G.R. Nos.

119987-88 October 12, 1995

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY
LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape,
committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?
The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner, 1 involve the perpetration of acts so bizarre and devoid of humanity as to horrify
and numb the senses of all civilized men:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a
nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo,
Manila.
When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light colored duster without her panties,
with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the left chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of
no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in
an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 94-138071, reads:
That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with one
alias "LANDO" and other persons whose true names, identifies and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another,
with treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is,
by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of
wood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL
ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIO
LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila, Rolando Manlangit y
Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St.,
Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape
with Homicide in an Information dated August 11, 1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR," JEOFREY and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who have
already been charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense under Criminal Case No. 94138071, and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity and
ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and
once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her
head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the
latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates ABUNDIO
LAGARTO y PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge.
Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by police escorts after attempting to
fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12, 1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the
Information.
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision 2 on January 31, 1995 finding the
defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both
accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." 3 Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of
Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against
respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portion reads:
The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with the legal requirements for the
perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this Court cannot take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Public Prosecutor of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by both herein accused is hereby reiterated.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases, together with the notices of appeal, to the
Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's determination of guilt and its conclusions will only be subject
to our scrutiny at an appropriate time on appeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of events to those cold facts antecedent to the instant case
relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e., whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.
We find for petitioner.
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule
of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," 4 resist encroachments by governments, political parties, 5 or even the interference of their
own personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the
accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:
Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. . . . 6
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes
cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the
offense committed to impose the penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of
these three instances. The law plainly and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances
described, other than a sentence of death.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his
predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where
the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose
the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of
laws. In People vs. Limaco 7 we held that:
[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving at a conclusion and
determination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error, then we are constrained to state our
opinion, not only to correct the error but for the guidance of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else,
layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as
long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of
laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or
vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And
for the guidance of the members of the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may
regard a certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department concerned, its amendment,
modification, or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the law-making body. 8
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law
on the accused." 9 This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law,
refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition
of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had
committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to
automatic review by this Court of the decision imposing the death penalty.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for
violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial
Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was
initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the
illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. 2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of
the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's
messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and
told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him
not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of
writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of
the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a
while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa
Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence
alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its
cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a
condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a
prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with
all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as
minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by
R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of
another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one
occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name
in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. 5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose. 6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under
which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7
November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened
or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to
obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth
the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the
date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where
the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which

he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial
authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for
an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's
name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for
the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the
proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are
duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other
than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations
thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The pertinent
provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any
written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in
or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or
style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with
his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business
transaction, or business . . . .
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of
different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names
which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one
names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in
the civil register. 9
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No.
142 when we ruled
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would
add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient
reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad,
Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his
transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner
could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in
Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen,
there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using
only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is
naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of
name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau
Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds
under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use
of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in
addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several
different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer
who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a
copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no
evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez"
was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself
properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman
could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended
under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not
present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142
is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for
the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14
Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24170

December 16, 1968

ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and MOHAMMAD BANTALLA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if not to do away entirely, with the evil and corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would
be frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by respondent Commissioner of Customs in this case, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside and
this appeal from the decision of the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the controlling principles of law do not call for a contrary conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the
legitimate authority vested in the government were not to be reduced to futility and impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times has assumed
epidemic proportions.
The principal question raised by petitioners, owners of five sailing vessels and the cargo loaded therein declared forfeited by respondent Commissioner of Customs for
smuggling, is the validity of their interception and seizure by customs officials on the high seas, the contention being raised that importation had not yet begun and that the
seizure was effected outside our territorial waters..
Why such a plea could not be given the least credence without doing violence to common sense and placing the law in disrepute would be apparent from a statement of the
case and the findings of facts as set forth in the decision now under review, of the Court of Tax Appeals, dated November 19, 1964, the opinion being penned by the late
Associate Judge Augusto M. Luciano.
His opinion starts thus: "This is an appeal from the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Customs in Customs Case No. 113, dated September 26, 1961, (Jolo Seizure
Identification Cases Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41 & 42) decreeing the forfeiture of five (5) sailing vessels (kumpits) named 'Iroc-Iroc,' 'Lahat-lahat,' 'Liberal Wing III,' 'Sulu Area
Command,' and 'Business,' with their respective cargoes of blue seal cigarettes and rattan chairs for violation of Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 426 in relation with Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code." 1
The facts according to the above opinion "are not controverted." Thus: "It appears that on September 10, 1950, at about noon time, a customs patrol team on board Patrol
Boat ST-23 intercepted the five (5) sailing vessels in question on the high seas, between British North Borneo and Sulu while they were heading towards Tawi-tawi, Sulu.
After ordering the vessels to stop, the customs officers boarded and found on board, 181 cases of 'Herald' cigarettes, 9 cases of 'Camel' cigarettes, and some pieces of rattan
chairs. The sailing vessels are all of Philippine registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of Sulu, and of less than thirty (30) tons burden. They came from
Sandakan, British North Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in the importation of merchandise into any port of the Sulu
sea, as required by Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code. Their cargoes were not covered by the required import license under Republic Act No. 426,
otherwise known as the Import Control Law."2
Respondent Commissioner of Customs, as noted at the outset, affirmed the decision rendered by the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who found cause for forfeiture under the
law of the vessels and the cargo contained therein. He was, as also already made known, sustained by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence this petition for review.
The first two errors assigned by petitioners would impugn the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs to institute seizure proceedings and thereafter to declare the forfeiture
of the vessels in question and their cargo. They would justify their stand thus: "In the light of the fact that the vessels involved with the articles laden therein were
apprehended and seized on the high seas, beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the said vessels could not have touched any place or port in the Philippines,
whether a port or place of entry or not, consequently, the said vessels could not have been engaged in the importation of the articles laden therein into any Philippine port or
place, whether a port or place of entry or not, to have incurred the liability of forfeiture under Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code." 3
Such a contention was advanced by petitioners before the Court of Tax Appeals. It met the repudiation that it deserved. Thus: "We perfectly see the point of the petitioners
but considering the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the vessels in question, we believe that Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code should be
applied to the case at bar. It has been established that the five vessels came from Sandakan, British North Borneo, a foreign port, and when intercepted, all of them were
heading towards Tawi-tawi, a domestic port within the Sulu sea. Laden with foreign manufactured cigarettes, they did not possess the import license required by Republic
Act No. 426, nor did they carry a permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in importation into any port in the Sulu sea. Their course announced loudly their
intention not merely to skirt along the territorial boundary of the Philippines but to come within our limits and land somewhere in Tawi-tawi towards which their prows
were pointed. As a matter of fact, they were about to cross our aquatic boundary but for the intervention of a customs patrol which, from all appearances, was more than
eager to accomplish its mission."4
The sense of realism and the vigorous language employed by the late Judge Luciano in rejecting such a plea deserve to be quoted. Thus: "To entertain even for a moment the
thought that these vessels were probably not bound for a Philippine port would be too much a concession even for a simpleton or a perennial optimist. It is quite irrational
for Filipino sailors manning five Philippine vessels to sneak out of the Philippines and go to British North Borneo, and come a long way back laden with highly taxable
goods only to turn about upon reaching the brink of our territorial waters and head for another foreign port." 5
1. We find no plausible reason not to accept in its entirety such a conclusion reached by the Court of Tax Appeals. Nor, even if the persuasive element in the above view
were not so overwhelming, could we alter the decisive facts as found by it. For it is now beyond question that its finding, if supported by substantial evidence, binds us, only
questions of law being for us to resolve. Where the issue raised belongs to the former category, we lack the power of review.6
Moreover, for understandable reasons, we feel extreme reluctance to substitute our own discretion for that of the Court of Tax Appeals in its appreciation of the relevant
facts and its appraisal of their significance. As we had occasion to state in a relatively recent decision: "Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for this Court to set aside
the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of
tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, ..., there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority." 7
2. We thus could rest our decision affirming that of the Court of Tax Appeals on the above consideration.
It might not be amiss however to devote some degree of attention to the legal points raised in the above two assignment of errors, discussed jointly by petitioners-appellants,
alleging the absence of jurisdiction, the deprivation of property without due process of law and the abatement of liability consequent upon the repeal of Republic Act No.
426. Not one of the principles of law relied upon suffices to call for reversal of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of Customs, even if the facts presented a
situation less conclusive against the pretension of petitioners-appellants.
From the apprehension and seizure of the vessels in question on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the absence of jurisdiction of Commissioner of
Customs is predicated. Such contention of petitioners-appellants is without merit.
It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship ... 8 The principle of law that
sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a firm foundation for the seizure of the five sailing vessels found thereafter to have violated the applicable
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.9

Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Church v. Hubbart, 10 an 1804 decision, that a state has the
right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall: "The authority of a
nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a
hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory."
The question asked in the brief of petitioners-appellants as to whether the seizure of the vessels in question and the cargoes on the high seas and thus beyond the territorial
waters of the Philippines was legal must be answered in the affirmative.
4. The next question raised is the alleged denial of due process arising from such forfeiture and seizure. The argument on the alleged lack of validity of the action taken by
the Commissioner of Customs is made to rest on the fact that the alleged offense imputed to petitioners-appellants is a violation of Section 1363(a) and not Section 1363(f).
The title of Section 1363 is clear, "Property subject to forfeiture under customs laws." The first subsection thereof, (a) cover any vessel including cargo unlawfully engaged
in the importation of merchandise except a port of entry. Subsection (f) speaks of any merchandise of any prohibited importation, the importation of which is effected or
attempted contrary to law and all other merchandise which in the opinion of the Collector of Customs have been used are or were intended to be used as instrument in the
importation or exportation of the former.
From the above recital of the legal provisions relied upon, it would appear most clearly that the due process question raised is insubstantial. Certainly, the facts on which the
seizure was based were not unknown to petitioners-appellants. On those facts the liability of the vessels and merchandise under the above terms of the statute would appear
to be undeniable. The action taken then by the Commissioner of Customs was in accordance with law.
How could there be a denial of due process? There was nothing arbitrary about the manner in which such seizure and forfeiture were effected. The right to a hearing of
petitioners-appellants was respected. They could not have been unaware of what they were doing. It would be an affront to reason if under the above circumstances they
could be allowed to raise in all seriousness a due process question. Such a constitutional guaranty, basic and fundamental, certainly should not be allowed to lend itself as an
instrument for escaping a liability arising from one's own nefarious acts.
5. Petitioners-appellants would further assail the validity of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of Customs by the plea that the repeal of Republic Act No.
426 abated whatever liability could have been incurred thereunder. This argument raised before the Court of Tax Appeals was correctly held devoid of any persuasive force.
The decision under review cited our opinion in Golay-Buchel & Cie v. Commissioner of Customs 11 to the effect that the expiration of the Import Control Law "did not
produce the effect of declaring legal the importation of goods which were illegally imported and the seizure and forfeiture thereof as ordered by the Collector of Customs
illegal or null and void."
Roxas v. Sayoc 12 announced that principle earlier. Thus: "Herein, we are concerned with the effect of the expiration of a law, not with the abrogation of a law, and we hold
the view that once the Commissioner of Customs has acquired jurisdiction over the case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650 will not divest him of his jurisdiction
thereon duly acquired while said law was still in force. In other words, we believe that despite the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 the Commissioner of Customs
retained his jurisdiction over the case and could continue to take cognizance thereof until its final determination, for the main question brought in by the appeal from the
decision of the Collector of Customs was the legality or illegality of the decision of the Collector of Customs, and that question could not have been abated by the mere
expiration of Republic Act No. 650. We firmly believe that the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 could not have produced the effect (1) of declaring legal the importation
of the cotton counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of declaring the seizure and forfeiture ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void; in
other words it could not have the effect of annulling or setting aside the decision of the Collector of Customs which was rendered while the law was in force and which
should stand until it is revoked by the appellate tribunal."
As late as 1965, in Bombay Dept. Store v. Commissioner of Customs, 13 we had occasion to reaffirm the doctrine in the above two decisions, the present Chief Justice,
speaking for the Court, stating that such expiration of the period of effectivity of Republic Act No. 650 "did not have the effect of depriving the Commissioner of Customs
of the jurisdiction, acquired by him prior thereto, to act on cases of forfeiture pending before him, which are in the nature of proceeding in rem...."
It is thus most evident that the Court of Tax Appeals had not in any wise refused to adhere faithfully to controlling legal principles when it sustained the action taken by
respondent Commissioner of Customs. It would be a reproach and a reflection on the law if on the facts as they had been shown to exist, the seizure and forfeiture of the
vessels and cargo in question were to be characterized as outside the legal competence of our government and violative of the constitutional rights of petitioners-appellants.
Fortunately, as had been made clear above, that would be an undeserved reflection and an unwarranted reproach. The vigor of the war against smuggling must not be
hampered by a misreading of international law concepts and a misplaced reliance on a constitutional guaranty that has not in any wise been infringed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 19, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
G.R. No. 124371

November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring
respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. 3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York. 6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank. 9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted
by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their
marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4)
Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was
signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. 10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego.
Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting
witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines,
including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real
properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my
children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife
Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein
Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. 19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. 25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the
status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March
13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also
entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal
shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in
her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory
of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to
pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
"legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. 29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the
only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate. 30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the
deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his
will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi
doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement
that "American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. 38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1wph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There
is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only

within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. 39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the
renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial
court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best
left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity." 44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984,
in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal
Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married
in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating
that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render
an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned
case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead
with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that
respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its
declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case
is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of
the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD.,
336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and
proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is
that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

BUENA, J.:
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted over a third party mortgagor's property situated in the
Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal loan before foreign courts?
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision 1 of public respondent Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997 and its resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America while private respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC)
is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the following
corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A. (hereinafter collectively referred
to as "borrowers"), all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private
respondent. 3
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA and the corporate borrowers signed and entered into restructuring agreements. As
additional security for the restructured loans, private respondent ARC as third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, 4 dated 17 February
1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the restructured loans prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions 5 before foreign
courts for the collection of the principal loan, to wit:
a) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio No 2098) against
Liberian Transport Navigation S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping
Company S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A., Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on June
17, 1992.
b) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245)
against El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio Katipunan
Litonjua on July 2, 1992;
c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No. 4039 of 1992) against Eshley Compania
Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A. Pacific Navigators Corporation, Eddie
Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering (Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and Eduardo
Katipunan Litonjua on November 19, 1992; and
d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No. 4040 of 1992) against Eshley
Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company, S.A., Pacific Navigators Corporation,
Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering (Edyship) Co., Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on
November 21, 1992.
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private respondent ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was private not impleaded as party-defendant.
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines an application for extrajudicial foreclosure
of real estate mortgage.
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, with
Integrated Credit and Corporation Services Co (ICCS) as the highest bidder for the sum of Twenty four Million Pesos (P24,000.000.00). 7
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, an action for damages 8 against the petitioner, for the
latter's act of foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal
loan.
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is
not applicable in the present case, claiming that:
a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and not a party to the principal restructuring agreements, was never made a party
defendant in the civil cases filed in Hongkong and England;
b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in the Philippines since the civil actions were filed in Hongkong and England. As
such, any decisions (sic) which may be rendered in the abovementioned courts are not (sic) enforceable in the Philippines unless a

separate action to enforce the foreign judgments is first filed in the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 50 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by
filing civil actions for sums of money.
On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for
suspension 10 of the redemption period on the ground that "it cannot exercise said right of redemption without at the same time waiving or contradicting its
contentions in the case that the foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties is legally improper and therefore invalid."
In an order 11 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the private respondent's motion for suspension after which a copy of said order was duly
received by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged properties at the foreclosure sale, consolidated its ownership over the real properties, resulting
to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T-186272, T-186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in its name.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its favor, ICCS sold the real properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for the amount of
Thirty Nine Million Pesos (P39,000,000.00). 12 Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T16652P(m) were issued in the latter's name.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 13 in favor of private respondent ARC dated 12 May 1993, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the filing in foreign courts by the defendant of collection suits against the
principal debtors operated as a waiver of the security of the mortgages. Consequently, the plaintiff's rights as owner and possessor of
the properties then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78763, T-78760 and T-78761, all of the Register of
Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines, were violated when the defendant caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages
constituted thereon.
Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the following sums, all with legal interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint up to the date of actual payment:
1) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00);
2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00); and
3) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration which the appellate
court denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review 14 on certiorari where herein petitioner BANTSA ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded the doctrines laid down by this Hon. Supreme Court in the cases of
Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as G.R. No. 74730 promulgated on August 25,
1989 and Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. IAC, 196 SCRA 29 (1991 case), although said cases were
duly cited, extensively discussed and specifically mentioned, as one of the issues in the assignment of errors found
on page 5 of the decision dated September 30, 1997.
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it awarded the private respondent actual
and exemplary damages totalling P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998 although such huge amount was not asked
nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint, is contrary to law and is totally unsupported by evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the
loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary damages in favor of private respondent
ARC, as third-party mortgagor, is proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits that a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of two requisites: an
ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to collect the principal loan does not suffice; a final judgment must be secured and obtained in the
personal action so that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure may be appreciated. To put it differently, absent any of the two requisites, the mortgagee-creditor
is deemed not to have waived the remedy of foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable and upholds the jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach
thus:

15

and similar cases adjudicated thereafter,

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such

election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring
a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the
mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of
action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his
right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to
justice (Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404), but also in
subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in
the place where the property lies.
In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating jurisprudence enunciated in Manila Trading and Supply Co vs. Co Kim 17 and Movido vs.
RFC, 18 invariably held:
. . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the
indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor, including the subject matter of the
mortgage . . . , subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has
waived. (Emphasis Ours)
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. 19
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates
as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action
for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is
deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the
sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over its properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing
so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the
latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. 20
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another's
obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contractloanremains to be
primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of
an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. 21
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is
untenable.
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with the petitioner in said case, that the filing of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the mortgage:
A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted over the personal
property as security for the debt or value of the promissory note when he seeks to recover in the said collection suit.
. . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not foreclosure, thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage as basis for relief,
he clearly manifests his lack of desire and interest to go after the mortgaged property as security for the promissory note . . . .
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for clarity and emphasis, that the mere act of filing of an ordinary action for collection
operates as a waiver of the mortgage-creditor's remedy to foreclose the mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary action for collection against the principal
debtors, the petitioner in the present case is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise. Corollarily,
no final judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate-Appellate Court, 23 a case relied upon by petitioner, supposedly to buttress its contention, this Court had
occasion to rule that the mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of
foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its
enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc, vs. Icarangal. 24
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of
action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two
demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment
of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate
agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one
cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause
of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so,
the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously
or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a
single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the doctrine enunciated in Caltex wherein this High Court relaxed the application of
the general rules to wit:
In the present case, however, we shall not follow this rule to the letter but declare that it is the collection suit which was waived and/or
abandoned. This ruling is more in harmony with the principles underlying our judicial system. It is of no moment that the collection suit
was filed ahead, what is determinative is the fact that the foreclosure proceedings ended even before the decision in the collection suit
was rendered. . . .

Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of context. We must stress that the Caltex case was never intended to overrule the well-entrenched
doctrine enunciated Bachrach, which to our mind still finds applicability in cases of this sort. To reiterate, Bachrach is still good law.
We then quote the decision

25

of the trial court, in the present case, thus:

The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the exception rather than the rule, dictated by the peculiar circumstances obtaining therein. In the
said case, the Supreme Court chastised Caltex for making ". . . a mockery of our judicial system when it initially filed a collection suit
then, during the pendency thereof, foreclosed extrajudicially the mortgaged property which secured the indebtedness, and still pursued
the collection suit to the end." Thus, to prevent a mockery of our judicial system", the collection suit had to be nullified because the
foreclosure proceedings have already been pursued to their end and can no longer be undone.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it has not been shown whether the defendant pursued to the end or are still pursuing the collection suits filed in
foreign courts. There is no occasion, therefore, for this court to apply the exception laid down by the Supreme Court in Caltex by
nullifying the collection suits. Quite obviously, too, the aforesaid collection suits are beyond the reach of this Court. Thus the only way
the court may prevent the spector of a creditor having "plural redress for a single breach of contract" is by holding, as the Court hereby
holds, that the defendant has waived the right to foreclose the mortgages constituted by the plaintiff on its properties originally covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78760 and T-78761. (RTC Decision pp., 10-11)
In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of severe criticism, to say the least.

26

Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by citing the case of PCIB vs. IAC. 27 Again, petitioner tried to fit a square peg in a round hole. It must be
stressed that far from overturning the doctrine laid down in Bachrach, this Court in PCIB buttressed its firm stand on this issue by declaring:
While the law allows a mortgage creditor to either institute a personal action for the debt or a real action to foreclosure the mortgage, he
cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously or successively as was done by PCIB in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392 to enforce payment of the 1.3 million promissory note secured by real estate mortgages
and subsequently filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the rule against splitting a cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the
remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by
filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of
action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy of foreclosure after the collection suit was filed, considering that the creditor should not be
afforded "plural redress for a single breach of contract." For cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. 28
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial but the efficacy of the remedy chosen in addressing the creditor's cause. Hence, a suit brought
before a foreign court having competence and jurisdiction to entertain the action is deemed, for this purpose, to be within the contemplation of the remedy
available to the mortgagee-creditor. This pronouncement would best serve the interest of justice and fair play and further discourage the noxious practice of
splitting up a lone cause of action.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money. 29
We rule in the negative.
This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet its crumbling cause. In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the
evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. 30 Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law. 31 This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, 32 said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied. 33
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 34
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is
the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 35

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to the award of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of
petitioner BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted a clear violation of the rights of herein private respondent ARC, as
third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same
must be proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no damages will be given. 36 Indeed, the question of the value of property is always a
difficult one to settle as valuation of real property is an imprecise process since real estate has no inherent value readily ascertainable by an appraiser or by
the court. 37 The opinions of men vary so much concerning the real value of property that the best the courts can do is hear all of the witnesses which the
respective parties desire to present, and then, by carefully weighing that testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable. 38
In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for relying heavily on the valuation made by Philippine Appraisal Company. In effect, BANTSA
questions the act of the appellate court in giving due weight to the appraisal report composed of twenty three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro Marquez and
submitted as evidence by private respondent. The appraisal report, as the records would readily show, was corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Reynaldo
Flores, witness for private respondent.
On this matter, the trial court observed:
The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee formally offered as evidence the appraisal report dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit J,
Records, p. 409), consisting of twenty three (23) pages which set out in detail the valuation of the property to determine its fair market
value (TSN, April 22, 1994, p. 4), in the amount of P99,986,592.00 (TSN, ibid., p. 5), together with the corroborative testimony of one
Mr. Reynaldo F. Flores, an appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. (TSN, ibid., p. 3). The latter's testimony was
subjected to extensive cross-examination by counsel for defendant-appellant (TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22). 39
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be
respected. 40 The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for
the reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 41
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, principally because they are in a better position to assess the same than
the appellate court. 42 Besides, trial courts are in a better position to examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of witnesses. 43
Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses rest primarily with the trial court. 44 In the case at bar, we see no
reason that would justify this Court to disturb the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with regard to the award of actual
damages.
In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial court justified the award by presenting the following ratiocination in its assailed decision 45, to wit:
Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the matter of valuation. The size of the subject real properties are (sic) set forth in their individuals
titles, and the Court itself has seen the character and nature of said properties during the ocular inspection it conducted. Based
principally on the foregoing, the Court makes the following observations:
1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in Bo. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which is (sic) not distant from Metro
Manila the biggest urban center in the Philippines and are easily accessible through well-paved roads;
2. The properties are suitable for development into a subdivision for low cost housing, as admitted by defendant's own appraiser (TSN,
May 30, 1994, p. 31);
3. The pigpens which used to exist in the property have already been demolished. Houses of strong materials are found in the vicinity of
the property (Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), and the vicinity is a growing community. It has even been shown that the house of the Barangay
Chairman is located adjacent to the property in question (Exh. 27), and the only remaining piggery (named Cherry Farm) in the vicinity
is about 2 kilometers away from the western boundary of the property in question (TSN, November 19, p. 3);
4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of the property, as indubitably shown by the fact that on March 18, 1994, ICCS (the buyer
during the foreclosure sale) sold the consolidated real estate properties to Stateland Investment Corporation, in whose favor new titles
were issued, i.e., TCT Nos. T-187781(m); T-187782(m), T-187783(m); T-16653P(m) and T-166521(m) by the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan;
5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for Thirty Nine Million
(P39,000,000.00) Pesos, which is more than triple defendant's appraisal (Exh. 2) clearly shows that the Court cannot rely on
defendant's aforesaid estimate (Decision, Records, p. 603).
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses command great respect and consideration especially
when the conclusions are supported by the evidence on record. 46 Applying the foregoing principle, we therefore hold that the trial court committed no
palpable error in giving credence to the testimony of Reynaldo Flores, who according to the records, is a licensed real estate broker, appraiser and director
of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. since 1990. 47 As the records show, Flores had been with the company for 26 years at the time of his testimony.
Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not confine itself to the appraisal report dated 29 March 1993, and the testimony given by Mr. Reynaldo
Flores, in determining the fair market value of the real property. Above all these, the record would likewise show that the trial judge in order to appraise
himself of the characteristics and condition of the property, conducted an ocular inspection where the opposing parties appeared and were duly represented.
Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted, we affirm the ruling of the trial court as regards the valuation of the property
. . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00) for the 39-hectare properties (sic) translates to just about Two Hundred
Fifty Four Pesos (P254.00) per square meter. This appears to be, as the court so holds, a better approximation of the fair market value
of the subject properties. This is the amount which should be restituted by the defendant to the plaintiff by way of actual or
compensatory damages . . . . 48
Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court awarding an amount allegedly not asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint.

Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and compensatory damages by the lower court exceeded that prayed for in the complaint, the same is
nonetheless valid, subject to certain qualifications.
On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgement; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. 49 citing Northern Cement Corporation vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court 50 is enlightening:
There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may
be validly awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that
asked for, no amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised the point on which recovery
was based. The appellate court could treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence although the pleadings were actually
not amended. Amendment is also unnecessary when only clerical error or non substantial matters are involved, as we held in Bank of
the Philippine Islands vs. Laguna (48 Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the rule on amendment need not
be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the recent case of National Power
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held that where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings and the evidence
adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to conform with the evidence.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above-mentioned rule and in light of the decisions cited, the trial court should not be
precluded from awarding an amount higher than that claimed in the pleading notwithstanding the absence of the required amendment.
But it is upon the condition that the evidence of such higher amount has been presented properly, with full opportunity on the part of the
opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to refute each other's evidence.
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial does not preclude an adjudication by the
court on the basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings, or serve as a basis for a higher award of
damages. Although the pleading may not have been amended to conform to the evidence submitted during trial, judgment may
nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of the issues alleged but also the basis of issues discussed and the assertions of fact
proved in the course of trial. The court may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although it had not
been actually so amended. Former Chief Justice Moran put the matter in this way:
When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or implied consent of the adverse party, as to issues
not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be considered
as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied consent to the evidence thus presented when the
adverse party fails to object thereto.
Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it even though the relevant pleading had not been
previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the
basis requirements of fair play had been met, as where litigants were given full opportunity to support their respective contentions and to
object to or refute each other's evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the
evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it.
In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to refute and object to the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, formally
offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair play are deemed satisfied. In fact, the testimony of Reynaldo Flores was put under scrutiny during the
course of the cross-examination. Under these circumstances, the court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and committed no reversible error in
awarding actual damages the amount of which is higher than that prayed for. Verily, the lower court's actuations are sanctioned by the Rules and supported
by jurisprudence.
Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being excessive, is subject to
reduction. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages. 51 Considering its purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to unjustly enrich a
prevailing party. 52 In our view, an award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in the present case qualifies the test of reasonableness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION of the amount awarded as exemplary damages. According, petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private respondent the sum of
P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damage and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.