1.) Japzon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180088, Jan.

19, 2009
X was a naturalborn Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a
naturalized American citizen. However, prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March
2007, he applied for reacquisition of his Philippine Citizenship. Such application was
subsequently granted. Y filed a petition to disqualify X on the ground of failure to comply
with the 1year residency requirement. Y argues that reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, by itself, does not automatically result in making X a resident of the locality. Is
Y correct?
A: Yes. Xs reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did
not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines. X merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place to have become his new domicile of choice.
The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. It is the fact of residence that is the
decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification
requirement.
However, even if Ys argument is correct, this does not mean that X should be automatically
disqualified as well, since there is proof that aside from reacquisition of his Philippine Citizenship,
there are other subsequent acts executed by X which show his intent to make General Arthur,
Eastern Samar his domicile, thus making him qualified to run for Mayor.
2.) Macias vs COMELEC
Petitioners are four members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis
Oriental, and Bulacan, and the provincial governor of Negros Oriental. They bring this action in
behalf of themselves and of other residents of their provinces. They allege, and this Court finds,
that their provinces had been discriminated against by Republic Act 3040, because they were
given less representative districts than the number of their inhabitants required or justified. It
apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. namely,
it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only and it
gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only. Respondents
argue that since RA 3040 improves existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise
of judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely political and therefore nonjusticiable. The overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to
review by the courts.
3.) Tan vs COMELEC
Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 - An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros
to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, Petitioners, who are residents of the Province
of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities filed a case for Prohibition for the
purpose of stopping respondents from conducting the plebiscite contending that B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
(2) The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute.

4.) PM vs COMELEC
Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent regarding the formula to be adopted
in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the 2004 elections. In response, the
respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835, adopting the simplified formula of "one
additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes. Party-List Canvass Report
showed that the total number of votes cast for all the party-list participants in the 2004 elections.
Petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation with respondent praying that they be
entitled to one (1) additional seat each and their respective second nominees be proclaimed as
duly elected members of the House of Representatives. For failure of the respondent
Commission to resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners and to cause the re-tabulation
of the party-list votes despite the lapse of time, petitioners PM and BUTIL filed this petition
seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Commission: to declare them
as entitled to one (1) additional seat each.
5.) Ang Bagong Bayani, et al v. COMELEC
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace
by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Can political parties participate in the party-list election?
Held: YES if it represents a marginalized sector. Intent of the law is not to allow all associations to
participate indiscriminately, but to limit participation to organizations representing the
marginalized and underprivileged. Even the nominees must comply with this requirement. All 50
seats are reserved for the marginalized sectors, not just for 3 terms but forever.
6. Mitra vs COMELEC
Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then
included, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. Puerto Princesa City was
reclassified as a highly urbanized city and ceased to be a component city of the Province of
Palawan. Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Puerto Princesa
City, to Aborlan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a
resident of Aborlan.
Respondents Gonzales and Balbon, Jr. filed a petition to cancel Mitras COC. Argued that Mitra
has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for Governor of
Palawan. Mitra answered that he has established a new domicile in Aborlan since 2008. First
Division granted the respondents petition to cancel Mitras COC. The COMELEC en banc
subsequently denied Mitras motion to reconsider.
HELD:
Yes,
Petition Granted and ANNUL the assailed COMELEC Resolutions to cancel Abraham Kahlil
Mitras Certificate of Candidacy.

7.) Dumpit Michelena vs Boado

G.R. Nos. 163619-20 : November 17, 2005
J. Carpio
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union during
the 2004 Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado and others sought Petitioner's disqualification and the
denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation
under Sec. 74 and 78 of BP 881. Respondents alleged that Petitioner, the daughter of Cong.
Dumpit, Sr. of the 2nd District of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo. Respondents claimed that
Petitioner is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian and that Petitioner only transferred
her registration as voter to Agoo on Oct 2003. Petitioner countered that she already acquired a
new domicile in Agoo when she purchased from her father a residential lot on April 2003.
Petitioner presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in Agoo to prove that she
actually resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of Respondents. Hence, the present
recourse.
Issue:
Did Petitioner satisfy the residency requirement under the LGC of 1991?
Held:
No, The Court agrees with the COMELEC that Petitioner failed to establish that she has
abandoned her former domicile. A beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can
hardly be considered a place of residence. The designation of caretaker with monthly
compensation only shows that Petitioner does not regularly reside in the place. When it comes to
the qualifications for running for public office, residence is synonymous with domicile. There are
three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice. First, residence or bodily
presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon
the old domicile. These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof. Petition
dismissed.
8.) SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.(G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEMBER 18, 1998)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The Senate with Sen. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on the first regular session of the
eleventh Congress. Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly
the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan, as Senate President, comprised the
"majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7)
and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on
the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. Santiago and Tatad later instituted an
original petition seeking the ouster of Sen. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the
declaration of Sen. Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
ISSUES:

In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials,
particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
HELD:
No. While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers
of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
RATIO:
Issue: Definition of minority
Held: No law says that the defeated candidate will automatically become the minority leader. It is
well within the power and jurisdiction of this court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives
9.) AVELINO VS. CUENCO(G.R. NO. L-2821, MARCH 4, 1949)
FACTS:
Sen. Lorenzo M. Taada requested his right to speak on the next session day to formulate
charges against Senate President Avelino be reserved. Sen. Taada repeatedly stood up to claim
his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but petitioner, continuously ignored him and
disorderly conduct broke out. Sen. David, one of the petitioner's followers, moved for adjournment
of session. Petitioner left the session hall followed by 6 Senators. The remaining members of the
Senate continued the session. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz suggested that respondent
be designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. Sen.
Taada finally delivered his privilege speech. Sen. Sanidad read Resolution No. 68 and the same
was unanimously approved. Sen. Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67 declaring vacant the
position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco
Acting President of the Senate. The President of the Philippines recognized the respondent.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines senate and
oust respondent.
ISSUE: Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
HELD:
None. The constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.The Court will not sally into the
legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis,
even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino
people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be
stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial

deliberations.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved
only by ten or less.
RATIO:
Initially, SC refused to assume jurisdiction over whether 12 senators could elect a new President
(out of 24 senators, 1 was in the US and 1 in the hospital). They held that the question was
political in nature.
Dissents:Moran question of quorum is a constitutional in nature. With the
conflict remaining unsettled, laws passed by Senate would be open to doubt.Tuason -- SC has
the power to ascertain whether President is holding office according to law or the Constitution.
Perfecto Senate must follow Constitution and its own internal rulesBriones besides
justicability, another ground for courts to take cognizance of a case is extreme necessity
In reconsideration of the case, SC decided to assume jurisdiction in the light of subsequent
events which justify its intervention. They held that the Presidency could not be taken away from
Avelino because the opposition did not constitute a majority, defined as more than half.
10.) Garcillano v House of Representatives
Tapes containing a wiretapped conversation between the President and COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano surfaced containing the Presidents instructions to manipulate in
her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. It became the subject of heated legislative
hearings. Sen. Santiago recommended a legislative investigation. Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge is
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings. He moved to intervene as
petitioner. Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of
the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. Respondents admitted that said rules
had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. They also
argued that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published
in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet
web page.
HELD:
The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to publish
its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct
from the one before it or after it.
11.) Pacete vs Commission on Appointments
Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the President of the Philippines as
Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. As his appointment was made during the recess of
Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session. He was
unanimously confirmed. More than 9 months after such confirmation, the Secretary of Justice,
advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being that his

appointment had been by-passed. Petitioner sought clarification from the respondent. He was
informed that a day after his confirmation, one of the members of the Commission on
Appointments, Sen. Guanzon, filed a motion for reconsideration of the appointment of petitioner
in view of derogatory information received. Respondent notified the Secretary of Justice, following
the prevailing practice of such body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically
vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question. Respondent Secretary of Justice
advised petitioner that he should vacate his position, as he had not been duly confirmed.
Held:
Section 10 par. (4), Article VII states that "The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next session
of the Congress."
No such rejection happened in this case. Petitioner, as pointed out, had instead in his favor a
unanimous vote of confirmation. He could thus invoke constitutional protection. For respondents
to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in the
absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided in the
Constitution.

12.) ARROYO vs DE VENECIA

August 14, 1997 | Mendoza, J. |
FACTS:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240 (Sin Tax Law). During the interpellations,
Petitioner Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. The Chair
declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation proceeded. After petitioners interpellation,
Majority Leader moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections and then declared: There being none, approved. At the same
time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker?. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. Petitioner claims
that the Speaker was violating the Rules of the House by not recognizing him, ignoring his
questions, not calling for yeas and nays, etc. And that the Speakerdeliberately adjourned the
session to prevent him from speaking.
ISSUE:
Is the case at bar subject to judicial review?
RULING:
NO. In such case where the rules of procedure are concerned, the Court must assume that the
process was done in good faith (enrolled bill doctrine). The petition for certiorari and prohibition is
DISMISSED.
1

RATIO:
To set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its

own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek rematch in the
judicial forum would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department.
Enrolled bill doctrine: The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the H and the President of the S and
the certification by the secretaries of both houses that such bill was passed are conclusive of its
due enactment.
What is alleged to have been violated in the passing of RA 8240 imposing sin taxes are merely
internal rules of procedure of the House and not the constitutional requirements for enacting a law
(Art 6, Sec 26-27)
2

13.) ALEJANDRINO VS QUEZON

G.R. No. 22041 | September 11, 1924

J. Malcolm
R

The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator
appointed by the Governor General to represent the 12th Senatorial District. The casus belli is a
resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, On February
5,1924, depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for
the period of 1 year from January 1, 1924 having been declared guilty of disorderly conduct and
flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera
on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate
regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the
resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect
ISSUE:
May the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of Senator
Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?
HELD:
No, the Constitution has purposely withheld from Legislature and the Governor-General alike the
power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature. The writ prayed for however cannot
issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of
coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. Neither the Philippine
Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative
powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition
and the demurrer must be sustained.
14.) OSMENA Jr. V. PENDATUN
G.R. NO. L-17144 OCTOBER 28, 1960
J. Bengzon
FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery on the administrations criminal justice system against the
President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59. Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59 found said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior; and

acting on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its session-House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended and suspending him from office for
fifteen months. Petitioner filed a petition asking for the annulment of such Resolution on the
ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity.
ISSUE:
Should the petitioner be liable for disciplinary action?
HELD:
Yes. Congressman Osmena made a serious imputation of bribery. The House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior and can subject its members to disciplinary action, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in
black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. However, the resolution did
not violate the constitutional parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Our
Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world.
15.) SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001
J. Vitug
In 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the Commissioner of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about
32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her
to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this
information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of
arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering
from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for
the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
Can the Sandiganbayan suspend petitioner?
HELD:
Yes, Section 13 of RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended
only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged.
Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he stands accused. RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress.
16.) DE VENECIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 130240, 5 February 2002

En Banc
An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against then Congressman Paredes, Jr. for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019. After the accused pleaded not guilty, prosecution
filed a Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion.
The Speaker did not comply. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear
before it to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker
filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he
can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116. The
Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of
court and ordering him to pay a fine. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as House Speaker and
other members of the House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of R.A. 3019?
HELD:
Yes, as held in Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude
the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, upon an erring member.
17.) CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., VS. GIMENEZ 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 7609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank issued Circular No.
95 fixing a unified margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transaction and a memorandum
establishing the procedure for application for exemption from payment of said fee. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., brought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde and paid for the margin fee therefore. Then as petitioner, the Central Bank
declaring that separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. When the
back issue corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund, the auditor of the back issue the
said vouchers upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is in violation
of Sec. 2(18_ of RA 2609, according to the pertinent portion of the Act, urea formaldehyde is
exempted from the margin fee. The National Institute of Science and Technology further affirms
that urea formaldehyde is different from urea and formaldehyde. Hence, the separate
importations of these two raw materials are not excluded from margin fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase should be read as urea and formaldehyde.?
HELD:
NO. Hence, urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and
different from urea and formaldehyde as used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as urea formaldehyde. Petitioner contends, that the bill approved in Congress contained the
conjunction and between the term urea and formaldehyde, not the latter as a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. Furthermore, it is well settled
that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde is a conclusive upon the courts as

regards the tenor of the measure passed by the Congress and approved by the President.
RATIO:
Enrolled bill is conclusive upon courts regarding the law passed by Congress and approved by
the President. This is based on respect due to a coequal and independent department.
18.) US VS. PONS
34 PHIL 729. 1916
FACTS:
The respondent, together with Beliso and Lasarte were charged with illegal importation of opium.
Pons and Beliso were tried separately on motion of counsel. Lasarte had not yet been arrested.
Each was found guilty of the crime, charged and sentenced accordingly. Both appealed. Beliso
later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become final. Respondents motion
alleged to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was
the 28th day of February, that Act No.2381 under which Pons must be punished if found guilty,
was not passed nor approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year. Also, counsel
for Pons alleged that the Assemblys clock was stopped on February 18, 1914 at midnight and left
so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters among which was Act NO.
2381. to prove aid allegations, counsel argued the court to go beyond the proceedings of the
Legislature as recorded in the journals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take judicial notice of said journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journal are clear and explicitly.
HELD:
YES. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of
the judiciary. And to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine government was brought into existence, to invade and
coordinate and independent department of the Government and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature.
19.) PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS
NO. 132875-76 | November 16, 2001| EN BANC, Ynares-Santiago | ATTENDANCE OF
SESSION
FACTS:
Jalosjos is serving sentence for being convicted for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness on
several accounts. He petitions to be allowed to fully discharge his duties as a congressman,
including the duty of attendance to legislative sessions and committee hearings. His primary
argument is the mandate of sovereign will as he was elected by the people citing Art 2, Sec. 1.
Deprivation of his attendance is tantamount to taxation without representation. A precedentsetting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress. The
House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member and urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect its mandate. The accused argues that a member of Congress' function to
attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but in the previous smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such

manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

ISSUE:

WON Jalosjos should be allowed to fully discharge mandate, being a member of house of
representatives
RULING:
Petition was denied. Allowance to leave prison should be based with a nature of emergency.
To allow him to attend the said events is to make a mockery of the justice system. An elected
official is not made an exception to the rules of law.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC:
Article 6, section 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.cr
RATIONALE:
Members of Congress are not exempt from detention for crime. They may be arrested for crimes
punishable by more than 6 years imprisonment, even while Congress is in session. There is no
basis for treating them differently from other prisoners.
Privilege of speech
Protection against forums other than Congress itself. Members still subject to disciplinary
measures of Congress. Absolute protection against suits for libel
Includes utterances made in the performance of official functions. It is not necessary that
Congress be in session. What is essential is that the utterance must constitute legislative action.
This privilege extends to agents of the Members, provided that they assist the legislator in the
performance of legislative action (Gravel v. US)

20.) JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG

G.R. NO. L-15905, AUGUST 3, 1966
CJ Concepcion
FACTS:
Respondent caused the publication of an open letter alleging that there have been 3 operational
plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defense Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The planners
allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or
may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to
have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against
Cabangbang alleging that his statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be
dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that

he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication?
HELD:
No. The publication does not fall within the purview of the phrase speech and debate therein
that is to say in Congress used in Art VI, Sec15. It refers to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions. In causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Knowing that is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs reputation, to
expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their
associates, communication is not absolutely privileged. Congressmen can be charged for acts
done outside their official duty.
21.) ADAZA VS PACANA JR.
G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985
J. Escolin
On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections;
petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by
placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said
office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be
the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to
be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and
that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand,
a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be
an elected member of Parliament.
Forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be automatic upon the members assumption of such
other office deemed incompatible with his seat in Congress
Acceptance of incompatible office ipso facto vacates the other. There is no necessity for any
proceeding to declare or complete the vacation of the first office.

22.) PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN, JR.

(G.R. NO. L-51122, MARCH 25, 1982)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the SEC granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to
intervene in a SEC Case. Before he moved to intervene he had signified his intention to appear

as counsel for the respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Acero instituted at
the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election for the 11 Directors of the
International Pipe Industries Corporation, a private corporation. Acero claimed that the
stockholders votes were not properly counted. Justice Fernandez, member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
petitioner Puyat objected on Constitutional grounds Sec.11, Art.VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then
in force, provided that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before... any administrative
body, and SEC was an administrative body. The cited constitutional prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect,
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the
Constitutional provision.
HELD:
Yes. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said
to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is
joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for
the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and
respected counsel.
However, he later had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out
of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after
the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on
May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC
on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention
to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by
petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on
the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed
before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition. An assemblyman cannot indirectly follow the constitutional prohibition
not to appear as counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying nominal amount
of share of one of the stockholders after his appearance as counsel therein was contested. A
ruling upholding the intervention would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblymen need to do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the interest of the client and then intervene in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
RATIO:
An Assemblyman cannot act as counsel, or intervene in a government proceeding by buying
shares in the shares in a company. Pecuniary benefit may be direct or indirect, prohibition covers
benefit for relatives.
23.) Sampayan vs Daza
Involving a petition filed directly with the Supreme Court to disqualify Congressman Raul Daza for
being allegedly a green card holder and a permanent resident of the United States, the Court held
that it is without jurisdiction, as it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating to

election, returns and qualifications of its members. Furthermore, the case is moot and academic,
because Dazas term of office as member of Congress expired on June 30, 1992. The proper
remedy should have been a petition filed with the Commission on Elections to cancel Dazas
certificate of candidacy, or a quo warranto case filed with the HRET within ten days from Dazas
proclamation.
It was held that Daza would have been a de facto officer, and as such, he cannot be made to
reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts were valid.

25.) Guerrero v COMELEC

Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of
Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been
campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file
a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy
substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit. After the election, Farinas was duly
proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas
could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of
LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent
candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas certificate of candidacy was fatally defective. On June 3,
1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. The
COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Qualifications are not only the ones enumerated in the Constitution. The HRET has jurisdiction
even over the qualifications under the Omnibus Election Code (certificate of candidacy, valid
substitution) as the sole judge of election contests.

27.) TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD 151 SCRA 204, 1987
FACTS:
PD NO 1987 is entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board. Section 10 thereof
imposes a 30% tax on gross receipts on video transactions. The petitioner argued that such tax
impose is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof.
ISSUE: Is section 10 a RIDER?
HELD:
NO. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if
the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve. Such is the case here. Taxation is sufficiently related to the regulation of
the video industry.
The provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of,
the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title.

The Supreme Court thus provided the following standards whether or not a provision is embraced
in the title:

Title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.

If all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter expressed in the title.

So long as they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general subject to the title.

Regardless of how diverse it is so long as it maybe considered in furtherance of such subject by

providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.

Should not be construed as to cripple legislative power

Given a PRACTICAL rather than a technical construction

RATIO:
The 1-bill 1-subject rule is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include all subjects
related to the general purpose of the law. Taxation is sufficiently related to the regulation of the
video industry.

26.) GUINGONA vs GONZALES

October 20, 1992| 214 SCRA 789 | J. Campos Jr.
FACTS: As a result of the 1992 elections, the Senate is composed of the following Senators
representing the respective political affiliations:

LDP 15 Senators

NPC 5 Senators

LAKAS-NUCD 3 Senators
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 Senator Based on the mathematical formula for determining the proportional
representation of each political party, the Commission on Appointments should be composed
of the following number of Senators:
LDP 7.5 Senators
NPC 2.5 Senators
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5 Senators
LP-PDP-LABAN .5 Senator As a compromise, Senator Tolentino proposed a temporary solution
where the CoA shall be composed of 8 Senators from the LPD, 2 from the NPC, 1 from
LAKAS-NUCD, and 1 from LP- PDP-LABAN.
Senator Teofisto Guingona is now petitioning for the prohibition of the respondents Senators
Alberto Romulo (as the eighth member of the LPD) and Wigberto Tanada (as the lone member for
the LP-PDP-LABAN) from assuming the position of members of the Commission on
Appointments and Senator Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio chairman of said Commission, from
recognizing and allowing the respondent senators to sit as members thereof. He claims that their
membership is a violation of the proportional representation which every partylist with a member
on the Senate is entitled to.

RULING:
Petition Granted. Election of the respondent senators as members of the Commission on
Appointments null and void.
DOCTRINE: (Applied Law) Article 6, Section 18
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected
by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
RATIO: (Law Applied in the Case)
R

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory.

It is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution
does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include 12
members from either House. What it does require is that there be at least a majority of the entire
membership. (Only 13 members from the entire Commission are needed to form a quorum but
there should be at least 4 members from either House.)
The election of Senators Romulo and Tanada are in violation of Section 18 because it is no longer
in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation
to LDP and the reduced representation of one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the
NPC.

28.) GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE196 SCRA 221, 1991

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831(GAA), or a total of P233.5 Billion, while
the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27 Billion. Said automatic appropriation for debt
service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of RA 4860 as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in
Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967,
entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,
therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the
highest budgetary priority to education.
FACTS:
PD 1177 is being assailed on its constitutionality. It is argued that the automatic reappropriation
law for servicing foreign debts is invalid because it does not appropriate a fixed amount and is
therefore an undue delegation of legislative power

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD:which requires the simple act of looking into the books of the Treasure.
Issue: Rounding up to obtain more CA seats
Held: Rounding up cannot be done. Neither can small parties form a unity for purposes of
obtaining a seat in the CA. By the SCs calculations, the result would be that the Senate would
only have 11 members in the CA. SC ruled that full complement of 12 is not mandatory.
(questioning auto appropriation for debt service based on PD)
Issue: Appropriation bills must originate in the House (Sec 24) and there must be definiteness,
certainty and exactness in the appropriation.
Held: Appropriation laws enacted before the Constitution was effective (PD and EO) not covered.
The provisions refer to bills still to be passed by Congress. PD gave sufficient rules to determine
amount to be appropriated.

29.) TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE 235 SCRA 630, 1994

FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts
from the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. It was
challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities (defects), among others: It is claimed that the
conference committee included provisions not found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill
that these provisions were stealthily inserted by the conference committee.
ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since the conference
committee included provisions not found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill.
HELD:
A third version of the bill may result from the conference committee, which is considered may
result from the conference committee, which is considered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute the only requirement being that the third version be germane to the subject of the
House and Senate bills.
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of a Conference Committee, it has been
explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any
material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have
already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the
problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything
following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The
versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a
new bill.

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute,"
the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the
House and Senate bills.
RATIO: (opposition to VAT law)
(1) Not in violation of Art 6 Sec 24 (all taxation bills must originate in the House) Senate is
allowed to substitute their version of a bill.(2) Not in violation of Art 6 Sec 26-2 (1 bill 1 subject)
title of law covers contents
(3) Judicial inquiry on the manner the bill was passed beyond those prescribed by the
Constitution is precluded by the principle of separation of powers.(4) Rushed passage of bill
resulted from certification of President because of a growing budget deficit.

30.) PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA) VS. ENRIQUEZ

235 SCRA 506. 1994 QUIASON, J.:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.GAA contains a
special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation for
Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.Philconsa claims
that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones
authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves. President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed
certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment
the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

FACTS:
The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and approved by both Houses of Congress. It
presented the bill to the president for the exercise of his veto power.
One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with respect to the realignment of
operating expenses. Whereas each member of Congress is allotted for his own operating
expenditures, a proportionate share of the appropriation for the house which he belongs. If he
does not spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to transfer his
allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of
Congress to realign his allocations for operational expenses to any other expense categorically
claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. They argue
that the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the individual member of Congress, are
the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.
Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the appropriation for debt service. It
provides Use of funds. The appropriation authorized therein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
excess of the amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President with
the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines; provided further, that in no case shall this
fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special provision on the appropriations for
debt service without vetoing the entire amount of P86B for said purpose.

In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new
provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity
funds. According to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be covered
by direct appropriation specially approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI
of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary, petitioners claim that
said provision is a condition or limitation, which is intertwined with the item of appropriation that it
could not be separated therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners contentions are tenable.
HELD:
Petitioners contentions are without merit. Under the special provisions applicable to the
Congress of the Philippines, the members of the Congress only determine the necessity of the
realignment of the savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best
position to do so because they are the one who know whether there are savings available in
some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses that
need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the
case may be who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, those two
officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to be aligned or transferred are actually savings in
the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment
is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is
to be made.
It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service in
so far as it refers to funds in excess of the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to
funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an inappropriate provision referring to
the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994.
The veto power while exercised by the President is actually a part of the legislative process.
Hence, found in Article VI rather than Article VII.
As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the Congress can include in an appropriate to
which it relates, it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which
it extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an inappropriate
provision which be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of
inappropriate provision are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to
amend other laws because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the special provision of the item on debt
services including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the
payment of one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in no case
shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators. These
provisos are germane to and have direct connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the
power of the appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said provisos
are appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.
The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt service can only be with
respect to the proviso therein requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein,
appropriated shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines.
The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund
for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of

Section 25 and Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution.

RATIO:
The essence of a veto rule is that the President may veto distinct and severable parts. SC
invalidated vetoes of restrictions on the use of funds for road maintenance and purchase of
medicines since the veto did not include a veto of the appropriated funds themselves.
CDF (pork barrel) allowed Congress to identify projects but their power was merely
recommendatory to the President who could approve or disapprove the recommendation.

31.) TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO(237 SCRA 324 [1994])

FACTS:
Petitioner contends that Republic Act No. 7496 is a misnomer or, at least deficient f0r being
merely entitled "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For Self Employed and Professionals
Engaged in the practice of their Profession". It is the petitioner's view that the said law should be
considered as having now adopted a gross income scheme, instead of having still deductions
from gross income of single proprietorships and professionals in the computation of their, taxable
net income, petitioner argued that this violated the requirement for uniformity in taxation and due
process because single proprietorship and professional were taxed differently from corporations
and partnerships.
ISSUE:
WON RA No. 7496 is in violation of Art. VI Sec. 26 and 28 of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
On the basis of the language of the said questioned law, it would be difficult to accept the
petitioner's view that the amendatory should be considered as now having adopted a gross
income, instead of as having still retained the net income, taxation scheme. The allowance of
deductible items may have been significantly reduced by the questioned law in comparison with
that which has prevailed prior to the amendment, limiting, however, allowable deductions from
gross income is neither discordant with nor opposed to, the net income tax concept.
Art. VI Sec. 26 (I) of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent logrolling
legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor anyone of the unrelated
subjects in support of the whole act; (b) to avoid surprise or even fraud upon the legislature and
(c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings are as usually made,
of the subjects of legislations. The above objective of the fundamental law appears to have
sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could
have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.
The contention of the petitioner that RA No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that
taxation shall be uniform and equitable is of no merit. The contention clearly forgets that such a
system of taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496.
Uniformity of Taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are
to be treated both in privileges and liabilities. Uniform does nor forefend classification as long as
1.) The standards that are used therefore are substantial and not arbitrary. 2.) The categorization
is germane to achieve legislative purpose. 3.) The law applies all things being equal, to both

present and future conditions, and 4.) The classification applies equally well to all those belonging
to the same class. Shifting the income taxation of individuals to the schedules system, this makes
the income tax depend on the kind of taxable income, and maintaining for corporations the global
treatment which treats in common all kinds of taxable income of the taxpayer.
RATIO:
Article 6, Section 26 (1) has been envisioned to- prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite
the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in the support of the
whole act- avoid surprises and fraud upon the legislature- fairly apprise the people of the subjects
of legislation
32.) John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Victor Lim, et al
Tax exemption cannot be granted by Executive Order. Neither can a tax exemption granted by
law to one area be extended to another by EO
33.) Fabian v. Desierto
RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. This violates Sec. 30.

34.) BENGZON VS. DRILON208 SCRA 133, 1992

FACTS:
The case involved the General Appropriations Act of 1992. The law appropriated 500M Pesos
For general fund adjustment for operational and special requirements as indicated hereunder.
Among the several authorized uses of the fund was the adjustment of pension of justices as
authorized by an earlier law. The President vetoed the use of such fund for the adjustment of the
pension of justices.
The funds pertaining to the payment of the adjusted pensions of Retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and CA was vetoed and assailed as being unconstitutional.

RA 1797 was the law granted these benefits in 1957.

Section 3-A of RA 1797 was repealed by PD 644.

Congress thought to revive RA 1797 through HB No.16297.

But PD 644 never became a law! (not published)

President vetoed HB No. 16297.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto act of the President the use of such fund for the adjustment of the
pension of justices is valid.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled:

In declaring the veto invalid, the Court said that it was not the veto of an item. The item was the
entire 500M peso allocation out of which unavoidable obligations not adequately funded in
separate items could be met. What the President had vetoed was the method of meeting
unavoidable obligations or the manner of using the 500M Pesos.

When the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was
actually vetoing RA 1797 since PD 644 never took effect which is beyond the power to
accomplish.

The Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds
and savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court
Resolution. As long as retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation
on the part of the government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-918-225-CA. Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA
1797. This is arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority.
The President has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much
less to repeal existing laws. The Presidents power is merely to execute the laws passed by
Congress.

38.) BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE 203 SCRA 767, 1991
FACTS:
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against Kokoy Romualdez, et al., in
connection with ill-gotten wealth. During the pendency of the case, there were rumors that the
properties involve in the case were already being disposed of by Romualdez. Senator Enrile in
his privilege speech before the Senate called the attention of the Senate regarding the matter.
On motion of Senator Mecado, the matter was referred to the Committee on Acountability of
Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). The committee subpoenaed petitioner who was also
one of the defendants in said case. Petitioner declined to testify on the ground that his testimony
might unduly prejudice the defendants. The committee continued in its inquiry, thus the present
petition for prohibition to restrain respondent from investigating.
The committee commented that the Court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the
lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations in aid of legislation under this doctrine of
separation of power. Petitioners contend that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no
valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in
conducting legislative investigations in aid of legislation under the doctrine of separation of power.
2. Whether or not such inquiry is within the power of the Congress to conduct investigation.
HELD:
1. YES, the Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into
private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
2. NO, the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; but in the present case, no legislation was apparently being
contemplated in connection with the said investigation.
The contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it
is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is
to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated the "AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature.
The Court ruled that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear,
testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because SC hold that the questioned inquiry is
not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers
between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE CRUZ:
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties
now being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the
Committee is to ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed.
It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of the public funds it has
appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money is an indispensable duty
of the legislature."
RATIO:
Section 21: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committeesMay conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with duly published
procedure. The rights of such persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Court ruled that the investigation was not in aid of legislation because the speech of Sen. Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation but pointed to the need to determine whether
President Aquinos relatives violated the law. To allow the investigation to continue would violate
separation of powers. Dissent:
Gutierrez SC is encroaching on power of Congress by prohibiting them from exercising a
constitutionally vested function. The SC has no power to second-guess the motives of legislators.