PERPETUA ABUAN, ET AL. v.

EUSTAQUIO S. GARCIA, ET AL.

FACTS:
On August 7, 1953, petitioners Perpetua
Abuan et al. sold a parcel of rice land to
defendants
Eustaquio Garcia et al. through a Deed of
Absolute Sale. A TCT was issued to
defendants.
Later, petitioners filed an action to recover
the land, alleging the sale was tainted with
fraud and
was without consideration. Reaching an
amicable settlement, the parties entered into
an
"Agreement" dated February 28, 1955,
under which defendants paid P500 as partial
payment of the purchase price of the land,
and promised to pay the balance of P1,500
on or before April 30,
1955, with a grace period of 30 days. The
Agreement also stated that it "shall
supersede all
previous agreements or contracts heretofore
entered into..."
Plaintiffs instituted the present action on
March 4, 1960. Defendants moved to
dismiss, on the
ground that plaintiffs' right of action was
already barred, because the five-year
redemption period had already expired.
Section 119 of the Public Land Law
provides:
o Every conveyance of land
acquired under the free patient or
homestead provisions, when proper,
shall be subject to re-purchase by
the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, for a period of five years from
the date of conveyance.
Plaintiffs argue that the period should be
counted from the date of full payment (May
1965) since it was on this date that the
contract was consummated.
CFI Nueva Vizcaya dismissed the
complaint, fixing the starting date as
February 28, 1955, when the Agreement
was entered into. CA certified the case to
SC.
SC: "Conveyance" means transfer of

ownership; it means the date when the title

to the land is transferred from one person to
another. The 5-year period should, therefore,
be reckoned with from the date that
defendants acquired ownership.
When did defendants legally acquire
ownership of the land?
Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale (August 7, 1953). Dismissal affirmed.
HELD:
Under Art. 1498, When the sale is made
through a public instrument, as in this case,
the execution thereof shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the thing which is the object
of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot be clearly
inferred. This manner of delivery is common
to personal as well as real property. It is
clear, therefore, that defendants acquired
ownership to the land in question upon the
execution of the Deed of Absolute on August
7, 1953. The Agreement of February 28,
1955, only superseded the deed as to the
terms and conditions of payment. The
Agreement did not operate to revest the
ownership of the land in the plaintiffs.
Assuming arguendo that the Deed is null
and void as petitioners allege, we can
consider the
date of the Agreement at the latest, as the
time within which ownership is vested in the
defendants. While it is a private instrument
the execution of which could not be
construed as constructive delivery under Art.
1498, Art. 1496 explicitly provides that
ownership of the thing sold is acquired by
the vendee from the moment it is delivered
to him "in any other manner signifying an
agreement that the possession is transferred
from the vendor to the vendee." The
intention to give possession (and ownership)
is manifest in the Agreement, especially
considering the following circumstances: (1)
the payment of part of the purchase price,
there being no stipulation in the agreement
that ownership will not vest in the vendees
until full payment of the price; and (2) the
fact that the agreement was entered into in
consideration of plaintiffs' desistance, as in
fact they did desist, in prosecuting their
reivindicatory action, thereby leaving the
property in the hands of the then and now
defendants as owners thereof,

necessarily. This was delivery brevi manu

permissible under Articles 1499 and 1501 of
the New Civil Code. In the absence of an
express stipulation to the contrary, the
payment of the price is not a condition
precedent to the transfer of ownership,
which passes by delivery of the thing to the
buyer.
PERFECTO DY, JR vs. CA
FACTS:
Wilfredo Dy bought a truck and tractor from
Libra Finance Corporation. Both truck and
tractor was also mortgage to Libra as
security for a loan and as such, they took
possession of it. Brother of Wilfredo,
Perfecto Dy and sister Carol Dy-Seno
requested Libra that they be allowed to buy
the property and assume the mortgage debt.
Libra agreed to the request.
Meanwhile, a collection suit was filed
against Wilfredo Dy by Gelac Trading Inc.
On the strength of a writ of execution, the
sheriff was able to obtain the tractor on the
premises of Libra. It was sold in a public
auction in which Gelac Trading was the lone
bidder. Gelac subsequently sold it to one of
their stockholders.
The respondents claim that at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale, no
constructive delivery was effected since the
consummation of the sale depended upon
the clearance and encashment of the check
which was issued in payment of the subject
tractor
ISSUE:
WON the William Dy is still the owner of the
tractor when it was obtained through the writ
of execution.
HELD:
The tractor was not anymore in possession
of William Dy when it was obtained by the
sheriff because he already sold it to his
brother.
William Dy has the right to sell his property
even though it was mortgage because in a
mortgage, the mortgagor doesnt part with
the ownership over the property. He is
allowed to sell the property as long as there

is consent from the mortgagee such as in

this case. But even if there is no consent
given, the sale would still be valid without
prejudice to the criminal action against the
mortgagor.
When William Dy sold the tractor, he
already transferred the ownership of it
because NCC states that the ownership of
the thing sold is acquired by the vendee
from the moment it is delivered to him or in
any other manner signing an agreement that
the possession is transferred from the
vendor to the vendee. In the instant case,
actual delivery of the subject tractor could
not be made but there was constructive
delivery already upon the execution of a
public instrument, which in this case is a
deed of sale.
The payment of the check was actually
intended to extinguish the mortgage
obligation.
INDUSTRIAL TEXTILE MANUFACTURING
COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner, vs. LPJ ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent LPJ Enterprises, Inc.
had a contract to supply 300,000 bags of
cement per year to Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corporation (Atlas
for short), a member of the Soriano Group of
Companies. The cement was delivered
packed in kraft paper bags. Sometime in
October, 1970, Cesar Campos, a VicePresident of petitioner Industrial Textile
Manufacturing Company of the Philippines
(or Itemcop, for brevity), asked Lauro
Panganiban, Jr., President of respondent
corporation, if he would like to cooperate in
an experiment to develop plastic cement
bags. Panganiban agreed because Itemcop
is a sister corporation of Atlas, respondent's
major client. A few weeks later, Panganiban
accompanied Paulino Ugarte, another VicePresident of Itemcop, to the factory of
respondent's supplier, Luzon Cement
Corporation in Norzagaray, Bulacan, to test
fifty (50) pieces of plastic cement bags. The
experiment, however, was unsuccessful.
Cement dust oozed out under pressure
through the small holes of the woven plastic
bags and the loading platform was filled with

dust. The second batch of plastic bags

subjected to trial was likewise a failure.
Although the weaving of the plastic bags
was already tightened, cement dust still
spilled through the gaps. Finally, with three
hundred (300) "improved bags", the
seepage was substantially reduced. Ugarte
then asked Panganiban to send 180 bags of
cement to Atlas via commercial shipping.
Campos, Ugarte, and two other officials of
petitioner company followed the 180 bags to
the plant of Atlas in Cebu where they
professed satisfaction at the performance of
their own plastic bags. Campos sent
Panganiban a letter proclaiming dramatic
results in the experiment. Consequently,
Panganiban agreed to use the plastic
cement bags. Four purchase orders were
thereafter issued.
Petitioner delivered the orders consecutively
on January 12, February 17, March 19, and
April 17, 1971. Respondent, on the other
hand, remitted the amounts of P1,640.00,
P2,480.00. and P13,230.00 on March 31,
April 31, and May 3, 1971 respectively,
thereby leaving a balance of P84,123.80. No
other payments were made, thus prompting
A. Soriano y Cia of petitioner's Legal
Department to send demand letters to
respondent corporation. Reiterations thereof
were later sent by petitioner's counsel. A
collection suit was filed on April 11, 1973
when the demands remained unheeded.
At the trial on the merits, respondent
admitted its liability for the 53,800
polypropylene lime bags covered by the first
purchase order. With respect to the second,
third, and fourth purchase orders,
respondent, however, denied full
responsibility therefor. Respondent said that
it will pay, as it did pay for, only the 15,000
plastic bags it actually used in packing
cement. As for the remaining 47,000 bags,
the workers of Luzon Cement strongly
objected to the use thereof due to the
serious health hazards posed by the
continued seepage of cement dust.
The trial court rendered its decision
sentencing the defendant to pay the sum of
P84,123.80 with l2% interest per annum
from May, 1971 plus 15% of the total
obligation as attorney's fees, and the costs.
Respondent corporation's appeal was
upheld by the appellate court when it
reversed the trial court's decision and

dismissed the case with costs against

petitioner.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent may be
held liable for the 47,000 plastic bags which
were not actually used for packing cement
as originally intended.
HELD: The conditions which allegedly
govern the transaction according to
respondent may not be considered. The trial
court correctly observed that such conditions
should have been distinctly specified in the
purchase orders and respondent's failure to
do so is fatal to its cause. The Court found
that Article 1502 of the Civil Code, invoked
by both parties herein, has no application at
all to this case. The provision in the Uniform
Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code from which Article 1502 was taken,
clearly requires an express written
agreement to make a sales contract either a
"sale or return" or a "sale on approval". Parol
or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted
for the purpose of showing that an invoice or
bill of sale that was complete in every aspect
and purporting to embody a sale without
condition or restriction constituted a contract
of sale or return. If the purchaser desired to
incorporate a stipulation securing to him the
right of return, he should have done so at
the time the contract was made. On the
other hand, the buyer cannot accept part
and reject the rest of the goods since this
falls outside the normal intent of the parties
in the "on approval" situation.
Therefore, the transaction between
respondent and petitioner constituted an
absolute sale. Accordingly, respondent is
liable for the plastic bags delivered to it by
petitioner.
Jesus Teran v. Francisca Villanueva,
Viuda De Riosa, Et Al.
G.R. No. L-34697, March 26, 1932
Villamor, J.:
FACTS: On October 6, 1928, the parties in
this case executed the deed of sale,
whereby the defendants sold to the plaintiff
for P4,000 the parcel of land therein
described as containing an area of 34
hectares, 52 ares, and 43 centares.
The plaintiff brought this action for rescission

of the contract, with damages, upon

discovering that the parcel of land contained
only about then hectares.
The trial court found no evidence of bad faith
on the part of the defendants, and we agree
with this finding. This land, with the same
area stated in the contract, was inherited by
the defendants from their late father,
Mariano Villanueva; and the same area
appears in the tax declaration given to the
plaintiff by an agent of the defendants,
named Rafael Villanueva. The latter,
accompanied by the plaintiff, inspected the
land. Villanueva pointed out some of the
boundaries, as they did not go over all of
them. Without further investigating the area
of the land, the plaintiff agreed to purchase it
for the sum of four thousand pesos, paying
the amount and taking possession thereof.
The plaintiff alleges that after the 1928
harvest he discovered that the boundaries
pointed out to him by Rafael Villanueva were
not the real ones, and, in order to ascertain
the exact area of the land, he went to the
cadastral office in Malinao and got a sketch
of the property which shows that the land in
question contains only ten hectares, and not
thirty-four, as appears in the deed of sale.
In view of these facts, the plaintiff now seeks
to rescind the contract on the ground that
the property contains a smaller area than
that stated in the deed of sale. Evidently this
is a sale of real estate with area and
boundaries given, for a lump sum and not so
much per unit of measure, provided for in
article 1471 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract may be
rescinded.
HELD: No. Whenever a certain real estate is
sold for a lump sum the rule in law is that
there shall be no increase or decrease in
price even if the area or extent is found to be
more or less than that stated in the contract;
but, if the vendor cannot deliver to the
vendee all that is included within the
boundaries stated in the contract the latter
has the option either to reduce the price in
proportion to the deficiency, or to set aside
the contract. In this case the Civil Code
presumes that the purchaser had in mind a
determined piece of land, and that he
ascertained its area and quality before the

contract was perfected. If he did not do so,

or it, having done so, he made no objection
and consented to the transaction, he can
blame no one but himself; and, because it is
presumed that he intended to buy a
determined object, any proof of
misrepresentation will not avail him, neither
will it vitiate the transaction.
Furthermore, in Azarraga v. Gay (52 Phil.,
599), it was held that When the purchaser
proceeds to make investigations by himself,
and the vendor does nothing to prevent such
investigation from being as complete as the
former might made false representations to
him. One who contracts for the purchase of
real estate is reliance on the representations
and statements of the vendor as to its
character and value, but after he has visited
and examined it for himself, and has had the
means and opportunity of verifying such
statements, cannot avoid the contract on the
ground that they were false or exaggerate.
The plaintiff had ample opportunity to
investigate the conditions of the land he was
purchasing, without the defendant's doing
anything to prevent him from making as
many inquiries as he deemed expedient, for
which reason he cannot now allege that the
vendors made false representations.
In the present case the parties did not
consider the area as an essential element of
the contract. There is no evidence of record
that the parties fixed the price at so much
per hectare. The contract is valid and
binding upon the parties.
Consolidated Rural Bank (Cagayan
Valley), Inc., v. Court of Appeals and
Heirs of Teodoro Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 132161. January 17, 2005
Tinga, J.:
FACTS: Rizal, Anselmo, Gregorio, Filomeno
and Domingo, all surnamed Madrid
(hereafter the Madrid brothers), were the
registered owners of Lot No. 7036-A of plan
Psd-10188, Cadastral Survey 211, situated
in San Mateo, Isabela.
On 23 and 24 October 1956, Lot No. 7036-A
was subdivided into several lots. On 15
August 1957, Rizal Madrid sold part of his

share identified to Aleja Gamiao and Felisa

Dayag to which his brothers Anselmo,
Gregorio, Filomeno and Domingo offered no
objection. The deed of sale was not
registered with the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Isabela. However, Gamiao and
Dayag declared the property for taxation
purposes in their names on March 1964
under Tax Declaration No. 7981.
On 28 May 1964, Gamiao and Dayag sold
the southern half to Teodoro dela Cruz, and
the northern half to Restituto Hernandez.
Thereupon, Teodoro dela Cruz and Restituto
Hernandez took possession of and
cultivated the portions of the property
respectively sold to them.
Later, on 28 December 1986, Restituto
Hernandez donated the northern half to his
daughter, Evangeline Hernandez-del
Rosario. The children of Teodoro dela
Cruz continued possession of the southern
half after their fathers death on 7 June
1970.
In a Deed of Sale dated 15 June 1976, the
Madrid brothers conveyed all their rights and
interests over Lot No. 7036-A-7 to Pacifico
Marquez. The deed of sale was registered
with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Isabela on 2 March 1982.
Subsequently, Marquez subdivided Lot No.
7036-A-7 into eight (8) lots for which TCT
Nos. T-149375 to T-149382 were issued to
him on 29 March 1984. On the same date,
Marquez and his spouse, Mercedita
Mariana, mortgaged Lots Nos. 7036-A-7-A
to 7036-A-7-D to the Consolidated Rural
Bank, Inc. of Cagayan Valley (hereafter,
CRB) to secure a loan of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). These
deeds of real estate mortgage were
registered with the Office of the Register of
Deeds on 2 April 1984.On 6 February 1985,
Marquez mortgaged Lot No. 7036-A-7-E
likewise to the Rural Bank of Cauayan
(RBC) to secure a loan of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00). As Marquez defaulted
in the payment of his loan, CRB caused the
foreclosure of the mortgages in its favor and
the lots were sold to it as the highest bidder
on 25 April 1986.
On 31 October 1985, Marquez sold Lot No.

7036-A-7-G to Romeo Calixto (Calixto). The

Heirs-now respondents herein-represented
by Edronel dela Cruz, filed a case for
reconveyance and damages the southern
portion of Lot No. 7036-A (hereafter, the
subject property) against Marquez, Calixto,
RBC and CRB in December 1986.
Evangeline del Rosario, the successor-ininterest of Restituto Hernandez, filed with
leave of court a Complaint in Intervention
wherein she claimed the northern portion of
Lot No. 7036-A-7.
In the Answer to the Amended Complaint,
Marquez, as defendant, alleged that apart
from being the first registrant, he was a
buyer in good faith and for value. He also
argued that the sale executed by Rizal
Madrid to Gamiao and Dayag was not
binding upon him, it being unregistered. For
his part, Calixto manifested that he had no
interest in the subject property as he ceased
to be the owner thereof, the same having
been reacquired by defendant Marquez.
CRB, as defendant, and co-defendant RBC
insisted that they were mortgagees in good
faith and that they had the right to rely on
the titles of Marquez which were free from
any lien or encumbrance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on double
sale is applicable in the case.
HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. Like
the lower court, the appellate court resolved
the present controversy by applying the rule
on double sale provided in Article 1544 of
the Civil Code. They, however, arrived at
different conclusions. The RTC made CRB
and the other defendants win, while the
Court of Appeals decided the case in favor
of the Heirs.
The provision is not applicable in the present
case. It contemplates a case of double or
multiple sales by a single vendor. More
specifically, it covers a situation where a
single vendor sold one and the same
immovable property to two or more buyers.
According to a noted civil law author, it is
necessary that the conveyance must have
been made by a party who has an existing
right in the thing and the power to dispose of
it. It cannot be invoked where the two

different contracts of sale are made by two

different persons, one of them not being the
owner of the property sold. And even if the
sale was made by the same person, if the
second sale was made when such person
was no longer the owner of the property,
because it had been acquired by the first
purchaser in full dominion, the second
purchaser cannot acquire any right.
In the case at bar, the subject property was
not transferred to several purchasers by a
single vendor. In the first deed of sale, the
vendors were Gamiao and Dayag whose
right to the subject property originated from
their acquisition thereof from Rizal Madrid
with the conformity of all the other Madrid
brothers in 1957, followed by their
declaration of the property in its entirety for
taxation purposes in their names. On the
other hand, the vendors in the other or later
deed were the Madrid brothers but at that
time they were no longer the owners since
they had long before disposed of the
property in favor of Gamiao and Dayag.
In a situation where not all the requisites are
present which would warrant the application
of Art. 1544, the principle of prior tempore,
potior jure or simply he who is first in time is
preferred in right, should apply. The only
essential requisite of this rule is priority in
time; in other words, the only one who can
invoke this is the first vendee. Undisputedly,
he is a purchaser in good faith because at
the time he bought the real property, there
was still no sale to a second vendee. In the
instant case, the sale to the Heirs by
Gamiao and Dayag, who first bought it from
Rizal Madrid, was anterior to the sale by the
Madrid brothers to Marquez. The Heirs also
had possessed the subject property first in
time. Thus, applying the principle, the Heirs,
without a scintilla of doubt, have a superior
right to the subject property.
Moreover, it is an established principle that
no one can give what one does not have
nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one
can sell only what one owns or is authorized
to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more
than what the seller can transfer legally. In
this case, since the Madrid brothers were no
longer the owners of the subject property at
the time of the sale to Marquez, the latter did
not acquire any right to it.

In any event, assuming arguendo that Article

1544 applies to the present case, the claim
of Marquez still cannot prevail over the right
of the Heirs since according to the evidence
he was not a purchaser and registrant in
good faith.
In the instant case, the actions of Marquez
have not satisfied the requirement of good
faith from the time of the purchase of the
subject property to the time of registration.
Found by the Court of Appeals, Marquez
knew at the time of the sale that the subject
property was being claimed or taken by the
Heirs. This was a detail which could indicate
a defect in the vendors title which he failed
to inquire into.
Martinez v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123547; 21 May 2001
Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz
and his sister Manuela De la Paz entered
into an oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr.
Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest
of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of Lot No.
1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in
Cabanatuan City for the sum of P15,000.00.
At the time of the sale, the lot was still
registered in the name of Claudia De la Paz,
mother of private respondents, although the
latter had already sold it to private
respondent Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated. He was
assured by them that the lot belonged to
Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that
petitioner would give a downpayment of
P3,000.00 to private respondents De la Paz
and that the balance would be payable by
installment. After giving the
P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started
the construction of a house on the lot and
began paying the real estate taxes on said
property.
In the meantime, in a Deed of. Absolute Sale
with Right to Repurchase, private
respondents De la Paz sold three lots with
right to repurchase the same within one year
to private respondents spouses Reynaldo
and Susan Veneracion for the sum of
P150,000.00. One of the lots sold was the

lot previously sold to petitioner. Petitioner

discovered that the lot he was occupying
with his family had been sold to the spouses
Veneracion after receiving a letter from
private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion
claiming ownership of the land and
demanding that they vacate the property
and remove their improvements
thereon. Petitioner, in turn, demanded
through counsel the execution of the deed of
sale from private respondents De la Paz and
informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was
the owner of the property as he had
previously purchased the same from private
respondents De la Paz.
ISSUE: Can the second purchaser in a case
of double sales of immovable property
(under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code)
claim the presence of good faith despite the
fact that he had previously seen the
construction of a house on the same lot?
HELD: NO. A purchaser who is aware of
facts which should put a reasonable man
upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and
later claim that he acted in good faith. The
fact that there are persons, other than the
vendors, in actual possession of the
disputed lot should have put the purchaser
on inquiry as to the nature of the builders
right over the property. Mere reliance on the
assurance of a third person regarding the
assertion that the lot had not been
previously sold to another purchaser does
not meet the standard of good faith required
under Article 1544.
Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 171008; 13 September 2007
Tinga, J.:
FACTS: On 1992, Cattleya Land
(Respondent) intended to buy the parcels of
land owned by Spouses Tecson. However,
only 6 out of 9 lots were annotated since 3
of those are subject to attachment.
On 1995, Fudot (Petitioner) presented for
registration before the Register of Deeds the
owners copy of the title of the subject
property, together with the deed of sale
purportedly executed by the Tecsons in
favor of petitioner on 19 December
1986. Respondent opposed the petitioners

application but the ROD had already

registered the Deed of Sale in favor of
Fudot.
Respondent filed its Complaint for Quieting
Of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership,
Cancellation Of Title With Damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.
Asuncion filed a complaint-in-intervention,
claiming that she never signed any deed of
sale covering any part of their conjugal
property in favor of petitioner and that her
husband had an amorous relationship with
the petitioner.
On 31 October 2001, the trial court
rendered its decision. (i) quieting the title or
ownership of the subject land in favor of
respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale
between petitioner and spouses Tecson
invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the
subject land in favor of respondent; (iv)
dismissing respondents claim for damages
against the Register of Deeds for
insufficiency of evidence; (v) dismissing
Asuncions claim for damages against
petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi)
dismissing petitioners counterclaim for lack
of the required preponderance of evidence.
[12]

According to the trial court,

respondent had recorded in good faith the
deed of sale in its favor ahead of petitioner.
Moreover, based on Asuncions convincing
and unrebutted testimony, the trial
court concluded that the purported
signature of Asuncion in the deed of sale in
favor of petitioner was forged,
thereby rendering the sale void.
ISSUE: Can there be a case of double sales
under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code if
the first purchasers alleged right is based
on a Deed of Sale that was later on declared
by the trial a forgery?
HELD: NO. Despite the fact that one deed
of sale was registered ahead of the other,
Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply
where said deed is found to be a forgery, the
result of this being that the right of the other
vendee should prevail. Art. 1544 of the Civil
Code, which provides the rule on double
sale, applies only to a situation where the
same property is validly sold to different

vendees. The act of registration does not

validate an otherwise void contract.
Registration is a mere ministerial act by
which a deed, contract, or instrument is
sought to be inscribed in the records of the
Office of the Register of Deeds and
annotated at the back of the certificate of
title covering the land subject of the deed,
contract, or instrument. While it operates as
a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument

to others, it does not add to its validity nor

converts an invalid instrument into a valid
one as between the parties, nor amounts to
a declaration by the state that the instrument
is a valid and subsisting interest in the land.
The registration of a void deed is not an
impediment to a declaration by the courts of
its invalidity.