REVIEW REPORT

ON
SOFA STORE FIRE
CHARLESTON, S.C.
(JUNE 18, 2007)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT3

2.

LAYOUT/ DESIGN DETAIL OF THE BUILDING.........................4

3.

GROWTH AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRE.6

4. SOME FINDINGS OF THE FIRE SPREAD MECHANISM.....6

5. FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES OF THE BUILDING AND ITS DEFICIENCES7

6. FIRE SERVICE RESPONSE ......8

7. RECOMMENDATIONS SUGGESTED.9

8.

CONCLUSIONS.10

9.

REFERENCES10

DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT:-

A fire incident took place in a Sofa Super Store, located at 1807 Savannah Highway, in
Charleston, South Carolina (S.C.) on 18th of June 2017 at 6:46 p.m. EST. From an unknown
source, a fire had ignited in a pile of packing material and discarded furniture outside an
enclosed docking area and spread from the rear of the building, quickly into interior of
loading dock, thereby to retail showroom, and then into warehouse spaces. Initially, it is
observed that during initial stages of the fire, because the latter two rooms were ventilation
controlled (not enough oxygen available for combustion of material), large volumes of
pyrolyzed fuel was produced, in the form of smoke and combustible gases. Through the
interstitial space between the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main room, large
volumes of the unburned fuel (in the form of smoke and combustible gases) started seeping
into the main room. Because of this, the top layer of the room was filled with this hot smoke
layer. By this time, the smoke was not visible to the fire fighters. This smoke layer, then
started burning additional fuel in the rear side of main showroom. By this time, the fire was
visible to the fire fighters.
However, at the outside end of the loading dock area, the fire is still under-ventilated (oxygen
was not sufficient for the fuel to burn). But the hot gas layer in the main showroom started
getting dense at the ceiling, because the fire in the rear of the main showroom pumped more
unburned fuel. It is when the front windows of the main showroom broke, additional oxygen
supply was available to the rear end of the main showroom. This was responsible rapid heat
release rate for the fire, and it burned the fuel below the drop ceiling. Intense fire created
which swept into the east and west showrooms. Huge amount of fuel load, in the form of
furniture was available, because of which sustained burning was witnessed in the main room,
which caused the collapse of portion of the roof in the main showroom. From then on, the
furniture and merchandise continued to burn for about 140 minutes until the fire
extinguished. Nine firefighters of the Charleston Fire Department died, fighting the fire.
A study was conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a nonregulatory agency from the U.S Department of Commerce, to understand the technical details
of the rapid cause of fire growth. The main aim and purpose was to gain knowledge from the
studies to help improve safety measures through recommended changes in the codes,
standards and practices.
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LAYOUT DESIGN/DETAIL OF THE BUILDING :-

The dimensions of each of the spaces were calculated by the NIST team, while on the
post-fire scene.
MAIN SHOWROOM :The main showroom was 38.5 m wide and 39.1 m deep with an additional section of 13.5
m wide and 6.1 m deep. As seen in the figure, three fire doors were provided on either
side of main showroom, which were used for commute as well as move the furniture from
warehouse, into retail showrooms. One additional fire door was provided at the southwest
corner of the main showroom that connected to the warehouse. One non-fire roll up door
was provided that provided access to the docking area. It was estimated that the furniture
and the merchandise in the main showroom occupied about 75% of its area (which
indicates that fuel load is very high). Outer walls of the main showroom are built by
concrete blocks and these walls extended above on top of composite roof. The composite
roof is supported by light weight trusses along east-west direction. The top of steel trusses
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were at 4.3m (14 ft) from the ground floor and the drop ceiling was provided at 2.7m (9
ft) from ground level. All the interior walls have been observed to have 0.5 in. thick
gypsum wallboard. Behind the rear of main showroom, where offices are present, the
gypsum wallboard is attached to the sheet metal and wooden studs. Also, it is observed
that the rear side of the office and support areas were filled with masonry bricks.
EAST AND WEST RETAIL SHOWROOMS:West showroom was 18.2 m wide by 35.5 m deep, whereas East showroom was 18.2 m
wide by 35.8 m deep. As per the configuration, east and west showrooms are more or less
similar, except that west showroom has a single partition wall and a single exit door,
whereas east showroom has two partition walls and two exits. The interior of the walls
was covered with 0.5-inch-thick gypsum wallboard with a combination of sheet metal and
wooden studs. Each of these walls extended above 0.3m from the drop ceiling, wherein
the Air handling units, cooling ducts and other cabling is laid through. The outermost wall
of either west showroom and east showroom (towards outside) were formed with steel
framed wall with foam panels/sheathing.
LOADING DOCK AND WAREHOUSE:Loading dock area was 12.6 m wide by 15.4 m deep. Loading dock was built with wood
framing, a wooden deck/floor and sheet metal siding and roof. The important thing to
notice is, gallon cans of organic solvents such as acetone, naphtha and lacquer thinner are
stored in this room. It has four doors, two of which are used for internal man movement/
furniture and two doors (sliding or barn as they call) open up to west side for trucks to
load/unload the material. One thing to note is none of the doors were fire-rated. Load
docking walls included wood studs with interior gypsum wall board of 0.5 in. thick
The high bay warehouse was 36.9 m wide by 39.8 m deep. It was an open clear structure
concrete floor and sheet metal roofing. The roofing was supported by the Z-shape steel
channel, which was in-turn supported by the I-beam joists, bolted to the steel columns.
However the north wall of warehouse is provided with metal sheeting, but there was no
insulation provided.
Apart from the above, there were three rooms, two of which are referred to as Paint
repair room (9.7m x 7.1m) and Wood repair room (10m x 7.6m), which also had
wooden framing, and sheet metal walls and roofing. The other one is a holding area
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(2.4m wide x 6.1m long). This was the area which was in close proximity to docking area,
and was damaged severely.

FIRE GROWTH AND MECHANISM OF SPREAD :The fire began in trash/ in a pile of packing material and discarded furniture outside the
loading dock. From there, it spread into merchandise holding area to the rear of main
showroom, then to the front of main showroom, and then to west and east showroom. At
the same time, from the holding area, through the metal sheet wall, it entered into the
warehouse.
Six firefighters got trapped in main showroom and three firefighters in the west
showroom. Although the fire was responsible for weakening of light weight steel trusses,
which caused partial collapse of the roof, the main reason for the death of firefighters was
the inhalation of toxic gases during the fire, and thermal burns.

SOME FINDINGS WITH REGARD TO FIRE SPREAD MECHANISMS:(i)

Loading Dock :A large amount of fuel load (furniture for delivery, liquid hydrocarbon solvents,
flooring) equivalent to 130 GJ, coupled with an open floor plan was responsible
for rapid fire growth. Similarly, metal sheet walls that shared with loading dock

were responsible for spreading of fire into warehouse.

The door was open and non-fire-activated, which allowed smoke and flames into

the area.
The heat release rate of fire was low due to lack of air, but enough amount of fuel
load gave rise to partially pyrolyzed fuel in the form of smoke and combustible

(ii)

was ignited by thermal radiation.

The smoke and flames propagated to the main showroom through the drop ceiling.
Showrooms:The fire spread through the rear of main showroom to front side, and then to west

and east showrooms.

Significantly huge amount of fuel (~ 480 GJ) of fuel load was available, which

(iii)

gases.
Holding Area :Smoke and flames entered to non-fire-activated door; furniture and merchandise

gave rise to the hot gas layer near the drop ceiling. Thermal radiation effect was

increasing. The fire was under-ventilated during this period.

Front windows were broken/ vented by Fire department for improving visibility,

which caused feeding of oxygen to the fire.

Tremendous increase in heat release rate caused the fatalities of firefighters, and
the part of roof above the main showroom collapsed; the roof in the west

(iv)

showroom deformed permanently, undergoing sagging.

Warehouse :Highest amount of fuel load (~840 GJ) was available, along with open floor plan

was responsible for the fire spread.

Increased heat from sustained burning caused the roof supports to weaken and

resulted in the collapse of roof and walls

No one entered into the warehouse to attempt to extinguish the flames, so no
casualties were observed.

FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES OF THE BUILDING: THEIR DEFICIENCIES:-

From the observation, it is found that, Lack of automatic sprinklers and Lack of effective
compartmentalization were the direct contributors for rapid fire growth in the showrooms and
warehouse. Furthermore, following are the inferences:

The fire sprinklers were not at all installed in the showrooms and warehouses. In
fact, post fire incident, simulations are run to check the survivability conditions in
the store. It showed that, if sprinklers had been installed, the fire would have been

suppressed to a larger extent.

Also, large open floor areas were an indication of poor compartmentalization.

Interior walls provided were not sufficient.

Only three of the seven fire-rated-doors activated and fully closed, while others
have failed to do so. The instrumentation failure was one more notable point.
The door between loading dock and holding area was not a fire-rated door which

was a major drawback and lead to a catastrophe.

The metal sheet walls (between warehouse and the loading dock and the south

wall of west showroom) were not at all insulated, leading to easy spread of fire.
Also, the store did not have an alarm system, smoke detectors. However, five
portable extinguishers were installed, two of which were used for extinguishing
loading dock fire.

The inferences regarding the codes and standards were as follows:

Strict adherence to 2006 model building and fire codes recommended the use of

sprinkler system for both showrooms as well as warehouse.

With respect to the area of the showrooms and warehouse, they exceed the
allowable unsprinklered areas as specified by 1991/1994 SBC and IBC 2006 for

both mercantile and storage occupancies

1991 SPFC and 2006 IFC specify the requirement of automatic sprinkler system
for the warehouse based on high-piled storage. As per 1991 SPFC and 2006 IFC,
the amount of liquid hydrocarbons stored didnt exceed the allowable limit.

FIRE SERVICE RESPONSE :-

The Fire Service Department arrived at the location, in less than 4 minutes after the 911
dispatch received the report of exterior trash fire behind the Store. The fire in the loading
dock area was addressed. Three minutes after the arrival, the firefighters were confirmed of
the fire inside the showrooms, the first one witnessed being the west side showroom. Within
5 minutes of arrival, the Department began suppressing the fire in loading dock area. In about
10 minutes, the fire hydrant line was established to exterior loading dock area and in 16
minutes, a fire hydrant line to the front of the store was established.
Within 16 to 19 minutes, radio communication indicated that firefighters might have lost in
the store. So the Fire Chief deployed a team to rescue the trapped firefighters in the store
between 16 to 21 minutes. Fire department vented windows in about 24 minutes after arrival,
during which the fire intensified and burning continued and at about 40 minutes, roof over
west side of main showroom. Material in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn
upto 140 minutes, until the fire extinguished.

RECOMMENDATIONS :Following are the recommendations suggested by the NIST in view of the Charleston S.C.
Fire disaster :

All the state and local jurisdictions must adopt a building and fire code covering the

new and existing high-fuel load mercantile occupancies

All the state and local jurisdictions must implement aggressive and effective fire
inspections, which address all aspects of building and fire codes, adequate
documentation of building permits and alterations, means of fire protection and fire
detection systems and detailed record keeping, frequency of rigorous inspections
including auditing procedures, guidelines for remedial measures when the inspections

identify deviations from codal provisions.

All fire inspectors and building plan examiners must be professionally qualified to a

national standard such as NFPA

Aggressive enforcement of sprinkler systems for all new commercial retail furniture

stores regardless of the size

Develop comprehensive risk management plans according to the level of occupational
hazards involved, resource allocation according to identified risk, developing

operating procedures that attended specified risks.

Develop guidelines for implementation of adequate ventilation during a fire.
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Research on furniture flame spread, improving fire barriers must be conducted to

understand the behavior of fire spread and to mitigate the spread of fire.

CONCLUSIONS:Fire hazards are very random and unpredictable in nature. Though it is not possible to
eradicate the incidence of fire completely, taking preventive measures will help in mitigating
the losses to property, life. Use of proper materials which are durable to fire exposure and at
the same time, economical and feasible will help in controlling the effect of fire. Creating
awareness among the engineers, researchers is also an important aspect to be taken into
consideration. Understanding of effect of fire on behavior on structural elements will help
architects, engineers to a consensus regarding the materials to be used, codes and standards to
be followed, safety measures to be adopted within the financial constraints.

REFERENCES :1.

Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire - South Carolina, June 18, 2007,
NIST, U.S. Department of Commerce

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