Civpro Compiled

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS
Judge Sia
to receive the summons. In fact, CTC was
apprised about the civil action because of
Canave. Therefore, making her an authorized
person in the company.
The Supreme Court has also ruled that it
is not necessary that the person charged with the
defendants was specifically authorized to receive
documents. It is enough that he appears to be in
charge. In this case, Canave, a secretary whose
job description necessarily includes receiving
documents and other correspondence, would
have the semblance of authority to accept the
court documents. The Court emphasized the
importance of strict compliance of substitute
service, but if it is a way to escape liability, then
the Court must intervene.
The Court reverses the decision of the CA and
affirmed the decision of the RTC
If asked:
Consulta was the only defendant in the present
case because he was the only one who brought
the action. The right to due process must be
invoked.
SUMMONS
GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES INC.
(GSP) VS. RICARDO CONSULTA
Facts:
1. GSP filed a collection case against
Consar Trading Corporation (CTC), its
president, Ricardo Consulta and its vicepresident, Norberto Sarayba. GSP
alleged that CTC bought certain
merchandise from the former and
refused to pay for it.
2. RTC, before serving the summons, it
issued a writ of preliminary attachment.
The court then ordered the summons of
the defendants.
3. The sheriff, having failed to serve the
summons personally, resorted to
substitute service, which he left copies to
Agnes Canave, which was the secretary
of Sarayba and authorized
representative of both defendants.
4. Defendants failed to file their answers,
which the court declared them in default
and proceeded to hear GSPs evidence ex
parte, while the sheriff attached the land
of Consulta. The RTC ruled that
defendants were solidarily liable for
GSP.
5. Subsequently, Consulta filed for the
annulment of the decision of the RTC
before the CA, stating that he only found
out about the case because of the notice
of sale in regards to his land and he was
not properly served with summons
because Canava was not in charge of the
matter.
CA ruling- the sheriff did not properly served the
summons to defendants and ordered the case to
be remanded back to the trial court.
MACASAET VS CO JR.
Co (Respondent) sued Abante Tonight a

tabloid of general circulation for
publishing a libelous article on their
issue on June 6, 2000. Among those he
sued is Allen Macasaet (Petitioner) who
is the Editor in Chief.
Upon filing of the case by respondent,
summons were served by Sheriff Medina
who went to petitioners office on
September 18, 2000. In the morning, he
failed to deliver given that petitioner was
not in the office, on his second attempt
in the afternoon he still failed to serve
summons as he was informed that
petitioner was still on field.
Since Medina deemed the service futile,
he resorted to substituted service. After
which, petitioner filed for dismissal of
complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction
and the ineffectual service of summons.
RTC denied the motion on the ground that
efforts were properly exerted in service of
summons. Citing Sec 7 Rule 14 that Secretary of
the President, Editorial Assistant along with the
defendants wife were considered competent
persons to realize the importance of legal papers
hence they were considered duly authorized.
CA Denied affirming RTC decision.
Issue: WoN the CA erred in ruling that the

service of summons was not properly served, to
which the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction?
Ruling: Yes, the decision of the CA is reversed.
There was a valid substitute service of
summons on Consulta at his business place.
According to the sheriff, the substitute service of
summons was served to Canave, an authorized
representative of both defendants. This is prima
facie evidence and Consulta did not even present
evidence to rebut the presumption. Neither did
Consulta present clear evidence that Canave is
not an authorized person or was not competent

Judge Sia
ISSUE: W/N there was proper service of
summons
HELD:
Yes. Given that Sheriff Medina administered all
possible efforts to serve such summons by
attempting both in the morning and afternoon to
deliver such. Rule on service is rigidly enforced
to attain two main objectives: (1) vest in court
jurisdiction over defendant (2) afford defendant
an opportunity to be heard. Court held that if for
justifiable reasons the service of summons may
then be effected by (a) leaving a copy in the
residence to a person of suitable age and
discretion residing therein (b) leaving the copy
at his office of regular place with some
competent person in charge.
Petioners contention:
The substituted service on her husband
was valid and binding on her
In filing 2 motions for extension of time
to file answer, Agudo voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
RTC
Ruled in favor of Agudo and granted the
motion to dismiss. It held that since
Agudo was abroad at the time of the
service of summons, she was a resident
who was temporarily out of the country;
thus, service of summons may be made
only by publication.
DOCTRINE: If defendant cannot be properly

served within reasonable time, substituted
service maybe resorted to.
Petitioner directly appealed to SC

ISSUE:
PALMA V GALVEZ
Since she was temporarily out of the

country, service of summons on her
should conform to Sec 16 Rule 14 of ROC
(1) W/N there was a valid service of

summons on private respondent Agudo?
YES
(2) W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction over
private respondent? YES
Petitioner filed action for damages

against Philippine Heart Center, 2
doctors (Giron and Cruz) alleging they
removed her right ovary against her will
and tissues extracted from her during
the surgery; although subsequently
found, the label was not in her name.
She subsequently prayed for the
inclusion of additional defendants
(nurses of PHC) one of which was
private respondent Agudo. Summons
was then issued to them.
RTC process server then submitted his
return of summons stated that it was
served upon private respondent thru her
husband who received and signed it
because Agudo was out of the country.
Agudos counsel then filed a Notice of
Appearance and Motion for Extension to
File Answer and even filed for another
extension saying that the draft was
already finished, it just needed to be
sent to Agudo for her verification before
the Philippine Consulate in Ireland
(prayed for another 20 days to file
Answer)
HELD:
(1) YES
Considering that Agudo was temporarily
out of the country, the summons and
complaint may be validly served upon
her through substituted service.
SC said: A man temporarily out of the
country leaves a definite place of
resident or dwelling where is bound to
return. He also leaves his affairs to
someone who protects his interests and
communicates with him on matters
affecting his affairs or business.
Sec 7 Rule 14: If the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time,
service may be effected by (a) leaving
copies of the summons at defendants
residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing
thereinx x x x x
In this case, Agudo was out of the
country, the service of summons was
made at her residence with her husband
(Afredo), acknowledging the receipt.
Alfredo was presumably of suitable age
and discretion who was residing in that
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Motion

to Dismiss saying that
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
her because she was not properly served
with summons

Judge Sia
place and was competent to receive the
summons on her behalf.
Rothschild filed with the SC the petition

assailing the 9/8 decision and 12/28
resolution of the CA.
MAIN ISSUE: W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction
over Rothschild on account of the improper
service of summons
HELD: Yes. Rothschild still made a voluntary
appearance.
RATIO:
Service may be made on the resident
agent of the foreign entity which has
transacted business in the Philippines.
In case no agent, service will be made on
the designated government official.
There are four instances where in a nonresident defendant may be served with
summons by extraterritorial service:
(1) Action affects personal status of plaintiffs;
(2) Action relates to/subject of which is property
within the Philippines and defendant claims an
interest;
(3) Releif demanded consists in excluding
defendant from interest in property located in
the Philippines;
(4) Defendants property has been attached
within the Phil.
Extraterritorial service of summons
applies only where the action is in rem
or quasi in rem.
The case at bar is in personam. Since
Rothschild is not found in the
Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try
a case against it for impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction unless it
voluntarily appears in court.
Nonetheless, Rothschild made a
voluntary appearance by seeking
affirmative reliefs other than the
dismissal of case. It also participated in
the trial and availed of modes of
discovery such as interrogatories.
Art 2018 of Civil Code: If a contract which
purports to be for the delivery of goods,
securities or shares of stock is entered into with
the intention that the difference between the
price stipulated and the exchange or market
price at the time of the pretended delivery shall
be paid by the loser to the winner, the
transaction is null and void. The loser may
recover what he has paid.
(2) YES
When Agudo earlier invoked the
jurisdiction of RTC to secure affirmative
relief in her motions for additional time
to file answer, she voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of RTC and is
estopped from asserting otherwise.
We have held that filing of motions
seeking affirmative relief such as: to
admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration are
considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS
(AUSTRIALIA) LMTD v. LEPANTO
CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY
FACTS:
Lepanto filed with the RTC a complaint
against Rothschild asking for the
declaration of the loan and hedging
contracts between parties as void for
being contrary to Article 2018.
Lepanto was authorized to personally
bring summons and complaint to the
Philippine Consulate General in
Australia to effect service of summons
on Rothschild.
Rothschild filed a Special Appearance
w/ Motion to Dismiss (MD) on the ff
grounds:
(1) Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
petitioner due to improper service of summons;
(2) Complaint failed to state cause of action;
(3) Action barred by estoppel;
(4) Lepanto did not come to court w/ clean
hands.Denied. Motion for Reconsideration
(MR) also denied.
Rothschild also filed a Motion to Leave
to take deposition of Murray and a
Motion for Leave to Serve
Interrogatories.
CA: Rothschild filed Petition for
Certiorari alleging RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the MD.
This was dismissed in 9/8/06 on the
ground that MD is an interlocutory
order and it cannot be the subject of
Petition for Certiorari. MR was also
denied MR on 12/28/06.
SANTOS V PNOC EXPLORATION

CORPORATION
FACTS:

Judge Sia
R filed a complaint for a sum of money

against P in the RTC of Pasig City
Personal service of summons to P failed
because P could not be located in his last
known address despite earnest efforts.
Subsequently, the Trial court allowed
service of summons by publication on
respondents motion
R caused the publication to remate (a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines)
Thereafter, R submitted the affidavit of
service and sent a copy of the summons
via registered mail to Ps last known
address
When P failed to answer, R moved to
present his evidence ex parte. Thus, the
trial court granted the motion.
P filed an Omnibus MOR and to admit
attached answer, alleging that the
affidavit submitted by R was not in
accordance with the Rules of Court (Sec.
9, Rule 14) as it was not executed by the
clerk of court. P was also claiming that
he was denied due process because he
was not notified thereof. Lastly, he was
praying that Rs evidence ex parte will be
stricken off in the record and that his
answer be admitted.
R opposed the motion, insisting that it
complied with the Rules of service by
publication and pursuant to the said
order, P was already in default for
failure to file his answer within the
prescribed period.
b. TC taking cognizance of the case

despite lack of jurisdiction due
to improper service of summons
c. Failing to furnish him with
copies of its orders and
processes, and
d. Upholding technicality over
equity and justice
During the pendency of petition in CA,
TC rendered a decision ordering P to pay
with legal interest and costs of suit
CA: rendered its decision by sustaining the

orders of the TRIAL COURT and dismissing the
petition. It denied reconsideration.
P went to the SC and reiterates the

grounds he raised in the CA. He claims
that the rule on service by publication
under sec. 14 Rule 14 of the ROC applies
only to actions in rem and not actions in
personam like a complaint for a sum of
money. P also contends that the affidavit
of service of a copy of the summons
should have been prepared by the clerk
of court, not Rs messenger.
ISSUE: W/N the service of summons by

publication is properly served
RULING: Yes, since P could not be personally
served with summons despite diligent efforts to
locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and
was granted leave of court to effect service of
summons upon him by publication in a
newspaper with summons by publication. Thus,
P was properly served with summons by
publication.
TRIAL COURT: Denied Ps MOR

It held that the rules did not
require the affidavit of
complementary service by
registered mail to be executed
by the clerk of court
It also ruled that the due process
was observed because the order
was actually mailed to P
It also denied the motion to
admit Ps answer because the
same was filed beyond the
reglementary period
P assailed the orders of the trial court in
the CA via petition for certiorari, it
contended that
a. The orders were issued with
grave abuse of discretion
PETITION IS DENIED.
*the rules do not require that the affidavit of
complementary service may be executed by the
clerk of court.
*P voluntarily appeared in the action when he
filed the Omnibus MOR and to admit attached
answer. This was equivalent to service of
summons and vested the trial court with
jurisdiction over the person of P
*Action in rem and in pesonam- the present rule
now applies to any action, whether in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The old rule
is silent in this case; the court held that the
limited application of the old rule is to in rem
actions only. Thus, present rule must be
followed.

Judge Sia
TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES
CORPORATION vs. TING GUAN
TRADING CORPORATION
had voluntarily submitted to the courts

jurisdiction when it raised other arguments
apart from lack of jurisdiction in its motion to
dismiss.
CA: Respondent responded to the denials by
filing a petition for certiorari before the CA with
an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction.
In its Memorandum, petitioner argued that a
Rule 65 petition is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial of a motion to dismiss. It
pointed out that the proper recourse for
respondent was to file an answer and to
subsequently appeal the case. It also posited that
beyond the reglementary period for filing an
answer, respondent was barred from raising
other grounds for the dismissal of the case.
Petitioner also claimed that the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan since
the return of service of summons expressly
stated that Tejero was a corporate secretary.
In its decision dated July 5, 2006, the CA
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of respondent.
The CA held that petitioner failed to establish
that Tejero was respondents corporate
secretary.
The CA also ruled that a petition for certiorari is
the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
motion to dismiss if the ground raised in the
motion is lack of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, any of the grounds for the
dismissal of the case can be raised in a motion to
dismiss provided that the grounds were raised
before the filing of an answer.
The CA likewise ruled that petitioner properly
filed the complaint before the RTC-Makati.
Subsequently, both parties moved to
partially reconsider the CA decision..
(REFER TO THE ORIGINALS)
FACTS: Tung Ho is a foreign corporation

organized under the laws of Taiwan, Republic of
China. On the other hand, respondent Ting Guan
Trading Corp. (Ting Guan) is a domestic
corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines.
January 9, 2002: Respondent obligated itself
under a contract of sale to deliver heavy metal
scrap iron and steel to Petitioner.
International Court of Arbitration:
Petitioner filed a request for arbitration before
the ICC in Singapore after Respondent failed to
deliver the full quantity of the promised heavy
metal scrap iron and steel.
ICC ruled in favor of petitioner on June 18,
2004 and ordered Respondent to pay the
petitioner the following:
(1) actual damages in the amount of US$
659,646.15 with interest of 6% per annum from
December 4, 2002 until final payment;
(2) cost of arbitration in the amount of US $
47,000.00; and (3) legal costs and expenses in
the amount of NT $ 761,448.00 and US $
34,552.83.7
RTC of Makati, Branch 145 (OCTOBER 24
2004): Petitioner filed an action against
respondent for the recognition and enforcement
of the arbitral award before this court.
Respondent moved to dismiss the case based on
Petitioners lack of capacity to sue and for
prematurity.
Respondent subsequently filed a supplemental
motion to dismiss based on improper venue.
Respondent argued that the complaint should
have been filed in Cebu where its principal place
of business was located.
The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss
in an order dated May 11, 2005.
Respondent moved to reconsider the order and
raised the RTCs alleged lack of jurisdiction over
its person as additional ground for the dismissal
of the complaint.
Respondent insisted that Ms. Fe Tejero, on
whom personal service was served, was not its
corporate secretary and was not a person
allowed under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court to receive a summons. It also asserted that
petitioner cannot enforce the award in the
Philippines without violating public policy as
Taiwan is not a signatory to the New York
Convention.
The RTC denied the motion in an order dated
November 21, 2005 and ruled that respondent
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent specifically:
a) Whether Tejero was the proper person
to receive the summons
SC RULING
The petition is meritorious.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent.
A. Tejero was not the proper person to
receive the summons
Nonetheless, the court sees no reason to disturb
the lower courts finding that Tejero was not a
corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the
proper person to receive the summons under

Judge Sia
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. This
Court is not a trier of facts; we cannot reexamine, review or re-evaluate the evidence and
the factual review made by the lower courts. In
the absence of compelling reasons, we will not
deviate from the rule that factual findings of the
lower courts are final and binding on this Court.
The decision and the March 12, 2008 resolution
of the CA was REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
ADC filed a Notice of Appeal which was

granted.
AHVAI filed before CA. CA upheld the
first decision in favor of AHVAI saying
that ADC has no legal personality to sue.
ISSUE: W/N ADC has capacity to sue

Lack of capacity to sue - refers to a plaintiffs
general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of
juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party.
ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS.

ALABANG HILLS VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION INC. AND TINIO
In the instant case, petitioner lacks capacity

to sue because it no longer possesses juridical
personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse
of the three-year grace period provided under
Section 122 of the Corporation Code
ADCs corporate registration was revoked. Based
on Sec. 122 of the Corp. Code, it had three years,
or until May 26, 2006, to prosecute or defend
any suit by or against it.
Facts:
ADC is the developer of Alabang Hills
Village and still owns certain parcels of
land that are yet to be sold and the open
spaces that have not yet been donated.
Sept. 2006 ADC learned that AHVAI
constructed a multi-purpose hall and a
swimming pool on one of the parcels of
land still owned by ADC without the
latters consent and approval.
Despite demands, AHVAI failed to stop
the construction.
ADC filed a complaint for injunction and
damages before RTC Muntinlupa
against AHVAI and Tinio.
AHVAI, in turn, claims that:
o ADC has no legal capacity to
sue since its existence as a
registered corporate entity was
revoked by the SEC.
o ADC has no cause of action
because by law it is no longer
the absolute owner but is merely
holding the property in question
in trust for the benefit of AHVAI
as beneficial owner.
o The subject lot is part of the
open space required by law to
be provided in the subdivision.
o They (AHVAI) be declared as
the owner of the land.
RTC dismissed ADCs petition and is in
favor of AHVAI on the grounds that
ADC has no legal capacity to sue, the
land is a reserved area for the beneficial
use of the homeowners, as mandated by
law and, that the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the
RTC, has exclusive jurisdiction over the
dispute between petitioner and
respondents.
The subject complaint, however, was filed only

on October 19, 2006, more than three years after
such revocation. Petitioner lacks capacity to
sue because it is already non-existent and
also beyond the 3 year period provided by
Corp. Code.
Petition is denied. SC upheld CA decision.
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE
MONTEFALCON vs. RONNIE S. VASQUEZ
FACTS:
Petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a
Complaint4 for acknowledgment and
support against respondent Ronnie S.
Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City.
Alleging that her son Laurence is the
illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed
that Vasquez be obliged to give support
to co-petitioner Laurence
Montefalcon, Petitioner Dolores added
that she and Vasquez are not legally
married, and that Vasquez has his own
family.
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and
complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao,
Nabua, Camarines Sur. Vasquez's
grandfather received them as Vasquez
was in Manila. Vasquez's mother
returned the documents to the clerk of
court, who informed the court of the
non-service of summons.

Judge Sia
personal,or if this is not feasible within a

reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is
of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers
are contractual employees. It is therefore
common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often
has a temporary residence in the urban areas
like Metro Manila, where majority of the
manning agencies hold offices, aside from his
home address in the province where he
originates.
Petitioners then filed a motion to declare

Vasquez in default. The court denied it
for lack of proper service of summons.
The court issued an alias summons on
Vasquez at Taguig upon petitioners'
motion. The deputy sheriff served it by
substituted service on Vasquez's
caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's
return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as
Vasquez's surname. Another alias
summons was issued, also received by
Bejer.
RTC Naga City declared Vasquez in
default for failure to file an answer
despite the substituted service of
summons. Vasquez was furnished with
court orders and notices of the
proceedings at his last known address,
but these were returned as he had
allegedly moved to another place and
left no new address and granted
petitioners prayers through Vasquez
silence and submission of Laurences
birth certificate as a prima facie
evidence. It ordered Vasquez to give
support to his illegitimate child and pay
the expenses and attorneys fees.
On his appeal, argued that the trial court
erred in trying and deciding the case as
it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his
person, as well as in awarding P5,000per-month support, which was allegedly
"excessive and exorbitant." The
appellate court noted that the service of
summons on Vasquez was "defective" as
there was no explanation of
impossibility of personal service and an
attempt to effect personal service.
CA granted. Decision of RTC was set
aside.
Petitioner filed MR and stating that at
any attempt at personal service of
summons was needless as Vasquez
already left for abroad. CA denied.
Hence, present petition.
In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from

Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City
when the complaint was filed. Notice may then
be taken that he has established a residence in
either place. Residence is a place where the
person named in the summons is living at the
time when the service was made, even though he
was temporarily abroad at the time. As an
overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino
resident temporarily out of the country. Hence,
service of summons on him is governed by Rule
14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the
Philippines. When any action is commenced
against a defendant who ordinarily resides
within the Philippines, but who is temporarily
out of it, service may, by leave of court,
be also effected out of the Philippines, as under
the preceding section.
Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words
"may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other
methods of service of summons allowed under
the Rules may also be availed of by the serving
officer on a defendant-seaman.
Personal service of summons was not practicable
since the defendant was temporarily out of the
country. To proceed with personal service of
summons on a defendant-seaman who went on
overseas contract work would not only be
impractical and futile it would also be absurd.
In this case, the substituted service in Taguig
was valid and justified because previous
attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the
summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were
evidently exerted in the conduct of the
concerned sheriffs in the performance of their
official duty. Also, the person who received the
alias summons was of suitable age and
discretion, then residing at Vasquez's dwelling.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a valid substituted service of
summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court
with jurisdiction over his person.
HELD: YES.
The absence in the final sheriff's return of a

statement about the impossibility of personal
service does not conclusively prove that the
service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at
RATIO:
To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant, service of summons must be

Judge Sia
personal service may have been submitted by the
plaintiff during the hearing of any incident
assailing the validity of the substituted service
had Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard.
In fact, he was declared in default. It was only
when a judgment against him was rendered by
the trial court that he questioned the validity of
service of summons before the appellate court.
Such failure to appear, and then later to question
the court's jurisdiction over his person, should
not be taken against herein petitioners.
Sep 25, 2007 hearing did not push through so

RTC issued another notice setting the hearing
for motion for reconsideration on Oct 26,2007
Oct 27, 2007 directed parties to file
additional pleadings after which the resolution
for MR would be submitted
Dec 19, 2007
RTC denied spouses Cabrera's MR on
the ground that the spouses violated Sec
4, Rule 15 of ROC, wherein it states that
every motion required to be heard
should be SERVED by the MOVANT at
least 3 days BEFORE the date of the
hearing to ensure receipt by the other
RTC held that the August 7 decision is
final due to this failure of the spouses to
comply the the 3-day notice
requirement.
Petition Granted. CA reversed and set aside.
MOTIONS
CABRERA v NG
Felix Ng filed complaint for sum of

money against spouses Cabrera.
Ng alleged that they issued him 3 checks
when he presented the checks they were
all dishonored because they were drawn
from closed account
Spouses admitted issuing the (31k and
38k checks) but they denied having
issued the 2.M check. alleging that the
check was forcibly taken from them by
their son Richard Ng
RTC (August 7, 2007)
ordered spouses Cabrera to pay 2M(plus
interest), 50k(moral damages) 20k(atty's fees),
10k (litigation expenses)
Spouses Cabrera appealed to CA:

the 3-day notice requirement was
already rendered moot because the
original date (August 17) set for the
hearing of MR did not push through and
it was only heard on (Oct 26) that was
after respondent filed their opposition to
the MR.
CA affirmed RTC ruling (both RTC & CA
ruling in favor of Ng)
ISSUE: W/N it was right for RTC and CA to deny
spouses Cabrera's motion for reconsideration for
failure to comply with the 3-day notice rule
under Sec 4, Rule 15? NO
HELD:
The motion for reconsideration filed by
the Spouses was reset by RTC twice. It
was only heard on Oct 26. More than 2
months had passed since respondent
received a copy of the said motion for
recon on August 21.
Respondents were given sufficient time
to study motion and the come up with
their arguments and they were even able
to filed their opposition (Sep 20)
Even though he received it 4 days late,
his right to due process was not violated
because he was still able to argue his
position afterwards.
Cabrera filed a motion for reconsideration at

RTC wherein the hearing for MR was set on Aug
17, 2007. They sent their motion for
reconsideration to Ng via registered mail which
was received by Ng on August 21, 2007
BUT the motion for reconsideration was not
heard on the set date of hearing because the
acting judge just assumed office
August 28 - RTC issued a notice, setting the
motion for reconsideration hearing on Sep 25,
2007
Sep 20, 2007
- Ng filed opposition to that motion for recon
alleging that the motion was a mere scrap of
paper since it violated the 3-day notice
requirement because:
* Aug 14 - spouses sent mail
* Aug 17 - scheduled date of hearing
* Aug 21 - Ng received mail regarding the motion
for reconsideration
DOCTRINE:
General rule:
3 day notice is mandatory because it is
an integral component of procedural
due process. It was established for the
benefit the adverse party and not the

Judge Sia
movant. The purpose of which is to
avoid surprises upon the adverse party
and to grant it sufficient time to study
the motion and to come up with
augments.
Clarification. Both were denied by the

RTC. Sarmiento should file it before
MeTC.
RTC reconsidered its previous Order by
granting Sarmientos motion for
Immediate Execution, but denied
Zaratans Motion for Clarification.
Zaratan filed before CA a Petition for
Certiorari which was granted.
Sarmiento filed MR. It was denied.
Issue #1: W/N Zaratans petition for certiorari
should have been dismissed in the first place
Ruling: No, it was correctly filed.
Zaratan correctly filed said petition pursuant to
Section 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
No appeal may be taken: x x x x (d) An
order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal; In all the above instances where
the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate civil action under Rule 65
Issue #2: W/N Zaratans failure to file Motion of
Extension of Time is fatal
Ruling: No
Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court
which provides: SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion.
Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party, every written motion shall be set
for hearing by the applicant. Every written
motion required to be heard and the notice of
the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice.
General Rule: Notice of motion is required
where a party has a right to resist the relief
sought by the motion and principles of natural
justice demand that his right be not affected
without an opportunity to be heard. The threeday notice required by law is intended not for
the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises
upon the adverse party and to give the latter
time to study and meet the arguments of the
motion. Principles of natural justice demand
that the right of a party should not be affected
without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
Exception: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the
Exception:
The three-day notice rule is not absolute
a liberal construction of the
procedural rules is proper where the
lapse in the literal observance of a rule
of procedure has not prejudiced the
adverse party and has not deprived the
court of its authority.
Wherefore, decision is REVERED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to RTC to
resolve the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the spouses on the merits within 5 days from the
finality of this Decision.
SARMIENTO VS. ZARATAN
Facts:
Sept. 2002 Sarmiento filed an
ejectment case against Zaratan before
MeTC of QC It was in favor of
Sarmiento. It ordered Zaratan to:
o Pay Sarmiento monthly rentals
of P3500 for his stay in the
premises
o To pay appearance and
attorneys fees
Zaratan filed an appeal before RTC of
QC. RTC directed her to submit a
memorandum in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 7(b) of Rule 40 of the
ROC and petitioner to file a reply
memorandum within 15 days from
receipt
o Her counsel received the notice
of May 19, 2003 and had until
Jun. 3, 2003 but failed to file
for Motion of Extension of Time
to finish the memorandum.
Zaratan still filed her memorandum but
RTC dismissed the appeal as it was
submitted late and there was no notice
of hearing.
o The counsel said he was sick for
a week, lack of staff to do the
work, and their office got
flooded damaging the wirings of
their computer.
Sarmiento filed a Motion for Execution
while Zaratan filed a Motion for

Judge Sia
fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing tha
the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or
circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the
present case.
Petition denied. CA affirmed.
HELD: No, they did not fail to comply.

Execution is a matter of right.
RATIO:
The general rule is that every motion
must contain the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing and
that there must be proof of service. It is
not absolute. There are motions that can
be acted upon ex parte if it would not
cause prejudice to the other party.
The motion for execution here is one of
those motions. The judgment sought to
be executed was already final and
executory and all the issues between
parties are deemed resolved. All that is
left is the execution which is a matter of
right and the issuance of the writ which
is a ministerial duty of the trial courts.
So, Spouses Co had every right to the
issuance of a writ of execution, even
without notice to the defeated party
(Anama), and the RTC had the
ministerial duty to enforce it.
Judgment debtor need not be given
advance notice.
Records show that the motion for
execution was actually duly served and
received by the counsel-of-record,
Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law
Offices, as evidenced by a received mark.
The 3 day notice rule is not absolute.
The test is the presence of opportunity
to be heard, as well as to have time to
study the motion and meaningfully
oppose the grounds on which it is based.
*Section 1 paragraph 1 of Rule 39 states
Execution as a matter of right. Paragraph 2 and
Section 2 require notice to the adverse party and
it refers to a different situation, probably one
where there is an appeal to the final judgment
(?).
ANAMA v. CA
FACTS:
1973: Anama and Philippine Savings
Bank (PSB) entered into a Contract to
Buy to buy the latters property on an
installment basis.
Anama defaulted in paying his
obligatiosn so PSB rescinded the
contract.
PSB then sold the property to Spouses
Co. They paid the purchase price in full,
caused the registration and were issued
a TCT.
Anama filed with the RTC a complaint
for declaration of nullity of deed of sale,
cancellation of TCT and specific
performance w/ damages against PSB,
Spouses Co and the Register of Deeds of
Metro Manila dismissed in 1991.
Anama appealed to the CA and SC
denied. They upheld validity of sale.
SC decision became final executory on
6/12/2004. Co Spouses moved for the
execution which was granted by the RTC
on 11/25/2005.
Anama questions the RTC order
regarding the Spouses Cos motion for
execution before the CA. He alleged that
there was no notice of hearing addressed
to the parties and it lacked the
mandatory affidavit of service.
CA dismissed the aforementioned
petition. A motion for execution of a
final judgment could be acted upon the
RTC ex parte and is therefore excused
from the said mandatory requirements.
Also, that the spouses resorted to
personal delivery in serving their motion
for execution did not render the motion
pro forma.
ISSUE: W/N PSB and Spouses Co failed to

comply with the rule on notice and hearing when
they filed their motion for execution
CASALLA VS PEOPLE
Lamberto Casalla (Petitioner) issued two

checks under the Bank of Commerce to
Milagros Estevanes (Respondent) as
payment of his wifes obligations. The 2
checks were dishonored and respondent
filed against petitioner 2 counts of BP 22
(Bouncing Checks Law).
MTC convicted petitioner of crime
RTC Affirmed the judgment of lower court;
petitioner then filed for Motion for
10

Judge Sia
Reconsideration on February 8, 1994 DENIED
for absence of a notice of hearing.
-
4. During the hearing of the motion on Feb

26, the court re-scheduled it to April 2
because it cannot be accommodated and
all parties were notified. Meanwhile, the
respondent only received the copy
of the motion for reconsideration
on March 3 (6 days after the
hearing on Feb 23).
5. Again, the hearing that was scheduled
for April 2 was again re-scheduled on
May 7. The hearing which was scheduled
on May 7 was yet again pushed back to
Aug 6. The hearing occurred on Aug 6.
6. After the hearing, respondent filed for a
motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioner did not comply with the 3day notice rule which did not stop
the running of the appeal and
rendered the decision final.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner for failure to appeal
within the 15 days prescriptive period, making
the decision final and executory. The petitioner
filed an Omnibus motion, but the court denied
it.
CA Ruling: Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari but it was denied by the appellate
court. It held that the 3-day notice rule under sec
4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is mandatory and noncompliance is fatal.
Issue: Whether or not the 3-day notice rule on
the motion for reconsideration was violated by
petitioner?
Ruling:
The 3-day notice rule is not absolute and
should be construed liberally when the rights of
the adverse party was not affected. Rules of
procedure are tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, and courts must avoid
their strict compliance if it would frustrate
rather than facilitate substantial justice.
The purpose of the 3-day notice rule is to avoid
surprises that may sprung upon the adverse
party, who must be given time to prepare and
meet the arguments in the motion for the
resolution of the court. The test is the presence
of opportunity to be heard as well as to have
time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the
grounds upon which it is based.
At the present case, because said hearing
was reset 3 times. It gave respondent more than
5 months or enough time to prepare for the
motion for reconsideration given by petitioner.
In fact, respondent did file an opposition to the
MR of the petitioner. In view of the
circumstances of this case, we find that there
Petitioner then filed for 2nd MR on

February 22 (DENIED);while
respondent filed for Writ of Execution
on February 24 (GRANTED); followed
by petitioners opposition to the writ of
execution on March 3 (DENIED).
CA petitions were filed out of time and the

absence of notice of hearing treats the motion as
a mere scrap of paper and that his filing of a
second MR is not a remedy as well as it is also
filed out of time.
ISSUE: W/N Notice of Hearing is a requirement
in petitioners Motion for reconsideration
HELD:
Yes. According to the SC Notice of Hearing shall
be directed to the parties concerned and shall
state the time and place for hearing of the
motion are mandatory. In the case at bar since
there was an absence of the said notice there was
no suspension of the prescriptive period
rendering the motion as a mere piece of paper
and the second MR as one that is filed of of time
and prohibited under the rules.
PREYSLER VS. MANILA SOUTHCOAST
DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Facts: (Note: the dates are important!)
1. Petitioner, Fausto Preysler filed before
the MTC of Batangas a forcible entry
case against the respondent, Manila
Southcoast Development Corp. The
subject of the case was a parcel of land,
which was located in Sitio, Batangas.
The disputed land, which was within the
Transfer Certificate Title of petitioner, is
also within the TCT of respondent.
2. The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner
and ordered the respondent to vacate
the disputed land. The respondent
appealed the MTC decision to the RTC.
The RTC reversed the decision of the
MTC and ruled in favor of respondent.
3. Petitioner received the decision of the
RTC on Feb. 9, 2004, which they filed
for a motion for reconsideration. The
petitioner sent the copy of the MR
on Feb. 23 via registered mail,
which the hearing was on Feb 26.
11

Judge Sia
was substantial compliance with procedural due
process.
This motion is expressly

prohibited under Rule
70 Sec 13, it is not for
Zamora to move for the
declaration in default.
Instead, the trial court,
either motu propriu or
on motion of Zamora,
should render judgment
as the facts alleged in
the complaint might
warrant.
Failure to file an answer
under Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court might
result to a judgment in
default, not to a
declaration of default.
2. MTCCs reception of oral
testimony of Zamora is also a
procedural lapse.
Rule 70 envisioned the submission
only of affidavits of the witness(not
oral testimony) and other proofs on
the factual issues and other proofs
and requiring parties to submit
affidavits or other evidence upon
such matters.
The procedural lapses committed in this case are
beyond comprehension. The MTCC judge could
not have been unfamiliar with the prevailing
procedure, considering that the revised version
of Rule 70, although taking effect only on July 1,
1997,was derived from the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, in effect since November
15, 1991. It was not likely, therefore, that the
MTCC judge committed the lapses out of his
unfamiliarity with the relevant rule. The MTCC
judge should not forget that the rules of
procedure were always meant to be implemented
deliberately, not casually, and their noncompliance should only be excused in the higher
interest of the administration of justice.
Grant the petition for review on certiorari; set
aside the decision promulgated on July 3, 2002
by the Court of Appeals; and dismiss the
complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of a
cause of action.
Petition granted. The decision of the CA is set

aside.
DOLORES MACASLANG VS. ZAMORA
FACTS:
March 10, 1999: Zamora filed for unlawful
detainer with MTCC, alleging among others that:
1. Macaslang sold to them a residential lot in
Sabang, Davao City.
2. After the sale, macaslang requested to be
allowed to live in the house. Zamora
granted the reliance on Macaslangs
promise to vacate as soon as she would be
able to find a new residence.
3. After one year, Zamora demanded(with
letter) upon the defendant to vacate but she
failed to refuse.
4. Zamora sought the help of the Lupon, but
no settlement was reached as shown by
certification to file.
Despite the due service of summons, Macaslang
did not file an answer. Hence, MTCC declared
her in default.
MTCC: In favor of Zamora, ordered Macaslang
to vacate, pay attorneys fees, and rental until
they have shall vacated the properties in
question.
Macaslang appealed to RTC alleging that:
Extrinsic fraud
Meritorious defense: there was no actual sake
considering that the deed of absolute sale relied
upon is a patent nullity as her signature therein
was procured through fraud and trickery.
RTC ruled: in favor of Macaslang and dismissed
Zamoras complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. The same may be refilled in the same
court by alleging the COA, if any.
Zamoras motion for Execution of Judgment of
the lower court is rendered moot by this
judgment.
CA: On appeal, reversed RTC decision for having
no basis.
Issue:
WON there was violation of the Rules on
Summary Procedure. YES
AQUINO vs. AURE

Facts:
The subject of this involves a parcel of
land.
Held:
MTCC committed procedural lapses.
1. MTCC granted the motion to
declare in default for failure to
file an answer.
12

Judge Sia
JOINDER OF ISSUES
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors

Inc, filed a complaint for ejectment
against Aquino before MeTC.
In their complaint Aure and Aure
Lending alleged that they acquired the
subject property from Aquino.
Aure claimed that after the Sps. Aquino
received substantial consideration for
the sale of the subject property, they
refused to vacate.
Aquino countered that the complaint
lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure
Lending do not have any legal right over
the property.
Aquino admitted that there was a sale
governed by MOA.
PACANA-CONTRERAS VS. ROVILA

WATER SUPPLY INC.
Facts:
1. The children of Luciano and Lourdes
Pacana, namely, Rebecca and Rosalie
(petitioners) filed a complaint before the
RTC for accounting and damages
against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and
Marisa (respondents).
2. Petitioners alleged that they were in the
family business of distributing water in
Cebu, and that Lilia was a former
trusted employee, who hid, burned and
ransacked the family files. The
petitioners further alleged that Lilia
posted security guards to prevent
members of the Pacana family from
operating the business. She was able to
claim ownership over the family
business through a corporation name,
Rovilla Water Supply Inc. (Rovilla
inc). The respondents conspired with
one another, and were able to form the
respondent corporation and took over
the family business.
3. Petitioners filed the complaint in their
own name, although Lourdes authorized
Rosalie by means of a special power of
attorney. A motion to dismiss was filed
by the respondents, but it was denied by
the RTC.
4. An amended complaint was filed, with
leave of court, when Lourdes died. The
sworn declaration and SPA is attached
to the amended complaint, but the
caption remained the same.
Subsequently, Luciano also died.
5. The respondent filed their answer. At
the subsequent pre-trial, the
respondents manifested to the RTC that
a substitution of parties is required due
to the deaths of Lourdes and Luciano.
The respondents manifested that they
would seek the dismissal of the
complaint because petitioners are not
the party-in-interest.
RTC Ruling: It denied the respondents motion
to dismiss on the ground that it was filed out of
time.
CA Ruling: Reversed the decision of the RTC on
the ground that there was grave abuse of
discretion. The court ruled that petitioners are
MeTC: In favor of Aquino and dismissed the

complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure
Lending for noncompliance with the barangay
conciliation process.
RTC: Affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on
the same ground that the dispute was not
brought before the barangay council for
conciliation before it was filed in court. [Failure
to comply constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the action]
Aure appealed the adverse RTC decision with the
CA arguing that the lower court erred in
dismissing his complaint for lack of cause of
action. Also, misjoinder of parties was not a
proper ground for the dismissal of his complaint.
Furthermore, MeTC erred in dismissing his
complaint on the ground of noncompliance with
the barangay conciliation process.
CA: reversed the decision of MeTC and RTC.
CA declared that the failure of Aure to subject
the matter to barangay conciliation is not a
jurisdictional law and it will not affect the
sufficiency of this complaint.
SC: the barangay justice system was established
primarily as a means of easing up the congestion
of cases in the judicial courts.
ISSUE: Whether nonrecourse to the barangay
conciliation is a jurisdiction of law.
SC: Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the
jurisdiction of the METC after having submitted
herself voluntarily thereto.
-The failure of Aquino in an ejectment suit to
specifically allege the fact that there was no
compliance with the barangay conciliation
procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense.
-CA decision AFFIRMED.
-Petition is DENIED.
13

Judge Sia
not the real party-in-interest since they are
authorized by means of SPA by their parents.
subpoena are the officers and not the bank itself

therefore they are not the adverse parties. The
RTC was lenient regarding the improper notice
of hearing but was strict in applying Sec 1-6 of
Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. It argued that the
persons who are subpoenaed are the very parties
that represent the respondent
CA Affirmed RTC decision
Issue: WoN the motion to dismiss by

respondents is deemed waived for failure to be
filed on time?
Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The
motion to dismiss based on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action is deemed waived for
not being filed on time.
The period to file a motion to dismiss as
provided for in Sec. 1 Rule 16 is before the filing
of the answer. Equally important is Sec. 1 Rule 9
which states that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an
answer is deemed waived, except for the
following grounds: 1) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis
pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4) prescription.
Since the ground of which the respondents based
their motion is not part of the exception, then it
must be filed on time or is waived. The rules are
clear and require no interpretation. The
dismissal of the case based on the grounds
invoked by the respondents are specifically
covered by Rule 16 and Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court which set a period when they should be
raised; otherwise, they are deemed waived. The
purpose for this is to eliminate the element of
surprise, which the parties are expected to raise
all issues of law and fact that they intent to raise
at the trial.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners can compel Metrobank

officers to testify as their witnesses
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition
given that no written interrogatories were served
by petitioner. The purpose of the rule is to
prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays.
Written interrogatories serve as limit to inquiry
on what is relevant to the case and to prevent the
calling party from harassing the adverse party.
In the case at bar, the compelling of Metrobank
officers as their witness is deemed improper
since they are building their case based on the
evidence of their opponent and that the burden
of proof lies with the petitioners and not to
Metrobank.
Further, the rule does not only protect adverse
parties from unwarranted surprises but also
from harassment in the witness stand that may
weaken its cause as a result of the calling partys
being bound to their testimony.
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION VS. CAMERON
GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT,
INC.
AFULUGENCIA VS METOPOLITAN BANK

AND TRUST CO.
Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia

(Petitioners) filed a complaint for
nullification of mortgage, foreclosure,
auction sale and other documents with
damages against Metrobank
(Respondent). Along with this, they filed
a Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum requiring Metrobank
officers to testify as their initial
witnesses and to bring documents
relative to their loan.
In opposition, Metrobank as adverse
party argued that there was a lack of
proper notice in hearing and that they
cannot be compelled to testify since they
were not initially served with written
interrogatories.
RTC Ruled in favor of respondents; despite
petitioners claim that the subject of the
Eagleridge Development Corporation

(EDC) and sureties Naval and Oben are
the defendants in a collection suit
initiated by Export and Industry Bank
(EIB) at RTC
By virtue of Deed of Assignment, EIB
transferred EDC's loan obligations of
10M to respondent Cameron. (Basically,
petitioners need to pay/reimburse
Cameron so that the obligation may be
extinguished)
Cameron filed a Motion to

Substitute/Join EIB (granted by TC)
Eagleridge filed a Motion for
Production/Inspection of the Loan
Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA)
referred to in the Deed of Assignment
Cameron filed its Comment:
14

Judge Sia
Eaglridge did not show "good cause" for

the production of the LSPA and it is
irrelevant to the case.
Petitioner Eagleridge filed its reply:
It was for a good cause because the
Deed of Assignment merely states "For
value received".
Due to the loan obligations, it may be
extinguished if it may be reimbursed up
to the extent of the amount paid by
Cameron in the acquisition thereof.
(relying the application of Art 1634 of
the NCC provided by Sec 12 Article 3 of
RA 9182 (Special Purpose Vehicle Law,
refer to case for the provision)
Hence, it becomes necessary to verify
the amount of the consideration from
the LSPA, considering that the Deed of
Assignment was silent on this matter.
RTC - denied the motion for production saying

there was failure to show "good cause" for the
production of the LSPA and failure to show that
the LSPA is material/contain evidence relevant
to the issue involved in the action. No need for
its production because it is enough that Cameron
showing that it has acquired the account of the
petitioners pursuant to the SPV Law has
produced the Deed of Assignment
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (eventually denied by
RTC)
CA (3rd Division) dismissed the petition saying:
there was a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping
(due to lack of Board Resolution
authorizing Oben, who is one of the
petitioners, to sign on behalf of
Eagleridge) and;
failure to attach the copy of the
complaint (dismissed from mere
technicality)
essential for the fair settlement of

expeditious trial of the case.
Although it is a judicial discretion, it
should be arbitrarily denied because this
would bar access to relevant evidence
that may be used by a party-litigant and
hence, would violate due process.
The test to be applied by the trial judge
is one of reasonableness and
practicability.
The claim of Cameron against
Eagleridge relies entirely on the validity
of the Deed of Assignment. Hence, it is
incumbent upon Cameron to allow
petitioners to inspect all documents
relevant to that Deed, especially that the
LSPA were referred to and identified in
the Deed itself,
As pointed out by petitioners, the Deed
of Assignment merely states "For value
received". The appropriate information
would be supplied by the LSPA. So that
in order to match the price paid by
respondent for the acquisition of the
loan, petitioner must be provided with
the necessary information to make a
reasonable proposal for reimbursement.
Due to the virtual refusal and denial of
the LSPA, petitioners were never given
the chance to reimburse Cameron which
the latter paid.
CHING v. CHENG
FACTS:
Antonio Ching owned several business
and properties including Po Wing
Properties. He had children with two
women: Ramon Ching with Lucina
Santos, his common law wife; Joseph
and Jaime Cheng with Mercees Igne, his
housemaid.
Lucina Santos was entrusted with the
distribution of his estate when Antonio
fell ill. She handed the titles to Ramon
for safekeeping. Antonio recovered and
demanded the return of the titles. He
was later murdered.
Ramon allegedly induced Mercedes and
her children to sign an agreement and
waiver of their share for a 22.5 million
consideration. Ramon never paid them
and he named himself as the sole heir.
According to Ramon, the Ching family
association influenced him to give
ISSUE: W/N the lower court was wrong in

denying the production/inspection of the LSPA?
YES
HELD:
The provision on production and
inspection of documents is one of
the modes of discovery, to enable the
party and the courts to discover all
relevant facts connected with the case
pending before it.
It should be liberally construed to
provide litigants w/ information
15

Judge Sia
Mercedes and her children financial aid

for their service. He was also summoned
by the association to execute an affidavit
of settlement of estate.
Ramon was found to be the primary
suspect in the murder.
FIRST CASE: The Chengs filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of
titles. Po Wing Properties (defendant;
Ramon is its primary stockholder) filed
a MD on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Granted. However, Chengs
and Santos were given 15 days to file the
appropriate pleading. They did not do
so.
SECOND CASE: Chengs and Santos filed
a complaint for annulment with TRO
and preliminary injunction. Chengs and
Santos filed MD that it be without
prejudice. Summons not yet served on
Ramon and Po Wing. Granted without
prejudice. Ramon and Po Wing filed MR
arguing dismissal should have been with
prejudice.
THIRD CASE: Chengs and Santos filed
complaint for disinheritance and nullity
with TRO and preliminary injunction.
MD on ground of res judicata, litis
pendencia, forum-shopping and failure
to state of cause of action denied.
Ramon and Po Wing filed MR. Denied.
FIRST CERTIORARI: MR of SECOND
CASE was denied. Ramon and Po Wing
filed petition for certiorari with CA
questioning the dismissal of the second
case. CA upheld the dismissal and ruled
that the two-dismissal rule did not
apply.
SECOND CERTIORARI: Ramon and Po
Wing filed petitioner for certiorari
assailing the denial of their MR in the
THIRD CASE.
1.
There was a previous case

dismissed by a competent court;
2. Both cases were based
on/include the same claim;
3. Both notices for dismissal were
filed by the plaintiff;
4. MD filed by plaintiff was
consented to by the defendant
on the ground that the latter
satisfied the claims of the
former;
Failure to file appropriate pleadings in
the first case did not make the dismissal
an adjudication upon the merits. No
bearing.
Under Rule 16, a party may re-file the
action subject to certain exceptions.
During the third case, there was one
dismissal by plaintiffs and one by
defendants.
Because there was an MR, the second
case was (and is) still pending when the
third case was filed.. Technically, there
was forum shopping but the court did
not strictly apply it considering they
sought the dismissal of the second case
due to counsel not amply protecting
their interests. The third case was only
to get the case moving with a better
cause of action and counsel.
Applying the twin-dismissal rule and
rule on forum shopping would not serve
the ends of substantial justice.
SALES v. SABINO
FACTS: In RTC Pasig City, Cyril Sabino filed an
amended complaint for damages against, among
others, Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved
in the accident which ultimately caused the
death of Sabinos son, Elbert.
Before any responsive pleading could be filed,
Sabino, notified thedefendants that he will take
the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before
the Clerk of Court, RTC- Pasig City.
ISSUE: W/N the two-dismissal rule is applicable

HELD: No. Dismissal of the first case was upon
motion of the defendants under Rule 16 while
the second was by the plaintiffs under Rule 17.
On Dec. 27, 1995 and resumed on Jan. 3, 1996,

the deposition on oral examination of Buaneres
Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court of
Pasig, in the presence and with the active
participation of Sales counsel, Atty. Villacorta,
who even lengthily cross-examined the
deponent. In the course of trial, respondent had
the deposition of Buaneres Corral marked as her
Exhibits DD and EE with submarkings.
RATIO:
Dismissals under Rule 17 are without
prejudice except when it is the second
time that plaintiff caused the dismissal.
Requisites for the two dismissal rule to
apply:
16

Judge Sia
proves the fact of Corral having left the country
on the date mentioned. It does not establish that
he has not returned since then and is unavailable
to be present in court to personally testify.
While depositions may be used as evidence in
court proceedings, they are generally not meant
to be a substitute for the actual testimony in
open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit
differently, a deposition is not to be used when
the deponent is at hand. Indeed,
any deposition offered during a trial to prove the
facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court, may be
opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay.
However,depositions may be used without the
deponent being called to the witness stand by
the proponent, provided the existence of certain
conditions is first satisfactorily established. 5
exceptions for the admissibility of
a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23.
Among these is when the witness is out of the
Philippines.
Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation,

Sabino made a Formal Offer of Exhibits, among
which are Exhibits DD and EE. Also offered
in evidence as Exhibit BB is a certification
from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the
May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres
Corral via Flight No. PR 658.
Sales opposed the admission of Exhs. DD and
EE and asked that they be expunged from the
records on the ground that the
jurisdictional requirements for
their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the
ROC were not complied with.
The TC admitted, among other evidence,
Sabinos Exhibits DD, EE and BB.
Sales MR was denied by the court so he went on
certiorari to the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the TC in admitting in
evidence the deposition (Exhibits DD and
EE).
TC determined that deponent Bueneres Corral

was abroad when the offer of his deposition was
made. This factual finding of absence or
unavailability of witness to testify deserves
respect, having been adequately substantiated.
The certification by the Bureau of Immigration
provides that evidentiary support. It is
customary for courts to accept statements of
parties as to the unavailability of a witness as a
predicate to the use of depositions. Had
deponent Buaneres Corral indeed returned to
the Philippines subsequent to his departure
via Flight No. PR 658, Sales could have
presented evidence to show such.
CA affirmed the TC and effectively denied due

course to and dismissed Sales recourse,
explaining that Sales active participation,
through counsel, during the taking of
subjectdeposition and adopting it as his own
exhibits, has thereby estopped him from
assailing the admissibility thereof as part of
Sabinos evidence.
Sales filed this petition.
ISSUES: (1) WON the requirements of Sec. 4,
Rule 24 (now Sec. 3) of the ROC were satisfied
by Sabino when it presented a certification
attesting to the fact that deponent has left the
country but silent as to won at the time
his deposition was offered in evidence deponent
is in the Philippines
(2) WON Sales, in cross-examining the deponent
during the taking of his deposition waived any
and all objections in connection therewith
(2) NO. As a rule, the inadmissibility of

testimony taken bydeposition is anchored on the
ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the
party against whom it is offered has no
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at
the time his testimony is offered. But it matters
not that opportunity for cross-examination was
afforded during the taking of the deposition; for
normally, the opportunity for cross-examination
must be accorded a party at the time the
testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing. In fine,
the act of cross-examining the deponent during
the taking of the deposition cannot, without
more, be considered a waiver of the right to
object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial
proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking
of the deposition, but objecting to its
admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did
HELD: (1) YES. Sales contends that none of

the conditions in Sec. 4, Rule 23 ROC exists to
justify the admission in evidence of Sabinos
Exhibits DD and EE. Hence, it was error for
the appellate court to have upheld
their admission. Discounting the probative value
of the certification from the Bureau of
Immigration (Exh. BB) that deponent
Buaneres Corral departed for abroad on May 28,
1996, Sales argues that said certification merely
17

Judge Sia
not assume inconsistent positions. He is not,
thus, estopped from challenging the
admissibility of the depositionjust because he
participated in the taking thereof.
Section 29, Rule 23 provides that, while errors

and irregularities indepositions as to
notice, qualifications of the officer conducting
thedeposition, and manner of taking
the deposition are deemed waived if not objected
to before or during the taking of the deposition,
objections to the competency of a witness or the
competency, relevancy, or materiality of
testimony may be made for the first time at the
trial and need not be made at the time of the
taking of thedeposition, unless they could be
obviated at that point.
While perhaps a bit anti-climactic to state at this

point, certiorari will not lie against an order
admitting or rejecting a deposition in evidence,
the remedy being an appeal from the final
judgment. For this reason, the CA could have
dismissed Sales invocation of its certiorari
jurisdiction.
PETITION DENIED. COSTS AGAINST THE

PETITIONER.
NOTE: The deposition-discovery procedure
simply advances the stage at which the
disclosure can be compelled from the time of
trial to the period preceding it thus reducing the
possibility of surprise. (Security Bank
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA
330 [2000])
OTERO V TAN
FACTS
Respondent Tan filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money with the
MTCC against Petitioner Otero, Tan
alleged
That on February 2000 to May
2001, Otero purchased petroleum
products from Tans Petron outlet in
Bukidnon.
Despite demands, Otero failed to
settle his obligations
Receipt of the summons and a copy of
the said complaint were served through
his wife, Grace Otero on Aug 31, 2005,
but Respondent Otero failed to file his
answer
18
Tan then filed a motion to declare Otero

in default for his failure to file his
answer
On the other hand, Otero opposed Tans
motion on, claiming that he did not
receive a copy of the summons and a
copy of Tans complaint
The case was set for hearing but Otero
failed to appear, and MTCC declared
him in default
Tan was then allowed to present his
evidence ex parte
Tan adduced in evidence the testimonies
of his employees, Rosemarie Doblado
and Zita Sara, who attended Oteros
needs upon purchasing the petroleum
products and presented various
statements of account showing the
purchased of Otero.
MTCC: directing Otero to pay Tan
his outstanding obligation. MTCC
opined that Oteros failure to file an
answer despite notice is a tacit
admission of Tans claim
Otero appealed The MTCC decision to
the RTC
RTC: affirmed MTCC Decision. RTC
held that the statements of account
that were presented by Tan were
enough to prove that Otero is indeed
indebted to Tan
Otero filed a petition for review with the
CA. Otero avers that the genuineness
and due execution of the said statements
of account, being private documents,
must first be established in case the said
documents be rendered inadmissible in
evidence. Thus, MTCC and RTC should
not have admitted in evidence the said
statements of account for failure to
establish the genuineness and due
execution of the same.
CA: denied Oteros petition. With
regard to genuineness and due
execution, CA held that any defense
which Otero may have against Tans
claim is already deemed waived due
to Oteros failure to answer,
applying Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the ROC
Due to Oteros failure to file his
answer despite being duly served
with summons coupled with his
voluntary appearance in court, he is
deemed to have waived whatever
defenses he has against Tans claim.
Apparently, Otero is employing

Judge Sia
dilatory moves to defer the payment
of his obligation which he never
denied.
2. This Court finds that Tan was still able to

prove by a preponderance of evidence the
material allegations of his complaint against
Otero.
First, the statements of account adduced by Tan
during the ex parte presentation of his evidence
are just summaries of Otero's unpaid
obligations, the absence of which do not
necessarily disprove the latter's liability.
Second, aside from the statements of account,
Tan likewise adduced in evidence the
testimonies of his employees in his Petron outlet
who testified that Otero purchased petroleum
products and failed to pay, proving that Otero
still has unpaid outstanding obligation
of P 270,818.01.
The petition is DENIED. CA Decision
is AFFIRMED.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Otero may still raise the failure of Tan to
authenticate the statements of account which he
adduced in evidence
2. W/N Tan was able to prove the material
allegations of his complaint
RULING:
1. A defending party declared in default retains
the right to appeal from the judgment by default.
However, the grounds that may be raised in such
an appeal are restricted to any of the following:
first, the failure of the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of the complaint; second,
the decision is contrary to law; and third, the
amount of judgment is excessive or different in
kind from that prayed for. In these cases, the
appellate tribunal should only consider the ex
parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence.
We must stress, however, that a
judgment of default against the
petitioner who failed to appear
during pre-trial or any
defendant who failed to file an
answer, does not imply a waiver
of all of their rights, except their
right to be heard and to present
evidence to support their
allegations. The law also gives
the defaulting parties some
measure of protection because
plaintiffs, despite the default of
defendants, are still required to
substantiate their allegations in
the complaint
The statements of account which Tan
adduced in evidence before the MTCC
are private documents. Considering that
these documents do not fall among the
exceptions, the MTCC could not admit
the same as evidence against Otero
without the required authentication
thereof pursuant to Section 20, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. During
authentication in court, a witness
positively testifies that a document
presented as evidence is genuine and
has been duly executed, or that the
document is neither spurious nor
counterfeit nor executed by mistake or
under duress
DIONA VS. BALANGUE

Facts:
Respondents (Balangues) obtained a
loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner
(Diona) payable in 6 months and
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over
their 202-square meter property located
in Marulas, Valenzuela. The debt was
due, respondents failed to pay despite
the demands.
Petitioner filed before RTC Valenzuela
ordering respondents pay petitioners
45k plus interests and damages, that a
foreclosure proceeding be made and an
auction on the said parcel of land.
Summons was served upon Sonny
Balangue. They filed a Motion to
Extend Period to Answer but was
denied because of their failure to file
any responsive pleadings.
RTC then declared respondents in
default and granted petitioners
complaint.
Respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment as not all of them were
served with summons, only upon
Sonny Balangue.
RTC ordered the writ of execution of the
foreclosure of the properties. An auction
was made.
Respondents then filed a Motion to
Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set
Aside Execution Sale claiming that the
parties did not agree in writing on any
rate of interest and that petitioner
merely sought for a 12% per annum
19

Judge Sia
interest in her Complaint. This was

granted and RTC awarded 5% monthly
interest (or 60% per annum).
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
before CA. This was granted. It then
declared that RTC exceeded its
jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly
interest but at the same time
pronouncing that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in subsequently
reducing the rate of interest to 12% per
annum.
Respondents filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment and
Execution Sale before CA. According
to respondents, the loan did not carry
any interest as it was the verbal
agreement of the parties that petitioners
family can continue occupying
respondents residential building located
in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said
loan is fully paid.
CA granted and ruled that aside from
being unconscionably excessive, the
monthly interest rate of 5% was not
agreed upon by the parties and that
petitioners Complaint clearly sought
only the legal rate of 12% per annum.
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of

Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional
ground to annul a judgment.
The Court presented the case of Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals wherein it declared that a final
and executory judgment may still be set aside if,
upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity
can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
The award of 5% monthly interest violated
respondents right to due process and, hence, the
same may be set aside in a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court.
In the case at hand The grant of 5% monthly
interest is way beyond the 12% per annum
interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of
violation of due process. It is settled that courts
cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the
pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by
the party. They cannot also grant a relief without
first ascertaining the evidence presented in
support thereof.
Issue: W/N CA erred when it granted

respondents petition for annulment of
judgment as a substitute or alternative remedy
of a lost appeal.
In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly

interest rate is not supported both by the
allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on
record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by
the parties does not include any provision on
interest. Clearly, the RTCs award of 5% monthly
interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and
disregards due process. It violated the due
process requirement because respondents were
not informed of the possibility that the RTC may
award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived
of reasonable opportunity to refute and present
controverting evidence as they were made to
believe that the complainant [petitioner] was
seeking for what she merely stated in her
Complaint.
Ruling: No.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances where a
party, without fault on his part, has failed to
avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies.
Said rule explicitly provides that it is not
available as a substitute for a remedy which was
lost due to the partys own neglect in promptly
availing of the same. The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling final
judgments goes against the grain of finality of
judgment. Litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest.
Petition denied. CA affirmed.
INTERVENTION OF PARTIES
HEIRS OF MEDRANO VS. DE VERA
Facts:
20

Judge Sia
This case concerns a 463-square meter parcel of
land in the name of Flaviana De Gracia
(Flaviana). In 1980, Flaviana died intestate,
leaving her half-sisters Hilaria Martin-Paguyo
(Hilaria) and Elena Martin-Alvarado (Elena) as
her compulsory heirs.
court treated the named defendants and De

Vera as distinct and separate parties.
Medrano filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
Order and asked the court to order De Vera to
file a pleading-in-intervention so that he could
be properly named as a defendant in the case.
RTC - granted Medranos motion and set aside its
Order which admitted De Veras Answer with
Counterclaim. Citing Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court, the court ordered De Vera to file a
pleading-in-intervention so that he could be
recognized as a party-defendant. But De Vera
did not comply with the courts order despite
service upon his lawyer.
RTC - It ruled that ownership over the titled
property has vested in petitioners by virtue of
good faith possession for more than 10 years;
thus, it was no longer necessary to compel the
defendants - heirs of Hilaria and Elena - to
execute an instrument to confirm Medranos
rightful ownership over the land.
De Vera filed MR but was denied. De Vera had
no legal personality to file MR because he did
not file a pleading-in-intervention. The RTC
explained it would have allowed De Vera to
present his evidence in the case had he complied
with the courts order to file a pleading-inintervention.
CA ruled in favor of de Vera. It that the trial
court should have exercised its authority to
order the substitution of the original defendants
instead of requiring De Vera to file a pleadingin-intervention. De Veras failure to file the
necessary pleading-in-intervention was a
technical defect that could have been easily
cured. This is allowed under Rule 3, Section 19 of
the Rules of Court. Since a transferee pendente
lite is a proper party to the case, the court can
order his outright substitution for the original
defendants. The trial court could have settled the
controversy completely on its merits had it
admitted De Veras Answer with Counterclaim.
Hence, present petition.
Hilaria and Elena, by virtue of a private

document waived all their hereditary rights to
Flavianas land in favor of Francisca Medrano
(Medrano). It stated that the waiver was done in
favor of Medrano in consideration of the
expenses that she incurred for Flavianas
medication, hospitalization, wake and burial.
some of their children affirmed the contents of
the private document executed by their deceased
mothers. To that end, they executed separate
Deeds of Confirmation of Private Document and
Renunciation of Rights in favor of Medrano.
Due to the refusal of the other children to sign a
similar renunciation, Medrano filed a Complainy
in 2001 for quieting of title, reconveyance,
reformation of instrument, and/or partition with
damages against Pelagia, Faustina, Jesus,
Veneranda Paguyo-Abrenica, Emilio a.k.a.
Antonio Alvarado, Francisca and Estrellita
before RTC Pangasinan.
Summons upon the original complaint was duly
served upon Pelagia and Estrellita. Medrano
filed an Amended Complaint impleading the
widow and children of Antonio Alvarado, in view
of his death but summons upon the amended
complaint was served upon the other defendants
but no longer served upon Pelagia and Estrellita.
Respondent Estanislao D. De Vera (De Vera)
filed an Answer with Counterclaim and
presented himself as the real party-in-interest
and maintained that the private documents was
executed by the defendants predecessors in favor
of Medrano was null and void for want of
consideration.
Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with
Counterclaim of Estanislao D. De Vera and to
Declare Defendants in Default. She argued that
respondent De Vera had no personality to
answer the complaint since he was not
authorized by the named defendants to answer
in their behalf.
Issue:
Whether De Vera could participate in Civil Case
No. U-7316 without filing a motion to intervene.
YES
Held:
De Veras right to participate in the case
was independent of the named
defendants. Because of its ruling that De Vera
had an independent interest, the trial court
considered his interest as separate from
Medranos claims against the named defendants,
and allowed the latter to be tried
RTC the admission of De Veras Answer with

Counterclaim is proper. In the same Order, the
court declared the named defendants in default
for not answering the complaint despite valid
service of summons. Thus, it appears that the
21

Judge Sia
separately. Thus, it admitted De Veras Answer
with Counterclaim but declared the named
defendants in default and allowed the ex
parte presentation of evidence by Medrano
against the named defendants.
De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the
named defendants (by virtue of the Deed of
Renunciation of Rights that was executed in his
favor during the pendency of Civil Case No. U7316). His rights were derived from the named
defendants and, as transferee pendente lite, he
would be bound by any judgment against his
transferors under the rules of res judicata. Thus,
De Veras interest cannot be considered and tried
separately from the interest of the named
defendants.
It was therefore wrong for the trial court to have
tried Medranos case against the named
defendants (by allowing Medrano to present
evidence ex parte against them) after it had
already admitted De Veras answer. What the
trial court should have done is to treat De Vera
(as transferee pendente lite) as having been
joined as a party-defendant, and to try the case
on the basis of the answer De Vera had filed and
with De Veras participation.
Thus, the default of the original defendants
should not result in the ex parte presentation of
evidence because De Vera (a transferee pendente
lite who may thus be joined as defendant under
Rule 3, Section 19) filed an answer. The trial
court should have tried the case based on De
Veras answer, which answer is deemed to have
been adopted by the non-answering defendants.
intervention, the damage had already been

done.
Petition Denied.
OMBUDSMAN v. SISON
Facts
The purpose of intervention is to enable a

stranger to an action to become a party in order
for him to protect his interest and for the court
to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is
allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits more than
on due process considerations. The intervenor
can choose not to participate in the case and he
will not be bound by the judgment. De Vera
is not a stranger to the action but a
transferee pendente lite. As mentioned, a
transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the
pending action from the moment when the
transfer of interest is perfected. His participation
in the case should have been allowed by due
process considerations.
De Veras failure to file a pleading-inintervention will not change the long foregone
violation of his right to due process.The ex
parte presentation of evidence had already been
terminated when the trial court required De
Vera to file his pleading-in-intervention. Even if
he complied with the order to file a pleading-in-
22
The Isog Han Samar Movement,

represented by Fr. Labendia of the
Diocese of Samar, filed a lettercomplaint addressed to Ombudsman,
Hon. Marcelo, accusing Governor Tan
and other local public officials including
respondent Sison, of highly anomalous
transactions entered into by them
amounting to several millions of pesos.
Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.
The letter-complaint stemmed from the
audit investigation conducted by LAO
and COA found that various purchases
have been made.
The Office of the Ombudsman, found
basis to proceed with the administrative
case against the impleaded provincial
officials of Samar. The latter were
required to file their counter-affidavits
and countervailing evidence against the
complaint.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison denied the
accusations contained in the lettercomplaint and claimed his innocence on
the charges.
Sison submitted his Position Paper to
the Office of the Ombudsman and
reiterated that he had not participated in
the alleged anomalous purchases and
use of public funds by the Province of
Samar.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered
a Decision, finding Sison and several
other local officials of the Province of
Samar guilty of grave misconduct and
dismissing him from service.
Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition
for Review
CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman against
Sison.
- CA held that the Office of the
Ombudsman failed to adduce
substantial evidence in order to
convict Sison.
- The Office of the Ombudsman filed
an Omnibus Motion for Intervention
and to Admit Attached Motion for

Judge Sia
Reconsideration, which denied by
the CA Hence, we have this petition.
Issue: W/N the Office of the Ombudsman may
be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration
of the adverse decision rendered by the CA.
Ruling: The appeal lacks merit.
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation

and effect of the judgment.
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does
not have the legal interest to intervene. As the
CA held correctly:
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third
party who has a legal interest in the
administrative case against the petitioner such
that it would be directly affected by the
judgment that this Court had rendered. It must
be remembered that the legal interest required
for an intervention must be direct and
immediate in character. Lest it be forgotten,
what was brought on appeal before this Court is
the very Decision by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the
Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and not an
advocate, has no legal interest at stake in the
outcome of this Rule 43 Petition.
Motion for Intervention Was Not Filed on
Time
The Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed
only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the
CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008. Since
the Office of the Ombudsman filed the motion
for intervention during the pendency of the
proceedings before the CA.
It should be noted that the Office of the
Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by
Sison. The Rules of Court provides that the
appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition
for review with the CA, with proof of service of a
copy on the court or agency a quo. Clearly, the
Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time
within which to file a motion to intervene. As
such, its failure to do so should not now be
countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman is
expected to be an "activist watchman," not
merely a passive onlooker.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the
Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly
filed. As we held in Rockland Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Singzon, Jr., no intervention is permitted
after a decision has already been rendered.
In light of the foregoing considerations, all other
issues raised in the petition are rendered moot
and academic and no further discussion is
necessary.
The petition is DENIED. The CA Resolution is
AFFIRMED.
Intervention Is Discretionary upon the

Court
It is fundamental that the allowance or
disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows
the intention to give to the court the full measure
of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
intervention, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A
person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be
adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of
court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not
the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The
motion to intervene may be
filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
copy of the pleading-in-intervention
shall be attached to the motion and served on
the original parties.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which
third persons, not originally parties to the suit
but claiming an interest in the subject matter,
come into the case in order to protect their right
or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to
settle in one action and by a single judgment all
conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy
among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1)
the movant has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the parties, nor should the claim of the
intervenor be capable of being properly decided
in a separate proceeding. The interest, which
entitles one to intervene, must involve the
matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will
PRE TRIAL
THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE &
INSURANCE COMPANY VS. JOSEPH
ENARIO
23

Judge Sia
Facts:
1. Joseph Enario (respondent) was an
agent of Philamlife (petitioner). Aside
from being an agent, he was also
appointed as manager where he also
receive his override commissions.
2. After Enarios resignation, Philamlife
discovered that the former still had a
remaining debit balance in the amount
of P1, 237,336.66. According to the
Revise Agency Contract, that upon
termination of the contract, with or
without the necessity of demand, to
return all documents, agency materials,
paraphernalia, and such other
properties to the company.
3. Philamlife sent 3 demand letters to
Enario, to which the latter replied to be
given more time to settle his records.
When the parties were not able to reach
an agreement, Philamlife filed before the
RTC.
Note: The dates are important!
4. The RTC first scheduled the pre-trial
conference on December 3 and 7 2002.
Enario moved for a postponement of the
pre-trail conference to Jan 14, 2003 due
to conflict of schedule. The RTC received
the motion only on Dec 2, 2002.
5. The parties then on Jan 14, 2003 agreed
to settle which prompted the RTC to
postpone yet again the pre-trial to May
8, June 3, and July 1.
6. On May 7, Enario sent a telegram,
asking for another postponement due to
medical reasons.
7. On June 3, Enario failed to appear in the
pre-trial conference, which prompted
Philamlife to have him in default. The
RTC allowed Philamlife to present its
evidence (the presentation is on July 1).
8. The next day, the RTC received Enarios
motion for postponement, which was
mailed on May 30, 2003. The July 1
conference was again reset to Aug, 28.
Despite notice, Enario failed to appear,
which the RTC allowed Philamlife to
present its evidence ex parte.
obstinate refusal to comply with the lower

courts orders.
Issue: WoN the RTC erred in declaring
respondent in default and allowing Philamlife to
present its evidence ex parte?
Ruling: Yes, the decision of the CA is reversed.
The decision of the RTC is reinstated.
Pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. As
sec. 4 of Rule 20 requires that the parties to
appear in the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a
party may be excused only if a valid cause is
shown therefor Only a valid excuse can be
permitted for non-appearance for the pre-trial.
It is established that respondent was
given enough time present his own evidence.
The trial court granted the first 2 postponements
of the pre-trial and only issued the default order
on the 3rd.
A motion for postponement is a privilege and
not a right. The granting of a motion for
postponement is in the discretion of the court. In
deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for
postponement of pre-trial, the court must take
into account the following factors: (a) the reason
for the postponement, and (b) the merits of the
case of movant.
Enario was given enough time to present
his own evidence, having reset the pre-trial
conference for 4 times, for a total of 6 months
before the trial court allowed Philamlife to
present its own evidence ex parte.
Wherefore, the decision of CA is reversed.
(In case lang tanongin kayo)
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the
speedy disposition of cases. Although it was
discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it
was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and
the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as
the most important procedural innovation in
Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century,
pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or
of a submission to alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments
to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of
issues to a commissioner;
RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of Philamlife,

ordering Enario to pay the former. Enario
elevated the case to the CA.
CA Ruling: Reversed the ruling of the RTC,
stating that respondents failure to appear in the
June 3 pre-trial conference does not constitute
24

Judge Sia
PNB VS SPS. PEREZ
HELD:
No. Under Sec 3 Rule 18 the notice of pre-trial
shall be served on the counsel or on the party
who has no counsel court held that the presence
of the word shall denotes the mandatory
character of the rule. Furthermore, the court
emphasizes its importance pointing out that the
absence of it constitutes a violation of a persons
due process.
Angelito and Jocelyn Perez

(Respondents) obtained a revolving
credit from PNB (petitioner) secured by
chattel mortgages over palay stocks and
real estate mortgages when they
defaulted in payment, PNB then
instituted foreclosure.
During hearing, respondents and
counsel failed to appear. Also during
pre-trial conference during September
19, 2002. Though respondents alleged
that they filed a Motion to
Postponement. Then they filed 2
Motions for Reconsideration, both
denied by the court.
Another MR was filed on April 29, 2003
setting a hearing for July 23 of the same
year. Respondents again filed 5 motions
to postpone but only 4 were granted.
January 25, CA denied petition for
Motion for Reconsideration spouses in
appeal reasoned that their counsel
failed to appear in pre-trial hearing
because their counsel had to attend
hearing for another case.
Such notice contains the date, time and place of

pre-trial and require both parties to file their
respective pre-trial briefs within the prescribed
period, the absence of such renders the
proceedings null and void. In the case at bar,
what was deemed by respondents as a notice is
the order of a hearing in March 8 and requires
PNB to prepare complete statement of accounts
and does not say anything about a pre-trial.
Therefore, there was no notice on the part of
PNB.
ANSON AND CHENG VS. PACIFIC
BANKING CORPORATION
Facts:
Petitioners Anson Trade Center Inc.
(ATCI) and Anson Emporium
Corporation (AEC) are corps. engaged in
retail and wholesale general
merchandising and Cheng is the Vice
Head.
Respondent bank is a closed banking
institution undergoing liquidation
process by PDIC.
ATCI obtained loan amounting to
P4,350,000.00 and AEC P1,000,000
from respondent bank. As a security,
Chen along with the late Keng Giok
provided two Continuing Surety
Agreements. It provided that
respondent bank has the right to retain a
lien upon any or all properties in the
accounts of ATCI and AEC.
Petitioners did not pay their loans
despite several attempts.
Petitioner Chen filed Motions to Dismiss
instead of filing an Answer to the
Complaint.
AEC, ATCI, and the Estate of Keng Giok
filed their replies. Keng Giok was then
dropped as a defendant because he was
long dead prior to the proceedings.
A pre-trial conference was held. The
possibility of an amicable settlement was
RTC Ruled in favor of Petitioners
After said ruling case was once again

remanded and Trial Court issued an
order requiring PNB to submit
statement of accounts from 1995 2000
and setting a hearing in March 8, 2006.
PNB failed to receive a copy of the order
and failed to attend the hearing and trial
court proceeded with the hearing and
favored respondents ordering petitioner
to pay spouses and REVERSED previous
decision.
PNB then filed a Petition for Certiorari
in the CA which granted the prayer for
TRO. Despite TRO issuance,
respondents were able to garnish the
amount.
CA ruled in favor for Petitioners claiming that

the trial court decision cannot be considered
because there was a failure to send notice of pretrial upon petitioners which is a mandatory
procedure.
ISSUE: W/N PNB was duly notified of the PreTrial
25

Judge Sia
explored but it was unsuccessful. The
respondents then failed to attend the
next scheduled pre-trial.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of the non-appearance of
respondent in the pre-trial Granted
Respondent filed a MR and prayed for
the relaxation of the rule on nonappearance in pre-trials citing excusable
negligence and interest of justice Denied
Respondent filed a Petition for
Certiorari before CA. It alleged that their
absence was not deliberate or
intentional. Further, PDIC was
undergoing a reorganization
which resulted to trimming their
manpower handling the litigation
work. Granted
Issue: W/N respondents non-appearance in the
pre-trial is excusable
Ruling: Yes
Pre-trial a procedural device intended to
clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the
parties and to take the trial of cases out of the
realm of surprise and maneuvering.
Rule 18, Sec. 5 provides that non-appearance
by the plaintiff in the pre-trial shall be the cause
for dismissal of the action. However, Rule 18,
Sec. 4 provides that non-appearance of a party
of a party may be excused if there is a valid
cause.
SC found a valid cause in the case at bar
Respondents did not intentionally snub the
proceedings. This was caused by the
reorganization of PDIC.
Petition DENIED.
fishpond showing their unwillingness to

vacate.
Laurel filed action to recover the a parcel

of land covered by TCT at RTC against
petitioners alleging that petitioners were
possessing the western portion of the
property and developed it into fishponds
demanding for payment of: unearned
income, atty's fees and costs of suits.
Prior to filing of complaint, they

informed Gustavo Tolentino that they
were occupying respondent's land and to
vacate it. Gustavo said that he would
verify such claim by Laurel but they
waited for a year until Gustavo died.
Petitioners continued to develop the
Tolentino claims their occupation is

lawful pursuant to a Fishpond Lease
Agreement with Dep. of Agriculture &
land belongs to the State.
Aug 27, 1996 - Tolentino declared in

default (failed to appear at pre-trial) but
RTC set aside default order and reset the
date for pre-trial. Despite several
resetting and given that Tolentino was
notified thereof, still failed to appear.
March 21, 2000 - RTC issued order
allowing Laurel to present evidence ex
parte
RTC - after ex parte hearing ruled in favor of

respondents (ordered Tolentino to vacate the
place, pay Laurel rents at 20k per annum,
litigation expenses of 10k)
CA - affirmed RTC ruling; MOR by Tolentino
(denied)
ISSUE: W/N petitioners were denied their day in
court? NO
HELD:
Take note: At the RTC level (where
Tolentino was declared in the default),
the plaintiff was Laurel and defendant
was Tolentino
Under Sec 4 and 5, Rule 18 of ROC:
Section 4. Appearance of parties.It shall be
the duty of the parties and their counsel to
appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of
a party may be excused only if a valid cause is
shown therefor, or if a representative shall
appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing
to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit
to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and
to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts
and of documents.
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear.The
failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section
shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof.
TOLENTINO V LAUREL
26

Judge Sia
Absence of party on the part of:
Plaintiff (Laurel)- his case shall be
dismissed
Defendant (Tolentino) - plaintiff allowed
to present evidence ex parte; court
render judgment on the basis thereof.
Hence, plaintiff is given privilege to present
evidence w/out objection from defendant and
the defendant, waived the opportunity to rebut
or present his evidence.
In this case, petitioners cannot

complain they were deprived/denied of
due process because when it was
essentially due to their fault and they
were given ample opportunity to be
heard thru their counsel.
August 27 1996 - first declared in default
but RTC reset the pre-trial several times.
Tolentino still failed to appear on 4
occasions (Jan 9, 1998; March 2, 1998;
May 18, 1999 & March 21, 2000)
Hence, this prompted the TC to allow
Laurel to present their evidence exparte.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

HEIRS OF ORIBELLO
FACTS:
Valentin occupied a parcel of land in
1968 thru a Rresidential Permit by the
Bureau of Forest Development. His son
Odillon occupied the same with Spouses
Apog. In 1969, Odillon sold it to Balcita
who sold it to Oribello.
Oribello filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application with the DENR which was
denied since it was still forest land.
In 1987, the property was declared open
to disposition under the Public Land
Act. Oribello filed another application
which was granted in 1990.
Apog and San Juan claimed to be actual
occupants. They alleged there was fraud
and sought annulment of the patent. The
DENR Regional Executive Director
found substantial evidence of fraud,
warranting a reversion suit.
The OSG instituted a complaint for
reversion while Oribello filed a
complaint for recovery of possession
against Apog and San Juan. The two
were consolidated.
In 1996, the trial court warned
petitioner if it does not appear at the
next scheduled hearing, its presentation
of evidence will be considered
terminated.
Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or
of a submission to alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments
to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of
issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the
pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground
therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending
the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action.
Action in this case: accion publiciana =

recovery of possession independently of
title (recover possession only not
ownership but courts may pass upon
such issue to determine who has the
better right)
In this case, Laurel had a Torrents Title
(TCT), which is indefeasible and binding
against the whole world.
Atty.'s fees and litigation expenses
mentioned only in dispositive portion of
RTC decisions without any prior
explanation and justification on its body
= baseless and must be deleted
TRIAL
Notes (Judge Sia may ask additional

questions):
mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the

subsequent amendments in 1997.
Hailed as the most important
procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon
justice in the nineteenth century
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call

for the speedy disposition of cases.
Although it was discretionary under the
1940 Rules of Court, it was made
27

Judge Sia
1943. Marcelina died in 1950 followed
by Bartolome much later on 1964.
Atty. Pascua, representing petitioner,

presented a witness.
Petitioner failed to appear at a hearing
in 1997 and the petitioner was deemed
to have abandoned its case.
Trial and reception of evidence
continued. The cases were dismissed in
2005 for non-substitution of Oribello
and his counsel (both died).
Petitioner filed MR stating the dismissal
applies only to Oribellos case for
recovery of possession. Granted.
Oribellos heirs filed a motion
contending that petitioner was already
declared to have abandoned the
reversion case. Case was dismissed
again.
CA denied petitioners appeal. It lost its
right to participate.
ISSUE: W/N the consolidated cases can be
subject to multiple appeals- YES.
RATIO:
The 1997 order was interlocutory. The
trial court considered petitioners
presentation of evidence as terminated
but it does not equate to dismissal for
failure to prosecute. The court continued
to recognize petitioners personality in
its proceedings even after the
dismissal.
There is only a consolidation for trial.
The two cases consolidated involve
common questions of law and fact but
each retains its separate character. They
involve different issues, seeking
different remedies and require separate
judgments.
Reversion settles whether land will be
reverted to state while recovery
determines who has better right of
possession.
Severance of one action from the other is
not necessary to appeal judgment in one
action.
Severance is within sound discretion of
court.
GONZALES v. BUGAAY
FACTS: The deceased spouses

Bartolome and Marcelina Ayad had five
(5) children: Enrico, Encarnacion,
Consolacion, Maximiano and
Mariano. The latter, who was single,
predeceased his parents on December 4,
28
Enrico has remained

single. Encarnacion died on April 8,
1966 and is survived by her children,
Nenita Gonzales, Generosa Gonzales,
Felipe Gonzales, Lolita Gonzales,
Dolores Gonzales, Conchita Gonzales
and Beatriz Gonzales, the petitioners in
this case. Consolacion, meanwhile, was
married to the late Imigdio
Bugaay. Their children are Mariano
Bugaay, Alicia Bugaay, Amelita Bugaay,
Rodolfo Bugaay, Letecia Bugaay, Lydia
Bugaay, Luzviminda Bugaay and Belen
Bugaay, respondents herein. Maximiano
died single and without issue on August
20, 1986. The spouses of petitioners,
except Nenita, a widow, and those of the
respondents, except Lydia and Belen,
were joined as parties in this case.
In their Amended Complaint for

Partition and Annulment of Documents
with Damages dated February 5, 1991
against Enrico, Consolacion and the
respondents, petitioners alleged, inter
alia, that the only surviving children of
the Spouses Ayad are Enrico and
Consolacion, and that during the
Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned
several agricultural as well as residential
properties.
Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico

executed fraudulent documents covering
all the properties owned by the Spouses
Ayad in favor of Consolacion and
respondents, completely disregarding
their rights. Thus, they prayed, among
others, for the partition of the Spouses
Ayad's estate, the nullification of the
documents executed by Enrico, and the
award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.
As affirmative defenses, Enrico,

Consolacion and respondents claimed
that petitioners had long obtained their
advance inheritance from the estate of
the Spouses Ayad, and that the
properties sought to be partitioned are
now individually titled in respondents'
names.

Judge Sia
On December, 13, 1995, respondents

filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial from the said
Decision. On November 7, 1996, the
RTC, through Judge Eugenio Ramos,
issued an Order which reads: in the
event that within a period of one (1)
month from today, they have not yet
settled the case, it is understood that the
motion for reconsideration and/or new
trial is submitted for resolution without
any further hearing.
Without resolving the foregoing motion,

the RTC, noting the failure of the parties
to submit a project of partition, issued a
writ of execution on February 17, 2003
giving them a period of 15 days within
which to submit their nominees for
commissioner, who will partition the
subject estate.
the RTC, this time through Presiding

Judge Dionisio C. Sison, denied in the
Order dated April 13, 2005 as well as
respondents' motion for reconsideration
in the August 8, 2005 Order.
After due proceedings, the RTC

rendered a Decision dated November
24, 1995, awarding one-fourth () proindiviso share of the estate each to
Enrico, Maximiano, Encarnacion and
Consolacion as the heirs of the Spouses
Ayad, excluding Mariano who
predeceased them. It likewise declared
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition executed by Enrico and
respondents, as well as all other
documents and muniments of title in
their names, as null and void. It also
directed the parties to submit a project
of partition within 30 days from finality
of the Decision.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated their

case to the CA through a petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in
denying their demurrer notwithstanding
petitioners' failure to present the
documents sought to be annulled. On
March 23, 2006, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision reversing and setting
aside the Orders of the RTC.
In the light of the foregoing where no

sufficient evidence was presented to
grant the reliefs being prayed for in the
complaint, more particularly the
absence of the documents sought to be
annulled as well as the properties sought
to be partitioned, common sense
dictates that the case should have been
dismissed outright by the trial court to
avoid unnecessary waste of time, money
and efforts.
Subsequently, the CA denied petitioners'

motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution dated June 2, 2006.
ISSUE: Petitioners question whether the CA's

dismissal of the Amended Complaint was in
accordance with law, rules of procedure and
jurisprudence.
HELD: The RTC Orders assailed before the CA
basically involved the propriety of filing a
demurrer to evidence after a Decision had been
rendered in the case.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Subsequently, the RTC, through then

Acting Presiding Judge Emilio V.
Angeles, discovered the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration and/or new
trial and set the same for hearing. In the
Order dated August 29, 2003, Judge
Angeles granted respondents' motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial for the
specific purpose of receiving and
offering for admission the documents
referred to by the [respondents]
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the

plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to
present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal was reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
However, instead of presenting the

documents adverted to, consisting of the
documents sought to be annulled,
respondents demurred to petitioners'
evidence on December 6, 2004 which
29

Judge Sia
FACTS
The petitioner, together with the
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas, Audiovisual Communicators,
Incorporated, Filipinas Broadcasting
Network and Rajah Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (complainants), filed with
the NTC a complaint against the
respondent to stop it from soliciting and
showing advertisements in its cable
television (CATV)system, pursuant to
Section 2 of Executive Order (EO) No.
205.
Under this provision, a grantees
authority to operate a CATV system shall
not infringe on the television and
broadcast markets. The petitioner
alleged that the phrase "television and
broadcast markets" includes the
commercial or advertising market.
In its answer, the respondent admitted
the airing of commercial advertisement
on its CATV network but alleged that
Section 3 of EO No. 436 expressly
allowed CATV providers to carry
advertisements and other similar paid
segments provided there is consent from
their program providers.
After the petitioner presented and
offered its evidence, the respondent filed
a motion to dismiss by demurrer to
evidence claiming that the evidence
presented by the complainants failed to
show how the respondents acts of
soliciting and showing advertisements
infringed upon the television and
broadcast market.
Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa

Santiago (Nature of demurrer of
evidence)
A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on

the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is
presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is
an objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on
demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of
the case.
In passing upon the sufficiency of the

evidence raised in a demurrer, the court
is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient proof to
sustain the judgment.[19] Being
considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a
demurrer to evidence must clearly be
filed before the court renders its
judgment.
In this case, respondents demurred to

petitioners' evidence after the RTC
promulgated its Decision. While
respondents' motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial was granted, it was for
the sole purpose of receiving and
offering for admission the documents
not presented at the trial. As
respondents never complied with the
directive but instead filed a demurrer to
evidence, their motion should be
deemed abandoned. Consequently, the
RTC's original Decision stands.
Accordingly, the CA committed

reversible error in granting the
demurrer and dismissing the Amended
Complaint a quo for insufficiency of
evidence.The demurrer to evidence was
clearly no longer an available remedy to
respondents and should not have been
granted, as the RTC had correctly done.
PETITION IS GRANTED. CA
decision was set aside. RTC orders
(denying respondents demurrer of
evidence are reinstated.
THE NTC RULING: granted the respondents

demurrer to evidence and dismissed the
complaint.
- EO No. 205 does not define
"infringement," EO No. 436 merely
clarified the details of the term and that
the CATV operators may show
advertisements, provided that they
secure the consent of their program
providers.
- The NTC added that the insertion of
advertisements under EO No. 436 would
result in the alteration or deletion of the
broadcast signals of the consenting
television broadcast station, its ruling
necessarily results in the amendment of
these provisions.
GMA NETWORK, INC vs. CENTRAL CATV,

INC
30

Judge Sia
over a parcel of land situated in Pasay
City to establish a commercial arcade or
to sublease for other business.
2. She further alleged that MIAA failed to
notify her that part of the leased premise
is subject to easement for public use,
since it was adjacent to the Paraaque
River. Because of this, Cruz was not able
to obtain a building permit, as well as a
certificate of electrical inspection Manila
Electric Company, failing to establish an
electrical connection. Due to lack of
electricity, tenants did not pay rent,
hence Cruz was not able to pay her own
rental obligation. MIAA also demolished
some of Cruzs stalls because of the
portion of public easement, causing her
actual damage in the amount of P633,
408.64.
3. Cruz sent a letter to MIAA for the rent, it
deducted damages caused, which pegged
the amount of P629, 880. 02. Instead of
accepting Cruzs payment, MIAA
terminated the lease contract. Hence,
Cruz filed the complaint.
4. MIAA moved to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds of forum shopping (an
action was filed in Manila) and
improper venue.
The petitioner went to the CA, alleging

that the NTC committed grave
procedural and substantive errors in
dismissing the complaint.
CA: upheld the NTC ruling. Hence, this present
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the
order of the NTC which granted the respondents
motion to dismiss by demurrer to evidence.
THE COURTS RULING: We deny the petition
for lack of merit.
The remedy of a demurrer to evidence is
applicable in the proceedings before the NTC,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9, Part 9 of its Rules
of Practice and Procedure which provides for the
suppletory application of the Rules of Court.
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides for the
rule on demurrer to evidence:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After
the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant may move for
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
If his motion is denied he shall have the right to
present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall
be deemed to have waived
the right to
present evidence.
The NTC disregarded the rule on demurrer by
allowing the submission of the respondents
evidence while depriving the petitioner of the
opportunity to question, examine or refute the
submitted documents.
In a demurrer to evidence, the respondents
evidence should not have been considered in the
first place, it should not have resolved the case
through the remedy of demurrer but instead
allowed the respondent to formally present its
evidence where the petitioner could properly
raise its objections. Clearly, there was a violation
of the petitioners due process right.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed the complaint on the

ground of forum shopping, since the action in
Manila and Pasig were based on the same
actionable document between the same parties.
It also observed that Cruz was not the party-ininterest, since the name in the lease contract was
one Fredrick Cruz. It did not however
sustain MIAAs contention of improper
venue.
Cruz filed her appellants brief, assigning the
following errors: a. there was forum shopping; b.
not a real-party-interest (Frederick Cruz merely
signed the lease contract as her attorney); and c.
not denying MIAAs motion to dismiss.
On the other hand, MIAA filed its
Appellees brief (not appeal) refuting the
arguments. It also raised the issue of
improper venue, which was denied by the
RTC.
DENY the petition. AFFIRM the decision CA.
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES

CRUZ VS. MIAA
Facts:
1. Corazon Cruz filed a complaint for
breach of contract, consignation and for
damages against the Manila
International Airport Authority before
the Regional Trial Court. In her
complaint, it was stated that she (Cruz)
and MIAA executed a Contract of Lease
CA Ruling: Affirmed the decision of the RTC

with modification. It modified that there was no
forum shopping and Cruz should be considered a
real party-in-interest. It however dismissed the
case for improper venue.
31

Judge Sia
Issue: WoN the CA may only resolve issues
raised by appellant (Cruz) and not issues raised
by the appellee? Yes
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in annulling judgment of

RTC
Ruling: The petition is meritorious

Jurisprudence dictates that the appellees role in
the appeal process is confined only to the task of
refuting the assigned errors interposed by the
appellant. Since the appellee is not the party who
instituted the appeal, then it merely assumes a
defensive stance. It is highly erroneous for an
appellee seek any affirmative relief or
modification, without interposing its own
appeal.
In the present case, The Court ruled that the CA
committed a reversible error in sustaining the
dismissal of the action based on improper venue
because it was not one of the issues raise by the
appellant (Cruz). The CA should have not taken
cognizance of the stance of MIAAs contention of
improper venue since the latter is the appellee.
As MIAAs interest was limited to sustaining the
RTC-Pasig Citys judgment, it cannot, without
pursuing its own appeal, deviate from the
pronouncements made therein.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS. NLRC
Respondent Aracayos filed for illegal

dismissal, arguing that he starting
working as Operations Manager of St.
Martin Funeral Home but there was no
contract of employment executed nor his
name included in the semi-monthly
payroll. He said that he was dismissed
from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating 38k for the payment of
the taxes (VAT) to BIR
Petitioner said that he was not its

employee but only the uncle of Amelita
(owner of the funeral home) Prior to
that, Amelita's mother extended
financial assistance to Aracayos so he
could work overseas and as a sign of
gratitude, respondent helped the mother
in the business.
Labor Arbiter - ruled in favor of

petitioner; no employer-employee
relationship existed b/w parties hence it
has no jurisdiction over the case
Aracayos appealed to NLRC saying that
he worked as a "volunteer" not as
employee of petitioner from Feb 6, 1995
- Jan 23, 1996 and insisted that there
was an employer-employee relationship
NLRC - remanded the case to the labor
arbiter for appropriate proceedings
Petitioner filed for MR (denied by
NLRC)
So petitioner filed for petitioner for
certiorari to the Supreme Court arguing
that NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion
The petition is granted.

MANILA VS GALLARDO-MANZO
Erlinda Gallardo (Respondent) leased 2

parcels of land in Las Pias to Eulogia
Manila (petitioner) for 10 years with a
rent of 2k for 2 years and an increase of
10% after 2 years with an option to but
the property after execution for 150k.
Upon expiration , lessee continued

possession of the said property despite
the formal demand. Respondent then
claimed that nothing is due because she
eventually became the owner.
No. Despite respondents claim that the

loss of remedies was due to their counsel
being sick and eventually dying, it
should be the fault of the counsel. SC
contended that annulment of judgment
was not based on the fraudulent
assurances of their counsel but for the
lack of jurisdiction and that their
inaction and neglect to pursue available
remedies gives presumption that they
have declined to assert their right over
the property.
BRGY failed compromise agreement

MeTC In favor of Petitioner
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners claiming that
they have exercised option to buy and on the
part of the respondent the option to sell by
allowing the construction of a building with
strong materials
CA upheld MeTC decision and alleged that

RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
32

Judge Sia
ISSUE: W/N the party aggrieved by the decision
of the NLRC should directly appeal to the SC?
NO
HELD:
The Court held that the property vehicle for such
review was a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC and this action should
be filed with the Court of Appeal in strict
observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The use of the word appeal was a "lapses

plumae" (error made in writing) because appeals
by certiorari and original action for certiorari are
both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate courts.
And a special civil action for certiorari is within
the concurrent original jurisdiction of the SC and
CA.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section
9 of B.P. No. 129 by RA 7902 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court
are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and
refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule
65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts
NEYPES V. CA
FACTS:
Petitioners Neypes, Faustino,
Victoriano, Obania and Cabacungan
filed an action for reconveyance against
the Bureau of Lands (BL) , Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD) , Land Bank
and heirs of del Mundo.
Neypes motion to declare BL and BFD
in default granted; Land Banks motion
to dismiss for lack of cause of action
denied because there were hypothetical
admission and matters that needed trial;
Motion to dismiss of heirs based on
prescription denied because there were
factual matters for trial;
Heris filed MR since the RTC could
resolve the issue of prescription from the
allegations.
February 12 1998: RTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription.
March 3 1998: Neypes received copy of
order of dismissal.
March 18 1998: Neypes filed MR.
July 1 1998: RTC denied MR.
July 22 1998: Neypes received copy of
order denying MR.
July 27 1997: Neypes filed notice of
appeal.
August 4 1998: RTC denied the notice of
appeal for being 8 days late.
September 16 1999: CA dismissed
Neypes petition for certiorari and
mandamus. It rules that the 15 day
period should have been reckoned from
March 3.
The case was remanded to CA for appropriate

action & disposition
Notes (Judge may ask further questions)
SC Tackled the history regarding amendments of
NLRC appeals:
Under PD 21 and PD 442 the aggrieved
party may appeal to the Secretary of
Labor but in PD 1391 amended those
previous PD's and no appellate review
was provided for so the SC delved into
BP No. 129 and RA 7902.
within the appellate jurisdiction o the SC

or any court.
SC said reviewing the legislative records
(Senate Bill and Reference Committee
Report) on the antecedents of RA 7902,
there may have been oversight in the
course of the deliberation regarding the
terminology used.
It was Senator Raul S. Roco who
sponsored the Senate Bill 1495 saying
labor cases are usually the cases being
elevate to the SC and causing heavy
burden to the SC because it usually just
orders the case to be remanded back to
the NLRC before and he wants to
eliminate the exceptions enumerated in
Sec 9 and extend the coverage of the
appellate review of the CA.
There caused a confusion regarding the

excepting clause provided for in
paragraph 3, Sec 9 of BP No 129, as
amended by RA 7902 wherein it grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CA
over final orders of the RTC and the
quasi-judicial agencies EXCEPT those
failing within the jurisdiction of the SC
in accordance with the Labor Code.
The SC said it was illogical and the
Congress did not intend such procedural
mistake since there are no cases in the
Labor Code wherein the decisions are
33

Judge Sia
ISSUE: W/N the 15-day period to appeal should
be reckoned from the date they received the
order of dismissal or from the date they received
the order denying MR
HELD:
It should be counted from the date of
receipt of order denying/dismissing the
MR (July 1). The order denying their MR
is the final order contemplated in the
rules.
Neypes filed notice of appeal on July 27/
5 days after receipt of order denying MR
on July 22. Notice of appeal was within
the fresh appeal period.
R41 S3 ROC: Appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of the
judgment OR final order appealed
from OR signifies disassociation of
one thing from another. So he may file
within 15 days from receipt of decision
or 15 days from receipt of order on his
motion.
The court allows a 15 day fresh period
within which to file notice of appeal. It is
counted from receipt of order dismissing
the motion for new trial, MR or any final
order. The fresh period rule applies to
appeals from MTC to RTC, RTC to CA,
quasi-judicial to CA and appeals by
certiorari to SC.
It used to be 30 days but shortened to 15
days by BP 129 to hasten disposition of
cases.
Fresh period is significant when a part
files motion for new trial or MR.
YU vs. HON. SAMSON-TATAD (Presiding

Judge of RTC) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Based on the complaint of Sps Sergio
and Cristina Casaclang, information for
estafa against the petitioner was filed
with the RTC, convicting the petitioner.
14 days later, or on June 9, 2005, the
petitioner filed a motion for new trial
with the RTC, alleging that she
discovered new and material evidence
that would exculpate her of the crime for
which she was convicted.
In an October 17, 2005 order,
respondent Judge denied the
petitioners motion for new trial for lack
of merit.
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner

filed a notice of appeal with the RTC,
alleging that pursuant to our ruling in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a
"fresh period" of 15 days from November
3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her
motion for new trial, or up to November
18, 2005, within which to file a notice of
appeal.
On November 24, 2005, the respondent
Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a
copy of Neypes for his guidance.
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
being filed 10 days late, arguing that
Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in
criminal cases.
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution
filed a motion for execution of the
decision.
On January 20, 2006, the RTC
considered the twin motions submitted
for resolution.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner
filed the present petition for prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
RTC from acting on the prosecutions
motions to dismiss the appeal and for
the execution of the decision.
The petitioner argues that the RTC lost
jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions
motions when she filed her notice of
appeal within the 15-day reglementary
period provided by the Rules of Court,
applying the "fresh period rule"
enunciated in Neypes.
The respondent People of the
Philippines, through the OSG, filed a
manifestation, stating that Neypes
applies to criminal actions since the
evident intention of the "fresh period
rule" was to set a uniform appeal period
provided in the Rules.
Sps Casaclang aver that the petitioner
cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend
the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases
because Neypes involved a civil case
ISSUE: whether the "fresh period rule"

enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in
criminal cases.
The Courts Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
34

Judge Sia
Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil
cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section
6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Writ of Preliminary

Attachment may issue ex parte before
acquisition of jurisdiction
HELD:
Yes. According to the SC in Writ of Preliminary
Attachment, the jurisdiction of the court is
acquired at the commencement of action which
is construed as the date of filing.
Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a

delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused
on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions,
with more reason should the same treatment be
accorded to the accused in seeking the review on
appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern
and the protection we must extend to matters of
liberty cannot be overstated.
Citing Toledo vs Burgos the only requisite is the

affidavit for sufficient cause of action.
In Mindanao vs Loan Association, the hearing
would defeat the purpose of the remedy because
it would enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of the property before issuance of
preliminary attachment more so, it would serve
as a warning for them to have time to hide their
assets.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the

petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal
on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the
date of receipt of notice denying her motion for
new trial.
LIM JR. VS. SPOUSES LAZARO

Facts:
Lim Jr. filed a complaint for sum of
money with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment before
the RTC, seeking to recover from
respondents-spouses Lazaro the sum of
P2,160,000.00, which represented the
amounts stated in several dishonored
checks.
RTC granted the writ of preliminary
attachment application and upon the
posting of the required P2,160,000.00
bond, issued the corresponding writ.
3 parcels of land situated in Bulacan
were levied upon.
In their counterclaim, spouses Lazaro
averred that Lim Jr. had no cause of
action against them since: (a) Colim
Merchandise (Colim), and not Lim, Jr.,
was the payee of the fifteen (15)
Metrobank checks; and (b) the PNB and
Real Bank checks were not drawn by
them, but by Virgilio Arcinas and
Elizabeth Ramos, respectively.
Spouses Lazaro further admitted their
indebtedness but said to have paid them.
They opposed the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment.
The parties entered into a Compromise
Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed
to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of
P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis
with the condition that: (a) that should
Petition for prohibition is GRANTED.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
DAVAO VS CA
Davao Light (P) filed for a recovery of

sum of money against Queensland
Hotel and Adarna (R) with an ex parte
writ of preliminary attachment bond of
4M.
Summons and copy of complaint were
served to Respondent with writ of
attachment and bond. Following this is
the execution of the Sheriff through
seizing their property.
Respondent filed a motion to discharge
alleging that court did not have
jurisdiction over their person at the
time the order was promulgated.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners granting writ

if attachment and denying motion to discharge
CA reversed RTC decision; court does not
acquire jurisdiction over respondent until he is
summoned or voluntarily appears and if it is
under ex parte, actual summons is needed .
35

Judge Sia
the financial condition of Sps. Lazaro
improve, the monthly installments shall
be increased in order to hasten the full
payment of the entire obligation; and
(b) that Sps. Lazaros failure to pay any
instalments due or the dishonor of any
of the postdated checks delivered in
payment thereof shall make the whole
obligation immediately due and
demandable.
Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion,
seeking to lift the writ of preliminary
attachment.
RTC RULING: It granted the motion of Sps.
Lazaro. It ruled that a writ of preliminary
attachment is a mere provisional or ancillary
remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect and
preserve certain rights and interests pending
final judgment. Considering that the case had
already been considered closed and terminated
by the compromise agreement, the writ of
preliminary attachment should be lifted and
quashed.
Lim Jr. filed a MR denied. Filed
Certiorari before CA.
CA RULING: Affirmed RTCs decision. Found
no grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part. It
observed that a writ of preliminary attachment
may only be issued at the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment.
Thus, since the principal cause of action had
already been declared closed and terminated by
the RTC, the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary attachment would have no leg to
stand on, necessitating its discharge.
ISSUE: W/N the writ of preliminary
attachment was properly lifted No.
Preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy
applied for not for its own sake but to enable the
attaching party to realize upon the relief sought
and expected to be granted in the main or
principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or
incidental to the main action. As such, it is
available during its pendency which may be
resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests during the interim,
awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment
in the case.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57
are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after
the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence
dictates that the said lien continues until the
debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution
issued on the judgment or until the judgment is
satisfied, or the attachment discharged or

vacated in the same manner provided by law.
In the case at bar, records indicate that while the
parties have entered into a compromise
agreement which had already been approved by
the RTC, the obligations thereunder have
yet to be fully complied with particularly,
the payment of the total compromise amount of
P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing
debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps.
Lazaros properties should have continued to
subsist.
Petition granted.
TORRES V. SATSATIN
Facts: The siblings Torres- Sofia, Fructosa and
Mario, each own a parcel of land located in
Dasmarinas, Cavite. Later on Nicanor Satsatin
asked petitioners mother, Agripina Aledia if she
wanted to sell their properties. Agripina agreed
after consulting her children and some of her
relatives.
Nicanor Satsatin was authorized
through a SPA to negotiate for the sale of the
properties. Nicanor offered the properties to the
Solar Resources, Inc. and the latter agreed to
buy the said properties for the amount of 35M.
However Nicanor only remitted 9M. The
petitioners found out that Nicanor bought a
house and lot at the BF Resort Village, Las Pinas
city. He also bought cars which were registered
to his unemployed children. Despite repeated
demands, written and verbal Nicanor still failed
to remit the balance worth 19M.
Petitioners now filed before the RTC a
complaint for some of money and damages
against the Satsatin and thereafter they also files
an ex-parte motion for the issuance of the writ of
attachment and that they are will to file a bond.
RTC: order to post a bond worth 7M
Petitioners filed a motion for the
deputation of the sheriff and informing the court
that they have already filed a bond
RTC: granted the motion for the
deputation of the sheriff and thereafter a writ of
attachment was issued ordering the sheriff to
attach the estate, real and personal properties of
the respondents.
Nov. 19, 2002- a writ of attachment was served
upon the respondents and on the same day the
sheriff levied their real and personal properties.
Nov. 21, 2001- a copy of summons together with
the copy of complaint were served upon the
respondents.
Now, the respondents filed an answer
and a motion to discharge writ of attachment
36

Judge Sia
alleging that such writ was issued before the
summons was received by the respondents. They
also offered to pay a counter-bond to lift the writ
of attachment.
RTC: Denied his motion but directing
them to file a counter-bond
Satsatin filed an urgent motion to set
aside the order but it was denied. He then files a
motion for reconsideration but it was also
denied. Thus, he filed before the C.A. a petition
for certiorari.
C.A.: there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the writ
attachment was lifted.
The petitioners the filed for a MR, but it
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the writ of attachment should
be lifted
Held: Yes
Ratio: the SC affirmed the C.A. decision
Every bond should be accompanied by a
clearance from the S.C. that the bonding
company is qualified to transact business
which is valid only for 30 days from the date
of the issuance.
In the case at bar, the bonds offered by the
bonding company is applicable only and may be
accepted in the cities of Makati, Pasay and Pasig.
This was stated in the certification issued by the
OCA. Thus the Dasamarinas, Cavite cannot
accept the bond offered by the bonding
company.
implemented, the trial court has not acquired

jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent
since no summons was yet served upon them.
The proper officer should have previously or
simultaneously with the implementation of the
writ of attachment, served a copy of the
summons upon the respondents in order for the
trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon
them and for the writ to have binding effect.
Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was
validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly
enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect
the respondents.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
MEDINA VS. GREENFIELD
Facts:
Petitioners are the grandchildren of
Pedro Medina from two marriages from
Isadora and Natalia. All of Pedros
children likewise bore children, the
petitioners in this case.
Pedro, his brother Alberto Medina and
his niece Nazaria Cruz (Albertos
daughter) executed a notarized Contract
to Sell in favor of respondent Greenfield
Development Corporation over a parcel
of land located in Muntinlupa City, then
in the Province of Rizal.
A notarized Deed of Sale covering said
property of Lot A was subsequently
entered into in favor of respondent,
signed by Medinas and Nazaria Cruz, as
vendors. Then again with the Lot B.
These lots were eventually registered in
the name of Respondent.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 98233, an action for annulment of titles
and deeds, reconveyance, damages with
preliminary injunction and restraining
order, against respondent and the
Register of Deeds of Makati. Included in
the complaint are the heirs of Nazaria
Cruz, as unwilling co-plaintiffs.
Petitioners allege in their complaint that
they are co-owners of these two parcels
of land. While the titles were registered
in the names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio,
Brigida and Gregoria, all surnamed
Medina, they alleged that they were
recognized as co-owners thereof.
Petitioners maintain that the deeds of
sale on these properties were simulated
and fictitious, and the signatures of the
There are 3 stages for the grant of the

provisional remedy of attachment- first, the
court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of attachment
issues pursuant to the order granting the
writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For
the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained. However, once
the implementation of the writ commences,
the court must have acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant, for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and
authority to act in any manner against the
defendant. Any order issuing from the Court
will not bind the defendant.
In the case at bar, at the time the trial court
issued the writ of attachment on November 15,
2002, it can validly to do so since the motion for
its issuance can be filed "at the commencement
of the action or at any time before entry of
judgment." However, at the time the writ was
37

Judge Sia
vendors therein were fake. Despite the

transfer of the title to respondents
name, they remained in possession
thereof and in fact, their caretaker, a
certain Santos Arevalo and his family
still reside on a portion of the property.
Petitioners found out that respondent
constructed a fence on the property and
posted security personnel, barring their
ingress and egress. Petitioners then
sought TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining respondent and its
agents and representatives from
preventing petitioners to exercise their
rights over the properties.
Respondent denied the allegations,
stating that petitioners have no valid
claim on the properties as it is already
titled in its name by virtue of the public
documents executed by their
predecessors. As counterclaim,
respondent alleged that Santos Arevalo
is not petitioners caretaker and it was
them who employed him as caretaker.
TC- granting petitioners prayer for injunctive

relief and the payment of bond for 100,000
Respondent filed a certiorari and prohibition
with CA. CA then annulled decision of RTC
Issue: whether or not the trial court erred in

granting petitioners prayer for injunctive relief.
YES
Held:
Petitioners entitlement to the injunctive

writ hinges on their prima facie legal
right to the properties subject of the
present dispute. The Court notes that
the present dispute is based solely on the
parties allegations in their respective
pleadings and the documents attached
thereto. Petitioners bare assertion or
claim that they are co-owners of the
properties sold by their predecessors to
respondent, and on the other,
respondents claim of ownership
supported by deeds of conveyances and
Torrens titles in their favor.
From these alone, it is clear that
petitioners failed to discharge the
burden of clearly showing a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected.
Where the complainants right or title is
doubtful or disputed, injunction is not
proper. The possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of actual existing

right is not a ground for an injunction.
They only have their own allegations and
are yet to prove their claim. And as
stated earlier, the only bases from which
the propriety of the injunction can be
determined are their respective
pleadings and documents. What tilt the
balance in respondents favor are the
notarized documents and the titles to
the properties. The well-settled rule is
that a document acknowledged before a
notary public enjoys the presumption of
regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. To overcome
this presumption, there must be
presented evidence that is clear and
convincing. Absent such evidence, the
presumption must be upheld.
In addition, the titles in the name of
respondent, having been registered
under the Torrens system, are generally
a conclusive evidence of the ownership
of the land referred to therein, and a
strong presumption exists that the titles
are regularly issued and valid.
Even assuming that petitioners
allegations are true, it bears no legal
consequence in the case at hand because
the execution of the deeds of
conveyances is already deemed
equivalent to delivery of the property to
respondent, and prior physical delivery
or possession is not legally required.
Possession is also transferred, along
with ownership thereof, to respondent
by virtue of the notarized deeds of
conveyances.
Petition DENIED for lack of merit. Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED except as to its view on
prescription
RECEIVERSHIP
COMMODITIES STORAGE VS COURT OF
APPEALS
Facts:
1. Spouses Victor and Johannah Trinidad
(petitioners) obtained a loan from Far
East Bank & Trust
Company(respondent) in the amount
of P31 million, to finance the purchase of
Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage in
Sta. Maria(property), Bulacan. The loan
38

Judge Sia
was secured by the ice-plant and the
land.
2. Petitioner spouses failed to pay the loan,
to which the respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged
property. The property was sold in a
public auction, to which the respondent
bank was the highest bidder. It later
took possession of the property.
3. Petitioner filed a civil case for the
reformation of the loan, annulment of
the foreclosure and damages against
respondent bank before the RTC. It was
dismissed due to failure to pay the
docket fees. It was dismissed without
prejudice.
4. Petitioner again filed a complaint for
damages, accounting and fixing of
redemption period, against the same
respondent before the RTC. As a
provisional remedy, petitioners also filed
an Urgent Petition for Receivership.
They alleged the because respondents
took possession of the property forcibly
and without notice to them, the iceplant, the records in order to pay
petitioners workers were destroyed and
the plant itself has started emitting
ammonia and other toxic refrigerant
chemicals into the atmosphere and was
posing a hazard to the health of the
people in the community because of lack
of lack of diligence to take care of it.
RTC ruling: Granted the urgent motion for
receivership.
CA ruling: Reversed the decision of the RTC
Issue: WoN the CA erred in denying the motion
for receivership?
Ruling: The Court rules in the negative.
A receiver is a person appointed by the
court in behalf of all the parties to the action for
the purpose of preserving and conserving the
property in litigation and prevent its possible
destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the
possession of any of the parties. The
appointment of a receiver is not a matter of
absolute right. It depends upon the sound
discretion of the court and is based on facts and
circumstances of each particular case
The Court ruled that petitioners failed to
sufficiently show that the property in litigation is
in danger of disappearing or being wasted and
reduce to scrap heap. When the case was filed
before the RTC, the leakage petitioner was
referring to was already treated by respondent
bank. It was already contained. Petitioners
contention of their drastic sanctions of their
records are not concerned by the plant itself, and

are personal liabilities, which do not constitute
material injury to the plant. Moreover, the
representative that was to be appointed appears
to be a representative of petitioners. The general
rule is that a receiver should be a person
indifferent to the parties and should be impartial
and disinterested. In appointing a receiver, there
must be a clear showing of necessity therefor in
order to save the plaintiff from grave and
irremediable loss or damage. It is only when the
circumstances so demand, either because there
is imminent danger that the property sought to
be placed in the hands of a receiver be lost or
because they run the risk of being impaired,
endeavoring to avoid that the injury thereby
caused be greater than the one sought to be
avoided.
Decision of the CA is affirmed
Doctrine: (In case mag tanong si judge sa
doctrine)
"Sec. 1. When and by whom receiver appointed.- One or more receivers of the property, real or
personal, which is the subject of the action, may
be appointed by the judge of the Court of First
Instance in which the action is pending, or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme
Court, in the following cases:
(a) When the corporation has been dissolved, or
is insolvent, or is in imminent danger of
insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate rights;
(b) When it appears from the complaint or
answer, and such other proof as the judge may
require, that the party applying for the
appointment of receiver has an interest in the
property or fund which is the subject of the
action, and that such property or fund is in
danger of being lost, removed or materially
injured unless a receiver be appointed to guard
and preserve it;
(c) When it appears in an action by the
mortgagee for the foreclosure of a mortgage that
the property is in danger of being wasted or
materially injured, and that its value is probably
insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt, or
that the parties have so stipulated in the contract
of mortgage;
(d) After judgment, to preserve the property
during the pendency of the appeal, or to dispose
of it according to the judgment, or to aid
execution when the execution has been returned
unsatisfied or the judgment debtor refuses to
apply his property in satisfaction of the
judgment, or otherwise carry the judgment into
effect;
39

Judge Sia
(e) Whenever in other cases it appears that the
appointment of a receiver is the most convenient
and feasible means of preserving, administering,
or disposing of the property in litigation."
answer which was granted. However,

tHey still failed to answer which led to
the dismissal of the case.
RTC decided in favor of respondents;
petitioners failed to prosecute against them and
failed to show any legal basis for the
respondents liability. They have no cause of
action against Roberto Reyes since he is an
ancillary debtor.
What is a receiver?
- A receiver of real or personal property,
which is the subject of the action, may
be appointed by the court when it
appears from the pleadings or such
other proof as the judge may require,
that the party applying for such
appointment has (1) an actual interest in
it; and (2) that (a) such property is in
danger of being lost, removed or
materially injured; or (b) whenever it
appears to be the most convenient and
feasible means of preserving or
administering the property in litigation
A receiver should be impartial to both parties
- The general rule is that neither party to
a litigation should be appointed as
receiver without the consent of the other
because a receiver should be a person
indifferent to the parties and should be
impartial and disinterested.[18] The
receiver is not the representative of any
of the parties but of all of them to the
end that their interests may be equally
protected with the least possible
inconvenience and expense
CA affirmed RTC ruling stating that there was

no cause of action against Roberto Reyes
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to the remedy
of replevin
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that in an action for
a recovery of possession plaintiff need not be the
owner so as long as he establishes his right over
the property with legal basis. Petitioner here
failed to establish a valid claim to the property
and failed to prove that it is an indispensable
party to the case.
DISTILLERIA V CA
Nov 2, 1981 - La Tondena Distillers Inc., file for
the recovery of possession or replevin against
Distilleria Washington of the 18,157 white flint
bottles with the blown-in marks of La Tondena
Inc and Ginebra San Miguel.
La Todena argued that Distilleria was using their
bottles for its own "Gin Seven" products without
the consent of LTDI
REPLEVIN
BA FINANCE CORPORATION VS CA
Spouses Manahan executed a

promissory note promising Carmasters
Inc. the amount of 83k in 36 monthly
installments. To secure such payment is
a chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle.
The promissory note and chattel
mortgage was then assigned to
petitioner BA Finance Corporation.
When the Manahans failed to pay,
petitioner filed for a complaint of
replevin with damages with a bond of
169k but was cautioned by the court that
if summons would not be served in 30
days, the case would be dismissed.
The service of summons was duly
received by Roberto Reyes hence,
petitioner commenced with the seizure
of the motor vehicle on October 20.
Respondents alleging possession in good
faith filed for an extension of time to
Nov 6, 1981 - The court, on application of

LTDI, issued an order of replevin for the seizure
of the empty gin bottles from Washington.
LTDI argued that:
being the owner and registrant of the
bottles, it was entitled for its protection
under RA 632 even if there was sale of
Ginebra San Miguel gin product which is
contained in the bottles
Washington argued:
RA 632 should not apply to gin an
alcoholic beverage
Owernership of the bootless should be
lawfully transferred to the buyers upon
the sale of the gin and containers at a
single price
40

Judge Sia
After hearing, the RTC ruled in favor of

Washington, it ordered:
LTDI to return to Washington the empty
bottles seized by virtue of the writ of
replevin
Failure to return the booths, it ordered
LTDI to indemnity Washington 18k
(value of the bottles)
LTDI appealed to CA; CA reversed the RTC

decision and ruled in favor of LTDI:
LTDI is the owner and is authorized to
retain the possession of the 18,157
bottles registered in its name to which
said bottles were delivered to it by the
sheriff following the bottles' seizure
pursuant to the writ of replevin
Use of marked bottles by any person
other than the manufacturer without the
latter's consent is unlawful
Ownership of containers DOES pass on

to the consumer although subject to the
limitation on the use of the registered
containers and trademark rights of the
registrant
However, while it may be unauthorized

for LTDI to simply seize the containers,
the SC finds it legally absurd to still
allow petitioner to recover the
possession.
Stating that under Sec 3, it states that

there is a prima facie presumption of
illegal use by a possessor whenever it is
without written permission of the
registered manufacturer
The SC said that it sees no other logical

purpose for petitioner's insistence to
keep the bottles, except for its continued
use.
Hence, instead of directing the return of

the bottles to Washington Distellery, the
Court said that the practical and feasible
alternative is for LTDI to pay
Washington just compensation for the
seized bottles.
Washington appealed to SC
ISSUE: Who is entitled to the possession of the
bottles?
HELD:
In this case, the suit is one for replevin

(manual delivery) where LTDI must be
able to show convincly that it is either
the owner or is clearly entitled to the
possession of object sought to be
recovered.
Replevin is a possessory action wherein

it focuses on the right of possession, is
dependent on a legal basis that,
frequently looks to the ownership of the
object sought to be replevied
Sec 5 of RA 623 it allows the sale or

transfer of ownership of the marked
bottles or containers, but the sale of the
beverage contained in the said
containers shall not include the sale of
the containers unless provided
Sec 6 of said law also stated that the law

allows the use of bottles as containers
for sissy, bagoong, patis and other
similar native products
The manufacturer sells the product in

marked containers thru dealers then to
the public in grocery stores,
supermarkets and other sale outlets.
The buyer takes the time, he is neither
required to return the bottle nor make a
deposit to assure its return to the seller.
He could return the bottles and get a
refund. A number of bottles at times find
their way to commercial users.
Sorry, di ko talaga gets ung case regarding

replevin. Ang gulo.
Sabi ni Court na si Washington may ari but then
hindi na pinabalik ung bottles kay Washington
which was previously replevied from it.
The SC in this case, after practically saying that
La Tondena does not own the bottles anymore,
still let LTDI have the possession of the bottles
be retained, on the ground that there is a
presumption of illegal use if Distilleria would be
allowed to recover / possess the property (Sec 3
of RA 632).
41

Judge Sia
The court rules that LTDI should have
possession of the bottles and pay Washington for
the just compensation for the seized bottles
TWIN ACE HOLDINGS vs RUFINA
FACTS:
Twin Ace is a private domestic
corporation manufacturing rhum, wines
and liquor under the name Tanduay
Distillers. Its mark of ownership of the
bottles is registered with the Bureau of
Patent, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer under RA 623. It retrieves its
used empty bottles, washes and uses
them up to 5 times as containers for its
products.
Rufina manufactures patis and other
food seasonings. It uses the bottles of
Twin Ace without permission from the
latter.
Twice Ace filed a complaint for recovery
of possession of personal property,
permanent injunction and damages
against Rufina.
Upon posting the required bond, RTC
granted the application for the issuance
of a writ of replevin. Sevilla (sheriff)
seized a total of 26,241 bottles marked
Tanduay Distillery Inc. from Rufina.
Rufina claimed the bottles were bought
from junk dealers. Hence, it became the
owner.
RTC: Dismissed complaint and
dissolving order of replevin. Ordered the
return of the bottles to Rufina.
Twin Ace appealed to CA. CA modified.
Award for damages removed (except
nominal damages).
Twin Ace MR denied.
ISSUE: W/N Twin Ace is entitled to the
possession of the bottles and is therefore entitled
to compensation for the unauthorized use by
Rufina NO.
exemption under law is

unqualified although it is
primarily meant to protect small
scale industries.
o Rufina, like Lorenzana, also
manufactures toyo, patis, etc.
o Exemption applies to all such
manufacturers.
Nominal Damages: When plaintiff
suffers injury not enough to warrant
award of actual damages, court may
award nomal damages. Nominal
damages to Rufina is justified.
Possession:
o A party praying for the recovery
of possession of personal
property must show by his own
affidavit or that of some other
person that he is the owner of
the property claimed.
o Wrongful detention by the
defendant of the properties
sought in an action for replevin
must be satisfactorily
established.
o Twice Ace failed to show that it
is entitled to the possession of
the bottles. So, there is no basis
for its demand of compensation.
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

SUSAN LIM-LUA vs. DANILO Y. LUA
FACTS
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action
for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua,
before RTC of Cebu City
In her prayer for support pendente lite
for herself and her two children,
petitioner sought the amount of
P500,000.00 as monthly support
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B.
Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order granting
support pendente lite;
HELD:
S6 of RA 623: The provisions of this Act
shall not be interpreted as prohibiting
the use of bottles as containers for sisi,
bagoong, patis and similar native
products.
o Twin Ace filed an earlier
complaint for replevin against
Lorenzana Food corp also to
recover bottles. The court
acknowledged that the
Amount of P250, 000.00 would be

sufficient to take care of the needs of the
plaintiff. This amount excludes the
P135,000.00 for medical attendance
expenses needed by
plaintiff. The amounts
already extended to the 2
children
should be continued.
42

Judge Sia
ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and
July 2005), totaling P2,645,000.00, the
advances given by him to his children
and petitioner in the sum
of P2,482,348.16.
In her Comment, petitioner asserted
that none of the expenses deducted by
respondent may be chargeable as part of
the monthly support contemplated by
the CA.
Trial court issued an Order granting petitioners
motion for issuance of a writ of execution as it
rejected respondents interpretation of the CA
decision.
Respondent filed a MR and
subsequently also filed a motion for
inhibition of Judge Raphael B.
Yrastorza, Sr. Thus, Judge Yrastorza, Sr.
denied both motions.
Since respondent still failed and refused
to pay the support pendente lite,
petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. The two cases were
consolidated.
CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court.
The appellate court said that the trial court
should not have completely disregarded the
expenses incurred by respondent which certainly
inured to the benefit not only of the two
children, but their mother (petitioner) as well.
Petitioner filed a MR but it was denied
by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether expenses already incurred by the
respondent may be deducted from the total
support owing to petitioner and her children
Ruling
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court,
either parent or both may be ordered to give an
amount necessary for the support, maintenance,
and education of the child. It shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional
support, the court may likewise consider the
following factors: (1) the financial resources of
the custodial and non-custodial parent and those
of the child; (2) the physical and emotional
health of the child and his or her special needs
and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child
Since the instant complaint was filed on

03 September 2003, the amount of
P250, 000.00 should be paid by
defendant to plaintiff retroactively to
such date until the hearing of the
support pendente lite.
P250, 000.00 x 7 corresponding to the
(7) months that lapsed from September, 2003
to March 2004 would tantamount to a total of
P1,750,000.00.
Thereafter, starting April 2004,
defendant is ordered to pay a monthly
support of P250, 000.00.
The monthly support of P250, 000.00 is
without prejudice to any increase or
decrease that the Court may grant
Respondent filed a MR asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not
maintain for herself a separate dwelling
from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family.
As to the P250, 000.00 granted by the
trial court as monthly support pendente
lite, as well as theP1,750,000.00
retroactive support, respondent found it
unconscionable and beyond the
intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent.
Trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order
had become final and executory since
respondents MR is treated as a mere scrap of
paper for violation of the 3 day notice period.
Respondent was given 10 days to show
cause why he should not be held in
contempt of the court for disregarding
the March 31, 2004 order granting
His second MR having been denied,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari
in the CA.
CA rendered its Decision, finding merit in
respondents contention that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in
granting P250,000.00 monthly support to
petitioner without evidence to prove his actual
income.
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of
the CA.
Respondent attached a copy of a check
he issued in the amount of P162,651.90
payable to petitioner.
Respondent explained that, as decreed
in the CA decision, he deducted from the
amount of support in arrears
(September 3, 2003 to March 2005)
43

Judge Sia
has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary
contributions that the parents will make toward
the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of
the provisional support from the salary of the
parent.
CA should not have allowed all the expenses
incurred by respondent to be credited against
the accrued support pendente lite. The monthly
support pendente lite granted by the trial court
was intended primarily for food, household
expenses such as salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy
sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars
bought by respondent for his children plus their
maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner
and Angelli, purchases through credit card of
items other than groceries and dry goods
(clothing) should have been disallowed, as
these bear no relation to the judgment awarding
While the Decision reduced the amount of
monthly support fixed by the trial court, it
nevertheless held that considering respondents
financial resources, it is but fair and just that he
give a monthly support for the sustenance and
basic necessities of petitioner and his children.
This would imply that any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should
only cover those incurred for sustenance and
household expenses.
1. The amounts already extended to the
two (2) children, being a commendable
act of petitioner, should be continued by
him considering the vast financial
resources at his disposal. (Emphasis
supplied.)
2. As to the contempt charge, we sustain
the CA in holding that respondent is not
guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a
disobedience to the court by
acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a
willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts order, but such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of
the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede
the due administration of
justice. To
constitute contempt, the act must be done
willfully and for an
illegitimate or improper
purpose. The good faith or lack of it, of the
alleged contemnor should be considered.
It is a matter of record that respondent
continued shouldering the full cost of their
education and even beyond their basic
necessities in keeping with the familys social
status. Moreover, respondent believed in good

faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon
equitable grounds, would allow him to offset the
substantial amounts he had spent or paid
directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very
much capacitated to generate income on her own
because she presently maintains a boutique at
the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the
same time engages in the business of lending
money. He also claims that the two children
have finished their education and are now
employed in the family business earning their
own salaries. (The amount of support may be
reduced or increased proportionately according
to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.34 As we held in
Advincula v. Advincula)
Judgment for support does not become final.
The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during
the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified
or altered, in accordance with his increased
or decreased needs, and with the means of
the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to
final determination.36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED.
a. DISMISSING the case of
Petition for Contempt of Court
with Damages filed by Susan
Lim Lua against Danilo Y.
b. GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y.
Lua's Petition for Certiorari
"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new
one is entered:
i.
ORDERING the deduction of
the amount of Php 648,102.29
from the support pendente lite
in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his
wife, Susan Lim Lua and their
two (2) children;
ii.
ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to
resume payment of his monthly
support of PhP115,000.00 pesos
starting from the time payment
of this amount was deferred by
him subject to the deduction
aforementioned.
iii.
DIRECTING the immediate
execution of this judgment.
44

Judge Sia
filing on time (imputes the delay to the
negligence of the lawyer).
CA ruling: Affirmed in toto the decision of the
RTC
Issue:
a. When is interpleader proper?
b. Can a claimant be held in default in an
interpleader case?
Ruling:
a.
Sec 1 Rule 62 provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper.
Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a
person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or
in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may
bring an action against the conflicting claimants
to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves.
An interpleader case is proper and may
be filed by the lessee against conflicting claims
over the rent due for the property leased. This
remedy is proper for to protect the lessee from
double vexation in respect to his liability. He or
she may file the interpleader case to extinguish
his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or
her from the adverse claimants dispute, and
compel the parties with conflicting claims to
litigate among themselves.
The purpose of the interpleader in the
present case is to extinguish the liability of
Zuellig pharma to pay rent. The purpose is not
defeated when RTC declared Lui in default. The
adverse claimant may be held in default in an
interpleader case if he fails to answer within the
reglimentary period. Here, Lui failed to show
excusable negligence in the filing of the answer.
b. Yes, an adverse claimant (Lui) may be
declared in default, having to fail to
answer within the reglamentary period.
Under rule 62 sec. 5, a claimant who
fails to answer within the reglamentary
period may, on motion, be declared in
default. The effect of default is that the
court may render judgment barring
[the defaulted claimant] from any claim
in respect to the subject matter. The
Rules would not have allowed claimants
in interpleader cases to be declared in
default if it would ironically defeat the
very purpose of the suit.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

RULE 62: INTERPLEADER
LUI ENTERPRISES VS ZUELLIG
PHARMA
Facts:
1. On March 9, 1995 Lui Enterprises and
Zuellig Pharma entered into a lease
agreement for 10 years for a parcel of
land.
2. On Jan 10, 2003 Philippine Bank of
Communication (PBC) sent a letter to
Zuellig, claiming to be the new owner of
the parcel of land. The bank is asking
Zuellig to pay directly to it. Attach in the
letter was a copy of the transfer
certificate title under the name of the
bank.
3. Zuellig informed Lui of the letter of
PBCs claim. Lui on the other hand,
insist its right to claim the collection of
money.
4. Because of the conflicting claims of PBC
and Lui over the payment of rent,
Zuellig filed a complaint for interpleader
before the RTC. Zuellig then alleged that
it already consigned the payment,
amounting to P604,024.35. The prayer
is that Zuellig be allowed to consign the
payment of rent and for PBC and Lui to
litigate their conflicting claims.
5. PBC filed an answer while Lui filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the
representative of Zuellig did not have
the authority to file the complaint
(interpleader).
6. Lui alleged that earlier, there is a
nullification of deed of donation case
initiated which barred the filing of the
interpleader case. The dispositive
portion on the earlier case prohibited
PBC and its representatives (writ of
preliminary injunction) from conducting
an auction sale.
7. Zuellig opposed the motion to dismiss,
alleging that the interpleader case was a
necessary consequence of the action for
consignation. It also alleged that Lui
filed its answer beyond the 15 day
period.
RTC ruling: Lui filed out of time, which denied
the motion to dismiss. Lui also failed to show
excusable negligence that prevented it from
TIRONA VS OCAMPO
45
Leonardo Ocampo (Petitioner) was the

owner of a parcel of land with an area of

Judge Sia
500 sqm in Pasay City that he bought
from Rosauro Breton with Tirona
(Respondent) as a lessee of the land.
RULE 63: DECLARATORY RELIEF

AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
In recognition of Ocampos right of

ownership, Tirona has been monthly
rentals. One day, Ocampo received a
letter from Callejo Law stating that the
land was declared as an area for priority
development. As a result Tirona stopped
payment until the National Housing
Authority has processed the papers as
regards to the amount due to Ocampo as
an effect of the above law.
GALICTO v. AQUINO
FACTS:
Pnoy alleged in his SONA the excessive
allowances and benefits of officers of the
Board of Directors of the Manila
Waterworks and Sewerage System, a
govt owned and controlled corp
(GOCC).
The Senate issued Senate Resolution No.
17 based on findings that officials of
GOCCs have been granting themselves
unwarranted allowances. The resolution
urges the president to order the
immediate suspension of excessive
allowances.
Pnoy issued Executve Order 7 entitled
Directing the Rationalization of the
Compensation and Position
Classification System in the GOCCs and
GFIs and for Other Purposes.
o It provides guidelines to
establish a fixed compensation
and classification system for
GOCCS and GFI.
o It ordered a moratorium on the
increases in the salaries except
those under EO 8011 and 900
for an indefinite period to be set
by the President.
o It also ordered the suspension of
all allowances and incentives of
the Board of Directors till
12/31/2010.
o Published on 9/10/10. Took
effect on 9/25/10.
Galicto is a Filipino citizen. He is Court
Attorney IV assigned at PhilHealth
Regional Office CARAGA. As a
PhilHealth employee, he claims he is
affected by EO 7 which is
unconstitutional for being issued beyond
the powers of the President and for
breach of existing laws.
He filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: W/N Certiorari is the proper remedy
NO.
HELD
Petitioner wrote an open letter to

respondent demanding him for payment
for the months of April, May, June, July
and August. But despite this, respondent
still failed to make payments. Urging
petitioner to file a complaint in the
MTC. As a reply, respondent asserted
that it was a certain Lourdes Yaneza who
owns the land therefore he shall not be
answerable to petitioner.
MTC In favor of petitione; Tirona does not

have any reason to suspend payment and that
her non-payment rendered her occupation of the
land illegal.
RTC Affirmed MTC decision issuing a Writ of
Execution; For the first time, Tirona disclosed
the ownership of Alipio Breton and Rosauro
Breton of the land claiming that it is only them
or in this case Rosauro is the only person who
can validly file an ejectment against her.
CA Dismissed the complaint
ISSUE: W/N the filing of an Interpleader is
proper in the case at bar
HELD:
No. As a rule, it is proper when the lessee does
not know the person whom to pay rentals due to
conflicting claims of property. In the case at bar,
Tirona should have practiced due diligence in
hailing the contending claimants of the court
and need not awaited an actual suit. Further,
there was no dispute in the property by different
parties. It was proven that Ocampo is indeed the
owner of the property therefore, have the right to
eject Tirona.
46

Judge Sia
MALANA v TAPPA
Prohibition is used to question

mandatory acts.
Certiorari (R65) is a special civil action
that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function.
o Judicial Function: Power to
determine what the law is and
what are the legal rights of the
parties
o Quasi-judicial Function: Actions
of public administrative bodies
required to investigate facts,
draw conclusions thereon and
exercise discretion of a judicial
nature
Issuance of an EO is not a judicial,
quasi-judicial or mandatory act.
Proper remedy is a petition for
declaratory relief under R63 filed
w/ the RTC.
o Who may file: Any person
interested under a contract
whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order before
breach to determine any
question of construction.
Liberality and the transcendental
doctrine cannot be used to disregard
procedural rules considering petitioner
had other available remedies.
Other issues:
Galicto has no locus standi. It must refer
to a present direct and substantial
interest. His interest is merely
speculative. He has no vested rights to
salary increases either. Mere invocation
of an IBP member to preserve the rule of
law is insufficient.
He failed to provide an identification
document issued by his agency bearing a
photograph and signature as competent
evidence of identity for his
verification/certification of non-forum
shopping as required by AM NO 02-813-SC. This is not a fatal defect. It is only
a formal requirement.
Petition is already moot and academic.
The suspension of allowances is only
until 12/31/10 which has already lapsed.
RA 10149) GOCC Governance Act of
2011) was also enacted. It authorizes the
President to fix the compensation and
position classification system for all
GOCC and GFI.
Malana filed for Reinvidication,

Quieting of Title and damages against
Tappa (family members of Consuelo)
Malana alleged that they are owners of
the land covered by TCT in Tugegarao
City and they inherited the property
from Anastacio who died intestate
During the lifetime of Anastacio it
allowed Consuelo to occupy the property
in dispute and Consuelo agreed that he
would vacate the land at the time
Anastacio and his heirs might need it
But respondents continued to occupy
the property despite petitioner's demand
to vacate and respondents were also
claiming ownership over the property to
which the respondents presented a
document supporting their claim before
the Lupong Tagamayapa in an attempt
to settle their land dispute there.
And that document created a cloud upon
petitioner's title to the property and
reason why the petitioners were
compelled to file before the RTC
Tugegarao, a complaint to remove the
cloud from their title
RTC of Tugegarao City, dismissed the

complaint for lack of jurisdiction:
RTC has jurisdiction over real actions
where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds P20k (outside MM)
and P50k (in MM)
The value of property was only P410
which is below P20K, hence it was
outside the jurisdiction of the RTC
And the MTC has jurisdiction over the
case
Petitioners filed MR (denied). They then filed
another pleading designated as Motion wherein
they prayed the RTC orders be set aside
Petitioners argued that:
their principal cause was for quieting of
title
the accion reinvindicatoria was included
merely to enable them to seek complete
relief from respondents
and that Sec 1 of Rule 63 of RoC
states that an action to quiet title
falls under the jurisdiction of the
RTC (they were referring to the 1st
paragraph of Sec 1)
47

Judge Sia
RTC issued another order (Oct 31, 2007)
and dissected Sec 1 Rule 63 of RoC:
Wherein it differentiated the first and
second paragraphs
1st paragraph - refers to an action for
declaratory relief (brought before RTC)
2nd paragraph - different set of
remedies including the action to quit
title to real property
And that the 2nd paragraph should be
read in relation to RA 7691 vesting MTC
jurisdiction over real actions where the
assessed value of the real property
involved does not exceed P20k (outside
MM) and P50k (within MM)
Petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65

appealing to SC
ISSUE: W/N the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint
for lack of jurisdiction? NO
HELD:
The RTC correctly made a dissection
between the 1st and 2nd paragraph of
Sec. 1 Rule 63 of RoC *refer to RTC
decision above*
To determine which court has
jurisdiction over the actions identified
in the 2nd paragraph, the provision
must be read together w/ the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980.
Also, Sec 1 Rule 63 does not require
an action to quiet title be filed
before the RTC because it repeatedly
uses the word "MAY be brought under
the Rule" on petitions for declaratory
relief.
The word MAY denotes the provision is
merely permissive and a possibility
of an option or opportunity
But in Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 it uses the word "SHALL"
and requires the MTC to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property where
the assessed value does not exceed
P20k (outside MM) and P50k (w/n
MM)
And in this case, the assessed value of
the property was only P410. Hence, the
RTC has no jurisdiction but the MTC.
FURTHERMORE, an action for

declaratory relief presupposes that
here has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or rights
arising thereunder.
Purpose of which is to secure an
authoritative statement of rights and
obligations of the parties and not to
settle issues arising from an alleged
breach.
It may only be entertained BEFORE
the breach or violation of the statute,
deed or contract
It is a practical remedy for ending
controversies that has not yet reached
the state where another relief is
immediately available; and supplies the
need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead
to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs
A court has no more jurisdiction over an

action for declaratory relief if its subject
has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the
action.
IN THIS CASE, the complaint of Malana

for quieting of title was filed AFTER
Malana demanded and the respondent
refused to vacate the property.
Since in the complaint, the petitioner
averred that they were already deprived
of the possession of their property
The proper remedy was to file an accion
publiciana or reinvindicatoria NOT for
declaratory relief
Other notes:
Accion publicana - recovery of
possession filed 1 yr after occurrence of
COA
Accion reinvidicatroia - object is
recovery of possession as owner
In this case, the court said the
petitioners complaint had sufficient
allegations for an accion reinvindicatoria
Regarding the issue of petitioners saying
the RTC dismissed the complaint motu
prorpio, the Court held that if the court
has no jurisdiction over the nature of
action, it may the same motu proprio
48

Judge Sia
because jurisdiction of a court is
conferred by law and not by the consent
or waiver of the parties.
to a second seat and Lokin to a

proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva
and Cruz-Gonzales.
COMELEC resolved to set the matter for proper
disposition and hearing.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC
was entitled to an additional seat,
Ricardo de los Santos (as secretary
general of CIBAC) informed Roberto P.
Nazareno (Sec. General of the HOR) of
the promulgation of NBC Resolution No.
07-72 and requested that Lokin be
formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de
Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume
office.
Nazareno replied that the request of
Delos Santos could not be granted
because COMELEC Law Director
Alioden Dalaig had notified him of the
pendency of E.M. 07-054.
COMELEC en banc approves the withdrawal of
the nomination of Atty. Lokin, Tugna and
Galang as second, third and fourth
nominees respectively and the substitution
thereby with Atty. Cruz-Gonzales as second
nominee and Atty. Borje as third nominee
for the party list CIBAC. The new order of
CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of
Villanueva in his capacity as the president of
CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of
his authority; that the president was charged to
oversee and direct the corporate activities, which
included the act of submitting the party's
manifestation of intent to participate in the May
14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of
nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed
Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as
a Party-List Representative of CIBAC
Issues
a) Whether or not the Court has
jurisdiction over the
controversy;
b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of
forum shopping;
c) Whether or not Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 is
unconstitutional and violates
the Party-List System Act; and
RULE 64: REVIEW OF

JUDGMENTS AND FINAL
ORDERS OF RESOLUTIONS OF
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION
AND THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
LOKIN V COMELEC
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption

(CIBAC) was one of the organized
groups duly registered under the partylist system of representation that
manifested their intent to participate in
the synchronized national and local
elections.
With the intent to participate,2 CIBAC,
through its president, Emmanuel
Villanueva, submitted a list of five
nominees
The nominees were: (1) Emmanuel
Villanueva; (2) Luis Lokin; (3) Cinchona
Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and
(5) Emil Galang.
Prior to the elections, CIBAC filed a
certificate of nomination, substitution
and amendment of the list of
nominees,6 whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and substituted Armi Borje as
one of the nominees.
Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos, to
confirm the withdrawal of the
nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang
and the substitution of Borje.
In their petitions, members of CIBAC
averred that Lokin and Tugna were not
the nominees presented and proclaimed
by CIBAC in its proclamation rally
CIBAC filed with the COMELEC en
banc sitting (as the National Board of
Canvassers) a motion seeking the
proclamation of Lokin as its second
nominee.
The right of CIBAC to a second seat and
the right of Lokin to be proclaimed were
based on Party-List Canvass which
showed CIBAC garnered 744,674 votes.
Using all relevant formulas, the motion
asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled
49

Judge Sia
d) Whether or not the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in
approving the withdrawal of the
nominees of CIBAC and
allowing the amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC
without any basis in fact or law
and after the close of the polls,
and in ruling on matters that
were intra-corporate in nature.
Ruling: The petitions are granted.
A. The Court has jurisdiction over the
case
The COMELEC posits that once the
proclamation of the winning party-list
organization has been done and its nominee has
assumed office, any question relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the
candidates to the House of Representatives falls
under the jurisdiction of the HRET. Thus, Lokin
should raise the question he poses herein either
in an election protest or in a special civil action
for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special
civil action for certiorari in this Court.
We do not agree.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning
candidate from office. It is strictly a contest
between the defeated and the winning
candidates, based on the grounds of electoral
frauds and irregularities, to determine who
between them has actually obtained the majority
of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the
office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has
duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to
questions of disloyalty to the State, or of
ineligibility of the winning candidate. The
objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the
petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest
where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the
respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an
election protest nor an action for quo
warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar
situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated
as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an
election protest may properly be available to one
party-list organization seeking to unseat another
party-list organization to determine which
between the defeated and the winning party-list
organizations actually obtained the majority of
the legal votes, Lokins case is not one in which a

nominee of a particular party-list organization
thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the
same party-list organization. Neither does an
action for quo warranto lie, considering that the
case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of
the Philippines, or some other cause of
disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil
action for certiorari against the COMELEC
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of
office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional
mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
for the review of the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the
mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the
Supreme Court within a limited period of 30
days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for
certiorari and for mandamus against the
COMELEC.
B Petitioner is not guilty of forum
shopping
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to
compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the
second nominee of CIBAC and to strike down
the provision in NBC. On the other hand, Lokin
has resorted to the petition for certiorari to
assail the resolution of the COMELEC
(approving the withdrawal of the nomination of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by
Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje
as the third nominee); and to challenge the
COMELECs basis for allowing CIBACs
withdrawal of Lokins nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the
consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and
the action for mandamus did not violate the rule
against forum shopping even if the actions
involved the same parties, because they were
based on different causes of action and the
reliefs they sought were different.
C Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution
No. 7804
The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, a
plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a
recall. COMELEC is also charged to promulgate
IRRs implementing the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the
COMELEC enforces and administers.30
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
50

Judge Sia
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List
Representatives.-Each registered party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days
before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from which party-list representatives
shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only.
Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall
not include any candidate of any elective office
or a person who has lost his bid for an elective
office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall
have been submitted to the COMELEC except in
cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in
writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated
in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House
of Representatives who are nominated in the
party-list system shall not be considered
resigned. The exceptions are exclusive.
Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list
organization of its right to choose its nominees,
but merely divests it of the right to change its
nominees or to alter the order in the list of its
nominees names after submission of the list to
the COMELEC.
F Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804
Sec 13 of Resolution No. 7804 allowing the
party-list organization to withdraw its
nomination was invalid, CIBACs withdrawal of
Lokins nomination and substitution of new
nominees were also invalid and ineffectual.
Hence, it should be struck down for lack of legal
basis. Thereby, COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly
issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for
certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Sec 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid
and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a
party-list organization to withdraw its
nomination of a nominee once it has submitted
the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007
issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens
Battle Against Corruptions withdrawal of the
nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N.
Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and
fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering
their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as

third nominee; and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on
Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a
Party-List Representative representing Citizens
Battle Against Corruption in the House of
Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to
forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.
as a Party-List Representative representing
Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House
of Representatives.
RULE 65: CERTIORARI,

PROHIBITION, AND MANDAMUS
A.L. ANG NETWORK INC. VS. EMMA
MONDEJAR
Facts:
1. Petitioner (A.L. Ang) filed a complaint
for sum of money under Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases
before the MTCC, seeking the amount of
P21, 111.17
2. Petitioner is duly authorized to supply
water and collect payment from the
homeowners of Regent Pearl
Subdivision (including respondent).
3. Respondent and her family consumed
1,150 cubic meters of water from June 1,
2002 to Sept. 30,2005, amounting to
P28,580.09. However, out of the whole
amount, respondent only paid
P5,468.38, leaving the amount of
P23,111.71.
4. Respondent counters that since April
1998 up to Feb 2003, she paid the
agreed monthly flat rate of the water
amount P75.00. Regardless of the
agreement of prior notification,
petitioner still changed the amount that
is unreasonable and excessive.
5. Petitioner subsequently disconnected
respondents water line for nonpayment.
MTCC Ruling: (falls under small claims cases)
The court ruled in favor of the respondent,
stating that petitioner was issued a Certificate of
Public Convenience by the National Water
Resources Board only on August 7, 2003, which
it can only charge the flat rate of
P75.00/monthly prior thereto. The total amount
is P1,050 for the months of Jun 1, 2002 to Aug.
7, 2003 and since the payment was P1,685.99,
then it is considered fully paid. For the period of
51

Judge Sia
August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005, based on
petitioners computation, respondent had only
paid P300.00 of her P1,500.00 obligation for
said period. Thus, it ordered respondent to pay
petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent
to P1,200.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from date of receipt of the
extrajudicial demand on October 14, 2010 until
fully paid.
Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule
65 before the RTC.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed the petitioner, stating
that it was only filed to circumvent the decision
of the MTCC.
Issue: WoN the RTC erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari under rule 65?
Ruling: Yes, the petition is meritorious.
Under Sec. 23 of the Rules of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases, an appeal is prohibited
in such cases. Considering its nature, the remedy
of appeal is not allowed. However, it does not
preclude the aggrieved party of filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The contention of
It may not be mistaken to conciliate the decision
of the RTC (that the intention was to circumvent
the decision of the MTCC), because the
petitioner was asking the court (RTC) supersede
the decision of the MTCC. It must be noted that
a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an
original action, designed to correct jurisdictional
errors. It thus falls to the petitioner the burden
to prove the jurisdictional error upon the MTCC.
The RTC in turn, has the discretion to either
grant or deny the petition.
It has been consistently ruled by the Court that
extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law The Court
finds that the petitioner correctly availed the
remedy of petition for certiorari, as contrary to
the RTCs ruling.
Petition is granted, the resolution is reversed.
The court a quo is ordered to resolve the same
with dispatch.
CRISOLOGO VS. JEWM AGROINDUSTRIAL CORP.

Facts:
The controversy stemmed from various
cases of collection for sum of money
filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of
various properties including two parcels
of land.
52
Petitioners Sps. Crisologo were the

plaintiffs in 2 collection cases that were
against Limso and So Keng Kok.
Respondent JEWM was the successorin-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the
plaintiff in another collection case before
RTC against So Keng Kok.
o RTC rendered a decision based
on a compromise agreement.
o RTC directed to transfer the
subject properties to Sy Sen
Ben.
o Sy Sen Ben then sold the
property to Lam who
subsequently sold the same to
JEWM.
o TCTs were issued in the name of
JEWM bearing an annotation of
lis pendens as there were other
cases against So Keng Kok.
A year after the decision, RTC rendered
in favor of Sps. Crisologo.
o So Keng Kok and Limso were
ordered to pay Sps. Crisologo.
o A writ of execution was issued.
Sheriff issued a notice of sale. The
property owned by JEWM was included.
JEWM filed an affidavit of third party
claim and an urgent motion ad
cautelam. It prayed to exclude the said
properties. This was DENIED.
Sps. Crisologo filed a bond in order to
proceed with the execution.
JEWM filed a separate motion for
cancellation of lien with prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Counsel of Sps. Crisologo appeared
questioning the restrain on execution.
JEWM opposed it on the ground that
Spouses Crisologo were not parties in
the case.
Sps, Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion
praying for the denial of the application
for writ or preliminary injuction filed by
JEWM and asking for their recognition
as parties. No motion to intervene was,
however, filed as the Sps. Crisologo
believed that it was unnecessary since
they were already the John and Jane
Does named in the complaint.
RTC denied Spouses Crisologos
Omnibus Motion and granted JEWMs
application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Sps. Crisologo filed a Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion before RTC. This was

Judge Sia
DENIED for lack of legal standing in
court considering that their counsel
failed to make the written formal notice
of appearance.
JEWM moved to declare the
defendants in default which was
GRANTED.
Sps. Crisologo then filed their Very
Urgent Manifestation arguing that they
could not be deemed as defaulting
parties because they were not referred to
in the pertinent motion and order of
default.
Sps. Crisologo filed before CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
decisions of RTC denying their motions
to be recognized as parties to the case
and prayed for an issuance of TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
CA denied the application for a TRO, but
ordered them to amend their
application.
While the action is pending in CA,
JEWM asked for the resolution of the
case based on the merits before RTC.
This was GRANTED.
Sps. Crisologo then filed their Omnibus
Motion Ex Abudanti ad Cautelam,
asking RTC to reconsider the above
decision. Because no motion for
intervention was filed prior to the
rendition of the judgment. The decision
was final and executory.
CA DENIED.
o Writ of preliminary injunction
was final fait accompli And
so grave abuse of discretion on
RTC is moot and academic
o failure of Sps. Crisologo to
file their motion to
intervene under Rule 19
(intervention) rendered
Rule 65 inapplicable as a
vehicle to ventilate their
supposed right in the case
ISSUE: W/N the failure of Sps. Crisologo
to file a motion to intervene (Rule 19)
barred their petition for certiorari NO
The main issue of the case: W/N RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it did not
recognize Sps. Crisologo as indispensable parties
to the case YES
Sps. Crisologos liens were annotated at
the back of TCTs of the subject
properties.
So, as their liens are annotated, they

stand to be benefited or injured by
judgments regarding on the properties.
Therefore, they are indispensable parties
and should be included as defendants.
Judge Omelio failed to include Sps. Crisologo
despite their pleas:
In Sps. Crisologo v. Judge George E.
Omelio, a related administrative case,
the Court found the trial judge guilty of
gross ignorance of the law when it
disregarded the claims of Spouses
Crisologo to participate.
JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation v.
Register of Deeds, Sheriff Medialdea,
John & Jane Does and all persons acting
under their directions, Judge Omelio
failed to cause the service of proper
summons upon the John and Jane Does
impleaded in the complaint.
Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the
sale without notifying the buyers, Sps. Crisologo,
is a violation of the latters right to due process.
Since this is the second time that Judge Omelio
has issued an order which fails to notify or
summon the indispensable parties, SC finds
Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of
the law, with a warning that repetition of the
same or similar act will merit a stiffer penalty in
the future.
The rule is that a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or
any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that
time, was available to Spouses Crisologo,
except resorting to Rule 65.
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have
been availed of, failing to use this remedy should
not prejudice Sps. Crisologo. It is the duty of
RTC, following the rule on joinder of
indispensable parties, to simply recognize them,
with or without any motion to intervene.
Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy
since only the original parties to an action can
appeal. Here, Sps. Crisologo were never
impleaded. Hence, they could not have
utilized appeal as they never possessed
the required legal standing in the first
place.
And even if the Court assumes the existence of
the legal standing to appeal, it must be
remembered that the questioned orders were
interlocutory in character and, as such, Sps.
Crisologo would have to wait, for the
review by appeal, until the rendition of the
53

Judge Sia
judgment on the merits, which at that time may
not be coming as speedy as practicable. While
waiting, Sps. Crisologo would have to endure the
denial of their right, as indispensable parties, to
participate in a proceeding in which their
indispensability was obvious. Indeed, appeal
cannot constitute an adequate, speedy and plain
remedy.
Petition GRANTED
CA De Leon a Petition for Mandamus praying

that petitioner be compelled to continue paying
his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid
monthly benefits from 2001. (GRANTED)
CA held that: Under R.A. No. 660, R.A. No.
8291, (P.D.) No. 1146, respondent is entitled to a
monthly pension for life. He cannot be penalized
for the error committed by GSIS itself. Thus,
although respondent may not be qualified to
receive the retirement benefits under R.A. No.
910, he is still entitled to a monthly pension
under R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, and R.A. No.
8291.
GSIS vs. DE LEON
Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief

State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of
service to the government. He applied
for retirement under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as
amended by R.A. No. 4140, which
provides that chief state prosecutors
hold the same rank as judges. The
application was approved by GSIS.
Thereafter, more than 9 years,
respondent continuously received his
retirement benefits, until 2001, when he
failed to receive his monthly
Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled
the payment of his pension because the
Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) informed GSIS that respondent
was not qualified to retire under R.A.
No. 910; that the law was meant to apply
only to justices and judges; and that
having the same rank and qualification
as a judge did not entitle respondent to
the retirement benefits provided
thereunder. Thus, GSIS stopped the
payment of respondents monthly
pension.
Respondent wrote GSIS several letters
but later he receive one from GSIS
stating that the DBM through Secretary
Boncodin already refused to release the
funds for the pension benefit on the
ground that Chief State Prosecutors are
not covered by R.A. 910 and that his
request to secure the benefits under R.A
660 or any applicable law cannot also
prosper because he already retired
under a different law, Republic Act No.
910, more than fifteen (15) years ago.
There is nothing in the GSIS law which
sanctions double retirement and that
GSIS said the concern must be address
to DOJ and DBM.
Hence, the petition of GSIS assailing the

decision of CA and denying their MR.
GSIS grounds:
1. For not specifying under which law
respondents retirement benefits should
be paid, thus making it legally
impossible for GSIS to comply with the
directive
2. CA erred in issuing a writ of mandamus
despite the absence of any specific and
clear right on the part of respondent,
since he could not even specify the
benefits to which he is entitled and the
law under which he is making the claim.
3. It had refunded respondents premium
payments because he opted to retire
under R.A. No. 910..
4. CA erred in concluding that respondent
would not be unjustly enriched by the
continuation of his monthly pension
because he had already benefited from
having erroneously retired under R.A.
No. 910. GSIS points out that it had
refunded respondents premium
contributions.
5. To compel GSIS to release respondents
retirement benefits despite the fact that
he is disqualified to receive retirement
benefits violates R.A. No. 8291, and
would subject its officials to possible
charges under R.A. No. 3019, the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act
6. GSIS contends that respondent is not
entitled to the retirement benefits under
R.A. No. 8291 because, when he retired
in 1992, the law had not yet been
enacted.
7. GSIS argues that the writ of
mandamus issued by the CA is not
proper because it compels
petitioner to perform an act that is
contrary to law
54

Judge Sia
Issue:
CA erred in issuing a writ of mandamus despite
the absence of any specific and clear right on the
part of respondent. NO
Held:
It is well to remind GSIS of its mandate to

promote the efficiency and welfare of the
employees of our government, and to perform its
tasks not only with competence and proficiency
but with genuine compassion and concern.
Respondents disqualification from
receiving retirement benefits under R.A.
No. 910 does not mean that he is
disqualified from receiving any
retirement benefit under any other
existing retirement law.
Petition denied. CA affirmed with modification.
To pay respondent retirement benefits with
deductions under P.D 1146 and R.A 910
The CA acted correctly when it gave due

course to respondents petition for
mandamus.
This case involves a former government
official who, after honorably serving
office for 44 years, was comfortably
enjoying his retirement in the relative
security of a regular monthly pension,
but found himself abruptly denied the
benefit and left without means of
sustenance. This is a situation that
obviously cries out for the proper
application of retirement laws, which are
in the class of social legislation.
The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is
that social legislation must be liberally
construed in favor of the beneficiaries.
Retirement laws, in particular, are
liberally construed in favor of the retiree
because their objective is to provide for
the retirees sustenance and, hopefully,
even comfort, when he no longer has the
capability to earn a livelihood. The
liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in
order that efficiency, security, and wellbeing of government employees may be
enhanced.25 Indeed, retirement laws
are liberally construed and administered
in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited, and all doubts are resolved in
favor of the retiree to achieve their
humanitarian purpose.
Other issues:
The CA incorrectly held that respondent
was covered by R.A. No. 8291. R.A. No.
8291 became a law after respondent
retired from government service.
Petitioner and even respondent agree
that it does not apply to respondent,
because the law took effect after
respondents retirement.
Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right
to benefits that have become due as
provided under the terms of the public
employees pension statute. No law can
deprive such person of his pension
rights without due process of law, that
is, without notice and opportunity to be
heard
Not a case of conversion within the
contemplation of the law. The
conversion under the law is one that is
voluntary, a choice to be made by the
retiree. Here, respondent had no choice
but to look for another law under to
claim his pension benefits because the
DBM had decided not to release the
funds needed to continue payment of his
monthly pension. DBM had not
suspended the payment of his pension;
he would not have sought any other law
under which to receive his benefits.
The refund by GSIS of respondents
premium payments was erroneous.
Hence, GSIS can demand the return of
the erroneous payment or it may opt to
deduct the amount earlier received by
respondent from the benefits which he
will receive in the future.
In this case, respondent was able to establish

that he has a clear legal right to the
reinstatement of his retirement benefits.
In stopping the payment of respondents
monthly pension, GSIS relied on the
memorandum of the DBM, which, in turn, was
based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsels
opinion that respondent, not being a judge, was
not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910. And
because respondent had been mistakenly
allowed to receive retirement benefits under R.A.
No. 910, GSIS erroneously concluded that
respondent was not entitled to any retirement
benefits at all, not even under any other extant
retirement law. This is flawed logic.
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP VS ROBREDO
55

Judge Sia
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger

areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds;
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap

along with other individual petitioners
occupying parcels of land in San Juan,
Navotas and Quezon. LGUs then sent
them notices for eviction and demolition
in pursuant to Sec 28(a) and (b) of RA
7279 to give way to the construction of
infrastructure projects.
Petitioners claim that Sec 28(a) and (b)
offend their constitutional right to due
process and their right to adequate
housing. Hence, the petition in the
Supreme Court.
To consolidate the positions of the
Mayors of Navotas, San Juan, and
Quezon contend that petitioners have
ignored the hierarchy of courts, that
they have incorrectly availed of the
petition for prohibition and mandamus,
that they have failed to state the grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the
mayors, that there is no justiciable
controversy and that petition was filed
out of time.
(b) When government infrastructure projects

with available funding are about to be
implemented;
The court in reading the said provision focused
on the permissive use of the word may that
determines the discretionary power of the
mayors as opposed to the ministerial duty
invoked by petitioners.
PASCUAL V. ROBLES
Facts:
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina filed a
petition for declaration of heirship and
appointment of administrator and
settlement of the estates of the late
Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez.
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina claimed
that they are the sole and surviving heirs
of Antonio and Hermogenes. They
alleged that they are the great
grandchildren of Antonio.
Henry and Certeza- surviving children of
Delfin Rodriguez Rosalina- surviving
heir of Consuelo Rodriguez
Delfin and Consuelo are the heirs of
Macario and Flora
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have incorrectly availed

themselves of the petition of mandamus and
prohibition
HELD:
Yes. The writ of prohibition only lies against the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or persons
exercise of judicial and quasi judicial functions
which is relief against respondents usurpation
of power. Since the mayors involved do not
exercise judicial functions, judicial functions
defined as the power to determine what the law
is and what the legal rights of the parties are,
and determine these questions and adjudicate
the rights of the parties. The mayors to which the
petition was filed against having none such
function cannot be held against such.
Macario and Flora are the heirs of

Antonio. Flora died, leaving Macario as
the sole heir.
For the estate of Hermogenes, they
contend that:
Antonio and Hermogenes are both brothers.
Hermogenes died earlier leaving Antonio as the
only heir.
At the initial hearing, no one opposed the
petition. After presentation of proof of
compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the
RTc allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to
submit evidence before a commissioner in
support of petition.
After evaluating the evidence, it was found out
that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the
grandchildren in the direct line of Antonio and
required them to present additional evidence to
establish the alleged fraternal relationship
between Antonio and Hermogenes.
On the other hand a petition for mandamus will

only issue to compel an officer to performs his
ministerial duty. In the case at bar what is being
prohibited to be implemented is Section 28(a)
and (b)
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or
demolition as a practice shall be discouraged.
Eviction or demolition, however, may be
allowed under the following situations:
56

Judge Sia
RTC: rendered a partial judgement
Declaring Henry, Certeza and
Rosaline as heirs of Antonio,
Macario, and Delfin.
Appointing Henry as regular
administrator of the estate of the
descendants Delfin, Macario and
Antonio and as special
administrator of the estate of
Hermogenes.
Ratio: Pascual has no personality to file the

instant petition. The requirement of personality
is sanctioned by Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the ROC which
provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi- judicial functions rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.
An aggrieved party is one who was a part
to the original proceedings that gave rise to the
original action for certiorari under 65. If a nonparty to the proceedings before the lower court
has no standing to file a motion for
reconsideration. Logic would lead us to
conclusion that he would likewise have no
standing to question the said order or decision
before the appellate court via certiorari. Thus a
person not party to the proceedings in the trial
court in the CA cannot maintain an action for
certiorari in the SC to have the judgment
reviewed.
In the present case, Pascual was never a
party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA.
in fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar
as the instant case is concerned. There is no
dispute that it was only January 2005 that he
acquired interest in a portion of the properties
subject of the estate proceedings when he bought
a real property located in Pampanga, which
belonged to the Rodriguez estate. Pascual claims
that he filed the instant petition for certiorari
only after learning of the assailed decision of the
CA and RTC, implying that he cannot intervened
earlier. This, however is not an excuse or
justification to allow petitioner to file the instant
petition.
Subsequently, 6 groups of oppositors entered

their appearances.
1.) Group of Judith Rodriguez- opposing
claim to the estate of Antonio while the
other are opposing claims to the estate
of Hermogenes.
2.) Group of Carola Favila- Santos
3.) Jaime Robles
4.) Florencia Rodriguez
5.) Victoria Rodriguez
6.) Bienvenido Rodriguez
RTC: Declared Carola Favila- Santos and her
co- heirs as heirs of Hermogenes and reiterated
its partial judgement declaring Henry, Certeza
and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio.
Dismissed the oppositions of Jaime Robles,
Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez and
Florencia Rodriguez for their failure to
substantiate their respective claims of heirship
to the late Hermogenes.
RTC amended its decision reversing its earlier
decision.
Carola Favila- Sanctos not related to
the descendant Hermogenes.
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the
heirs of Hermogenes
Robles appealed but it was denied. He then
questioned the denial of appeal by filing a
petition for certiorari before the SC which was
referred to the C.A.
C.A.: annulled the Amended decision of RTC.
Henry and his group filed a MR but it was
denied. They did not furthermore appeal.
On the other hand, Robles filled an appeal
assailing a portion of the C.A. decision. But it
was denied. Thus the resolution became final
and executory.
An instant petition was later filed assailing the
decision of the SC on the notice of appeal and
record on appeal against Robles.
Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari
should be granted?
Held: no
RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO

RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION
RULE 68: FORECLOSURE OF
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
RULE 69: PARTITION
RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY AND
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK VS
SPS. JOVELLANOS
57
Sps. Jovellanos entered into a Contract

to Sell with Palmera Homes for the
purchase of a residential house in
Caloocan City. They took possession
over the property through the payment

Judge Sia
of 91k installment and with the contract

price of 13k as monthly installments to
be paid for 10 years starting June 2005.
On August 2006 Palmera Homes
assigned all its rights in a contract to sell
to Optimum Development Bank wherein
the latter issued a cancellation of
contract to sell over the Spouses since
they have failed to pay their monthly
installments despite written and verbal
demands.
MeTC ruled in favor of Optimum Development

Bank with the reason that Spouses possession
over the property has been cancelled for
nonpayment of the monthly installment which
constitutes to unlawful detainment.
Manuel and Edgardo formed Torres

Palaban Realty Inc (Torres Palaban) and
part of Manuels capital contribution it
assigned the same land to TorresPalaban. Torres building was then
constructed and units were rented out
and it was declared by Torres-Palaban
for tax purposes. Manuel then resigned.
On the other hand, Tormil filed a case

before the SEC to compel Manuel to turn
over the document for the registration &
transfer of titles in its name that were
assigned to it.
March 1994 - During the pendency of the SEC

case, ProGuard entered into a lease agreement
with Edgardo to the rent a unit from the Torres
building. As payment, petitioner would provide
security service.
RTC Affirmed MeTC decision

CA Set Aside the MeTC decision claiming that
the subject matter was incapable of pecuniary
estimation therefore should be filed under RTC
since the matter involved is the validity of the
cancellation of the contract to sell
ISSUE: W/N the MeTC has jurisdiction over the

complaint
As for the SEC case, it granted the

petition of Tormil and by Oct 1998, the
titles of the land were registered in
Tormils name.
Nov 5 1998 Tormil sent letters to Edgardo and

Pro Guard to validate their possession and the
contract of lease as well as to settle the rents but
they ignored such.
HELD:
Yes. The Metropolitan Trial Court has
jurisdiction since it is conditionally vested with
the authority to resolve questions of ownership
with regard to ejectment cases wherein the
determination of the issue of possession is
essential for the case to prosper. Further, it is
allowed to interpret and enforce the contract or
agreement between plaintiff and defendant in
order to resolve the issue of possession. In the
case at bar, the MeTC held that the nonpayment
of the installments led the Spouses to be
deprived of possession over the property and
that the suit filed by Optimum is a lawful
exercise of its possession that was transferred by
Palmera.
Nov 16 Tormil sent separate demand letters

and pay the monthly rental of 20k but were still
unheeded
Tormil then filed for unlawful

detainer before the MeTC Pasay
MTC:
The occupancy of the defendant was
only upon the Tolerance of Tormil and
the possession became unlawful when
the latter asserted ownership over the
building after the SEC case was upheld.
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES

CORP. V TORMIL REALTY
Manuel assigned to Tormil 3 parcels of

land in exchange for shares of stock. But
the titles remained in the name of
Manuel and no documents were turned
over. Manuel then unilaterally revoked
the transaction.
With respect to ProGuard, it ordered

them to vacate and pay 20k/mo. From
June 1995 until they vacate (from the
time ProGuard occupied the building)
RTC: affirmed; possession became unlawful

when demand letters to vacate and pay were sent
and were not complied with
CA: affirmed RTC
58

Judge Sia
Tolerated acts: the owner of the property allows
to do an act or gives the property and permits to
use it out of friendship or courtesy
Petitioner filed for MR before CA objecting the

order regarding the payment of 20k rental and
the reckoning point of payment.
Effects of withdrawal of tolerance:

A person who occupies the land of
another at the latters tolerance without
any contract between them is an implied
promise that he will vacate upon
demand.
Proguard argued: it should have been from

the date Tormils notice to vacate because when
they entered into the lease contract, it was
Torres Palaban that was in possession. Hence, it
cannot be maid to pay the rents for the entire
period of its stay
Tormil argued: Pro-guards stay was merely
out of tolerance and does not bar it from
claiming arrears of rents and that the demand to
vacate was for the purpose of counting the
prescriptive period to file the unlawful detainer
case.
Proguard is not permitted to deny the title of his

landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant and from the
viewpoint of ProGuard, the lease contract
remained b/w it and Torres as evidence by the
tax declarations and although not conclusive
proof of ownership, are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner.
ISSUE: When is the reckoning point of payment

of the rentals?
REPUBLIC AND NPC (PMO) VS. SUNVAR

REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.
HELD:
The rents should be paid from the
time of the demand to vacate and
not from the time when Pro-guard
occupied the building.
In unlawful detainer cases, entry is legal

but possession thereafter illegal. In this
case, when Pro-guard occupied the unit
in March 1994 until Nov 15 1998, its
right to possess the premises was not
challenged.
It was only after Tormil was able to
secure a judgment of its owernship that
it terminated Pro-Guards right to
possess thru the letter to vacate (Nov 16,
1998)
And it was only from that time that
Tormil considered to have withdrawn its
tolerance of Pro-Guards occupation.
And this was supported from the
allegations in the complaint for
ejectment by tormil when it initiated the
action not for non-payment of rentals
but because of withdrawal of tolerance.
Petitioners Republic and NPC are

registered co-owners of four parcels of
land located along Pasong Tamo
Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City.
o The subject of the case is 1 out of
4 of the land owned.
o 80% is owned by RP and 20 %
by NPC
Petitioners are being represented in this
case by the Privatization Management
Office (PMO).1
Respondent Sunvar occupied the subject
property by virtue of sublease
agreements, which had in the meantime
expired.
Facts:
Respondent first leased the property to
Technology Resource Center
Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI). The
agreement provided:
o TRCFI has the right to sublease
the land.
o Lease agreement was for 25
years It ends on Dec. 31, 2002
TRCFI subleased the majority of the
land to Sunvar. The agreement
contained common provisions such as
the date of expiration
o BUT it was subject to renewal
option of Sunvar.
Note:
Tolerance: act of permitting/enduring
something not wholly approved of
the agency tasked with the administration and

disposal of government assets.
59

Judge Sia
According to petitioners: The sublease

agreements provided that Sunvar agreed
to return the property after the
expiration of the agreement.
During the period of the sublease,
Sunvar:
o Introduced useful
improvements (commercial
buildings in which the spaces
within are also leased out)
o Utilized the open spaces
profitably for parking areas
Less than a year before the agreement
expires, Sunvar wrote to PDAF
(successor of TRCFI) expressing their
desire to extend the lease.
PDAF relayed to NPC. NPC did not want
to renew the contract.
When the lease expired, Sunvar
continued to occupy the property.
2008 6 years after the lease expired,
RP, through OSG, demanded Sunvar to
vacate the property in 30 days.
2009 Sunvar received a final notice to
vacate. Sunvar still refused.
PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal
Report to determine the fair rental value
of the subject property and petitioners
lost incomea loss arising from the
refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate
the property after the expiration of the
main lease contract and sublease
agreements. It amounted to
P630,123,700.
Petitioners filed 2009 for unlawful
detainer with MeTC of Makati City.
Petitioners prayed that respondent
Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject
property and to pay damages for the
illegal use and lost income owing to
them.
Sunvar filed a MTD alleging that
petitioners action was an accion
publiciana and should be filed before
RTC DENIED, Sunvar then filed an
answer.
Despite filing an answer, Sunvar filed a
petition for certiorari (Rule 65) before
RTC.
o Petitioners answer petitioners
placed in issue the jurisdiction
of the RTC and reasoned that
the Rules on Summary
Procedure expressly prohibited
the filing of a petition for
certiorari against the
interlocutory orders of the

MeTC.
o DENIED (in favor of Sunvar)
the motion for dismissal and
ruled that extraordinary
circumstances called for an
exception to the general rule on
summary proceedings
RTC GRANTED. Directed MeTC to
dismiss the complaint for unlawful
detainer because of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N RTC violated the Rules on

Summary Procedure when it took
cognizance and granted the certiorari
petition filed by Sunvar YES
The RTC should have dismissed

Sunvars petition outright for being a
prohibited pleading.
Under the Rules on Summary
Procedure, a certiorari petition under
Rule 65 against an interlocutory order
issued by the court in a summary
proceeding is a prohibited pleading.
The proper remedy in such cases is an
ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment on the merits incorporating in
said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. Allowing appeals
from interlocutory orders would result
in the sorry spectacle of a case being
subject of a counterproductive ping
pong to and from the appellate court as
often as a trial court is perceived to have
made an error in any of its interlocutory
rulings.
The Court mentioned only two cases in
which they allowed exceptions to this
rule and since Sunvar could not
substantiate its claims of extraordinary
circumstances that would allow those
same exceptions to apply to his case, the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65
remains, for him, a prohibited pleading.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom

possession of any land is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration of the right to hold
possession mayby virtue of any express or
implied contract, and within one year after the
unlawful deprivationbring an action in the
municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for
restitution of possession with damages and
costs.
60

Judge Sia
Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the
lessor shall commence only after a demand to
pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease
and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a
written notice of that demand is served upon the
person found on the premises, and the lessee
fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the
case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
for unlawful detainer if it states the following
elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property
by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession became
illegal upon the plaintiffs notice to the
defendant of the termination of the
latters right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the latters enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the
last demand on the defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the
Complaint for ejectment.
Petition GRANTED. MeTC was directed to
proceed with the unlawful detainer case.
RTC Ruling: Reversed and set aside the

decision of the MCTC. It argued that the
complaint did not state that respondent entered
the premises through stealth and strategy.
Failure of respondent to file an appeal, made the
decision final. Subsequently, petitioner filed for
a motion for execution, while respondents
counsel made known that they filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA
CA Ruling: Agreed with the decision of the
MCTC. It granted the petition of the
respondents. The CA held that MCTC clearly had
no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a
valid cause for unlawful detainer. Although the
remedy of petitioner is wrong, this does not
prejudice her to file an action for accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria
Issue:
a. WoN the unlawful detainer is the proper
remedy at the present case?
Ruling: The Court rules in the negative.
It is a general rule that what constitutes
the nature of the action and jurisdiction of the
court are the allegations in the complaint. In
forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of the
possession of his property by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth (FISTS).
In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration
or termination of his right thereto under
any contract, express or implied.
The Court agrees with the MCTC and CA
that the complaint make out a case for forcible
entry and not unlawful detainer case.
The complaint failed to allege that the
respondents possession were initially lawful and
only became unlawful when petitioner
demanded them to vacate, and the latter refused.
Petitioners alleged that possession of
respondents were for mere tolerance. The word
tolerance must be present right from the start
of possession, to categorize it as unlawful
detainer.
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land
which determines the cause of action, whether it
is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry
is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the
case is unlawful detainer.
Wherefore, petition is denied, the decision of the
CA is affirmed.
ZACARIAS VS ANACAY
Facts:
1. Amada Zacarias (petitioner) filed a
complaint for ejectment with
damages/unlawful detainer against
Victoria Anacay and members of her
household. The latter and her household
were occupants of a parcel of land in
Cavite.
2. Parties were ordered to proceed to the
Philippine Mediation Center as provided
in Rule 18 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. All attempts to mediate were
not successful. The case was brought
back to the MCTC.
MCTC Ruling: This court dismissed the case
because the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful
detainer. The claim of petitioner that she had
permitted or tolerated respondents occupation
was substantiated. The court noted that the
demand letter sent by petitioners counsel
that respondent entered the property
through stealth and strategy, while in
petitioners own sinumpang sinalaysay
is more of an action for forcible entry,
which should be filed within 1 year from
discovery.
61

Judge Sia
RULE 71: CONTEMPT
BACULI V. BELEN
Facts:
This case stem from two separate
administrative complaints filed by State
Prosecutor Jorge Baculi against Judge
Belen charging the latter with gross
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
violation of R.A. 3019, conduct
prejudicial to the interest of public
service, grave abuse of authority,
oppressive conduct, harassment, and
issuance of fraudulent and unjust orders
and decisions.
In the first complaint, this is in relation
to People v. Capacete wherein Baculi file
Information for Qualified Theft against
Capacete. Judge Belen found that the
crime committed was not Qualified
Theft but Estafa thus the case was
dismissed. Baculi then filed a MR but it
was denied.
Judge Belen issued an order directing
Baculi to explain why he should not be
cited in contempt of court for the
following statement in his MR which to
Judge Belen attacked the integrity of the
court. (the dismissal of the case was
motivated by hatred, ill-will and
prejudice against Baculi)
Baculi filed a comment, stating that
resentment and hatred was the real
reason why Judge Belen initiated
contempt cases against him. Later on,
Judge Belen issued a decision finding
Baculi guilty of direct contempt. Baculi
then filed a MR.
Meanwhile, in relation to the indirect
contempt proceedings, Baculi continued
to file manifestations and motions to
postpone or cancel the hearings also
seeking the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Belen.
Eventually, Judge Belen promulgated a
decision finding Baculi in contempt of
court. Baculi then file a Notice of Appeal
and a motion praying for the stay of
execution of the judgement. Judge Belen
directed Baculi to post a bond worth
40K but Baculi moved to reconsider the
amount, insisting that it is excessive.
However the motion was stricken off the
records of the case.
Judge Belen directed the issuance of a

writ of execution and a warrant of arrest
against Baculi to implement the
decision. Subsequently, Baculi filed an
verified administrative complaint
alleging that Judge Belens decision
violated hid right to due process of law.
That he was not formally charged and no
notice or hearing was conducted to
afford him the opportunity to air his
side.
The second complaint is in relation to
People v. Estacio. The subject of the
complaint here relates to similar
decision of judge Belen finding Baculi
again guilty of direct and indirect
contempt. For this second complaint,
Baculi was cited in contempt for his
participation in Comilangs (Prosecutor)
comment/ explanation.
As what happened in the first
administrative complaint, Baculi filed
several motions and manifestations.
Issue: Whether Judge Belen acted beyond his

authority in conducting the contempt
proceedings?
Held: No
Ratio: The institution of an administrative
complaint is not the proper remedy for
correcting the action of a judge alleged to have
gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient judicial remedy exists.
Rule 71, Secs. 2 and 11 of the Rules of Court lay
down the proper remedies from a judgment in
direct and indirect contempt proceedings,
respectively. For direct contempt, the Rules
states:
Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.The person
adjudged in direct contempt by any court may
not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of
the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended
pending resolution of such petition, provided
such person files a bond fixed by the court which
rendered the judgment and conditioned that he
will abide by and perform the judgment should
the petition be decided against him.
In indirect contempt proceedings, the Rules
states:
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond
for stay.The judgment or final order of a court
in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed
to the proper court as in criminal cases. But
62

Judge Sia
execution of the judgment or final order shall
not be suspended until a bond is filed by the
person adjudged in contempt, in an amount
fixed by the court from which the appeal is
taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided
against him he will abide by and perform the
judgment or final order.
He chose instead to question the
proceedings and the judgments in the
form of motions and manifestations, and
administrative complaints. Due to the
failure of the complainant here to avail
himself of these remedies, Judge Belen
correctly ruled that the assailed
judgments have become final and
executory. They cannot anymore be
reviewed by this Court.
He has belabored this point in his
complaint and supplemental
complaints, pointing out that the judge
has deep-seated hatred for him and is
bent on repeatedly citing him in
contempt.
Aside from his bare allegations, the
complainant, however, has not
presented any credible evidence to
support his allegations against Judge
Belen. The fact that Judge Belen had
initiated contempt proceedings against
him, and in fact convicted him in such
contempt proceedings, does not by itself
amount to ill motives on the part of
Judge Belen. The initiation of the
contempt proceedings stemmed from
the acts of the complainant himself.
As the proponent of these allegations,
the complainant should have adduced
the necessary evidence to prove the
claim of bad faith. This he failed to do.
In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, the following presumptions
stand: (1) that official duty has been
regularly performed and (2) that a
judge, acting as such, was acting in the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
HABAWEL VS. CTA
RTC dismissed its petition due to

prescription and failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Surfield filed a petition for review with
the CTA. It was likewise denied for lack
of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust
remedies.
Habawel and Medina filed MR. They
stated that the ff because they thought
the court was oblivious of S7(3) of RA
1125:
o It is gross ignorance of the law
for the honorable court to have
held that it has no jurisdiction.
o The grossness of the honorable
courts ignorance of the law is
matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this
honorable courts jurisdiction.
o The honorable courts lack of
understanding and respect for
the doctrine of stare decisis
(considering Ty. V. Trampe held
that there was no need to file an
appeal before the Local Board of
Assessments)
March 15 2006: CTA denied the MR. It
explained that its jurisdiction conferred
by S7(3) referred to appeals from the
decision of RTCs in local tax cases, not
including realty tax. It also required the
petitioners to explain within 5 days from
receipt why they should not be liable for
contempt.
March 27 2006: They submitted a
compliance where in they apologized but
still justified their language and referred
to the courts error by calling a spade a
spade. (so parang they claim it was a
plain mistake on the courts part)
CTA adjudged both of them guilty of
direct contempt for failing to uphold the
duty of preserving the integrity and
respect due to the courts. 10 day
imprisonment and 2k fine.
ISSUE: W/N they are guilty of direct contempt

for offensive language- YES.
FACTS:
Habawel and Medina were the counsel
of Surfield Devt Corp which sought the
refund of excess realty taxes from the
Office of the City Treasurer of
Mandaluyong City.
Its claim was denied so they filed an
action for mandamus with the RTC. The
HELD:
Canon 11 CPR mandates attys to observe
respect due to the courts and judicial
officers.
It is a lawyers right to criticize in
respectful term. The test is w/n the
criticism is done in good faith and does
63

Judge Sia
not spill over the walls of decency and

propriety.
An imputation of gross ignorance
against a court esp w/o evidence is a
serious allegation. Derogatory
statements in pleadings presented to the
court in which the proceedings are
pending are equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of the court.
Direct contempt.
They also failed to convince that the CTA
truly erred. It had no jurisdiction
because S7(3) only covers appeals of the
decisions of RTC in local tax cases.
S7(5) would be applicable in that CTA
has appellate jurisdiction over the
decisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals over realty tax.
Power to punish contempt is exercised
to preserve the respect without which
the administration of justice will fail.
The penalty of imprisonment is
excessive and deleted.
2k fine is upheld as max imposable fine
under S1 R71 considering CTA is of the
same level as CA, the second highest
court.
64

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS

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DOCTRINE: If defendant cannot be properly

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R filed a complaint for a sum of money

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4. During the hearing of the motion on Feb

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