NCC was legal or
consented to.
This is without prejudice to the
obligation of NCC to pay reasonable
compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises fro the time
the NCC's possession ceased to be in
good faith.
Other notes regarding the time for filing the

illegal detainer case:
The Court held, from the notice to
vacate until the filing of the complaint of
illegal detainer against NCC by Sagrada,
one year had not elapsed.
Dissenting opinion by Paras:
The possession of the petitioner was
illegal since August 1946 when National
Coconut Corporation possessed such
property.
And the claim for damages basing from
the allegations of the complaint was
from Aug 1946 until Feb 1949. And it
showed that more than 1 year had
elapsed from the alleged illegal
deprivation until the filing of the illegal
detainer in the Municipal Court.
Note: Nagugulhan ako actually sa case, di ko
sure if ung possession in good faith ceased to be
such nung rendition of judgment or nung time of
demand.
065 - REPUBLIC VS. CASTELLVI
FACTS:
This involves 3 parcels of (adjoined)
land located in San Jose, Flordiablanca,
Pampanga:
1. Lot No. 199-B owned by
Castellvi with an area of 759,299
sqm.
2. Two owned y Toledo-Gozun.
One with an area of 450,273
sqm and another of 88,772 sqm.
The Castellvi property had been
occupied by the Philippine Air Force
since July 1, 1947 under a contract of
lease. It was renewed yearly till June 30,
1956.
On July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the
chief of staff AFP that theyve decided to

subdivide the land for sale to the general

public.
AFP refused to vacate because of the
permanent installations and other
facilities.
Castellvi brought an ejectment suit while
the Republic instituted an expropriation
proceeding on June 26, 1959. The
ejectment suit was dismissed on
November 21, 1959 since Castellvi
agreed to receive the rent of the lands
from 1966 up to 1959.
The republic deposited Php 256, 669.10
with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga. It was then placed in
possession of the lands on August 10,
1959.
On November 4, 1959, the Provincial
Treasurer was ordered to pay ToledoGozun the sum of Php 107,609 and
Castellvi Php 151,859 as provisional
value of their lands.
The trial court then appointed three
commissioners: Atty. Yuzon (clerk of
court), Atty. Pamandanan (PNB
counsel) and Atty. Lansangan (Clark Air
Base counsel). They recommended that
the lowest price should be Php 10/sqm.
An additional 5000 must be paid to
Toledo-Gozun for improvements. Legal
interested should be paid from August
10, 1959.
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun objected,
claiming that the fair market value
(FMV) should be Php 15/sqm while the
Republic insists on Php 0.20/sqm.
Trial Court: Just compensation of Php
10/sqm. Republic will pay 6% int per
annum to Toledo-Gozun counted from
August 10, 1959. 6% interest per annum
to be paid to Castellvi from July 1, 1956
when Republic commenced its
possession.
Republics motion for new trial was
denied.
Republic claims that taking should be
counted from the 1947 lease; That it was
granted the right and privilege to buy
the property should the lessor wish to
terminate the lease and FMV should be
as of the time of the occupancy.
ISSUE:
1. W/N taking under expropriation
commenced with the filing - YES
2. W/N Php 10/sqm is fair just
compensation - NO
HELD:
RE: Taking
Elements of taking for purposes of
eminent domain:
1. Expropriator must enter private
property
o Present. AFP took
possession of the
property by virtue of the
lease agreement.
2. Entrance into the private
property must be for more than
a momentary period/limited
period (not indefinite or
permanent)
o Present. Installations of
permanent nature do
not alter the fact that
entry into the land was
transitory.
o If they intended to
permanently occupy
Castellvis property,
they ought to have
expropriated it from the
beginning instead of
annually renewing the
lease agreement.
3. Entry is under warrant of legal
authority
o Present. Republic
entered as lessee.
4. Property is devoted to public
use.
o Present. It was used by
the air force.
5. Use of the property in such a
way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
o No ousting. Castellvi
remained as owner. The
Republic undertook to
return the property if
the lease was
terminated.
o Castellvi even received
monthly rentals.
So, there was no taking in 1947 under
the lease. Taking should be counted
from the time of the filing of the action
for expropriation.
RE: Compensation
The value of the property being
expropriated cannot be reckoned from
the start of the lease. This is a deceptive

scheme which would deprive the owner

of the property of its true and fmv,
which would have increased during the
lease, at the time of expropriation
proceedings.
Just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing
(June 26, 1959).
The owner has the right to its value for
the use for which it would bring most in
the market.
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are
residential lands. They have taken steps
to convert them into subdivisions.
Castellvi land is suitable for a residential
subdivision. It is near the municipal
building, school house and chapel.
Lands ceased to be devoted to the
production of agricultural crops from
the time it was leased to the AFP.
Compensation cannot be Php 0.20/sqm
like in Narciso case. The expropriation
proceeding in Narciso was instituted in
1949. Present case was instituted in
1959.
Findings of commissioners are not
binding but just advisory. Their
recommendation was based on their
ocular inspection, personal knowledge,
testimony of owners and documentary
evidence.
Fair valuation and just compensation
should be at Php 5/sqm. This is based
on the resolution of the Provincial
Committee on Appraisal that in the year
1959, the Castellvi land could be sold
from Php 3 to 4/sqm while ToledoGozun from Php 2.50 to 3/sqm.
Sale by Francisco to Narciso of 100,000
sqm land situated in Fortuna,
Floridablanca for Php 0.14/sqm is
immaterial because that sale covered
sugarlands, not residential lands.
066 - REYES vs. LIMJAP

Ireneo Felix requested the registration
of a parcel of land belonging to him,
situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
a. Bounded on the north by Calle Real;
b. On the east by lots owned by Braulia
Cuepangco and Engracia Loalhati;
c. On the south by Calle Martinez; and
d. On the west by lots belonging to
Gregorio Lim and Braulia Cuepangco;
It has an area of 815.98 sq.m.
The said property was allegedly acquired

by purchase from the Vicente Francisco
Ayco.
It was assessed at $110 and is free from
all encumbrances,
After hearing, it is now occupied by the
applicant (felix) and conveyed the said
land by means of an absolute sale to
Canuto Reyes for the sum of P600.
The representative of Jacinto Limjap
made written opposition, requesting
that the application be dismissed and
that the registration of the said property
in favor of Irineo Felix with cost be
denied;
Trial court overruled the opposition of Limjap
and decreed the adjudication and registration of
the aforesaid property in favor of Canuto Reyes.
Court of Land Registration proved: (1) That
Crisostomo Marero possessed the land in
question under title of ownership and sold it to
Vicente Francisco Ayco (2) the fact that the
vendor did not redeem the property within the
period fixed by Art 1508 of the CC, no term was
stipulated in the contract sale with the right of
repurchase, Vicente Francisco sold it to Irineo
Felix under public instrument, and the latter,
also sold the said lot to Canuto Reyes, in whose
favor the registration was decreed.
It appears that Crisostomo Marero was the
original owner and possessor of said land, and it
does not appear that Marero had transferred his
control over the property to Braulia Cuepangco,
no possible reason exists under the law that the
latter to be the lawful owner of the land;
therefore, she could neither have disposed of it
nor sold it to the opponent Limjap.
Cuepangco never possessed nor pretended to
own the said parcel of land situated between 2
lots belonging to his mother-in-law, and when
he sold it, he did not include the intermediate
lot, which was the property of Marero.
Issue: Who has the better right to possess the
subject property?
Ruling:
Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that
"Natural possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right by a person. Civil
possession is the same holding or enjoyment,
together with the intention of acquiring
ownership of the thing or right."
Vicente Francisco was the owner and possessor
with just title and in good faith and the right that
he transmitted to the applicant must be
sustained and protected by the courts.

The opponent has not proved that the land is not
the land described in the application and in the
public instrument.
Article 1281, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code
provides that "If the words should appear
contrary to the evident intention of the
contracting parties, the intention shall prevail."
Article 1283 of said code prescribes that
"However general the terms of a contract may be
there should not be understood as included
therein things and cases different from those
with regard to which the persons interested
intended to contract."
Hence, considering that the land of the applicant
was not the subject of the contract, and that it
could not so be for the reason that it did not
belong to the vendor, it can no wise be
understood as included in the instrument of sale,
no matter what may be the terms of the
document.
The petition is AFFIRMED.
067 - SALVORO V. TAEGA
Facts: The disputed property in this case is a
parcel of land located in Tacloban city which was
originally owned by Sps. Salvoro. Sps. Salvoro
mortgaged the said property to the Development
Bank of the Philippines for the sum of 27,000
pesos. Failure to pay the said loan, they received
a notice of the foreclosure of the mortgage
property.
Thereafter, Sps. Salvoro executed a deed
of absolute sale of the said property in favor of
the Sps. Taega in consideration of the sum of
30,00 pesos ( 3,000 pesos will be paid cash
upon the execution of the document and and
remaining 27,000 pesos will be used for the
payment of the loan).
From June 1955- July 1959, the Sps.
Taega were able to pay the Development Bank
of the Philippines for the sum of 20,583.16
pesos. However they defaulted for the remaining
balance. That prompted the bank to foreclose
the said property.
Sps. Salvoro, repurchase the property
and on the same day, they executed a deed of
sale of the property to Sps. Tismo. On the other
hand, Sps. Taega upon arrival from Manila
tendered payment of the purchase price plus 2%
interest to Sps. Salvoro, but the latter refused to
accept.
Sps. Salvoro filed a complaint praying to
annul the deed of absolute sale that they
executed in favor of Sps. Taega with damages
alleging that the latter wasnt able to fulfill their
obligations in paying the loan and claiming that
they are still the owner of the property by

rescission and as redemptioner.
Sps. Taega on their answer alleged that
they are the owner of the property and that Sps.
Salvoro only acquired the right to be reimbursed
for the redemption price. They prayed for the
dismissal of the case. Later on, they file a motion
to bring in Sps. Timos as 2nd buyers in bad faith,
which motion was granted.
Meanwhile, Sps. Taega had registered a
notice of lis pendens on the land with the
register of deeds. However, despite said notice of
lis pendens Sps. Timos were able to register the
sale in their favor.
Sps. Tismo demand Sps. Taega for the
possession and to vacate the said property but
the latter refused. That prompted the Sps. Timos
to file for an unlawful detainer.
With regard to the case filed by Sps.
Salvoro, the MTC ruled in favor of Sps. Salvoro.
MTC: Sps. Taega has to pay 460 pesos as
monthly rental to Sps. Salvoro.
Sps. Taega appealed to the RTC.
RTC: dismissed the complaint of Sps. Salvor and
ordered Sps. Taega to reimburse the
redemption price with legal interest.
Then it was appealed to the C.A. by Sps. Salvoro
C.A.: affirmed the decision of RTCa dn ordering
the register of deeds to cancel the TCT in the
name of Sps. Timos and issue a new TCT in the
name of Sps. Salvoro.
Issue: In a double sale, who has the better right
over the property.
Held: Sps. Taega is the owner of the property
because Sps. Timos are buyer in bad faith.
Ratio: Art. 1544 of the Civil code talks about
double sale. It states that for movable
properties, the first person who has taken
possession in good faith shall have the
ownership. For immovable properties, the
ownership shall belong to the person who has
acquired it in good faith and recorded it in the
registry of property. In the absence thereof, the
person who has the oldest title in good faith shall
have the ownership.
The basic premise of the preferential
rights of Art. 1544 is good faith. The 2nd buyer
must not only have a prior recording but must
above all, have acted in good faith, that is
without knowledge or notice of the previous or
existing alienation made by his vendor to
another.
In the case at bar, Sps. Taega
immediately took of possession of the property

after the execution of the deed of sale. On the
part of Sps. Timos as buyer, they should have
inquired the true status of the property. As a
buyer, failure to exercise the ordinary care
expected to them in buying real estate, they must
suffer the consequences.
Sps. Timos are deemed to be buyer in
bad faith because when they registered the deed
of sale, they could not have failed to know the
existence of the lis pendens annotated in the title
of the property. Thus they know that the land
was previously sold to Sps. Taega when they
were about to register the deed of sale. Hence,
there was bad faith on the part of the Sps. Timos
and the said registration will constitute a
registration in bad faith and will not confer upon
him any right, it is as if there had been no
registration. The buyer who took possession of
the property in good faith shall be preferred.
068 - SANTIAGO V CA
Who has the superior right to a parcel of land
sold to 2 different buyers at different times by its
former owners.
The parties filed 3 cases against each
other in the RTC of Makati.
Respondent Aquilino Arevalo filed a
complaint for specific performance,
cancellation of title, and damages
against: (a) Evelyn Mercado and her
brothers and sisters were the original
co-owners of the 100 square-meter lot in
question, and (b) petitioners who were
the first buyers of the disputed property.
Honorio Santiago and his wife, in turn,
filed a case for quieting of title against
Aquilino Arevalo and for damages also
against Aquilino Arevalo.
The records show that sps. santiago
bought 2 parcels of land from Mercado
The first parcel, purchased on November 18,
1977, is not involved in the case at bench.
Adjoining said lot is the disputed 100 squaremeter lot which was offered to petitioners for
P100,000 shortly after the sale of the first lot.
Thus, an Absolute Deed of Sale was executed.
Mercado turned over the owner's copy of
the Torrens title to petitioners.
Two months before the registration of
the deed of sale, Mercado sold the land
to respondent Aquilino Arevalo.
No attempt to register the deed was
made by respondent Arevalo.
Arevalo filed the action for specific

performance, cancellation of title, and
damages.
The original owners (mercados) did not
file any answer.
TRIAL COURT ruled in favor of respondent
Arevalo. It directed Evelyn Mercado and her
brothers and sisters to surrender the disputed
lot to respondent Arevalo.
On appeal, CA affirmed.
There is no question from the records
that petitioners were the first buyers of
the disputed lot from Evelyn Mercado
and her brothers and sisters, the original
owners.
We believe that petitioners' purchase
was made in good faith.
The applicable provision of law is Article 1544 of
the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been
sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first
taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership
shall pertain to the person who in god faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
There is no need to enter into a discussion of
who between petitioners and respondent
Arevalo first recorded the sale in their favor.
Unfortunately, for respondents, petitioners are
the only registrants as indeed up to the
present time Arevalo has not recorded the sale in
his favor. Too, petitioners have been issued a
new certificate of title in their names.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners were in good
faith both at the time of the acquisition or
sale of the property and also at the time of
the recording or registration of the same.
RULING:
Good faith on petitioners' part was not
found by respondent court, thus its
decision adverse to them. It is in this
regard where we find reversible error.
It is axiomatic that good faith is always
presumed. There being absent any direct
evidence of bad faith, there is need to
examine what respondent Court of

Appeals said are indices of bad faith on

the part of petitioners.
Even though on the date of the
execution of deed of sale on July 30,
1979, in favor of petitioners, respondent
Arevalo was still a complete stranger to
the transaction,
CA would also count against petitioners
that the deed of sale was executed before
the SPA of the other co-owners were
executed.
We believe that petitioners cannot be said to be

in bad faith simply because they had the deed of
sale executed even if not all the co-owners had
executed their respective special powers of
attorney. Consider thus the following: (a)
petitioners were holding on to and had in their
possession the certificate of title of the sellers;
(b) petitioners had the sellers' general powers of
attorney which of course were unavailing to
transfer ownership over realty; (c) petitioners
waited until all the necessary special powers of
attorney were obtained before they registered
the sale.
The vendors did not disturb the peaceful
possession and full ownership of petitioners over
the lot. Not only did petitioners buy the lot
ahead of respondent Arevalo but they also took
possession of the property and have remained in
possession up to the present time. They had
their deed of sale registered. They now are the
title holders of the property.
The disputed lot was adjacent to another lot
which petitioners had previously purchased
from the same vendors only two and a half
months before they paid the earnest money on
the second lot. Obviously, petitioners wanted the
two adjacent lots to form one integrated whole.
Appellant has been and continues to be in actual
possession of the property, and her deed
of pacto de retro sale dates back to 1957 while
the deed of sale in favor of appellees was
executed in 1970; and there is no showing that
appellant's possession and her pacto de retro
sale were done in bad faith.
The records show that petitioners are the first
buyers of the disputed land. They are the only
party to obtain and take hold of the owner's copy
of the Torrens title. They are the only party to
thereupon take possession of the property. They
are the only registrants of the sale for which they
have been issued a certificate of title in their
names. All these circumstances and acts can only
be indicative of good faith. It follows that their
title to the land should be upheld and remain

undisturbed.
070 - YU VS. PACLEB
Facts:
September 1992 - Ruperto Javier
allegedly offered to sell a lot to Yu for
P75 per sq.m. The lot was approximately
18,000 square meters and was located in
Dasmarias, Cavite.
Javier supposedly purchased the lot
from one Rebecca del Rosario who
acquired it from Pacleb and his wife.
Title of the property remained in the
names of respondent and his wife.
Yu accepted the offer and gave Javier
P200,000 as downpayment for the lot.
Javier then delivered his supposed
muniments of title to Yu. After the
execution of a contract to sell, he
formally turned over the property to Yu.
A portion of the lot was occupied by
Paclebs son (Ramon) as tenants.
Ramon and his wife allegedly
surrendered possession of their portion
to Yu. Later on, Yu appointed Ramon as
their trustee over the subject lot.
Yu alleged that they exercised ownership
rights as well as enjoyed open, public
and peaceful possession over the
property from September 12, 1992 until
the early part of September 1995. During
this time, Pacleb was in the United
States. Upon Paclebs return to the
Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly
entered the property by means of force,
threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth
thereby ousting petitioners and their
trustee, Ramon.
Yu filed an action of forcible entry before
MTC of Dasmarinas, Cavite. It was
granted and Pacleb is ordered to vacate
the property.
RTC reversed.
CA affirmed. RTCs decision.
ISSUE: W/N Pacleb had prior physical
possession of the subject property YES
Forcible entry The plaintiff must prove that he
was in prior possession of the land or building
and that he was deprived thereof by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Two things are paramount in possession:
First, there must be occupancy,
apprehension or taking.

Second, there must be intent to possess

(animus possidendi).
Yu failed to establish that they had prior physical

possession to justify a ruling in their favor in the
complaint for forcible entry against respondent.
The claim that the lot was turned over to
petitioners in 1992 was self-serving in the face of
this factual finding. On the other hand, the tax
declarations and receipts in the name of
respondent in 1994 and 1995 established the
possession of respondent. The payment of real
estate tax is one of the most persuasive and
positive indications showing the will of a person
to possess in concepto de dueo or with claim of
ownership.
Yu cited a document, Kusangloob na Pagsasauli
ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan and the affidavit of
Ramon It failed to convince SC that they had
actual occupancy of the subject land.
First, petitioners themselves
acknowledged that Ramon and his wife
occupied part of the land as tenants of
respondent.
Second, Ramon, a mere tenant, had no
authority to sign such document dated
March 10, 1995 waiving all rights to the
land.
Third, there was no clear proof in the
records of the appointment of Ramon as
petitioners trustee save their selfserving statements to this effect.
Finally, at the time the Kusangloob na
Pagsasauli document was executed, the
caretaker of the land was no longer
Ramon but Oscar.
The title of the land also remained in the
name of Pacleb.
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of copossession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred; if there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a
title; and if all these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings
Petition is denied.
071 - AMANTE VS. SERWELAS

Facts:
Danilo Bicomong was the registered
owner of a 1990 Isuzu Jitney. He was
employed as plant supervisor of Amante
Motors.
Bicomong sold the vehicle for P200,000
to Serwelas evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale. Serwelas registered it in
his own name and operated it as a
common carrier on a boundary system.
The vehicle was seized by the police
highway patrol group in Cavite without a
warrant, upon the request of petitioner
Gregorio Amante, the manager of
Amante Motors.
The vehicle was released to Gregorio
Amante. Despite Serwelas demand,
Gregorio Amante refused to return the
vehicle.
Serwelas instituted a replevin suit with
the trial court.
Asserting ownership of the vehicle,
Vicente Amante, the proprietor of
Amante Motors, intervened in the suit.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Ruled in favor of
Serwelas and declared him as the lawful owner.
No evidence was adduced by Amante to support
his claim of ownership.
Note: The petitioners are claiming the car
because they had a suspicion that it was spirited
out of Amante Motors by Bicomong and sold.
It was NOT shown:
That the certificate of registration of
Bicomong was spurious or fake.
That the subject vehicle was registered
in the name of either the defendant or
intervenor Amante Motors.
CA RULING: Affirmed with TC.
ISSUE: W/N Serwelas is the rightful
owner of the vehicle YES
The findings of the Trial Court, especially when
affirmed by the Appellate Court shall be binding.
Serwelas ownership of the vehicle was proven
by the certificate of registration in his name.
Amante, on the other hand, could not present
any certificate of registration to support his
claim. Between one who is armed with a
certificate of registration clearly establishing his
ownership and another whose claim is
supported only by unconvincing allegations, SC
would rule for the former.
A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle
creates a strong presumption of ownership in
favor of one in whose name it is issued, unless

proven otherwise. In this case, SC did not find
sufficient proof to destroy the presumption.
Petition denied.
072 - BARRETTO VS LANE
Antonio Barretto was the owner of an

option to buy the whole property of Tayabas
Sawmill and Lumber Company consisting of real
and personal property worth 315k. He sold the
option to respondent Lane under an agreement
that agreement stated:
Baretto has granted all his title, right, and
interest for the purchase of Tayabas Sawmill
Company to E.J. Lane upon payment on or
before December 31, 1913 the sum of 85k
ISSUE: W/N there was reconveyance despite the
action being prematurely brought on August
1912
HELD:
No. There was no reconveyance. According to
Article 1461 and 1462 A vendor is bound to
deliver and warrant the thing which is the object
of sale When a sale is made by means of a
public instrument, the execution would be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is
the object of the contract.
In the case, another agreement was made with
regard to the delivery of the object upon down
payment of the amount of 30k which was written
on a public instrument. However, such cannot as
well be considered as delivery of the object
because in the public instrument, it merely
stated the delivery of such possession until the
happening of a certain event. Therefore, the
sawmill company never came into the
defendants possession.
073 - BASECO V. PCCG
Facts: When President Corazon Aquino took
power, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) was formed in order to
recover ill- gotten wealth allegedly acquired by
former President Marcos and his cronies.
Aquino then issued two executive orders in 1986
and pursuant thereto, a sequestration and a
takeover order were issued against Bataan
Shipyard & engineering Co., Inc. (BASECO).
BASECO was alleged to be in actuality owned
and controlled by the Marcoses through the
Romualdez family, and in turn, through dummy
stockholders.
The sequestration order issued in 1986 required,

among others, that BASECO produce corporate
records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of
contempt of the PCGG if it fails to do so.
BASECO assails this order as it avers, among
others, that it is against BASECOs right against
self- incrimination and unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Issue/s:
1.)
Whether E.O. no. 1 &2 and 14 are
constitutional
2.)
Whether PCCG had unduly interfered
with its rights of dominion and management of
its business affairs
Held: 1.) Yes, the two executives are
constitutional
2.)
PCCG has only powers of administration
Ratio:
1.)
The impugned executive orders are
avowedly meant to carry out the explicit
command of the provisional constitution,
ordained by Proclamation No. 3 that the
President in the exercise of legislative power
which she was authorized to continue to wield.
Executive order no. 1 stresses the urgent need to
recover all ill- gotten wealth and postulates that
vast resources of the government have been
amassed by former President Macos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates
both here and abroad.
Executive no. 2 gives additional and more
specific data and directions respecting the
recovery of ill- gotten properties amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime.
The third executive order is relevant: Executive
order no. 14 by which the PCCG is empowered
with the assistance of the OSG and other
government agencies to file prosecute all cases
investigated as may be warranted by its findings.
PCGG has the right to require the production of
such documents pursuant to the power granted
to it. Second, and more importantly, right
against self-incrimination has no application to
juridical persons. There is a reserve right in the
legislature to investigate the contracts of a
corporation and find out whether it has
exceeded its powers. It would be a strange
anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a
corporation like BASECO to make use of certain
franchises, could not, in the exercise of
sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had
been employed, and whether they had been
abused, and demand the production of the
corporate books and papers for that purpose.
Neither is the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures applicable here. There

were no searches made and no seizure pursuant
to any search was ever made. BASECO was
merely ordered to produce the corporate
records.
2.)
PCCG cannot exercise acts of dominion
over the property sequestered, frozen or
provisionally taken over. The act of
sequestration; freezing or provisionally taken
over property does not make the PCCG the
owner thereof. In relation to the property
sequestrated, the PCCG is a conservator, not an
owner. Therefore, it cannot perform acts of strict
ownership and this is specially true in the
situations contemplated by the sequestration
rules where unlike cases of receivership for
example no court can exercise effective
supervision or can upon due application and
hearing, grant authority for the performance of
acts of dominion.
Equally evident is that the resort to the
provisional remedies in question should entail
the least possible interference with business
operations or activities so that, in the event that
the accusation of the business enterprise being
ill- gotten be not proven. It may be returned to
its rightful owner as far as possible in the same
condition as it was at the time of sequestration.
PCCG may thus exercise only powers of
administration over the property or business
sequestrated or provisionally taken over, much
like a court appointed a receiver (Powers of a
receiver).
074 - CEA v. VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
Property in question is a parcel of land

(Parcel No. 2) located in Camarines.
September 1906: Villanueva foreclosed a

mortgage over Ceas parcels of real estate.
Parcels of land were sold to Villanueva at a
public auction.
Villanueva entered into possession of

Parcel No. 2. A house was built on the lot. It was
not specifically mentioned in the lot description.
Ceas employee was notified and he was

allowed by Villanueva to stay on the premises to
care for certain articles. Villanueva also placed
his own employee to protect the lot from
destruction.
October 1906: House was destroyed by a

fire.
November 1906: Court annulled the sale

and ordered resale.
December 1906: Sold again to

Villanueva.
(So. Cea most likely filed a case against

Villanueva to hold him liable for the fire.)
TC: House was included in the sale

under the judgment of foreclosure and
Villanueva is a possessor in good faith. The
description of parcel no. 2 includes the house.
ISSUE: W/N Villanueva is a possessor in bad
faith and he is liable for the loss due to the fire?
NO.
HELD:
Villanueva is neither a holder in bad

faith nor a usurper. A purchaser at a defective
foreclosure sale who goes into possession under
the right supposed to have been acquired from
the sale is deemed a mortgagee in possession.
He is liable only for losses caused by his

negligence. No negligence was shown in the
present case. Having entered into possession
lawfully, he was obliged to exercise only
reasonable diligence and care in the
management of the property.
075 - CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
vs. SPOUSES TOBIAS L. LOZADA and
ERLINA P. LOZADA
FACTS:
Sps. Lozada entered into a Contract to

Sell with PPGI (developer of Makati Prime City
Condominium Townhomes Project, agreed to
sell to the sps. Lozada Unit No. 402 of the
Project (two-bedroom residential unit with an
area of 42.90 sq.m) for the total price of
P1,444,014.04
Six months later, PPGI, represented by

its President Kenneth T. Yap and Treasurer
Gilbert Y. Yap, with Mortgage Clearance from
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), executed two Deeds of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of CBC (petitioner) to secure
the credit facilities granted by CBC to PPGI.
PPGI availed credit facilities and

incurred a total principal obligation of
P29,067,708.10 to CBC.
PPGI failed to pay; CBC filed a Petition

for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the real estate
mortgages.
Public auction sale took place which

CBC was the highest bidder.
The Certificate of Sale of the foreclosed

properties was subsequently issued in favor of
CBC.
CBC Chief Executive Officer Peter S. Dee

executed an Affidavit of Consolidation stating
that 21 of the 51 foreclosed properties had been
either "released by take-out by certain buyers" or
partially redeemed;

The period for redemption of the

remaining foreclosed properties (which included
Unit No. 402) had already expired without
having been redeemed;
The titles to the remaining foreclosed

properties had already been consolidated in the
name of CBC;
Pursuant to the Affidavit of

Consolidation, the Registry cancelled CCT No.
34898, covering Unit No. 402, and registered in
the name of PPGI, and issued in the name of
CBC.
It appears that a few months prior to the

foreclosure of the real estate mortgages, PPGI,
through its Senior Manager Salvador G. Prieto,
Jr., sent a letter to respondent Erlina P. Lozada
No record shows any immediate action

taken by the sps. Lozada on the said letter.
Year after the public auction sale, Erlina

executed a Notice of Adverse Claim as regards
Unit No. 402, which she registered with the
Registry of Deeds
Erlina next sent a letter to both PPGI

and CBC, laying down her position pertaining to
Unit No. 402, to wit:
1.
I have been ready, willing, and able
since August 25, 1998 to pay the balance under
my contract and I have tendered payment as
early as then.
2.
My liability is limited to the amount
stated thereunder plus reasonable expenses for
the transfer of title; no other liability such as for
interests, penalties, charges or any other
imposition is recognized. The VAT is a liability of
the seller and I have never consented to accept
this burden.
3.
On delivery of my full payment, I have a
right to demand reasonable assurance that title
could be transferred to me immediately and so
to require that the muniments of title and
evidence of all tax payments by seller (necessary
for registration) be delivered to me.
In the same letter, she advised that she

was tendering payment by opening an escrow
account with CBC in the amount of
P1,010,809.83
Thereafter, Erlina sent another letter to

PPGI and CBC stating that she was unable to
open an escrow account. Instead, she opened a
special account.
In reply, CBC sent Erlina a letter, telling

her that the consideration for Unit No. 402 was
P1,100,788.29; thus, the amount she was
tendering was insufficient.
CBC also informed her that all taxes

including documentary stamp tax, capital gains
tax, transfer tax, and all other expenses for the
transfer of title to her name shall be for her

exclusive account.
In another letter to Erlina, CBC notified

her that it had already consolidated its title and
ownership over Unit No. 402 which she
presently occupied, and requested her to vacate
and surrender the said property
Subsequent to the letter of CBC to

Erlina, a conference was held and more letters
were exchanged between the parties, but no
agreement was reached.
CBC filed an Ex Parte Petition for

Issuance of a Writ of Possession
The sps. Lozada filed with the CA their

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with
Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/Temporary Restraining
CA issued a Resolution granting in favor of the
sps Lozada a TRO enjoining the Sheriff and the
other respondents therein from enforcing the
Writ of Possession and Notices to Vacate.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of
possession was improper and unwarranted
RULING: The Court answers in the affirmative.
The purchaser in the public auction sale of a
foreclosed property is entitled to a writ of
possession; and upon an ex parte petition of the
purchaser, it is ministerial upon the RTC to issue
such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser.
However, while this is the general rule, as in all
general rules, there is an exception.
In the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgages, possession of the property may be
awarded to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
during the pendency of the period of
redemption.
Section 33 of Rule 39, which reads:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at
expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given. If no redemption be made
within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, the
purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the property; x x x.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption,
the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. The
possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same
officer unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The right of the respondent to the possession of
the property is clearly unassailable. It is founded
on the right of ownership. As the purchaser of
the properties in the foreclosure sale, and to
which the respective titles thereto have already
been issued, the petitioner's rights over the
property has become absolute, vesting upon it
the right of possession of the property which the
court must aid in affecting its delivery. After
such delivery, the purchaser becomes the
absolute owner of the property.
The instant Petition for Review is GRANTED.
076 - CITY OF MANILA vs. GERARDO
GARCIA, et al.
FACTS
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of
parcels of land, forming one compact
area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and
Singalong streets in Malate, Manila.
After liberation from 1945 to 1947,
defendants entered the said land
without plaintiff's knowledge and
consent. They built houses without
plaintiff's knowledge and without the
building permits from the city. There
they lived thru the years to the present.
Defendants Miranda, Parayno, Diaz,
Dizo, Barrientos, Ramos, Nepacina,
Sanchez, Berio, Velasco, Alunan and
Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant
Carandang) were given by Mayor
Valeriano E. Fugoso permits each
labeled "lease contract" to occupy
specific areas in the property
Defendants Obaob and Garcia received
their permits from Mayor Manuel de la
Fuente on January 29 and March 18,
respectively, both of 1948. The rest of
the 23 defendants exhibited none.
For their occupancy, defendants were
charged nominal rentals.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary
School is close, though not contiguous,
to the property. Came the need for this
school's expansion
Plaintiff's City Engineer directed to clear
squatters' houses on city property, gave
each of defendants thirty (30) days to
vacate and remove his construction or
improvement on the premises.
This was followed by the City
Treasurer's demand on each defendant
for the payment of the amount due by
reason of the occupancy.
Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to

recover possession.
The judgment directed defendants to vacate the
premises and to pay their monthly rentals.
Defendants appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court properly found
that the city needs the premises for school
purposes.
RULING
1.
These permits, erroneously labeled

"lease" contracts, were issued by the
mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the
effects of the war had simmered down.
Two decades have now elapsed since the
unlawful entry. Defendants could have,
if they wanted to, located permanent
premises for their abode. And yet,
usurpers that they are, they preferred to
remain on city property.
2. Defendants' entry was illegal. Their
constructions are illegal, without
permits. The city charter enjoins the
mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the
City of Manila.
3. The houses and constructions constitute
public nuisance per se for the reason
that they hinder and impair the use of
the property for a badly needed school
building, to the prejudice of the
education of the youth of the land.
4. We have reached the conclusion that
their forcible entry dates back to the
period from 1945 to 1947. That entry
was not legalized by the permits. Their
possession continued to remain illegal
from incipiency.
We vote to affirm the judgment under review.
Costs against defendants-appellants.
077 - COMMISSIONER ON INTERNAL
REVENUE (PETITIONER) VS
SOLIDBANK CORP. (RESPONDENT)
Facts:
1.
Respondent, for the calendar year of
1995, filed its Quarterly Percentage Tax Returns
reflecting gross receipts (note: this pertains the
5% Gross Receipt Tax rate) in the total amount
of P1,474,691,693.44 with the corresponding
gross receipts tax payment in the sum of
P73,734,584.60 (please refer to the full text for
the bread down).
2.
Respondent alleged that the total gross
receipts included the amount of
P350,807,875.15 representing gross receipts

from passive income, which was already
subjected to the 20% final withholding tax (note:
the amount is not actually received by the bank
and is directly remitted to the government).
3.
In a case rendered by the Court of Tax
Appeals (Asian Bank Corp vs. CIR), it held that
20% final withholding tax (FWT) on banks
interest income should not form part of its
taxable gross receipts for computing the gross
receipts tax(GRT).
4.
Because of the case stated above,
Respondent filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue a letter-request for the refund of tax
credit certificate in the amount of 3,508,078.75,
which represents the overpaid gross receipt tax
(so, respondents contention is that the amount
of P350,807,875.15 should not be included in the
computation of the 5% GRT).
5.
Without waiting for the action of
petitioner, respondent filed for a petition for
review before the CTA for the claim of the refund
of the overpaid internal revenue tax, pursuant of
Sec. 230 (now 229) if the Tax Code.
CTA ruling: Ruled in favor of the respondent,
ordering the petitioner to refund the former.
However, the amount was reduced to P1,
555,749.65 as the amount of overpaid. In the
above stated case (Asian Bank Corp vs. CIR), it
was ruled that banks interest income should not
form part of its taxable gross receipts for
purposes of computing the (gross receipts tax).
CA ruling: Petitioner elevated the case to the CA,
however, the CA affirmed the decision of the
CTA holding that the 20% FWT should not form
part of the 5% GRT, for the reason that it was
not actually received by the bank and was
directly remitted to the government. (Note: that
the 20% should not be included in the
computation of the 5%).
Issue: WoN the 20% FWT of the banks interest
income should form part of the computation of
the 5% GRT?
Ruling: SC rules in the affirmative, the 20%
FWT forms part of the computation of the 5%
GRT.
Petitioner claims that although the 20%
FWT was not actually delivered to the
respondents (directly remitted to the
government), it redounded to the benefit of the
latter (respondents). Respondents maintain that
the decision of the CA is correct. The SC agrees
with petitioner.
FWT and GRT are two different taxes
In scrutiny of the provisions, the two
types of taxes are the following: a. GRT is a
percentage tax; and b. FWT is an income tax.
Banks are covered by both taxes. Percentage tax
is a national tax measured by a certain

percentage of the gross selling price or gross
value in money of goods sold, barted, or
imported; or of the gross receipts or earnings
deprived by any person engaged in the sale of
services. Income tax is a national tax imposed
on the net or the gross income realized in a
taxable year.
Constructive receipt vs actual receipt (important
for property!)
Respondents claim provides that there is
no actual receipt, in regards with the FWT, and
is therefore not to be included in the
computation of the GRT. Respondent further
alleged that no pecuniary benefit or advantage
accruing to the bank from the FWT because it is
directly remitted to the government. The Court
does not agree. Following the provisions of
Article 531 and 532 of the Civil Code, the Court
applies the analogy of the rules of actual and
constructive possession.
Provided in the last means of acquiring
possession under article 531, this refers to
judicial acts of acquisition of possession by
sufficient title to which the law gives the force of
acts of possession. It is stated that possession is
through proper acts and legal formalities
established therefor. The withholding process is
one such act. There may be no actual receipt of
the income withheld; however, as provided for
in Article 532, possession by any person without
any power whatsoever shall be considered as
acquired when ratified by the person in whose
name the act of possession is executed?
In the withholding tax system, possession is
acquired by the payor as the withholding agent
of the government, because the taxpayer ratifies
the very act of possession for the government.
Therefore, there is constructive receipt. There
being constructive receipt, the income then is
included for the computation of the GRT.
RR 12-80 superseded by RR 17-84
As a general rule, rules and regulations issued by
administrative or executive officers pursuant to
the procedure or authority conferred by law
upon the administrative agency have the force
and effect or partake of the nature, of a statute.
It is the finance secretary who promulgates the
revenue regulations, upon the recommendation
of the BIR commissioner at the case at bar.
What needs to be determined is if RR 12-80 has
been repealed by RR 17-84. A repeal may be
express or implied. Seeing the provisions, RR 1280 provides that only income actually received
shall be included in the computing of the GRT
while RR 17-88 provides that all interest
earned shall be included. There is clear intent

that RR 17-84 (the latter law) includes the all
interests earned within the scope of the general
rule. Therefore, RR 12-80 superseded by RR 1784 (the latter law). (Note: that items only
inconsistent with the former law are repealed by
the latter law. Therefore, when there is no
conflict between the latter and former laws, then
there is no repealing, example as stated above).
Reconciling the two regulations
Granting that the two regulations can be
reconciled, respondents reliance on section on
Sec. 4(e) of RR 12-80 is misplaced. The accrual
referred to therein should not be equated with
the determination of the amount to be used as
tax base in computing the GRT. Such accrual
merely refers to an accounting method that
recognizes income as earned although not
received, and expenses as incurred although not
yet paid.
Accrual should not be confused by with the
concept of constructive possession or receipt as
earlier discussed. Petitioner correctly points out
that income that is merely accrued earned
not yet received does not form part of the taxable
gross receipts: income that has been received
albeit constructively does.
No double taxation
As stated above, the FWT and the GRT are two
different taxes. The basis of imposition may be
the same, but they are different in nature. There
is no double taxation. Double taxation means
taking the same property twice when it should
be taxed only once. This is not the case in the
present litigation. First, the taxes have different
subject matter. Second, although both taxes are
national in scope, the period they affect are
different. Third, these two taxes are different in
kind or character. Therefore, there is no double
taxation.
Petition is granted
078 - CRUZ VS. PAHATI
Facts:
Pahati bought an automobile from

Bulahan, for the sum of P4,900 which he paid in
check.
When the Manila Police Department

impounded the automobile, Pahati cancelled the
sale and stopped the payment of the check and
as a result he returned the automobile to
Bulahan who in turn surrendered the check for
cancellation. Bulahan set up a counterclaim for
the sum of P2,000 as attorneys fees.
Bulahan acquired the automobile from

Belizo and Bulahan did not know that there was
a defect in the title of the car.
LOWER COURT RULING: Ruled in favor of

Bulahan.
The Lower Court found that:
Belizo is a second hand car dealer who

sold an automobile to plaintiff Cruz.
After a year, Belizo offered to sell the sell

the same car to a certain buyer. Plaintiff agreed
and since the certificate of registration was
missing, Cruz made a letter addressed to the
Motor Section of the Bureau of Public Works for
the issuance of a new certificate.
Cruz gave the letter to Belizo to be

submitted to the said office and he gave the car
as well on the latters pretext that he was going
to show it to a prospective buyer. The letter was
falsified, making it appear that a deed of sale was
executed in favor of Belizo, who then got a
certificate of registration on his name.
ISSUE: Who has a better right to the
automobile, Cruz or Bulahan? Cruz
Cruz, the original owner has the better right for
it cannot be disputed that plaintiff had been
illegally deprived through ingenious schemes by
Belizo and that Art 559 and 1505 are applicable
in this situation.
Art 559 clearly indicates that the one who has
lost any movable or has been lawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same and the only defense is if
the other party has acquired it in good faith and
at a public sale.
Art 1505 clearly says that in cases where a sale is
made not by owner and was made without
authority, the buyer acquires no better right
than that of the seller unless the owner is
estopped.
If Bulahan had been more diligent, he could
have seen that the letter had an erased portion
which couldve aroused his suspicion and made
him conscious on making inquiries which he
failed to do.
The contention of Bulahanan regarding common
law principle that the one who has made the
happening of fraud possible through misplaced
confidence must suffer the consequence cannot
be applied since there is an express provision
covering the case.
In favor of Cruz.
079 - ENDEISA VS. TALEON
Facts:
The plaintiff alleged:
(1) That he is the owner of the lorcha
named Leal, the dimensions and capacity of
which are described in the document;

(2) that the defendant Jesusa Laureano, in a suit
brought by her against Luis Rivera, secured the
attachment of the lorcha as being the property of
Luis Rivera, and had it sold at public auction;
(3) that the defendant Jose M. Taleon, as deputy
sheriff, levied upon the lorcha auction on the
27th of April, 1906, and sold it at public auction
on June 25 following;
(4) that on the 28th of May of the same year,
before the lorcha was sold at public auction, the
plaintiff legally notified the sheriff, Jose Maria
Taleon, that the said lorcha did not belong to
Rivera, but that it was the property of the
plaintiff, he having purchased it from Francisca
de Herrerias;
(5) that notwithstanding this notification, the
sheriff sold the lorcha at public auction, at which
Juan de Leon was the highest bidder;
(6) that by reason of the attachment and sale,
the plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of the
ownership and possession of the said lorcha,
He prayed: (1) the attachment and sale of the
said lorcha to the be declared null and void; (2)
he be entitled to ownership and possession (3)
the defendants be ordered to deliver the lorcha
to the plaintiff in Iloilo where sold and in the
same condition as it was prior to said
attachment and sale.
Following facts has been proven:
1. That the lorcha Leal formerly belonged to
Francisco Elorriaga.
2. That after the death of Francisco Elorriaga, his
widow, Jesusa Barrioso, solicited authority from
the CFI of Iloilo to sell, either by private or
public sale, all the personal property pertaining
to the inheritance. (GRANTED)
3. among other property of Elorriaga, an
inventory of which appears in the record as
Exhibit 3, and admitted without objection,
the Panco Leal was found
4. under a notarial instrument executed by
Jesusa Barrioso and Agustin Asensio on March
7, 1903, the former, as the owner of one-half of
the lorcha Leal and judicial administratrix of the
remaining portion on behalf of the intestate
estate of her deceased husband, Elorriaga, sold
the said lorcha to Asensio for the sum of $1,800,
Mexican currency.
5. That on May 17, 1905, Asensio sold the said
lorcha to Francisca Zulueta Jose for P2,000
under an instrument executed before a notary
public.
6. That on July 28 of the same year, Francisca
Zulueta Jose told it to Pedro Endeisa for P2,500
in the same manner.
Issue:
WON plaintiff is the rightful owner of Lorcha
property. YES
Held:
The finding contained in the judgment, to the
effect that Luis Rivera was the purchaser of the
lorcha at the public sale, is absolutely
incompatible with them, inasmuch as Agustin
Asensio was the purchaser. The evidence of the
document that proves this sale has not been
rebutted or impugned in any manner.
Admitting that Luis Rivera was in possession of
the lorcha, as in reality he was then it was
attached and sold, the record contains no proof
as to when the said possession commenced and
how it was acquired. In accordance with
paragraph 2 of article 573 of the Code of
Commerce, the ownership of the vessel
may be acquired by possession; such
possession must be in good faith,
continued for three years, and with good
title duly recorded. None of these
requisites been proven in favor of the
possession of Luis Rivera. Therefore, there
are no grounds in law for sustaining the
judgment appealed from, based as it was only on
said possession as the principal foundation.
SC ruled that: It be declare null and void the
attachment and sale of the said lorcha in favor of
the defendant Juan de Leon; that the plaintiff is
the owner and is entitled to the possession of the
same; and that the defendants shall deliver to
the plaintiff the said lorcha in the condition that
it was prior to the attachment and sale, such
delivery to be made in the city of Iloilo where it
was attached and sold.
Note: Lorcha is a type of sailing vessel having a
Chinese junk rig on a Portuguese or other
European style hull. Because of its hull
structure, the vessel is faster and can carry more
cargo than the normal Chinese junk
080 - FILIPINAS INVESTMENT &
FINANCE CORP V RIDAD (1969)
Spouses Ridad bought a Ford Consul

sedan for P13,871 from Supreme Sales & Dev
Corp (Filipinas Investment's assignor-ininterest)
P1,160 was paid upon delivery while the

remaining balance is to be paid in 24 monthly
installments
As a security, a promissory note and

chattel mortgage on the car were executed by the

spouses to ensure the payment of the remaining
balance
Spouses failed to pay the 5 consecutive

installments (remaining balance 5k)
Filipinas instituted a replevin suit for

the seizure of the car or in case delivery could
not be effected, to recover the unpaid balance
The complaint stated that there was

unjustifiable failure and refusal on the part of
the spouses to surrender the car
Subsequently, the car was seized by the

sheriff. During the progress of the case, Filipinas
instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding. Due to this, the car was sold at the
public auction, Filipinas being the highest bidder
& purchaser
Meanwhile, the spouses Ridad were

declared in default during the hearing for the
said proceedings due to their alleged non-receipt
of summons
And due this order of default, the

judgment ordered them to pay Filipinas:
a)
P500 - atty's fees
b)
P163.65 - actual expense incurred in
seizing the car
Spouses appealed to the CFI, to which the CFI
stated:
The only issue to be resolved was

regarding the atty's fees and the expenses
incurred in seizing the car
It ruled that Filipinas was entitled to

recover both amounts
The decision was appealed to the SC
Spouses Ridad's contention:
When Filipinas seized the car, foreclosed

the mortgage, had the vehicle sold, and bought it
at the public auction, it renounced all its rights
under the promissory note and chattel mortgage
As well as the payment of the unpaid

balance, including the fees and costs of suit
Basing such contention under Art 1484

(Recto Law) of the NCC
Filipinas' contention:
It is entitled to award for atty's fees and

actual expenses and costs of suit due to the
unjustifiable failure and refusal of the spouses to
comply with their obligation (one of which was
the surrender of the chattel mortgage upon
Filipinas' demand)
It also argued that what 1484 prohibits

is the recovery of the unpaid balance by means
of an action other than a replevin suit
ISSUE: Is Filipinas entitled to the award of atty's
fees and expenses incurred due to the seizure of
the car? YES
HELD:
Under Art 1484 (Recto Law), there are 3
remedies/options available to the vendor who
has sold personal property in installment:
1.
Exact fulfillment of the obligation (if
vendee fails to pay)
2.
Cancel the sale (if vendee fails to pay 2
or more installments)
3.
Foreclose the mortgage (if one has been
constituted over the property AND if vendee fails
to pay 2 or more installments)
If the vendor chooses the 3rd option, he

shall have no further actions against the
purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance
(it includes any deficiency of judgment after the
object has been sold at the publication and this
necessarily includes the atty's fees and costs of
suit)
This doctrine prevents the vendor from

circumventing the Recto Law
This is to protect the buyers/vendees on

installments from vendors who aside from
recovering the goods sold upon default of the
buyer in payment of 2 installments, still retained
for themselves the amount already paid and also
entitled to atty's fees and expenses of litigation
Underlying philosophy of Recto Law:

The underprivileged mortgagors (debtor) must
be afforded full protection against the capacity of
mortgagees (creditor)
HOWEVER, the Court also recognizes

that such philosophy should not be construed to
deprive the mortgagee (creditor) of their own
protection against perverse mortgagors (debtor)
Hence, where the mortgagors (debtors)

plainly refuses to deliver the chattel mortgage
due to his failure to pay 2 or more installments
OR if he conceals the chattel for it to be beyond
the reach of the mortgagee (creditor)
The mortgagee is entitled to recover

necessary expenses incurred by him in the
prosecution of the action for replevin
And such recoverable expenses includes

the expenses incurred in effecting the seizure of
the object and atty's fees

*Notes:
Foreclosure of chattel mortgage and recovery of
unpaid balance of the price - alternative
remedies and should not be pursued together
The ruling in this case, in so far as it conflicts
with previously established doctrine is pro tanto
qualified
081 - FRANCISCO VS RODRIGUEZ
Mora who was an illiterate applied for a

sales application for the purchase of a lot in
Barrio Bunawan Davao City and was able to
cultivate it by planting abaca, coconuts, cacao,
lanzones nanca and durian and was declared for
taxation by 1932.
Her application was rejected because

she was being used as a dummy. Despite this,
she remained in possession of the property and
eventually filed a motion for reconsideration
through her Lawyer Julian Rodriguez who sent
an affidavit of Ursula Francisco (petitioner) to
the Bureau of Lands.
When Ursula was in need of money she

approached Rodriguez for a loan to which he did
not agree but was able to give consent insisting
an absolute conveyance of the property. Usrsula
found out that what she signed was not a
document of antichresis and not an absolute
sale.
CFI declared her case null and void since the
property in dispute was not private but of the
governments.
CA restored the status of Ursula and
Rodriguez until an investigation has been made
by the Bureau of Lands
ISSUE: W/N Director of Lands is entitled to the
reimbursement of the fruits of the property
HELD:
No. The court ruled that despite the fact that
said property would more or less belong to the
government, the Director of Lands is not entitled
to reimbursement for the reason that he is not a
party to the case at bar.
082 - MACASAET VS. R TRANSPORT
CORP.
Facts:
1.
R. Transport Corporation (respondent)
was a holder of a Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) to operate a public utility
bus service within Metro Manila and the
provinces while New Mindoro Transport Classic
(NMTC), which is represented by Alexander
Macasaet (petitioner), operates in Oriental
Mindoro.
2.
Petitioner and respondent entered into a
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage over 4
passenger buses, whereby the former is to pay
P12 million and assume the mortgage obligation
of the latter for the 4 buses in favor of Phil. Hino
Sales Corp. Respondent delivered 2 passenger
buses to petitioner.
3.
Petitioner however failed to pay his
obligation, despite repeated demands, which
prompted respondent to file a complaint for the
issuance of a writ of replevin.
4.
However, before the execution of the
contract, a Special Trip Contract was entered by
the parties, whereby the respondent would lease
the 4 buses to petitioner for the week of Oct 15
up to 22, 1995, in the amount of P10,000 per bus
or a total of P280,000.
5.
On Jan 8, 1996, the RTC issues a writ of
seizure, ordering the sheriff to take possession of
the 3 buses, subject to the complainants bond.
6.
Petitioner answers that he has already
paid the consideration sum of P12 million and
had agreed to assume the mortgage of the 4
buses. Petitioner claims that he was the owner of
the 4 buses (including the 2 buses delivered).
Petitioner also claim that he had remitted
already 12,000 for the mortgage obligation.
Petitioner did admit that he had been earning at
least 7,000 per day on each of the buses.
RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of respondents right
to possess the 2 buses (which was actually
delivered), but dismissed its claim for the
recovery of rentals for the use of the two buses.
CA Ruling: Sustained the respondents right to
possession. It also ruled that the deed of sale was
perfected, and that respondent retained
ownership over the buses. It ordered petitioner
to remit the income from the passenger buses in
the amount of P7k per day, from Oct 16, 1995 to
Jan 16, 1996.
Issue:
a.
WoN there a perfect contract between
petitioner and respondent? Yes.
Ruling:
Respondent claims that the contract was
never consummated for lack of consideration
and the disapproval of the security finance
needed for petitioner to assume the mortgage
obligation. Petitioner on the other hand, claims

ownership by virtue of payment of the
consideration. The CA declared the nonperfection of the deed of sale contract and that
petitioner was precluded in possessing and
enjoying the subject buses.
In this regard, the CA erred since there
was a perfect contract, however there was no
consummation. The requisites of a contract
under Article 1318 of the Civil Code are the
following: a. consent of the parties; b. subject
matter; c. cause of obligation. Thus, contracts
other than real contracts are perfected by mere
consent, which is the meeting of the minds. The
contract of sale is perfected from the moment of
the meeting of the minds. Thus, the contracting
parties may reciprocally demand performance.
Respondents then has the right to demand
performance or to rescind the contract and
damages for both instances, since there is failure
to pay the consideration and not lack of
consideration. The CA failed to consider that
there was failure on the part of petitioner to pay
the purchase price and complete the mortgage.
It is true that respondent should have filed a
case for to resolve or for rescission of the
contract, however, the complaint was cured
when the complaint itself made out a case for
rescission or resolution for failure of petition to
comply, as alleged in the complaint.
A necessary consequence of rescission is
restitution with payment for damages. Thus,
petitioners possession became unlawful over the
buses from the time the demand for the return,
but the latter wrongfully detained the same.
Therefore, it is but fair that petitioner should be
made to pay reasonable rentals for the use of the
two passenger buses. It is a basic principle that
no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another. Niguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizamente condao de otro.
Wherefore, petition is denied.

083 - SAN LORENZO DEVT CORP VS CA
FACTS:
This involves two parcels of land in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna measuring 15,808 sqm or
3.1616 hectares.
August 1986: Miguel and Pacita
(Spouses Lu) purportedly sold the land
to Babasanta for Php 15/sqm. Babasanta
made a 50k downpayment evidenced by
a receipt. Several other payments
totaling to 200k.
May 1989: Babasanta wrote a letter to
Pacita Lu for the execution of a final
deed of sale in his favor to make full

payment of the purchase price; That he
also received information that the
spouses sold the property to another
without his knowledge and consent so
he demanded the cancellation of the
second sale.
June 1989: Babasanta filed a complaint
for specific performance and damages
against spouses Lu. (He also later
claimed that the lis pendens was
annotated to the property in June 1989)
Spouses allege that:
o Babasanta granted loans to
Pacita reaching 50k.
o Pacita (w/o knowledge and
consent of Miguel) agreed to
transform the loan into a
contract to sell with Babasanta.
o The 50k would become the
downpayment for the property
and the balance to be paid on or
before 31 Dec 1987.
o Nov 1987: Total payments by
Babasanta reached 200k.
o Babasanta failed to pay the
260k balance and asked for a
reduction of the price from
15/sqm to 12/sqm.
o Spouses refused and Babasanta
rescinded the contract to sell
and declared that the loan
transaction will continue.
Spouses would be indebted to
him for 200k.
July 1989: Spouses purchased a 200k
Interbank Managers Check in the name
of Babasanta to show she was willing to
pay the balance.
January 1990: San Lorenzo
Development Corp (SLDC) filed Motion
for Intervention. It alleges the ff:
o February 1989: Spouses Lu
executed in its favor an Option
to Buy over the lots. It paid 316k
option money out of the total
consideration of the purchase
price of Php 1,264,640.
o May 1989: Spouses received a
total of 632,320 and executed
Deed of Absolute Sale with
Mortgage.
June 1990: SLDC registered the sale.
RTC: Upheld sale to SLDC. The
execution of a public instrument in favor
of SLDC is considered delivery.

Symbolic possession first transferred to
SLDC. Spouses to pay Babasanta 200k.
CA: Spouses argued that the properties
were conjugal and the verbal contract to
sell between Pacita and Babasanta was
void. CA set aside RTC. Sale between
Babasanta and spouses is valid. Sale to
SLDC null and void for it was a
purchaser in bad faith.
ISSUE: Who has a better right? SLDC or
Babasanta? SLDC.
HELD:
1. Contract and payment
There was a contract to sell, not of sale,
between spouses and Babasanta. In a
contract to sell, ownership is reserved in
the vendor and does not pass until full
payment.
Spouses never intended to transfer
ownership except upon full payment of
purchase price.
Babasanta should have made tender of
payment and consignation. His letter for
the execution of the deed showing his
intention to pay but without actual
payment was not a valid tender of
payment.
Babasanta made no attempt to make
proper consignation.
2. Babasanta still has no ownership assuming it
was a contract of sale.
Contracts only constitute rights to the
transfer of ownership. Delivery is the
mode of accomplishing the transfer.
Actual delivery consists in placing the
thing in the vendees possession.
Constructive delivery through any of the
ff:
1. Symbolical tradition: Delivery of
the keys of movable
2. Traditio longa manu: Mere
agreement if the movable cant
be transferred yet
3. Traditio brevi manu: Buyer
already has possession before
the sale
4. Traditio consitutum
possessorium: Seller remains in
possession of the property in a
different capacity
No actual or constructive delivery to
Babasanta. He had not taken possession
of the property. The receipt or their
agreement was not embodied in a public
instrument either.
3. Lis Pendens and Good Faith
When an immovable is the object of a

double sale, the one who acquires and
records it first in good faith is deemed
the owner.
A buyer in good faith is one who buys
property without or before notice that
some person has a claim to it.
No evidence that SLDC had knowledge
of the prior transaction.
Person dealing with owner of registered
land is not bound to go beyond the
certificate of title.
The rule that every lien, which affects
registered land, is constructive notice to
all persons upon filing of the same. It
operates as constructive notice from the
time only of the registration of the lis
pendens. In this case, it is June 1989. At
that time, the SLDC sale was already
consummated (May 1989).
Assuming the SLDC sale was made after
the notice of lis pendens, SLDC still has
a superior right. The delivery to SLDC
was immediately effected after execution
of deed. Babasanta, on the other hand,
neither registered nor possessed the
property at any time.
Criterion:
1. Priority of entry in the registry
of property.
2. Priority of possession.
3. Date of title with good faith
084 - SAVELLINO V DIAZ
Diaz executed a public instrument

conveying to Savelllino the exclusive
enjoyment and use of 2 hectares of land
together with the hemp stalks planted in
Mawab, Tagum Davao.
This is in exchange for the amount of
P600 and such enjoyment and use shall
last until Diaz returns the P600
borrowed.
Savellino then took care and preserved
the hemp stalk.
Subsequently, the spouses Diaz forcibly
entered upon the property with their
laborers and took about 2 piculs of
hemp valued at 100
Savellino then filed for an action of
forcible entry against Diaz
Savellino argued that the possession of
the land together with the right to

harvest was transferred to him due to

the agreement between him and Diaz
Diaz argued that the amount of 600 was
already paid due to the amount of hemp
stalks cut and harvested by Savellino
ISSUE:
Was it right for Savellino to file an

action for forcible entry for him to be
restored of the actual and physical
possession of the land? YES
HELD:
Under Art 536:
In no case may possession be acquired
thru force and intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto
He who believes has an action or right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing
Must invoke the aid of the competent
court
In this case, Savellino had been in

possession of the land since 1954 (date
of execution of the agreement between
them) until Diaz forcibly entered the
same in 1956.
And since then Diaz has been enjoying

the produce of the said land without
paying the P600 agreed by them.
Hence, the action of forcible entry is the

remedy available to Savellino who had
been deprived of possession of the part
of the land.
085 - TAN V. C.A.

Facts: The disputed property in this case is the
Shares of Stock of Tan which he assigned to
three companies.
Tan was arrested by the military
authorities because of criminal charges filed
against him before the PC Criminal Investigation
Service for alleged irregular transactions at
Continental Bank. At the time of his arrest, Tan
was neither a director nor an officer of said
bank. Subsequently, three (3) other officers of
Continental Bank, all with the rank of vicepresidents, were arrested. However, the bank's
chairman of the board, Cornelio Balmaceda, and
its President, Jose Moran, were not arrested,
and in fact continued to run the operations of

the bank.
Because of a possible bank run as a
result of the arrests, the officers of Continental
Bank requested an emergency loan to meet
pending withdrawals of depositors. The
Monetary Board approved the request on June
21, 1974 subject, however, to a verification of the
bank's assets. On June 24, 1974, after said
verification, it was reported that Continental
Bank's assets cannot meet its liabilities, since the
latter exceeded the former by P67.260 million.
The report also indicated that Continental Bank
was insolvent and that its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its
depositors and creditors, justifying the closure
and placing under receivership of a bank.
While still under detention by the
military, Tan executed certain agreements on
February 2, 1977, May 12, 1977 and July 5, 1977
transferring and assigning 359,615 shares of
stock in Continental Bank, as well as other
properties belonging to him and his affiliate
firms, to Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel
Property Management, Inc. and Antolum
International Trading Corporation in
consideration of the assumption by these
assignees of the liabilities and obligations of
respondents Tan and his companies.
The assignees of respondents Tan and
his companies rehabilitated Continental Bank
and, in support thereof, respondent Tan wrote
the petitioner (CB) on July 5, 1977 certifying on
his own behalf and in behalf of the corporations
owned and controlled by him, that they have no
objection to the reopening and rehabilitation of
Continental Bank under its new name,
International Corporate Bank or Interbank.
Interbank reopened in 1977 and since then
operated as a banking institution with
controlling ownership thereof changing hands
during the past decade.
On January 13, 1987, after more than twelve (12)
years, Tan filed the present case of reconveyance
of shares of stock with damages and restraining
order before the respondent court. Petitioner
(CB) filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations or prescription and that Tan have no
cause of action against the CB as well as laches
on the part of plaintiffs.
Trial Court: resolved the motion to dismiss in
favor of Tan
CB filed for a MR but it was denied. Then filed
an appeal before the C.A
C.A: reversed the ruling of the trial court and
dismissed the complaint for reconveyance of Tan

Hence this petition
Issue/s:
1.) whether the action for reconveyance ha
already prescribed.
2.) Whether theres a cause of action.
Held: 1.) Yes & 2.) No
Ratio:
1.) The rule anent prescription on recovery
of movables (shares of stock in this case)
is expressed in Article 1140 of the Civil
Code, which we quote:
Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall
prescribe eight years from the time the
possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor
had acquired the ownership by prescription for
a less period, according to article 1132, and
without prejudice to the provisions of articles
559, 1505, and 1133.
As it provides, Article 1140 is subject to the
provisions of Articles 1132 and 1133 of the Code,
governing acquisitive presciption, in relation to
Articles 559 and 1505 thereof. Under Article
1132:
Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes
through uninterruped possession for four years
in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also
prescribes through uninterrupted possession for
eight years, without need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover
personal property lost or of which he has been
illegally deprived, as well as with respect to
movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or
market, or from a merchant's store the
provisions of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code
shall be observed.
Acquisitive prescription sets in after
uninterrupted possession of four years, provided
there is good faith, and upon the lapse of eight
years, if bad faith is present. Where, however,
the thing was acquired through a crime, the
offender cannot acquire ownership by
prescription under Article 1133, which we quote:
Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime
can never be acquired through prescription by
the offender.
For purposes of existence prescription visavis movables, we therefore understand the
periods to be:
1. Four years, if the possessor is in good faith;
2. Eight years in all other cases, except where the
loss was due to a crime in which case, the
offender can not acquire the movable by
prescription, and an action to recover it from
him is imprescriptible.
It is evident, for purposes of the complaint in
question, that the petitioners had at most eight
years within which to pursue a reconveyance,

reckoned from the loss of the shares in 1977,
when the petitioner Vicente Tan executed the
various agreements in which he conveyed the
same in favor of the Executive Consultants, Inc.,
Orobel Property Management, Inc., and
Antolum Trading Corporation.
Since the complaint was filed on January 13,
1987, ten years more or less after the petitioners
transferred the shares in question, it is clear that
the petitioners have come to court too late.
Tans contention about the period during which
the authoritarian rule governs that interrupted
prescription and that the same begins to run
only when the Aquino government took power is
not accepted by the S.C
Based on the pieces of evidence presented it was
shown that Tan during his detention was well
represented by his counsel and that he was even
able to execute different letters and petitions
that is why the court is convinced that detention
was not an impediment to a judicial challenge,
and the fact of the matter was that he was
successful in obtaining judicial assistance. Under
these circumstances, we cannot declare
detention, or authoritarian rule for that matter,
as a fortuitous event insofar as he was
concerned, that interrupted prescription.
2.) Tans shares in the Continental Bank
were assigned to the firms already above
specified (which Herminio Disini
allegedly controlled), and not to the
Central Bank. It is therefore fairly
obvious that if any claim for
reconveyance may be prosecuted, it
should be prosecuted against the Disini
companies.
Clearly, however, if the Central Bank were
"owner" which as we shall see, it is notit is
"owner" only because it is preserving its money
exposure to the National Development
Corporation and the American Express Bank. It
is not "owner" for reconveyance purposes, that
is, as the trustee holding shares acquired by
fraud or mistake. To say now that it is holding
those shares as such a trustee, that is, as a result
of the takeover of Continental Bank by the Disini
companies, in spite of the fact that based on the
records the bank now pertains to the NDC and
American Express, is a mere conclusion of fact of
the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the trial court.
086 - TUATIS V. ESCOL.
FACTS:
On 18 June 1996, Tuatis filed a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages against

herein respondent Visminda Escol (Visminda)
before the RTC.
Tuatis alleged that in Nov 1999 Visminda, as
seller, and Tuatis, as buyer, entered into a Deed
of Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by
Installment.
The parties agreed that in consideration of the
sum of 10,000 pesos, the seller sells to the buyer
the parcel of land under the conditions that the
buyer pays 3,000 pesos as downpayment, 4,000
pesos on or before December 31, 1989, and
3,000 pesos on or before January 31, 1990.
The agreement also stated that failure of the
buyer to pay the remaining balance within the
period of three months from the period
stipulated above, the BUYER [Tuatis] shall
return the land subject of this contract to the
SELLER [Visminda] and the SELLER
[Visminda] [shall] likewise return all the amount
paid by the BUYER [Tuatis]. In the meantime,
Tuatis already took possession of the subject
property and constructed a residential building
thereon.
In 1996, Tuatis requested Visminda to sign a
prepared absolute deed of sale covering the
subject property, but the latter refused,
contending that the purchase price had not yet
been fully paid. The parties tried to amicably
settle the case before the Lupon Barangay, to no
avail. Tuatis contended that Visminda failed and
refused to sign the absolute deed of sale without
any valid reason. Thus, Tuatis prayed that the
RTC order Visminda to do all acts for the
consummation of the contract sale, sign the
absolute deed of sale and pay damages, as well
as attorneys fees.
In her Answer, Visminda countered that, except
for the P3,000.00 downpayment and P1,000.00
installment paid by Tuatis on 19 December 1989
and 17 February 1990, respectively, Tuatis made
no other payment to Visminda. Despite repeated
verbal demands, Tuatis failed to comply with the
conditions that she and Visminda agreed upon
in the Deed of Sale by Installment for the
payment of the balance of the purchase price for
the subject property. Visminda asked that the
RTC dismiss Tuatis Complaint, or in the
alternative, order Tuatis to return the subject
property to Visminda after Vismindas
reimbursement of the P4,000.00 she had
received from Tuatis.
RTC rendered in favour of Visminda. It said
that Tuatis failed to pay the remaining balance
within the period of three months from the
period stipulated, hence, Tuatis shall return the
land subject of this Contract to the Seller
[Visminda] and the Seller [Visminda] shall

likewise return all the amount paid by Tuatis.
Tuatis constructed the building in bad faith for
she had knowledge of the fact that the Seller
[Visminda] is still the absolute owner of the
subject land. There was bad faith also on the
part of [Visminda] in accordance with the
express provisions of Article 454 of the New Civil
Code since she allowed Tuatis to construct the
building without any opposition on her part and
so occupy it. The rights of the parties must,
therefore, be determined as if they both had
acted in bad faith. Their rights in such cases are
governed by Article 448 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines. Tuatis appealed but the same
was dismissed. The RTC decision became final
and executor.
Tuatis filed before the RTC a Motion to Exercise
Right under Article 448 of the Civil Code and to
allow her to buy the subject property from
Visminda. While Tuatis indeed had the
obligation to pay the price of the subject
property, she opined that such should not be
imposed if the value of the said property was
considerably more than the value of the building
constructed thereon by Tuatis. Tuatis alleged
that the building she constructed was valued at
P502,073. but the market value of the entire
piece of land measuring 4 hectares, of which the
subject property measuring 300 square meters
formed a part, was only about P27,000. Tuatis
maintained that she then had the right to choose
between being indemnified for the value of her
residential building or buying from Visminda the
parcel of land subject of the case. Tuatis stated
that she was opting to exercise the second
option.
ISSUE: W/N Tuatis has the right to choose
between being indemnified for the value of her
residential building or buying from Visminda the
parcel of land subject of the case pursuant to
Article 448 of the Civil Code
HELD: No, under Article 448, the landowner,
Visminda, has the right to choose and not Tuatis.
Taking into consideration the provisions of the
Deed of Sale by Installment and Article 448 of
the Civil Code, Visminda has the following
options:
Under the first option, Visminda may
appropriate for herself the building on the
subject property after indemnifying Tuatis for
the necessary and useful expenses the latter
incurred for said building, as provided in Article
546 of the Civil Code. It is worthy to mention
that in Pecson v. Court of Appeals, the Court

pronounced that the amount to be refunded to
the builder under Article 546 of the Civil Code
should be the current market value of the
improvement. Until Visminda appropriately
indemnifies Tuatis for the building constructed
by the latter, Tuatis may retain possession of the
building and the subject property.
Under the second option, Visminda may choose
not to appropriate the building and, instead,
oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair
value of the land. The P10,000 price of the
subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on
Installment executed in November 1989, shall
no longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging
Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the
exercise of Vismindas rights under Article 448
of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed.
Tuatis obligation will then be statutory, and not
contractual, arising only when Visminda has
chosen her option under Article 448 of the Civil
Code. Still under the second option, if the
present or current value of the land, the subject
property herein, turns out to be considerably
more than that of the building built thereon,
Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject
property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable
rent for the same. Visminda and Tuatis must
agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the
court will fix the terms.
Necessarily, the RTC should conduct additional
proceedings and it should determine which of
the aforementioned options Visminda will
choose. Subsequently, the RTC should ascertain:
(a) under the first option, the amount of
indemnification Visminda must pay Tuatis; or
(b) under the second option, the value of the
subject property vis--vis that of the building,
and depending thereon, the price of, or the
reasonable rent for, the subject property, which
Tuatis must pay Visminda. The Court highlights
that the options under Article 448 are available
to Visminda, as the owner of the subject
property. Tuatis rights as a builder under
Article 448 are limited to the following: (a)
under the first option, a right to retain the
building and subject property until Visminda
pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the
second option, a right not to be obliged to pay
for the price of the subject property, if it is
considerably higher than the value of the
building, in which case, she can only be obliged
to pay reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the
Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in
accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that
the accessory follows the principal and not the
other way around. Even as the option lies with
the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is

preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to
exercise either option and compel instead the
owner of the building to remove it from the land.
Petition Granted
087 - S. Benedicto (deceased). R.
Benedicto vs. CA and V. Heras (1968)
Facts:
1. Miriam Hedrick was the former owner
of Lot Nos. 8, 9, 10, 22, 23 and 24 which
was situated in City of Manila. She
then sold Lot Nos. 8, 9, 22 and 23 to
Claro M Recto. Same time of the sale,
constructions were located on the
respective properties of both Recto and
Hedrick as described in the Escritura de
Compra-Venta (contract of sale).
2. The Escritura de Compra-Venta was
subject to the conditions. Before the new
survey was conducted as ascribed in
parrafo septimo (paragraph 7) Recto
obtained a separate title.
3. To carry out paragraph 7 of the contract
of sale, Recto wrote to Marcial Zamora
of the General Land Registration Office,
asking for the issuance of a new title in
his favor. Recto amended the motion in
the Court of Land Registration of Manila
for the issuance of the new title base on
the new survey.
4. Recto sold his portion to Emmanuel
Conty, to which latter sold to Salvador
Benedicto (defendant). On the other
hand, Hedrick sold her retained
property (10 & 24) to Chow Kwo Hsien.
The latter sold it to General Security and
Investment Co, which in turn sold it to
Vicente Heras (plaintiff).
5. Subsequently, sometime in 1941, Heras
demolished the entire house situated on
his land. Because of this, Benedicto
constructed a wall on the easement or
passageway. This prompted Heras to file
a case before the CFI to recover the
portion of the land enclosed (easement)
by S. Benedicto
6. The Trial Court found among other
things, that the easement of way was
found entirely within the property of S.
Benedicto, contrary to the stipulation in
the deed of sale between Hedrick and
Recto.
7. The TC directed both parties to
contribute equally to the maintenance of
the passageway between their
properties. It also rejected the

contention of Benedicto that the
easement had been extinguished by
nonuser and by the cessation of the
necessity for a passageway.
8. Both Parties appealed. Salvador
Benedicto died, who was substituted by
Roberto Benedicto(admin). The CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the TC.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the easement must be
deemed to have been extinguished?
Ruling: No
There is no proof of nonuser of the
easement. Benedicto only assumed that the
easement had not been used since 1941 because
of the demolition of the house of Heras which
gained direct access to San Marcelino Street.
Even assuming that it was not used, the
testimony of Benedicto shows that it was only
1946 when the passageway was walled, and since
the present action was filed only in 1955, the
prescriptive period has not yet elapsed.
It cannot also be assumed that Heras
has renunciated the use of the passageway. It is
clear on the records that the latter has
constructed an apartment building on his land
after the demolition of his house. Since it is clear
that the easement is mainly for passageway of
vehicles, this negates any presumption of
renunciation on the part of Heras.
Furthermore, the easement is perpetual
in character in the given case. It was annotated
in all the transfer certificates issued in the series
of transfers from Hendrick and Recto to the
present plaintiff and defendant. Nothing in the
records point a mutual agreement between any
predecessors-in-interest to discontinue the
easement, which was annotated on the titles.
The continuance of the easement must be
respected.
Doctrine:
Article 631 of the Civil Code provides in part:
Art. 631. Easments are extinguished:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) By nonuser for ten years, with respect to
discontinuous easements, this period shall be
computed from the day on which they ceased to
be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act
contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into
such condition that the easement cannot be
used; but it shall revive if the subsequent
condition of the estates or either of them should
again permit its use, unless when the use
becomes possible, sufficient time for
prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the

provisions of the preceding number; . . . .
088 - NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO. VS
HIDALGO
Petitioner North Negros Sugar Co. filed

a complaint praying for the issuance of
an injunction against Serafin Hidalgo,
restraining him from passing through
the mill site which is owned by the
petitioner that houses a factory and
residential buildings for his laborers.
Adjoining this and other sugar
plantations is Hacienda Begona that is
accessed through the road the petitioner
built that allows the public to pass
through as well as vehicles for a charge
of P0.15 centavos.
Adjoining as well the mentioned mill

site is Hacienda Sangay owned by
Luciano Aguirre where the defendant
runs his tuba station and billiard hall.
The defendant uses the said road to get
to his business until one day he was
prevented by petitioner from passing
through because he was accused of
causing trouble and disturbing the
peaceful people of the petitioners mill
site as he is selling tuba causing the
residents and laborers to get drunk and
make commotions.
The complaint was ultimately denied by

the court alleging that respondents
selling of tuba is a mere exercise of a
legitimate business and that if ever there
was one to be held liable for the
commotion it should be the petitioner.
This issue along with petitioners issue of
ill feelings toward the defendant has
been deemed by the court frivolous and
baseless.
The dismissal of the actions filed by the

petitioner led to the discussion of the
true nature if the road in question. The
road was built on petitioners property
which he made accessible to the general
public regardless of class or group was
the argument posed by the defendant
since he refused to pay the designated
tolls when he drives with his car.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hidalgo is entitled to the
benefit of easements along with the community
HELD:
No. first, the court discussed that under Art. 594
the owner of an estate may burden it with such
easements as he may deem fit, and in such
manner and form as he may consider desirable,
provided he does not violate the law or public
order. Voluntary easement as per Art. 594
constitutes not as contractual in nature but as an
act of the owner. Therefore, he has the right to
exact conditions for the use of the easement.
Despite this, defendant still claims that such
property is to be deemed a public utility given
that said property has been used in such a way to
make it of public consequence and affect the
community at large.
However, the court classified such case as a
turn-pike road or toll road which differs
from that of a public highway given that the cost
of its construction is borne by individuals or
corporations that have authority from the state
to build it and further to the right of public use,
impose a toll. In the case at bar the court
classified the road as private property affected
with public interest. Given the nature of such
property, the petitioner allowing the use of the
road is by mere tolerance and that since it is not
of public utility, Hidalgo is not entitled to such
benefit.
089 - CID VS JAVIER
Facts:
Javier owns a building with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot owned by
Cid.
In 1913 or 1914, before the New Civil
Code took effect, the predecessors-ininterest of the petitioner were verbally
prohibited by the respondent to obstruct
view and light.
When the CA adjudicated the case, it
found out that the two estates are
covered by the Original Certificates of
Title, both issued by the Registered of
Deeds.
The court further observed that in both
of the title, any annotation does not
appear in respect to the easement
supposedly acquired by prescription
which counting 20 years from 1913 or
1914, would have already ripened by

1937, date of the decrees of registration.
RTC and CA: Respondents Javier et al did
acquire such easement and gave judgment
accordingly. Hence, petitioner has come to the
SC seeking review, alleging that both courts are
in error.
ISSUE: Were the owners of the building
standing on their lot with windows overlooking
the adjacent lot had acquired prescription to
petitioners predecessor-in-interest as owner of
the adjoining lot which was covered by Torrens
titles?
HELD: NO
The applicable legal provision is
Article 538 of the Spanish Civil
Code: Negative easements are
acquired from the day which the
owner of the dominant estate has
by a formal act forbidden the
owner of the estate to perform any
act which would be lawful without
the easement.
The law is explicit. It requires
not any form of prohibition, but
exacts, in a parenthetical
expression, for emphasis, the doing
not only of a specific, particular act,
but a formal act. From these
definitions, it would appear that the
phrase "formal act" would require
not merely any writing, but one
executed in due form and/or with
solemnity.
Respondents could have not

acquired the easement by
prescription because they have
not fulfilled this requirement.
Even assuming they have
acquired it, the easement no
longer exists because the
properties were registered
under the Torrens system
without any annotation or
registration of the said
easement.
NOTE: Easements are in the nature of an
encumbrance on the servient estate. They
constitute a limitation of the dominical right of
the owner of the subjected property. Hence,
they can be acquired only by title and by
prescription, in the case of positive easement,
only as a result of some sort of invasion,
apparent and continuous, of the servient estate.
By the same token, negative easements cannot

be acquired by less formal means. Hence, the
requirement that the prohibition (the equivalent
of the act of invasion) should be by "a formal
act", "an instrument acknowledged before a
notary public.
090 - MUNICIPALITY OF DUMANGAS
VS. BISHOP OF JARO (1916)
The disputed lands are situated in the

barrio of Balabag of the pueblo of
Dumangas, Iloilo with an area of 41, 815
sq meters
The Municipality of Dumangas, claiming
ownership over the lands, petitioned for
the registration of 6 parcels of land.
They said that they were possessing it
from time immemorial and it was
occupying the said lands as a public
market while the rest being unoccupied
This registration was opposed by Roman
Catholic Bishop of Jaro objecting the
registration of lot 2, and lot 1 of parcel 4
stating that the lots belonged to them
and they had been in quiet and
peaceable possession since time
immemorial
The lot 1 of parcel 4 is adjacent to the
same wall forming the side of the church
wherein in that side door the
faithfuls/worshipers pass in order to
enter the church. And in order to do so,
they have to pass to the said land/lot in
question.
Based on the records:

The municipality has been possession of
the lot for more than 30 days and before
the revolution, it constructed
infrastructures such as flag-staff, using
the land as corral for branding cattle, as
a public square. On these occasions the
Church did not object to
The land is now occupied by a billiard
hall and by several housing belong to
different private persons paying rent to
the municipality and when the billiard
hall was constructed, the respondent did
not object as well
When the church was constructed, there

exists a wall wherein there is a side door
located on the southeast side of it and it
adjoins the building and land in
question. Wherein the worshippers

attending divine service use that side
door to enter and leave. And to which
they have to pass over the land in
question.
And also since then, the municipality
has not prohibited the passage
over the land by the persons who
attend the divine services in the
church
ISSUE: W/N the easement of right of way over

the land in question has been acquired by
prescription by the Church? YES
HELD:
Neither the date when the Spanish Gov.
ceded to the church the plot nor the date
when it was opened to the public square
adjacent thereto was proven
There are good grounds for presuming

that, in apportionment of the lands
made when the pueblo was organized
and when the land adjacent to the
church was designated as town square,
there was, upon said plaza, the burden
of easement of right of way to the
public to allow the entrance to or
exit by the church door which was
opened for that purpose
And due to that reason, the municipality

never erected on this square any
permanent building nor any
construction which would have
obstructed the public's passage and
access to the side door of the church
And since the public has been

enjoying the right of passage over
the land in question for almost
immemorial length of time, an
easement of right of way over the
land has been acquired by
prescription.
Hence, not only the Church but also

the public, has availed itself of said
easement without any object or protest
thereto by the municipality
Doctrine:

Art 614. Servitudes may also be established for
the benefit of a community or of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered estate does
not belong
091 - RONQUILLO vs. ROCO (1958)
FACTS:
Ronquillo et al. have been in continuous
and uninterrupted use of a road crossing
the land of Vicento Roco in Naga,
Camarines Sur.
They used it to go to Igualdad Street and
the market place from their homes for
more than 20 yrs. This private legal
easement of right of way was respected
by Roco.
May 1953: Jose Roco started
constructing a chapel. It disturbed the
continuous exercise of the right of way.
July 1954: Natividad Roco and Miras,
with the approval of Jose, fenced and
closed the passage way.
Ronquillo claims they acquired the
easement of right of way over the land
thru prescription by their continuous
and uninterrupted.
ISSUE: W/N an easement of right of way can be
acquired through prescription NO.
HELD: (majority opinion)
Easements may be continuous or
discontinuous (intermittent), apparent
or non-apparent.
Discontinuous: Used at long intervals
and depends on acts of man.
Continuous and apparent: Acquired by
title or prescription.
Continuous non-apparent and
Discontinuous: Acquired by a title.
The easement of right of way is
discontinuous. Thus, it can only be
acquired by a title. Here, Ronquillo had
no title.
Even under the old Civil Code:
discontinuous easements were excluded
from Art 1959, which provides
prescription of ownership and real
rights in property.
Minority opinion:
Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure
1901) Section 14 provides no distinction
as to the real rights which are subject to
prescription. No reason why the
continued use of a path by the public for
10+ yrs through adverse use cannot give
a right through prescription.
Continuous enjoyment does not require

everyday use but simply the exercise of
the right frequently according to the
nature of the use.
The code provided for a 10 year
prescription period.
092 - ANECO REALTY AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V
LANDEX DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (2008)
Petitioner: Aneco Realty And Development
Corporation
Respondent: Landex Development
Corporation
Ponencia: REYES, R.T, J.:
DOCTRINE: See CA decision for
EASEMENT PART
Easement that used to exist on a lot ceased
when owner agreed that the lots would be
consolidated and would no longer be
intended as a subdivision project
An easement involves an abnormal
restriction on the property of the servient
owner and is regarded as a charge or
encumbrance on the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the
servient estate
The essential requisites to be entitled to a
compulsory easement of way are:
1) Dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway;
2) Proper indemnity has been paid;
3) Isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate;
4) Right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and in
so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest
FACTS:
1. Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc.
(FHDI) is the original owner of land in
San Francisco Del Monte, QC. FHDI
subdivided it into 39 lots.
2. 22 lots were sold to Aneco (pet.) and 17
lots to respondent Landex (resp).
3. Landex started the construction of a
concrete wall on one of its lots.
4. Aneco filed:
i.
Complaint for injunction to
restrain construction of the wall
(RTC QC); complaints to

demolish the wall; Landex liable
for P2M in damages.
5. Landex stated:
i.
Aneco was not deprived access
to its lots; Aneco has its own
entrance (3) to its property. The
Resthaven access became
inaccessible when Aneco
constructed a building on said
street.
ii.
FHDI sold ordinary lots, not
subdivision lots, to Aneco based
on the express stipulation in the
deed of sale that FHDI was not
interested in pursuing its own
subdivision project.
6. RTC: Granted the complaint for
injunction
i.
To stop the completion of wall
and excavation of the road OR if
completed, to remove the same
and to return the lot to its
original situation;
7. Landex field an MR. Aneco filed motion
for execution
8. RTC: granted Landex MR and set a
hearing; denied Aneco's motion for
execution
i.
Aneco's property has access to a
public road for ingress and
egress; Property is not isolated;
Landex, has not yet been
indemnified whatsoever for the
use of his property, as mandated
by the Bill of Rights.
ii.
The circumstances, negates the
alleged plaintiffs right of way.
9. Aneco appealed to the CA.
CA:
AFFIRMED RTC
CA ISSUES:
1. W/N the law allows the continued use
on an easement should an owner
alienate the property to different
persons? (YES)
2. W/N compulsory easement of right of
way may prosper? (NO)
CA RATIO + RULING:
Art. 624: The existence of an apparent sign of
easement between 2 estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be
considered, should either of them be alienated,
as a title in order that the easement may
continue actively and passively, unless, at the
time the ownership of the two estates is divided,
the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the

execution of the deed. This provision shall also
apply in case of the division of a thing owned in
common by two or more persons.
1. Aneco knew at the time of the sale that
the lots sold by FHDI were not
subdivision units based on the express
stipulation in the deed of sale that
FHDI, the seller, was no longer interested in
pursuing its subdivision project, thus:
The subject property ceased to be a road lot
when its former owner (FHDI) sold it to
appellant Aneco not as subdivision lots and
without the intention of pursuing the
No question that the law allows the continued
use of an apparent easement should the owner
alienate the property to different persons.
The lot provided by FHDI was for road lot
because of its intention to convert it into a
subdivision project. When the 22 lots were sold
to Aneco, it was clear from the deed of sale that
the lots sold ceased to be subdivision lots.
Easement that used to exist on the subject
lot ceased when appellant Aneco and the
former owner agreed that the lots would
be consolidated and would no longer be
intended as a subdivision project.
Aneco did not acquire any right from the
previous owner since the latter itself expressly
stated in their agreement that it has no more
intention of continuing the subdivision project.
If appellant desires to convert its property into a
subdivision project, it has to apply in its own
name, and must have its own provisions for a
road lot.
2. Compulsory easement of right of way:
Aneco failed to prove the essential requisites
to avail of such right
An easement involves an abnormal restriction
on the property of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the
servient owner and is regarded as a charge or
encumbrance on the servient estate
The essential requisites to be entitled to a
compulsory easement of way are:
1) Dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway;
2) Proper indemnity has been paid;
3) Isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate;
4) Right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and in
so far as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest

Aneco filed for MR but was DENIED.
SUPREME COURT
SC ISSUES:
1. W/N Aneco may enjoin Landex from
constructing a concrete wall on its own
property.
SC RULING +RATIO: NO
Agree with RTC and the CA that the complaint
for injunction against Landex should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
There was an undue interference on the property
rights of a landowner to build a concrete wall on
his own property.
It is a simple case of a neighbor (Aneco), seeking
to restrain a landowner (Landex), from fencing
his own land.
Article 430: gives every owner the right to
enclose or fence his land or tenement by means
of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means.
Right to Fence: flows from the right of
ownership. As owner, Landex may fence his
property subject only to the limitations and
restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal
and enforceable right, no one shall interfere with
the exercise of an essential attribute of
ownership.
Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to
prevent, much less restrain, Landex from
fencing its own property.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old
subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at
the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary
lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI.
This is clear from the deed of sale between FHDI
and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was
no longer interested in pursuing its own
If Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a
subdivision project, it must make its own
provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy
back on the road lot of the defunct subdivision
project of FHDI to the detriment of the new
owner Landex.
Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision
AFFIRMED.
093 - CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS and
PEDRO P. ROXAS, plaintiffs, vs. THE
CITY OF MANILA and ROBERT G.
DIECK, as city engineer, defendants.
(1907)
This case involves a property (eastern boundary
of which adjoins the canal of San Jacinto or
Sibacon to the extent of 23.50m, with the total
area of 658.19 sq.m.) owned by the plaintiffs
situated in Manila (escolta)
Plaintiff applied to the city engineer

(Robert Dieck) for a license to construct
a terrace over "the strip of land 3 meters
in width between the main wall of her
house and the edge of the said canal,
which strip of land belongs exclusively
to her";
But the defendant refused to grant the
license
Plaintiff has been informed that the
license was denied because "the
defendants pretend to compel the
plaintiff to leave vacant, without any
construction on the said strip belonging
to her, in order to use it as a public way,
that the plaintiff will only be able to use
it in the same manner and for the same
purposes as the public, thus losing the
enjoyment, use, and exclusive
possession of the said strip of the
property which the plaintiff and the
former owners have enjoyed quietly and
peacefully during more than 70 years."
The strip in question was occupied by a
two-storey building constructed more
than 70 years ago.
It appears from the evidence:
1. That the plaintiff's ownership of the
whole ground and of the strip in
question is beyond all doubt, by reason
of her title and entry in the registry of
property, and by the acknowledgment
made by the city of manila
2. The license which the plaintiff requested
for the construction of a terrace was
denied; both parties agree that the
denial was due to the intent to reserve
the said strip for the establishment of a
public easement
3. That it was agreed between both parties
that the strip had not been expropriated
by the municipality of Manila, and that
neither had the latter offered any
compensation to the owner.
4. That according to Engineer Dieck, the
purpose of the city was to use the said
strip of 3 meters (1) as a place for
discharging and landing goods, and (2)
as a place of shelter for shipwrecked
persons and for fishermen, (3) and to
devote it also to a towpath for craft
passing through the canal; (3) that a
building line has been established by the
Municipal Board leaving a strip of 3
meters within which no constructions

would be permitted; (based on existing
ordinances).
But John Tuther (sec of the Municipal Board)
declares that, when Ordinance No. 78 was
under discussion, he does not recall having
heard any of the members of the board make
reference to a towpath nor heard anything to
which the strip of 3m was to be devoted, though
he believes that, it would be easier to prevent
collisions;
5. That "the intention of the Municipal
Board, when denying the permit asked
for by the plaintiff, has never been to
establish any way along the Sibacon
Creek so that said plaintiff could close
her property with walls perpendicularly
to said creek provided she does not close
or build over the 3-meter space running
along the creek," which space is subject
to the "easement of public use for the
general interest of navigation, flotation,
fishing, and salvage," citing the Law of
Waters and the Civil Code.
6. "that the plaintiff shall only be able to
use said strip in the same manner and
for the same purposes as the general
public, thus losing the enjoyment, use,
and exclusive possession of said strip of
the ground which the plaintiff and the
former owners of the same have enjoyed
as such owners quietly and peacefully
during more than 70 years."
ISSUE: Whether or Not the defendants should
issue a license in favor of the plaintiff to
construct a terrace house
RULING
YES. SC ordered the defendants to immediately
issue a license in favor of the plaintiffs to
construct the terrace in accordance with the plan
and specification thereof.
What the defendants have done is to prevent the
plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use, and
freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as
they had been doing up to the time when they
applied for a license to construct a terrace over
said strip, and the defendants prevented it with
the intention of establishing a public easement
provided for in an ordinance of their own which
they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the
Law of Waters and of the Civil Code in force.
The powers of the administration do not extend
to the establishment of new easements upon
private property but simply to preserve old ones,
whenever a recent and easily proven usurpation
exists. (Decision of January 23, 1866.)
Ayuntamientos are not authorized to impose an
easement upon private property; therefore, any
order thus given cannot be held to have been

issued in the exercise of their lawful powers.
(Decision of July 28, 1866.)
Administrative action for the recovery of a public
easement which has been usurped by a
constructive work of private ownership can only
be taken when such usurpation is of recent date
and easily proven.
When real rights are concerned an ayuntamiento
may prosecute such actions as it may consider
itself entitled to, for the possession or ownership
in accordance with law. (Decision of October 26,
1866.)
According to article 349 of the Civil Code, no one
shall be deprived of his property, except by
competent authority and with sufficient cause of
public utility, always after proper indemnity; if
this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts
must protect, and eventually restore possession
to the injured party. The refusal to grant a
license or the enactment of an ordinance
whereby a person may be deprived of property
or rights, or an attempt thereat is made, without
previously indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor
can it be, due process of law.
DOCRTRINE:
The easement intended to be established is not
merely a real right that will encumber the
property, but is one tending to prevent the
exclusive use of one portion of the same, by
expropriating it for a public use which, cannot be
accomplished unless the owner of the property
condemned or seized be previously and duly
indemnified.
The question involved here is not the actual
establishment of an easement which might be
objected to by an action in court, but a mere act
of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the
powers of the city of Manila, because it is not
simply a measure in connection with building
regulations, but is an attempt to suppress,
without due process of law, real rights which are
attached to the right of ownership.
094 - BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO.,
INC. V. CA
PETITIONER: Bogo Medellin Milling Co.,
RESPONDENT: CA and Heirs of Magdaleno
Valdez Sr. (private respondents)
FACTS
Magdaleno Valde, Sr. purchased from
Feliciana Santillan a parcel of land.
Prior to the sale, the entire length of the
land from north to south was already

traversed in the middle by railroad

tracks owned by Bogo-Medellin Milling
Company (BOMEDCO). The tracks were
used for hauling sugar cane from the
fields to petitioners sugar mill.
Subsequently, Magdaleno passed away.
His heirs inherited the land. However,
the heirs did not know that BOMEDCO
was able to have the disputed middle lot,
which was occupied by the railroad
tracks placed in its name.
1989: the heirs discovered what
BOMEDCO did. This prompted them to
file a complaint for payment of
compensation and/or recovery of
possession of real property.
RTC: ruled in BOMEDCOs favor.
CA reversed RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not BOMEDCO should

vacate the lot?
HELD: YES. There is no dispute that the
controversial strip of land has been in the
continuous possession of BOMEDCO since 1929.
BUT possession, to constitute the foundation of
a prescriptive right, must be possession under a
claim of title, that is, it must be adverse. Unless
coupled with the element of hostility towards the
true owner, possession, however long, will not
confer title by prescription.
Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these
receipts showed that all BOMEDCO had was,
possession by virtue of the right of way granted
to it. Were it not so and BOMEDCO really owned
the land, petitioner would not have consistently
used the phrases central railroad right of way
in its tax declarations until 1963. Certainly an
owner would have found no need for these
phrases. A person cant have easement on his
own land, since all the uses of an easement are
fully comprehended in his general right of
ownership.
DOCTRINE: An easement or servitude is a real
right, constituted on the corporeal immovable
property of another, by virtue of which the
owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow
someone to do, something on his property, for
the benefit of another thing or person. It exists
only when the servient and dominant estates
belong to two different owners. It gives the
holder of the easement an incorporeal interest
on the land but grants no title thereto.
Therefore, an acknowledgement of the easement
is an admission that the property belongs to

another.
The mere expiration of the period of easement in
1959 did not convert petitioners possession into
an adverse one. Mere material possession of
land is not adverse possession as against the
owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession is accompanied by the intent to
possess as an owner. There should be a hostile
use of such a nature and exercised under such
circumstances as to manifest and give notice
that the possession is under a claim of right.
Acts of possessory character executed by virtue
of license or tolerance of the owner, no matter
how long, do not start the running of the period
of prescription.
Easements are either continuous or
discontinuous. An easement is continuous if its
use is, or may be, incessant without the
intervention of any act of man, like the easement
of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used
at intervals and depends on the act of man, like
the easement of right of way. Like a road for the
passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of
right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous
because the right is exercised only if and when a
train operated by a person passes over anothers
property. The presence of more or less
permanent railroad tracks does not in any way
convert the nature of an easement if right of way
to one that is continuous. It is not the presence
of apparent signs or physical indications
showing the existence of easement, but rather
the manner of exercise thereof that categorizes
such easement into continuous or
discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual
signs only classifies an easement into apparent
or non-apparent.
095 - NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
V. MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (2004)
Facts:
National Power Corporation
commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon
HVDC Power Transmission Project for
the purpose of transmitting excess
electrical generating capacity from Leyte
Geothermal Plant to Luzon.
In this project, transmission lines will
cross over certain lands including a

portion owned by Manubay AgroIndustrial Development Corp.

National Power Corp filed for
expropriation over the land of Manubay,
which had an area of to acquire an
easement or right of way.
Said property is in Naga City, Camarines
Sur with an area of 22,961 square
meters.
Taking into account the surroundings
and potential of the property as it will be
developed into a first class subdivision,
the land was valued at 550 pesos per
square meter as just compensation.
Petitioner contends that the valuation
was too high a price for the acquisition
of an easement of a mere aerial right of
way because respondent would continue
to own the land anyway and that there is
no taking but only an imposition of an
easement. Such will not deprive the
respondent of the enjoyment of their
property.
Petitioner claims that it should only pay
for the easement fee.
RTC and CA ruling: High powered
electric lines traversing ones property
would diminish the value and use of the
property as well as endanger lives and
limbs because of the high tension
current conveyed. Therefore, respondent
is entitled to just compensation that is
not more nor less than the lands
monetary equivalent. 550 pesos per
square meter is proper and reasonable.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should only
pay for the easement fee and not the full
value of the property?
Ruling:
No. Easement of a right of way transmits
no rights except the easement itself;
respondent retains full ownership of the
property.
The acquisition of such easement is,
however, not gratis. As held by the CA,
considering the nature and effect of the
installation power lines, the limitations
on the use of the land for an indefinite
period would deprive respondent of
normal use of property.
For this reason, the respondent is
entitled receive just compensation that
is of the monetary equivalent of the
land.
096 - REPUBLIC V PLDT (1969)

Parties:
The plaintiff, Republic of the
Philippines, is a political entity
exercising governmental powers
through its branches and
instrumentalities, one of which is the
Bureau of Telecommunications
The defendant, Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT),
is a public service corporation holding a
legislative franchise, Act 3426, as
amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to
install, operate and maintain a
telephone system throughout the
Philippines and to carry on the business
of electrical transmission of messages
within the Philippines and between the
Philippines and the telephone systems
of other countries.
RCA Communications, Inc., (which is
not a party to the present case but has
contractual relations with the parties) is
an American corporation authorized to
transact business in the Philippines and
is the grantee, by assignment, of a
legislative franchise to operate a
domestic station for the reception and
transmission of long distance wireless
messages and to operate broadcasting
and radio-telephone and radiotelegraphic communications services.
Facts:
PLDT, and the RCA Communications,
Inc., entered into an agreement whereby
telephone messages, coming from the
United States and received by RCA's
domestic station, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT and
vice-versa.
The contracting parties agreed to divide
the tolls, as follows:
- 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA.
- amended in 1941: to 30% for PLDT and 70%
for RCA
- amended in 1947: to a 50-50 basis.
The arrangement was later extended to radiotelephone messages to and from European and
Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a
stipulation that either party could terminate it
on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2
February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to
terminate their contract on 2 February 1958.
Later on, the Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own

Government Telephone System by
utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting trunk lines of
the PLDT to enable government offices
to call private parties.
Subsequently, the plaintiff, through the

Director of Telecommunications,
entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications, Inc., for a joint
overseas telephone service whereby the
Bureau would convey radio-telephone
overseas calls received by RCA's station
to and from local residents.
PLDT complained to the Bureau of

Telecommunications for violating the
conditions under which their Private
Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities,
referring to the rented trunk lines, for
the Bureau had used the trunk lines not
only for the use of government offices
but even to serve private persons or the
general public, in competition with the
business of the PLDT
PLDT gave notice that if said violations

were not stopped, the PLDT would sever
the telephone connections. PLDT
received no reply, thus it disconnected
the trunk lines being rented by the
Bureau. The result was the isolation of
the Philippines, on telephone services,
from the rest of the world, except the
United States.
Plaintiff Republic filed suit against the

PLDT, praying in its complaint for
judgment commanding the PLDT to
execute a contract with the Bureau, for
the use of the facilities PLDTs telephone
system throughout the Philippines
under such terms and conditions as the
court might consider reasonable, and for
a writ of preliminary injunction against
the PLDT to restrain the severance of
the existing telephone connections
and/or restore those severed.
CFI: Ordered to restore the trunk lines that were
disconnected
PLDT filed a counterclaim and it
contends that the court cannot compel it
to enter into an interconnecting
agreements with the Bureau of
Telecommunications and that they have

no obligations to execute a service with
the Bureau. It also claimed that its
previous action with regard to
disconnecting the trunk lines leased by
the Bureau was justifiable because its
facilities were used in fraud of its rights.
CFI: declared that court cannot compel the
PLDT to enter into an agreement with the
Bureau because the parties were not in
agreement. But they also ruled that the
preliminary injunction be permanent.
Both parties appealed.
Issue: Whether the interconnection between
the Republic and PLDT can be valid object for
expropriation.
Held: Yes
Ratio: It is correct that the parties cannot be
coerced to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them as to the
principal terms and conditions of the contract.
Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions
is of the essence of our contractual system, and
by express provision of the statute, a contract
may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
But the Republic may compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in
the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent
domain, require the telephone company to
permit interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the
needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation to
be determined by the court. Nominally, of
course, the power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no
cogent reason appears why the said power may
not be availed of to impose only a burden upon
the owner of condemned property, without loss
of title and possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right of way.
The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow
inter-service connection between both telephone
systems is not much different. In either case
private property is subjected to a burden for
public use and benefit. If, under section 6,
Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may,
in the interest of national welfare, transfer
utilities to public ownership upon payment of
just compensation, there is no reason why the
State may not require a public utility to render
services in the general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would

be the users of both telephone systems, so that
the condemnation would be for public use.
097 - DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS' MULTIPURPOSE ASSOCIATION, INC.
[DESAMA] VS. GOZUN [2006]
FACTS:
1995 - President V. Ramos signed into
law the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
Subsequently, DENR Secretary issued
DENR Administrative Order containg
the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the law
Ramos then executed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement [FTAA]
with Arimco Mining Corporation
[AMC], an Australian company
The FTAA will cover a total land area of
37,000 hectares covering the provinces
of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included
in this area is Barangay Dipidio.
After several unsuccessful actions
[demand letters sent to DENR, Office of
the Executive Secretary, President GMA,
Mines and Geosciences Bureau] to
cancel the FTAA and its IRR for being
unconstitutional, the petitioners finally
submitted a petition to the SC.
Petition for prohibition, mandamus,
with a prayer of TRO assailing the
constitutionality of the Philippine
Mining Act and its IRR.
Petitioners claim that the law and its
IRR allow the unlawful and unjust
"taking" of private property for private
purpose in contradiction with Section 9,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall
not be taken except for public use and
the corresponding payment of just
compensation.
Petitioners also stress that the right to
enjoy easement rights, the use of timber,
water and other natural resources in the
Exploration Contract Area result in a
taking of private property
Petitioners add that even assuming
arguendo that there is no absolute,
physical taking, at the very least, Section
76 of the assailed law establishes a legal
easement upon the surface owners,
occupants and concessionaires of a
mining contract area sufficient to
deprive them of enjoyment and use of
the property and that such burden
imposed by the legal easement falls

within the purview of eminent domain
Respondents believe that by entering

private lands and concession areas,
FTAA holders do not oust the owners
thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial
enjoyment of their properties as the said
entry merely establishes a legal
easement upon surface owners,
occupants and concessionaires of a
mining contract area.
ISSUE: W/n the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow
the unjust and unlawful taking of property
without payment of just compensation , in
violation of Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution.
HELD:
Petition dismissed.
Taking may include trespass without
actual eviction of the owner, material
impairment of the value of the property
or prevention of the ordinary uses for
which the property was intended such as
the establishment of an easement. In
Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was
held that the imposition of burden over
a private property through easement
was considered taking; hence, payment
of just compensation is required
Normally, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of the condemned
property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement right of way
[Republic vs. PLDT]
As shown by the foregoing
jurisprudence, a regulation which
substantially deprives the owner of his
proprietary rights and restricts the
beneficial use and enjoyment for public
use amounts to compensable taking.
The entry referred to in Section 76 of the
Phil. Mining Act is not just a simple
right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Here, the holders of mining rights enter
private lands for purposes of conducting
mining activities such as exploration,

extraction and processing of minerals.

Mining right holders build mine
infrastructure, dig mine shafts and
connecting tunnels, prepare tailing
ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots,
install their machinery, equipment and
sewer systems. On top of this, under
Section 75, easement rights are accorded
to them where they may build
warehouses, port facilities, electric
transmission, railroads and other
infrastructures necessary for mining
operations. All these will definitely oust
the owners or occupants of the affected
areas the beneficial ownership of their
lands. Without a doubt, taking occurs
once mining operations commence.
SC agrees with the petitioners that
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 is a
Taking Provision
HOWEVER, there is no basis for the
claim that the Mining Law and its IRR
do not provide for just compensation in
expropriating private properties. It is
readliy seen that Sec. 76 of the Law and
Sec. 107 of the DENR Administrative
Order provide for the payment of just
compensation. Hence, the dismissal of
the case.
**ADDITIONAL NOTE - Public use as a
requirement for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is now
synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare and public
convenience - it includes the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage - public use as traditionally
understood as "actual use by the public"
has already been abandoned - mining
industry plays a pivotal role in the
economic development of the country
and is a vital tool in the government's
thrust of accelerated recovery
098 - NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION VS. MARUHOM DEC
2009
Facts:
Respondents Ibrahim and his co-heirs
(Maruhom) are owners of a 70,000
square meter lot in Marawi City.
NPC took possession of the
subterranean are of the said land and
built tunnels without the knowledge and

consent of Ibrahim.
o Tunnels were used for siphoning
water from Lake Lanao to the
city.
o Respondents demanded that
NPC pay damages and vacate
the subterranean portion of the
land, but the demand was not
heeded.
Respondents filed for an action of
recovery of possession before RTC.
RTC RULING: It DENIED respondents action
for recovery BUT ordered NPC to pay monthly
rentals and fair market value price of the
property (for 70,000 less 21,995 square meters
at P1,000 per square meter) as just
compensation.
CA RULING: It AFFIRMED RTCs decision.
SC RULING (JUNE 2007): AFFIRMED CAs
decision.
Respondents filed before RTC a motion
for execution GRANTED
Notice of garnishment was made before
NPCs depositary bank.
NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari before
CA. It argued that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion when it granted the
motion for execution without ordering
respondents to transfer their title in
favor of NPC.
NPC filed a motion for TRO to enjoin
the implementation of the writ of
execution. CA GRANTED
CA RULING
It DISMISSED NPCs Petition for
Certiorari.
It rejected NPCs argument that the
previous decision of the SC meant that
NPC would have to pay the full value of
the property as compensation without
ordering the transfer of respondents
title to the land.
CA presented that involving lands
traversed by NPCs transmission lines, it
had been consistently ruled that an
easement is compensable by the full
value of the property despite the fact
that NPC was only after a right-of-way
easement, if by such easement it
perpetually or indefinitely deprives the
land owner of his proprietary rights by
imposing restrictions on the use of the
property. The CA, therefore, ordered
NPC to pay its admitted obligation to

respondents amounting to
P36,219,887.20.
ISSUE: W/N the payment made by NPC to
respondents is for just compensation
with a right of ownership over the land
HELD: NO
A writ of execution must strictly conform with
the dispositive portion of the decision sought to
be executed. In here, the decision did not order
the transfer of ownership upon payment of the
adjudged compensation.
NPCs acquisition of an easement of right-of-way
on the lands of respondents amounted to
expropriation of the portions of the latters
property for which they are entitled to a
reasonable and just compensation.
Since the property of the respondents are
affected by the tunnels of NPC, they are entitled
to just compensation. Such payment DOES NOT
amount to the transfer of ownership of the
property to NPC.
099 - WILLIAM LI YAO VS. NARCISA DE

LEON (1901)
FACTS:
This cases involves a parcel of land (LOT
3) in Manila and is adjoined, on the
South, by Raon Street. It is bounded on
the East, by two lots; on the southern
portion, by another lot adjoining Raon
St. and on the Northern portion, by a lot
belonging to appellants Narcisa B. de
Leon at al.
The lots to belong to Mariano Cu

Unjieng and Cu Unjieng Hijos, who,
before the year 1930, had leased said Lot
No. 3, now owned by petitioner William
Li Yao, to Smith Bell & Co., Ltd., which
had applied for a permit to make
thereon certain constructions, one of
which was, seemingly, in the inner
portion of Lot No. 3 and did not abut on
Raon Street.
As a condition for the issuance of the
permit, the City Engineer of Manila
demanded that a Private alley, two (2)
meters in width, be opened on the
eastern part of Lot No. 3, to connect said
construction, in the northern portion of
said lot, with Raon Street, pursuant to
section 103 of the Revised City
Ordinances.
In compliance with this demand, the Cu
Unjieng executed on July 25, 1931 a
public instrument undertaking to open

and maintain said private alley. This was
annotated on the TCTs.
The TCT no. 13432, then covering Lot
No. 3, was cancelled upon acquisition
thereof by petitioner William Li Yao, to
whom Transfer Certificate of Title No.
46619 was issued in lieu thereof.
The contract of lease in favor of Smith
Bell & Co. had expired and its
annotation in the corresponding
certificate of title was ordered cancelled
on April 8, 1952.
the building or buildings of Smith Bell
& Co., Ltd., which gave occasion for the
undertaking and annotation, involved in
this case, were destroyed during the
liberation of Manila.
The other adjacent lots were acquired by
appellants.
On July 16, 1957, Li Yao, as present
owner of Lot No. 3, filed a petition
praying, under the provisions of section
112 of Act No. 496, that the annotation
of the aforementioned entry on TCT be
cancelled, because the building to which
said entry referred no longer exists, and
the legal necessity for the private alley
mentioned therein has ceased and
terminated.
Appellants(De Leon) herein opposed the
petition on the grounds that:
1. the ground that they have on
Lot 6-B a building which is used
and operated as a first class
theater, known as Dalisay
Theater
2. that the air-conditioning
equipment to air condition the
Dalisay Theater is housed in a
building erected on Lot 4-B,
which adjoins the northern
portion of the aforementioned
alley, and is accessible only
through Raon Street, passing
through said alley
3. hat the occupants of said
building have no access to Raon
Street, except through such
alley, the closure of which would
make said building a veritable
fire trap; that the existence and
continuance of said alley is
indispensable to the safety of
the employees and patrons of
the Dalisay Theater

4. that one of the conditions of the
undertaking to which the entry
in question refers is that said
alley would be maintained and
kept in good condition and
would not be closed, as long as
there is a building or
construction fronting or
abutting said alley
CFI Manila - overruled appellants' opposition
and granted Li Yao's petition.
Issue:
WON the encumbrance/ the alley be kept for the
use of De Leon et. Al?
Held: NO
The encumbrance in question was
created by an undertaking executed by
the Cu Unjiengs, whose tenant wanted
to construct on Lot No. 3-A, building
which otherwise would have been
inaccessible from any public or private
street or alley.
The only "parties" to said undertaking
were the Cu Unjiengs and the City of
Manila, on whose demand the
undertaking was executed. The City of
Manila through its City Engineer, who
had actually made said demand, now
agrees to the cancellation of the
encumbrance constituted by said
Undertaking and of the annotation
thereof, in the following language.
One of the conditions imposed in said
application for private alley is that the
same shall not be closed so long as there
is a building abutting or facing the said
alley and inasmuch as the said building
was already destroyed, hence, there is no
more use for said alley.
Having been made as a condition
precedent for the construction of a
building in the interior of Lot No. 3, said
demand was evidently made for the
benefit of the occupants of said building,
not those of Lots 4-B or 6-B, now
belonging to appellants.
The opinion of the fire department
relied upon by appellants merely
indicates the necessity for them, if they
wish to continue operating the Dalisay
Theater, to have a corridor that would
give their employees an exit to Raon
Street. Such communication does not
conflict with the stand of the City
Engineer that petitioner Li Yao is no
longer bound to maintain the alley in

question.
Acquisition by prescription implies
adverse possession or enjoyment, which
is inconsistent with the voluntary nature
of the undertaking involved in the case.
Moreover, as above stated, the private
alley in question was opened to give
access, from Raon Street, to the interior
portion of Lot No. 3, not to any other
property.
Doctrine:
A private street or alley as may have been
opened and maintained as a condition for the
authority to construct a particular building, duly
annotated in its title, is intended solely for its
benefit. Thus, upon destruction of that building,
the owners have no obligation to keep that alley.
100 - REPUBLIC (DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS) VS
ANDAYA (2007)
Facts:
1. Ismael Andaya owned 2 parcels of Land
situated in Bading, Butuan City. The
properties are subject to a 60-meter
wide perpetual easement for public
highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts,
and other similar works of the
government (annotated in the title).
2. Petitioner negotiated with Andaya to
enforce the 60 meter easement of rightof-way for the concrete levees and
floodwalls of phase 1 stage 1 of the
Lower Agusan Development Project.
However, the parties failed to reach an
agreement.
3. Subsequently, republic filed an action to
enforce the easement of right-of-way or
eminent domain before the RTC. The
court issued the writ of possession. It
also constituted the Board of
Commissioners (Board) to determine
just compensation. An order was then
issued for expropriation upon payment
of just compensation. After, the board
reported a discrepancy in the
description of the property. The
Republic amended the complaint,
reducing the 60-meter easement to 10
meters (701 square meters).
4. The Board reported that the project
would affect a total of 10,380 square
meters of Andayas property, which
4,443 square meters will be the 60-

meter easement (republic is entitled to
this). It recommended the consequential
damage amounting of P2,820,430.
5. Andaya objected, contending that the
consequential damages should be the
remaining area of 9,679 square meters,
which should be a total of P11,373,405.
Issue: WoN the Republic is liable if enforcing
the legal easement of right-of-way would render
the remaining portion of the property unusable
and uninhabitable?
Ruling:
Yes, the Republic is liable for the consequential
damage if enforcing the legal easement, the area
would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable.
The power of eminent domain is not only when
the state deprives the owner of its property, but
also when there is material impairment or
destruction of the property. At this instance,
there is no doubt that there is taking of the
remaining area of the property of Andaya.
Although Andaya still retained the title and
possession, the Board and the courts
correctly observed the effects of the
floodwalls, which would deprive Andaya
of the normal use of the remaining area
of the property in the enforcement of the
easement. In this case, Andaya is entitled to
payment of just compensation, which should be
equivalent to the value of the property. The
Constitution provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of
law. As an element of due process, there must be
just compensation when property is taken for
public use.
This Court also affirms the decision of the lower
courts that just compensation should be paid
only for the 5,937 square meters of the property.
The republic only needs 10-meter easement or
701 square meters, and it is also entitled to a 60meter wide easement or 4,443 square meters.
Therefore, the republic will only use 701 square
meters and should not be held liable for the
3,742 square meters, which is entitled to use free
of charge (the 60-meter).
The case is remanded for determination of just
compensation.
For reference:
The total affected area is 10,380 square
meters.
The 4,443 square meters or the 60-meter wide
easement is the right of the republic to make
use free of charge except for damage on
the improvements.
Therefore, out of the 10,380, the Republic is

only liable for 5,937 square meters.
For the easement
Republic only needs 10-meter easement = 701
square meters
Republic is entitled to the 60-meter easement =
4,443 square meters
Therefore, the republic will only use 701 square
meters, it should not be liable for the 3,742
square meters (4,443 701 = 3,742).
101 - BACOLOD MURCIA MILLING VS
CAPITOL
FACTS:
The original owners of Hacienda
Mandalagan had entered into a milling
contract with Central for 30 years,
extended to 45 years.
The contract stipulated that the planter
gratuitously ceded for a period of 45
years a right way for railways, canals,
water pipes and telephone lines that
Central might require.
Although certain portions of the
Hacienda was intended for the easement
of right way, Central built a railroad
occupying 2,138 lineal meters in length
and 7 meters wide over the lands of
Hacienda for transporting sugar.
(Milling contracts would expire)
Subdivision had demanded Central to
remove the railroad tracks.
Central: It would cause damage to Central and
its planters for a yearly quota as part of their
commitment of United States. Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff
to restrain Subdivision form removing the said
tracks.
CFI: Granted
CA: In favor of Subdivision. Centrals right of use
expired with its milling contract.
ISSUE: Is Central entitled to the Writ of
Injunction?
HELD:
No. The four requisites for compelling the grant
of right way:
(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway
(Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649,
p. 1, end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to the
Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and
(4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and

insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
None of the four requisites for

compelling the grant of a right
of way being shown, the title or
right of petitioner Central to the
relief demanded is not clearly
established and the
extraordinary writ of injunction
should not have been issued,
since injunction, whether
preliminary or final, is not
designed to protect contingent
or future rights.
The Central's use of the present
railway for the preceding 45
years was based on the assent of
the Subdivision's predecessorsin-interest, as evidenced by
their milling contract, while a
compulsory servitude of right of
way on the same spot and route
must be predicated on the
minimum inconvenience to the
would be servient estate, in
addition to the other requisites
above set forth. There is no
specific finding by the court of
origin that the prerequisites
exist, and the lack of it suffices
to negate the Central's right to
the servitude claimed, as it
likewise negates the propriety of
the temporary injunction issued.
CFI extended the contract even
beyond the term stipulated by
the parties. Such action is not
warranted by law. The function
of an injunction is the
maintenance of the status
quo as of the time of its
issuance, and at that time, the
right of the Central under the
milling contract had
uncontrovertibly expired. It
needs no emphasizing that the
court cannot create contracts
between the parties.
102 - LA VISTA ASSOCIATION INC., V CA

(1997)
The controversy in this case is regarding

the right of way in Manyan road. The
road is a 15 meter wide road abutting
Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses
the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the
north and of the Ateneo de Manila
University and Maryknoll College
(MIRIAM) on the south.
The said road was originally owned by
the Tuasons sold a portion of their land
to Philippine Building Corporation
(PBC)
Included in such sale was half or 7.5
meters width of the Mangyan road.
The said corporation (PBC) assigned its
rights, with the consent of the tuasons,
to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment
with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo
later on sold to Maryknoll (Miriam) the
western portion of the land.
Tuason developed their land which is
now known as La Vista.
On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista
acknowledged the voluntary easement
or a Mutual right of way wherein the
parties would allow the other to use
their half portion of the Manyan road
(La Vista to use AdMUs 7.5 meters of
the mangyan road and also the other
way around.)
But Ateneo auctioned off the property
wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer
of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest
bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the
property, but also the right to negotiate
the easement on the road. However, La
Vista did not want to recognize the
easement thus they blocked the road
using 6 cylindrical concrete and some
guards over the entrance of the road
blocking the entrance of the residents of
Loyola Grand Villas.
Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction
and La vista in turn filed a third party
complaint against AdMU.
One of the arguments of the petitioner
was that Loyola residents had adequate
outlet to a public highway using other
roads and also that AdMU has not yet
finalized the negotiation of the
easement.

ISSUE: Is there an easement of right of way?
YES (A voluntary easement exists)
HELD:
A voluntary easement is
constituted by will or agreements
of the parties.
As opposed to legal or compulsory
which is constituted by law for
public use or private interest.
In this case, the predecessors-ininterest of both LA VISTA and Solid

Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the
Philippine Building Corporation,
respectively, clearly established a
contractual easement of right-of-way
over Mangyan Road.
When the Philippine Building
Corporation transferred its rights and
obligations to ATENEO, the Tuasons
expressly consented and agreed thereto.
Meanwhile, the Tuasons themselves
developed their property into what is
now known as LA VISTA.
On the other hand, ATENEO sold the
hillside portions of its property to Solid
Homes, Inc., including the right over the
easement of right-of-way.
In sum, when the easement in this case
was established by contract, the parties
unequivocally made provisions for its
observance by all who in the future
might succeed them in dominion.
DOCTRINE:
Those in bold letters (ruling part).
Requisites of legal or compulsory easement:
a) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
b) after payment of the proper indemnity;
c) the isolation was not due to the
proprietors own acts; and
the right-of-way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate
103 - WHITE PLAINS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOC v. COURT OF APPEALS (1998)
FACTS:
Quezon City Devt & Financing Corp

(QCDFC) was the owner and developer
of White Plains Subdivision in QC.
The subject property is Road Lot 1. It is
38m of land reserved for the proposed
Highway 38/Katipunan Ave/C-5. This
was in compliance with the requirement
by the National Planning Commission.
The proposed road is to traverse QC and
Rizal.
QCDFC developed 20m of the said lot
into a road.
The streets inside White Plains were
donated to QC by QCDFC except Road
Lot 1.
C-5 was instead constructed along Libis.
G.R. 55868(1970): QCDFC filed a
petition to convert the undeveloped 18m
strip of land into residential lots. This
was dismissed because it should be for
the use of the general public.
G.R. 95522(1989): The Department of
Public Works & Highways began the
widening of Katipunan Avenue. QCDFC
filed a complaint to enjoin the widening.
The court reiterated that Road Lot 1 was
already withdrawn from the commerce
of man and it is part of mandatory open
space for public use.
Present case: QCDFC filed an action to
enjoin Association from collecting
rentals from the garden operators
occupying the undeveloped portion for
landscaping business.
CA: Road Lot 1 belongs to QC which has
the right to collect rent.
CA resolution: Full ownership should be
restored to QCDFC.
Association claims that the previous
decisions already held that the lot is
outside the commerce of man and it may
be used by the general public.
ISSUES:
May the reserved lot be used for other
public purposes? NO.
Does QCDFC have permanent
ownership of the said lot (and to whom
rentals must be paid)? YES.
HELD:
The decisions from the previous cases
actually ordered that title would remain
in QCDFC but with a lien annotated by
the government. It is not conclusive on
the issues in the present case.

Road Lot 1 existed solely for the national

thoroughfare. It cannot be used for any
other public purpose.
Road Lot 1 is a parkway, not a
subdivision street. A subdivision street
is only 15m wide. It could hardly be
developed for other public use other
than a highway.
A parkway by its nature is 38m wide and
it is the responsibility of the govt. The
QC ordinance requires a minimum 38m
for street-right-of-way for parkways
under the responsibility of the
government.
Only a lien was imposed on QCDFC. It is
not required to develop the highway.
The unused portion must revert to its
owner. The government abandoned the
reserved
highway/parkway/thoroughfare when it
constructed C-5 elsewhere. No reason
why it should be restrained from
exercising full ownership when there is
no longer a lien.
104 - BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL V.

EDMUNDO OBIAS (2009)
Petitioner: Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers
Cooperative, Inc. (Bapci)
Respondent: Edmundo O. Obias, Perfecto O.
Obias, Victor Bagasina, Elena Benosa, Melchor
Brandes, Rogelio Montero, Pedro Montero,
Claudio Resari, Pilar Galon, Antonio Buison,
Prudencio Benosa, Jr., Maria Villamer And
Roberto Padua
Ponencia: PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE: To establish the existence of
a voluntary easement, the burden of
proof is on the party alleging such
existence and must be proven by
conclusive proof and not merely
circumstantial evidence.
(Circumstantial evidence is not enough to prove
the existence of a voluntary easement.)
FACTS:
In 1972, BISUDECO in Camarines Sur
constructed a road (the disputed road)
measuring approximately 7m wide
and 2.9km long used for hauling and
transporting sugarcane to and from its
mill site and has thus become
indispensable to its sugar milling

operations.
BAPCI acquired the assets of
BISUDECO in 1992 who later filed a
Complaint against respondents alleging
that respondents unjustifiably
barricaded the disputed road by placing
bamboos, woods, placards and stones
across it, preventing petitioners and the
other sugar planters vehicles from
passing through the disputed road.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO
constructed the disputed road pursuant
to an agreement with rice field owners of
the road traversed and that BISUDECO
shall employ the children and relatives
of the landowners in exchange for the
construction of the road on their
properties.
BAPCI contends that through prolonged
and continuous use of the disputed road,
BISUDECO acquired a right of way over
the properties of the landowners, which
right of way in turn was acquired by it
when it bought BISUDECOs assets.
Respondents denied having
entered into an agreement with
BISUDECO regarding the construction
and the use of the disputed road.
o They alleged that BISUDECO,
surreptitiously and without
their knowledge and consent,
constructed the disputed road
on their properties and has
since then intermittently and
discontinuously used the
disputed road for hauling
sugarcane despite their repeated
protests.
Respondents claimed they tolerated
BISUDECO in the construction and the
use of the road since BISUDECO was a
government-owned and controlled
corporation, and the entire country was
then under Martial Law.
Respondents likewise denied that the
road has become a public road, since no
public funds were used for its
construction and maintenance and
denied that they barricaded the road.
ISSUES:
1. W/N BAPCI acquired the road right of way in
dispute through voluntary easement. NO
2. W/N the road right of way has been acquired
by prescription. NO.

RULING + RATIO:
1. NO. BAPCI did not satisfy the burden of
proving the existence of the alleged agreement
between BISUDECO and respondents for the
construction of the road. Testimonies presented
are mainly hearsay, as not one among the
witnesses had personal knowledge of the
agreement by reason of direct participation in
the agreement or because the witness was
present when the agreement was concluded by
the parties.
2. NO. The road is a discontinuous easement
notwithstanding that the same may be apparent.
discontinuous according to the manner they are
exercised, not according to the presence of
apparent signs or physical indications of
the existence of such easements. Hence,
even if the road in dispute has been improved
and maintained over a number of years, it will
not change its discontinuous nature but
simply make the same apparent. Article
622 states that discontinuous easements,
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only
by virtue of a title.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The August 24, 2005
Decision and October 27, 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59016 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
105 - VALDEZ VS. TABISULA

FACTS:
Spouses Valdez bought from Spouses

Tabisula the 200 square meter (sq.m.)
portion (the subject property) of a 380
sq. m. parcel of land San Fernando, La
Union. The absolute sale indicated a
right of way:
That now and hereinafter, said VENDEESPOUSES VALDEZ shall be the absolute owners
of the said 200 sq. meters, eastern portion and
that we shall warrant and forever defend their
ownership of the same against the claims of all
persons whomsoever; they shall be provided
a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-ofway on the western side of their lot but
which is not included in this sale.
Spouses Tabisula subsequently built a
concrete wall on the western side of the
subject property. Believing that that side
is the intended road right of way
mentioned in the deed, Spouses Valdez

opposed such act. Conciliation was then
initiated. Spouses Tabisula failed to
attend the conferences scheduled. This
prompted Spouses Valdez to file, after
more than six years of execution of the
deed, a complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages.
Spouses Valdez contended that they
purchased the subject property on the
strength of respondents assurance of
providing them a road right of way, and
prayed that respondents be ordered to
provide the subject property with a 2meter wide easement and to remove the
concrete wall blocking the same.
On the other hand, spouses Tabisula
averred that the 2-meter easement
should be taken from the western
portion of the subject property and not
theirs, and petitioners and their family
are also the owners of two properties
adjoining the subject property, which
adjoining properties have access to two
public roads or highways the bigger one
which adjoins P. Burgos St. on the
north, and the smaller one which abuts
an existing barangay road on the north.
Respondents further averred that they
could not have agreed to providing
petitioners an easement on the western
side of their lot as there exists a twostorey concrete house on their lot where
the supposed easement is to be located,
which was erected long before the
subject property was sold to petitioners.
In support of this claim, respondents
submitted a February 20, 2003 letter
from the City Engineers Office.
ISSUE:
Whether Spouses Valdez are entitled to the right
of way as indicated in the absolute sale?
HELD:
NO, Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that
any transaction involving the sale or disposition
of real property must be in writing. The
stipulation harped upon by Spouses Valdez that
they shall be provided a 2 meters wide road
right-of-way on the western side of their lot but
which is not included in this sale is not a
disposition of real property. The proviso that the
intended grant of right of way is not included in

this sale could only mean that the parties would
have to enter into a separate and distinct
agreement for the purpose. The use of the word
shall, which is imperative or mandatory in its
ordinary signification, should be construed as
merely permissive where, as in the case at bar,
no public benefit or private right requires it to be
given an imperative meaning.
As found by the trial court, which is supported
by the Sketch of the location of the lots of the
parties and those adjoining them, a common
evidence of the parties, Spouses Valdez and their
family are also the owners of two properties
adjoining the subject property which have access
to two public roads or highways.
To be conferred a legal easement of right of way
under Article 649, the following requisites must
be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded
by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must
be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the
owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the
right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servant estate; and (5) to the
extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the
distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The onus of
proving the existence of these prerequisites lies
on the owner of the dominant estate, herein the
spouses Valdez.
Since Spouses Valdez then have more than
adequate passage to two public roads, they have
no right to demand the grant by spouses
Tabisula of an easement on the western side of
Spouses Tabisulas lot.
105 - NICOLAS VALISNO vs. FELIPE

ADRIANO,
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
possessor of a land in Nueva Ecija, with
TCT No. NT-16281. He bought the land
from the respondents sister, Honorata
Adriano Francisco.
The land which is planted with
watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and
other vegetables adjoins that of the
respondent Adriano on the bank of the
Pampanga River.
Both parcels of land had been inherited
by Honorata and Felipe from their
father. At the time of the sale of the land
to Valisno, the land was irrigated by

water from the Pampanga River through
a canal about seventy (70) meters long,
traversing the Respondent's land.
In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion
of the irrigation canal so that Plaintiff
was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57hectare land.
Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public
Works and Communications a
complaint for deprivation of water
rights.
A decision was rendered ordering
Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation
canal. Instead of restoring the irrigation
canal, the appellee asked for a
reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau
of Public Works and Communications. A
reinvestigation was granted.
In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the
irrigation canal at his own expense
because his need for water to irrigate his
watermelon fields was urgent.
Later, he filed a complaint for damages
in the RTC claiming that he suffered
damages when he failed to plant his
fields that year for lack of irrigation
water, and when he reconstructed the
canal.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications reversed
the Bureau's decision by issuing a final
resolution dismissing Valisno's
complaint.
The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's
water rights which had been granted in
1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in
1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal
collapsed. His non-use of the water right
since then for a period of more than five
years extinguished the grant by
operation of law, hence the water rights
did not form part of his hereditary estate
which his heirs partitioned among
themselves.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the
easement of water over Respondents land.
Held:
Yes.

The existence of the irrigation canal on
Respondents land for the passage of water from
the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to
and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to
the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the
vendee of the land to continue using it as
provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code
(Doctrine of Apparent Sign):
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of

easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both shall be
considered, should either of them be alienated,
as a title in order that he easement may continue
actively and passively, unless at the time,
theownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed.
The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the

"conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's
property. According to the Plaintiff, the water
right was the primary consideration for his
purchase of Honorata's property, for without it
the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage

ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated
even if the water is supplied by a third person.
The fact that an easement by grant may also
have qualified as an easement of necessity does
detract from its permanency as property right,
which survives the determination of the
necessity.
As an easement of waters in favor of the
appellant has been established, he is entitled to
enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or
wrongful interference, such as the appellee's act
of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of
the use of water from the Pampanga River.
106 - CRISPINA SALAZAR vs.
GUILLERMO GUTIERREZ, and DAMASO
MENDOZA (1970)
Crispina Salazar is the owner of a piece

of land (Lot 436 of the Cadastral Survey
of Balanga) situated in Bataan, covered
by TCT issued by the Register of Deeds
and acquired by her from the
Municipality of Balanga. The lot is
bounded on the northeast by Lot 361, on
the southeast by Sapang Tuyo, on the
southwest by Lot 435, and on the
northwest by Lot 433.
Lot 433 was registered under the
Torrens system with OCT.
Ownership passed to respondent
Guillermo Gutierrez by inheritance in
1927, and TCT was issued in his name.
No annotation of any lien or
encumbrance affecting the land appears
on either title.
Before the present controversy arose,
Lot 436 and Lot 433, were irrigated with
water from Sapang Tuyo, a public
stream, flowing through a dike that
traversed Lots 431, 434, 433 and 461.
The portion of this dike that passed
through Lot 433 branched near the
boundary between this lot and Lot 434
into a canal which ran across the rest of
Lot 433 up to Lot 436. It was with the
water flowing through this canal that
Lot 436 used to be irrigated.
Respondent Damaso Mendoza, a lessee
of Lot 433, demolished the said canal,
thereby stopping the flow of the water
and depriving Salazar's Lot 436 of the
irrigation facilities which it had formerly
enjoyed.
Salazar requests that the canal be rebuilt
and the water flow be restored.
Salazar commenced the present suit,
praying that these reliefs be granted and
that the defendants be ordered to pay
her actual damages
The trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the
defendants to restore the demolished
portion of the canal and to refrain from
again demolishing the same.
After trial, the CFI of Bataan, finding
that the demolished canal had been in
existence for more than 30 years and
that the big dike from which it extended
had been constructed for the use of Lot
436 as well as several other lots
belonging to different owners, rendered
judgment, ordering the defendants to
restore at their expense the canal in

question, to connect it with the canal
found in Lot 436
CA reversed the decision of the CFI and
held that since the easement of aqueduct
over Lot 433 for the benefit of Lot 436
was a voluntary one, the same was
extinguished when Lot 433 was
registered and the corresponding
certificate of title was issued without the
annotation of said easement as a
subsisting encumbrance.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the easement of
aqueduct claimed by the petitioner?
RULING: Decision of the CA is set aside, and
that of the CFI of Bataan affirmed
If voluntary, according to the said Court, the
easement was extinguished upon the registration
of Lot 433 in 1923, pursuant to Section 39 of Act
No. 496, which provides:
But if there are easements or other rights
appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which
for any reason have failed to be registered, such
easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant
notwithstanding such failure and shall be held to
pass with the land until cut off or extinguished
by the registration of the servient estate, or in
any other manner. (Emphasis supplied).
In arriving at the conclusion that the easement
in question was voluntary and not legal or
compulsory, the CA took into consideration the
provisions of Articles 557 and 558 of the Spanish
Civil Code, now Articles 642 and 643 of the new
Civil Code respectively, as follows:
ART. 642. Any person who may wish to use
upon his own estate any water of which he can
dispose shall have the right to make it flow
through the intervening estates, with the
obligation to indemnify their owners, as well as
the owners of the lower estates upon which the
waters may filter or descend.
ART. 643. One desiring to make use of the right
granted in the preceding article is obliged:
1. To prove that he can dispose
of the water and that it is
sufficient for the use for
which it is intended;
2. To show that the proposed
right of way is the most
convenient and the least
onerous to third persons;
3. To indemnify the owner of
the servient estate in the
manner determined by the
laws and regulations.
Specifically the appellate court held that there is

no evidence to show that the petitioner has
complied with the three requisites laid down in
Article 643 in order to entitle her to claim a legal
easement of aqueduct under Article 642.
It is a reasonable conclusion from the foregoing
that the demolished canal supplying water to Lot
436 of the petitioner was merely extension of the
system of conduits established long ago,
considering that in view of the topography of the
area and the proximity of the said lot to the main
dike in Lot 433 it was more convenient to make
the connection therewith than to draw water
directly from Sapang Tuyo. Article 118 of the
Spanish Law of Waters allows the creation of a
compulsory easement of aqueduct for the
purpose of establishing or extending an
irrigation system, and there is nothing to the
contrary in the Civil Code.
The original registered owner allowed the
easement to continue in spite of such nonregistration: the least that can be said is that he
either recognized its existence as a compulsory
servitude on his estate or voluntarily agreed to
its establishment and continuance. And the
respondent Guillermo Gutierrez, as the
successor-in-interest to the, said owner by
inheritance, is not an innocent third person who
could plead the absence of annotation on the
title. Not only was he aware of the existence of
the easement when he inherited the property in
1927, but he likewise allowed it to continue for
twenty-six years after he acquired title. He is
bound both by the act of his predecessor and by
his own.
107 - NICOLAS LUNOD, ET. AL. V.
HIGINO MENESES
Nicolas Lunod, et. al owners of farmlands,
situated in Maytunas and Balot, near Calalaran
Lake.
Higino Meneses owner of a fishpond and a
strip of land in Paraanan, adjoining Calalaran
Lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the
other.
FACTS
March 14, 1904: Nicolas Lunod, et. al.,

filed a complaint before the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan (CFI) against
Higino Meneses; they alleged that from
time immemorial, there exists in favor of
their rice fields a statutory easement
permitting the flow of water over the

land in Paraanan and consisted in: that

the water collected upon their lands and
in the Calalaran Lake could flow through
Paraanan into the Taliptip River.
However, in 1901, Meneses, converted
the land in Paraanan into a fishpond
and by means of a dam and a bamboo
net, prevented the free passage of the
water through said place into the
Taliptip River, and that in consequence,
their lands became flooded and
damaged by the stagnant waters, there
being no outlet except through the land
in Paraanan.
In sum, Lunod, et. al. prayed for the CFI
to declare the tract of land in Paraanan
as subject to a statutory easement
permitting the flow of water from their
property, and that Meneses be ordered
to remove and destroy the obstructions
that impede the passage of the waters
through Paraanan.
In defense, Meneses, argued (1) that no
statutory easement existed nor could
exist in favor of Lunod et. al.s rice
fields; (2) that he and his brothers had
inherited the land from their deceased
mother, Apolinaria de Leon; and (3) that
the same had been surveyed by a land
surveyor in September 1881.
CFI: Upon the evidence adduced, the
CFI found for Lunod, et. al. and ordered
Meneses to remove the dam, as well as
to remove and destroy the obstacles to
the free passage of the waters through
the land in Paraanan, and to abstain in
the future, and forever, from obstructing
or closing in any manner the course of
the waters through the strip of land.
Upon denial of his motion for new trial,
Meneses appealed the judgment of the
CFI before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the dam and other obstacles to

the free flow of waters through the land in
Paraanan be removed?
HELD: YES. According to the old Civil Code
and the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
Meneses, has no right to construct the dam
which blocks the passage, through his lands and
the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters
which flood the higher lands of Lunod, et. al.;
and having done so, to the detriment of the
easement charged on his estate, he has violated
the law which protects and guarantees the
respective rights and regulates the duties of the

owners of the fields in Calalaran and Paraanan.
It has been clearly proven that in the border
line between Calalaran and Paraanan there has
existed from time immemorial a dam,
constructed by the community for the purpose of
preventing the salt waters from the Taliptip
River, at high tide, from flooding the land in
Calalaran, passing through the lowlands of
Paraanan; but when rainfall was abundant, one
of the residents was designated in his turn by the
lieutenant or justice of the barrio to open the
sluice gate in order to let out the water that
flooded the rice fields, through the land of
Paraanan to the Taliptip River, and that since
1901, Meneses constructed another dam along
the boundary of his fishpond in Paraanan,
thereby impeding the outlet of the waters that
flood the fields of Calalaran, to the serious
detriment of the growing crops.
The owner of the lower lands cannot erect
works that will impede or prevent such an
DOCTRINE
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an
easement is charge imposed upon one estate for
the benefit of another estate belonging to a
different owner, and the realty in favor of which
the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the one charged with it the
servient estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are
subject to the easement of receiving and giving
passage to the waters proceeding from the
higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this
easement was not constituted by agreement
between the interested parties; it is of a statutory
nature, and the law had imposed it for the
common public utility in view of the difference
in the altitude of the lands in the barrio
Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates
construct works preventing this easement, nor

the one of the higher estate works increasing the
burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions
of the easements of waters to which this section
refers shall be governed by the special law
relating thereto in everything not provided for in
this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating
of natural easements relating to waters,
provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to
receive the waters that flow naturally, without
the work of man, from the higher lands together
with the stone or earth which they carry with
them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not
erect works that will impede or prevent such an
108 - RESURRECCION OBRA V.
SPOUSES BADUA
Facts:
Their residential houses are erected on a
lot commonly owned by them in
Galongen, Bacnotan, La Union and their
only access to the national highway is
about a meter wide and 16 meters long
pathway traversing the northern portion
of Obras property and the southern
portion of the Baduas and Bucasases.
In 1995, Obra constructed a fence on the
north boundary of his property, blocking
the respondents access to the national
highway. Despite demands, petitioner
refused to demolish the fence.
Thus, respondents filed a Complaint for
Easement of Right-of-Way against the
petitioner.
Obra alleged that the respondents had
another access as ingress and egress to
the public road other than the one
traversing her property
RTC dismissed the complaint on the
ground that respondents were not able
to satisfy the requisites for their claim of
an easement of right of way, that there
was no adequate outlet to a public
highway, and that the new pathway used
was more that adequate.
In 2001, Obra constructed another fence

on the southern portion, which again
restricted the respondents use of the
new pathway.
On motion of respondent, the RTC
clarified its initial ruling and held that
the dismissal of the complaint was based
on petitioners representation that she
allowed respondents to use another
pathway. Since the southern portion was
an agreed pathway, petitioner couldnt
reduce it and ordered her to remove the
fence.
Issue:
Whether or not the court can declare a
compulsory right of way on a property
not subject of a pending case?
Whether or not there was voluntary
easement of right of way
Ruling:
No. The cause of action in the case was
the recognition of easement of right of
way that traversed the northern portion
of the property. The court made no
pronouncement on the nature and
legality of the new pathway. Thus, no
easement was established and their
claim for a right of way on the southern
portion had no basis.
The courts order of removing the fence
did not create a right of way on the basis
of voluntary agreement. There was no
agreement executed by the parties and
there was no payment for proper
indemnity.
Since a right of way is an interest in the
land, any agreement creating it should
be drawn and executed with the same
formalities as a deed of sale and must,
ordinarily, be in writing. No written
instrument was adduced by the parties
in the case.
109 - LAO V. ALBURO (1915)
Facts:
Sps. Lao filed for the a written
application in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of four
parcels of land, together with the
buildings thereon, of which they claimed
to be the absolute owners. All 4 parcels
of and are situated in Binondo.
After due service of notice, counsel for

the administrator of the estate of the

deceased Lorenza Alburo filed in court a
written objection, alleging that in the
part of the application relative to the
second parcel, a stone wall shown in the
northeast of the said parcel had been
improperly included.
That this wall had belonged to the said

Lorenza Alburo, for it had existed since
March 8, 1881; that the principal
timbers of the building that had
belonged to the said deceased had rested
on it for more than thirty-five years, and
the latter's successors had been and
were now in the quiet, peaceable and
uninterrupted possession of the said
wall.
Lower court: Sps. Lao, conclusively and

satisfactorily proved that they were, and had
been for about forty years, the lawful owners and
possessors of the four properties sought to be
registered; wherefore the court decreed the
registration thereof in their names, but ordered
that record be made in the decree that the wall
marked on the plan of the parcel No. 2 as a stone
wall was a party wall.
Issue: Whether the disputed stone wall is a
party wall
Held: no, it belongs to the Sps. Lao
Ratio: Article 572 of the old Civil Code
provides that the easement of party walls is
presumed, unless there is a title or exterior mark
or proof to the contrary in the dividing walls of
adjoining buildings up to the common point of
elevation. (Art. 659 NCC)
Article 573 of the old Civil Code also declares
that it shall be understood that there are exterior
signs which conflict with the easement of party
wall, when, among other circumstances, the
entire wall is built on one of the lots and not on
the line dividing the two adjoining parcels; when
the dividing wall, being constructed of stone and
cement, has stone projecting at intervals from
the surface on one side only and not on the
other; and when it supports joists, beams, floors,
and the roof timbers of one of the houses but not
of the adjoining building. (Art. 660 NCC)
In the case at bar, the record shows it to have
been duly proven that the enclosing wall of
Parcel No. 2 belonging to the applicant is much
higher than the adjoining building of the
objectors. That along the top of the said wall
there is a gutter which catches the rain water
from the eaves of the roof of the applicants'
building and carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna
through an iron pipe fastened to the said wall.

One-half of the top of the said wall is covered by
the roof of the applicants' building; that the
supports of the said wall project toward the side
of the applicants' land and that none of the
buttresses are on the side of the objectors' lot;
that the stones of the wall in dispute are bound
or inset in the rear enclosing wall of the
applicants' property in such wise that the two
walls that inclose the lot form but a single
construction, the exterior signs of which show
that the wall in question is not a party wall, but
that it forms a part of the applicant's building
and belongs to them.
Cayetano Arguelles, a master builder, who
climbed to the top of the wall in question and
examined it, testified that the aforesaid drain
caught the rain water from the eaves of the
applicants' roof, and that from the outside the
division or space between the applicants' wall
and the wall on the objectors' land could be seen.
That the lower part of this latter wall had two
arch like hollows.
The objectors have not proved that a part or onehalf of the wall in litigation was erected on the
land that belonged to the deceased Lorenza
Alburo. The fact that the owners of the objectors'
property may have surreptitiously inserted some
of the timbers or joists of their building in the
wall belonging to the applicants is not enough to
convert this latter into a party wall, when there
are so many exterior signs to indicate the
exclusive ownership of the wall and to conflict
with the existence of the easement that the
objectors endeavor to establish. The wall in
litigation is fully proven by the record to belong
exclusively to the applicants.
110 - CORTES VS. YU-TIBO
Facts:
House #65 Calle Rosario, Manila City,
property of the wife of the plaintiff, has
certain windows therein, through which
it receives light and air, said windows
opening on the adjacent house, #63 of
the same street. These windows have
been in the existence since the year 1843
Defendant, the tenant of house #63, has
commenced certain work raising the
roof of the house in such a manner that
one-half of the windows in said house
#65 has been covered, thus depriving
the house of a large part of the air and
light formerly received through the
window.

Plaintiff has not proven that he has, by

any formal act, prohibited the owner of
house #63, from making improvements
of any kind therein at any time prior to
the complaint
Plaintiff contends that by the constant
and uninterrupted use of the windows
during a period of 59 years he acquired
from prescription an easement of light
in favor of the house #65, and as a
servitude upon house #63, and,
consequently, has acquired the right to
restrain the making of any
improvements in the latter house which
might in any manner be prejudicial to
the enjoyment of the said easement. He
contends that the easement of light is
positive, therefore the period of
possession for the purposes of the
acquisition of a prescriptive title is to
begin from the date on which the
enjoyment of the same commenced, or,
in other words, from the time that said
windows were opened with the
knowledge of the owner of the house
#63, and without opposition on his part.
Defendant contends that the easement is
negative, therefore the time for the
prescriptive acquisition thereof must
begin from the date on which the owner
of the dominant estate may have
prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of
the servient estate from doing
something which would be lawful were it
not for the existence of the easement.
Court below ruled in favor of the
defendant, holding that the easement of
light is negative. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the easement of light, as

presented in this case, is positive or negative
Held:
Negative. Judgment of court below is affirmed.
Defendant won
When a person opens windows in his
own building, he does nothing more
than exercise an act of ownership
inherent in the right of property. It does
not in itself establish any easement,
because the property is used by its
owner in the exercise of dominion, and
not as the exercise of an easement. "For
a man should not use that which belongs
to him as if it were a service only, but as
his own property."
The use of the windows opened in a wall

of one's own property, in the absence of
some covenant or express agreement to
the contrary, is regarded as an act of
mere tolerance on the part of the owner
of the adjoining property, and does not
create any right to maintain the
windows to the prejudice of the latter.
As Manresa says in his commentaries on
the Civil Code, "there is no true
easement as long as the right to impede
its use exists." The easement really
consists of in prohibiting or restraining
the adjacent owner from doing anything
which may tend to cut off or interrupt
the light
Easement of lights in the case of
windows opened in one's own wall is of a
negative character, and, as such, cannot
be acquired by prescription, except by
counting the time of possession from the
date on which the owner of the
dominant estate may, by a formal act
have prohibited the owner of the
servient estate from doing something
which it would be lawful from him to do
were it not for the easement.
The prescription of the easement of
lights does not take place unless there
has been some act of opposition on the
part of the person attempting to acquire
such a right against the person
attempting to obstruct its enjoyment.
The plaintiff, not having executed any
formal act of opposition to the right of
the owner of the house #63 to make
therein improvements which might
obstruct the light of the house #65, at
any time prior to the complaint, has not
acquired, nor could he acquire by
prescription, such easement of light, no
matter how long a time have elapsed.
111 - PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO

Facts:
Fajardo and Babilonia are convicted of a
violation Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950
of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines
Sur.
During the incumbency of Fajardo, as
mayor of Baao, Camarines Sur, the
municipal council passed said ordinance
providing:
o Any person or persons who
will construct or repair a

building should, before
constructing or repairing,
obtain a written permit from
the Municipal Mayor.
4 years after his term, Fajardo and
Babilonia (his son in law) filed a written
request with the incumbent municipal
mayor for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gasoline
station on a parcel of land. It is located
along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a
creek.
o The request was DENIED.
o The reason was it would destroy
the view or beauty of the public
plaza.
Fajardo and Babilonia still proceeded
with the construction of the building
without a permit.
JUSTICE OF PEACE: Convicted Fajardo and
Babilonia for violation of the said ordinance.
Respondents appealed before CFI.
CFI RULING: Affirmed the decision of Justice
of Peace.
Respondents now question the
constitutionality of the said ordinance.
MAIN ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 7,
Series of 1950 is unconstitutional - YES
The mayor has absolute discretion to issue or
deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any
policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit
the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by
requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions
for its grant or refusal are enumerated. The
ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, and it is a settled
rule that such an undefined and unlimited
delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity, per se lawful, is invalid.
The reason why the permit was denied is

it "destroys the view of the public plaza
The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive Fajardo and
Babilonia of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds
of police power, and amounts to a taking
of appellants property without just
compensation.
The State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them

solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community.
As the case now stands, every structure
that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands
condemned under the ordinance in
question, because it would interfere with
the view of the public plaza from the
highway. With this, they would be
constrained to let their land remain idle
and unused for the obvious purpose for
which it is best suited, being urban in
character. To legally achieve that result,
the municipality must give appellants
just compensation and an opportunity
to be heard.
Ordinance is unconstitutional. Fajardo
and Babilonia are acquitted.
112 - AMOR V. FLORENTINO
G.R. No. L-48384 | October 11, 1943 |
FACTS:
It appears that over 50 years ago, Maria
Florentino owned a house and a camarin
or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
The house had and still has, on the

north side, three windows on the upper
story, and a fourth one on the ground
floor.
Through these windows the house

receives light and air from the lot where
the camarin stands. - On September 6,
1885, Maria Florentino made a will. o
House and lot to Gabriel Florentino and
to Jose Florentino, father of the other
respondents.
Warehouse and the lot where it is

situated to Maria Encarnancion
Florentino. - Upon the death of the
testatrix, nothing was said or done by
the devisees regarding the windows in
question.
On July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion
Florentino sold her lot and the
warehouse to petitioner, Severo Amor,
the deed of sale stating that the vendor
had inherited the property from her
aunt, Maria Florentino.
In January, 1938, petitioner destroyed
the old warehouse and started to build
instead a two-story house.
On March 1st of that year, respondents
filed an action to prohibit petitioner
from building higher than the original

structure and from executing any work

which would shut off the light and air
that had for many years been received
through the four windows referred to.
The petitioner asks for the setting aside
of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
Trial court - declared that an easement
of light and view had been established in
favor of the property of the plaintiffs
(respondents herein) and ordered the
petitioner to remove within 30 days all
obstruction to the windows of
respondents' house, to abstain from
constructing within three meters from
the boundary line, and to pay P200.00
damages.
CA - There is an easement of light and
view in favor of the respondents'
property under article 541 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE:
Was there an existing easement so as to prohibit
Amor from maintaining his two-storey house?
DECISION: Yes, judgment affirmed. An

easement of light and view has been established
in favor of the property of respondents, for these
reasons:
1. Maria Florentino having died in 1892,
according to a finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals, which we cannot review, Article 541 of
the Civil Code is applicable to this case.
The issue as to the date of Maria
Florentino's death cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner did not in the trial court
allege or prove this point. He
presented this issue for the first
time in the CA.
The evidentiary fact from which the
CA drew the above finding is that
Gregorio Florentino during the trial
in 1938 testified to facts of his own
personal knowledge, and he was
then 58 years old, having been
born in 1880. If Maria Florentino
had died in 1885, Gregorio
Florentino would have been only 5
years of age at the time of Maria
Florentino's death.
The CA therefore concluded that
Maria Florentino died in 1892,
when Gregorio Florentino was ten

12 years of age. It is reasonable to
believe that a person 58 years old
cannot remember facts of
inheritance as far back as when he
was only 5 years of age.
Furthermore, the burial certificate
and the gravestone, whose copy
and photograph were offered by
petitioner in a motion for new trial
filed in the CA, could have been
discovered by petitioner before the
trial in the CFI by the exercise of
due diligence. There is no reason
why this evidence could be found
when the case was already before
the CA, but could not be found
before the trial in the CFI.
It was easy, before such trial, for
the petitioner to inquire from the
relatives of Maria Florentino as to
when she died. And having
ascertained the date, it was also
easy to secure the burial certificate
and a photograph of the
gravestone, supposing them to be
really of Maria Florentino.
The fact is, petitioner never tried to
find out such date and never tried
to secure the additional evidence
till his counsel raised this issue for
the first time before the CA. That
Court was therefore died in 1885.
2. Granting, arguendo, that Maria Florentino

died in 1885, nevertheless that same principle
embodied in article 541 of the Civil Code was
already an integral part of the Spanish law
before the promulgation of the Civil Code in
1889, and therefore, even if the instant case
should be governed by the Spanish law prior to
the Civil Code, the easement in question would
also have to be upheld.
Under Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3, this

easement was constituted by an
implied contract among the heirs of
Maria Florentino. - Granting for the
sake of argument that this easement
was not created through an implied
contract according to Law 14, Title 31,
Partida 3, yet that provision of the
Partidas was not inconsistent with the
principle in question, so that there was
a gap in the Partidas which the
Supreme Court of Spain filled up from

the Roman Law and modern civil

codes, by recognizing the existence of
this kind of easement. The principle in
question was deeply rooted in the
Roman Law.
It is from the Roman Law that the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain obtained
this principle, in order to solve a
question not provided for by the
Partidas, whose main source was also
the Roman law.
Other considerations show that the
principle of apparent sign as
announced by the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain is not incompatible with the
Partidas. As to the implied contract.
Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3 provided
that easements were acquired by
contract, by will and by prescription.
Upon the death of the original owner,
Maria Florentino, the four windows
under consideration already existed
and were visible. One of the heirs,
Maria Encarnacion Florentino, to
whom the camarin and its lot had been
devised, having failed to object to the
same, knowingly consented to their
continuance. Nor did Gabriel and Jose
Florentino permanently close the
windows. There was consequently an
implied agreement between her and the
devisees of the house with the four
windows to the effect that the service of
these windows would continue, thus
creating the easement of light and view
and the concomitant easement of altius
non tollendi.
When Maria Florentino died
(supposing she died in 1885), the status
of the Spanish law was in favor of the
doctrine in question. We cannot change
it because it was in full force at the time
of the alleged date of Maria
Florentino's death having been
established by the Spanish Supreme
Tribunal as an integral part of the
Spanish law before the promulgation of
the Civil Code in 1889.
This law regulates the extinguishment
of an easement by merger of the
dominant and the servient estates.
Speaking of this law of the Partidas and
of article 546, par. 1, of the Civil Code,
both of which refer to merger of the two
estates.
But there is a world of difference

between extinguishment of an
easement by merger of the two estates
and the constitution of an easement by
an apparent sign when nothing is done
or said upon the division of the
property. Having in mind only the
modes of extinguishment, the legislator
did not intend to cover the question
involved in the present case, which
refers to the creation of an easement.
3. The easement under review has been acquired

by respondents through prescription.
The easement involved in this case is of
two aspects: light and view and altius
non tollendi. These two aspects
necessarily go together because an
easement of light and view prevents the
owner of the sevient estate from
building to a height that will obstruct
the windows.
This court in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo, supra,

held that the easement concerned when
there is an apparent sign established by
the owner of two estates is positive.
This being so, and inasmuch as the
original heirs of Maria Florentino
succeeded to these two estates either in
1885 or in 1892 and as petitioner
bought one of the lots in 1911, the
prescriptive period under any
legislation that may be applied - the
Partidas, Civil Code or Code of Civil
Procedure - has elapsed without the
necessity of formal prohibition on the
owner of the servient estate.
The respondent's action was brought in
1938. The persons who were present,
and 20 years between absentees.
According to article 537 of the Civil
Code, continuous and apparent
easements may be acquired by
prescription for 20 years. Under
sections 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the period is 10 years.
4. The petitioner was not an innocent purchaser,
as he was in duty bound to inquire into the
significance of the windows.
The petitioner maintains that he is an
innocent purchaser for value of the lot
and camarin thereon, and that he was
not bound to know the existence of the
easement because the mere opening of
windows on one's own wall does not

ipso facto create an easement of light.

Such contention might perhaps be in
point if the estates had not originally
belonged to the same owner, who
opened the windows. But the petitioner
was in duty bound to inquire into the
significance of the windows,
particularly because in the deed of sale,
it was stated that the seller had
inherited the property from her aunt,
Maria Florentino.
Referring to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain dated
February 7, 1896, which applied Article
541, this Court in the case of Cortes vs.
Yu-Tibo already cited, said that the
establishment of the easement "was an
act which was in fact respected and
acquiesced in by the new owner of the
servient estate, since he purchased it
without making any stipulation against
the easement existing thereon, but on
the contrary acquiesced in the new
owner of the servient estate, since he
purchased it without making any
stipulation against the easement
existing thereon, but on the contrary,
acquiesced in the continuance of the
apparent sign thereof."
Moreover, it has been held that
purchasers of lands burdened with
apparent easements do not enjoy the
rights of third persons who acquire
property, though the burden it not
recorded. (Sentence of the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain, April 5, 1898).
5. On the standpoint of justice and public policy:

First, when Maria Encarnacion
Florentino, as one of the devisees,
accepted the camarin and the lot, she
could not in fairness receive the
benefit without assuming the burden
of the legacy. That burden consisted of
the service in fact during the lifetime
of the original owner, which service
became a true easement upon her
death.
Second, according to Scaevola, the

reason for the principle in question is
that there is a tacit contract. It is not
just to allow Maria Encarnacion
Florentino or her successor in interest
to repudiate her own undertaking,
implied, it is true, but binding
nevertheless. This easement is
therefore a burden which Maria

Encarnacion Florentino and her
successor in interest willingly
accepted. They cannot now murmur
against any inconvenience consequent
upon their own agreement.
Third, during the construction of the
new house by the petitioner, the
respondents filed an action to stop the
work. But petitioner continued the
construction, so that when the Court
of First Instance was ready to pass
upon the preliminary injunction, the
work had almost been finished.
Petitioner, therefore, cannot complain
if he is now ordered to tear down part
of the new structure so as not to shut
off the light from respondents'
windows.
Fourth, when petitioner bought this
lot from the original coheir, Maria
Encarnacion Florentino, the windows
on respondents' house were visible. It
was petitioner's duty to inquire into
the significance of those windows.
Having failed to do so, he cannot now
question the easement against the
property which he purchased.
113 - FABIE VS LICHAUCO AND

CHILDREN OF ROXAS (1908)
Facts:
1. Miguel Fabie applied for the registration
of his property, situated in Binondo,
Manila. The property is without
incumbrances, except for an easement of
right of way, which he doesnt negate in
favor of respondents, Lichauco and
Roxas.
2. What respondents is claiming in the
present case is the additional easements
light, view, and drainage. In the course
of the litigation, Lichauco limited her
claim to the easement of light and view.
3. No doubt that the easement of right of
way exits in favor of respondents,
therefore, the subject matter at the
present case is the easement of
light and view.
4. The lower court held the right of
respondents to the easement of right of
way and drainage, but dismissed the
other claims of easement (subject
easement of light and view).
Lichaucos alleged:

1.
That both her and petitioners property

came from Juan Bautista Santa Caloma
(original owner), that the latter
constructed not only an easement of
right of way, but also the easement of
light and view. That during the sale to
both the petitioner (Nov. 28, 1848) and
respondent (Oct 31, 1848), the existence
said easement was not removed, nor was
it expressed to be abolished.
2. The easement talked about in the case is
the gallery with windows through, which
light is admitted. It was supported by
columns erected from the ground
belonging to petitioner. Both parties
admitted to the existence of the gallery.
Issue:
a. WoN the gallery (easement of light and
view) existed at the time the estate was
divided and alienated to petitioner and
respondent?
b. WoN the respondents are entitled to the
easement (light and view)?
Ruling:
a. No the gallery did not exist at the time
the property of respondent was
alienated to her.
Out of the many documents presented
by Lichauco, nothing mentions the gallery in
question. It appears that this is not due to
carelessness or inadvertence. It is thus in the
opinion of the Court that it is highly improbable
that different persons who surveyed in different
times would omit only one of the galleries, and
the other one always mention.
Base on the documentary pieces of evidence
presented adduced during the trial, it is in the
conclusion of the Court that the gallery in
question did not exist at the time when the
house of the respondent was alienated by its
original owner, Santa Coloma. Therefore,
respondent cannot claim the right to the
easement of light and view by virtue of title when
there is no evidence to support it.
b. No, respondent Lichauco was not able to
prove her claim.
The burden of proof should be on the part of the
respondent, who alleged that they have the right
of the easement of light and view. Respondents
who claims they have the right to the easement
must be obliged to prove that the subject
easement (the gallery) have existed. However,
respondent is not able to prove the contrary,
based on the records of the case.
The assailed decision of the lower court is
affirmed.
114 - BOCALBOS VS RCC (CATHOLIC

CHURCH)
FACTS:
Defendants raised a fence and ossuary
(building serves as a final resting of
human skeletal remains) on the western
side of the church yard of the Catholic
Church in Tobaco Albay fronting the
residence of the plaintiffs who are
allegedly the owners or actual
possessors of the lots which they
acquired from Patio Pastoral
Development Project Committee.
Plaintiff:
Constructions caused not only
inconvenience but pose health risks and
anxiety as it exudes cemetery-like
atmosphere.
They were done without a building
permit pursuant to the National
Building Code.
Filed for a restraining order and writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Defendants:
Claimed that the plaintiffs with the
exception of certain people are not
owners of the lots because they came to
possess through tolerance of the church.
The construction was done without
malice as an attribute of ownership and
the exercise of propriety rights of the
church.
RTC: Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
Granted.
The case was re-raffled and Hon Real
and Luis Bocalbos (Plaintiff) inhibited
the case.
Pre-trial was conducted.
RTC: Lifted the injunction. Provisions of law on
easement of light and view find no application in
this instance case.
Issue: Whether or not the construction by the
church violated the easement of light and view of
plaintiffs.
Held:
No. In this case, plaintiffs failed to
present any evidence to establish their
alleged right to the easement of light
and view and neither did they establish
that they have formally forbidden the
church from constructing the said fence
and ossuary within its premises upon
which prescription shall commence.

The distance between the

constructed fence of the church
and the window of the plaintiff is
more than a distance of 3 meters.
The restriction imposed by Article 673 of
the New Civil Code upon the owner of
the servient estate was not violated by
the construction of the fence.
Note: The fence and ossuary are not held as
nuisance.
The construction does not cause any of
the instances enumerated under 694 of
NCC.
No evidence was shown that the ossuary
is a health risk, existed for more than 20
years (it was not proved that foul odors
came from the ossuary).
115 - CASTRO v MONSOD (2011)
Castro owns a parcel of land on Garnet

Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las
Pinas City covered by a TCT with an
area of 130 sq.m.
While Monsod owns the property
adjoining the lot of Castro located on
Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase 2,
Las Pinas City
And there exists a concrete fence
(more/less 2 meters high) dividing the
Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village
The house of Monsod is located on an
elevated plateau of 15 feet above the
level of petitioner's property.
And Castro has been doing some
excavations and digging with the risk of
Monsod's house to collapse
Monsod then caused an annotation of an
adverse claim against the 65 sq., of the
property of Castro in Manuela Home.
The adverse claim was filed without any
claim of ownership of the property but
this was done just to assert the existing
legal easement of lateral and subjacent
support at the rear portion of his estate
to prevent the property from collapsing.
Castro's argument:
There was a leak the caused the front
portion of her house to be slippery so
she hired workers to see where the leak
was coming from and the workers
started digging
When she bought the property no

annotation exists of any easement over
the property
Neither Monsod asked permission to her
regarding the use of 65 sqm of her
property as easement
Castro then filed for TRO and also
prayed that the Register of Deeds of Las
Pinas be ordered to cancel the
annotation of the adverse claim on her
property
RTC - in favor of Castro; the adverse claim was

non-registrable because the basis of claim was
an easement and not an interest adverse to the
registered owner and did not also contest the
title of the owner
CA - reversed the RTC decision; it may be
annotated in the title as recognition of the
existence of legal easement of subjacent and
lateral support. The purpose of annotation was
to prevent Castro from making injurious
excavations on the subject embankment
depriving Monsod's residential house of its
support and cause it to collapse.
ISSUE:
Whether the easement of lateral and
subjacent support exists on the subject
adjacent property? YES
If it does, may it ba annotated at the
back of the title of the servant estate?
NO.
HELD:
(1) Yes based on Art 634 on easements on lateral
and subjacent support
Under Art 684, it provides that no
proprietor shall make excavations
upon his land as to deprive any
adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent
support.
From that provision, an owner by virtue
of his surface right, may make
excavations on his land, but his right is
subject to the limitation that he shall not
deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
In this case, there is legal (by law)

easement. An easement of subjacent and
lateral support exists in favor of
respondent.

The residential house and lot of

respondent is located on an elevated
plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the
level of petitioners property. The
embankment and the riprapped stones
have been in existence even before
petitioner became the owner of the
property.
It was proven that petitioner has been
making excavations and diggings on the
subject embankment and, unless
restrained, the continued excavation of
the embankment could cause the
foundation of the rear portion of the
house of respondent to collapse,
resulting in the destruction of a huge
part of the family dwelling.
(2) NO. Annotation is a notice to 3rd persons

that there is controversy over the ownership of
the land and to protect the right of the adverse
claimant during the pendency of the
controversy.
In this case, what respondent wants is
for a judicial recognition of the existence
of the easement of subjacent and later
support over 65 sq.m portion of
petitioner's property covering the land
support.
And an easement is established by
law or by will of the owners. There
is no judicial easement. The courts
can only declare existing
easements.
HOWEVER, an annotation of the
existence of the subjacent and later
support is no longer necessary.
It exists even if it is not annotated or
registered in the registry of property. A
judicial recognition of the same already
binds the property and the owner of the
same, including her successors-ininterest.
Otherwise, every adjoining landowner
would come to court or have the
easement of subjacent and lateral
support registered in order for it to be
recognized and respected.
Doctrine:
Those in bold letters (ruling part)
116 - BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO.,
INC. V. CA
PETITIONER: Bogo Medellin Milling Co.,

RESPONDENT: CA and Heirs of Magdaleno
Valdez Sr. (private respondents)
FACTS
Magdaleno Valde, Sr. purchased from
Feliciana Santillan a parcel of land.
Prior to the sale, the entire length of the
land from north to south was already
traversed in the middle by railroad
tracks owned by Bogo-Medellin Milling
Company (BOMEDCO). The tracks were
used for hauling sugar cane from the
fields to petitioners sugar mill.
Subsequently, Magdaleno passed away.
His heirs inherited the land. However,
the heirs did not know that BOMEDCO
was able to have the disputed middle lot,
which was occupied by the railroad
tracks placed in its name.
1989: the heirs discovered what
BOMEDCO did. This prompted them to
file a complaint for payment of
compensation and/or recovery of
possession of real property.
RTC: ruled in BOMEDCOs favor.
CA reversed RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not BOMEDCO should
vacate the lot?
HELD: YES. There is no dispute that the
controversial strip of land has been in the
continuous possession of BOMEDCO since 1929.
BUT possession, to constitute the foundation of
a prescriptive right, must be possession under a
claim of title, that is, it must be adverse. Unless
coupled with the element of hostility towards the
true owner, possession, however long, will not
confer title by prescription.
Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these
receipts showed that all BOMEDCO had was,
possession by virtue of the right of way granted
to it. Were it not so and BOMEDCO really owned
the land, petitioner would not have consistently
used the phrases central railroad right of way
in its tax declarations until 1963. Certainly an
owner would have found no need for these
phrases. A person cant have easement on his
own land, since all the uses of an easement are
fully comprehended in his general right of
ownership.
DOCTRINE: An easement or servitude is a real
right, constituted on the corporeal immovable

property of another, by virtue of which the
owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow
someone to do, something on his property, for
the benefit of another thing or person. It exists
only when the servient and dominant estates
belong to two different owners. It gives the
holder of the easement an incorporeal interest
on the land but grants no title thereto.
Therefore, an acknowledgement of the easement
is an admission that the property belongs to
another.
The mere expiration of the period of easement in
1959 did not convert petitioners possession into
an adverse one. Mere material possession of
land is not adverse possession as against the
owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession is accompanied by the intent to
possess as an owner. There should be a hostile
use of such a nature and exercised under such
circumstances as to manifest and give notice
that the possession is under a claim of right.
Acts of possessory character executed by virtue
of license or tolerance of the owner, no matter
how long, do not start the running of the period
of prescription.
discontinuous. An easement is continuous if its
use is, or may be, incessant without the
intervention of any act of man, like the easement
of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used
at intervals and depends on the act of man, like
the easement of right of way. Like a road for the
passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of
right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous
because the right is exercised only if and when a
train operated by a person passes over anothers
property. The presence of more or less
permanent railroad tracks does not in any way
convert the nature of an easement if right of way
to one that is continuous. It is not the presence
of apparent signs or physical indications
showing the existence of easement, but rather
the manner of exercise thereof that categorizes
such easement into continuous or
discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual
signs only classifies an easement into apparent
or non-apparent.
117 - SORIANO VS STERNBERG
In 1917, Manuel Soriano wants to

compel Oscar Sternberg to close the
windows in the wall of his house
adjacent to his property because the wall
of Sternbergs house is less than two

meters (1.36 m) from the division line.
To add, the house of the respondent
stood with the same openings since 1905
which was the time it was built.
Upon inspection of lawyers of both

parties, they found out that the view of
defendant has over petitioners lot are
direct and that petitioners windows and
galleries have direct view over
defendants lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 582 may be lost

for failure to prosecute within the prescriptive
period
HELD:
No. To reiterate Article 582 provides that no
windows or balconies or other similar
projections which directly overlook the adjoining
property maybe opened or built without leaving
a distance of not less than two meters between
the wall in which they are built and such
adjoining property. The court held that his right
of action has already prescribed which was in
1905 when the house of the defendant was built
and the windows were opened.
118 - AZNAR VS.
YAPDIANGCO(DEFENDANT) AND
SANTOS(INTERVENOR)
Facts:
1. In May 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised
in two metropolitan papers the sale of
his Ford Fiarlane 500. After, a certain L.
De Dios, representing himself to be
Vicente Marellas nephew, went to
Teodoro to answer the ad. Because
Teodoro was out, it was his son, Irineo
Santos who talked to De Dios.
2. After being informed, Teodoro
instructed Irineo to go to the residence
of Vicente the next day at the address of
1642 Crisostomo Street, Sampaloc
Manila which the latter complied.
Vicente agreed to buy the car for
P14,700.00 on the condition that it
would only be paid after it was
registered in his name.
3. Irineo fetched Teodoro, together with
De Dios which the 3 went to a certain
Atty. Padolina for the execution of the
sale. After, they 3 went to the Motor
Vehicles Office in Quezon City where the
registration of the car in Marella's name

was effected. From the Motor Vehicle
Office, Teodoro, before going home,
gave the papers and a copy of the deed
of sale to Irineo, instructing the latter to
hold onto it until the full payment.
4. Upon reaching Vicente, the latter told
Irineo that he was P2k short, and ask to
be allowed to get the said amount to his
sister living somewhere Azcarraga
Street, also in Manila. Vicente ordered
De Dios to go to the said address, and
suggested Irineo to go with him. Vicente
also requested the papers and the copy
of the deed of sale from Irineo, on the
reason that he would like to show it to
his lawyer. Irineo, out of trust and good
faith, gave the documents. De Dios and
Irineo was accompanied by another
unidentified person.
5. Upon reaching the location, the other
person stayed in the car while Irineo and
De Dios went inside, to which the latter
requested Irineo to sit in the sala, while
he went inside the room. After time,
Irineo was not able to find De Dios nor
the car.
6. Irineo went to his father, where they
immediately reported it to the
authorities. Meanwhile, the same day,
Vicente was also able to sell the disputed
car to the petitioner herein, Jose Aznar.
7. Aznar, as he was attending to the
registration of the car, agents from the
Philippine Constabulary seized the car.
This prompted Aznar to file a replevin
case against Captain Rafael Yapdiangco.
Teodoro Santos filed to intervene.
Trial Court: Ruled in favor of Santos, holding
that he was unlawfully deprived of the car. The
TC applied Article 559, which implies that even
if Aznar acquired the car in good faith, Santos
was still entitled to recover it.
Issue: Who between Santos and Aznar had
better right to possession?
Ruling:
Santos had better right to possession.
Petitioner contends that Article 1506 should be
applied and not Article 559 of the Civil Code.
This contention is devoid of merit. Article 1506
posits that the seller, at least should have a
voidable title to the thing. This is not applicable,
since Vicente never had title to begin with.
Vicente never had title to the disputed
car because it was never delivered to him in the
first place. Vicente could have acquired the title
of the car only upon delivery or tradition of the
car to him. Referring to article 712, this Court
interpreted that ownership is not transferred

merely by contract but by tradition or delivery.
At the present case, the car was never
delivered to Vicente and thus, the latter never
acquired any title thereto. The taking of
possession was through stealing the same. No
evidence was shown that Irineo voluntarily
delivered the key of the car. Even if he did, it was
not the same as contemplated in Article 712.
Doctrine:
ART. 559. The possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to title.
Nevertheless, one who lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it
from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the
owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a
voidable title thereto, but his, title has not been
voided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires
a good title to the goods, provided he buys them
in good faith, for value, and without notice of the
seller's defect of title.
119 - BACHRACH VS SEIFERT
E.M Bachrach died without heirs except

his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach
who was left with his estate composed of
108,000 shares of stock of Atok-Big
Wedge Mining Co.
As administrator of his estate, Mary
petitioned to the lower court to
authorize Peoples bank and Trust
Company to administer her 54,000
share of the stock dividend claiming it as
a fruit that belongs to her as a
usufructuary.
This was opposed by the legal heirs of
Bachrach, Sophie Seifert and Elisa
Elianoff claiming the stock dividends
were not fruits but part of the capital
which belongs to the remainderman.
ISSUE: W/N Stock dividends are considered

fruits that belong to the usufructuary rights of
Mary?
HELD:
Yes. The Pennsylvania Rule parallel to Section 16
of our Corporation Law which states that no

corporation may make or declare any dividend
except from surplus profits arising from its
business. According to the court, any dividend
whether cash or stocks represents surplus
profits. Citing Art 471 of the Civil Code that
entitles the usufructuary to all natural, industrial
and civil fruits. Given that the 54,000 dividends
are civil fruits of the original investment it
represents profits to which Mary is entitled to.
Pennsylvania Rule all earnings of the
corporation made prior to the death of the
testator stockholder belong to the corpus of the
estate, and that all earnings, when declared as
dividends in whatever form, made during the life
of the usufructuary or life tenant.
120 - BALURAN VS NAVARRO
Facts:
-The Paraisos (owners of the residential lot)
executed an agreement entitled "BARTER"
whereby as party of the first part they agreed to
"barter and exchange" with spouses Avelino and
Benilda Baluran their residential lot with the
latter's unirrigated riceland situated in Sarrat,
Ilocos Norte, of approximately 223 square
meters without any permanent improvements,
under the following conditions:
1. Both shall enjoy the material possession of
their respective properties. the Party of the First
Part shall reap the fruits of the unirrigated
riceland and the Party of the Second Part shall
have a right to build his own house in the
residential lot.
2. Nevertheless, in the event any of the
children of Natividad P. Obencio,
daughter of the First Part, shall choose to
reside in this municipality and build his
own house in the residential lot, the Party
of the Second Part shall be obliged to
return the lot such children with damages
to be incurred.
3. That neither the Party of the First Part nor the
Party of the Second Part shall encumber,
alienate or dispose of in any manner their
respective properties as bartered without the
consent of the other.
-Antonio Obendencio inheriting the property
from his mother (the son of the other party's
daughter) filed for recovery of the "exchanged"
property.
CFI: In favor of the Obendencio. Baluran seeks
for a review of decision. Avelino Baluran now
seeks a review of that decision.
Issue: Was there transfer of ownership of

the properties covered in the "barter
agreement"?
Held:
-No. The use of the term "barter" in describing
the agreement is not controlling. The agreement
is clear that there was no intention on the part of
the signatories thereto to convey the ownership
of their respective properties; all that was
intended, and it was so provided in the
agreement, was to transfer the material
possession thereof. It is also clear that the
parties retained the right to alienate their
respective properties, which right is an element
of ownership.
-Under the agreement, spouses Paraiso would
harvest the crop of the unirrigated riceland while
Baluran could build a house on the residential
lot, subject to the condition that if any of the
children of spouses Paraiso's daughter shall
choose to reside in the municipality and build
his house on the residential lot, Baluran shall be
obliged to return the lot to said children "with
damages to be incurred." Thus, the mutual
agreement of each party enjoying "material
possession" of the other's property was subject
to a resolutory condition the happening of which
would terminate the right of possession and use.
121 - ANULINA L. VDA. DE
BOGACKI petitioner, vs. HON. SANCHO Y.
INSERTO Presiding Judge, Branch 1,
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ILOILO, and
MA. EMMA LUZ BOGACKI respondents.
Maria Emma Luz Bogacki is the owner

of 4 parcels of land situated in Iloilo
City, known as Lots 72-B, 591, 73, and
72-A of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo
over which her mother (petitioner
Anulina Ledesma Vda. de Bogacki) has a
usufruct, covering
a) one-third (1/3) of one-half
(1/2) each of the said parcels of
land or
b) equivalent to one-sixth (1/6) of
the share pertaining to the
deceased Cesar Bogacki, Jr.
Maria Emma Bogacki then left the home
for her mother and the latter took
possession of all these properties
exclusively

As a consequence, Luz filed an action for

partition with the CFI against her
mother "to define the portions over
which the defendant may exercise her
usufructuary rights over the four parcels
of land, Lots 72-B, 591, 73 and 72-A."
After appropriate proceedings, the Court
hereby orders the defendant to limit her
right of usufruct to one-sixth (1/6)
each of all these portions of the land
described in the complaint, including
14th 72-A which is included in the
amended complaint already admitted by
this Court.
No appeal was taken. Thus, a writ of
execution was issued. But, since no
tangible assets or properties were
available to satisfy the money judgment,
the plaintiff asked the Court that a levy
be made on the usufructuary rights of
the defendant. 3
The defendant opposed the motion upon
the ground that her usufructuary right is
one created by law as a surviving spouse
and hence, exempt from execution for
family reasons.4
The motion was denied5 and thereafter,
the respondent Sheriff set the sale of the
usufruct at public auction. 6
The defendant filed an urgent motion to
stop said public auction sale, 7 but it was
denied. 8
The usufructuary rights were
subsequently sold to the judgment
creditor, Maria Emma Luz Bogacki, as
the highest bidder
Defendant Anulina filed a MR stating a
new grounds, that the usufructuary right
is exempt from execution and that the
usufruct cannot be levied upon, much
less sold at the public auction which, in
effect, would extinguish it in a manner
not according to the modes for
extinguishing a usufruct as provided for
under Art. 603 of the Civil Code. 10 Her
motion was denied. 11
the plaintiff filed a motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution, to
which the defendant filed an opposition,
but the said motion was withdrawn
Plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance
of a writ of possession, 12 which was
granted
Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether or not there was abuse of
discretion in the levy and sale on execution of
the petitioner's usufructuary rights and the

issuance of the writ of possession.
RULING: The petition is without merit. This
Court had ruled that the usufruct of a widow
may be transferred, assigned or otherwise
disposed of by her as she may please, like any
other hereditary property, 14 and hence, an
interest in real property which can be sold upon
execution. 15
The usufruct herein granted cannot be alienated
or transferred to third persons because it arises
from parental authority and is necessary to
enable the parents to carry out their obligations
to the incompetents under their authority. But,
upon emancipation of the child or loss of
parental authority, as in the case of the private
respondent who has already attained the age of
majority, is married, and living independently of
the petitioner, the usufruct is extinguished.
Moreover, it appears that the levy on execution
made and the petitioner's usufructuary rights
were sold at a public auction sale. 20 The
petitioner took no action therefore the orders
issued have already become final and executory
when she filed the instant petition. It is now too
late to review the proceedings made therein.
It results that there was no abuse of discretion
committed in the levy and sale on execution of
the petitioner's usufructuary rights to satisfy a
judgment against her. There was, likewise, no
abuse of discretion in the issuance of the writ of
possession because the said writ is but
complementary to the writ of execution, and the
period for the redemption of the thing sold at
public auction had expired without its being
redeemed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be
dismissed.
122 - CASTRO VS. CA
On June 6, 1948, Alejandra Austria

(who died during the pendency of this
case) filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title
covering 10 parcels of land situated in
the barrios of Punglo Grande and
Caviernesan, as well as in the poblacion
of Mangatarem, Pangasinan.
Socorro A. Castro submitted an
opposition, alleging that the lands
applied for had been donated to her by
the applicant in 1939.
Court: Alejandra Austria had been in
possession of the lands in concept of
owner since 1894, and consequently, by

virtue of the donation, ordered the
registration thereof in the name of the
donee,
Socorro A. Castro, subject only to the usufruct
reserved by the donor in herself for the rest of
her lifetime.
Alejandra Austria was the widow of the
deceased Antonio Ventenilla.
On March 31, 1950 a number of

persons, claiming to be his heirs
(nephews and nieces) appeared and
filed a petition to set aside the decision
and the order of general default
previously entered, and to have their
opposition to the application admitted.
Their petition was granted and the case
was set for trial anew.
They claim that the lands applied for
were owned by Antonio Ventenilla; that
when he died he left a will bequeathing
them in usufruct to his wife Alejandra;
and that upon her death they passed to
the said oppositors as his heirs.
Meanwhile, Alejandra Austria died
and Socorro A. Castro was substituted
in her place.
Trial Court: rejected both the claims of

Socorro A. Castro and of the oppositors
without deciding the question of title for
purposes of registration.
CA (only Socorro A. Castro appealed):
dismissed the appeal
. The ten parcels of land applied for
may be classified into two groups:
Parcel Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, by agreement of the
parties at the trial, passed into the possession of
Alejandra Austria after the death of Antonio
Ventenilla by virtue of the will left by the
deceased Antonio Ventenilla
Parcels No. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, the parties
reached no agreement. The oppositors
contended that they belonged to the said
deceased, while the petitioner insists that
Alejandra Austria acquired them by purchase.
Issue:
A. Whether Alejandra Austria was
a mere life usufructuary thereof, the
naked ownership being in the
oppositors, as collateral heirs of Antonio
Ventenilla, or was the owner in fee
simple, as residuary legatee under his

will. (regarding parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and
10)
B. WON by virtue of the donation,
Socorro A. Castro succeeded to the
properties applied for, and hence
registration in the name of her Intestate
Estate.
Held:
A. Alejandra Austria was the
residuary legatee of the estate of the
deceased.
1. Court of Appeals: "But, to say that a parcel of
land passed into the possession of a person does
not necessarily mean that said parcel of land
formed part of the residuary legacy of said
person, for it may mean that said person had
usufructuary right over said parcel of land."
2. PREVIOUS CASE: Austria v. Heirs of Antonio
Ventenilla (probate proceedings in CFI
Pangasinan)
a. The widow, Alejandra Austria was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
b. In 1910 the collateral heirs, now oppositors,
filed a petition for the annulment of the will,
which petition was denied by the Court below.
That order was affirmed by this Court on appeal.
c. 38 years later, herein oppositors filed a
motion in the same testate proceeding claiming,
among other things, that Alejandra Austria was
merely the life usufructuary of the estate of the
deceased, the naked ownership belonging to the
movants; that she was no longer able to
administer the properties; and that she had been
disposing of them in violation of her trust; and
praying that said Alejandra Austria be removed
as administratrix and another appointed in her
place.
d. The trial Court denied the motion and ruled
that the estate case had long since been closed.
e. SC: affirmed trial courts order; declared
Alejandra Austria as the residuary legatee of all
the movable and immovable properties of the
estate after the payment of the shares of the
oilier heirs (sister and nephews and nieces of the
deceased) in the proportion of P17.52 per
stripes, conditioned upon their putting up of the
bond required by law
f. Appellants: Alejandra Austria is not the
residuary legatee of the estate of Antonio
Ventenilla but only its life usufructuary.
SC ruled:

Alejandra Austria was the residuary
legatee of the estate of the deceased is, therefore,
res adjudicata because SC has already denied
their petition to annul the will of Antonio
Ventenilla and declared appellee entitled to all
the remaining properties of the state and can no
longer be relitigated by appellants after thirtyeight years.
Alejandra had been in the possession
and enjoyment of said properties all these years
in the concept of owner, being the residuary
legatee thereof.
3. The contention of the oppositors below is
that these parcels also belonged to the deceased
Antonio Ventenilla. Even assuming this to be so,
they would have passed to widow, Alejandra
Austria, as the residuary heir under his will and
as stated in the previous decision.
4. In any event whether, as purchaser or as
residuary legatee, such possession in concept of
owner constituted sufficient registrable title.
As a result the plaintiff filed a case for

unlawful detainer for the restitution of
the land claiming that article 1569 of the
Civil Code provided that a lessor may
judicially dispossess the lessee upon the
expiration of the conventional term or of
the legal term; the conventional term
that is, the one agreed upon by the
parties; the legal term, in defect of the
conventional, fixed for leases by articles
1577 and 1581.
The Plaintiffs argued that the duration

of the lease depends upon the will of the
lessor on the basis of Art. 1581 which
provides that, "When the term has not
been fixed for the lease, it is understood
to be for years when an annual rental
has been fixed, for months when the
rent is monthly. . . ." And in this case,
the second clause of the contract of lease
provides as follows: "The rent of the said
land is fixed at 25 pesos per month."
The lower court ruled in favor of the

Plaintiffs on the basis of above-cited
Article 1581 of the Civil Code, the law
which was in force at the time the
contract was entered into.
It is of the opinion that the contract of
lease was terminated by the notice given
by the plaintiff.
The judgment was entered upon the
theory of the expiration of a legal term
which does not exist, as the case
requires that a term be fixed by the
courts under the provisions of article
1128 with respect to obligations which,
as is the present, are terminable at the
will of the obligee.
B. Yes.
1. It is quite clear from the terms of the
donation [deed of donation is in Spanish] that
the donor intended to and did dispose of her
properties irrevocably in favor of the donee,
subject only to the conditions therein expressed,
one of which was that the latter would have no
right to the products during the donor's lifetime.
2. This merely indicates a reservation in
herself of the usufruct over said properties,
which usufruct would be consolidated with the
naked ownership of the donee upon the former's
death.
3. The use of the words "se consolidaran"
implied transfer of the naked ownership, with
which the beneficial title would be consolidated
upon arrival of the term thus fixed.
4. By virtue of the donation executed by the
original owner and applicant in favor of Socorro
A. Castro, the latter succeeded to the properties
applied for, and hence registration in the name
of her Intestate Estate, represented in this case
by the petitioner as administrator.
123 - ELEIZEGUI v MANILA LAWN
TENNIS (1903)
A contract of lease was executed on

January 25, 1980 over a piece of land
owned by the plaintiffs Eleizegui
(Lessor) to the Manila Lawn Tennis
Club, an English association
(represented by Mr. Williamson) for a

fixed consideration of P25 per month
and accordingly, to last at the will of the
lessee.
Under the contract, the lessee can make
improvements deemed desirable for the
comfort and amusement of its members.
It appeared that the plaintiffs
terminated the lease right on the first
month.
The defendant is in the belief that there
can be no other mode of terminating the
lease than by its own will, as what they
believe has been stipulated.

ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the parties have agreed upon
the duration of the lease
b) Whether or not the lease depends upon the
will of the lessee
simply because it has been stipulated

that its duration is to be left to his will.
The Civil Code has made provision for

such a case in all kinds of obligations. In
speaking in general of obligations with a
term it has supplied the deficiency of the
former law with respect to the "duration
of the term when it has been left to the
will of the debtor," and provides that in
this case the term shall be fixed by the
courts. (Art. 1128, sec. 2.) In every
contract, as laid down by the authorities,
there is always a creditor who is entitled
to demand the performance, and a
debtor upon whom rests the obligation
to perform the undertaking. In bilateral
contracts the contracting parties are
mutually creditors and debtors. Thus, in
this contract of lease, the lessee is the
creditor with respect to the rights
enumerated in article 1554, and is the
debtor with respect to the obligations
imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. The
term within which performance of the
latter obligation is due is what has been
left to the will of the debtor. This term it
is which must be fixed by the courts.
The only action which can be

maintained under the terms of the
contract is that by which it is sought to
obtain from the judge the determination
of this period, and not the unlawful
detainer action which has been brought
an action which presupposes the
expiration of the term and makes it the
duty of the judge to simply decree an
eviction. To maintain the latter action it
is sufficient to show the expiration of the
term of the contract, whether
conventional or legal; in order to decree
the relief to be granted in the former
action it is necessary for the judge to
look into the character and conditions of
the mutual undertakings with a view to
supplying the lacking element of a time
at which the lease is to expire.
The lower courts judgement is

erroneous and therefore reversed and
the case was remanded with directions
to enter a judgment of dismissal of the
action in favor of the defendant, the
Manila Lawn Tennis Club.
HELD:
a) YES, the parties have agreed upon a
term hence Art. 1581 is inapplicable.
The legal term cannot be applied under

Art 1581 as it appears that there was
actually an agreement between the
parties as to the duration of the lease,
albeit implied that the lease is to be
dependent upon the will of the lessee. It
would be absurd to accept the argument
of the plaintiff that the contract was
terminated at its notice, given this
implication.
Interestingly, the contract should not be

understood as one stipulated as a life
tenancy, and still less as a perpetual
lease since the terms of the contract
express nothing to this effect, even if
they implied this idea. If the lease could
last during such time as the lessee might
see fit, because it has been so stipulated
by the lessor, it would last, first, as long
as the will of the lessee that is, all his
life; second, during all the time that he
may have succession, inasmuch as he
who contracts does so for himself and
his heirs. (Art. 1257 of the Civil Code.)
The lease in question does not fall
within any of the cases in which the
rights and obligations arising from a
contract cannot be transmitted to heirs,
either by its nature, by agreement, or by
provision of law. Moreover, being a
lease, then it must be for a determinate
period. (Art. 1543.) By its very nature it
must be temporary, just as by reason of
its nature, an emphyteusis must be
perpetual, or for an unlimited period.
(Art. 1608.)
B) The duration of the lease does not

depend solely upon the will of the Lessee
(defendant).
It cannot be concluded that the

termination of the contract is to be left
completely at the will of the lessee

Notes regarding Usufruct:
Usufruct is a right of superior degree to
that which arises from a lease
It is real right and includes all the just
utendi and jus fruendi
The utmost period for which a usufruct
can last if constituted in favor of:
a) natural person - lifetime of
the usufructuary
b) juridical person - it cannot
be created for more than 30
yrs
(Questions in the case: why did they not contract
for a usufruct or emphyteusis?)
If it is a lease, it shall be for a
determinate period (it is temporary)
If in the nature of emphyteusis, it must
be perpetual (unlimited period)
Emphyteusis:
A long-term lease of land or building; 99
yrs or such similar long term or even
perpetually
The real right by which a person is
entitled to enjoy another's estate as if it
were hisown, and to dispose of its
substance, as far as can be done without
deteriorating it
124 - FABIE V. DAVID, NGO BOO SOO
AND JUAN GREY
Facts: Rosario Fabie y Grey owned a certain
houses at Santo Cristo, Binondo, Sta. Cruz,
Manila and in her will it was stated in the 9th
clause that Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of
the of those certain houses.
Juan Grey owns the property in Santo
Cristo while the property in Ongpin belongs to
some persons not interested in this case.
Before this present case, there had been
a previous case in which we have the same
parties except that in the previous case, the
owner of the property in Ongpin is an
intervenor, involving the administration of the
houses mentioned in the 9th clause of the will.
This previous case was decided by a compromise
agreement that was approved by the court. It
was stipulated that:
Beginning with the month of September 1944
the usufructuary shall collect all the rents of the
property in question; shall, at her own cost and
expense, pay all the real estate taxes, special
assessments, and insurance premiums,

including the documentary stamps, and make all
the necessary repairs on the property; and in
case of default on her part the owner shall the
right to do any or all of those things, in which
event he shall be entitled to collect all
subsequent rents until the amounts paid by him
are fully satisfied, after which the usufructuary
shall again collect the rents. It was further
stipulated by the parties and decreed by the
court that the foregoing shall be in effect during
the term of the usufruct and shall be binding on
the successors and assigns of each of the parties.
This present case was filed in 1945.
Josefa filed for an action of unlawful detainer
against Ngo Boo Soo, who is leasing the house in
Santo Cristo. Ngo Boo Soo as alleged by Josefa
should pay rent every 5th of each month. He pays
300php per month for the premise including a
one door which Ngo Boo Soo subleased to
another Chinese without the consent of Josefa.
Josefa also alleged the Ngo Boo Soo was duly
notified to leave the said premise but he refused.
Thus, she filed for this case praying for the
eviction and for unpaid rents.
Ngo Boo Soo on the other hand alleged
that since 1908, he is already leasing the said
premise as a store and second as his living
quarter. He also alleged that he was renting it
from its owner and administrator, Juan Grey.
That Josefa was only a usufructuary and entitled
only to receive the whole income of the usufruct,
as embodied in the final judgement of the Court
in the previous case. Josefa never had possession
of the property. Ngo Boo Soo, lease contract is a
5- year contract with an option to renew the said
contract at the end of each period. He also
alleged that the reason why Josefa wanted to
evict him from the premise is because Josefa
wanted to lease the said premise to others for a
higher rent (which Josefa has no right because
she is only a usufructuary to the income) and
that he never subleased the other premise.
Juan Grey intervened and affirmed the
contentions of Ngo Boo Soo. That he is the sole
owner of the premise. Josefa was a usufructuary
that is entitled only to the income when due. She
has no authority to administer the premise nor
to lease them or evict tenants.
MTC: ruled in favor of Josefa. That based on the
stipulation of the parties in the previous case,
Josefa was considered as an administratix and
she had proved her cause.
- Order for the eviction of Ngo Boo Soo
and pay for rent
- Dismissed the intervention complaint.
CFI: Dismissed the case (without jurisdiction)

Issue: who has the right to administer the
property?
Held: Josefa Fabie has the right to administer
the property as usufructuary
Ratio: All the acts of administration to
collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the
property by making all necessary repairs and
paying all the taxes, special assessments, and
insurance premiums thereon were by said
judgment vested in the usufructuary. The
pretension of the respondent Juan Grey that he
is the administrator of the property with the
right to choose the tenants and to dictate the
conditions of the lease is contrary to both the
letter and the spirit of the said clause of the will,
the stipulation of the parties, and the judgment
of the court. He cannot manage or administer
the property after all the acts of management
and administration have been vested by the
court, with his consent, in the usufructuary. As
long as the property is properly conserved and
insured he can have no cause for complaint, and
his right in that regard is fully protected by the
terms of the stipulation and the judgment of the
court above mentioned. To permit him to
arrogate to himself the privilege to choose the
tenant, to dictate the conditions of the lease, and
to sue when the lessee fails to comply therewith,
would be to place the usufructuary entirely at his
mercy. It would place her in the absurd situation
of having a certain indisputable right without the
power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy it.
125 - GABOYA VS. CUI
Facts:
1. Don Mariano Cui owned three parcels of
land in Cebu, which are, lots no. 2312,
2313, and 2319. He sold these parcels of
land in favor of his 3 children, who were
Rosario, Mercedes and Antonio. Because
Rosario was not able to pay the amount,
the sale to her was cancelled.
2. Because the sale was pro indiviso and
the cancellation of the sale in favor of
Rosario, Don Mariano and his two
children became co-owners of the whole
mass. However, Don Mariano retained
to himself the usufruct of the property.
3. A Chinese businessman erected a
building thereafter, for which he pays
Don Mariano monthly rentals of P600.
4. Subsequently after the sale, Antonio and
Mercedes applied to the Rehabilitation
Finance Corp (RFC) for a loan of P130k
to construct a 12-door commercial
building. Since only 2 of the 3 co-owners

applied, Don Mariano executed an
Authority to Mortgage, authorizing his
two children to mortgage his share of
the property.
5. The loan was eventually granted and
was secured by a mortgage. Don
Mariano being included in the mortgage.
However the latter did not join the
construction of the commercial building.
6. After the construction of the commercial
building, Mercedes and Antonio
continued to receive rents thereof for the
amount of P4,800 for the payment of
the loan to RFC.
7. Rosario then filed to declare his father
incapacitated. The petition was granted
and Victorino Reynes was appointed as
guardian. Thereafter, a complaint was
filed to annul the sale in favor of the two
children (Mercedes and Antonio) and
was amended to include plaintiffs, not
only Reynes but also the other children.
8. Reynes then filed a motion, seeking
authority to collect the rentals from the
3 parcels of land and ask the court to
order Antonio and Mercedes to deliver
the rentals of the commercial building.
9. A third case was filed by the former
guardian, seeking to recover the amount
of P126, 344.91 from Antonio and
Mercedes, for the fruits due his ward
(Don Mariano) by virtue of his usufruct.
CFI Ruling: The lower court ruled that the
reserved right of the usufruct did not include,
nor was it intended to include the rentals of the
building subsequently constructed to the vacant
lots. However, the lower court did award the
right to the usufruct to receive reasonable rent
for the land occupied by the building
Issue: WoN the reserved right to usufruct by
Don Mariano included the rents received from
the commercial building?
Ruling:
No, the Court ruled in the negative. The
right to usufruct of Don Mariano did not include
the rentals of the commercial building
constructed, but it did entitle him reasonable
rent for the land. It was clear in the deed,
authorizing the mortgage by Don Mariano, that
the reserved usufruct was only limited to the
rentals of the land. Had it been designed to
include the building to be constructed, then a
separate stipulation should have been added.
Appellant argues that the law determines the
rights conferred in usufruct and not the deed

(authorization of mortgage), referring to article
571 of the Civil code. Said article provides
Article 571 - The usufructuary shall have the
right to enjoy any increase which the thing in
usufruct may acquire through accession, the
servitudes established in its favor, and, in
general, all the benefits inherent therein,
The Court is not convinced, Article 445 and 456
(this is however industrial accession) is limited
to buildings constructed on the land of another.
Article 449 also is states construction on the
land of another. Articles 447 and 445, in turn,
treat of accession produced by the landowner's
building, planting and sowing "with the
materials of another" and when "the materials,
plants or seeds belong to a third person other
than the landowner or the builder, planter or
sower.
Nowhere in these articles mention has
the case of a landowner constructed a building in
his own land, with materials own by himself.
Article 595 provides that The owner may
construct any works and make any
improvements of which the immovable usufruct
is susceptible, or make new plantings thereon if
it be rural, provided that such acts do not cause a
diminuition in the value of the usufruct or
prejudice the right of the usufructuary. The
limitation imposed by this article is that the
naked owner, in his construction would reduce
the area of the land, for which the usufruct
should be indemnified.
Wherefore, finding no irreversible error, the
decision is affirmed
126 - GREY v. CARANDANG
FACTS:
Dona Rosario Fabie Grey owned a lot
situated in Ongpin and Sto. Cristo,
Manila with a building erected on it.
Upon her death, naked ownership of the
property was transferred to Rosario
Grey de Albar and the usufruct to Josefa
Fabie for life.
Property was registered n the name of
Rosario et al. as naked owners and
Josefa as life usufuctuary.
The building was burned down during
the liberation (1944-1945?)
Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the
property for 5 yrs at Php 500/month. He
would also construct a new building
worth 30k.
*The usufructuary maintains that she
has the right to cede property by lease
and to receive the rents while the naked
owners maintain that the right of

usufruct was extinguished when the
building was destroyed.
They agreed on a temporary
compromise:
o Rosario would receive Php 100
(20% of the monthly rental).
o Josefa would receive the rest
(80% of 400 pesos).
o Title of the new building would
go to the naked owners but
subject to the right of usufruct
of Josefa.
The United States War Damage
Commission approved the claim for
damage to the property for Php 8,574.
Paid to Rosario.
Josefa paid real estate taxes from 19451954 pursuant to an
agreement/amicable settlement made in
Fabie v. David.
1952: Rosario filed an action to settle
their dispute (*). Rosario claims that
Josefa is limited to receiving legal
interest on the value of the land and she
can no longer receive rentals.
TC: Josefas usufruct subsists upon the
new building and she is entitled to
receive 6% p.a. legal int from the time
the claim was received from the Phil.
War Damage Commission.
CA: Modified. Reimbursement to Josefa
for the amount paid for taxes is deferred
until termination of usufruct.
ISSUE: W/N usufruct subsists- YES.
HELD:
The usufruct on the rentals of the fincas
situadas imposed the encumbrance on
both the building and the land. The
building cannot exist without the land.
The land, being an indispensable part of
the rented property, cannot be
considered as having no rental value.
So, usufruct was not extinguished by the
destruction of the building.
All acts of administration such as
collecting rent, conserving property by
making repairs and paying taxes are
vested in the usufructuary.
Their compromise recognizes that the
naked ownership belongs to Rosario and
beneficial ownership to Josefa. The
usufruct continues on the land and the
new improvement that may be
constructed there on.

War damage payment should also be

subject to the usufruct because it was
not used in the construction of the new
building. Such payment was intended to
replace part of the capital invested in the
building destroyed during the war.
Rosario cannot be asked to reimburse
Josefa for taxes paid. Josefa is the
recipient of the benets of the propery
and she bound herself to pay in a formal
agreement in Fabie v. David.
127 - LOPEZ INC. VS. PHI AND EASTERN

TRADING (Case 9)
FACTS:
Before the last (Pacific) war
the Defendant corporation Philippine & Eastern
Trading Co., Inc., as lessee at the Lopez building
in the City of Baguio belonging to
the Plaintiff corporation Lopez Inc. of which
Atty. Eugenio Lopez was then the President.
Defendant was paying P160 monthly rental and
the lease was from month to month. Said two
doors were used as a store. During the bombing
of the City of Baguio during the first months of
1945 by the American Air Forces in trying to
liberate the city from the Japanese occupation
forces the Lopez Building including the two
doors in question were burned and seriously
damaged leaving only the concrete walls and
framework.
After liberation, the Defendant Corporation
wants to resume the lease and use it for
commercial purposes as it did before the war
thought of rebuilding it. One Mr. Macario
Rebodos, VP of the Defendant, went to Manila to
confer with Atty. Eugenio Lopez, about the
rehabilitation of the premises but he failed to see
him on 3 occasions in the city. So, according to
Rebodos, he left a letter for Mr. Lopez with an
inmate of the house. Said letter was never
answered by Attorney Lopez.
The Defendant proceeded to repair or rebuild
the two doors spending the amount of P14,
583.45. Later, an agreement was entered into
between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant whereby the latter re-occupied
the premises paying a rental of P300 a month.
In 1947 the Defendant failed to pay the monthly
rentals amounting to P2,200.
The Defendant company admitted its
delinquency but said it has the right to be
reimbursed in the sum of P14,583.45, value of
the improvements introduced by it, the amount
of its delinquency (P2,200) could well be

charged against it.
For failure to pay the delinquency, Plaintiff filed
an action of ejectment in the Municipal Court of
Baguio plus rentals and damages.
Municipal Court: The Defendant Philippine &
Eastern Trading Corporation to vacate, to pay
the Plaintiff the sum of P300 monthly rental of
the premises until completely vacated by
the Defendant. But the said P300 monthly can
be set off against the rental, part of the value of
the improvements and the P2,200, back rentals,
it declared that this sum is already offset by a
part of the amount of the value of the
improvements so that it be free from paying it in
cash.
Both parties appealed: Defendant based it on Art
453 was a possessor in GF and the
improvements valued P14,583.45 and had the
right to retain the premises until it was
reimbursed the said amount.
TC- Defendant no right of retention and must
vacate the premises and reimbursement of the
value of the improvements introduced by it must
determined in a separate action.
Issue:
WON the defendant is entitled for
reimbursements of the improvements it
introduced. NO
Held:
They both thought that a lessee may be
considered a possessor in GF and that
improvements introduced by him on the leased
premises are to be regarded as made in GF. This
rule or principle contained in the civil law refers
only to party who occupies or possess property
in the belief that he is the owner thereof and said
good faith ends only when he discovers a flaw in
his title so as to reasonably advise or inform him
that after all he may not be the legal owner of
said property. This principle of possessor in
good faith naturally cannot apply to a
lessee because as such lessee he knows
that he is not the owner of the leased
property. Neither can he deny the
ownership or title of his lessor. Knowing
that his occupation of the premises
continues only during the life of the lease
contract and that he must vacate the
property upon termination of the lease or
upon the violation by him of any of its
terms, he introduces improvements on
said property at his own risk in the sense
that he cannot recover their value from
the lessor, much less retain the premises
until such reimbursement. His right to
improvements introduced by him is expressly

governed by Articles 1573 and 487 of the old
Civil Code which reads as follows:
Article 1573. A lessee shall have, with respect to
useful and voluntary improvements, the same
rights which are granted to usufructuaries.
Article 487. The usufructuary may make on the
property held in usufruct any improvements,
useful, or recreative, which he may deem proper,
provided he does not change its form or
substance; but he shall have up right to be
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove
such improvements should it be possible to do
so without injury to the property.
SC ruled: Defendant-Appellant is not entitled to
reimbursement for the value of the
improvements introduced by it that it is ordered
to pay to Plaintiff-Appellant the amount of
P2,200, with interest and to pay the amount of
P300 per month until it actually vacates the
premises but given the right to remove the
improvements introduced by it without injury to
the property, under the provisions of Article 487
of the old Civil Code.
128 - MERCADO VS. RIZAL
Facts:
Paciano Rizal y Mercado left properties:
o In usufruct nine heirs
(Plaintiff is two of the
usufructuary)
o In naked ownership seven
heirs (Defendant is one of the
naked owners)
P6,503.80 was paid for the tax of these
lands. Of this amount the naked owners
made the plaintiffs pay P1,445.29, or
P722.64 each, representing one-ninth of
the taxes paid during the aforesaid
years.
Plaintiffs did not agree to this payment,
because they were mere usufructuaries
and they contend that the duty devolves
upon the naked owners to pay the tax for
the lands.
The naked owners, with the exception of
the defendant, agreed with this
contention and paid to each of the
plaintiffs sum of P206.47, which is oneseventh of the P1,445.29 deducted from
the products of the land corresponding
to the plaintiffs.
An action was brought to compel the
defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the
amount of P206.47 (the amount charged
to the plaintiff).
A demurrer interposed to the complaint

for failure to allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action was
sustained ground that the action is
premature under article 505 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in
applying the provisions of Art. 505 par. 2
to the case at bar YES
Art 505 of the Civil Code (now 597 of the NCC):
Any taxes which may be imposed directly upon
the capital, during the usufruct, shall be
chargeable to the owner.
If paid the latter, the usufructuary shall pay him
the proper interest on any sums he may have
disbursed by reason thereof; if the usufructuary
should advance the amounts of such taxes he
shall recover them upon the expiration of the
usufruct.
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, the tax
directly burdens the capital should be paid by
the owner. The second paragraph however, does
not apply to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not
pay the tax.
They objected to this payment. In fact they did
not make the payment. The resolution of the
trial court was reversed, the demurrer
interposed to the complaint is overruled, and it
is ordered that the case be remanded to the court
of origin to act in accordance with SC decision
and go forward with the case until it is finally
decided.
129 - MONSERRAT v. CERON
FACTS:
Monserrat was the president and
manager of Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.
(MYT) He owned 1200 common shares
of stock thereof.
March 1930: He assigned to Ceron the

usufruct of 600 shares for the aid
extended by Ceron in the organization of
the corporation.
A deed of transfer (Exhibit A) was
executed. It states that the transferee is
given only the right to enjoy the profits
which might be derived from the shares.
The transferor reserved for himself the
right to vote and recover the ownership.
The corresponding certificate of stock
no. 7 was issued. Stock certificate no. 7
was recorded in Cerons name in the
stock and transfer book of the company.
February 1931: Ceron mortgaged to
Matute (president of Erma Inc.) some

shares of stock of the company,
including the 600 which was transferred
by Monserrat.
Matute was not informed of Exhibit
A/Deed of Transfer. He even went to
MYT to examine the books but found so
such encumbrance.
Ceron claims the notation of the deed
was made only in May 1931, the date on
which the shares were to be sold at
public auction to satisfy his debt to
Matute.
Matute has been in possession of the
certificate of stocks without notation of
the deed since Cerons default in
payment/public auction.
CFI: Declared Monserrat as owner of the
600 shares of stock, the mortgage on the
ownership is void but the mortgage on
the usufruct is valid.
ISSUE: W/N the chattel mortgage on the
usufruct is valid YES.
HELD:
Transfer refers to an act by which the
property of one is vested in another.
There is intent to pass the rights.
Transfer in a chattel mortgage is not
absolute but it is a mere security for the
payment of the debt. The transfer
becomes null and void from the time the
debtor pays his debt.
Sec 35 of Corporation Law requires that
the transfer of ownership of a title to a
share must be noted in the books of the
corporation to be valid as against third
persons. Such entry is not required for a
chattel mortgage because it is not an
absolute alienation of the dominion and
ownership.
So, the chattel mortgage on the usufruct
of the shares is valid.
130 - MONTEROS V. C.A
Facts: The disputed properties in this case are
the intestate of Don Fabian, situated in Agusan.
Don Fabian married twice and had eight
children, four from each union. First, Don
Fabian married Soledad Doldol.
Their children are: Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin,
and Tirso.
Later on, Soledad Doldol Monteroso passed
away. After a year, Don Fabian contracted a
second marriage with Sofia Pendejito.
Their children are: Florenda, Reynato, Alberto,
and Fabian, Jr.
After the death of his first wife, but during the

early part of his second marriage, Don Fabian
filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Agusan an intestate proceeding for the estate of
his deceased first wife to obviate any dispute
over the inheritance of his children from his first
marriage.
CFI: approved the partition of the property.
The partition covered Parcels F-1 to F-5.
Adjudicated to Don Fabian the whole of
Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half
of Parcel F-5.
the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of
Parcel F-5 was comprised as the
intestate of Soledad and this was
partitioned and distributed equally to
her 4 children.
Don Fabian on October 26, 1948. On July 28,
1969, the children of the late Benjamin D.
Monteroso (son of Don Fabian with Soledad),
namely: Ruby Monteroso, Marlene M. Pospos,
Henrieto Monteroso, and Adelita MonterosoBerenguel, filed with the RTC a Complaint
for Recovery of Property with Damages against
their uncle, Tirso D. Monteroso.
As the heirs of Benjamin alleged in their
complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with
the one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of
the share from the estate of Soledad. However,
their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the
same when they demanded such delivery upon
their reaching the majority age.
Tirso countered that the portion pertaining to
Benjamin was never entrusted to him; it was in
the possession of their sister, Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to
any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted
to exchange her share in said property for
another parcel of land, Parcel F-7, then being
occupied by her.
Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition
and Damages with Receivership involving 12
parcels of land against his stepmother,
Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings.
Tirso, alleged the following:
(1) the 12 parcels of land belong to the conjugal
partnerships of the first and second marriages
contracted by Don Fabian
(2) SP No. 309, which purportedly judicially
settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null
and void for the reason that the project of
partition failed to comprehend the entire estate
of the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were
excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-

fourth share or legitime over the said three
parcels of land; and
Note: the properties showed at the full text, Don
Fabian acquired 8 parcels of land during her
marriage with Soledad and 4 parcels of land
during his second marriage.
However, in the SP for the partition of the
properties only 5 parcels of land was included.
(3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired
during the second marriage of Don Fabian, are
not paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito
Vda. de Monteroso.
The defendants in 2nd Civil Case contended that
Don Fabian acquired Parcel F-6 during the
second marriage, while Parcels F-7 and F-8 were
Don Fabians exclusive properties having been
acquired through a donation from the heirs of
one Benito Tinosa. They further maintained the
validity of the judicial partition under SP No.
309. In particular, they asserted that:
Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, and one-half of F-5
were adjudicated to Don Fabian as his
share in the conjugal partnership of the
first marriage
Parcel F-4 and the other half of Parcel F5 were equally divided among the four
children of the first marriage.
During his lifetime, Don Fabian sold
Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang.
That Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang,
Tirso D. Monteroso, and Mauricia
Nakila Vda. de Benjamin Monteroso
donated Parcel F-6 to Reygula
Monteroso-Bayan.
That Parcels S-1 to S-4 are truly
paraphernal properties of Sofia
Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso as Parcel
S-1 was acquired by her through a
homestead patent.
Parcel S-2 through adverse possession.
Parcels S-3 and S-4 by purchase.
The cases were consolidated.
RTC: dismissing the case filed by the heirs of
Benjamin on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, but finding, in Civil Case No.
1332 (case filed by Tirso) in favor for Tirso.
Defendants filed for a MR and rendered a new
decision.
RTC: the heirs of Benjamin have indeed been
deprived of their inheritance which corresponds
to one-fourth share due their father from the

intestate estate of their grandmother, Soledad.
Turning on the alleged sale of Parcels F-1, F-2,
F-3, F-7, and F-8 by Don Fabian to Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang, the RTC found the
covering three deeds of absolute sale to be null
and void for the reason that the alleged
conveyances were fictitious, simulated, and/or
without sufficient consideration.
The RTC also declared as null and void the
donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula MonterosoBayan, as one of the signatory- donors, Mauricia
Nakila, Benjamins widow, did not have the right
to effect a donation because she was not a
compulsory heir of her husband by
representation.
This was appealed to the C.A.
C.A.: affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue: whether the C.A committed error in
concluding that by invoking the benefits of
prescription in their favor, the Sps. Cagampang
are deemed to have admitted the existence of coownership.
Held: No. the decision of C.A was affirmed.
Ratio: Partition is the proper remedy available
to Tirso who is a co- owner of the subject
properties by virtue of his being a compulsory
heir. The right to seek partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches.
Consequently, acquisitive prescription or laches
does not lie in favor of Sps.Cagampang and
against Tirso, the gen. rule being that
prescription does not run against co- owners or
co- heirs. The only exception to the
imprescriptibility of the action for partition
against the a co-owner is when a co- owner
repudiates the co- ownership. Thus, the
appellate court ruled that by invoking extinctive
prescription as a defense, the lone exception
against imprescriptibility of action by a coowner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to
have contextually recognized the co-ownership
of Tirso and must have repudiated such coownership in order for acquisitive prescription
to set in. Taking off from that premise, the
appellate court then proceeded to tackle the
issue of repudiation by the Cagampang spouses.
Therefore, we hold that the appellate court did
not err in finding that the Cagampang spouses

are effectively barred from invoking
prescription, given that the subject properties
are conjugal properties of the decedent, Don
Fabian, which cannot be subjected to acquisitive
prescription, the necessary consequence of
recognizing the co-ownership stake of other legal
heirs.
131 - NHA vs. CA
Facts:
Proclamation No. 481 was issued by
then President Marcos to set aside a
120-hectare portion of land in Quezon
City owned by the NHA as reserved
property for the site of the National
Government Center (NGC).
President Marcos then issued
Proclamation No. 1670, which removed
a 7-hectare portion from the coverage of
the NGC and gave Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation Inc. (MSBF) usufructuary
rights over this segregated portion it
can have survey over the land. Over the
years, MSBF exceeded the portion its
been using up to 16-hectares.
MSBF leased a portion of the area it
occupied to Bulacan Garden
Corporation (BGC) and other
stallholders. It occupied 4,590 square
meters of the 16-hectare area.
President Aquino issued Memorandum
Order No. 127 which revoked the
reserved status of the 50 hectares, more
or less, remaining out of the 120
hectares of the NHA property reserved
as site of the National Government
Center. MO 127 also authorized the
NHA to commercialize the area and to
sell it to the public. NHA gave BGC 10
days to vacate the area.
BGC then filed a complaint for
injunction before the trial court and
eventually amended its complaint to
include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.
TRIAL COURT RULING: Ruled in favor of
NHA. The survey was to be conducted by MSBF
but they failed to do so. Also, it exceeded the
allowable area of 7 hectares. NHA then
demolished the facilities of BGC.
CA RULING: In favor of BGC and MSBF. It
ruled that MSBF did in fact assert this right by
conducting two surveys and erecting its main
structures in the area of its choice.
ISSUE: W/N the premises leased by BGC
from MSBF is within the seven-hectare
area that Proclamation No. 1670 granted

to MSBF by way of usufruct
Held: It was remanded back to the trial
court for a joint survey to determine
finally the metes and bounds of the sevenhectare area subject to MSBFs
usufructuary rights.
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified
term and under such conditions as the parties
may deem convenient subject to the legal
provisions on usufruct. A usufructuary may lease
the object held in usufruct.
Thus, the NHA may not evict BGC if the 4,590
square meter portion MSBF leased to BGC is
within the seven-hectare area held in usufruct be
MSBF. The owner of the property must respect
the lease entered into by the usufructuary so
long as the usufruct exists. However, the NHA
has the right to evict BGC if BGC occupied a
portion outside of the seven-hectare area
covered by MSBFs usufructuary rights.
More evidence supports MSBFs stand on the
location of the seven-hectare area. The main
structures of MSBF are found in the area
indicated by MSBFs survey.
132 - OROZCO V ARANETA
Eugenio Orozco died on 1922 and

leaving a will which he executed in 1921
In that will, it provided that his son,
Jacinto Orozco, (plaintiff) should be
given life usufruct of Eugenio's
properties with the obligation on the
part of Jacinto to preserve the properties
in favor of the other heirs who were
declared the naked owners thereof
One of those properties were 5,714
shares of stock of Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company
In 2 instances (1934 and 1939) the
mining company declared and
distributed stock dividends out its
surplus profits and the plaintiff
(Jacinto) received a total of 28.570
shares.
ISSUE:
W/N the stock dividend is part of the
capital which should be preserved in
favor of the owners OR an income of
fruits which should be given to and
enjoyed by the life usufructuary Jacinto
as his exclusive property? Latter

HELD:
The court cited the Bachrach

doctrine wherein the same issue was
raised. In that case, the court held that
dividend, whether in the form of cash
or stock, is income and, consequently,
should go to the usufructuary,
taking into consideration that a stock
dividend as well as a cash dividend can
be declared only out of profits of
the corporation, for it were declared
out of the capital it would be a serious
violation of the law.
Araneta and his clients attempt to

differentiate the present case from that
Bachrach case, contending that, while
the doctrine in that case effected a just
and equitable distribution, the
application of it in the present case
would cause an injustice quoting
Justice Holmes, "abstract propositions
do not decide concrete cases.
The defendants claimed that by the

declaration of stock dividends the voting
power of the original shares of stock is
considerably diminished, and, if the
stock dividends are not given to the
remaindermen, the voting power of the
latter would be greatly impaired
But the court said there is no difference

that would justify a reversal or
modification of the doctrine in the
Bachrach case.
Hence, the 28,570 shares belongs to

Jacinto exclusive and in absolute
ownership
133 - POLICARPIO VS SALAMAT

Facts:
-In a duly probated last will and testament of
one Damasa Crisostomo, gave the naked
ownership of a fishpond situated at Bulacan to
her sister Teodorica de la Cruz while its usufruct
to the children of her cousins. Teodorica de la
Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed in her will all
her rights to the fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
-The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond
first to one Gil P. Policarpio who used to give
them proportionately the usufruct
corresponding to them. During the term of the
lease, however, three of the usufructuaries died.

Upon their death, both the naked owner and the
remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares
corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries.
Because of these conflicting claims, the lessee
withheld said amount.
-The surviving usufructuaries leased the
fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios who, after
executing the contract of lease, came to know of
the existing conflicting claims, and not knowing
to whom of the claimants the shares of the
deceased usufructuaries should be paid, said
lessee was also constrained to withhold the
corresponding part of the usufruct of the
property.
-The two lessees commenced the present action
for interpleader against both the naked owner
and surviving usufructuaries to compel them to
interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
Defendant:
-He is entitled to the shares corresponding to the
three deceased usufructuaries inasmuch as the
usufruct in their favor was automatically
extinguished by death and became merged with
the naked owner.
Surviving Usufructuaries:
-Since the usufructuaries were instituted
simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo,
the death of the three usufructuaries did not
extinguish the usufruct. The surviving
usufructuaries are entitled to receive the shares
corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries,
the usufruct to continue until the death of the
last usufructuary.
Trial Court: In favor of Salamat
Issue: Whether the eleven surviving
usufructuaries of the fishpond in question are
the ones entitled to the fruits that would have
corresponded to the three deceased
usufructuaries or the naked owner Jose V.
Salamat.
Held:
-Yes. Article 611 of the Civil Code provides "A
usufruct constituted in favor of several persons
living at the time of its constitution shall not be
extinguished until the death of the last survivor.
There is accretion among usufructuaries who are
constituted at the same time when one of them
dies before the end of the usufruct. The only
exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last
will and testament and the testator makes a
contrary provision. Here there is none.
-The testatrix constituted the usufruct in favor of
the children of her three cousins with the

particular injunction that they are the only ones
to enjoy the same as long as they live, from
which it can be implied that, should any of them
die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the
surviving ones. These provisions of the will are
clear. They do not admit of any other
interpretation.
134 - REYES VS GREY
Remedios died without ascendants or

descendants leaving her husband
Vicente (petitioner) and four siblings
who are supposed to inherit all of the
estate subject to the right of the husband
to a usufructuary interest of .
During administrative proceedings Jose

Grey (brother) was appointed as an
administrator.
CFI declared each sibling to be entitled to of

the estate subject to husbands right to usufruct.
Prior to his (Jose) determination as

administrator, the husbands right has
been sold to the siblings by execution of
deeds.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner has usufructuary rights

over the property.
HELD:
Yes. Though his right has been sold to the
siblings by execution of deeds, the right was
again conferred to him by the death of his wife
making him entitled to all fruits of the property
subject of the usufruct.

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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS

ATTY. HELI TOLENTINO

defendant and the damages incurred by the